Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Eric Drake, Petitioner v. Texas

.1. •

In The

Supreme Court of tip Wniteb States

-----------------

Eric Drake,

FILED

j

NOV 10 2025

j

|

Petitioner

The State of Texas,

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Eric Drake

Pro-Se

10455 North Central Expressway

Suite 109

Dallas, Texas 75231

912-281-7100

directdrakeemail@gmail.com

November 10, 2025

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the State’s refusal to allow out of state travel for

life-saving medical treatment to a defendant on deferred probation

violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Whether the Second Amendment prohibit a state from restricting

a defendant on deferred probation from possession of firearms to protect

his life and property since a deferred adjudication is not a conviction.

Whether it violates the Due Process Clause under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments if a judge lacked subject-matter jurisdiction

entered judgments and sign orders in a state criminal matter.

i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner Eric Drake was the Relator below. The Respondent is the

State of Texas.

RELATED CASES

In re Eric Drake, No. WR-95,163-03, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Mandamus denied. (August 27, 2025)

In re Eric Drake, No. 05-25-00651-CR, No. 05-25-00652-CR, Fifth Court

of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. Mandamus denied. (June 11, 2025)

In re Eric Drake, No. 05-25-00542-CR, No. 05-25-00543-CR, Fifth Court

of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. Mandamus denied. (May 12, 2025)

In re Eric Drake, No. 05-25-00360-CR, No. 05-25-00361-CR Fifth Court

of Appeals, Dallas, Texas. Mandamus denied. (May 2, 2025), Rehearing denied.

(May 5, 2025)

State of Texas v. Eric Von Drake, Cause Numbers: F-22-76307 & F-24-

76901, 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED................................................................................i

LIST OF PARTIES...............................................................................................ii

RELATED CASES................................................................................................ ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................................................................... iii

INDEX TO APPENDICES................................................................................... iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES................................................

v

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI.......................................................1

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................................................................. 1

JURISDICTION.....................................................................................................1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED.............2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................................................. 2

A. State Refusal to Address Jurisdictional Defect and Medical Crisis......... 3

B. Ongoing Denial of Access to Medical Care ................................................. 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION.................................................. 5

A. Improper Assignment of Visiting Judge Michael Snipes................... 6

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

The Texas Courts’ Refusal to Address a Fundamental Jurisdictional

Defect is a Violation of Due Process and Conflicts with This Court’s

Precedents on Structural Error............................................................ 8

Due-Process Violations........................................................................... 10

A. Lack of Jurisdiction and Void Judgment.........................................10

B. Previous Mandamus Filings For Speedy Trial and Dismissal....... 11

The Coercion of Petitioner’s Guilty Plea Through Unconstitutional

Confinement And False Arrest Violates Established Federal

Laws......................................................................................................... 13

State’s Final Denial of Medical Access Constitutes Cruel and Unusual

Punishment............................................................................................. 17

All Writs Act and Younger Abstention and

Its Exceptions.......................................................................................... 20

iii

Restriction on Out-of-State Travel Violates the

Right to Travel........................................................................................24

VII. 14th Amend. Guarantees Due-Process Protection

Arbitrary Probation...............................................................................24

VIII. Texas Statutory Auth. Does Not Permit Unproven

Mental Drug Testing.............................................................................. 25

IX.

Restrictions On Firearms For Deferred Probationer’s

A Violation of Second Amendment Rights........................................... 27

X.

Egregious Pattern of Misconduct Warrants Dismissal

With Prejudice......................................................................................... 29

VI.

CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (enclosed as a separate page)

APPENDIX........................................................................................................... 34

APPENDIX OF EXHIBITS

APPENDIX EXHIBIT A: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Order Denying

Rehearing on Mandamus

(August 27, 2025).....................................................

App.la

APPENDIX EXHIBIT B: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Order Denying

Mandamus

(August 27, 2025)......................................................................................... App.2a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT C: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Mandamus

(June 11, 2025)............................................................................................ App.3a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT D: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Mandamus

(May 12, 2025)............................................................................................ App.4a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT E: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Rehearing on Mandamus

(May 5, 2025)

................................................................................. App.5a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT F: Texas Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas), Order

Denying Mandamus

(April 2, 2025)............................................................................................ App.6a

iv

APPENDIX EXHIBIT G: Emergency Room Visit With Diagnosis of

Pneumonia

(Feb. 08, 2025)...........................................................

App.7a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT H: Emergency Room Visit With Diagnosis of

Loss of Sight

(Oct. 03, 2025)....................................................................................... App.8a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT I: Sworn Declaration of Dr. Larry Taub

(August 28, 2025)............................................................................. App.9a-12a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT J: Photograph of Applicant’s leg (DVT)

In the Emergency Room at Baylor Hospital

(March 2025).......................................................................................... App.l3a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT K: Clerk’s Entry of Guilty Plea of

The Applicant Before Judge Michael Snipes

(January 27, 2025)..........................................................

App.l4a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT L: Clerk’s Entry of Sentencing of

The Applicant Before Judge Michael Snipes

(March 27, 2025)........................................................

App.l5a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT M: Order of Deferred Adjudication Signed

By Judge Tammy Kemp of the 204 District Criminal Court

(April 3, 2025)................................................................................... App.l6a-17a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT N: Order of Deferred Adjudication Signed

By Visiting Judge Michael Snipes

(May 8, 2025).................................................................................... App.l8a-19a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT O: Order of Recusal of Judge Tammy Kemp

Of 204 District Criminal Court (Dallas County)

(October 18, 2024).................................................................................... App.20a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT P: Excerpt from October 29, 2024 Transcript

Applicant Objection to Judge Snipes Jurisdiction

(October 29, 2024).................................................................................... App.21a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT Q: Excerpt from October 29, 2024 Transcript

Applicant Objection to Judge Snipes Jurisdiction

(October 29, 2024)......................................................................... App.22a—23a

v

APPENDIX EXHIBIT R: Email From Judge Michael Snipes

Confirming That Appellant Had A Legal Right To View His Emails

(September 3, 2024)..................................................................................... App.24a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT S: Email From Judge Michael Snipes Indicating

He Did Not Have Jurisdiction In Applicant Cases.

(September 13, 2024)................................................................................... App.25a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT T: Judge Wheless Fraudulent Assignment

Order For Visiting Judge Michael Snipes (Backdated Order)

(Dated August 22, 2024 but Actually Signed May 2025)..................... App.26a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT U: Judge Snipes Fraudulent Warrant for

Applicant’s Arrest

(September 16, 2024).........................................................

App.27a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT V: Excerpt from October 14, 2024 Transcript

Judge Michael Snipes Explanation of Why He Issued Warrant

For The Applicant’s Arrest

(October 14, 2024)............................................................................................ App.28a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT W: Assistant District Attorneys Robin

Ogbonna and Shawnkeedra Houston-Martin Bogus, Conspired

Motion To Hold Applicants Bond Insufficient

(September 13, 2024).............................................................................App.29a-30a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT X: Order of Deferred Adjudication That Is

Void Because Judge Tammy Kemp Recused Herself From The

Applicant’s Criminal Case an Judge Michael Snipes Never

Possessed Proper Assignment or Jurisdiction

(April 4, 2025).......................................

App.31a-37a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT Y: October 28, 2024 Transcript Excerpt

Judge Michael Snipes admitting that Judge Tammy Kemp assigned

Him to Applicant’s criminal case

(October 28, 2024)........................................................................................... App.38a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT Z: January 27, 2025 Transcript Excerpt (Plea)

Judge Michael Snipes granting a PR Bond after he forced a guilty

plea from. Applicant. Prior to the guilty plea—no bond was sufficient

(October 28, 2024)........................................................................................... App.39a

vi

APPENDIX EXHIBIT—1: Copy of Dallas County Community

Supervision and Corrections Department Assessment, Treatment

Research Services Report (February 25, 2025)................................... App.40a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT—2: Dr. Chris Heath, M.D., Curriculum Vitae

(September 13, 2024).......................................................................... App.48a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT—3: Dr. Chris Heath, M.D letter regarding the

Petitioner in regards to dependency of illegal drugs, alcohol abuse does

not exist.

(Dated October 23, 2025).......................................................................App.52a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT—4: Fallacies of the Dallas County Community

Supervision and Corrections Department Assessment, Treatment

Research Services Report....................................................................... App.53a

APPENDIX EXHIBIT—5: Sworn Declaration of Dr. Oliver Hunter, M.D.

in regards to the Petitioner urgent need for specialized treatment

(November 3, 2025)................................................................................. App.56a

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).................................... 8

Arkebauer, 751F. Supp. 783 (N.D. Ill. 1990)............................................. 20

Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).................................................................. 19

Boumediene v. Bus, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).................................................... 10

Cases Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)................................... 13

Cf. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)............................................. 31

Duron v. State, 915 S.W.2d920 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996)..............................

8

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)....................................................... 17

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)........................................... 18

Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973).......................................... 25

Gould v. Lombardo, No. 20-5263 (D. Nev. May 28 2020)......................... 20

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)....................................................... 8

Ortiz v. State, (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1992)...........................................

25

National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 26

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992)....................................................... 13

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)....................................................... 25

Rosado v. Alameida, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)...................... 19

Saenz v. Roe, 523 U.S. 989, 1002 n.4 (1998).............................................. 24

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)............................................ 26

Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)............ 26

State v. Frye, 897 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)...............

30

State v. Hill, 558 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018)........................... 30

State v. Terrazas, 962 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)......................... 31

Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1972)........................................ 20

United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981)......30

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONTINUED

PAGE

United States v. Nebel, 856 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Tenn. 1993)..................... 32

United States v. Richey, 399 U.S. 657 (1970).............................................. 31

United States v. Santana, 808 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1992)...................... 30

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 n.5 (1990).................................... 24

West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1978).................................................... 19

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)........................................................... 20

U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitutional Provisions U.S. Const. Amend. VI..........................................13

U.S. Const, amend. VIII................................................................................ 2,16

U.S. Const, amend. XIV..................................................................................... 2

18U.S.C. §242 ................................................................................................ 15

28 USC §§ 1651-1652....................................................................................... 20

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2

■............................. 24

TEXAS STATUTES AND CODES

Statutes 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).............................................................................. 1 ,

Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a.............................................................................................. 2

Tex. Gov. Code § 74.056(a)................................................................................. 2

Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)................................................................................ 12

Tex. Health & Safety Code § 614.001-.026.................................................... 26

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.001 ............................................................. 32

IX

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Eric Drake, respectfully petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to

review the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denying Petitioner’s

petition for a writ of Mandamus is not reported and is included in the

Appendix. (App. la, 2a). The orders of the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals

(Dallas) denying Petitioner’s three separate petitions for a writ of Mandamus

are also not reported. 05-25-00651/0652-CR, Memorandum Opinion Denied/Do

Not Publish (June 11, 2025) (App.3a); 05-25-00542/00543-CR, Memorandum

Opinion Denied/Do Not Publish (May 12, 2025) (App.4a); 05-25-00360/00361-

CR, Memorandum Opinion Denied/Do Not Publish (May 5, 2025) Rehearing

Denied (App.5a) and (App.6a) Denied/Do Not Publish.

JURISDICTION

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest court in the state of

Texas for criminal matters, denied Petitioner’s application for a writ of

Mandamus, which challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court and the

constitutionality of his conviction. That order was entered on August 27, 2025.

This Court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the highest court of

a state under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). This writ is therefore timely and properly

brought before this Honorable Court on an emergency basis.

(1)

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

U.S. Constitution, Amendment VIII Excessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S.

Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, “All persons born or naturalized in

the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or

enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(f)(l)(A): If a motion to recuse is filed,

the judge must either recuse or refer the motion. The judge "shall make no

further orders and shall take no further action in the case" until the recusal

motion is decided.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case presents a catastrophic failure of the Texas judicial system,

where state courts have refused to address a fundamental, non-waivable

jurisdictional defect that renders Petitioner’s conviction and ongoing probation

void. This failure is not a mere procedural misstep but a structural collapse of

due process, allowing a man to be deprived of his liberty by an individual with

no lawful authority to act as a judge in his case. The surprising point of this

case is that the Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) and Texas Court of Criminal

(2)

Appeals not only allowed this injustice to continue but the justices supported

these unconstitutional depraved actions. As a result, Petitioner, Eric Drake,

was unconstitutionally and inhumanly coerced into a guilty plea while

suffering from a severe upper respiratory illness, see App.7a, and now remains

unlawfully restrained and is currently denied access to urgent medical care in

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (App.31a-37a). Even

though Petitioner has not been found guilty of any crime (deferred), he is

prohibited from possessing firearms in violation of the Second Amendment.

Petitioner was charged with stalking in Dallas County, Texas. The case

was fraudulent from its conception. Once local law enforcement was prepared

to manufacture evidence and witnesses against the Petitioner, prosecutors

Shawnkeedra Houston-Martin and Robin Ogbonna conspired with the police

to obtain a conviction. But the state’s evidence was not sufficient to prove its

case against the Petitioner, hence state actors resulted to violating the

Constitution and fraud. However, jurisdictional issues rendered Petitioner’s

plea, sentencing and probation orders void. State actor’s violated Petitioner’s

Constitutional rights to coerce him to plead guilty.

A. State Courts Refusal to Address Jurisdictional Defect and

Petitioner’s Medical Crisis.

Following his plea, Petitioner filed two motions to withdraw his plea and

to vacate the void judgment, all predicated in part on Judge Michael Snipes’

(3)

lack of jurisdiction and the fact Petitioner’s plea was an unconscionable—

brutal act of unConstitutional Coercion.

Petitioner sought relief from the state district court, and the appellate

courts, but to no avail. Petitioner not only raised jurisdictional issues but he

also requested assistance because of his urgent medical condition that, doctors

described as critical. After filing four original petitions in the state appellate

courts, including the highest court in Texas—all sought relief were denied.

B. Ongoing Denial of Access to Medical Care.

As a condition of his void community supervision, Petitioner is forbidden

from traveling outside Dallas County. He suffers with a severe ophthalmologic

disorder that has caused temporary loss of sight on numerous occasions. The

Petitioner’s dentist is outside of Dallas County—yet he is prevented from this

care. The state courts, from the trial level to the highest court of appeals have

refused to grant him permission to travel out-of-state for urgent medical

treatment. This demonstrates deliberate indifference to his serious medical and

dental needs, which would subject him to detention in a state prison if he does

not comply with the void order of probation; even to seek, life-saving help.

While on deferred probation, the State imposed mandatory mental

health counseling for schizophrenia, bipolar, and suicide; which is supervised

by a mental-health state probation officer, with compulsory urine-drug (UIA)

(4)

testing—none of which are medically indicated, nor does the state of Texas

have any evidence or expert witnesses that could support such requirements.

Petitioner has no history of substance abuse or mental impairment.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This case is not about a mere error in trial procedure; it is about the

structural collapse of due process. The Texas courts have allowed a conviction

to stand on the foundation of a void judgment, entered by a judge with not a

shred of legal authority, and secured through unconstitutional coercion. By

refusing to address the foundational issue of jurisdiction, the state’s highest

courts have sanctioned a violation of the most basic principles of law and have

trapped Petitioner in a procedural ‘catch-22’ where he is bound from challeng­

ing his unlawful restraint. State appellate courts have blocked every effort to

nullify the void judgment. Review by this Court is necessary to correct this

grave injustice and to clarify fundamental constitutional protections.

Medical experts have warned Petitioner that his medical condition is

rapidly deteriorating and will certainly precipitate a cerebrovascular accident

(stroke) that could be fatal unless timely, specialized testing and treatment are

obtained. These specialists that the Petitioner wishes to see are located in the

states of Missouri and Indiana, which is well outside the borders of Texas.

Petitioner attempted to obtain assistance on the district court level by

(5)

petitioning the presiding district judge, Audra Riley, to hear his critical

motions because visiting judge, Michael Snipes did not possess jurisdiction.

Judge Riley of Criminal District Court Number 3 in Dallas County refused to

hear the urgent motions, and referred Petitioner back to Judge Snipes even

after explaining to her that he did not possess jurisdiction.

A. The Improper Assignment of Visiting Judge Michael Snipes

Allegedly, Criminal District Judge Tammy Kemp of the 204th District

Court assigned Judge Snipes to the Petitioner’s criminal case. (App.38a, L 715). But as argued extensively in the district court and appellate courts

through Mandamus petitions, Judge Kemp could not legally assign Judge

Snipes because the Petitioner’s recusal was pending against her. The Tex. R.

Civ. P., Rule 18a prevents a judge from acting any further in a proceeding other

than to recuse or refer. Orders issued while a recusal is pending are void.

Judge Kemp has a well-grounded history of unethical conduct, which

also extends to her bailiffs, probation staff, and her clerks. On July 31,2024,

Judge Kemp rose from the bench, claiming she needed to retrieve her book to

set a trial date. She then summoned former Dallas prosecutor Keith Harris to

the courtroom where the Petitioner and Dallas Assistant District Attorneys

Shawnkeedra Houston-Martin and Robin Ogbonna were waiting. Mr. Harris

whispered to Mr. Ogbonna that Judge Kemp wanted to speak with him alone,

(ex parte) without the Petitioner being present. Ms. Houston-Martin remain-

(6)

ed in the courtroom to watch Petitioner. In fact, Judge Snipes admitted in an

October 28, 2024 hearing that Judge Kemp assigned him to Petitioner’s case:

Cause F-22-76307, Transcript excerpt, P. 15, L 6-17. (App.38a)

THE COURT:

I was appointed to this case by Judge

Tammy Kemp.

THE DEFENDANT: Well,

Judge Kemp can't appoint you

to --

THE COURT: Yes, she can.

On October 18, 2024, Judge Kemp recused herself from the Petitioner’s

case. However, after Judge Snipes confirmed that the Petitioner was correct

that, Judge Kemp could not legally assign him, because it violates Texas law.

Next, Judge Ray Wheless came to the rescue by falsifying an order of

assignment in May of 2025. Wheless order suggests that he assigned Judge

Snipes on 08/22/2024. But Judge Snipes’ actions nullified Wheless’ handiwork

through an email he sent to Wheless on 09/13/2024 at 1:37 p.m., see App.25a,

requesting Wheless to grant him permission to preside over Petitioner’s case.

Why would Snipes need to obtain permission on 09/13/2024, if Judge Wheless’

08/22/2024 assignment order was authentic? Snipes email to Wheless stated:

I already accepted the transfer of Mr. Drake’s case to me and I am happy

and privileged to take the case. I have already presided over at least two

hearings. {Signed Senior Judge Mike Snipes)

(7)

Furthermore, Judge Wheless would have answered Judge Snipes on

September 13, 2024 and informed him that he had already issued the

assignment, which Judge Wheless did not respond to Judge Snipes request.

Accordingly, the guilty plea must be vacated on jurisdictional grounds.

Even if the plea was voluntary—which it wasn’t, this in of itself does not waive

a jurisdictional defect, for the reason that when a court lacks jurisdiction over

any count in a multi-count plea, the entire plea is void. Duron v. State,

915 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Snipes had no legal authority to

conduct the Petitioner’s January 27,2025 plea, (App.14a) or the sentencing on

March 27, 2025, (App.l5a) or to sign the order of probation on May 8, 2025

and then backdate the order into the clerk’s record. See App.l8a-19a.

I.

Texas Courts’ Refusal to Address a Fundamental Jurisdictional

Defect is a Violation of Due Process and Conflicts with This

Court’s Precedents on Structural Error.

A judgment rendered by a court that lacks jurisdiction is "void for every

purpose" and "must be regarded as a nullity." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

468 (1938).

The presence of a judge who lacks authority over the case is a structural

error of the highest order—it is a defect affecting "the framework within which

the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself."

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).

(8)

Such errors defy harmless-error analysis because the "entire conduct of

the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected." Id. at 309-10. The actions

of visiting judge, Michael Snipes, were not those of a court, but of an individual

acting under the mere color of law, making every order he issued, including

the final sentencing order, and the order of probation void ab initio.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not merely

protect against erroneous deprivation of liberty; it protects against

deprivations based on a proceeding that is itself illegitimate. When Petitioner

presented the Texas courts with unrebutted, on-the-record evidence of this

fundamental jurisdictional defect, the state judiciary had a constitutional

obligation to provide a remedy. The state's obstructionist tactics extended even

to Petitioner's First Amendment rights. The intermediate appellate court

interfered with his right to self-representation and meaningful court access by

its continual denying his Mandamus petitions, effectively silencing his pro se

voice. This pattern of erecting procedural barriers, culminating in the

summary postcard denial from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,

transformed judicial inaction into an act of sanction. The Texas courts have

effectively ratified the void judgment and perpetuated an unlawful restraint

on Petitioner's liberty.

This Court has recognized that the suspension of a remedy for a clear

(9)

constitutional violation can itself be a constitutional violation. See Boumediene

v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). By refusing to correct a structural error so

profound that it rendered the entire proceeding a nullity, the Texas judiciary

has failed to provide the "meaningful review" that due process requires. This

Court should grant certiorari to reaffirm that state courts cannot, consistent

with the Fourteenth Amendment, ignore and thereby validate judgments that

are constitutionally void.

II. Due-Process Violation

Judgments entered without jurisdiction are void under the Fourteenth

Amendment’s substantive due-process clause. Pursuant to Williams v.

Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), this case holds that a court lacking authority

cannot deprive liberty. Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114 Wis. 2d 575, 338N.W.2d861

(Wis. Ct. App. 1983) - a judgment is void when a court’s jurisdiction is deficient

or when it denies due-process rights.

A. Lack of Jurisdiction and Void Judgment

Orders and judgments entered by a judge who lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction is a legal nullity under Texas law. In re Marriage of McClure,

350 Tex. 121,125 (2015) holds that “a judgment entered without jurisdiction

has no legal effect and may be challenged at any time.” This Court has

similarly recognized that a court may declare such orders void when jurisdic-

(10)

tion is absent, Cottrell v. St. John’s County, 877 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1989).

Statutory authority for this Court to address the void judgment derives

from its original and appellate jurisdiction under 28U.S.C. §§ 1251 (original

jurisdiction over writs of certiorari) and § 1253 (appellate jurisdiction over

interlocutory orders of a State court), together with the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651, which empowers the Court to issue injunctions “necessary or

appropriate in aid of ” its jurisdiction.

Enforcing a judgment that the Court itself can deem void violates the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due-Process Clause because it deprives the

Petitioner of liberty without lawful authority. The combination of (a) the

judge’s lack of jurisdiction, (b) the resulting void nature of the order, and (c)

the constitutional due-process violation provides a solid basis for this Court to

render the Deferred Adjudication Order void and enjoin its enforcement.

B. Previous Mandamus Filings For Speedy Trial And Dismissal

Petitioner filed Mandamus petitions for a speedy trial and for dismissal

of the indictment in both the Fifth Court of Appeals (Dallas) Cause No. 05-24-

00342-CV and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Cause No. WR-95,163-02.

The Fifth Court of Appeals denied the Mandamus on November 1, 2024, while

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued a procedural postcard denial of the

Mandamus on May 29, 2024.

(ID

In the prior original petitions, Petitioner sought a speedy trial and

dismissal because the State had not tried him in over 22-months. The district

courts would not grant a hearing on Petitioner’s motion to dismiss to hinder

dismissal of the indictment, and to allow the prosecutors unlimited time.

The District Attorney’s Office in Dallas, Texas was unable to prove their

case before a jury that the Petitioner was guilty of any crimes. Consequently,

before the state of Texas would dismiss the fraudulent case that is litigated by

a pro se defendant who is African American, the state through its attorneys

turned to conspiring with Judge Snipes—to take Petitioner’s liberty—to create

immense mental and physical punishment and to force him into a guilty plea.1

The Petitioner resigned to pleading guilty; see (App.l4a), because of a

debilitating sickness, and the fact that Dallas County Jail medical staff would

not transport him to Parkland Hospital to undergo a simple X-ray of his chest

that would have revealed he had contracted pneumonia while in custody.

The appellate court’s denial of Petitioner’s timely previously filed

Mandamus requests—despite clear statutory authority under the Speedy Trial

Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.) and analogous Texas provisions—demonstrates at

Attorney Franklyn Mickelsen advised Petitioner that, “Judge Snipes was

going to have him arrested.” When the Petitioner asked Mr. Mickelsen for what

reason would Judge Snipes arrest him, Mickelsen responded by saying, “Judge

Snipes don’t need a reason to have you arrested.” Mickelsen then said, “You

don’t understand the criminal justice system.”

(12)

minimum bad faith inaction, but in reality, state criminal district judges

conspired to deprive the Petitioner of his constitutional right to a speedy trial

pursuant to the Sixth Amendment or dismissal of the indictment to assist the

prosecutors. Moreover, according to Smith v. Gohmert, 962 S. W. 2d 590 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998) (holding mandamus is appropriate to compel a trial court to

honor a speedy trial claim when the defendant’s right is being thwarted).

The combination of (a) State’s refusal to act on previous Mandamus

petitions for a speedy trial—prior to the coerced plea, (b) the subsequent forced

guilty plea while petitioner was ill with pneumonia in custody, (App.7a), (c)

continued enforcement of a void order underscores the urgency of this Court’s

intervention. Without immediate proper medical care—a stroke will occur.

III. The Coercion of Petitioner’s Guilty Plea Through Unconstitutional

Confinement And False Arrest Violates Established Federal Laws.

In order for a guilty plea to be valid, it must be a "voluntary and

intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant.”

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992). The "totality of the circumstances" must

demonstrate that the plea was not induced by threats, misrepresentation, or

promises that are by their nature improper. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.

742, 755 (1970). The circumstances surrounding the Petitioner's plea

demonstrate a textbook case of unconstitutional coercion.

(13)

The prisoner of war tactics began with the state's violating the Eighth

Amendment. The purpose of bail is to ensure the accused attendance at trial,

and "bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill

this purpose is ‘excessive' under the Eighth Amendment." Stack v. Boyle, 342

U.S. 1, 5 (1951). The $500,000 bail, predicated on a fraudulent warrant, served

no legitimate purpose.1 Its true intent, revealed when it was instantly

converted to a PR bond post-plea. See App.39a, January 27, 2025 Plea: P. 8,

L 1 —5. In 32-years, pro se Petitioner has never missed a court date.

THE STATE: I was told by Mr. Ogbonna the State would

be opposed to a PR bond or any lowering of the bond

amount.

THE COURT: Ms. Raza, here's how I'm going to handle

that. I 'm going to give him a PR bond and I'll put over

State's objection. Okay?

Petitioner’s confinement was a conspired effort between visiting judge,

Michael R. Snipes, and Dallas Assistant District Attorneys Robin Ogbonna and

Shawnkeedra Houston-Martin.

This Eighth Amendment violation was compounded by the state’s

deliberate indifference to Petitioner’s acute case of pneumonia, which left him

physically and cognitively impaired at the time of the plea. (App.7a) Judge

(14)

Michael Snipes and Prosecutors Ogbonna and Houston-Martin—maliciously

deprived Petitioner of his rights to a reasonable bail and due process. Their

conduct constitutes violations of federal law under 18 U.S.C. § 242, which was

designed to prevent the consciously-deliberate deprivation of any constitu­

tional or statutory right by anyone acting under color of law. A plea extracted

under such conditions cannot be considered voluntary. This Court should grant

certiorari to make clear that a plea obtained through such a confluence of state

sanctioned duress, conspiracies, false arrests, torture, fraud, and fundamental

jurisdictional error is a per se violation of the Due Process Clause.

To defeat Petitioner’s pro se defense, Judge Snipes and state prose­

cutors engaged in a scheme of cruelty that violated multiple Constitutional

provisions. On September 13, 2024, prosecutors filed a bogus motion to hold

Petitioner’s bond insufficient, see (App.29a-30a) falsely claiming he failed to

appear for the September 13th hearing. Judge Snipes, the prosecutors, and at

least two other attorneys were present and witnessed Petitioner’s presents at

that very hearing. Despite having direct personal knowledge that the allega­

tions in the prosecutors pleading were false, see (App.29a), three days later,

on September 16, 2024, visiting judge, Michael Snipes, issued a warrant for

Petitioner’s arrest based on the prosecutors’ fraudulent bail motion. (App.27a)

On October 29, 2024, during a status conference hearing, Petitioner

(15)

objected to Visiting Judge Michael Snipes while in custody as he had

repeatedly throughout the case. See excerpt of transcript (App.21a, L 7-10)

THE COURT: Mr. Drake, do you wish to be heard?

THE DEFENDANT: I do.

Well,

the first thing I’d like to say is that I

object to you even hearing this case. I don't think you

have judicial authority nor do you have the jurisdiction

to hear this case.

Petitioner also complained to the court that his hands were cuffed on

each side and he was unable to write or take notes during court hearings. This

was to prevent the Petitioner from keeping his personal record of the court, the

many court reporters, and events, which was a violation of his First

Amendment, Due Process and other Constitutional rights. Oct. 26, 2025,

(App.23, L 4—25). Some court reporters has refused to provide transcripts of

hearings, and other reporters alter what Snipes said to me to protect him.

THE DEPUTY SHERIFF: Oh,

you would like your hands

to be uncuffed ...

THE DEFENDANT:

Judge,

this is ridiculous

...

All

right. Now, you have humiliated me, falsely arrested me,

falsely filed a warrant for my arrest, and I'm going to

fight this all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.

(16)

Facing a critical illness—pneumonia (App.7a), which Petitioner was

unaware he had pneumonia until he was released. Nevertheless, he knew that

he was grievously sick. Petitioner’s appointed counsel advised him, “the only

way" to obtain professional medical treatment was to plead guilty. Petitioner

was pressured to plead guilty on January 27, 2025 to obtain medical help and

preserve his life. (App.l4a) But compare Petitioner’s defiant response on

October 29, 2024, where he rejected the exact plea offer by the State, because

at that time, he wasn’t infected with pneumonia. (App.22a, L 18—23a)

The transcript of Petitioner’s plea before Judge Snipes reveal that he

was so ill that he could barely speak. Judge Snipes said on the record that the

Petitioner was somewhat ill and that he may have to assist his answers.

However, neither the district court nor the Petitioner’s appointed attorney

requested that he be immediately transported to a hospital. Factually, Judge

Snipes and the appointed attorney left the Petitioner confined in an extreme

cold jail cell—grievously ill, with a severe upper respiratory infection for three

additional weeks after he pled guilty.

IV. The State's Final Denial of Medical Access Constitutes Cruel

and Unusual Punishment.

The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Four­

teenth Amendment, prohibits "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

of prisoners." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). This protection is not

(17)

limited to the incarcerated; it extends to individuals, like the Petitioner, whose

liberty is restrained by the state through probation and who is dependent on

the state for permission to obtain necessary medical care. The state's

restriction on Petitioner's travel is the direct cause of his inability to be

examined by doctors who are specialist, but practice outside of Texas.

Deliberate indifference is established by showing a defendant was

"aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer u.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Petitioner’s plea for medical help was not

merely ignored at the district court level; it was presented directly and

unequivocally to the (TCCA) Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. That court was

made explicitly aware of his serious health conditions, the necessity of out-ofcounty and out-of-state testing and treatment, and the ongoing pain and risk

of permanent injury, including blindness and possible death.

On page 4 of the Petitioner’s Mandamus filed in the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals, Cause No. WR-95, 163-03 he pled the following in | 4:

“Relator has an urgent need to obtain medical testing, and medical and

dental treatment . .

Relator is suffering from episodes of Transient Loss of

Vision, which treating physicians have determined may represent mini-strokes.

The imminent, life-threatening nature of these medical episodes

(18)

necessitates immediate diagnostic testing and treatment that is not available

through any medical provider within Dallas County for the Relator. See

App.18.’”

Petitioner’s urgent request for assistance to the TCCA through his writ

of Mandamus was denied. See (App.la, 2a) The TCCA refused to even provide

a written order, but instead only a postcard, which is deliberate indifference.

Furthermore, pursuant to West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1978), and

Rosado v. Alameida, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (E.D.N.Y. 2004), if we apply the

two-pronged Gamble test—(1) a serious medical need, and (2) deliberate

indifference; the Petitioner’s circumstance of untreated ophthalmologic

disorder, which threatens death by stroke, and the courts reaction—satisfies

both prongs. The Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due-process com­

ponent likewise bars state actions that “arbitrarily deprive” an individual of a

fundamental interest in health and life Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).

The Petitioner attempted to redress the urgent need for medical

assistance in his motion to reconsider to the TCCA, but to no avail. (App.la)

This Court should grant certiorari to address the application of the

Eighth Amendment in this context and hold that when a state's highest court

is directly informed of a serious critical medical necessity that was created by

a condition of supervision and the state refuses to provide a remedy, it ratifies

a policy of deliberate indifference in violation of the Constitution.

(19)

V. The All Writs Act And The Younger Abstention Do Not Bar

Relief Because Extraordinary-Circumstances Exception Applies

Under 28 U.S.C. §§1651-1652, this Court may issue an injunction

“necessary or appropriate in aid of’ its jurisdiction. The present case demands

such relief to preserve the Court’s ability to review the void judgment and to

prevent irreparable injury. As such, the Petitioner have simultaneously filed a

request for emergency injunctive relief that is also pending before this

Honorable Court.

While Younger v. Harris ordinarily requires federal abstention from

interfering with state criminal proceedings, the “extraordinary circum­

stances” exception is triggered when the state is unwilling or unable to remedy

an imminent, irreparable injury. Here, the State’s refusal to allow out-of-state

medical care creates a life-threatening condition, and the state of Texas

officials knowingly enforcing a void probation order. This Court has applied

this exception in Arkebauer v. Kiley (9th Cir. 1993), Gould v. Lombardo

(D.Nev. 2020), and Sweeten v. Sneddon (2d Cir. 1972). The actions of the State

in this case is knowningly, willingly and intentional.

The Court has recognized a narrow “extraordinary-circumstances”

exception for cases where the state action threatens irreparable injury that the

state cannot remedy. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

(20)

In Arkebauer, the district court expressly noted that “where the

plaintiff’s life is at stake, the equitable power of the federal courts to enjoin the

state proceeding is triggered.” The Texas probation office’s categorical refusal

to assist the Petitioner, despite the Petitioner’s pleas and medical evidence of

possible death, is analogous to the harassment identified in Arkebauer, 751 F.

Supp. 783 (N.D. Ill. 1990).

Furthermore, the court’s opinion in Gould v. Lombardo, No. 20-5263

(D. Nev. May 28 2020) reiterates that the “extraordinary-circumstances” ex­

ception is triggered in the Petitioner’s case because of the life-threatening

medical emergency satisfies that requirement. The Petitioner’s physicians

have warned that a “stroke” will occur if he does not take immediate steps to

obtain proper treatment and testing. The probation office’s unconcern dismiss-

sal creates the precise “great and immediate” danger contemplated in Gould.

The Second Circuit held that federal intervention is proper when a state

prosecution threatens irreparable injury, such as a danger to Petitioner’s life,

and when the state is as in this case before the Court; unwilling to protect the

Petitioner. The denial of 4-Mandamuses to the appellate courts in Texas is a

clear display of unwillingness. And the Texas probation order, upheld by the

state court, when the appellate courts understood the order was void, is a clear

example of the state’s unwillingness to protect Petitioner’s life. Sweeten v.

(21)

Sneddon, 463F.2d713 (2d Cir. 1972). Even if Younger were otherwise

applicable, Dombrowski v. Pfister creates an exception when state action is

undertaken in bad faith to chill constitutional rights. The State’s continued

enforcement of a known-void order, despite the Petitioner’s constitutional

claims, satisfies the Dombrowski exception.

How the Present Facts Satisfy All Three Precedents

Requirement

Gould

Arkebauer

Sweeten

Bad-faith/harassment caJe80*^ca^

—

by the state

"efus^

despite

medical

evidence

—

v

State unable or

unwilling to protect

the defendant

—

S

Probation

office’s

Yes state’s

Great and immediate

threat of irreparable —

injury

Situation

s. •

hfe-threatemng

.. .

—

medical

emergency

—

(22)

refusal is a

deliberate

obstruction of

life-saving

care

Physicians’

affidavits

r

warn of

.

.

,

imminent

stroke/death

Texas appeal

x

x courts denied

state court,,

. , three

denied

,

,. P

, mandamus

relief and

....

,,

, petitions; the

affirmed

j

• j

,

TCCA denied

e, . ,.

Petitioner’s

restriction

,

mandamus

Further, Petitioner’s motions to reconsider filed with the Court of

Appeals and Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were denied, leaving him

without any state remedy. The Texas Appeals court’s refusal to assist is a

deliberate indifference to Petitioner’s medical needs. All three cases converge

on the principle that when a state-initiated restriction creates an immediate

threat to life that the state cannot cure, federal courts may intervene. And in

this case, Younger would not preclude immediate intervention because all of

the orders by the state are void. Hence, Petitioner’s circumstances satisfy each

prong, making the extraordinary circumstances exception applicable. Dr.

Larry Taub warned the Petitioner that his most recent symptoms are signs of

a transient ischemic attack (TIA). See App.9a-12a. Dr. Oliver Hunter also

advised immediate professional medical care, testing and treatment by a

neuro-ophthalmologist and cardiologist/vascular specialist. See App.56.

The Petitioner contends that the probation office’s refusal to allow travel

out of state to be examined by medical specialist constitutes a violation of his

Fourteenth-Amendment due-process rights and his substantive right to

receive medically necessary care. The refusal creates an immediate, disruptive,

and irreparable threat to his life—an injury that the state court is unwilling to

prevent. It is not the fact that the State cannot cue the problem, but the state

of Texas deliberate indifference is the obstacle.

On October 3,2025, Petitioner was compelled to seek emergency medical

care after a sudden episode of loss of sight, which lasted for about 20-minutes.

(23)

Petitioner drove himself to a local hospital after his sight returned. The ER

immediately evaluated the petitioner’s symptoms and advised him that the

signs he experienced are consistent with an imminent stroke. Thereafter, on

October 6, 2025, Petitioner had another attack that was more aggressive,

causing the Petitioner’s left arm, hand, and upper chest to become numb. These

are stroke-like symptoms. Petitioner has two appointments with specialist.

Air-flight and other accommodations are arranged. But Petitioner, needs this

Court’s assistance for an order to travel to be examined a by these doctors.

VI. Restriction on Out-of-State Travel Violates the Right to Travel.

The Constitution guarantees a fundamental right “to move from one

State to another.” This right is rooted in the Privileges and Immunities Clause

of Article IV, § 2, and is reinforced by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due-Process Clause. This Court first articulated the breadth of this liberty in

Saenz v. Roe, 523 U.S. 989, 1002 n.4 (1998), holding that the right to travel is a

protected liberty that states may not burden without a constitutionally

permissible justification.

VII. Fourteenth Amendment Guarantees Substantive Due-Process

Protection Against Arbitrary Conditions of Probation.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects “a liberty

interest ... from arbitrary governmental interference.” Washington v. Harper,

494 U.S. 210 221 n.5 (1990). Conditions of probation are restrictions on liberty

(24)

therefore, they must be justified by a legitimate governmental interest and

must be narrowly tailored. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 783 (1973)

(recognizing that probation conditions “must be reasonable and related to the

offender’s rehabilitation”).

Here, the Dallas County Probation Office imposed mental-health

counseling and UID testing without any medical diagnosis or evidence of drug

dependence or even a history of mental health disorders or substance abuse of

anykind. This Court has repeatedly held that the government may not impose

medical treatment absent a showing of necessity. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,

125 (1973) (recognizing the state’s interest in protecting health must be

balanced against individual liberty). In the probation context, Ortiz v. State

(Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1992) held that “the trial court may not order psychiatric

treatment unless a qualified medical professional has established a need.” In

this case before the Court; Petitioner has never used tobacco, or experimented

with any type of illegal drugs. He has no dependency on prescribed drugs or

alcohol, or other similar substances. Because no qualified physician or

psychiatrist have evaluated Petitioner regarding his mental-health, or for

substance abuse, the state’s actions are an arbitrary condition that violates

substantive due-process.

VIII. Texas Statutory Authority Does Not Permit Imposition of

Unsubstantiated Mental-Health or Drug-Testing Conditions

Forced counseling without medical diagnosis from a qualifed heathcare

(25)

provider is a non-neutral intrusion into bodily autonomy, violating the

substantive liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) and Cruzan further hold that

compelled medical treatment absent a qualified diagnosis is unconstitutional.

The mandatory, suspicionless urine-drug testing (UID) condition is a

search of the person. This Court has held that extracting bodily fluids for

analysis constitutes a search subject to Fourth-Amendment scrutiny.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (recognizing that taking blood—

or, by analogy, urine—for testing is a search).

Petitioner has no documented history, no diagnosis, and there is no

evidence of drug dependence or mental health disorders. This distinction is

critical. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 614.001-.026 authorizes the imposition

of mental-health treatment only when a qualified medical professional

determines that the offender “requires such treatment.” The State of Texas is

knowingly violating Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment right. See National

Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v.

Railway Labor Executives’Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); Schmerber v. California,

384 U.S. 757 (1966).

Consequently, the order exceeds the authority granted by §§ 42A.07

and 614. More importantly, the judge who ordered these invasive tests, visiting

judge, Michael Snipes, did not possess proper assignment or jursidiction.

Hence, the probation order is void.

(26)

The State of Texas’s imposition of mental-health and drug-testing

requirements is driven by financial incentives. First, by referring thousands of

defendants to various clinics, Dallas County likely receives referral fees.

Secondly, the system creates a mechanism that encourages defendants to

return to jail or prison, generating substantial revenue from the cost of housing

inmates. Third, Dallas County imposes a 2-percent surcharge on probation

fees, even when the defendant pays in cash. Additionally, failure to attend a

mandated session allows the probation officer to incarcerate the defendant, all

of which, produce substantial profits for Dallas County and the state of Texas

(through jail bookings) and (through prison labor).

IX. Restrictions On Firearms For Deferred Probationer’s Is

A Violation of Second Amendment Rights

Just a few days ago, theives destroyed property were the Petitioner

reside. This action made the Petitioner realize that he is unable to protect his

himself or his property. The Dallas Police normal turnaround time is 10-hours

and many times officers migh will appear the next day for theft crimes.

As set forth herein, I am on deferred probation and have not been found

guilty of any crimes. The state’s entire case was founded on false and

misleading warrants, witnesss, and evidence to the Petitioner’s detriment.

Texas Constitution guarantees “the right of every person to keep and

bear arms, for the defense of himself and the State.” Tex. Const, art. I, § 23.

(27)

The provision is broad and, like the federal Second Amendment, is subject to

only limited, historically-based restrictions.

This Court recognized that the Second Amendment protects an

individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. District of Columbia

v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). The Second Amendment is incorporated

against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. Chicago,

561 U.S. 742, 756 (2010). Consequently, Texas’ firearm restrictions must be

consistent with the federal constitutional guarantee. United States v. Rahimi,

59 F.4th 163 (5th Cir. 2023).

The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas made the

comment that the federal prohibition on firearm acquisition by persons under

felony indictment “does not interfere with the Second Amendment because it

does not disarm felony indictees who already had guns and does not prohibit

possession or public carry.” Petitioner will also direct the Court’s attention to

another note worthy case in the context of disablities and firearms: United

States v. Rahimi, 59 F.4th 163 (5th Cir. 2023).

The State of Texas, by treating a deferred-probationer as a convicted

felon for purposes of § 46.04, creates a structural denial of due process. The

Texas courts have refused to recognize that a deferred adjudication is not a

conviction, thereby imposing a disability that the Constitution does not per-

(28)

mit. This denial is fundamental because it deprives the petitioner of a core

constitutional right-of-self-defense without any legitimate procedural

safeguard. The state’s refusal to correct this error, despite clear statutory and

case-law authority, renders the state corrective process fundamentally

inadequate and warrants Supreme Court intervention.

X. The Egregious Pattern of Misconduct Warrants Dismissal

With Prejudice, Barring Retrial

The cumulative effect of the state's actions in this case constitutes a

pattern of outrageous government conduct so severe and pervasive that it

violates the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause. This

is not a case of simple trial error, but one where state actors built their case

upon a foundation of fraud and coercion, culminating in a judgment that is void

from its inception. The state's pattern of misconduct began long before the

events of 2024, originating in 2022 with an arrest warrant instigated by a

Dallas police detective who conspired with the complaining witnesses. After

significant delay and Petitioner's demand for a trial via a writ of mandamus to

the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Cause No. WR-95,163-02, the State,

unprepared to proceed, filed a procedurally deficient motion for a continuance.

When Petitioner appeared for trial and the prosecutors did not, the

State, facing the likelihood of a loss against a pro se defendant, escalated its

(29)

tactics. Prosecutors filed a baseless motion to hold Petitioner's bond

insufficient on September 13, 2024. Two days later, Judge Snipes, acting

without any lawful jurisdiction, issued a fraudulent arrest warrant based on

the prosecutors bogus motion. This initial fraud was compounded by the

imposition of a punitive, unconstitutional bail designed not to ensure

appearance but to inflict punishment and manufacture a guilty plea. See

United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981)

(dismissing indictment where government 'manufactured' the crime, violating

due process). Here, the state of Texas manufactured the plea.

This pattern of deliberate misconduct, designed to subvert the judicial

process, caused demonstrable and irreparable harm to Petitioner's consti­

tutional rights and to his health. See State v. Frye, 897 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1995) (upholding dismissal with prejudice where official misconduct

caused irreparable harm). Because of such outrageous conduct, federal courts

have dismissed cases when a defendant’s due process rights are violated. See

United States v. Santana, 808 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1992).

A new trial cannot cure this harm. The entire prosecution has been

irreparably tainted by this pattern of bad-faith, conspirator, and criminal

conduct. As the Texas courts have recognized, the "drastic remedy" of dis­

missal with prejudice is warranted when the cumulative effect of misconduct

makes a fair trial impossible. State v. Hill, 558 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.-Dallas

(30)

Dallas 2018). The judiciary's inherent power to protect the integrity of its own

proceedings demands such a result when faced with misconduct this egregious.

See State v. Terrazas, 962 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (affirming court's

authority to dismiss for constitutional violations causing demonstrable

prejudice). To merely vacate the conviction and allow the state another

opportunity to commit more crimes against the Petitioner through another

prosecution would be an inadequate remedy. The state of Texas has proven

that its officials are not capable of obeying the Constitiution. This pattern of

criminal behavior will continue to reward the state for its unconstitutional

behavior—undermining, the very principle of justice this Court is sworn to

uphold. To ignore such illicit and dishonorable actions, only enourages

prosecutors throughout the nation to use any means to obtain convictions. And

it disregards the grueling 5-months penalty the Petitioner had to pay in a filthy

jail when he was innocent of the alleged crimes. Cf. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456

U.S. 667 (1982) (barring retrial where prosecutor purposely goads a mistrial).

As such, the only proper remedy is to remand with instructions to

dismiss the indictment with prejudice, thereby barring any future retrial.

Pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. &Rem. Code §16.001 (2023), “A void

judgment is a nullity and may be attacked in any court at any time.” The court

in United States v. Richey, 399 U.S. 657 (1970) cited 28 U.S.C. § 1652, and

reiterated that a void judgment is a nullity that may be attacked in any court.

Dismissal in this case is warranted. See U.S. v. Nebel, 856 F. Supp. 392 (M.D.

(31)

Tenn. 1993). State Ex Ret. Forsythe v. Coate, 558P.2d647 (Mont. 1976). The

courts in Texas recongize that an order of probation, signed by a visiting judge

who possessed no jurisdiction in the case—is unenforceable and void.2 Yet, the

courts as well as the probation office in Dallas County are using this void order

to prevent Petitioner from obtaining critical life saving medical care.

On October 23, 2025, the Petitioner notified his probation officer that

the probation order is void because it was signed by a judge lacking jurisdic­

tion. On October 24, 2025, he hand-delivered a six-page letter to Mr. Arnold

Patrick, Director of Adult Probation for Dallas County, reiterating those fasts

in detail. Petitioner asserted that continual enforcement of a void order

violates his Constitutional rights. Moreover, the ATRS report was not support­

ed by facts, and prepared by someone who was not qualified under Texas law.

Petitioner direct the Court’s attetion to (App.40a-47a). This is the

ATRS report generated by Dallas County. The report is self-reporting, self­

servicing, and contain contradictory observations, absent objective data to

make credible findings, no collateral medical records are found, and no verified

mediction list. The report at best is speculative rather than evidence-based.

The ATRS report appears intended to subject the Petitioner and other

defendants to unnecessary medical treatment and testing; not to assist the

Petitioner, but to create a trap that could lead to incarceration if they do not

comply. Petitoiner requirement to pay for UID testing when he has no history

of drug usage or alcohol dependency, indicate a profit motive.

(32)

In this case, the goal of Dallas County appears to portray the Petitioner

as a violent criminal irrespective of the facts, thereby justifying a brutal forced

guilty plea, and reflecting the state’s inability to try the petitioner pro se and

secure a jury verdict. These actions violate both the United States Constitution

and the Texas Constitution.

Petitioner directs the Court’s attention to (App.48a-55a). Here, a

certified licensed psychiatrist denounce the allegation that the Petitioner has a

depenceny on drugs or alcohol. It is the psychiatrist medical opinion that, the

Petitioner shows no signs of psychotic illness, bipolar disorder or schizophre­

nia

and no signs of risk of suicide or violence.

state of Texas will allow the Petitioner to die or suffer blindness if

this Court, does not intervene. Or incarcerate him in jail or prison to silence

him from exposing their corruption, to prevent him from filing of petitions to

seek assistance, and to keep him from obtaining proper medical care.

Petitioner, Eric Drake, is therefore requesting the Court to dismiss the

indictments, Cause No. F-22-76307 and F-24-76901 for the egregious miscon­

duct by judges and prosecutors in the state of Texas that, cannot be cured by a

lesser sanction. This is an extraordinary circumstance of deliberate indiffer-

ence, criminal acts, conspiracy and Constitutional violations by state actors.

"Rice v. State, 971S.W.2d533 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) - the court held that a

probation order issued without jurisdiction is void and cannot be enforced. In re

Hall, 989 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) - the court emphasized that a court lacks

authority to act outside the statutoiy window; any order entered thereafter is void.

(33)

Furthermore, the Petitioner believes that he is entitled to reimburse­

ment of his travel, lodging, and medical expenses, a right grounded in Tex. Civ.

Prac. &Rem. Code §38.001, which allows recovery of reasonable expenses

incurred as a result of the State’s unlawful restraint of his liberty.

This writ is presented to the Honorable Court as a matter of life and

death. Respecfully, the Court’s intervention is requested and warranted Now.

XI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

C

Zs/ Eric Drake

fihieJDxake___

10455 N. Central Expy

Suite 109

Dallas, Texas 75231

Tele: 912-281-7100

drakeministries.org@gmail.com

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements and allegations

contained in this Writ of Certiorari are true and correct to the best of my

knowledge and belief.

Thus, done on this 10th day of November, 2025.

Eric Dra^ke^^^

EricDrake

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