Petition for Writ of Certiorari — In Re Michael Albert Focia, Petitioner

Supreme Court briefOct 20, 2025

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

jHJU

ORIGINAL

In Re: Michael-Albert Focia,

Petitioner,

FILED

OCT 2 0 2025

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

to the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MICHAEL ALBERT FOCIA

Sui Juris, in propria persona

c/o 1043 Stableway Road

Pike Road, Alabama 36064

Telephone: (972) 677-3087

Petitioner, Sui Juris, In propria Persona

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

QUESTION’(S) PRESENTED

usa

1. Does the district court's application of the Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C.

section 921 and following, to apply to private arms sales on the secondary

market constitute a clear absence of jurisdiction, violating the statute's text,

congressional intent, Supreme Court precedent, and a recent federal

injunction supported by the attorneys general of Texas, Louisiana,

Mississippi, and Utah, and three gun rights organizations, thus requiring a

writ of mandamus to compel dismissal?

2. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(21 )(C) is unlawfully being applied outside the

statutory scheme to private sales on the secondary markets allowing Batfe

agents, prosecutors and judges to assume “hypothetical jurisdiction” to

decide the merits of a case, when there is a clear absence of jurisdiction as

congress never gave the courts of limited jurisdiction any delegation of

authority over private sales on the secondary market?

3. If the above question is answered in the negative, then did congress violate

the fifth amendment’s substantive due process clause by taking the right to

dispose of one’s own lawfully owned private property of arms and violate

the unconstitutional conditions doctrine?

4. Whether the Gun Control Act of 1968 exceeds federal authority under the

Commerce Clause by regulating private, non-commercial secondary-market

Page 1 of 5

arms sales by unlicensed individuals, thereby infringing the Second

Amendment right to keep and bear arms and the Fifth Amendment's

substantive due process protections for liberty and disposal of privately

owned property of arms, in the absence of any delegated power to Congress

for such regulation as intended by the Founders?

5. Whether, contrary to explicit congressional intent in the Gun Control Act of

1968 exempting private secondary-market sales by non-dealers (e.g., Rep.

Dingell, Cong. Rec., Vol. 114, p. 27462 (1968)), and given a circuit split on

its applicability (e.g., dismissal in United States v. Kouyate, D. Colo. 2024),

the Act's enforcement against unlicensed individuals unconstitutionally

usurp jurisdiction, violating the harmonious protections of the Second and

Fifth Amendments and the Framers' design limiting federal power to

external commerce without internal conflicts?

6. Whether the federal regulation of any private arms transfers under the Gun

Control Act impermissibly burdens the cohesive framework of the Bill of

Rights—including the First (chilling expressive association), Fourth

(enabling arbitrary intrusions), Ninth (undermining retained natural rights),

and Tenth (overriding reserved powers)—while clashing with Second

Amendment safeguards and Fifth Amendment due process, absent any

Page 2 of 5

delegated authority and in defiance of the Framers' design of a non

conflicting Constitution limiting government to external concerns?

7. Whether the Gun Control Act's conditioning of private arms sales on FFL

licensure violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine by coercing

waivers of rights under the Fourth (privacy from surveillance) and Fifth

(liberty/property) Amendments, further implicating the First (speech in

transactions), Ninth (uneriumerated liberties), and Tenth (federalism)

Amendments, where legislative history confirms no intent to regulate non

dealers and the Framers withheld such power to prevent arbitrary

disarmament schemes?

8. Whether district and circuit courts' assumption of "hypothetical jurisdiction"

over Gun Control Act charges for non-FFL private sales, despite

congressional exemptions for such transactions (Sen. Dodd, Cong. Rec.,

Vol. 114, p. 11069 (1968)), constitutes a clear abuse warranting mandamus,

as it usurps undelegated powers in violation of the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and

Tenth Amendments, creating equal protection disparities across circuits and

conflicting with the Framers' harmonious constitutional limits?

9. Whether convictions under the Gun Control Act for private sales by non

dealers are void ab initio for lack of jurisdiction, as misapplication creates no

federal offense, warranting mandamus to declare them nullities attackable at

Page 3 of 5

any time (Elliott v. Piersol, 26 U.S. 328 (1828); Valley v. Northern Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920)), and violating the harmonious

protections of the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments absent

delegated power or historical basis?

10. Whether the district court's denial of coram nobis relief in Case No. 2:23-cv-

00399-RAH-CWB (March 21, 2025), by adopting a recommendation that

fails to engage with post-Bruen developments and Abramski's limitations on

GCA scope, compounds jurisdictional errors and evidences bad faith,

warranting supervisory mandamus to enforce uniform application of this

Court's precedents and prevent ongoing constitutional harms?

11 .Whether ATF's Final Rule violates the Fifth Amendment by being void for

vagueness, failing to provide fair notice to ordinary individuals of when

private arms sales trigger dealer licensing, through non-exhaustive

presumptions that criminalize innocent conduct (United States v. Davis, 139

S. Ct. 2319 (2019); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156

(1972)) that was applied in petitioners case a full 8 years before this final

rule was instituted?

12. Whether ATF's Final Rule infringes the Second Amendment by burdening

the right to acquire and dispose of arms without historical analogue, as

required by Bruen, and by coercing licensure that subjects personal

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collections to warrantless inspections (N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v.

Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570

(2008); United States v. Hicks, 649 F. Supp. 3d 357 (W.D. Tex. 2023))?

13. Whether ATF's Final Rule violates the Fourth Amendment by mandating

warrantless entry and inspection of premises for newly coerced FFL holders

engaging in private sales, lacking any closely regulated industry exception

(27 C.F.R. § 478.23(b))?

14. Whether ATF's Final Rule usurps legislative power under Article I, §§ 1, 7,

by enacting omnibus gun Control through regulation rather than

bicameralism and presentment, contrary to separation of powers (Sessions v.

Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003

(2014)) prior to ever passing this rule in 2015 when they applied it

unlawfully to petitioner?

Page 5 of 5

Table of Contents

Section

Page

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

Jurisdiction

Statement of the Case

Other Litigation That Further Supports Petitioner

How the Writ Aids the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction 10

Mandatory Relief for Void Judgments

Exceptional Circumstances

Reasons for Granting the Writ

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Conclusions of Law

Conclusion

Demand for Relief

Declaration

Certificate & Proof of Service

Table of Authorities

Case

Page(s)

Abramskiv. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014)

4 6 7 9 10 14

’ ’ ’

’

22, 25, 31, 33

Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990)

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.

(1997)

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998)

4, 6

Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004)

3, 10, 12, 14, 20

City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) '

25, 29

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

3, 10

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &

Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988)

EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)

Elliott v. Piersol, 26 U.S. 328 (1828)

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)

Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943)

11, 15

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)

Grayned v. City of Rockford;. 408 U.S. 104 (1972)

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)

Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241

(1964)

Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S.

51 (1984)

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977)

Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940)

Klugh v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 892 (D.S.C. 1985)

Lane v. Holder, 703 F.3d 668 (4th Cir. 2012)

7, 13, 22, 30, 33

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)

Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884)

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

4, 15, 35

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)

Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987)

Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934)

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1

(2022)

4, 9, 31

Omer v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 1994)

Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018)

Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83

(1998)

4, 6, 8, 11, 15, 19,

Texas v. ATF, No. 2:24-cw00089-Z (N.D. Tex. 2024)

9, 18, 31, 33

United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)

United,States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 (1936)

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)

32, 33

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019)

10, 17

United States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2017)

1, 7

United States v. Gundy, 804 F. App'x 998 (11th Cir. 2020)

United States v. Hicks, 649 F. Supp. 3d 357 (W.D. Tex. 2023)

UnitedJStates v. Jimenez-Shilon, 34 F.4th 1042 (11th Cir. 2022) 16

United States v. Kouyate, No. U24-cr-00131-RM (D. Colo. 2024) 6, 11, 15, 25, 31

United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258

(1947)

United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820)

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014)

Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920) 29

Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)

Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003 (2014)

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) 29

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)

STATUTES

Statute

Page(s)

5 U.S.C. § 706

10, 32, 33

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C)

5, 13, 15, 21, 22, 33

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)

4, 22, 25, 30, 33

18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5)

4, 22, 30, 33

18 U.S.C. § 923(c)

III

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D)

18 U.S.C. § 926(a)

18 U.S.C. § 2516

5, 8

18 U.S.C. § 3231

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)

1, 3, 7, 10

28 U.S.C. § 1746(1)

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (2022)9, 33

Federal Firearms Act (1938)

9, 32

Firearms Owners' Protection Act (1986)

9, 33

Gun Control Act of 1968

5, 6, 9, 11, 22, 25, 31, 33

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Provision

Page(s)

U.S. Const, art. I, §§ 1, 78, 9, 13, 17, 20, 22, 29

U.S. Const, art. Ill

U.S. Const, art. IV, § 4

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2 34

U.S. Const, amend. I

2, 3, 5, 8

U.S. Const, amend. II

2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33

U.S. Const, amend. Ill

2, 8, 15, 21

U.S. Const, amend. IV

2, 5, 8, 9, 17, 21

U.S. Const, amend. V

2, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33

U.S. Const, amend. VI

8, 17, 20, 31

U.S. Const, amend. VIII 5

U.S. Const, amend. IX

2, 8

U.S. Const, amend. X

2, 8, 34

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Authority

Page(s)

30A Am. Jur. Judgments §§ 44, 4529

63 C.J.S. §§ 10, 11, 12

89 Fed. Reg. 28968

9, 19

Anti-Federalist Papers Nos. 3, 28 17

Cong. Rec., Vol. 114

26, 27

Federalist No. 45

15, 22

H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577 (1968)

Magna Carta

Senate Rep. No. 90-1097

Sup. Ct. R. 10

11, 14

Sup. Ct. R. 20

1, 3, 7, 12

3fa tije Supreme Court of tfje Binteb States

On Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eleventh Circuit and United States District Court of the Middle District of

Alabama

Re: Michael Albert Focia,

Petitioner, Sui Juris,

In Equity in Original Jurisdiction of Article 3, Non-Statutory, as applied

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

To the Honorable Justice Clarence Thomas and to the Justices of the whole

Supreme Court of the United States of America:

Petitioner, Michael Albert Focia, sui juris, in propria persona, respectfully petitions

this Court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to this courts original jurisdiction

and/or the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and Supreme Court Rule 20, and it’s

duty and obligation to correct the usurpation of jurisdiction (United States v.

Corrick, 298 U. S. 435, 440 (1936) (footnotes omitted).” Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U. S., (slip op., at 28) (1997), directing the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to vacate its opinion in United

States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2017), and to remand the case to the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama for vacateur.

This extraordinary relief is warranted because:

Page 1 of 37

The 11th circuit courts and court of appeals are in open rebellion to the

constitution, Forcible opposition to public law and blatant defiance of

Supreme Court Precedent.

The Eleventh Circuit's opinion failed it’s special obligation to “satisfy itself

not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause

under review,” even though the parties are prepared to concede it. Mitchell v.

Maurer, 293 U. S. 237, 244 (1934). See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U. S. 327, 331-332

(1977).

District court bad actor administrators acting as Judge R. Austin Huffaker Jr.

and Magistrate Chad W. Bryan are conspiring to aid and abet the fraud on the court

by wrongdoer BATFE agent provocateurs, prosecutors and communist/Marxist

activitist masquerading as judges in “clear absence of all jurisdiction”, upholding a

multitude of structural errors, flawed reasoning, and misapplications of law that

deprived Petitioner of his God given rights protected by the Constitution for the

united States of America under the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and

Tenth Amendments, and violated fundamental principles of subject-matter,

personal and territorial jurisdiction and due process. These errors are clear and

indisputable, and no other adequate means exist to attain relief, as the Eleventh

Circuit's decision is final, and certiorari review was denied and would not address

the supervisory need to correct these systemic flaws.

Page 2 of 37

Exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of this Court's mandatory

powers and adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other court or form, because

of bad faith, bias and harassment, and want of jurisdiction. How much longer will

petitioner be prejudiced by these bad actors that are protracting this litigation and

exhausting judicial resources?

JURISDICTION

1. This Court has original and appellate jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus

under its original jurisdiction and/or the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),

which empowers this court to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid

of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of

law." See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004).

This Court may issue mandamus to compel a lower court to perform a

ministerial duty or to correct a clear abuse of discretion where the right to

relief is clear and indisputable. Id. at 3 81; see also Supreme Court Rule 20

(governing extraordinary writs). The Eleventh Circuit's opinion, issued on

September 6, 2017, and denying rehearing en banc, is final, and mandamus

is necessary to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice and to enforce this

Court's precedents in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008);

Page 3 of 37

conducted no business with the United States. (See transcripts of the testimony of

the agent provocateur Jennifer Rudden Conway), In testimony by The Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Arms and Explosives (BATFE) agent provocateurs, including

Jennifer Rudden Conway, Tulley Kessller, John Harell, and William Bass, acted

ultra vires by misapplying the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) to non-FFL, private

transactions, conspiring under color of law to stalk, harass, and report Petitioner to

the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), using 18 use 2516 illegally, resulting in

present, ongoing and continuous torture, torment, and cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the first & eighth amendment, retaliation of Petitioner

exercising his rights of disposal of his own private, lawfully owned property or

arms protected by the second, fourth, and fifth amendments. After petitioner was

falsely imprisoned and denied bail in violation of the eighth amendment and forced

to defend a law he is not bound to and the prosecutors being equitably estopped

and the courts exceeding their jurisdiction. The district court denied motions to

dismiss on Second Amendment grounds and overruled objections to jury

instructions omitting the "hobby" exemption under § 921 (a)(21 )(C). This is

structural error and further demonstrating bias, and a scheme to disarm the militia,

sentencing included improper enhancements, yielding a 51-month term further

evidencing even more prejudice, bad faith, discrimination and retaliation for

engaging in a unpopular but protected right of disposing of Petitioner’s own

Page 5 of 37

personal private property of arms. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting

challenges to jurisdiction, evidence sufficiency, instructions, constitutionality, and

sentencing. Further evidence by the 11th circuit’s abuse of discretion is failing to

ensure they had jurisdiction and conflating the sentencing hearing with the trial

transcript of facts not in evidence. Rehearing en banc was denied and certiorari

was denied by this court. In 2025, the district court denied coram nobis relief in

Case No. 2:23-cv-00399-RAH-CWB, adopting the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation (dated February 20, 2025) to deny the petition, overruling

Petitioner's objections (dated March 7, 2025), and certifying any appeal as not

taken in good faith under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (order dated March 21, 2025). This

denial compounds structural errors by failing to address the GCA's inapplicability

to private sales per congressional intent of the GCA of 1968, Abramski v. United

States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014), and United States v. Kouyate, No. 1:24-cr-00131-RM

(D. Colo. 2024), violating equal protection and ignoring jurisdictional voids under

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), and

misapplying coram nobis standards by not recognizing fundamental miscarriages

of justice under Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). The denial also

denied related motions for sanctions and mental evaluation, further evidencing bias

and refusal to confront BATFE overreach. The case presents a “clear absence of all

jurisdiction”, and structural errors voiding jurisdiction ab initio.

Page 6 of 37

Petitioner Michael-Albert Focia, sui juris, one of the prosperity of the people on

the soil of the land known as the Union state, New Jersey and respectfully petitions

this Court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to the original jurisdiction and/or in the

alternative the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)1, and Supreme Court Rule 20,

directing the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to vacate its

opinion in United States v. Focia, 869 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2017), and to remand

the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama for

vacateur and granting the writ of error coram nobis (Case No. 2:23-cv-00399RAH-CWB). This extraordinary relief is warranted because there was a “complete

absence of all jursidction and the Eleventh Circuit's opinion was without subject

matter, territorial and impersonam jurisdiction despite being challenged at first

instance.

Despite petitioners case being coram non judice, acting ultra vires, the wrongdoer

men, BATFE agent provocateurs, equitably estopped Prosecutors (by written and

oral arguments that the law did not apply to private sales (see lane v. holder and

abramski v. united states), dishonorable District court judges and appellate court

judges engaged in a remarkable feat of judicial alchemy, using sophistry, dialects,

1 The use of any statutes, codes, rules, regulations, or court citations, within any document created by me, at any

time, is only to notice that which is applicable to government officials, and is not intended, nor shall it be construed,

to mean that i have conferred, submitted to, or entered into any jurisdiction alluded to thereby. Moreover it is used

to illustrate principles of law and the repeated injuries of rights protected by the Constitution of the united States of

America by the wrongdoer men acting as agents, prosecutors and judges for want ofjurisdiction and a clear abuse of

power.

Page 7 of 37

semantics, terms of art with different shades of meaning with a judicial gloss, to

engage in dilatory tactics and countless crimes to aid and abet, this jurisdictional

void and commit fraud on the court using structural errors, flawed reasoning, and

misapplications of law as logical proof that Petitioners seemingly (working with

the mockingbird media and communist/Marxist activist judges to propagate)

politically unpopular, but protected rights are criminal, to vilify Petitioner and

persuade their audience of this political heresy2. This deprived Petitioner of his

God given rights of privacy using 18 use 2516 illegally for a lawful act, self

preservation, self-defense, and the right to contract for the disposal of petitioner’s

privately owned personal property of arms under the First, Second, Third, Fourth,

Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, Article 1, Sections I and 7 and

violated fundamental principles of subject-matter jurisdiction and due process by

“using the defunct “hypothetical jurisdiction” to assume a merit’s based

argument refuted by this court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,

523 U.S. 83 (1998).

Other litigation that further supports Petitioner

2 “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political

controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be

applied by the courts. One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and

assembly, [right to keep and bear arms and dispose of ones own lawfully owned private property ]and other

fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections! (West Virginia State

Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) Justice Robert H. Jackson

Page 8 of 37

These errors are clear and indisputable, and no other adequate means exist to attain

relief, as the Eleventh Circuit's decision is final, and certiorari review would not

address the supervisory need to correct these systemic flaws in a timely manner.

Petitioners claim is further supported by ongoing litigation in Texas v. ATF, No.

2:24-cv-00089-Z (N.D. Tex. 2024), where four states (Texas, Louisiana,

Mississippi, Utah), three gun rights organizations (Gun Owners of America,

Tennessee Firearms Association, Virginia Citizens Defense League), and an

individual plaintiff challenge the same ATF Final Rule ("Definition of'Engaged in

the Business' as a Dealer in Firearms," 89 Fed. Reg. 28968) as exceeding statutory

authority, a standard that was used in 2015 when petitioner was unlawfully

convicted. Further supporting the fact that it is arbitrary and capricious, and

violating the APA, Second Amendment (under Bruen), Fourth Amendment

(warrantless inspections), Fifth Amendment (vagueness), and separation of powers,

Article I, Sections 1 and 7. The complaint highlights that Congress, through the

Federal Firearms Act (1938), Gun Control Act (1968), and Firearms Owners'

Protection Act (1986), intentionally narrowed the dealer definition to protect

private, non-commercial sales, a regime the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act

(2022) only modestly amended, but which ATF has unlawfully expanded to

criminalize innocent conduct. On May 19, 2024, Judge Matthew J. Kacsmaryk

issued a.memorandum opinion and order granting a temporary restraining order

Page 9 of 37

(TRO) against enforcement of the Final Rule against certain plaintiffs, finding a

likelihood of success on the merits due to ATF exceeding statutory authority under

the APA (arbitrary and capricious, contrary to law per 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(C);

Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494

U.S. 638 (1990)), void for vagueness (United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319

(2019); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)), infringing the

Second Amendment (no historical analogue for licensing private sales per Bruen;

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); United States v. Hicks, 649 F.

Supp. 3d 357 (W.D. Tex. 2023)), violating the Fourth Amendment (warrantless

inspections), and usurping legislative power (Sessions v. Dimay a, 138 S. Ct. 1204

(2018); Whitman v. United States, 574 U.S. 1003 (2014)). The TRO was extended

to a preliminary injunction on June 11, 2024, and as of August 20, 2025, the case

remains ongoing, with the government’s motion to stay denied on March 5, 2025,

affirming the rule’s likely illegality. Despite all this, the bad actor district court

judge stated my Coram nobis relief had no merit after two years of dilatory tactics.

How the Writ Aids the Supreme Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction:

The writ aids the Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) by

preserving, protecting, and facilitating review (Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380

(/case/cheney-v-united-states-dist-court-for-dc#p380)). Specific ways:

’

Page 10 of 37

1. Corrects Jurisdictional Voids and Structural Errors: Vacates flawed lower

O./ 4

rulings, ensuring clean records for certiorari (Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89

(/case/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment#p89): Resolve jurisdiction

first), preventing mootness from tainted precedents.

2. Resolves Circuit Splits and Inconsistencies: Addresses GCA misapplication

splits (e.g., Kouyate), aiding uniform law application (Sup. Ct. R. 10(a): Cert

for conflicts).

3. Prevents Manifest Injustice and Resource Waste: Halts ongoing harms (e.g.,

TSC listing) and duplicative litigation, conserving judicial resources

(Cheney, 542 U.S. at 382 (/case/cheney-v-united-states-dist-court-for-

dc#p382): Avoid unnecessary burden).

4. Vindicates Fundamental Rights: Corrects multi-Amendment violations,

enabling the Court to enforce constitutional harmony (Marbury, 5 U.S. at

163: Remedies for rights).

3 "Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and

slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that

constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal

construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted

more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen,

and against any stealthy encroachments thereon." (Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)116 U.S. at 635)

Page 11 of 37

5. Supervisory Aid: Clears ultra vires BATFE patterns, aiding future review of

similar cases (Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 583 (/case/ex-parte-peru#p583):

Mandamus for jurisdictional excesses).

6. Mandatory Relief for Void Judgments

7. When a rule providing relief from void judgments applies, it is mandatory,

not discretionary (Omer v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1307 (/case/omer-v-shalala)

(10th Cir. 1994): Relief from void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) is

mandatory). Void judgments lack effect and must be set aside (Klugh v.

United States, 620 F. Supp. 892 (/case/klugh-v-united-states) (D.S.C.

1985)). This reinforces the writ's demand for vacatuer as obligatory.

Exceptional circumstances:

Exceptional Circumstances Warranting Exercise of the Court's Discretionary

Powers, Mandamus is an "extraordinary remedy" reserved for "exceptional

circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power" or "clear abuse of

discretion" (Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81

(/case/cheney-v-united-states-dist-court-for-dc#p380) (2004)). The Court exercises

discretion when the case involves novel, important questions or systemic issues

(Sup. Ct. R. 20.1). Exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of this Court's

mandatory, powers to cure a systemic abuse and usurpation of power by lower

Page 12 of 37

courts “clear absence of jurisdiction” and adequate relief cannot be obtained

in any other court or form, because of open defiance of this court’s precedents,

open rebellion4 and deliberate blindness to legislative intent and enactment,

bad faith of being equitably estopped from both prior written and oral

arguments of the government then attorney general Eric Holder in in Lane v.

Holder, 703 F.3d 668 (4th Cir. 2012), and that they applied only to FFLs and the

primary market, stating that the challenged scheme ’’does not burden the

rights... because they can purchase handguns... from private sellers." And oral

arguments in Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) in this court where

the solicitor General stated it did not apply to the secondary market of private

sales, demonstrating bias and harassment, involuntary servitude, attempted murder

(Petitioner) extrajudicial killing (Bryan Malinowski) disarming of militia, virtual

quartering soldiers and usurpation of jurisdiction.

The lower courts have been a rubber stamp for illegal warrants (see attached

exhibit B) by the agent Provocateurs to be the judge, jury and executioner without

any authority of law to misapply part of the statutory scheme (18 U.S.C. §

921(a)(21)(C) Engaged in the business of outside the statutory scheme to private

sales. Thus, allowing these wrongdoers to plainly and openly violate the due

4,1 If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto

himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) Justice Brandeis Dissent

Page 13 of 37

process clause and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Here, exceptional

circumstances exist:

1. Clear Abuse and Usurpation: The Eleventh Circuit usurped power by

-assuming jurisdiction over private sales the GCA does not cover (Abramski

v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179-80 (/case/abramski-v-united-

states#pl79) (2014)), ignoring jurisdictional voids and structural errors (e.g.,

incomplete jury instructions). This abuse warrants discretion to enforce the

"clear and indisputable" right to dismissal (Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381

(/case/cheney-v-united-states-dist-court-for-dc#p3 81)).

2. Novel Constitutional Questions and Circuit Split: Post-Bruen uncertainty on

GCA's scope, combined with a split (e.g., Kouyate dismissal in D. Colo. vs.

Eleventh Cir. affirmance), violates the equal protection clause of the fifth

amendment and presents novel issues on Commerce Clause limits and multi

Amendment infringements (Second, Fifth, etc.). The Court exercises

discretion for such "important questions of federal law" (Sup. Ct. R. 10(c)),

especially where misapplication enables disarmament contrary to Founders'

intent.

3. Systemic Bad Faith and Injustice: BATFE's ultra vires pattern (e.g., Roh

case, TSC harassment) and court complicity in denying coram nobis relief

Page 14 of 37

evidence bad faith/bias, creating manifest injustice (ongoing punishment,

property seizure). Discretion is warranted to address "exceptional" systemic

overreach threatening liberties (Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 584-85

(/Case/ex-parte-peru#p584) (1943): Mandamus for "clear" rights violations).

4. Public Importance and Gravity: The case implicates disarmament via

misapplied laws, conflicting with the Constitution's design (no delegated

power over private transactions, Federalist No. 45). With media-propagated

narratives enabling this, discretion aids the Court's role in safeguarding

against tyranny (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803): Courts must

provide remedies for rights violations).

5. Misapplication of Federal Law and Equal Protection Violations: Exceptional

circumstances further include the misapplication of federal law and Fifth

Amendment equal protection violations across circuits, warranting

immediate attention to conserve judicial resources and avoid duplicative

proceedings. District courts usurp jurisdiction by misapplying 18 U.S.C. §

921 (a)(21 )(C) (/statute/united-states-code/title- 18-crimes-and-criminalprocedure/part-i-crimes/chapter-44-armss/section-92 1 -definitions) to nonFFL secondary-market sales using 'hypothetical jurisdiction' to reach merits,

contrary to Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83

Page 15 of 37

(/case/steel-co-v-citizens-for-better-environment) (1998), perpetuating a

pattern of disarmament through pretextual enforcement.

6. Focia as Bad Precedent Propagating Errors: Focia's use as precedent in cases

like United States v. Jimenez-Shilon, 34 F.4th 1042 (/case/united-states-v-

jimenez-shilon) (11th Cir. 2022) (rejecting Second Amendment challenges)

and United States v. Gundy, 804 F. App'x 998 (11th Cir. 2020) (affirming

unlicensed dealing), perpetuates misapplication, creating exceptional need

for mandamus to halt flawed rulings' propagation, resolve splits, and avoid

resource waste on void judgments.

7. Failure to act makes these bad actors a government of men, instead of law to

act as their own paramilitary group.

8. It sanctions robbery and theft by allowing BATFE agents to use courts as a

rubber stamp for the misapplication of law and conduct extrajudicial

killing,(Bryan Malinowsky, Arkansas Airport Executive 10th circuit)

kidnapping, robbery, theft of property, libel, slander, disarmament of the

militia, false claims acts violations, torture, torment, harm, undue hardship,

and loss of dignity (Petitioner).

Page 16 of 37

9. It allows the BATFE to unlawfully invade peoples privacy by using 18 use

2516, to illegally spy on people engaging in lawful acts, violating the fourth

amendment.

10.lt sanctions a tyranny that our founders feared. (See Anti-Federalist papers

of 3 and 28.

11 .It allows the judges continued open defiance of this court’s precedents by

continuing to engage in “hypothetical jurisdiction” to illegally allow the

judges to usurp jurisdiction and make it a merit’s based argument refuted in

this courts’ precedent of Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523

U.S. 83 (1998).

12.Failure to act enables the continued flawed convictions and enabling false

imprisonment, libel, slander and void convictions based on belief instead of

law.

■ 13.It allows the BATFE agents, prosecutors, and judges to become the judge in

their own case, rob the jury of their role as fact finder and executioner

violating the separation of powers of Article 1, sections 1 and 7.

14.If Federal criminal laws must “give ordinary people fair warning about what

the law demands of them.” United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323

(2019). Then how does one get a fair trial when the judge tells the jury “I

Page 17 of 37

will tell you what the law is and you decide the facts”. This conflicting

application that the judge decides the law, and prevents the jury from

reading the law, when ordinary people are supposed to be able to get fair

notice is a contradiction that violates the equal protection of the due process

clause of the fifth amendment and the sixth amendment trial by jury.

15.If this court fails to correct this flagrant unconstitutional action, it is

condoning a violation of the third amendment of virtual quartering of

soldiers by allowing BATFE agents to buy virtually any gun on the

secondary market of private sales using websites to monitor transactions, it

allows these agents to unlawfully target any one for prosecution and then

allow the courts as they did in my case to usurp jurisdiction by saying “you

were charged and therefore we have jurisdiction to decide the merits. This is

illogical, it would allow the courts to unlawfully decide sua sponte that they

have jurisdiction of all private sales transactions to decide the merits of, if

someone was subject to the statutory scheme, outside the statutory scheme

that only applies to FFL’s as congresses clear intent. (See Coram Nobis Case

No. 2:23-cv-00399-RAH-CWB 2025 denial, Texas v. ATF, No. 2:24-cv00089-Z (N.D. Tex. 2024), where four states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,

Utah), three gun rights organizations (Gun Owners of America, Tennessee

Arms Association, Virginia Citizens Defense League), and an individual

Page 18 of 37

plaintiff challenge the same ATF Final Rule ("Definition of'Engaged in the

Business' as a Dealer in Armss," 89 Fed. Reg. 28968). And the defunct

hypothetical jurisdiction, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523

U.S. 83 (1998)) Moreover, it allows the BATFE to violate the fourth

amendment by invading privacy of private arms sales.

16.It gives judges a free pass to avoid the rules of strict statutory construction

and violate the separation of powers by deciding for themselves how to

interpret statutes outside of these rules and mi sapply federal law.

17.It causes present, continuous and ongoing irreparable harm, mentally,

physically and financially causing intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

18.It violates your oaths to the constitution and your duty to uphold the law.

Reasons for Granting the Writ Mandamus is warranted:

(1) Petitioner has no other adequate means to attain relief, as the Eleventh Circuit's

decision is final and has been relied upon in subsequent proceedings denying

coram nobis relief;

Page 19 of 37

(2) Petitioner's right to the writ is clear and indisputable, given the Clear absence of

jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit's structural errors and flawed reasoning, of fifth

amendment burden shifting, sixth amendment trial by jury by robbing the jury of

their role and deciding for itself the facts of the case and violating maxims of law

by being a judge in their own case which contravene this Court's precedents; and

(3) Issuance is appropriate under the circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of

justice and to vindicate fundamental rights. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81.

Exceptional circumstances warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary

powers and adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other court or form, because

of bad faith, bias and harassment, and want of jurisdiction.5

The Eleventh Circuit's opinion contains multiple structural errors—defects that

render the proceedings fundamentally unfair and void ab initio, such as

jurisdictional flaws and instructional omissions that allowed conviction for non

criminal conduct. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (structural

errors include biased judge, or omission of essential elements from jury

instructions) and burden shifting. These errors, combined with flawed reasoning,

demand supervisory mandamus.

5 "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto

himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)

Page 20 of 37

The district court's denial of coram nobis relief compounds these errors with

additional flawed reasoning, as analyzed below, further justifying mandamus to

vacate and remand.

The Gun Control Act's provisions, including 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C) and §

923(c), distinguish between Federal Firearms Licensees' (FFLs) business inventory

and personal collections, imposing a one-year holding period for FFLs to transfer

firearms from business to personal use before private disposition.

Petitioner was never an FFL; his transactions were always private sales on the

secondary market, rendering these statutes inapplicable. Misapplying them to non-

FFLs constitutes overreach, tantamount to an embargo on private commerce and a

Third Amendment violation by effectively "quartering" government oversight in

every transaction, monitoring and restricting free exchange and violating the

second amendment as well as the Fifth Amendment substantive due process clause

of disposing one’s own lawfully owned private property of arms.

Strict statutory construction forbids such expansion, as statutes must be read

narrowly to avoid constitutional infirmities. The judges abdicated their duties

in this case by violating the separation of powers of Article 1, section 1 and 7.

1. It is the duty of judges to construe legislation as it is written, not as it might

be read by a lay person or as it might be understood by someone what has

Page 21 of 37

not read it. The judges and court here failed to construe the legislation of the

GCA of 1968 and the discussion in the congressional testimony. Placing

their abuse of power and pathological usurpation above that of the people by

their representatives.6

2. "It is axiomatic that the statutory definition of the term excludes unstated

meanings of that term." (Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987)) This case

never reaches the merits issue because the BATFE and Courts have no

subject matter jurisdiction of private sales. If they did, it would effectively

mean that we don’t have a limited government and they can take jurisdiction

in every single private sales case to decide the merits. Making it a

government of men and not law. This is antithetical to the letter and spirit of

the Constitution for the united States of America and rendering James

Madison federalist paper 45, meaningless.

3. "A court must interpret words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the

statutory context, structure, history and purpose. All these tools of divine

meaning, not to mention common sense which is a fortunate side benefit of

construing statutory terms." (Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169

6 Dr. Gabor Mate, concludes that addiction to power is greater than addiction to opioids and concludes that

addictions to power are more destructive on a global scale, as they drive behaviors that exploit people and the

planet, while substance addictions primarily harm individuals. Dr. Gabor Mate, who has extensively discussed

addiction in both substance and behavioral forms In his 2012 TEDxRio+20 talk titled "The Power of Addiction and

the Addiction to Power,"

Page 22 of 37

(2014)). Yet, in this case they are misapplying federal law by applying

18 U.S.C. 921(a)(21)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. §

922(a)(5) outside the statutory scheme to private sales.

4. "Trial judges and [Appellate Judges] are presumed to know the law and to

apply it in making their decisions." Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990)

5. Here though, the judges are engaging in “hypothetical jurisdiction” to usurp

power and jurisdiction to decide the merits of the case, despite Supreme

Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1998) is 523 U.S.

83 (1998) telling them that, “The requirement that jurisdiction be

established as a threshold matter “spring[s] from the nature and limits

of the judicial power of the United States” and is “inflexible and without

exception.” Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382

(1884).

6. Despite Petitioner’s objections to subject matter jurisdiction at first instance

and every subsequent hearing the judges became a judge in their own case

and defied law and Supreme court case precedents.

7. "When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions of

government, the principles upon which they are supposed to rest, and review

the history of their development, we are constrained to conclude that they do

not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely personal and

Page 23 of 37

arbitrary power. Sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is

the author and source of law; but, in our system, while sovereign powers are

delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the

people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts. And the law

is the definition and limitation of power."(Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.

356 (1886))

8. “The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not

much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the

law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle, that the power of

punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.”

“To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language

must authorize us to say so. It would be dangerous indeed to carry the

principle that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute is

within its provisions so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the

statute because it is of equal atrocity or of kindred character with those

which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized in

expounding criminal law, it has been in cases of considerable irritation

which it would be unsafe to consider as precedents forming a general rule

for other cases. (United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (5 Wheat.) (1820).

Page 24 of 37

9. “It is fundamental that an agency may not bootstrap itself into an area in

which it has no jurisdiction” (City of Arlington v. FCC, 467 U.S. 689

(1984)).The right to use and enjoy, and to acquire and sell, one's property is

a fundamental right protected by the state and federal constitutions (see the

4th and 5 th Amendments).

10. As recently confirmed in United States v. Kouyate, No. l:24-cr-00131-RM,

2024 WL 3486489 (D. Colo. July 17, 2024), “the Supreme Court has made

clear that the GCA does not cover secondary market sales by non-dealers.”

In Kouyate, the district court dismissed charges under § 922(a)(1)(A) for

unlicensed dealing, citing Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 176,

180-81 (2014), which holds that the GCA is targeted at dealers funneling

weapons with background checks and records, but "does not touch" sales

between private individuals. The court in Kouyate emphasized that the GCA

"does not cover all arms transactions" and is aimed at regular, repetitive

purchases for “criminal purposes or terrorism”, not private secondary

market sales. Based on this, the case was dismissed, further illustrating the

misapplication in Petitioner's case and supporting Vacatuer here.

1 l.This disparate treatment across circuits—where secondary market sales lead

to dismissal in the 10th Circuit but conviction in the 11th—violates the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment by denying uniform

Page 25 of 37

application of federal law, creating arbitrary geographic disparities in

fundamental rights protection.

The congressional record of the GCA debates unequivocally confirms that the

Act was not intended to regulate private, non-commercial secondary-market

sales nor could they.

1. In the House, Rep. John D. Dingell (D-MI) stated on July 19, 1968: "This

bill does not affect the sportsman or the private citizen who wishes to buy a

gun for his own use... It does not interfere with the rights of citizens to own

guns. It provides for the licensing of manufacturers, importers, and dealers

in armss... The bill will not cover or prohibit the sale of arms by private

individuals to other private individuals within their own State" (Cong. Rec.,

Vol. 114, p. 21791).

2. On September 18, 1968, Dingell reiterated: "The bill will not cover or

prohibit the sale of arms by private individuals to other private individuals

within their own State. It will not prohibit a citizen from giving or lending a

gun to a friend or relative for temporary use in hunting or other lawful

purposes. It will not prohibit the return of arms after repair or customizing"

(Cong. Rec., Vol. 114, p. 27462). Rep. Robert McClory (R-IL) added: "The

bill carefully protects the rights of the law-abiding citizen to own and traffic

in arms for lawful purposes... It imposes no restrictions on the sale or trade

Page 26 of 37

of arms by private individuals as long as the sale or trade does not constitute

engaging in the business" (Cong. Rec., Vol. 114, p. 21784 (July 19, 1968)).

3. In the Senate, Sen. Thomas J. Dodd (D-CT), the primary sponsor, stated on

April 29, 1968: "The bill imposes no restrictions on the sale or trade of arms

by private individuals as long as the sale or trade does not constitute

engaging in the business. The committee believes that licensing should be

required only for those who are engaged in the business of dealing in arms...

4. The bill would not apply to a person disposing occasionally of his personal

arms" (Cong. Rec., Vol. 114, p. 11069). Dodd further noted on May 9, 1968:

"The legislation is designed to regulate the interstate traffic in arms... It does

not affect the law-abiding citizen who uses arms for sport or recreation, or

the person who needs a gun for self-protection. It is aimed at the criminal

and the irresponsible" (Cong. Rec., Vol. 114, p. 12284).

5. Committee reports reinforce this: The House Report No. 90-1577 states:

"This subparagraph excludes from the definition of'dealer' those individuals

who engage in occasional sales or who sell all or part of their personal

collection of arms. The committee believes that licensing should be required

only for those who are engaged in the business of dealing in arms... The bill

would not apply to a person disposing occasionally of his personal armss"

(H.R. Rep. No. 90-1577, at 14 (1968)).

Page 27 of 37

6. The Senate Report No. 90-1097 similarly provides: "The committee believes

that licensing should be required only for those who are engaged in the

business of dealing in arms... The bill would not apply to a person disposing

occasionally of his personal arms.

7. Moreover, as history teaches, congresses discussion about for “hunting or

sporting purposes” is a canard and had nothing to do with the reason for the

second amendment. Furthermore, congress is presumed to legislate against

the backdrop of constitutional norms, presumptions, or limitations (often

through interpretive canons like constitutional avoidance or clear statement

rules, which reflect the assumption that Congress intends to act

constitutionally unless clearly stated otherwise) Bond v. United States, 572

U.S. 844 (2014), EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991),

Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.

Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568

(1988): Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps'

of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). This implicates the unconstitutional

conditions doctrine, congress can’t take your property of contracting the

disposal of your own private personal property without out just

compensation under the fifth amendment.

Page 28 of 37

8. Furthermore, this Supreme Court has recognized that provisions of the

constitution do not conflict. Bolling v. Sharpe (1954), Heart of Atlanta

Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964), Goldstein v. California (1973)

9. Judgments rendered without jurisdiction are void and may be attacked at any

time, directly or collaterally, as they are nullities that bind no one and entitle

no respect (Elliott v. Piersol, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828): "If the court acts

without authority, its judgments and orders are nullities"; Vallely v.

Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 353 (/case/vallely-v-

northem-fire-ins-co#p353) (1920): Void for lack of jurisdiction; Kalb v.

Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438 (/case/kalb-v-feuerstein#p438) (1940): "Null

and void"; United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 295

(/case/united-states-v-mine-workers#p295) (1947): Attackable anytime;

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291

(/case/world-wide-volkswagen-corp-v-woodson#p291) (1980): Void under

due process). As summarized in 30A Am. Jur. Judgments §§ 44, 45, a void

judgment "has no legal or binding force... All proceedings founded on the

void judgment are themselves regarded as invalid." The Eleventh Circuit's

affirmance is thus void, warranting mandamus to declare it so and provide

mandatory relief. 11th circuit bad actors acting as judges violated the

separation of powers of Article 1, section 1 and 7 and arrogated it itself

Page 29 of 37

unilaterally legislative policymaking and lawmaking power and failing “to

confine itself to it’s proper role and ensuring that the other branches do so as

well”. (City of Arlington, supra) Effectively subverting the Constitution and

laws of the United States and levying war as well. (See 63 CJS Section 10,

11, 12 on page 816).

10.The BATFE and prosecutors were equitably estopped and knew in 2012 that

§§ 922(a)(1)(A) and (a)(5) did not apply to the secondary market, as argued

by then-Attomey General Eric Holder in Lane v. Holder, 703 F.3d 668

(/case/lane-v-holder-2) (4th Cir. 2012), that they applied only to FFLs and

the primary market, stating that the challenged scheme "does not burden

the rights... because they can purchase handguns... from private sellers."

This knowledge persisted through subsequent years, including the

indictment, conviction, affirmation, sentencing, imprisonment, release,

reimprisonment, and denial of coram nobis relief. The government is

equitably estopped from prosecuting such sales after admitting they are

unregulated (Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467

U.S. 51, 59 (/case/heckler-v-community-health-services#p59) (1984):

Estoppel against government for affirmative misconduct; here, positional

inconsistency shows bad faith).

Page 30 of 37

11 .The term "due process of law" is the exact equivalent as the phrase "law of

the land " ( See Magna Carta) and Petitioner rights were infringed under the

fifth and sixth amendments because he was prosecuted under no law at all

but agency internal Policy that is arbitrary and capricious without

jurisdiction. " It is fundamental that an agency may not bootstrap itself into

an area in which it has no jurisdiction. ( City of Arlington v FCC 133 S. Ct.

1863, 185 L. Ed. 2d 941 (2013)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

The GCA does not apply to non-FFL private sales, as confirmed in

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (/case/abramski-v-united-states)

(2014) (regulates only licensed dealers/primary market), and United States

v. Kouyate, No. l:24-cr-00131-RM (D. Colo. 2024) (dismissing similar

charges). This voided federal subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §

3231 (/statute/united-states-code/title-18-crimes-and-criminalprocedure/part-ii-criminal-procedure/chapter-211-jurisdiction-andvenue/section-3231-district-courts), as confirmed by precedents

distinguishing merits-based thresholds from jurisdictional bars (Arbaugh

v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (/case/arbaugh-v-y-h-corp-7) (2006)). The case

implicates a systemic overreach, infringing Second and Fifth Amendment

rights without historical basis (Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)).

Page 31 of 37

1) In Texas v. Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, No. 2:24-

cv-00089-Z (N.D. Tex. 2024), U.S. District Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk issued

a nationwide injunction of the ATF rule on July 23, 2024, finding it exceeds

statutory authority, violates the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706),

and contravenes congressional intent to protect private sales, with the ruling

upheld by the Fifth Circuit on February 14, 2025.

2) In United States v.. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), the Supreme Court held

that the Second Amendment restricts only the federal government from

infringing the right to keep and bear arms, as it is a pre-existing right not

granted by the Constitution, and federal authority does not extend to private ’

conduct or state actions absent specific delegation.

3) Federal statutes since the Federal Firearms Act of 1938 have consistently

distinguished between licensed dealers (FFLs) and private sellers, with ATF's

delegated authority under 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) limited to regulating FFLs and

enforcing background checks for commercial sales, not extending to intrastate

or interstate private transfers between non-dealers.

4) The ATF rule imposes criminal penalties (up to 5 years imprisonment under 18

U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D)) on private sellers without clear statutory authorization,

Page 32 of 37

creating vagueness by using undefined presumptions (e.g., "repetitive" sales),

which fails to provide fair notice of prohibited conduct.

5) The Fifth Amendment prohibits takings of private property without just

compensation and protects the right to contract, as private arms sales involve

personal private property and voluntary agreements historically free from

federal interference.

6) The government, prosecutors and judges were acting in bad faith because they

were estopped from taking contrary positions in both oral arguments and

written arguments in Lane v. Holder, Supra and Abramski v. United States,

Supra that (18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C)) 8 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(a)(5) only apply to FFL’s.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The ATF's Final Rule is unlawful, as it exceeds statutory authority under the

GCA, FOPA, and BSCA, which do not delegate power to regulate or

criminalize private, non-commercial firearm sales, rendering the rule void

under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)) for being in

excess of jurisdiction. And especially in Petitioners case here as the BATFE

and judges were misapply federal law and applying this unconstitional

scheme well before the final rule in Texas v. BATFE, supra

Page 33 of 37

2. ATF lacks any jurisdiction over private gun sales, as federal authority is

confined to regulating licensed dealers (FFLs), not intrastate and interstate

transfers between non-dealers, making any attempt to impose licensing or

presumptions on private sellers a “clear absence of jurisdiction”.

3. The Second Amendment, as interpreted in United States v. Cruikshank, 92

U.S. 542 (1875), prohibits federal infringement on the right to keep and bear

arms, including through regulations that burden private sales without

historical analogue, rendering the ATF rule unconstitutional and void.

4. The ATF rule is void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment's Due

Process Clause, as its presumptions fail to provide ordinary people with fair

notice of what constitutes "engaged in the business," and who it applies to,

violating principles in Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972),

and encouraging arbitrary enforcement.

5. Imposition of the ATF rule constitutes an unlawful taking under the Fifth

Amendment, as it deprives owners of the right to dispose of private property

(firearms) through voluntary contracts without just compensation, exceeding

federal police power and shielding bad actors from accountability.

6. Courts are bound by strict statutory construction under Loper Bright

Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), requiring independent

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interpretation without deference to agencies, and any regulation contrary to

the Constitution or statutes is notwithstanding and void ab initio.

7. The Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2) mandates that the

Constitution is paramount, and federal actions attempting to regulate private

sales infringe on reserved state powers under the Tenth Amendment, lacking

any enumerated authority to rule over the people in this manner.

Conclusion

The constitution either says what it means, and means what it says or it does not.

The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government

of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if

the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right. Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In fact and law, the bad actors do not represent the

UNITED STATES and is not her agent, officer or representative. Petitioner is

seeking to establish the UNITED STATES Law and vindicate her integrity as he

maintains his own right.7 This court has a duty and obligation to end the political

heresy of giving administrators/judges and BATFE agents any discretionary

authority to legislate from the bench and become the judge, jury and executioner in

7 "The defendant in error is not her officer, her agent, or her representative, in the matter complained of; for he

has acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her express commands. The plaintiff in error, in fact and

in law, is representing her as he seeks to establish her law, and vindicates her integrity as he maintains his own

right." Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1885)

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any case involving secondary market sales. The canard that judges have discretion

using “hypothetical jurisdiction” to get to the merits of a case involving private

sales this court should resolutely set its face against in this instance.

Demand for Relief

Wherefore, Petitioner demands that this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing

the Eleventh Circuit to vacate its opinion, dismiss the indictment for lack of

jurisdiction, or remand for vacatuer consistent with this Court's precedents.

Petitioner also requests any further relief as may be just and proper, including:

• Granting the Writ of Error Coram Nobis filed February 26, 2025.

• Vacating Petitioner’s convictions on Counts 1-3 of November 24, 2015.

• Declaring the warrant, jury instructions, and jurisdiction unconstitutional.

• Expunging all records that defame Petitioner and are Petitioner's private

proprietary property, with the record exemplified, and vacating the 11th

Circuit opinion.

• Re-affirm Petitioner’s rights, including arms ownership, and expunging false

TSDB designations.

• Returning seized property, (status quo ante) including 2,874 Bitcoins (valued

at $278,000,000 as of March 12, 2025), arms, and a damaged safe.

• Enjoining the BATFE from enforcing any and all of their regulations against

Petitioner.8

8 “The right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,” Justice

Louis Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).

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• Prohibit any and all administrator’s acting as judges in the 11th circuit from

adjudicating any cases of the self-governing Petitioner without explicit

authorized written consent protected by Article 4, section 4 of the

Constitution for the united States of America.

• Awarding $100,000,000 in restitution for constitutional violations.

Respectfull^gb^n^u,

Michael-Albert Focia, Sui Juris

c/o 1043 Stableway Road

Pike Road, Alabama [36064]

Email: chiefmichacl@protonmail.com''

Phone: 972-677-3087

Declaration

I, Michael-Albert Focia, declare under the pains and penalties of bearing false

witness in the nature of 28 U.S.C. § 1746(1) that the foregoing is true, correct, and

materially complete, supported by evidence in the record. I am 57 years of age, of

sound mind, and competent to testify.

Executed on this 8th day of September, two thousand t

Lord and Savior.

year of our

Michael-Albert: Focia, Sui Juris, in

propria persona

Certificate & Proof of Service

I certify that a c^»vof Aisnetjiion was served on Respondents via postage prepaid

via USPO

2ul5.

Michael-Albert: Focia; Creditor in fact to the United States.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.