Opposition Brief — Christopher Matthew Henderson, Petitioner v. Alabama

No. 25-5953

In the Supreme Court of the United States

──────────────────────────────

CHRISTOPHER HENDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Respondent.

──────────────────────────────

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

═══════════════════════════════

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

═══════════════════════════════

Steve Marshall

Attorney General

A. Barrett Bowdre

Solicitor General

Jordan Mauldin

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

STATE OF ALABAMA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

501 Washington Ave.

Montgomery, AL 36130

(334) 242-7300

Jordan.Shelton@AlabamaAG.gov

Counsel for Respondent State of Alabama

JANUARY 23, 2026

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner Christopher Henderson murdered—by stabbing, shooting, and setting them on fire—his estranged wife, their unborn daughter (cut from his wife’s

womb), his elderly mother-in-law, his eight-year-old stepson, and his one-year-old

nephew. For that, he was sentenced to death.

Henderson argues that his sentence was unconstitutional because his accomplice, who pleaded guilty, cooperated with law enforcement, and testified at trial

against Henderson, was spared the death penalty. At the penalty phase, Henderson’s

counsel argued that the jury should consider his accomplice’s sentence—life without

parole—when weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of his crimes.

The prosecution responded by pointing out that, in contrast to his accomplice, Henderson was the driving force behind the murders, refused to cooperate with law enforcement, and offered no indication of remorse. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals rejected Henderson’s contention that the prosecutor’s response unlawfully commented on his right to remain silent and that his sentence therefore had to be reversed.

The question presented is whether, during penalty-phase closing arguments,

the Fifth Amendment prohibits the prosecution from rebutting defense counsel’s assertions by commenting on the lack of evidence that the defendant expressed remorse

for his crimes.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................ ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................... 1

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ................................ 5

I. The Decision Below Was Correct And Unremarkable. .......................... 5

II. Any Split Is Not Implicated. ................................................................... 9

CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 11

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Estelle v. Smith,

451 U.S. 454 (1981) .................................................................................................... 6

Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609 (1965) .................................................................................................... 6

Henderson v. State,

CR-2021-0044, 2024 WL 1946585 (Ala. Crim. App. May 3, 2024) ......... 4, 5, 6, 7, 10

Isaacs v. Head,

300 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................. 6

Jenkins v. Anderson,

447 U.S. 231 (1980) .................................................................................................... 6

Mitchell v. United States,

526 U.S. 314 (1999) ................................................................................................ 6, 9

United States v. Hasting,

461 U.S. 499 (1983) .................................................................................................... 9

United States v. Jones,

299 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 2002) ..................................................................................... 8

United States v. Knowles,

66 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1995) ................................................................................ 6, 7

United States v. Vazquez-Larrauri,

778 F.3d 276 (1st Cir. 2015)....................................................................................... 6

United States v. Wells,

623 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010) ...................................................................................... 6

White v. Woodall,

572 U.S. 415 (2014) .............................................................................................. 9, 10

Whittenburg v. Werner Enterprises Inc.,

561 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................. 8

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. On August 4, 2015, Christopher Henderson illegally entered the home of his

estranged in-laws and murdered five of the family’s most vulnerable members: his

pregnant wife, Kristen Smallwood, who was due to deliver later that month; their

unborn daughter, Loryn Brooke Smallwood; his elderly mother-in-law, Carol Jean

Smallwood; his eight-year-old stepson, Clayton Chambers; and his one-year-old

nephew, Eli Sokolowski. After stabbing and shooting the victims, Henderson set the

home on fire. Within minutes, the victims’ bodies—including Loryn’s, cruelly cut from

Kristen’s womb—were consumed by the flames.

Henderson and Kristen began their relationship in 2014. At the time, Henderson was still married to Rhonda Carlson—his eventual accomplice in the murders.

(R. 1758-60.) Henderson broke up with Carlson and married Kristen. (R. 1499-1500,

1758-60.) In May 2015, Henderson, Kristen, and Clayton moved in with Kristen’s

parents. (R. 1504-03.) Kristen’s sister and her husband, along with their son, Eli,

were also living in the Smallwood home. (R. 1499-1500.) Henderson and Kristen began having issues in their marriage and, by June 2015, Kristen’s father asked Henderson to leave. (R. 1504-05.)

Henderson reconnected with Carlson. (R. 1760-62.) She testified at trial that

Henderson was angry and felt he had been mistreated by Kristen’s father. (R. 176465.) As his anger intensified, Henderson eventually formed a plan to “tak[e] out the

entire family.” (R. 1766.) Carlson was glad to help him because she too resented and

blamed Kristen for the breakdown of her marriage with Henderson. (R. 1823-24.)

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Henderson then researched, planned, and prepared to kill the Smallwoods. He

searched the internet for how to break into the home, searching for “how to use a

lockpick gun” and “how to break a house window with no sound.” (R. 1745.) He also

inquired into handguns with “quiet rounds” and what happens when a person is shot.

(R. 1745.) Finally, Henderson purchased the necessary tools and practiced using

them. (R. 1742.) He decided he and Carlson would break into the home during the

day, while the men were at work, and murder the women and children. (R. 1771.)

On the afternoon of August 4, 2015, Henderson and Carlson waited near the

Smallwood home until Kristen left to pick up Clayton from school. (R. 1775.) Carlson

dropped Henderson off, where he remained with Jean (his mother-in-law) and Eli (his

one-year-old nephew) until Kristen and Clayton arrived. (R. 1776-77.) As planned,

Henderson eventually contacted Carlson and told her to bring the gas container. (R.

1778.) When she arrived, Carlson attempted to enter the house through a door in the

garage, but she found a body lying on the ground, obstructing the doorway. (R. 1779.)

Henderson told her to use the front door instead; when she entered, she saw “blood

on the carpet and all over him.” (R. 1779.) Henderson poured gasoline throughout the

house and lit the home on fire. (R. 1779-80.) The couple then left in Carlson’s vehicle.

(R. 1780.)

After the fire was extinguished, investigators discovered the bodies of Jean,

Clayton, Eli, Kristen, and Loryn inside the home. (R. 1484, 1488, 1627-69.) Law enforcement accessed surveillance videos recorded by two exterior cameras. (R. 157279.) The videos, which show Henderson and Carlson at the home, were shown to the

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jury and corroborated Carlson’s testimony. (R. 1572-79.) Although no video shows

Henderson entering the house, he is seen fleeing through the front door of the residence barefoot. (R. 1572-79.)

2. Once arrested and advised of his Miranda rights, Henderson refused to

speak to police. (R. 1870.) Carlson, on the other hand, cooperated with law enforcement and gave several statements. She also testified at Henderson’s trial. (R. 1758.)

She told the jury about her role in the murders and acknowledged that she received

a plea deal: In exchange for her truthful testimony, she was allowed to plead guilty

to her pending capital murder charges and receive a sentence of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole. (R. 1758.) Although investigators collected evidence

independently connecting Henderson to the murders, Carlson’s testimony provided

the jury with the details of his plan and how he carried it out. (R. 1545-60, 1565-68,

1572-79, 1701-02, 1718-22, 1726-27, 1864.) Henderson was convicted of fifteen counts

of capital murder. (R. 2082-87.)

At the penalty phase, defense counsel repeatedly argued that it was fundamentally unjust for Henderson to face the death penalty while Carlson received a life

sentence. Counsel urged the jury to recognize that a single mitigating circumstance

could outweigh the aggravating factors and argued that Carlson’s sentence could

serve as the decisive factor in their deliberations. (R. 2112-13.) The State countered

by pointing out that the evidence demonstrated that Henderson was the more culpable actor given his level of involvement in planning and executing the murders. (R.

2207.) And unlike Henderson, prosecutors noted, Carlson pleaded guilty and

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cooperated with law enforcement, which is why she received a sentence of life without

parole. (R. 2207.)

Henderson also presented testimony from several witnesses, including a mitigation specialist. (R. 2121-67.) The mitigation specialist testified that she had developed a relationship with Henderson and his family after spending hours working on

the case. (R. 2145-46.) She stated that she had personally met with Henderson ten to

fifteen times. (R. 2157.) At closing argument, the prosecutor responded to this evidence by highlighting that, despite all the time she spent with Henderson, the mitigation specialist “never mentioned remorse.” (R. 2193.) The prosecutor continued: “In

any of those conversations, in any of her research about him, never once, until I just

mentioned it, has the word ‘remorse’ come out.” (R. 2193.) The prosecutor revisited

the theme during rebuttal argument, again noting that the evidence and the mitigation expert’s relationship with Henderson demonstrated no indication of remorse. (R.

2208.)

The jury unanimously found that each of the fifteen counts of capital murder

was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. By a vote of eleven-to-one, it then recommended that Henderson be sentenced to death. (R. 2232-41.) The court followed the

jury’s recommendation. (C. 252-80.)

3. Henderson did not object to the State’s comments on remorse at trial and

raised the issue for the first time on direct appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals. See Henderson v. State, CR-2021-0044, 2024 WL 1946585, at *34 (Ala. Crim.

App. May 3, 2024). The ACCA reviewed the prosecution’s penalty-phase arguments

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for plain error and noted that remorse is a proper subject of closing arguments. Accordingly, it reasoned, the jury would not have “naturally and necessarily taken the

prosecutor’s argument to be a comment on Henderson’s decision not to testify.” Id. at

*36. The court also determined that, considering the context, the prosecutor’s comments that Carlson accepted responsibility was “not intended to draw attention to

the fact that Henderson had chosen not to testify” but rather “was an attempt to explain, in response to defense counsel’s argument regarding fundamental fairness,

why the State had offered Carlson a less severe sentence than it was pursuing against

Henderson.” Id. at *37. The court affirmed Henderson’s convictions and death sentence. Id. at *39.

Henderson petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari,

which that court denied on June 20, 2025. Henderson v. State, No. SC-2024-0555.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Henderson’s petition presents neither an important federal question nor a genuine conflict among the courts. It simply asks this Court to review an unpreserved

issue that was correctly resolved below. The Court should deny the petition.

I.

The Decision Below Was Correct And Unremarkable.

Henderson claims that his sentence must be vacated because the prosecution

violated his Fifth Amendment rights by improperly commenting on his failure to testify during the initial and rebuttal closing arguments at the penalty phase of his

trial.1 Pet. 13-16. But there was no error below, and this case would be a poor vehicle

1 In his petition, Henderson also references a question the prosecution directed to

Investigator Eugene Nash in the guilt phase. Pet. 14-15. These facts are outside the

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for review regardless because Henderson did not object to the statements at trial and,

given the atrocious nature of his crimes, any error was harmless.

“The Fifth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to remain silent during his criminal trial and prevents the prosecution from commenting on the silence

of a defendant who asserts the right.” Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235 (1980)

(citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)). This prohibition extends to

penalty phase proceedings. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981); Mitchell v.

United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999).

In applying this guarantee, courts distinguish between impermissible commentary on a defendant’s silence from permissible commentary on the evidence. See,

e.g., Isaacs v. Head, 300 F.3d 1232, 1267-72 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v.

Vazquez-Larrauri, 778 F.3d 276, 285-87 (1st Cir. 2015); United States v. Wells, 623

F.3d 332, 338-40 (6th Cir. 2010). For instance, courts ask whether the prosecutor’s

statement was “manifestly intended to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to

testify” or “was of such character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it

to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.” United States v. Knowles, 66

scope of his question presented, which asks this Court to consider whether the Fifth

Amendment prohibits the prosecution and sentencing court from drawing inferences

from a defendant’s silence “[i]n the sentencing phase of a capital trial.” Pet. i. Rule

14.1(a) requires that the question presented be expressed concisely in relation to the

circumstances of the case. Whether the prosecution may comment on post-arrest silence in the guilt phase is a question that was neither presented in Henderson’s petition nor fairly included in the one question he did present. This Court should therefore not consider it. In any event, Henderson’s argument was addressed and correctly

rejected by the court below. See Henderson, 2024 WL 1946585, at *34-35.

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F.3d 1146, 1162-63 (11th Cir. 1995). “The comment must be examined in context.” Id.

at 1163.

The court below applied this standard when it reviewed Henderson’s claim that

the prosecutor improperly commented on his silence during his closing arguments at

the penalty phase. Henderson, 2024 WL 1946585, at *36-37. Examining the context

of the prosecution’s closing arguments, the court explained:

[T]he jury would have understood the prosecutor’s argument to be nothing more than a comment on the fact that [Henderson’s mitigation specialist] had not testified that she had observed any signs of remorse during her meetings with Henderson, i.e., a comment on the evidence (or

lack of evidence), which was proper.

Id. at *36.

The court also properly determined that the prosecutor’s argument that Carlson took accountability for her actions “was not intended to draw attention to the fact

that Henderson had chosen not to testify,” and the court noted that the jury would

not have “‘naturally and necessarily taken’ the argument that way.” Id. at *37. Instead, the court explained, “that part of the prosecutor’s argument was an attempt to

explain, in response to defense counsel’s argument regarding fundamental fairness,

why the State had offered Carlson a less severe sentence.” Id. The court thus concluded that the prosecutor’s comments did not violate Henderson’s Fifth Amendment

rights. Id. at *37-38. That holding was consistent with federal law and was in no

sense groundbreaking.

While Henderson asserts that the only way he could have rebutted the prosecutor’s arguments was by testifying, Pet. 15, this is not accurate. Had he had any

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remorse, Henderson’s witnesses—like the mitigation specialist who met with him repeatedly—could have told the jury about it. She did not. The Fifth Amendment safeguards a defendant’s choice to testify or not testify; it does not immunize him from

all the potentially negative consequences that may arise from that choice. United

States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 111 (2nd Cir. 2002).

The fact that Henderson did not object to the error at trial also makes his petition a poor vehicle for review. It is notable that defense counsel, having heard the

prosecutor’s arguments in real time, evidently did not find the comments to be objectionable. And preservation is particularly critical because the presiding trial judge is

“uniquely positioned to assess the prejudicial effect of an improper argument in the

context of the overall trial, as well as to fashion an appropriately tailored remedy.”

Whittenburg v. Werner Enterprises Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2009).

In any event, Henderson cannot show prejudice by any error. It is hardly surprising that a man who stabbed and shot five of his family members (including his

eight-year-old stepson and one-year-old nephew), cut his unborn daughter out of his

wife’s womb, and set their bodies on fire was sentenced to death. Henderson was not

penalized for remaining silent; he was penalized for his heinous crimes. Notably, in

its 29-page sentencing order, the trial court2 mentioned Henderson’s lack of remorse

only once and did not treat it as a non-statutory aggravating factor. (C.279, 264-67.)

Rather, the court was clear that it considered death a proper sentence because

2 Alabama Laws Act 2017-131 amended the Code of Alabama to eliminate judicial

override. Henderson was charged prior to the amendment; therefore, the trial court

was the sentencer in his case.

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Henderson “coldly and meticulously planned and prepared for the killings” and “was

merciless and cruel to blameless, innocent, and vulnerable children.” (C. 279.) Given

that it is hard to imagine a crime more worthy of death than Henderson’s, any error

was harmless. E.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 (1983) (rejecting view

that Griffin error is per se error requiring automatic reversal and instead applying

harmless-error review). The court should deny the petition.

II.

Any Split Is Not Implicated.

Henderson claims (at 16-20) that this Court’s decisions in Mitchell, 526 U.S. at

314, and later in White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014), have produced division among

the lower courts over what adverse inferences may be drawn from a defendant’s silence at sentencing. But even assuming a split exists, Henderson’s case does not fall

within it because—as explained above—the prosecution did not comment on his silence. And while lower courts have adopted varying approaches to the issue left open

in Mitchell, those differences do not require the Court’s involvement in this case. Under current law, these cases demand a fact-specific, case-by-case analysis, and the

issue is often not outcome determinative.

In Mitchell, the Court held that the sentencing court cannot draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s silence when determining facts relating to the circumstances and details of the crime. 526 U.S. at 328. The Court declined to decide

whether a defendant’s silence may be used to infer a lack of remorse or a failure to

accept responsibility. Id. at 330. Then in White, the Court addressed whether a state

court’s determination was objectively unreasonable under the Antiterrorism and

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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) when it held that a trial court did not

violate the Fifth Amendment when it refused to give a blanket “no-adverse-inference”

instruction following a defendant’s decision to remain silent. 572 U.S. at 418. The

Court noted that Mitchell framed its holding narrowly, suggesting it was limited to

inferences concerning the factual circumstances of the crime, and reasoned that

“Mitchell suggests that some actual inferences might be permissible at the penalty

phase.” Id. at 422. That conclusion was sufficient to establish that the state court’s

decision was not objectively unreasonable. Id. at 423. Mitchell and White thus leave

open the possibility that courts may permit certain penalty-phase inferences from a

defendant’s silence, and lower courts have adopted varying fact-specific approaches

to that issue. See Pet. 16-20.

But those approaches are not implicated here. Regardless of any split in authority on the Mitchell question, Henderson’s case does not implicate it because the

prosecution did not comment on his silence or draw an adverse inference from his

failure to testify. Again, as the court below noted, the prosecutor’s remarks were nothing more than a comment on the testimony by Henderson’s mitigation specialist—a

permissible comment on the evidence (or the absence of it) rather than Henderson’s

decision not to testify. Henderson, 2024 WL 1946585, at *36-37. Likewise, the court

correctly held that the jury would not have naturally and necessarily interpreted the

prosecution’s comments regarding Carlon’s acceptance of responsibility as highlighting Henderson’s silence. Id. at *37. Thus, Henderson’s case does not come close to the

questions left unresolved by Mitchell. There is no need for further review.

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should deny certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Steve Marshall

Attorney General

A. Barrett Bowdre

Solicitor General

Jordan Mauldin

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

STATE OF ALABAMA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

501 Washington Ave.

Montgomery, AL 36130

(334) 242-7300

Jordan.Shelton@AlabamaAG.gov

Counsel for Respondent State of Alabama

JANUARY 23, 2026

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No. 25-5953

In the Supreme Court of the United States

──────────────────────────────

CHRISTOPHER HENDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Respondent.

──────────────────────────────

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Jordan Mauldin, do hereby certify that on this date, January 23, 2026,

I served a copy of the enclosed BRIEF IN OPPOSITION on counsel for Petitioner Henderson by email, as follows:

Alicia A. D’Addario

adaddario@eji.org

Steve Marshall

Attorney General

A. Barrett Bowdre

Solicitor General

Jordan Mauldin

Assistant Attorney General

Counsel of Record

STATE OF ALABAMA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

501 Washington Ave.

Montgomery, AL 36130

(334) 242-7300

Jordan.Shelton@AlabamaAG.gov

Counsel for Respondent State of Alabama

JANUARY 23, 2026

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