Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stephen Lambert, Petitioner v. Ross Casteel, York City Police Officer

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 24-2946

STEPHEN LAMBERT,

Appellant

v.

ROSS CASTEEL, York City Police Officer, Badge #103

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. l:22-cv-01220)

SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: CHAGARES, ChiefJudge, HARDIMAN, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE,

RESTREPO, BIBAS, PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS, FREEMAN,

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, CHUNG, and NYGAARD,* Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellant Stephen Lambert in the above­

captioned case having been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of this

Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active service,

and no judge who concurred in the decision having asked for rehearing, and a majority of

the judges of the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the petition for

rehearing by the panel and the Court en banc is denied.

By the Court,

s/ Arianna J. Freeman

Circuit Judge

* Judge Nygaard’s vote is limited to panel rehearing.

Appendix A

Dated: July 1, 2025

Gch/cc: Stephen Lambert

Leticia J. Santiago, Esq.

DLD-092

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 24-2946

STEPHEN LAMBERT,

Appellant

v.

ROSS CASTEEL, York City Police Officer, Badge #103

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. l:22-cv-01220)

District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 27, 2025

Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

JUDGMENT

This cause came to be considered on the record from the United States District

Court for Middle District of Pennsylvania and was submitted for possible dismissal

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and for possible summary action pursuant to Third

Appendix A

Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 on February 27, 2025. On consideration whereof, it is

now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED by this Court that the judgment of the District Court

entered October 10, 2024, be and the same hereby is affirmed. All of the above in

accordance with the opinion of this Court.

ATTEST:

s/ Patricia S. Dodszuweit

Clerk

DATED: March 24, 2025

07/09/2025

Teste:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

DLD-092

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 24-2946

STEPHEN LAMBERT,

Appellant

v.

ROSS CASTEEL, York City Police Officer, Badge #103

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. l:22-cv-01220)

District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

February 27, 2025

Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 24, 2025)

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not

constitute binding precedent.

Appendix A

Stephen Lambert appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellee’s motion to

dismiss his amended complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm

the District Court’s order.

The procedural history of this matter and the allegations of Lambert’s complaints

are well-known to the parties, set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, in 2022, Lambert filed a

complaint against Appellee Officer Ross Casteel and the York City Police Department.

He alleged that in 2019, Officer Casteel refused to let Lambert file a report for a sexual

assault. He asserted that he was given a rectal examination in an emergency room and

the exam was performed by someone Lambert "believed to be FBI.” He asked for

damages and for criminal charges to be brought against the parties involved. The

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. A Magistrate Judge, sitting by

consent, granted the motion and dismissed some claims with prejudice as time-barred,

dismissed the claims against the York City Police Department with prejudice, and gave

Lambert the opportunity to file an amended complaint.

Lambert filed an amended complaint against Officer Casteel. This time, he added

allegations that, at the direction of the FBI, a doctor injured Lambert during eye surgery

in June 2022. He also asserted that the FBI interfered with his seeing a nerve specialist.

Appellee Officer Casteel moved to dismiss the complaint. A Magistrate Judge

2

recommended that the motion be granted.1 The District Court adopted the Report and

Recommendation and dismissed the amended complaint.with prejudice. Lambert filed a

timely notice of appeal.

■

...

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review

over the District Court’s order granting the motion to dismiss. See Simko v. United

States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2021). We accept the facts alleged in

the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in Lambert’s favor. Id. at 204.

Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal.

See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4. We may summarily affirm a District Court’s decision "on any

basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. Murray

v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

The District Court did not err in determining that Lambert’s allegations against

Officer Casteel do not state a claim for relief. Lambert alleges that Officer Casteel made

him more vulnerable to harm by failing to accept Lambert’s complaint. There is,

however, no affirmative obligation on the state to protect its citizens. Bright v.

Westmoreland Cty, 443 F.3d 276, 280 (3d Cir. 2006). Likewise, Lambert has not alleged

a claim of state-created danger because he has not alleged that 'Casteel affirmatively used

1 Initially, another-Magistrate Judge granted the motion to dismiss, and Lambert .

appealed. We dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the parties had not

consented to proceed before the other Magistrate Judge.

3

Case l:22-cv-01220-JPW Document 36 Filed 07/16/24 Page 1 of 14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEVEN LAMBERT,

Plaintiff,

CIV. NO. l:22-CV-1220

(Judge Wilson)

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

ROSS CASTEEL,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I.

Factual Background and Procedural History

This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss the pro se

plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Doc. 23). This case was referred to us on February

4, 2024, and upon review it is clear that we do not wrote upon a blank slate in this

case.

Quite the contrary, this district court has already determined that Lambert’s

initial complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and

dismissed that complaint. (Docs. 18,19). Thus, we are called upon to assess the legal

sufficiency of Lambert’s amended complaint. (Doc. 20). In undertaking this task, we

are struck by two facts: First, it is evident that Lambert’s claims continue to shift,

evolve, and transmogrify over time. Thus, the gist of Lambert’s initial complaint

related to the failure of local police to follow up on his allegations that he was

Appendix B

case i:2Z-cv-u122U-jhw Document 36 Filed 07/16/24 Page 2 of 14

sexually assaulted in the course of a 2017 emergency room encounter during which

Lambert averred that FBI agents performed a rectal examination upon him. In stark

contrast, Lambert’s amended complaint asserts that an FBI agent forced him to

undergo unnecessary eye surgery in June of 2022 and that local police have failed to

aggressively pursue his allegations.

Second, we are constrained to observe that there is a recurring theme to these

disparate allegations that the FBI is compelling Lambert to undergo invasive medical

procedures and unnecessary ocular surgeries: The claims have the quality of things

that are more imagined than real.

Nonetheless, based upon these extraordinary averments relating to the FBI,

Lambert now sues a York City Police Officer, Ross Casteel. (Doc. 20). The

gravamen of Lambert’s latest allegations against Officer Casteel is that the officer

has violated Lambert’s substantive due process rights by exposing him to a state

created danger.

With Lambert’s latest allegations framed in this fashion, the defendant has

filed a motion to dismiss this amended complaint. (Doc. 23). This motion is fully

briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution.

For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motion be granted.

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Case l:22-cv-U122U-JPW Document 36 Filed 07/16/24 Page 3 ot 14

II.

Discussion

A. Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)—Standards of Review.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a

complaint. It is proper for the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to

this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing

pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips fv. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than

the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

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case ±:zz-cv-uizzu-jhvv Document 3t> Filed U/71b/24 Page 4 ot 14

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal, v, California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to

dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679.

According to the Supreme Court, “(tjhreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather,

in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has

advised trial courts that they must:

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case ±:zz-cv-u±zzu-jhw

Document 3b Hied u//ib/Z4 Hage b ot 14.

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiffs claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiffs

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement

with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the Court of Appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allowf ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

5

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Dtvse ±.zz-uv-uizzu-jrw Document jo Hiea u/7±t>/Z4 nage 0 ot 14

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert, denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861, 182 L.Ed.2d 644 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a

three-step analysis: “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must

plead to state a claim.’ Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify

allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ Id.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,

629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic

documents] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the

plaintiffs claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit GuarCorp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be

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case j/zz-cv-uizzu-jhvv uocumem 3b Hied u//ib/Z4 Hage ( or 14

considered.” Pryor v, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd, v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)

(holding that “[although a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the

pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be

considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary

judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in

determining a motion to dismiss, or when determining whether a proposed amended

complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

It is against these legal guideposts that we assess the legal sufficiency of this

complaint.

B. The State Created Danger Doctrine

In its current form the gravamen of Lambert’s amended complaint is an

allegation that Defendant Casteel has violated his substantive due process rights and

exposed him to a state created danger by failing to follow up on his various

allegations that the FBI is indulging in physically invasive medical procedures and

forcing him to undergo unnecessary eye surgeries. Lambert faces an exacting burden

of pleading and proof in advancing this substantive due process, state created danger

claim. As we have observed:

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case i:zz-cv-uizzu-jhw Document 3b Hiea U/7ib/Z4 nage a or 14

An important starting point for this kind of substantive due process

analysis is recognition that the Supreme Court has found that the Due

Process Clause “d[oes] not impose an affirmative obligation on the state

to protect its citizens[.]” Bright v. Westmoreland Cty, 443 F.3d 276,

280 (3d Cir. 2006). On this score, the Supreme Court has stated:

The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power

to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety

and security. It forbids the State itself to deprive

individuals of life, liberty, or property without “due

process of law,” but its language cannot fairly be extended

to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure

that those interests do not come to harm through other

means. Nor does history support such an expansive

reading of the constitutional text.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S.

189, 195, 109S.Ct.998,103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989). As such, the minimal

“affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the

individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him,

but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on

his own behalf.” Bright, 443 F.3d at 280-81 (quoting DeShaney, 489

U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998). In other words, “DeShaney stands for

the proposition that the Due Process Clause imposes no affirmative

duty to protect a citizen who is not in state custody.” Bright, 443 F.3d

at 281.

However, DeShaney does not preclude the existence of constitutional

violations where “state authority is affirmatively employed in a manner

that injures a citizen or renders him ‘more vulnerable to injury from

another source than he or she would have been in the absence of state

intervention.’ ” Bright, 443 F.3d at 281 (quoting Schieber v. City of

Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 2003)). The Third Circuit has

accordingly recognized, but narrowly construed, the state-created

danger doctrine as a carefully crafted and specifically defined exception

to DeShaney’s scope. Construed in this narrow fashion the four

“essential elements” of the doctrine are as follows: (1) the harm

ultimately realized must have been foreseeable and fairly direct; (2) a

state actor must have acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the

conscience; (3) there must have been a relationship between the state

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case i:zz-cv-u±zzu-jhvv Document 3b Filed u//lb/'Z4 Page 9 ot 14

actor and the plaintiff such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of

the defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons

subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions; and

(4) a state actor must have affirmatively used his or her authority in a

way that created a danger to the citizen or caused the citizen to be more

vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all. Id.

Vorobyev v. Wolfe, 638 F. Supp. 3d 410, 423-24 (M.D. Pa. 2022).

Thus, at the outset, an essential element to any state created danger claim is a

showing that state actors were presented with some foreseeable future harm. On this

score, the future harm potentially facing the plaintiff must be defined with a high

degree of certainty.

In order to satisfy the first element of the state-created danger theory,

the plaintiffs bear the burden of showing “that the harm ultimately

caused was a foreseeable and fairly direct result of the state's actions.”

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist, 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997).

This requirement obligates the plaintiffs to adduce evidence

demonstrating “an awareness on the part of the state actors that rises to

the level of actual knowledge or an awareness of risk that is sufficiently

concrete to put the actors on notice of the harm.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at

238.

Hamilton v. Spriggle, 965 F. Supp. 2d 550, 580 (M.D. Pa. 2013).

Confronted with this clearly foreseeable future harm, the state actor must then

affirmatively use his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or

caused the citizen to be more vulnerable to that danger. In this regard, we have found

that:

This is a particularly difficult element of the state-created danger test to

prove, as courts have often noted. The Third Circuit has explained:

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It is important to stress ... that under the fourth element of

a state-created danger claim, “[liability under the statecreated danger theory is predicated upon the states'

affirmative acts which work to the plaintiffs' detriments in

terms of exposure to danger.” D.R. by L.R. v. Middle

Bucks Area Vo. Tech. School, 972 F.2d 1364, 1374 (3d

Cir.1992) (en banc) (emphasis supplied); Brown v.

Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1100-01 (3d Cir.1990)

(finding that DeShaney fv. Winnebago County Dep't of

Soc.Servs., 489 U.S. 189,109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249

(1989) ] holds “that a state's failure to take affirmative

action to protect a victim from the actions of a third party

will not, in the absence of a custodial relationship ...

support a civil rights claim”). It is misuse of state

authority, rather than a failure to use it, that can violate the

Due Process Clause.

Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir.2006). The

Third Circuit has acknowledged that drawing a distinction between

action and inaction is not always clear or easy. See D.R, 972 F.2d at

1374. However, the appeals court has emphasized that “we have never

found a state-created danger claim to be meritorious without an

allegation and subsequent showing that state authority was

affirmatively exercised.” Bright, 443 F.3d at 282

[T]he Third

Circuit held that a plaintiff must establish three elements in order to

show an affirmative act by state officials to satisfy the state-created

danger test: (1) a state actor exercised his or her authority; (2) the state

actor took an affirmative action; and (3) this act created a danger to the

citizen or rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than if the

state had not acted at all. Ye v. United States, 484 F.3d 634, 639 (3d

Cir.2007).

Hamilton, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 593-94.

These legal tenets serve as the guideposts for our evaluation of Lambert’s

amended complaint.

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C. The Amended Complaint Should Be Dismissed,

Judged by these benchmarks, Lambert’s amended complaint continues to fail

to state a substantive due process claim under the state created danger doctrine. At

the outset, the factual premise underlying Lambert’s various complaints—his

assertion that the FBI has engaged in a far-reaching pattern of physical, sexual, and

medical abuse of the plaintiff spanning five years—is plainly more fantastic than

foreseeable. Thus, the amended complaint is subject to dismissal because it presents

a cause of action that “relies on ‘fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” DeGrazia v.

F.B.L, 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Neitzke v, Williams, 490 U.S.

319,328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989)). Furthermore, we are obliged to

“sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the allegations within the complaint

‘are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, . . . wholly

insubstantial, . . . obviously frivolous, . . . plainly unsubstantial, ... or no longer

open to discussion.’ There is no question that [these] claims meet this standard, as

they rely on fantastic scenarios lacking any arguable factual basis.” DeGrazia v.

F.B.L, 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.

528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974)) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

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Moreover, the fantastic nature of Lambert’s underlying allegations about

physical and sexual abuse at the hands of the FBI wholly undermine any state created

danger claim that Lambert may wish to level against Officer Casteel. At the outset,

the well-pleaded facts alleged by Lambert simply do not support an inference that

Officer Casteel had actual knowledge of or an awareness of a sufficiently concrete

and readily foreseeable risk to Lambert’s safety. Quite the contrary, it appears that

Lambert was reporting what he believed to be past incidents, and not foreseeable

future harms. Furthermore, the nature of these allegations made by Lambert

described matters that were fantastic rather than foreseeable. Therefore, Lambert’s

state created danger claim fails on the first element of any such claim—the existence

of a readily foreseeable, concrete future harm to the plaintiff.

This state created danger claim also founders on the final element of any such

claim, since Lambert has not alleged facts which would permit an inference that

Officer Casteel took some affirmative act which led to a state created danger. Quite

the contrary, Lambert’s complaint seems premised upon an alleged failure to act;

that is, the failure of the local police to aggressively investigate the strange scenarios

of past abuse by the FBI which he reported to them. Since a state created danger

claim must be based upon some affirmative act by state officers, these averments of

mere police inaction when presented with what were facially incredible claims by

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Lambert simply do not satisfy the elements of the state created danger, substantive

due process doctrine.

Simply put, Lambert’s state created danger claim, which rests upon scenarios

that are more imagined than real, continues to fail as a matter of law. Therefore,

Lambert’s amended complaint should be dismissed. We are mindful of the fact that

in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to

amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-

Hardee Corp, v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless

granting further leave to amend is not necessary because amendment would be futile

or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this

case, however, Lambert was provided leave to amend but to no avail. Lambert’s

amended complaint still fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and

the flaws in this pleading are so persistent and profound that they cannot be corrected

through any more artful form of pleading. Therefore, it is recommended that the

amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice.

III.

Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the pending motion

to dismiss, (Doc. 23), be GRANTED.

The parties are hereby placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,

recommendations, or report addressing a motion or matter described in

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28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the

disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within

fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party

shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and

all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the

portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which

objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing

requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,

however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or

where required by law, and may consider the record developed before

the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis

of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall

witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.

Submitted this 16th day of July 2024.

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

14

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEVEN LAMBERT,

Civil No. L22-CV-01220

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSS CASTEEL, etal.,

Defendants.

Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

ORDER

Before the court is the report and recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommending that Plaintiffs amended

complaint be dismissed with prejudice because it fails as a matter of law and leave

to amend would be futile. (Doc. 36.) Specifically, Judge Carlson finds that

Plaintiff has failed to state a substantive due process claim under the state-created

danger theory, because the factual premise of the case is “more fantastic then

foreseeable” and the amended complaint fails to support the elements of a statecreated danger claim. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed objections to the report and recommendation. (Doc. 37.)

Therein, he restates the allegations of his complaint, submits that his claim is based

on “Defendants misuse of state authority, rather than a failure to use it,” and asserts

that a hearing to prove the facts should be held. (Id.) Upon review of Plaintiffs

objections, the court finds them to be general objections.

Appendix B

When a party raises only general objections to a report and recommendation,

a district court is not required to conduct a de novo review of the report and

recommendation. Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1984). “To obtain de

novo determination of a magistrate’s findings by a district court, 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1) requires both timely and specific objections to the report.” Id. at 6.

Thus, when reviewing general objections to a report and recommendation, the

court’s review is limited “to ascertaining whether there is ‘clear error’ or ‘manifest

injustice’” on the face of the record. Boomer v. Lewis, No. 3:06-CV-00850, 2009

WL 2900778, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2009).

The court has reviewed Judge Carlson’s report and recommendation and

finds no clear error or manifest injustice on the face of the record. Plaintiffs

objections merely express disagreement with Judge Carlson’s analysis and attempt

to rehash arguments already considered and rejected by Judge Carlson in the

thorough report and recommendation. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1) The report and recommendation, Doc. 36, is ADOPTED;

2) Plaintiffs objections, Doc. 37, are OVERRULED;

3) Plaintiffs amended complaint, Doc. 20, is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson_________

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: October 10, 2024

2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEPHEN LAMBERT,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. L22-CV-01220

(MEHALCHICK, M.J.)

ROSS CASTEEL, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of June, 2023, for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum

Opinion concurrently filed herewith, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 13) is GRANTED;

2. Lambert’s claims pertaining to events that took place before August 5,2020,

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred;

3. Lambert’s claims against Defendant YCPD are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE and Defendant YCPD is TERMINATED from this action;

4. Lambert’s remaining claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

and

5. Lambert is granted 28 days to file an amended complaint, on or before

Friday, July 28, 2023.

jnujuj,

KAROLLNE MEHALCHICK

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Appendix C

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.