Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Teresa Miller, Petitioner v. Officer Helms, et al.

No.

3fn tlje Supreme Court of tlje Siniteb States;

TERESA MILLER,

Petitioner,

v.

OFFICER HELMS, OFFICER BRADFORD, ERIC

POWELL, and MORGANTOWN CITY POLICE

DEPARTMENT,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

APPENDIX

Teresa Miller

1300 Goshen Road

Apt. 5

Morgantown, WV

(304) 216-1415

Pro Se Petitioner

Third day of September, MMXXV

United States Commercial Printing Company • www.uscpc.us • (202) 866-8558

App-i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A

Opinion [Not Precedential], United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit, Teresa Miller v. Officer Helms,

Morgantown City Police Department,

Eric Powell, and Officer Bradford,

No. 24-1718 (Aug. 18, 2025)..........................App-1

Appendix B

Order [order adopting report and

recommendation, dismissal], United

States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, Teresa Miller

v. Officer Helms, Morgantown City

Police Department, Eric Powell, and

Officer Bradford,

No. l:23-cv-00026-TSK-MJA

(Mar. 13, 2024)................................................. App-4

Appendix C

Opinion [precedential] United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,

United States of America v. Teresa

Miller,

No. 21-4086 (Nov. 29, 2022)

App-10

App-ii

Appendix D

Dismissal of Indictment, United States

District Court for the Northern District

of West Virginia, United States of

America v. Teresa Miller,

No. l:19-cr-00041-TSK-MJA

(Jan 13, 2023)

App-33

App-1

Appendix A

[Filed: Aug. 18 2025]

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1718

TERESA MILLER, an individual,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

OFFICER HELMS, an individual; MORGANTOWN

CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, a law enforcement

agency; ERIC POWELL; OFFICER BRADFORD,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.

Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (l:23-cv00026-TSK-MJA)

Submitted:

July 18, 2025

Decided:

August 18, 2025

App-2

Before AGEE, QUATTLEBAUM, and BERNER,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Teresa Miller, Appellant Pro Se. Keith C. Gamble,

PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN & POE,

PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia; Margaret Lewis,

MANCHIN

INJURY

LAW

GROUP,

PLLC,

Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in

this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Teresa Miller appeals the district court’s order

accepting the recommendations of the magistrate

judge and dismissing Miller’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error in the district court’s dismissal of

Miller’s complaint as untimely. See Smith v.

Travelpiece, 31 F.4th 878, 883, 886-88 (4th Cir. 2023).

We also discern no abuse of discretion in the denial

of Miller’s motion for a venue transfer. See Trs. of the

Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v.

Plumbing Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 436, 443-44 (4th Cir.

2015) (stating standard of review and discussing

applicable factors); see also Liteky v. United States,

App-3

510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (describing limited

circumstances in which recusal is warranted based

on judge’s opinions formed through prior judicial

involvement). Accordingly, we deny Miller’s motions

for appointment of counsel, Miller’s motions to

submit additional evidence and for court order

clarification, Miller’s motion to address deficient

pleadings and for relief due to denied PACER access,

and Appellants’ motions to strike, and we affirm the

district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

App-4

Appendix B

[Filed: Mar. 13, 2024]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST

VIRGINIA

TERESA MILLER,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action

No. l:23-CV-26

v.

OFFICER HELMS et

al.,

Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORTS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS [ECF NO. 23, 24],

OVERRULING OBJECTIONS [ECF NO. 27],

AND GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS [ECF

NOS. 4, 6]

I.

BACKGROUND AND REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On or about February 7, 2023, Plaintiff Teresa

Miller (“Plaintiff’ or “Miller”) filed a pro se complaint

in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West

Virginia, which Defendants subsequently removed to

this Court. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges she was

subjected to an unlawful search and seizure during a

traffic stop on July 13, 2018, and suffered resulting

damages. Id.

App-5

Pending before the Court are Defendants Eric

Powell

and

the

Morgantown

City

Police

Department’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 23] and

Defendants Officer Helms and Officer Bradford’s

Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 24]. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636 and the local rules, the Court referred

the action to United States Magistrate Judge

Michael J. Aloi (the “Magistrate Judge”) for initial

review. ECF No. 8. On June 6, 2023, the Magistrate

Judge entered Reports and Recommendations

(“R&Rs”) [ECF Nos. 23, 24], recommending the

Court dismiss Plaintiffs complaint without prejudice

[ECF No. 1]. The R&Rs informed the parties that

they had fourteen (14) days plus an additional three

(3) days from the date of the filing of the R&R to file

“specific written objections identifying the portions of

the Report and Recommendation[s] to which

objection is made, and the basis for such objection.”

It further warned them that the “[failure to timely

file objections . . . shall constitute a waiver of de novo

review by the District Court and a waiver of

appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.”

ECF No. 23 at 11, ECF No. 24 at 8. Miller timely

filed an objection to the R&Rs. ECF No. 27.

IL

OBJECTIONS AND STANDARD OF

REVIEW

On June 23, 2023, Miller timely filed “Answer to

Report and Recommendation” in objection to the

R&Rs [ECF No. 27],1 When reviewing a magistrate

1 Plaintiff filed Supplement Add to Answer to Report and

Recommendation on January 22, 2024.• ECF No. 29. As advised

App-6

judge’s R&R, the Court must review de novo only the

portions to which an objection has been timely made.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Otherwise, “the Court may

adopt, without explanation, any of the magistrate

judge’s recommendations” to which there are no

objections. Dellarcirprete v. Gutierrez, 479 F. Supp.

2d 600, 603—04 (N.D.W. Va. 2007) (citing Camby v.

Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983)). Courts

will uphold portions of a recommendation to which

no objection has been made unless they are clearly

erroneous. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident

Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).

“When a party does make objections, but these

objections are so general or conclusory that they fail

to direct the district court to any specific error by the

magistrate judge, de novo review is unnecessary.”

Green v. Rubenstein, 644 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (S.D.

W. Va. 2009) (citing Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44,

47 (4th Cir. 1982)). “When only a general objection is

made to a portion of a magistrate judge’s report­

recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of

the report-recommendation to only a clear error

review.” Williams v. New York State Div, of Parole,

No. 9:10-CV-1533 (GTS/DEP), 2012 WL 2873569, at

*2 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012).

A party waives any objection to an R&R that

lacks adequate specificity. See Mario v. P & C Food

in the R&Rs, “Failure to timely file objections to the Report and

Recommendation . . . will result in waiver of the right to appeal

from a judgment of this Court based upon such Report and

Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When reviewing a

magistrate judge's R&R, the Court must review de novo only

the portions to which an objection has been timely made. §

636(b)(1)(C).

App-7

Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002)

(finding that a party’s objections to the magistrate

judge’s R&R were not specific enough to preserve the

claim for review). Bare statements “devoid of any

reference to specific findings or recommendations . . .

and unsupported by legal authority, [are] not

sufficient.” Mario, 313 F.3d at 766. Pursuant to the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s

Local Rules, “referring the court to previously filed

papers or arguments does not constitute an adequate

objection.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Here, Miller’s objections largely repeat the

arguments raised in her prior filings or express her

disagreement with the applicable law. Specifically,

Miller’s objections rely upon the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision from the

related criminal action [See ECF No. 182 in Criminal

Action No. 1:19-CR-41]. See e.g., ECF No. 27 at p. 6

(“What more facts do you want? I attach my direct

appeal from United States District Court at the

fourth circuit Richmond, Virginia to my filing . . .”).

Furthermore, instead of lodging objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s specific findings, Miller repeats

her arguments that (1) she filed the Complaint

within two years of the Fourth Circuit decision

vacating her underlying criminal conviction and

sentence [November 29, 2022] and (2) governmental

declarations regarding COVID-19 permitted her

untimely filing. See ECF No. 27. However, she does

not provide any legitimate basis for why the two-year

statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

would not apply. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge

previously addressed Miller’s COVID-19 tolling

App-8

argument and properly concluded that no such

tolling applied. See ECF Nos. 23 and 24 at p. 7.2

Miller’s objections to the R&RS are general

grievances and repeat conclusory allegations which

do not merit a de novo review. Indeed, “referring the

court to previously filed papers or arguments does

not constitute an adequate objection.” Mario, 313

F.3d at 766; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The

objections are unspecific and are unsupported by

legal authority. Accordingly, the Court reviewed the

R&R for clear error and found none. For those

reasons, Millers’ objections are OVERRULED.

III.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS the

R&Rs in their entirety [ECF Nos. 23, 24] and

OVERRULES Miller’s objections [ECF No. 27]. The

Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED [ECF Nos. 4, 6].

Miller’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE and the Court DIRECTS the Clerk to

strike this case from the Court’s active docket.

It is so ORDERED.

The Clerk shall transmit copies of this Order to

counsel of record via email and the pro se Defendant

via certified mail, return receipt requested.

2 “That Administrative Order provided that, during the judicial

emergency from March 23, 2020 to May 15, 2020, statutes of

limitations which did not expire in that timeframe were not

extended. (Statutes of limitations which did expire in that

timeframe were extended to June 12, 2020). The applicable

statute of limitations here did not expire in that timeframe, and

so the applicable two-year statute of limitations in this matter

was unaffected by that Administrative Order.

App-9

DATED: March 13, 2024

ZsZ THOMAS S. KLEEH

THOMAS S. KLEEH,

CHIEF JUDGE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF

WEST VIRGINIA

App-10

Appendix C

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-4086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TERESA MILLER,

Defendant — Appellant,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.

Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (l:19-cr00041-IMK-MJA-l)

Argued:

October 28, 2022

Decided:

November 29, 2022

App-11

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE, and DIAZ,

Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, conviction and

sentence vacated, and remanded by published

opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Agee and Judge Diaz joined.

ARGUED: Jenny R. Thoma, OFFICE OF THE

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West

Virginia, for Appellant. Zelda Elizabeth Wesley,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Hilary L. Godwin, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

Katy J. Cimino, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Randolph

J. Bernard, Acting United States Attorney, OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling,

West Virginia, for Appellee.

GREGORY, Chief Judge:

Teresa Miller was indicted on one count of

unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The firearms at

issue were uncovered during a traffic stop. Miller

was traveling in the backseat of a vehicle operated

by Jessica Phillips when the vehicle was stopped by

Officer Helms for having an inoperable taillight.

After printing a warning citation for Phillips, Officer

App-12

Helms used his canine to sniff around the vehicle,

and then conducted a full search when the dog

alerted, uncovering two firearms in Miller’s backpack.

The district court denied Miller’s motion to suppress

evidence of the firearms, concluding that Officer

Helms had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop

and conduct the search. Following a bench trial,

Miller was convicted of one count of unlawfully

possessing a firearm.

On appeal, Miller argues that the district

court erred by (1) denying her motion to transfer the

proceedings to another district pursuant to Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a) and (2) finding that

Officer Helms had reasonable suspicion to extend the

traffic stop.

We hold that (1) Miller’s motion to transfer

was appropriately denied and (2) Officer Helms

lacked a reasonable, articulable factual basis for

extending the traffic stop to conduct the dog sniff.1

We therefore reverse the district court’s order

denying Miller’s motion to suppress, vacate Miller’s

conviction and sentence, and remand to the district

court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

On July 3, 2018, Officer Helms, who conducts

surveillance with a canine, stopped a vehicle driven

by Phillips for having an inoperable taillight. See

Supplemental J.A. Volume I (“S.J.A. I”); see also J.A.

1 There is no dispute that once the dog alerted on the

vehicle, Officer Helms had probable cause to conduct a full

search.

App-13

109.2 Officer Helms’s dashboard camera captured

footage of the traffic stop. The footage begins roughly

thirty-one seconds before Officer Helms turned on

his lights to pull Phillips over. Supplemental J.A.

Volume II (“S.J.A. II”) at 00:00-00:31.3 When Officer

Helms turned on his lights, Phillips’s vehicle was

essentially parallel with a turn lane that led to a

well-lit parking lot. Id. at 00:31. Phillips hit her

brakes just four seconds after Officer Helms’s lights

came on and activated her blinker three seconds

after hitting her brakes. Id. at 00:35-00:38. Phillips

came to a complete stop seventeen seconds after

Officer Helms turned his lights on. Id. at 00:48.

After Phillips came to a stop, Officer Helms

approached the driver’s side of the vehicle. His body

camera captured his exchange with Phillips. Shortly

after Officer Helms approached Phillips’s vehicle, she

began searching for her license. S.J.A. I 00:00-00:30.

While Officer Helms testified that Phillips’s hands

were shaking during the encounter, her hands did

not appear to be shaking while she was handing

Officer Helms her license or her insurance

2 While Officer Helms stated that the stop occurred on

July 4, the stop was instituted approximately ten minutes

before midnight on July 3, as shown by the body camera footage.

The search, however, began on July 4. See S.J.A. I at 08:00.

3 Two days before oral argument, Miller submitted a

motion to file a supplemental appendix containing the

dashboard camera footage. The footage is considered a part of

the record on appeal because it was a part of the record at the

district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(1). Although the footage

need not be included as an appendix, the motion is granted. See

Fed. R. App. P. 30(a)(2).

App-14

information. See id. at 00:28-00:32, 00:35-00:40; J.A.

117.4 The next time that Phillips’s hands were in

view, it still was not evident that she was shaking. Id.

at 01:11-01:18, 01:25-01:32.

While Phillips was looking for the vehicle’s

registration card, she noted that the vehicle was not

very organized and, as a result, she was struggling to

locate the card. Id. at 00:45-01:35. Phillips stated

that she had seen the registration card earlier that

day because she used it at the Department of Motor

Vehicles (“DMV”). Id. at 00:58-01:01. Officer Helms

then asked Phillips if “everything [was] good with

her license,” to which she replied “yeah,” and then

noted that she had renewed her license at the DMV

earlier that day and had to wait three hours to do so.

Id. at 01:01-01:09. Officer Helms responded, “ah,

that’s always awesome.” Id. at 01:08-01:11. While

continuing to search for the registration card,

Phillips continued the conversation, saying that “it

took [her] three hours and twenty minutes to renew

[her] license.” Id. at 01:14-01:20. Officer Helms

responded by laughing and saying, “that’s always

pleasant.” Id. Expanding on her unpleasant DMV

experience, Phillips stated that she had to supervise

her three grandchildren while at the DMV. Id. at

01:21-01:25. Officer Helms then said, “if everything

is good, I’m just going to cut you a warning.” Id. at

01:34-01:37. Phillips thanked him. Id. at 01:38-01:40.

Officer Helms returned to his car just one minute

4 Officer Helms held the insurance paper in front of his

body camera for a prolonged period of time, obstructing the

body camera’s view of Phillips. S.J.A. I at 00:45-01:23.

App-15

and fifty seconds after he initially approached

Phillips’s vehicle. Id. at 01:50.

When a backup officer arrived,5 Officer Helms

told him that he was suspicious of the vehicle’s

occupants because Phillips was shaking and tapping

on the car door. Id. at 07:15-07:50. At approximately

the same time, Officer Helms printed Phillips’s

warning ticket. Id. at 07:15. Soon thereafter, Officer

Helms approached Phillips’s vehicle, asked Phillips

to exit the vehicle, and told her he would be leading

his canine around the vehicle to sniff for illegal drugs.

Id. at 08:25. After the canine indicated that there

were drugs in the vehicle, officers performed a full

search. Id. at 12:00-12:15. During the search, they

located two handguns in Miller’s backpack. J.A. 127.

In July 2019, Miller was indicted in the

Northern District of West Virginia for unlawfully

possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). J.A. 15—16. Acting pro se,

Miller filed a motion to transfer her case to another

district because multiple civil suits she had

previously filed in the Northern District of West

Virginia—which named judges sitting in that district

as defendants—had been transferred to the Southern

District of West Virginia due to a conflict of interest.

J.A. 17—19; see Miller v. Gaujot, No. 2:16-CV-50

(N.D.W. Va. Oct. 6, 2017); Miller v. Gaujot, No. 1:17CV-128 (N.D.W. Va. Sep. 5, 2017). The district court

denied the motion because defense counsel, who was

5 Officer Helms testified that it is standard procedure

for officers to provide backup during night shift traffic stops.

J .A. 170.

App-16

appointed just two days after Miller filed the motion,

refused to adopt it. J.A. 24—27.6

Miller later filed a motion to suppress

evidence of the firearms, arguing that the extension

of the stop to conduct the dog sniff violated the

Fourth Amendment. J.A. 33—34. A magistrate judge

recommended denying the motion. The district court

adopted the majority of the magistrate judge’s report

and recommendation, 7 including its ultimate

recommendation to deny Miller’s motion to suppress.

J.A. 72—73. The district court held that the

magistrate judge properly (1) considered Officer

Helms’s experience and training; (2) determined that

Phillips was excessively nervous; and (3) concluded

that Phillips was slow to pull over. J.A. 83—91.8

Regarding Phillips’s alleged nervousness, the

district court stated that while the body camera

footage was not clear enough to see whether Phillips

was shaking, she exhibited nervous behavior by

sharing unnecessary details of her day, her

6 The district court addressed the issue again at

sentencing and stated that the civil cases had to be transferred

because they created a conflict of interest between the judges

sitting in that district. J.A. 302.

7 The district court rejected only one portion of the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, which

considered the passengers’ lack of eye contact when analyzing

whether Officer Helms had reasonable suspicion to extend the

stop. J.A. 91.

8 The district court only considered evidence arising

before Officer Helms printed the warning ticket, which occurred

approximately seven-and-a-half minutes after the initial stop.

J.A. 82; S.J.A. I at 07:10.

App-17

nervousness did not subside after she was told she

would receive a warning if her license was clean, and

tapping her fingers on the car door constituted

excessively nervous behavior. J.A. 86-88. Further,

the district court noted that Phillips “was slow to

pull over and passed at least one or two well-lit

streets and parking lots in favor of a dimly-lit section

of Route 7.” J.A. 88—90. In considering whether

Phillips was slow to stop, the district court found it

significant that Phillips would have travelled

roughly 100 yards if traveling at 35 miles per hour

for six seconds. J.A. 90.9 Finally, the district court

noted that Route 7 was a known drug corridor. J.A.

91. These factors, it concluded, were enough to

establish reasonable suspicion for Officer Helms to

extend the traffic stop. J.A. 92.

II.

We first address Miller’s argument that the

district court erred by refusing to transfer her case to

another district. We conclude that the district court

did not so err.

A.

We consider Miller’s appeal from the district

court’s order denying her motion to transfer

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

21(a). Notably, the Government interprets Miller’s

motion to be for recusal rather than transfer. But

9 The district court did not further explain why the

distance that Phillips travelled was more important than the

time it took for her to come to a complete stop.

App-18

regardless of whether Miller moved for transfer or

recusal, we review for abuse of discretion. See Scott v.

United States, 255 F.2d 18, 20 (4th Cir. 1958); United

States v. Whorley, 550 F.3d 326, 339 (4th Cir. 2008).

B.

Miller filed a pro se motion to transfer under

Rule 21(a), which states that “the court must

transfer the proceeding against [the] defendant to

another district if the court is satisfied that so great

a prejudice against the defendant exists in the

transferring district that the defendant cannot

obtain a fair and impartial trial there.” Fed. R. Crim.

P. 21(a). Miller filed the motion just two days before

being appointed counsel, and counsel subsequently

refused to adopt the motion. J.A. 17—19, 46—26. The

district court declined to consider the motion,

reasoning that every circuit court to address the

issue has held that a district court has no obligation

to consider a pro se motion filed by a represented

party. J.A. 24—25.

Miller argues that this case should have been

transferred to the Southern District of West Virginia

because the civil cases she had filed in the Northern

District had been transferred due to a conflict of

interest. Tellingly, Miller’s appellate counsel does not

appear to support this argument. Brief of Appellant

at 12 (stating that “Counsel’s research into this issue

does not appear to offer relief; however, as the issue

was preserved below, Miller respectfully requests

this Court consider Miller’s argument and whether it

has merit.”).

The Government characterizes Miller’s motion

as a motion for recusal rather than transfer and

App-19

argues that, because the civil cases are unrelated to

this criminal action, they do not bring the district

court’s impartiality into question.

Under either standard, the district court did

not have to transfer this case because Rule 21(a)

addresses juror, rather than judicial, prejudice, and

the district judge was not otherwise required to

recuse herself.

It is quite clear that district courts are “not

require [d] ... to permit ‘hybrid’ representation,”

which occurs when a person is represented by

counsel but still seeks to act as her own attorney,

during a court hearing or jury trial. McKaskle v.

Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984). This Court has

echoed this view, albeit in an unpublished opinion,

with regard to written motions. See United States v.

Barnes, 358 F. App’x 412, 413 (4th Cir. 2009).10 As

the district court correctly noted, other circuits agree

that a defendant has no right to hybrid

representation for written motions. See, e.g., Clark v.

Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 395 (2d Cir. 2008); Myers v.

Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019, 1024 (10th Cir. 1975).

The question here is whether the district court

must consider a pro se motion filed before the

defendant is appointed counsel and counsel refuses

to adopt the motion once appointed. No circuit seems

to have passed judgment on this precise issue. We

10 Similarly, a litigant may not “raise substantive

motions while [she] is represented by counsel” in this Court.

United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938, 941 n.l (4th Cir.

2014) (internal quotations omitted).

App-20

need not resolve that question here, because Miller’s

motion fails on the merits.

Rule 21(a) is commonly invoked when pre-trial

publicity could taint the jury pool, which indicates

that the rule is designed to prevent juror, rather

than judicial, prejudice. See, e.g., United States v.

Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 307-08 (4th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1332 (11th Cir.

2011); United States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645, 659 (2d

Cir. 2021). Note 4 of the 1944 Advisory Committee

Notes on Rule 21(a) states that the Rule applies “in

addition to and does not supersede existing statutes

enabling a party to secure a change of judge on the

ground of personal bias or prejudice.” Additionally,

Note 1 of the 1944 Advisory Committee Notes states

that Rules 21(a) and (b) provide a new right for

defendants to move for a change of venue based on

the “public feeling in the vicinity of the crime [that]

may render impossible a fair and impartial trial.”

Therefore, Rule 21(a) appears to be concerned with

juror, rather than judicial, prejudice. Thus, Miller’s

motion for transfer should have been brought as a

motion for recusal and was properly denied.

Even if Miller’s motion is treated as a motion

for recusal, as the Government seems to believe, it

would still fail. Miller overstates the possibility that

her prior civil suits would threaten the impartiality

of judicial proceedings. As the district court

explained, the civil cases had to be transferred out of

the Northern District of West Virginia because they

named judges sitting in that district as defendants,

thereby creating a conflict. J.A. 302.

There is no such conflict in Miller’s criminal

case. The judge in her criminal case was not named

App-21

as a defendant in the civil cases, so any relation

between the civil and criminal cases is too

attenuated to warrant recusal. Miller has made no

showing that the district judge has personal bias

against her, and she cannot point to any evidence of

partiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (stating that a

judge should recuse herself if her “impartiality might

reasonably be questioned”); 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)

(stating that a judge should recuse herself where she

“has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party”).

Accordingly, the district court properly denied

Miller’s motion for transfer.

III.

A.

“In considering the district court’s suppression

decision, we review legal determinations de novo and

the [district] court’s underlying factual findings for

clear error.” United States v. Thomas, 908 F.3d 68,

72 (4th Cir. 2018). We construe the facts in the

Government’s favor. United States v. Brinkley, 980

F3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2020).

The standard governing traffic stops under the

Fourth Amendment is well established in this

Circuit. Traffic stops are “subject to the

reasonableness

requirement

of the

Fourth

Amendment.” United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d

200, 209 (4th Cir. 2018). The standard the Supreme

Court articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),

applies to traffic stops because they are investigatory

stops rather than custodial arrests. Bowman, 884

F.3d at 209. Accordingly, we ask “(1) if the stop was

legitimate at its inception, and (2) if the officer’s

App-22

actions during the seizure were reasonably related in

scope to the basis for the traffic stop.” Id. (cleaned

up). For the initial stop to be reasonable, the officer

must have probable cause to believe a traffic

violation occurred. Id. However, a traffic stop that

was reasonable at its inception can violate the

Fourth Amendment when an officer extends the stop

beyond the ‘“time reasonably required to complete

[the] mission’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Id. at

209—10 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,

407 (2005) (brackets in original)). Even a de minimis

extension violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 210.

In order to extend a traffic stop beyond what is

necessary to effectuate its original purpose, the

officer must possess reasonable suspicion. Id.

“A dog sniff around [a] vehicle’s perimeter for

the purpose of detecting narcotics ‘is not an ordinary

incident of a traffic stop.’” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v.

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015)). However,

the officer may “conduct an investigation unrelated

to the reasons for the traffic stop as long as it ‘[does]

not lengthen the roadside detention.’” Id. (quoting

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354) (brackets and emphasis

in original). Thus, a canine sniff that is unrelated to

the purpose of the original stop is lawful only if it

does not extend the traffic stop or is based on

reasonable suspicion. See id. at 209.

Reasonable suspicion “require[s] something

more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized

suspicion or hunch.’” United States v. Sprinkle, 106

F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.

at 27). Indeed, “an officer and the Government must

do more than simply label a behavior as ‘suspicious’

to make it so.” United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243,

App-23

248 (4th Cir. 2011). That said, the reasonable

suspicion standard is not mechanical; rather, it

“entails common sense, nontechnical conceptions

that deal with factual and practical considerations of

everyday life on which reasonable and prudent

[people], not legal technicians, act.” United States v.

Foreman, 369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004).

To support reasonable suspicion, an officer

must put forth “specific and articulable facts that

demonstrate at least a minimal level of objective

justification for the belief that criminal activity is

afoot.” Bowman, 884 F.3d at 213 (internal quotations

omitted). The Government may not rely on post hoc

rationalizations to explain a search—rather, the

officer must have had a reasonable suspicion at the

time the search was conducted. See United States v.

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 511-12 (4th Cir. 2011),

abrogated in part on other grounds by Rodriguez, 575

U.S. 348. Accordingly, we consider only those facts

known to the officer at the time of the search. See id.

When assessing whether reasonable suspicion

existed, we view the evidence in its totality, while

remaining “mindful of the practical experience of

officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires

on the street.” Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214 (internal

quotations omitted). However, we address each

factor individually before evaluating them together.

Id. Critically, the facts “must in their totality serve

to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent

travelers.” Id. at 213 (internal quotations omitted).

One relevant factor in the reasonable

suspicion inquiry is whether a driver was excessively

nervous during the stop. Id. at 214. In analyzing this

factor, we have considered, inter alia, whether the

App-24

driver was fidgeting, shaking, or talking nervously.

See id.; United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 711

(4th Cir. 2012). But “[a]s this court has recognized on

multiple occasions, a driver’s nervousness is not a

particularly good indicator of criminal activity,

because most everyone is nervous when interacting

with the police.” Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214 (internal

quotations omitted). The suspect’s nervousness must

therefore be unusual, beyond the norm, or evasive.

Id.; United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 490

(4th Cir. 2011). Therefore, “absent signs of

nervousness beyond the norm, we will discount the

detaining officer’s reliance on the detainee’s

nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion.”

Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214 (quoting Massenburg, 654

F.3d at 490). In determining whether a person was

excessively nervous, it is relevant whether their

nervousness subsided or increased after the initial

stop because an innocent person’s nerves tend to

decrease as the traffic stop progresses. See Bowman,

884 F.3d at 214-15; Vaughan, 700 F.3d at 711.

Other relevant factors include the road the

driver was traveling on and the length of time it took

the driver to pull over. See United States v. Mason,

628 F.3d 123, 128-29 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v.

Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2015). But the

mere fact that a person is travehng on a route

commonly used to transport drugs, “standing alone,

is entitled to very little weight.” Williams, 808 F.3d

at 247. We have observed that “the number of

persons using interstate highways as drug corridors

pales in comparison to the number of innocent

travelers on those roads,” which makes it doubtful

that the mere fact a person was traveling on such a

App-25

road late at night “helps narrow the identification of

travelers to those involved in drug activity.”

Williams, 808 F.3d at 247; see also United States v.

Villavicencio, 825 F. App’x 88, 98 (4th Cir. 2020).

Finally, when an officer’s testimony is clearly

contradicted by video evidence, the-court should

normally discount the testimonial statements. See

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 512—13.

B.

To reiterate, the district court held that

Officer Helms had reasonable suspicion to extend the

traffic stop because Phillips was (1) slow to pull over,

(2) excessively nervous, and (3) traveling on a known

drug corridor. The district court gave great weight to

Officer Helms’s experience in its analysis. 11 It

determined that Phillips was slow to pull over

because she “passed at least one or two well-lit

streets and parking lots in favor of a dimly-lit section

of Route 7.” J.A. 89-90. It further found that Phillips

was excessively nervous because she was allegedly

shaking during the traffic stop, talking excessively,

and tapping her fingers on the outside of her car door.

11 Officer Helms testified to having over fourteen years

of law enforcement experience with the Morgantown Police

Department—including assignments to the Department’s

Street Crimes Unit and the Department’s Drug Task Force. J.A.

103—04. Officer Helms noted that he had received training for

drug interdiction that included courses on how to spot deceptive

behavior. J.A. 105. He also testified to having executed more

than 2,000 traffic stops throughout his career, with

approximately 300 of those occurring in 2018. J.A. 85, 106—07.

Of those 300 stops in 2018, he said, more than 60 resulted in

drug prosecutions. J.A. 106—07.

App-26

The district court also found that Phillips’s

nervousness did not decrease after being told she

would only receive a warning. Finally, the district

court credited Officer Helms’s testimony that Route 7

was “a corridor commonly used to traffic drugs

between counties.” J.A. 91, 108.

Here, however, the video evidence does not

support some of Officer Helms’s statements and

impressions. As we explain, the district court clearly

erred by crediting portions of Officer Helms’s

testimony regarding whether Phillips was slow to

stop and excessively nervous. These erroneous

findings of fact ultimately led the district court to

incorrectly find that Officer Helms possessed

reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop.

1.

First, Phillips was not unduly slow to pull over.

Phillips was even with the turn lane when Officer

Helms’s lights first came on. She hit her brakes four

seconds after his lights came on, activated her

blinker three seconds after that, and stopped the

vehicle a total of seventeen seconds after Officer

Helms first activated his lights. S.J.A. II at 00:3100:48. The district court nonetheless found that

Phillips was slow to pull over and passed “at least

one or two well-lit streets and parking lots in favor of

a dimly-lit section of Route 7.” J.A. 89-90. It also

noted that the seventeen seconds it took Phillips to

stop gave her an opportunity to converse with her

passengers about how to cover up criminal conduct.

J.A. 89. Additionally, the district court found the

distance the vehicle traveled in those seventeen

App-27

seconds (100 yards) was more important than the

time it took for her to stop. J.A. 90

We cannot agree. Just as officers are not

required to complete a traffic stop as quickly as

humanly possible, drivers should not be required to

pull over as quickly as humanly possible—especially

when a driver may need to continue driving for a

slightly longer amount of time to reach a safer

stopping point—as long as the time it took to stop

was reasonable. See United States v. Perez, 30 F.4th

369, 375-76 (4th Cir. 2022) (finding that an officer’s

search of a vehicle was proper despite it not being

completed as quickly as possible due to the officer’s

reasonable safety precautions). Such a rule deters

the Government from transforming innocuous

behavior—or, as found here, behavior that enhances

the safety of the driver, the officer, and others on the

road—into evidence of criminality. See Foster, 634

F.3d at 248 (expressing “concern about the

inclination of the Government toward using

whatever facts are present, no matter how innocent,

as indicia of suspicious activity”).

Our analysis is necessarily fact-specific, and

the ultimate touchstone is whether the driver pulled

over in a reasonable amount of time given the

circumstances. Still, some commonsense principles

should guide the way. First, a driver should be given

time to react and be entitled to make certain that a

hailing officer intends to pull them over rather than

simply pass them on the way to another emergency.

Second, a driver should be given a meaningful

opportunity to reach a safe place to stop.

Here, the video evidence from Officer Helms’s

dashboard camera shows that Phillips stopped

App-28

within a reasonable amount of time. Phillips could

not have pulled into the well-lit parking lot that

Officer Helms intended her to because she was

parallel with the entrance when Officer Helms

activated his lights. And contrary to the district

court’s findings, the video shows Phillips did not pass

any other area, well-lit or otherwise, where she could

have safely stopped. There were no earlier exits, and

the road did not have a shoulder. Next, Phillips

began braking just four seconds after Officer Helms

turned his lights on, indicating that she was in the

process of stopping. Four seconds is a reasonable

time for a person to react and determine that an

officer intends to pull her over. While it ultimately

took Phillips thirteen seconds to come to a complete

stop after first engaging her brakes, she stopped at

the first available place on the road where she could

safely do so. Under these facts, she came to a stop in

a reasonable amount of time.

The fact that Officer Helms intended for

Phillips to turn into the well-lit parking lot is of little

probative value because Phillips had no way of

knowing Helms’s intention. Although Officer Helms

had extensive experience conducting traffic stops,

Phillips did not. Thus, she should not be expected to

intuit the precise place Officer Helms wanted her to

pull over.

Accordingly, the district court clearly erred by

finding that Phillips was slow to pull over.

2.

Second, the body camera footage showed that

Phillips was not excessively nervous during the

traffic stop. On that point, the footage of the stop

App-29

depicts multiple instances where Phillips’s hands can

be seen. See S.J.A. I at 00:28-00:32, 00:35-00:40,

01:11-01:18, 01:25-01:32. While the district court is

correct that the video does not show Phillips’s hands

the entire time, the video clarity is quite good, and

shows that her hands were not shaking. See id.

Moreover, her hands can be seen both at the

beginning of the encounter and at the end, and the

video footage shows that her demeanor did not

change throughout the conversation. Thus, the

district court clearly erred by finding that Phillips

was shaking during the traffic stop.

The body camera footage also refutes Officer

Helms’s testimony that Phillips was nervously

talking and sharing unnecessary details about her

day. The footage shows that Phillips was simply

making related small talk and responding to the

questions Officer Helms asked. For instance, while

looking for the vehicle’s registration card, Phillips

noted that the car was not very organized, which was

why she was struggling to find the card. Id. at 00:4501:00. Phillips also stated that she had seen the

registration card earlier in the day because she had

used it at the DMV. That point was directly relevant

to the stop, given that Officer Helms asked to see the

card. Id. at 00:50-01:00. In context, it is clear that

she was simply explaining that she knew the card

was somewhere in the car.

Phillips’s allegedly unrelated statement about

her visit to the DMV was made in response to Officer

Helms asking her if “everything [was] good with [her]

license.” Id. at 01:00-01:05; see J.A. 86. She

responded by saying that she knew her license was

“good” because she had visited the DMV to renew it

App-30

earlier that day. S.J.A. I at 01:05-01:30. The

allegedly “unnecessary details of her day” that

Phillips shared were simply remarks about how

unpleasant her DMV experience was. Id.; see J.A. 87.

In response to her comments about the long wait

time at the DMV and having to simultaneously

watch her three grandchildren, Officer Helms even

chuckled and remarked, “that’s always pleasant.”

S.J.A. I at 01:15-01:20. It is hard to imagine why this

exchange would arouse suspicions of criminal

behavior. The district court clearly erred by finding

that Phillips was talking excessively and that these

statements were unrelated to the traffic stop.

Additionally, the district court found it

“significant” that Phillips remained nervous “despite

having been told by Officer Helms that she would be

free to go if her license came back clean.” J.A. 87—88.

The only (arguably) nervous behavior the

Government can point to after Officer Helms’s

statement is Phillips tapping her fingers on the car

door. But tapping is not an indicator of excessive or

sustained nervousness because it is completely

consistent with law abiding behavior. Although

fidgeting may certainly be a sign of nervousness,

Bowman, 884 F.3d at 214, tapping one’s fingers may

just as likely be a sign of annoyance, impatience, or

even boredom—any of which may be expected when

a person is stopped by a police officer and is awaiting

the results of a license check. By itself, tapping one’s

fingers is a very weak indicator of nervousness.

App-31

3.

Finally, the district court thought it relevant

to the reasonable suspicion analysis that Phillips

was traveling on a known drug corridor.

But this Court has stated that traveling on a

known drug corridor is not itself probative of

criminal behavior and does not serve to eliminate a

substantial portion of innocent travelers. See

Williams, 808 F.3d at 247 (explaining that “the

number of persons using the interstate highways as

drug corridors pales in comparison to the number of

innocent travelers on those roads” and stating that

“we are not persuaded by the proposition that

traveling south on [a known drug corridor] late at

night helps narrow the identification of travelers to

those involved in drug activity.”).

Considering the record as a whole, and even

after accounting for Officer Helms’s substantial

experience, we conclude that Officer Helms did not

have reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Simply

put, the factors articulated to support reasonable

suspicion in this case do not “serve to eliminate a

substantial portion of innocent travelers.” Foreman,

369 F.3d at 781. The district court erred in denying

the motion to suppress.12

12 Miller also challenges the district court’s sentencing

decision, arguing that it focused too heavily on a single issue at

the expense of a properly reasoned analysis of the 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a) factors. Because we vacate Miller’s conviction and

sentence based on the Fourth Amendment violation, this issue

is now moot.

App-32

IV.

In sum, we affirm the district court’s denial of

Miller’s motion to transfer. But because the

extension of the traffic stop was not supported by

reasonable suspicion, the district court erred in

denying Miller’s motion to suppress the evidence

seized during the subsequent search. Accordingly,

the district court’s order denying Miller’s motion to

suppress is reversed, Miller’s conviction and sentence

are vacated, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,

CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED,

AND REMANDED

App-33

Appendix D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA,

Criminal No. 1:19CR41

v.

TERESA MILLER,

Defendant.

DISMISSAL

Now comes the United States of America and

William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney for the

Northern District of West Virginia and Zelda E.

Wesley, Assistant United States Attorney, and

pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure, and by leave of Court endorsed

hereon, hereby dismisses the Indictment against the

defendant, Teresa Miller, in light of the fourth circuit

decision vacating her conviction and sentence.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM IHLENFELD

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

App-34

By: ZsZ Zelda E. Wesley

Zelda E. Wesley

Assistant United States

Attorney

Leave of Court is granted for the foregoing Dismissal.

DATE: January 13, 2023

ZsZ THOMAS S. KLEEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE