Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Rashun Rafael Suncar, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefOct 14, 2025

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APPENDIX A:

Opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (July 2, 2025)

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4765

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff − Appellee,

RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, a/k/a Blackie,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at

Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:23−cr−00039−JPB−JPM−1)

Argued: December 10, 2024

Decided: July 2, 2025

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and AGEE and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion in which Judge Agee

and Judge Richardson joined.

ARGUED: Jenny R. Thoma, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Carly Cordaro Nogay, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

John A. Schwab, JOHN SCHWAB LAW, LLC, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.

William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

DIAZ, Chief Judge:

Rashun Suncar challenges the district court’s decision to apply the career offender

enhancement to his federal drug conviction. The court did so because Suncar had two prior

Pennsylvania state convictions for delivery of a controlled substance, in violation of 35 Pa.

Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30). Suncar maintains on appeal that section 780113(a)(30) criminalizes (1) offers to sell drugs, and (2) the attempted transfer of drugs,

both of which make Pennsylvania’s statute categorically broader than the conduct

criminalized under the then applicable federal sentencing guidelines. 1

We disagree and affirm the judgment. 2

The Sentencing Commission later amended the guidelines to include “attempt[s]

to commit” a “controlled substance offense” within the definition of a “controlled

substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(d) (2023).

In his reply brief, Suncar argues that the district court procedurally erred in two

other ways and imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. But Suncar forfeited these

arguments by failing to raise them in his opening brief. Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l

LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017). In any event, Suncar conceded at oral argument

that we couldn’t reach his otherwise-forfeited arguments unless we agreed that the district

court erred in imposing the career offender enhancement. See Oral Argument at 15:40–

15:58, United States v. Suncar, No. 23-4765 (4th Cir. Dec. 10, 2024),

http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/23-4765-20241210.mp3.

Because the

district court correctly applied the enhancement, we don’t consider Suncar’s other

arguments.

Twice, Suncar sold a confidential informant oxycodone pills, some of which

contained a detectable amount of fentanyl. Law enforcement then obtained a warrant to

search Suncar’s home, where they found crack cocaine, marijuana, and a pistol.

Suncar ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of fentanyl, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Under his plea agreement, he reserved “the right

to appeal an adverse sentencing determination on the issue of whether his prior felony drug

convictions qualified as a ‘controlled substance offense’ as contemplated by U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(b).” J.A. 10.

Suncar’s two prior state drug convictions were for delivery of cocaine under 35 Pa.

Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30). That statute prohibits “the manufacture, delivery,

or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance . . . or knowingly

creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.”

35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30). The statute, in turn, defines “delivery” as

“the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled

substance, other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency relationship.”

Id. § 780-102(b).

A presentence report assigned Suncar a base offense level of twenty and applied a

two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon. The report also applied the

career offender enhancment, but reduced Suncar’s offense level by three points for

acceptance of responsibility, leaving him with a total offense level of 29. Without the

career offender enhancement, Suncar’s guideline range was 46–57 months’ imprisonment.

With it, his applicable guidelines range jumped to 151–188 months’ imprisonment.

Suncar challenged the career offender enhancement. He argued (as he does here)

that section 780-113(a)(30) criminalizes offers to sell and attempted transfers of drugs,

while U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) punished neither at the time of Suncar’s conviction. Because

of those apparent discrepancies, Suncar contended that his Pennsylvania convictions

weren’t “controlled substance offenses” and couldn’t serve as predicates for the career

offender enhancement.

The district court disagreed. It explained that the Third Circuit had previously held

that the Pennyslvania statute “[was] in fact [an] appropriate predicate[] for [a] career

offender finding” in United States v. Dawson, 32 F.4th 254 (3d Cir. 2022). J.A. 158. And

because “[t]he Third Circuit obviously is the [c]ourt charged with interpreting those

[Pennsylvania] statutes,” the district court would “follow Dawson [until] told otherwise.”

J.A. 158.

The district court nonetheless imposed a sentence of 92 months’ imprisonment,

“well below the applicable sentence called for by the guidelines as a career offender.” J.A.

168–69. The court also “note[d] that in the event the guideline determination made in this

case [was] found to be incorrect, [it] would still impose a sentence identical to that imposed

in this case.” J.A. 169.

This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, Suncar argues that the district court erred by applying the career offender

enhancement because the Pennsylvania delivery statute on which his predicate offenses

rested is categorically overbroad. First, he asserts that “the least culpable conduct [section]

780-113(a)(3) criminalizes [is] offers to sell, which [is] categorically broader than the

ordinary meaning of distribution [under the guidelines].” Appellant’s Br. at 5. Second,

Suncar contends that “Pennsylvania delivery also [criminalizes] attempted transfer[s],”

which he claims are also “broader than the ordinary meaning of distribution [under the

guidelines].” Id.

Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “controlled substance offense” under the

guidelines is a “legal issue that we review de novo.” United States v. Groves, 65 F.4th 166,

169 (4th Cir. 2023).

Before tackling Suncar’s arguments, we provide some background on how we treat

controlled substance offenses under the guidelines, including the categorical approach we

use to determine whether a state law is a predicate for the career offender enhancement.

Under the guidelines, a sentencing court may apply the career offender enhancement

if a defendant “has at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance

offense.” United States v. Davis, 75 F.4th 428, 441 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). “As

we[’ve] explained . . . , to determine whether a conviction under an asserted predicate

offense statute . . . constitutes a ‘controlled substance offense’ as defined by the Sentencing

Guidelines, we employ the categorical approach.” Groves, 65 F.4th at 171 (cleaned up).

That “approach requires us to focus on the elements of the prior offense rather than

the conduct underlying the conviction.” Id. (cleaned up). So, “[i]f the least culpable

conduct criminalized by the predicate offense statute does not qualify as a ‘controlled

substance offense,’ the prior conviction cannot support a Guidelines enhancement.” Id.

(cleaned up).

Section 4B1.2(b) of the guidelines defines a “controlled substance offense” as one

that “prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled

substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a

counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.”

U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). 3

Now recall the Pennsylvania delivery statute.

It prohibits “the manufacture,

delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance . . . or

knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled

substance.” 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30). And the statute defines

“delivery” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of

a controlled substance, other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency

relationship.” Id. § 780-102(b) (emphasis added).

Our task is to compare the “distribution” term in the guidelines with Pennsylvania’s

“attempted transfer” (or under Suncar’s interpretation, implied offer to sell) term to

The parties don’t dispute the definition of “distribution” under the guidelines. We

have defined it by its “readily apparent meaning.” United States v. Ward, 972 F.3d 364,

370–71 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing dictionary definitions of “distribution”).

determine whether the least culpable conduct implicated by the Pennsylvania statute

matches conduct criminalized under the guidelines.

Suncar insists that the least culpable conduct that section 780-113(a)(30)

criminalizes is an offer to sell, which is broader than “distribution” under the guidelines.

The Pennsylvania statute, of course, says nothing about offers to sell, but Suncar asks us

to read in that language based on a single non-precedential decision from a Pennsylvania

court.

In Commonwealth v. Walker, No. 222-EDA-2021, 2021 WL 5314436, at *6 (Pa.

Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2021), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania equated section 780113(a)(30) with a New York drug statute by reading offers to sell into the former. 4 But, in

so holding, the Walker court departed from the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v.

Glass, 904 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2018).

There, the Third Circuit held that section 780-113(a)(30) didn’t impliedly include

an offer to sell drugs, so the statute wasn’t categorically overbroad in the controlled

substance offense context. Id. at 324. Our sister circuit has since reiterated that holding in

several cases. See United States v. Hurtt, 105 F.4th 520, 525 (3d Cir. 2024); United States

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania is one of two intermediate appellate courts in

the Commonwealth. See The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, The Unified Jud. Sys. of

Pa., https://www.pacourts.us/courts/superior-court [https://perma.cc/S8LN-CJTM]. Its

rules dictate that a non-precedential decision “can be cited only for its persuasive value.”

United States v. Brown, No. 23-2296, 2024 WL 2953127, at *3 n.3 (3d Cir. June 12, 2024)

(citing Pa. R. App. P. 126(b); Pa. Super. Ct. R. 64.37(b)).

v. Magobet, No. 23-2824, 2024 WL 3617296, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 1, 2024); United States

v. Brown, No. 23-2296, 2024 WL 2953127, at *3 (3d Cir. June 12, 2024).

To be sure, “a federal court must follow the decision of an intermediate state

appellate court unless there is persuasive data that the highest court would decide

differently.” United States v. Little, 52 F.3d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). But

where, as here, we think the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would reach a different result

under the plain language of the statute, we choose a different path. To explain why, we

take a closer look at Walker.

To begin, the defendant in Walker argued that the trial court abused its discretion in

calculating his “prior record score” because the court equated the defendant’s prior New

York drug conviction to a Pennsylvania drug conviction under section 780-113(a)(30). 5

Walker, 2021 WL 5314436, at *4–5. The defendant, relying on the Third Circuit’s decision

in Glass, sought to distinguish the two convictions because the New York statute expressly

criminalized offers to sell while the Pennsylvania statute did not. Id. at *5.

The Walker court reviewed the trial court’s finding “that the language of the

Pennsylvania statute [was] similar to the language of the New York statute which

specifically includes an offer to sell.” Id. (cleaned up). The trial court had found the

statutes sufficiently analogous because “an offer to sell” in the New York statute, was

A defendant’s prior record score captures his or her prior criminal history. See

Sentencing, Pa. Comm'n on Sent’g, https://pcs.la.psu.edu/guidelines-statutes/sentencing

[https://perma.cc/S5Z6-VNPS].

“substantial in nature to the attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled

substance as defined in the Pennsylvania statute.” Id. (cleaned up).

The Walker court affirmed, concluding “that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion” in equating the two statutes. Id. First, it noted that Glass was “not binding

authority” on a “determination of the Superior Court.” Id. Second, it explained that “Glass

did not involve a comparison of New York’s and Pennsylvania’s drug statutes,” but

“assessed whether a conviction under section 780-113(a)(30) qualifies as a predicate

offense triggering the career offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).” Id. The

court thus found “that Glass [was] inapplicable to the issue at hand.” Id.

Still, the Walker court added that it “would reject the conclusion in Glass that

section 780-113(a)(1)’s use of the phrase ‘offer for sale,’ while that language [was] omitted

from section 780-113(a)(30) and the definition of ‘delivery,’ indicates that the legislature

did not intend for section 780-113(a)(30) to encompass an offer for sale.” Id. at *6. The

court did so in three sentences, without resort to any statutory interpretive tools or a review

of how drug sale attempts are prosecuted in Pennsylvania. It merely concluded that the

language in section 780-113(a)(1) “[left] open the possibility” that the legislature also

intended to criminalize offers to sell in section 780-113(a)(30). Id.

Suncar would make a mountain out of Walker’s molehill, but that’s wrong on two

fronts.

For starters, the Walker court decided the case under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard (unlike our de novo review) and qualified the decision as nonprecedential. Then, in addressing Glass, the Walker court found that the Third Circuit’s

analysis was “inapplicable” to the prior record score issue because Glass addressed

whether a section 780-113(a)(30) conviction was a predicate for the career offender

enhancement. Respectfully, we view Walker’s limited commentary on the merits of Glass

as mere dicta.

Writing on a clean slate, we don’t think that section 780-113(a)(30) criminalizes

offers to sell drugs for the reasons our sister circuit explained in Glass. The Glass court

noted, for example, that another provision of section 780-113 expressly criminalizes

“offer[ing] [drugs] for sale”—language that was “conspicuously absent from [section] 780113(a)(30).” 904 F.3d at 323. “Obviously,” said the Third Circuit, “the Pennsylvania

legislature knew how to criminalize offers; it simply chose not to in [section] 780113(a)(30).” Id.

The Glass court likewise rejected the defendant’s reliance on the definition of

“deliver” under the Texas Health and Safety Code, which the Fifth Circuit recognized as

including offers to sell. Id. (citing United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016)).

But as the Glass panel explained, the Fifth Circuit did so because the Texas Code defined

“deliver” to “include[] offering to sell a controlled substance.” Id. (quoting Tex. Health

& Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(8)). So Glass made the straightforward point that “[t]he

Texas Code expressly reaches offers, whereas Pennsylvania’s definition fails to include

similar language.” Id.

At bottom, Suncar doesn’t explain why the Third Circuit erred in Glass. Instead, he

relies solely on the fact that Walker rejected Glass. But in its drive-by critique of Glass,

the Walker court did no more than “leav[e] open the possibility that the [Pennsylvania]

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legislature intended section 780-113(a)(30) to criminalize an offer to sell a drug that [had]

not been adulterated or misbranded,” or that it meant to criminalize offers to sell within the

phrase “attempted transfer.” 2021 WL 5314436, at *6.

To the first point, we agree with Glass that the Pennsylvania legislature’s choice to

include offers to sell in one provision of section 780-113 and to exclude them in another

must mean something. Glass, 904 F.3d at 323. After all, we “assume that the legislature

used words that meant what it intended” and “that all words had a purpose and were meant

to be read consistently.” Blakely v. Ward, 738 F.3d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

Conversely, we won’t read in text that appears to have been purposefully excluded.

Even more so when our sister circuits have found predicate offenses criminalizing

offers to sell to be categorically overbroad based on express language in the respective

criminal statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Palos, 978 F.3d 373, 375 (6th Cir. 2020);

United States v. Cavazos, 950 F.3d 329, 337 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. McKibbon,

878 F.3d 967, 972 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Madkins, 866 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th

Cir. 2017); Hinkle, 832 F.3d at 572; United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 966 (2d Cir.

2008). Absent such express language here or authority from the state’s highest court, we

take the Pennsylvania legislature at its word. 6 See United States v. Johnson, 945 F.3d 174,

182 (4th Cir. 2019) (rejecting defendant’s argument that Maryland possession with intent

As the Third Circuit noted in later declining to follow Walker, the decision “has

not been cited by any state or federal court since it was issued [in 2021].” Brown, 2024

WL 2953127, at *3 n.3.

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to distribute statute included offers to sell because “such ‘offer to sell’ language [was]

nowhere to be found in Maryland law”).

To the Walker court’s second point, we decline to collapse an “offer to sell” into an

“attempted transfer,” which is a separate crime and, under our precedent (as we discuss

below), a completed delivery. All said, we reject Suncar’s argument that section 780113(a)(30) includes offers to sell.

We turn next to Suncar’s argument that section 780-113(a)(30) is overbroad because

it criminalizes attempted transfers. Suncar relies on our decision in United States v.

Campbell, 22 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2022), to argue that the Pennsylvania delivery statute is

“independently overbroad” because the least culpable conduct it criminalizes is an

attempted transfer. Appellant’s Br. at 11. In Campbell, we held that an attempt offense

under a West Virginia statute was an inchoate crime that didn’t constitute a “controlled

substance offense” under the guidelines.

22 F.4th at 444. 7

Suncar says that “a

straightforward application of Campbell” compels reversing the career offender

enhancement here. Appellant’s Br. at 12.

Suncar’s contention highlights an “interesting dynamic” between Campbell and our

later-decided precedent, beginning with United States v. Groves, 65 F.4th 166 (4th Cir.

The question in Campbell was whether the guidelines commentary impermissibly

expanded the guidelines text by including an attempt to commit an offense within the

definition of a “controlled substance offense.” Campbell, 22 F.4th at 441–49. Answering

yes, we adhered to the guidelines text. Id. at 443–47.

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2023). United States v. Jackson, 127 F.4th 448, 454 (4th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). These

later cases hold that even drug distribution statutes that are substantially like the one in

Campbell are not categorically overbroad because an “attempted transfer” is a completed

(rather than inchoate) offense. Groves, 65 F.4th at 172–73 (federal drug distribution

statute); see also United States v. Miller, 75 F.4th 215, 229–31 (4th Cir. 2023) (North

Carolina statute); United States v. Davis, 75 F.4th 428, 443 (4th Cir. 2023) (South Carolina

statute).

In other words, the Groves court departed from Campbell because it didn’t view an

“attempted transfer” as an “attempted delivery” under federal or analogous state drug

distribution statutes. Groves, 65 F.4th at 172 (citing cases) (emphases added). Instead,

because under federal law the term “distribute” means “to deliver,” and the term “to

deliver” includes “actual, constructive, or attempted transfer[s],” an “attempted transfer”

is an actual delivery, not an attempted one. Id.

We grounded this conclusion on superfluity principles: that “attempt offenses are

criminalized separately from completed offenses under the relevant federal and state

schemes.” Id. If a court read the drug distribution provision as criminalizing attempt

offenses when a separate provision already did so, it would render that separate provision

superfluous. See id. at 173.

In deciding Groves, we cited the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v.

Dawson, which the district court relied on here. And, in fact, Dawson held that 35 Pa. Stat.

and Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30)—the statute under which Suncar was twice convicted—

“is a completed offense,” “not an inchoate crime.” 32 F.4th at 259.

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The Dawson court explained that Pennsylvania separately “prosecutes legal

attempts to deliver drugs under the . . . general attempt provision . . . , rather than by

charging a violation of [section] 780-113(a)(30) and then invoking [section] 780-102(b)’s

‘attempted transfer’ definition.” Id. at 259–60. To then “interpret ‘attempted transfer’ as

an embedded inchoate offense would mean holding that Pennsylvania has codified a

redundant, vestigial crime—violating the canon against surplusage.” Id. at 260.

We, of course, aren’t bound by Dawson, but we are bound by Groves and its

progeny. In Miller and Davis, we relied on Groves to hold that North Carolina’s and South

Carolina’s drug distribution statutes—though like the West Virginia statute in Campbell—

nonetheless qualified as “controlled substance offenses” under the guidelines. Miller, 75

F.4th at 230–31; Davis, 75 F.4th at 443. We distinguished those statutes from West

Virginia’s because “the [latter]—at least as it was presented in Campbell—does not

criminalize attempt offenses separately from completed drug distribution offenses.” Davis,

75 F.4th at 444–45 (quoting Groves, 65 F.4th at 174). 8

But Pennsylvania does criminalize attempts separately, as do North Carolina and

South Carolina. So this case resembles Groves, Davis, and Miller (as well as Dawson)

more than Campbell. 9 Because Pennsylvania’s statute is “materially distinguishable” from

As we noted in Groves, “the government did not dispute in the Campbell

proceedings that the West Virginia drug distribution statute criminalizes the attempt

offense of attempted delivery.” 65 F.4th at 174 n.5.

We adhere to Campbell’s “core holding that an attempt offense cannot be a

‘controlled substance offense,’ as defined in Guidelines § 4B1.2(b).” Jackson, 127 F.4th

at 455 (cleaned up). But because section 780-113(a)(30) doesn’t criminalize attempt

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West Virginia’s, Davis, 75 F.4th at 445, and criminalizes only the completed offense of

“attempted transfer,” section 780–113(a)(30) isn’t categorically overbroad as compared to

the guidelines.

III.

For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.

offenses for the reasons explained in Groves and our later cases, Campbell’s holding is

“distinguishable” from our holding today. Id.

15a

APPENDIX B:

Judgment of Conviction in the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of West Virginia (December 7, 2023)

Case 5:23-cr-00039-JPB-JPM

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Document 16

Filed 12/07/23

Page 1 of 7 PageID #:

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

)

RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, a/k/a ‘~BLACKIE”

Case Number: 5:23CR39

)

THE DEFENDANT:

USM Number: 25455-510

John A. Schwab

Defendant’s Attomey

One Information

~ pleaded guilty to count(s)

EJ pleaded nob contendere to count(s)

___________________________________________________________________________

which was accepted by the court.

was found guilty on count(s)

after a plea of not guilty.

_____________________________________________________________________________

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Title & Section

21 U.S.C. §~ 841(a)(1)

Nature of Offense

Offense Ended

Distribution of Fentanyl

Count

10/13/2021

and 841(b)(1)(C)

fl See additional count(s) on page 2

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through

the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to

El The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)

E~’Count(s) I and 2 of the Indictment in Case No.: 5:22CR38 are dismissed on the motion of the United States.

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name, residence,

or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay

restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic circumstances.

December 06, 2023

Honorable John Preston Bailey, United States District Judge

Name and Title of Judge

Date

16a

12 7~ac.I,3

Case 5:23-cr-00039-JPB-JPM

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Document 16

Filed 12/07/23

Page 2 of 7 PageID #:

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 2 — Imprisonment

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, a/k/a “BLACKIE”

CASE NUMBER: 5:23CR39

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total

term of: 92 Months

The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

~ That the defendant be incarcerated at an FCI or a facility as close to Wheeling, WV

as possible;

I?1

and at a facility where the defendant can participate in substance abuse treatment, as determined by the Bureau of Prisons;

El including the 500-Hour Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program.

That the defendant be incarcerated at ____________________________________ or a facility as close to his/her home in

_____________________________________as possible;

and at a facility where the defendant can participate in substance abuse treatment, as determined by the Bureau of Prisons;

U including the 500-Hour Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program.

~j that the defendant receive credit for time served from October 6, 2022 to the present.

~ That the defendant be allowed to participate in any educational or vocational opportunities while incarcerated, as determined by

the Bureau of Prisons.

El Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14135A, the defendant shall submit to DNA collection while incarcerated in the Bureau of Prisons,

or at the direction of the Probation Officer.

El The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

_____________________

D a.m.

D p.m.

______________________________

LI as notified by the United States Marshal.

LI The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

LI before 12:00 pm (noon) on

U as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

U on __________________________, as directed by the United States Marshals Service.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

________________________________________ to

at_______________________________________

with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

By ______________________________________________

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

17a

Case 5:23-cr-00039-JPB-JPM

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Document 16

Filed 12/07/23

Page 3 of 7 PageID #:

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3 — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, alkla “BLACKIE”

CASE NUMBER: 5:23CR39

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, you will be on supervised release for a term of: 3 Years

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from

imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the probation officer.

El The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court’s determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse. (check ~f applicable)

El You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §~ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence of

restitution. (check ~f applicable)

You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer. (check i/applicable)

You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as

directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the location where you

reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check ([applicable)

El You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. ~‘check ([applicable,)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court in its November 29, 2016, Standing Order, as

well as with any other conditions on the attached page (if apphcahle).

18a

Case 5:23-cr-00039-JPB-JPM

AO 245B (Rev. 09 19)

Document 16

Filed 12/07/23

Page 4 of 7 PageID #:

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3A — Sunervised Release

DEFENDANT: RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, alkla “BLACKIE”

CASE NUMBER: 5:23CR39

Judgment

Page

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are imposed

because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed by probation

officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your

release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different

time frame.

After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and when

you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.

You shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.

You shall not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. You shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You shall

submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the

probation officer.

You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from the

court or the probation officer.

You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying

the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72

hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer to

take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

You must work full time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment unless the probation officer excuses

you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or yourjob

responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10

days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of

becoming aware of a change or expected change.

You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been

convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the

probation officer.

If you are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that was

designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or tasers).

You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant without

first getting the permission of the court.

If the probation officer determines that you pose a risk to another person (including an organization), the probation officer may

require you to notify the person about the risk and you must comply with that instruction. The probation officer may contact the

person and confirm that you have notified the person about the risk.

You shall not purchase, possess or consume any organic or synthetic intoxicants, including bath salts, synthetic cannabinoids or other

designer stimulants.

You shall not frequent places that sell or distribute synthetic cannabinoids or other designer stimulants.

Upon reasonable suspicion by the probation officer, you shall submit your person, property, house, residence, vehicle, papers,

computers, or other electronic communications or data storage devices or media, or office, to a search conducted by a United States

Probation Officer. Failure to submit to a search may be grounds for revocation of release. You shall warn any other occupants that

the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition.

You are prohibited from possessing a potentially vicious or dangerous animal or residing with anyone who possesses a potentially

vicious or dangerous animal. The probation officer has sole authority to determine what animals are considered to be

potentially vicious or dangerous.

You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a written copy of this

judgment containing these conditions. For further information regarding these conditions, see Overview ofProbation and Supervised

Release Conditions, available at: www.uscourts gov.

Defendant’s Signature

Date

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Case 5:23-cr-00039-JPB-JPM

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Document 16

100

Filed 12/07/23

Page 5 of 7 PageID #:

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 3D — Supervised Release

Judgment—Page

DEFENDANT: RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, a/k/a “BLACKIE”

CASE NUMBER: 5:23CR39

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1) You must participate in a substance abuse treatment program. The probation officer will supervise your participation in

the program.

2) You must submit to substance abuse testing to determine if you have used a prohibited substance. You must not

attempt to obstruct or tamper with the testing methods.

3) You must participate in training, counseling, and/or daily job search as directed by the probation officer. Unless

excused for legitimate reasons, if not in compliance with the condition of supervision requiring full-time employment at a

lawful occupation, you may be required to perform up to 20 hours of community service per week until employed, as

approved by the probation officer.

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Case 5:23-cr-00039-JPB-JPM

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Document 16

101

Filed 12/07/23

Page 6 of 7 PageID #:

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 5 — Criminal Monetary Penalties

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, a/k/a ‘BLACKIE”

CASE NUMBER: 5:23CR39

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

TOTALS

Assessment

Restitution

$ 100.00

$ 0.00

AVAA Assessment*

$ 0.00

LI The determination of restitution is deferred until

after such determination.

$ 0.00

JVTA Assessment**

$ 0.00

An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (AO 245C) will be entered

LI The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment, unless specified otherwise

in the priority order or percentage payment column below. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3 664(i), all nonfederal victims must be

paid before the United States is paid.

The victim’s recovery is limited to the amount of their loss and the defendant’s liability for restitution ceases if and when the victim

receives full restitution.

Name of Payee

TOTALS

Total Loss**

Restitution Ordered

Priority or Percentage

_______________$ _______________

See Statement of Reasons for Victim Information

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $ __________________________

The defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before the

fifteenth day after the date of the judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be subject

to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

LI the interest requirement is waived for the

LI fine

LI restitution.

LI the interest requirement for the

LI fine LI restitution is modified as follows:

*Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-299.

** Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22.

* * * Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 1 09A, 110, 11 OA, and 11 3A of Title 18 for offenses committed on

or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23, 1996.

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Case 5:23-cr-00039-JPB-JPM

AO 245B (Rev. 09/19)

Document 16

102

Filed 12/07/23

Page 7 of 7 PageID #:

Judgment in a Criminal Case

Sheet 6— Schedule of Payments

Judgment — Page

DEFENDANT: RASHUN RAFAEL SUNCAR, a/k/a “BLACKIE”

CASE NUMBER: 5:23CR39

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

I~1 Lump sum payment of $

100.00

due immediately, balance due

Li not later than _________________________

Li in accordance with Li C

Li E, Li F, or Li G below; or

Li Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

Li Payment in equal

_____________

_______________

Li D,

Li F, or

Li G below); or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

(e.g., months or years), to commence

Payment in equal

Li C,

___________

over a period of

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment; or

(e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

(e.g., months or years), to commence

___________

over a period of

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from imprisonment to a

term of supervision; or

Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from

imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant’s ability to pay at that time; or

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

Financial obligations ordered are to be paid while the defendant is incarcerated, and if payment is not completed during

incarceration, it is to be completed by the end of the term of supervised release; or

____________

Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

per month, due on the first

The defendant shall immediately begin making restitution and/or fine payments of

of each month. These payments shall be made during incarceration, and if necessary, during supervised release.

$_______________

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is due

during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to Clerk, U. S. District Court, Northern District of West Virginia, P.O. Box 1518,

Elkins, WV 26241.

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

Joint and Several

Case Number

Defendant and Co-Defendant Names

(including deftndant number)

Total Amount

Joint and Several

Amount

Corresponding Payee,

if appropriate

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

A Taurus, 9mm pistol, serial number ACC624428, and accompanying magazine and ammunition seized on October 6, 2022.

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment, (21 restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) AVAA assessment,

(5) fine principal, (6) fine interest (7) community restitution, (8) JVTA assessment, (9) penalties, and (10) costs, including cost of

prosecution and court costs.

22a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.