Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Kenneth J. Rosellini, Petitioner v. Gary N. Wilcox, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Judge, Superior Court, Bergen County, New Jersey, et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 29, 2025
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
IN THE
JUL 2 9 2025
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KENNETH ROSELLINI--PETITIONER,
v.
GARY WILCOX, HON. FRANK LAROCCA,
MICHAEL DOBLIN, DDS, JUDGE EDWARD
TORACK, MARIE LIHOTZ, HANY MAWLA, MARIE
SIMONELLI, STUART RABNER, CARMEN DIAZ
PETTI, SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DISTRICT XI ETHICS COMMITTEE, NORMAN
KLEIN, and ROBERT C. PAPA-RESPONDENTS
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
KENNETH JAMES ROSELLINI (PROSE)
636A VAN HOUTEN AVENUE
CLIFTON, NEW JERSEY 07013
(973) 998-8375
received
NOV - * 2025
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1)
Is there a full and fair opportunity for a
person to raise constitutional issues in in state court
attorney ethics proceedings, so that Younger
Abstention can be invoked by a federal district court
to dismiss a §1983 civil rights case filed by that
person alleging constitutional violations, where a
state court rule bars the trial level tribunal and
appellate level tribunal from hearing constitutional
issues, reserves constitutional issues for a hearing
with the state’s highest court, and the state’s highest
court fails or refuses to make any opinion or decision
whatsoever on those constitutional issues, except to
deny the person’s petition to the highest court
without explanation?
LIST OF PARTIES
All parties appear in the caption of the case on the
cover page.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPINIONS BELOW........................................................ 1
JURISDICTION...............................................................2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED ........................................ 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................... 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT........................... 7
CONCLUSION .............................................................. 16
INDEX TO APPENDICES
APPENDIX A -- UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, Case
No. 22-2610, Order denying Appellant’s petition
for rehearing by the panel and the Court en banc, .la
APPENDIX B - UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, Case
No. 22-2610, Order affirming district court
dismissal of Appellant’s claims against
Appellees under the Younger Abstention
Doctrine.............................................................................3a
APPENDIX C - UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, Case
No. 22-2610, Opinion affirming district court
dismissal of Appellant’s claims against
Appellees under the Younger Abstention
Doctrine.............................................................................5a
APPENDIX D - UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY, Civil Action No. 20-20101,
Order denying Appellant’s motion to vacate Order
of dismissal of Appellant’s claims against Appellees
under the Younger Abstention Doctrine .............. 17a
ii
APPENDIX E--DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF
NEW JERSEY, Civil Action No. 20’20101,
Order of dismissal of Appellant’s claims
against Appellees under the Younger
Abstention Doctrine.................................................... 23a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
PAGE NUMBER
Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103’04
(2d Cir. 1994).............................................................. 16
Feingold v. Office ofDisciplinary Counsel, 487 F.
App'x 743, 745 (3d Cir. 2012)
:.................... 12
Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n ofN.Y. Harbor,
755 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2014).............................
7
In Re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604 449 A.2d 483 (1982). . . .11
Malhan v. Secy United States Dep’t ofState,
938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019)...........................
3
Middlesex County Ethics Comm, v Garden State
Bar Assn., 457 US 423, 435 (1982)...................... 7’13
Ohio Civil Rights Comm 'n v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629, 106 S. Ct. 2718,
91 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1986)............................................ 8’10
Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 169 F.2d
514, 521-22 (3d Cir. 1948)........................................ 13
Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. vAG, 21 F.4th 886,
888 (3d Cir 2022).......................................................... 10
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,
77-78 (2013)................................................................
3
United States Supreme Court in Middlesex Cty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423, 437 (1982)....................................................... 7
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)..................
3
Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 210 (3d Cir. 2002) .8'11
STATUTES AND RULES
28U.S.C. §1254................................................................ 2
28 U.S.C. §2201 ...............................................................3
42U.S.C. §1983 ...............................................................2
Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules
Following Rules Governing the Courts of the State of
New Jersey-
Rule 1-4-5..................................................................
4
Rule L20-16(f)(2)......................................................
6
Rule L20'15(h).......................................................
3-4
Rule Professional Conduct 3.4(c)............................... 4
Rule Professional Conduct 8.4(d).............................. 4
CONSTITUION OF THE UNITED STATES
First Amendment....................................................... 1-16
Fourteenth Amendment........................................... 1*16
iv
OPINIONS BELOW
The Drder of the United States Court of
Appeals for die Third Circuit, filed on April 30, 2025,
reprinted i Appendix hereto at Appendix A, la to
2a, Rosellir v. Wilcox, Case No. 22-2610. This Order
denied Ap] sllant’s petition for rehearing by the
panel and t e Court on banc.
The )rder of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on February 5,
2025, reprii ted in Appendix hereto at Appendix B,
3a to 4a.
'his Order Affirmed the District Court
Dismissal appellant’s claims against Appellees
under the Y unger Abstention Doctrine.
The 1 pinion of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, filed on February 5,
2025, reprii ;ed in Appendix hereto at Appendix C,
5a to 16a. ' his Opinion Affirmed the District Court
Dismissal
.ppellant’s claims against Appellees
under the Y< rnger Abstention Doctrine.
The C der of the United States District Court
for the Disti it of New Jersey, filed on July 28, 2022,
reprinted in \ppendix hereto at Appendix D, 17a to
22a. This O der denied Appellant’s motion to vacate
Order of dis lissal of Appellant’s claims against the
Appellees ur [er the Younger Abstention Doctrine.
The 0 der of the United States District Court
for the Dist] ct of New Jersey, filed on October 14,
2021, reprin id in Appendix hereto at Appendix E,
23a to 42a. This Order of dismissed Appellant’s
claims agaii jt the Appellees under the Younger
Abstention E ctrine.
1
JURISDICTION
The < ate on which the United States Court of
Appeals fo the Third Circuit denied Appellant’s
petition for •ehearing by the panel and the Court en
banc was A ril 30, 2025, a copy of this Order appears
at Appendix A.
This natter involves federal questions under
the under t e First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constit tion for the United States of America,
and the a plication of the Younger Abstention
Doctrine tc decline to exercise jurisdiction over
Appellant’s Complaint for violations of the
Constitutioi pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983..
The j risdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. §1 554.
CONSTH JTIONAL, PROVISIONS, STATUTES
AND POLICIES AT ISSUE
First Amenc nent to the Constitution of the United
States
Congress si all make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of s eech ....
Fourteenth imendment to the Constitution of the
United Stat( i
No State sh< LI make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the ] rivileges or immunities of citizens of the
United Stal s; nor shall any State deprive any
person of 1 e, liberty, or property, without due
process of la1 ... .
2
Younger Al itention Doctrine
‘Younger i quires federal courts to abstain from
deciding ci ;es that would interfere with certain
ongoing sts e proceedings.” Malhan v. Secy United
States Dep ; of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir.
2019) (citir ; Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571
U.S. 69, 77 78 (2013)); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
TATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding involves one or more
questions o: exceptional importance, whether state
court rules, n this case Rule l-20-15(h) of the Rules
Governing 1 le Courts of the State of New Jersey,
violate the iue process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it instructs persons to take
actions regs dless of whether those actions violate
the Constiti ;ion for the United States of America,
and whethe: only being permitted to present claims
of Constitw onal violations to one tribunal in a
proceeding, n this case the New Jersey Supreme
Court, is si Eficient due process so that Younger
Abstention l >plies even when that tribunal denies a
hearing on lose claims without a hearing or any
explanation s to why they were denied.
Petitic ter seeks the following declaratory
relief in the Inited States District Court. Count I of
Petitioner’s ( implaint seeks declaratory relief under
28 U.S.C. §2; 11 for, inter alia, the following-
A. Declaring as a matter of due process under the
Fourteenth 1 mendment to the Constitution for the
3
United Sta ss of America, that state court officers
have a dut and obligation to guard against fraud
upon the lourt to ensure their constitutional
integrity, a: d that the doctrine of Res Judicata may
not be us d as a legitimate basis under the
Fourteenth Amendment to deny an application to
vacate or
id a state court judgment based upon
fraud upon le court; and . . .
C. Declarin as a matter of due process under the
Fourteenth Lmendment, that Rule U20-15(h.) of the
Rules Gove ning the Courts of the State of New
Jersey viol tes the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, both on its face and as
applied to t e Plaintiff, because it instructs persons
to take acti ns regardless of whether those actions
violate the Constitution for the United States of
America,' an ...
F. Declaring that Rule 1-4-8, RPC 8.4(d), RPC 3.4(c),
and any ini ;rent power possessed by state courts,
may not be used for purposes of intimidation or
chilling fu: damental rights under the First
Amendment ind both the Due Process and Privileges
and Immu ities clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment so that they infringe upon the
fundamental rights of free speech and advocacy of
litigants in s ite courts.
Subse< aent to the Petitioner’s filing of the
federal civil: ghts complaint, on March 31, 2021 the
District Ethi s Panel issued a 2-1 decision that the
Complaint si mid be dismissed without prejudice for
the Petitiom • to pursue the issues raised in the
federal comp lint. The public panelist who refused to
4
recuse himself on a motion by Petitioner, issued a
dissenting opinion in clear retaliation for the filing of
the federal complaint; in violation of Petitioner’s
First Amendment rights he found [emphasis added]... in light of the fact that Mr. Rosellini
continues to pursue his quest, and now cites
that he is being denied his right to free speech
as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, I would
now recommend that the District Review
Board consider to issue a reprimand as a
result of this hearing, regardless of the
outcome of his latest Civil Complaint.
Subsequently, the Office of Attorney Ethics (“OAE”)
sought censure, citing with approval the dissenter’s
opinion.
When the Disciplinary Review Board
(appellate review from the District Ethics Panel)
found for Suspension, the OAE adopted that position
to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
When Petitioner raised the issue of
Constitutional issued to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, as the Third Circuit Panel acknowledges, “the
New Jersey Supreme Court denied Rosellini’s
petition without explanation”. See 13a. This denial,
without any evidence of consideration of the
Petitioner’s Constitutional issues raised, is clearly
not in accordance with the requirement under
Younger Abstention that Petitioner had an adequate
opportunity to be heard on these issues in state
court.
The Third Circuit Appellate Panel asserts-
5
Rosellini faced no procedural barriers here. In
fact, New Jersey’s disciplinary rules provide
two avenues for constitutional challenges to
the proceedings. An attorney can (1) petition
the New Jersey Supreme Court for immediate,
interlocutory review upon a showing of
irreparable harm during the proceedings, N.J.
Ct. R. l-20’16(f)(l), or (2) raise constitutional
challenges in a petition for review after an
adverse decision by the DRB, N.J. Ct. R. 1-2016(f)(2). Rosellini chose only the second
avenue. If anything, Rosellini limited his own
opportunities to raise his constitutional
claims.
See 13a.
Petitioner in no way “limited his own
opportunities to raise his constitutional issues”, and
in fact was afforded no effective opportunity. N.J.
Ct. R. 1-20-16(f)(2) provides two possible avenues to
raise constitutional issues, this first one is an
interlocutory petition which the New Jersey
Supreme Court can simply deny without explanation,
or on a final appeal, which apparently the New
Jersey Supreme Court denied without explanation—
choosing the second avenue in no way “limited” any
opportunity to have Constitutional issues heard. In
fact, the Appellees application of the rule, finding
that they were barred from opining on Constitutional
issues before it, was a clear bar.
6
r
REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD BE
GRANTED
Younger Abstention and Due Process require a
full and fair opportunity for a person to raise
constitutional issues in in state court attorney ethics
proceedings, so that Younger Abstention cannot be
invoked by a federal district court .to dismiss a §1983
civil rights case filed by that person alleging
constitutional violations, where a state court rule
bars the trial level tribunal and appellate level
tribunal from hearing constitutional issues, reserves
constitutional issues for a hearing with the state’s
highest court, and then state’s highest court fails or
refuses to make any opinion or decision whatsoever
on those constitutional issues, except to deny the
person’s petition to the highest court without
explanation.
The case , that the Third Circuit Panel relies
on, Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor,
755 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2014), misapplied the facts
and law of the cases it cited, and the Third Circuit
Panel itself misapplies the facts and law of the cases
of United States Supreme Court in Middlesex Cty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457- U.S.
423, 437 (1982). Gonzalez v. Waterfront Comm’n of
N.Y. Harbor, 755 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 2014) states
in pertinent.part:
The
Supreme
Court
has,
on
multiple [**21] occasions, affirmed decisions
to abstain notwithstanding the state agency's
refusal or inability to consider federal
challenges in the initial administrative
proceeding—at least where those challenges
may be presented on appeal to the state
7
the Appellees, and the Third Circuit Panel, that an
ethics committee’s refusal to abide by the
Constitution, would be consistent with Younger
Abstention in the face of a District Court’s
responsibility to enforce the Constitution. See Smith
& Wesson Brands, Inc. v AG, 27 F.4th 886, 888 (3d
Cir 2022) (“District Court violated its "virtually
unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction
given," Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47
L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976)”). In Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n
v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629,
106 S. Ct. 2718, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1986), the court
found it absurd the Commission would not consider
Constitutional issues before it:
. . . even if Ohio law is such that the
Commission
may
not
consider
the
constitutionality of the statute under which it
operates, it would seem an unusual doctrine,
and one not supported by the cited case, to say
that the Commission could not construe its
own statutory mandate in the light of federal
constitutional principles ....
See Ohio Civ. Rights Commn. v Dayton Christian
Schs., Inc., 477 US 619, 629 (1986). In Zahl v
Harper, 282 F3d 204, 210 (3d Cir 2002), the Court
found that:
The third part of the Garden State test is met
because Zahl can assert his federal preemption
claim in the state administrative proceeding.
Moreover, he has an automatic right of appeal
to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey, N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3(a)(2), which is
capable of reviewing Zahl's federal claims.
10
See Zahl v Harper, 282 F3d 204, 210 (3d Cir 2002).
In Middlesex itself, the New Jersey Supreme Court
actually heard and ruled upon the Constitutional
claims raised in that proceedingWhatever doubt, if any, that may have existed
about respondent Hinds' ability to have
constitutional challenges heard in the bar
disciplinary hearings was laid to rest by the
subsequent actions of the New Jersey
Supreme Court. Prior to the filing of the
petition for certiorari in this Court the New
Jersey Supreme Court sua sponte entertained
the constitutional issues raised by respondent
Hinds. Respondent Hinds therefore has had
abundant
opportunity
to
present
his
constitutional challenges in the
state
disciplinary proceedings
See Middlesex County Ethics Comm, v Garden State
Bar Assn., 457 US 423, 436 (1982). The plaintiff
appellant in the Middlesex case, therefor, actually
had his Constitutional issues heard and ruled upon
by the New Jersey Supreme Court [In Re Hinds, 90
N.J. 604 449 A.2d 483 (1982)], which is why the
United States Supreme Court ruled in favor of
abstention. In fact, the Third Circuit Panel cites not
a single Circuit or Supreme Court decision in which
the person asserting standing and jurisdiction in
district court was denied any ruling or explanation
on Constitutional issues that they raised at either
the trial/commission level or the appellate level of
the subject tribunal. Under no circumstance is the
situation which the Petitioner in the within case has
found himself in, should the District Court’s virtually
11
unflagging obligation ... to exercise the jurisdiction
given. This is clearly not in accordance with the
requirement for abstention that the state
“proceedings must afford an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims.” See Feingold v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 487 F. App'x 743, 745 (3d Cir.
2012) (emphasis added).
The Third Circuit Panel also failed to properly
consider the issues of bad faith in the state
proceedings. Those proceedings were found by a two
to one decision to be required to be dismissed at the
local ethics committee level, and only proceeded
when the Office of Attorney Ethics and every
subsequent tribunal either explicitly or tacitly
supported the position of the dissenter in that “in
light of the fact that Mr. Rosellini continues to
pursue his quest, and now cites that he is being
denied his right to free speech as guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution, I would now recommend that the
District Review Board consider to issue a reprimand
as a result of this hearing, regardless of the outcome
of his latest Civil Complaint.” The reason for the
retaliation is clear, the state actors refuse to
acknowledge their obligations under the Constitution
to ensure that state court tribunals must be free
from fraud, even in the face of doctrines such as Res
Judicata, which is why Appellees oppose the
declaratory relief Petitioner is seeking, that as a
matter of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution for the United States
of America, that state court officers have a duty and
obligation to guard against fraud upon the court to
ensure their constitutional integrity, and that the
doctrine of Res Judicata may not be used as a
12
legitimate basis under the Fourteenth Amendment
to deny an application to vacate or void a state court
judgment based upon fraud upon the court.
[W]hen the controversy has been terminated
by a judgment, its freedom from fraud may
always be the subject of further judicial
inquiry; and the general rule that courts do
not set aside their judgments after the term at
which they rendered has no application.
See Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 169 F.2d
514, 521-22 (3d Cir. 1948).
“If all three prongs of the Younger analysis are
met, federal courts should abstain unless there is a
showing of "bad faith, harassment, or some other
extraordinary circumstance that would make
abstention inappropriate." Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423,
435, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982).” See
Feingold v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 487 F.
App'x 743, 745 (3d Cir. 2012). The bad faith on the
part of the Appellees is in covering up the
wrongdoing of the state court proceedings which led
to the subject sanctions and ethics proceedings. This
includes the actions of the Defendant-Appellee Gary
Wilcox, who was recently temporarily suspended
from the state bench for unethical conduct (Gary N.
Wilcox, Supreme Court Order) (referred to by the
Third Circuit Panel, footnote 7 on Page 9, Appellant
“also cites unrelated ethics proceedings against a
New Jersey judge . . . .”
This matter stems from New Jersey Attorney
Ethics proceedings brought against Petitioner for
disobeyed are frivolous litigation sanctions orders
13
that were issued when he filed, pro bono, on behalf of
a client, a motion in New Jersey Superior Court to
vacate family court orders based upon fraud upon the
court, including allegations that there was forged
signature on a settlement agreement, which was not
properly placed upon the record and which went
missing from the record, which had never been
litigated before. Petitioner openly asserts that these
orders are constitutionally invalid, and were issued
in retaliation for him having raised issues of fraud
upon the court which expose the state courts’ own
wrongdoing. Petitioner’s client, Linda Doblin, passed
away in August of 2022. She was denied justice in
her lifetime. At the time of the fraud upon the court,
she was a hearing disabled financially dependent
spouse who had obtained a final order of divorce
after being subjected to spousal abuse, with primary
custody of her minor child and with necessary
financial support from her ex-spouse. Due to the ex
spouse’s successful fraud upon the court and abuse of
process, less than three years after the final
arbitrator’s judgment pursuant to the divorce,
Petitioner’s client found herself a) bankrupt, b) with
her child effectively in the sole custody of the spouse,
with one hour a week supervised visitation with her
son, the father enabled to abuse their son’s education
by sending him away to an isolated desert
Scientology indoctrination camp for months at a
time, and c) subjected to malicious criminal
prosecution for interference with custody (which was
dismissed when the subject settlement agreement
came up missing from the court record), when her
son in accordance with the law, time after time
sought refuge with his mother from abuse from the
spouse).
The Third Circuit Panel applied too
14
limiting a definition of bad faith to the Younger
Abstention exception.
Intervention would still be warranted upon a
showing of "bad faith, harassment or any other
exceptional circumstance that would call for
equitable relief. . . a refusal to abstain is also
justified where a prosecution or proceeding has
been brought to retaliate for or to deter
constitutionally protected conduct, or where a
prosecution or proceeding is otherwise brought
in bad faith or for the purpose to harass. E.g.,
Lewellen v. Raff, 843 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (8th
Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 103 L.
Ed. 2d 229, 109 S. Ct. 1171 (1989) (bad faith
prosecution where brought in retaliation for
exercise of First Amendment rights); Rowe v.
Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982) (bad faith
prosecution where brought after assurances of
immunity to defendant).
In such cases, a showing of retaliatory or bad
faith prosecution establishes
irreparable
injury for the purposes of the Younger
doctrine, Bishop v. State Bar of Texas, 736 F.2d
292, 294 (5th Cir. 1984); Shaw v. Garrison, 467
F.2d 113, 119-21 (5th Cir.), cert, denied,
409 U.S. 1024, 34 L. Ed. 2d 317, 93 S. Ct. 467
(1972), and the expectations for success of the
party bringing the action need not be relevant.
See, e.g, Lewellen, 843 F.2d at 1109-10
(injunction justified regardless of expectations
where prosecution brought to discourage
exercise of constitutional rights). Abstention
would serve no purpose because a state cannot
have a legitimate interest in discouraging the
exercise of constitutional rights, see, e.g., id. at
15
1110, or, equally, in continuing actions
otherwise brought in bad faith, thereby
reducing the need for deference to state
proceedings.
See Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2d Cir.
1994) (emphasis added). It is respectfully submitted,
that the sole purpose of the state ethics proceedings
against the Petitioner is to retaliate, in bad faith,
against him for the exercise of First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, and under those circumstances,
the District Court must not abstain.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully
submits that this Petition for Writ of Certiorari
should be granted under Rule 10 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dated- July 29, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH ROSELLINI, ESQ.
16
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