Amicus Curiae Brief — Department of the Air Force, et al., Petitioners v. Prutehi Guahan, fka Prutehi Litekyan

No. 25-579

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

PRUTEHI GUAHAN,

Respondent.

——————

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

AND 20 OTHER STATES

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

JOHN B. MCCUSKEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

mwilliams@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MATTHEW K. NIU

Caldwell Fellow

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and Interests of Amici Curiae ..................... 1

Summary of Argument ........................................................ 3

Argument .............................................................................. 4

I.

The Ninth Circuit improperly allowed review

of a non-final agency action ........................................ 4

A. The application was the start of the relevant

process—not the end ............................................... 4

B. The Ninth Circuit threw a wrench in

cooperative federalism processes like

RCRA’s .................................................................... 11

II.

The Ninth Circuit improperly layered a

needless NEPA review on top of RCRA’s

comprehensive provisions......................................... 15

A. Under the functional equivalence doctrine,

NEPA review was not required ........................... 16

B. Considering the harms, the Court should

exercise caution before extending

burdensome NEPA review ................................... 24

Conclusion ........................................................................... 29

II

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136 (1967) ......................................................... 5

Advanced Integrative Med. Sci. Inst.,

PLLC v. Garland,

24 F.4th 1249 (9th Cir. 2022) ......................................... 6

Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA,

911 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1990) ..................... 17, 18, 20, 24

Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA,

501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ...................................... 19

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,

477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973) ......................................... 20

Appalachian Voices v. FERC,

139 F.4th 903 (D.C. Cir. 2025) ..................................... 25

Arkansas v. Oklahoma,

503 U.S. 91 (1992) ......................................................... 11

Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc.,

462 U.S. 87 (1983) ......................................................... 19

Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564 (1972) ......................................................... 8

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154 (1997) ........................................... 5, 6, 9, 10

Biden v. Texas,

597 U.S. 785 (2022) ......................................................... 7

Birckhead v. FERC,

925 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ...................................... 22

III

Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA,

481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973) ......................................... 20

Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA,

934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ........................................ 7

Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass'n v. Kempthorne,

No. 6:06-CV-1501, 2007 WL 1593727

(N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2007) ................................................. 5

Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of

Fed. Rsrv. Sys.,

603 U.S. 799 (2024) ......................................................... 4

Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest

Serv.,

911 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2018) ......................................... 27

Cronin v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990) ......................................... 26

Dalton v. Specter,

511 U.S. 462 (1994) ................................................... 5, 10

DOT v. Pub. Citizen,

541 U.S. 752 (2004) ........................................... 16, 17, 18

Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Rural

Utilities Serv.,

74 F.4th 489 (7th Cir. 2023) ........................................... 5

Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA,

489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) .............................. 17, 18

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, LP,

572 U.S. 489 (2014) ....................................................... 12

Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass’n

of Okla.,

426 U.S. 776 (1976) ........................................... 16, 18, 24

IV

Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. WallStreet.com, LLC,

586 U.S. 296 (2019) ......................................................... 8

Franklin v. Massachusetts,

505 U.S. 788 (1992) ......................................................... 5

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Sec’y of

U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,

No. 25-12873, 2026 WL 1077624 (11th

Cir. Apr. 21, 2026) ........................................................... 8

FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal.,

449 U.S. 232 (1980) ................................................... 6, 14

Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,

206 U.S. 230 (1907) ....................................................... 11

Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations), Inc. v.

Ruckelshaus,

467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972) .......................................... 19

Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations), Inc. v.

Ruckelshaus,

409 U.S. 1125 (1973) ............................................... 19, 20

Gill v. DOJ,

913 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2019) ....................................... 10

Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus.,

No. 4:93CV0083, 1993 WL 134861 (N.D.

Ohio Mar. 5, 1993) ................................................... 20, 21

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991) ....................................................... 11

Hodel v. Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation

Ass’n, Inc.,

452 U.S. 264 (1981) ................................................. 11, 12

V

Holtz & Krause, Inc. v. DNR,

270 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1978) ......................................... 20

ICC v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co.,

383 U.S. 576 (1966) ......................................................... 5

Illinois v. Lidster,

540 U.S. 419 (2004) ......................................................... 9

In re Aiken Cnty.,

645 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ........................................ 9

Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA,

509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975) ......................................... 20

Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus,

478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ...................................... 17

Kewayfati v. Bondi,

165 F.4th 342 (5th Cir. 2026) ......................................... 2

Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utilities Co.,

905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018) ......................................... 12

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) ....................................................... 19

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,

497 U.S. 871 (1990) ......................................................... 7

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo

Cnty.,

477 U.S. 340 (1986) ......................................................... 8

Maine v. Taylor,

477 U.S. 131 (1986) ....................................................... 11

Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council,

490 U.S. 360 (1989) ....................................................... 17

Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee,

41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) .......................................... 11

VI

Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc.,

516 U.S. 479 (1996) ......................................................... 2

Merrell v. Thomas,

807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................... 19, 20

Merrell v. Thomas,

484 U.S. 848 (1987) ....................................................... 19

Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against

Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983) ......................... 25

Mont. Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Burgum,

No. 1:26-cv-00021-TJC (D. Mont. filed

Mar. 3, 2026), ECF No. 1 ............................................. 15

Morton v. Mancari,

417 U.S. 535 (1974) ....................................................... 18

Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States,

435 U.S. 679 (1978) ....................................................... 19

New York v. United States,

505 U.S. 144 (1992) ....................................................... 12

Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club,

523 U.S. 726 (1998) ......................................................... 9

Pacito v. Trump,

169 F.4th 895 (9th Cir. 2026) ......................................... 2

Parsons v. DOJ,

878 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 2017) ........................................... 8

People Against Nuclear Energy v. U.S.

Nuclear Regul. Comm'n,

678 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ...................................... 25

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,

486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) .......................... 17, 19, 22

Portland Cement Corp. v. EPA,

417 U.S. 921 (1974) ....................................................... 17

VII

Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Int’l Union of

Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, AFLCIO,

367 U.S. 396 (1961) ..................................................... 8, 9

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.

Amalgamated Bank,

566 U.S. 639 (2012) ....................................................... 18

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens

Council,

490 U.S. 332 (1989) ....................................................... 19

Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States,

307 U.S. 125 (1939) ......................................................... 8

Sackett v. EPA,

566 U.S. 120 (2012) ......................................................... 7

San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v.

Jewell,

747 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2014) ......................................... 16

Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle

Cnty.,

605 U.S. 168 (2025) .......................... 15, 16, 23, 24, 26, 29

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

531 U.S. 159 (2001) ....................................................... 11

Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc.

v. Karlen,

444 U.S. 223 (1980) ....................................................... 23

Tex. Comm. on Nat. Res. v. Bergland,

573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978) ......................................... 20

U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio,

503 U.S. 607 (1992) ....................................................... 13

VIII

U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River

Pres. Ass’n,

590 U.S. 604 (2020) ....................................................... 27

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,

427 U.S. 246 (1976) ................................................. 12, 20

United States v. Bormes,

568 U.S. 6 (2012) ..................................................... 18, 19

Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,

123 F.4th 513 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ....................................... 4

W. Neb. Res. Council v. EPA,

943 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1991) ......................................... 20

Webster v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,

685 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................................... 2

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7 (2008) ........................................................... 16

Wyoming v. Hathaway,

525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975) ................................... 20, 22

Wyoming v. Kleepe,

426 U.S. 906 (1976) ....................................................... 20

Federal Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 704 .................................................................. 4, 10

16 U.S.C. § 1535 .................................................................. 12

28 U.S.C. § 2412 .................................................................. 26

33 U.S.C. § 1251 .................................................................. 12

42 U.S.C. § 4321 .................................................................. 16

42 U.S.C. § 4331 .................................................................... 3

42 U.S.C. § 4332 .................................................................. 19

IX

42 U.S.C. § 4336 ............................................................ 16, 21

42 U.S.C. § 4336a ................................................................ 27

42 U.S.C. § 6921 .................................................................. 21

42 U.S.C. § 6922 .................................................................. 21

42 U.S.C. § 6925 .............................................................. 9, 23

42 U.S.C. § 6926 ............................................................ 1, 6, 7

42 U.S.C. § 6930 .................................................................. 21

42 U.S.C. § 6961 .................................................................. 13

42 U.S.C. § 6974 .................................................................. 21

Federal Regulations

40 C.F.R. Pt. 270, Subpt. B ............................................... 23

40 C.F.R. § 124.5 ................................................................... 6

40 C.F.R. § 124.6 ................................................................... 6

40 C.F.R. § 124.9 ................................................................. 21

40 C.F.R. § 124.10 ................................................................. 6

40 C.F.R. § 124.11 ................................................................. 6

40 C.F.R. § 124.12 ................................................................. 6

40 C.F.R. § 124.13 ................................................................. 6

40 C.F.R. § 124.14 ................................................................. 6

40 C.F.R. § 124.19 ................................................................. 5

40 C.F.R. § 262.13 ............................................................... 21

40 C.F.R. § 264.51 ............................................................... 21

40 C.F.R. § 264.56 ............................................................... 21

40 C.F.R. § 270.51 ............................................................... 10

X

40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 ............................................................... 23

40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 ............................................................. 16

State Statutes

ALA. CODE § 22-28-2 ........................................................... 12

ALA. CODE § 22-28-16 ......................................................... 12

ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.100 .................................................. 12

ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.900 .................................................. 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-421 ................................................. 12

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-426 ................................................. 12

ARK. CODE § 8-7-203 .......................................................... 12

ARK. CODE § 8-7-215 .......................................................... 12

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39047 ........................... 12

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42300 ........................... 12

CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.5 ........................................ 20

COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-103 ............................................. 12

COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-8-501 ............................................. 12

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-423 .............................................. 12

CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-430 .............................................. 12

DEL. CODE tit. 7, § 6002 ..................................................... 12

DEL. CODE tit. 7, § 6003 ..................................................... 12

FLA. STAT. § 403.031 .......................................................... 13

FLA. STAT. § 403.161 .......................................................... 13

GA. CODE § 12-9-3 ............................................................... 13

GA. CODE § 12-9-7 ............................................................... 13

XI

HAW. REV. STAT. § 342B-1 ................................................. 13

HAW. REV. STAT. § 342B-11 ............................................... 13

IDAHO CODE § 39-4403 ....................................................... 13

IDAHO CODE § 39-4408 ....................................................... 13

ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3.315.................................................... 13

ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9(b) ...................................................... 13

IND. CODE § 13-11-2-158 .................................................... 13

IND. CODE § 13-18-4-5 ........................................................ 13

IOWA CODE § 455B.171....................................................... 13

IOWA CODE § 455B.183....................................................... 13

IOWA CODE § 455B.186....................................................... 13

KAN. STAT. § 65-164 ............................................................ 13

KAN. STAT. § 65-165 ............................................................ 13

KY. REV. STAT. § 224.1-010 ................................................ 13

KY. REV. STAT. § 224.70-110 .............................................. 13

LA. STAT. § 30:2004 ............................................................. 13

LA. STAT. § 30:2076 ............................................................. 13

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 26A ........................................ 13

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21, § 43 ........................................... 13

MD. CODE, ENV. § 9-301 .................................................... 13

MD. CODE, ENV. § 9-322 .................................................... 13

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 361-A ......................................... 13

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 413 ............................................. 13

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.301 ............................................ 13

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.3112 .......................................... 13

XII

MINN. STAT. §§ 115.01 sub. 10, 115.07 .............................. 13

MISS. CODE § 49-17-5 ......................................................... 13

MISS. CODE § 49-17-29 ....................................................... 13

MO. REV. STAT. § 644.016................................................... 13

MO. REV. STAT. § 644.051................................................... 13

MONT. CODE § 75-5-605 ...................................................... 13

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-212 ................................................. 13

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-215.1 .............................................. 13

N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-02 ............................................. 13

N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-28-06 ............................................. 13

N.H. REV. STAT. § 485-A:2................................................. 13

N.H. REV. STAT. § 485-A:13............................................... 13

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:14A-1.2 .......................................... 13

N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:14A-2.1 .......................................... 13

N.M. STAT. § 74-2-2 ............................................................ 13

N.M. STAT. § 74-2-7 ............................................................ 13

N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 17-0701 .............................. 13

N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 17-0105 .............................. 13

NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1502 ................................................ 13

NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1506 ................................................ 13

NEV. REV. STAT. § 445A.390 .............................................. 13

NEV. REV. STAT. § 445A.465 .............................................. 13

OHIO REV. CODE § 6111.01 ................................................ 13

OHIO REV. CODE § 6111.04 ................................................ 13

OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, § 2-1-102 .......................................... 13

XIII

OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, § 2-6-304 .......................................... 13

OR. REV. STAT. § 468.005 ................................................... 13

OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.050 ................................................ 13

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12-1................................................... 13

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-12-5................................................... 13

S.C. CODE § 48-1-10 ............................................................ 13

S.C. CODE § 48-1-110 .......................................................... 13

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-2-2 ........................................ 13

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-2-21 ...................................... 13

TENN. CODE § 69-3-103 ...................................................... 13

TENN. CODE § 69-3-108 ...................................................... 13

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.003 ........................ 13

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 382.0518 ...................... 13

UTAH CODE § 19-1-103 ....................................................... 13

UTAH CODE § 19-5-107 ....................................................... 13

VA. CODE § 62.1-44.3........................................................... 13

VA. CODE § 62.1-44.5........................................................... 13

VT. STAT. tit 10, § 1251 ....................................................... 13

VT. STAT. tit 10, § 1259 ....................................................... 13

W. VA. CODE § 22-11-3 ....................................................... 13

W. VA. CODE § 22-11-8 ....................................................... 13

WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.020 ........................................... 13

WASH. REV. CODE § 90.48.160 ........................................... 13

WIS. STAT. § 283.01 ............................................................. 13

WIS. STAT. § 283.31 ............................................................. 13

XIV

WYO. STAT. § 35-11-103 ...................................................... 13

WYO. STAT. § 35-11-301 ...................................................... 13

35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.1 ................................................. 13

35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.202 ............................................. 13

327 IAC § 5-2-2 ................................................................... 13

Other Authorities

A. Dan Tarlock,

Safe Drinking Water: A Federalism

Perspective,

21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y

REV. 233 (1997) ............................................................. 12

Alan Masinter,

The National Environmental Policy

Act and the Value of Information,

22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 465

(2020) .............................................................................. 26

Albert C. Lin,

Revamping Our Approach to Emerging

Technologies,

76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2011) .................................... 25

Application,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(12th ed. 2024) ................................................................. 6

Bradley C. Karkkainen,

Whither NEPA?,

12 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 333 (2004) ................................. 22

CEQ,

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

TIMELINES (2010-2018) (2020),

https://perma.cc/RL9L7HDE ..................................... 26

XV

Cmdr. Charles W. Tucker,

Compliance by Federal Facilities with

State and Local Environmental

Regulations,

35 NAVAL L. REV. 87 (1986) ......................................... 12

Denis Binder,

NEPA at 50: Standing Tall,

23 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2020) ............................................ 25

EPA,

Off. of Solid Waste and Emergency

Response, Directive

No. 9522.1979(01), Opinion Letter on

Applicability of the National

Environmental Policy Act's

Environmental Impact Statement

Requirements to EPA's Actions Under

the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (Mar. 22, 1979), 1979 WL

51519 .............................................................................. 21

Final,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(12th ed. 2024) ................................................................. 6

Frank B. Cross,

The Judiciary and Public Choice,

50 HASTINGS L.J. 355 (1999) ....................................... 26

GUAM EPA,

ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM:

HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT

FACILITY PERMIT (2018),

https://tinyurl.com/2dak2r2s ......................................... 9

XVI

H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 (1976), reprinted in

1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238 ............................................... 22

KRISTEN HITE,

CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11932,

NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

ACT: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND REMEDIES

(2025) ........................................................................ 25, 26

L. Diane Schenke & Sharon Shutler,

The Application of NEPA to

Restoration Plans Under the Oil

Pollution Act,

45 BAYLOR L. REV. 345 (1993) ..................................... 20

Lori Hackleman Patterson,

NEPA’s Stronghold: A Noose for the

Endangered Species Act?,

27 CUMB. L. REV. 753 (1997) ....................................... 22

Mark C. Rutzick,

A Long and Winding Road: How the

National Environmental Policy Act

Has Become the Most Expensive and

Least Effective Environmental Law in

the History of the United States, and

How to Fix It, REGUL. TRANSPARENCY

PROJECT (Oct. 16, 2018),

https://tinyurl.com/3br559z5. ...................................... 27

NIKKI CHIAPPA ET AL.,

BREAKTHROUGH INST.,

UNDERSTANDING NEPA LITIGATION: A

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF RECENT

NEPA-RELATED APPELLATE COURT

CASES (2024),

https://perma.cc/FX4M-YPYA ................................... 15

XVII

Press Release,

Duke Energy, Dominion Energy and

Duke Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast

Pipeline (July 5, 2020),

https://tinyurl.com/3mx8sere ...................................... 27

Request,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(12th ed. 2024) ................................................................. 6

INTRODUCTION

AND INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE

It might be surprising to think that a waste disposal

site at an isolated air base across the Pacific Ocean might

have vast implications for all the States. But here, it does.

Things started simple enough. For four decades, the

U.S. Air Force has disposed of World-War-II era

munitions at Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. To

conduct those activities, the Air Force secured a permit

under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of

1976. Every so often, the Air Force must renew its permit.

And because States and territories administer the RCRA

permit process, see 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b), the Air Force

submits its application to the Guam Environmental

Protection Agency.

But things went sideways in 2021, when the Air Force

once more sought to renew its permit. This time, before

the Guam EPA could even reach any final decision, a

“direct action” group sued the Air Force. The group

insisted that the Air Force needed to prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement or an Environmental

Assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act

of 1969 before the Air Force could put pen to paper on any

permit application. The Ninth Circuit agreed.

So activists have successfully employed NEPA to hit

the brakes on ongoing state review under a cooperative

federalism scheme. Allowing this kind of midstream

judicial review is problematic enough; after all, the

Administrative Procedure Act contemplates that courts

will review “final agency action,” not every preliminary or

intermediate step. But truth be told, NEPA had no role

to play in this story at all. Because RCRA already

provides for a sweeping environmental review, layering

2

NEPA over top of it does nothing but throw up an

unnecessary roadblock.

If the Ninth Circuit’s logic stands, then cooperative

federalism schemes like RCRA’s will be subject to serial

lawsuits and challenges. Each procedural step will thus

become another opportunity for opponents to attack. But

as even the Ninth Circuit has recognized in other cases,

the APA “prevents piecemeal or premature review of

agency action.” Pacito v. Trump, 169 F.4th 895, 930 (9th

Cir. 2026). And “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction—not overseers of unfinished agency

business.” Kewayfati v. Bondi, 165 F.4th 342, 346 (5th

Cir. 2026). Nothing about a federal submission to a state

process changes these bottom-line rules. Maybe even

more so in a cooperative federalism scheme, judicial

review should wait until some final decision—not a

request for a final decision—is on the table. Otherwise,

state permit authority will effectively be cut down as

review is punted to federal courts.

Perhaps worse still would be the consequences from

adopting the Ninth Circuit’s view that NEPA mandates

redundant review processes even when another

“comprehensive environmental statute” like RCRA gives

the federal government all the information it needs.

Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996). NEPA

has already become a weapon of choice for those opposed

to development of critical infrastructure projects. But if

the decision below stands, then those project opponents

will be emboldened to push ever more aggressive readings

of NEPA in seemingly every conceivable context—all for

no discernible benefit in return. Yet Congress didn’t mean

for NEPA to “impose red tape for its own sake.” Webster

v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 685 F.3d 411, 424 (4th Cir. 2012). It

intended to balance environmental consciousness with the

3

need to “fulfill the social, economic, and other

requirements.” 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). The decision below

threatens that balance.

In granting this petition, the Court has already

recognized that this otherwise localized dispute about

weapons disposal carries national weight. The Court

should now take the next step and reverse.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The Air Force’s application was not final, so it was

not properly subject to judicial review. It did not mark the

end of any agency decision-making process, but rather

only the beginning. It also did not impose legal

consequences; consequences would follow from the Guam

EPA’s decision on the application, not the application

itself. Allowing this sort of early review conflicts with the

notions of cooperative federalism embodied in RCRA and

other environmental statutes. These suits shift decision

authority away from the States—who Congress intended

to decide—and place it instead in the hands of federal

judges.

II. The Ninth Circuit also erred in thinking that the

Air Force’s RCRA application was subject to NEPA’s

environmental evaluation requirements. RCRA already

provides for a comprehensive scheme of environmental

review. That more specific statute prevails over NEPA’s

general provisions, affording a functional equivalent that

obviates the need for duplicative evaluations under the

NEPA framework.

Mandating NEPA review in

circumstances like these—where it serves no useful

function—only heightens the problems with NEPA. It

transforms the statute from a useful informational device

into a weapon to impede important development and other

projects.

4

ARGUMENT

I.

The Ninth Circuit improperly allowed review of

a non-final agency action.

The Ninth Circuit first erred in thinking that now is the

right time for judicial review. The Air Force’s RCRA

permit renewal application was just an initial, nonreviewable step. Treating it more than that will ultimately

impair the States’ role in statutes like RCRA, as the

center of attention shifts to premature review in federal

court.

A. The application was the start of the relevant

process—not the end.

Because RCRA lacks its own judicial review provision,

the APA decides when judicial review of a RCRA-related

decision can be had. And the APA limits judicial review to

“final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. This provision

“codifies the understanding that premature review

squanders judicial resources, and that litigants are

generally best served by a system which prohibits

piecemeal appellate consideration of rulings that may fade

into insignificance by the time proceedings conclude.”

Vanda Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 123 F.4th 513, 521 (D.C. Cir.

2024). It then works “work[s] hand in hand” with Section

704’s injury requirement,1 Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of

Remember that Respondent attacks the submission of the

application itself. See App.23 (alleging that “Defendants’ decision to

submit an application” to Guam EPA triggered NEPA obligations).

By attacking the application, Respondent has created a problem with

Section 704’s injury requirement, too, as Respondent has not alleged

any injury from the application. Rather, Respondent focuses on the

harms that would result if the application is approved and disposal

activities are conducted. See App.7 (“The aforementioned cultural,

1

5

Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 808 (2024),

guaranteeing that a given case presents the court with a

crystallized dispute before the court jumps in.

“The cases dealing with judicial review of

administrative actions have interpreted the ‘finality’

element in a pragmatic way.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). Generally, “two conditions must

be satisfied for agency action to be ‘final.’” Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). First, the action must

denote a “completed … decisionmaking process.”

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992).

Second, the action must determine “right[s] or

obligation[s]” or have direct “legal consequences.” ICC v.

Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 383 U.S. 576, 602 (1966); see also

Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469 (1994). At bottom,

though, Section “704 asks whether a terminal event has

occurred.” Driftless Area Land Conservancy v. Rural

Utilities Serv., 74 F.4th 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2023)

(Easterbrook, J.) (cleaned up).

Taking a pragmatic view, the Air Force’s application

was not a “final agency action” in any sense. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 124.19(l)(2) (explaining that a “final permit decision” is

required for “final agency action” under RCRA).

social, spiritual, health, professional, scientific, recreational, aesthetic,

economic, and other interests of Prutehi Litekyan and its members in

Guam will be adversely affected and irreparably injured by the

proposed OB/OD operations at the EOD Range on Andersen AFB.”

(emphasis added)). Respondent is thus not aggrieved by the action it

purports to challenge. Cf. Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass'n v. Kempthorne,

No. 6:06-CV-1501, 2007 WL 1593727, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2007)

(dismissing NEPA challenge to submission of “land-into-trust

applications” to the Secretary of the Interior because, “even if

acceptance of the applications constituted ‘final agency action,’

plaintiffs do not (and could not) allege how they were aggrieved by the

acceptance of the applications”).

6

1. An application for a RCRA permit is not the

“consummation” of a decision-making process. Bennett,

520 U.S. at 177. Rather, an “application” is just a “request

or petition,” Application, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(12th ed. 2024), to “seek[] permission for the exercise of a

privilege,” Request, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed.

2024). At most, it is a “threshold determination that

[Guam EPA’s] further inquiry is warranted” and serves

“only to initiate” the reciprocal response from the state

regulator. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232,

241-42 (1980). Because it requires Guam EPA’s “further

… action,” Final, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed.

2024), the application alone is “merely tentative,” Bennett,

520 U.S. at 178. It is the start and not the end. See, e.g.,

Advanced Integrative Med. Sci. Inst., PLLC v. Garland,

24 F.4th 1249, 1258 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that an

application for the renewal of a waste discharge permit

would “begin” the “agency’s decisionmaking process,”

which would not finish “until the [applicant] had exhausted

the [administrative] appeal process” (cleaned up)).

Although the Ninth Circuit thought the application

“marked an endpoint,” Pet.App.23a, the Air Force still has

every opportunity to withdraw, modify, or adjust its

application—or make another decision entirely. Indeed,

the whole point of the application process is that the

Guamanian agency will have a chance to request—or more

accurately, demand—changes from the Air Force lest it

risk losing its permit. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.5(c),

124.6. Likewise, the required public comments and

hearings might prompt changes. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.10124.14. Yet in assuming that none of that will happen, the

Ninth Circuit improperly dismissed both the importance

of public involvement and the central role that a state

regulator plays under delegated RCRA authority. See 42

U.S.C. § 6926(b). It presumed instead that Guam EPA

7

acted as a mere rubberstamp—even though, under

RCRA, its view carries the same weight as the federal

regulator’s. Id. § 6926(d).

Far from turning on an endpoint, the Ninth Circuit’s

logic allows litigants to challenge any internal agency

“assessment, plan, or decision” that takes a position on

anything. Pet.App.25a. But this Court already closed the

door on such a broad conception of judicial review: a party

can’t sue to “demand a general judicial review” of an

agency’s “day-to-day operations.” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 899 (1990). “To the extent that the

Court of Appeals understood itself to be reviewing an

abstract decision”—or assessment or plan—“apart from

specific agency action, as defined in the APA, that was

error.” Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, 809 (2022).

The Ninth Circuit also here put too much weight on

Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 127 (2012), in suggesting the

application was more than some interlocutory step. See

Pet.App.23a. Other lower courts have rightly warned that

“courts should resist the temptation to define the [finality

of an agency] action by comparing it to superficially

similar actions in the caselaw.” Cal. Cmtys. Against

Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2019).

Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit succumbed to that

temptation here. The EPA compliance order at issue in

Sackett offered no mechanism for further agency review

after it is issued. Sackett, 566 U.S. at 127. It also marked

the beginning and end of the relevant decision—a selfcontained decision made by the federal agency. And it

effectively bound another federal agency on issuance. Id.

at 126.

In contrast to Sackett, the application here was only the

start of a decision process by a separate governmental

decisionmaker (Guam EPA) who was free to exercise

8

independent judgment. An agency action is not final

where it “only affects [a plaintiff’s] rights adversely on the

contingency of future administrative action.” Rochester

Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S. 125, 130 (1939);

contra Pet.App.25a; see also, e.g., Parsons v. DOJ, 878

F.3d 162, 168 (6th Cir. 2017) (explaining that an agency

action is not final where it merely prompts actions by

other parties, even when those other parties are

“government actors”). And as for the Air Force, nothing

commits it to its present course; it can reconsider its

position until the moment before Guam EPA decides on

its application. No one is bound.

Thus, Respondent’s argument that this is final agency

action fails on the first prong.

2. Beyond lacking completeness or consummation,

the application also does not determine “rights or

obligations” or have “direct legal consequences.”

Rights and obligations cannot flow to the Air Force

from an application alone because no “legitimate claim of

entitlement” to dispose of hazardous waste arises until

after the state agency approves the application. See Bd.

of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

In other words, “[a] request cannot determine rights or

obligations until another party acts on it, and when it does,

that decision then becomes legally binding.” Friends of

the Everglades, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep't of Homeland

Sec., No. 25-12873, 2026 WL 1077624, at *3 (11th Cir. Apr.

21, 2026) (cleaned up). This requirement of mutuality—an

offer and acceptance—applies when it comes to

constitutional property rights, Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, land

zoning, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Cnty., 477

U.S. 340, 351 (1986), copyright registration, Fourth Estate

Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 586 U.S. 296,

300 (2019), and nuclear reactor operation, Power Reactor

9

Dev. Co. v. Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers,

AFL-CIO, 367 U.S. 396 (1961). It should be no different

in the RCRA context, where hazardous-waste activities

happen only after approval of the application and issuance

of the permit. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925; cf. In re Aiken Cnty.,

645 F.3d 428, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that challenge

to ongoing administrative proceedings after Department

of Energy’s submission—and later attempt to withdraw—

application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was

“premature”).

An application also cannot command the Air Force “to

do anything or to refrain from doing anything” because

the material terms of the “doing” aren’t yet set. See Ohio

Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998). A

state agency can place conditions on the permit, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6925(c)(3); in practice, Guam EPA has done so at

Andersen. See GUAM EPA, ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE,

GUAM: HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITY

PERMIT 1 (2018), https://tinyurl.com/2dak2r2s. Past

conditions have included requirements for facility safety,

security, inspection, contingency planning, and

recordkeeping, among others. See generally id. So before

the new permit is approved, the Air Force has no way of

knowing the legal obligations that will flow from it. Any

analysis of tentative legal obligations thus becomes

speculative at best, as “new potential legal obligations …

[can]not yet be[] determined.” Pet.App.65a (Van Dyke, J.,

dissenting).

Faced with facts like these, the Ninth Circuit again

looked to authority examining “quite different

circumstances”—namely, Bennett. Illinois v. Lidster, 540

U.S. 419, 424 (2004). In particular, it perceived “the Air

Force’s waste disposal plan [to be] closely analogous to the

agency action at issue in Bennett itself,” which this Court

10

held was a final one. Pet.App.30a-31a (citing Bennett, 520

U.S. at 157-58, 178). But in Bennett, an affected agency

could not “disregard the issued opinion” without

“subject[ing] it or its employees to substantial civil and

criminal penalties, including imprisonment.” Gill v. DOJ,

913 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). The

decision in Bennett also closed the door on specific agency

actions unless those actions complied with “prescribed

conditions.” 520 U.S. at 178.

Again: neither the Ninth Circuit nor Respondent have

pointed to such Bennett-like consequences from the

application here. See also supra note 1. Were the Air

Force to withdraw it, no consequences would follow.

Further, any “prescribed conditions” or authorization will

attach only on approval. Contrast with Bennett, 520 U.S.

at 170 (characterizing the challenged action as a “permit

authorizing the agency action”). And the application alone

did not commit the agency to continue its waste disposal

operations in any way. (Its present disposal activities

result from the prior renewal application, not the current

one. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a), (d).) Without a legal

penalty for removing the application, or an affirmative

duty to do anything after submitting it, it’s hard to spot

any consequences at all. The consequences will instead

arise from whatever Guam EPA does with that application

(and the Air Force’s later implementation of it)—when

Respondent is free to try to challenge the action. See 5

U.S.C.A. § 704 (contemplating that judicial review is not

available unless “no other adequate remedy in a court” is

available). And even Bennett recognized that an agency

action can’t be final when it merely submits information to

a recipient who then has “discretion to accept or reject

[it].” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (describing Dalton).

11

Respondent has thus failed to satisfy the second prong

of this test, too.

B. The Ninth Circuit threw a wrench in

cooperative federalism processes like

RCRA’s.

Respondent’s dismissive reading of the finality

requirement offends the States.

It helps to first level set. States enjoy “traditional and

primary power over land and water use.” Solid Waste

Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001). So the Court has long sought to

leave them room to exercise “broad regulatory authority

to protect … the integrity of [their] natural resources.”

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986). In other words,

States hold an “absolute right,” Martin v. Waddell’s

Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 367 (1842), and “final power”

over “all the earth and air within [their] domain[s],”

Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). And

when Congress has not made it “unmistakably clear” that

it “intends to alter the usual constitutional balance

between the States and Federal Government,” the Court

won’t assume it has. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,

460 (1991) (cleaned up).

Congress has been careful to respect the States’

important role in all manner of environmental statutes. It

most often does so by employing cooperative federalism.

“Cooperative federalism” is “a partnership between the

States and the Federal Government.” Arkansas v.

Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992). It “allows the States,

within limits established by federal minimum standards,

to enact and administer their own regulatory programs,

structured to meet their own particular needs.” Hodel v.

Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,

12

289 (1981). Cooperative federalism is a key feature of

“numerous federal [environmental] statutory schemes,”

including the Clean Water Act, the Alaska National

Interest Lands Conservation Act, New York v. United

States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992), the Clean Air Act, EPA v.

EME Homer City Generation, LP, 572 U.S. 489, 511 n.14

(2014), the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1535, the

Safe Drinking Water Act, see A. Dan Tarlock, Safe

Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. &

MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 247 (1997), and, of

course, RCRA, Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utilities Co.,

905 F.3d 925, 929 (6th Cir. 2018).

States play all kinds of roles in these cooperative

federalism regimes. In the Clean Air Act, for example,

States formulate their own plans to implement the Act’s

requirements. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 24952 (1976). And under the Clean Water Act, States have

the “primary responsibilit[y] and right” “to prevent,

reduce, and eliminate pollution.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b). But

most relevant here, Congress has expressly empowered

States to subject federal facilities to state air, water,

waste, and other environmental limits and permitting

requirements. See, e.g., Cmdr. Charles W. Tucker,

Compliance by Federal Facilities with State and Local

Environmental Regulations, 35 NAVAL L. REV. 87, 91-93

(1986) (describing RCRA, CWA, and CAA provisions).

States have in turn passed many statutes requiring all

entities—federal facilities included—to submit to their

permitting authority through relevant applications.2 That

See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-28-2(4), 22-28-16(d); ALASKA STAT.

§§ 46.03.900(18), 46.03.100(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 49-421(3), 49426(A); ARK. CODE §§ 8-7-203(8), 8-7-215(b); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE §§ 39047, 42300(a); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-8-103(13), 25-8501(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-423, 22a-430(a); DEL. CODE tit. 7,

2

13

then brings us to RCRA, which “obligate[s] a federal

polluter, like any other, to obtain permits from … the state

permitting agency.” U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503

U.S. 607, 613 (1992); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a).

The Ninth Circuit’s approach upends the cooperative

federalism embodied in RCRA and many other statutes.

If the Ninth Circuit is right, then challengers will be

motivated to file actions early and often (under NEPA or

otherwise). These challenges will either halt the state

review process before it starts (and before States get a

reasonable opportunity to weigh in) or render it moot after

§§ 6002(40), 6003(a); FLA. STAT. §§ 403.031(9), 403.161(1); GA. CODE

§§ 12-9-3(23), 12-9-7(a)(2); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 342B-1, 342B-11;

IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4403(21), 39-4408(1); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3.315,

5/9(b); IND. CODE §§ 13-11-2-158(a), 13-18-4-5(a); 327 IAC § 5-2-2;

IOWA CODE §§ 455B.171(20)(a), 455B.183, 455B.186; KAN. STAT.

§§ 65-164, 65-165; KY. REV. STAT. §§ 224.70-110, 224.1-010(16); LA.

STAT. §§ 30:2004(11), 30:2076; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 361-A(4),

413(1); MD. CODE, ENV. §§ 9-301(f), 9-322; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21,

§§ 26A, 43(2); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.301(h), 324.3112(1); MINN.

STAT. §§ 115.01 sub. 10, 115.07(a); MISS. CODE §§ 49-17-5(3)(b), 49-1729(1)(a); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 644.016(19), 644.051(1); MONT. CODE § 755-605(1)-(2); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-1502(10), 81-1506(1); NEV. REV.

STAT. §§ 445A.390, 445A.465(1); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 485-A:2(IX), 485A:13(I)(a); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 7:14A-1.2, 7:14A-2.1; N.M. STAT.

§§ 74-2-2(O), 74-2-7(A); N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW §§ 17-0105(1), 170701(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-212(4), 143-215.1(a); N.D. CENT.

CODE §§ 61-28-02(5), 61-28-06(1)-(2); OHIO REV. CODE §§ 6111.01(I),

6111.04(A); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, §§ 2-1-102(10), 2-6-304(A); OR. REV.

STAT. §§ 468.005(5), 468B.050(1); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 691.1, 691.202;

R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 46-12-1(13), 46-12-5(a)-(b); S.C. CODE §§ 48-110(1), 48-1-110(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34A-2-2(3), 34A-2-21;

TENN. CODE §§ 69-3-103(28), 69-3-108(b); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY

CODE §§ 382.003(10), 382.0518(a); UTAH CODE §§ 19-1-103(4), 19-5107(3); VT. STAT. tit 10, §§ 1251(8), 1259(a); VA. CODE §§ 62.1-44.3,

62.1-44.5(A); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.48.020, 90.48.160; W. VA. CODE

§§ 22-11-3(14), 22-11-8(a)-(b); WIS. STAT. §§ 283.01(11), 283.31(1);

WYO. STAT. §§ 35-11-103(a)(vi), 35-11-301(a).

14

it’s done. For instance, under the Ninth Circuit's rule,

Guam EPA could invest months developing permit

conditions—negotiating

monitoring

requirements,

specifying closure plans, tailoring corrective action

schedules to local conditions—only to discover that a

federal court has already passed judgment on some

central issue that resets the board. The State’s technical

expertise and local knowledge, which Congress made

central to the RCRA scheme, would be rendered advisory

at best. More likely, the relevant State wouldn’t be able

to build a record at all, as litigation would leave it

uncertain about what parts of the submitted application

will actually hold. All the relevant action will then shift to

federal courts, and the States who are supposed to keep

hold of the wheel will instead become nothing more than

silent passengers. And these problems will not be

confined to NEPA or RCRA. For instance, challengers to

a disfavored federally driven infrastructure project could

challenge a state certification application under CWA

Section 401 right out of the gate, arguing that it lacks some

critical information (before the State even offered a

chance to correct it). See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 242.

The consequences are also asymmetric. A challenger

who succeeds in blocking an application before the State

acts pays no cost for having bypassed the state process.

But a State that loses its opportunity to shape the permit

through conditions and public comment cannot recover

that role after the fact. Federal court review of an

unapproved application thus substitutes a judicial

determination for the regulatory judgment Congress

assigned to the States. And because a challenger will

enjoy multiple chomps at the apple (by filing early and

often), this kind of preemptive strike could become

accepted practice in any cooperative federalism regime in

which federal actors are regulated entities.

15

To be sure, others beyond the States would be hurt,

too. Courts are the most obvious victims, seeing as

seriatim litigation could quickly clog their dockets at a

time when NEPA litigation is already increasing. NIKKI

CHIAPPA ET AL., BREAKTHROUGH INST., UNDERSTANDING

NEPA LITIGATION: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF RECENT

NEPA-RELATED APPELLATE COURT CASES 3 (2024),

https://perma.cc/FX4M-YPYA.

Really, that’s no

hypothetical; just witness how a single Montana coal

mining company has been fighting NEPA challenges for

almost 20 years. See Compl., Mont. Env’t Info. Ctr. v.

Burgum, No. 1:26-cv-00021-TJC (D. Mont. filed Mar. 3,

2026), ECF No. 1. Federal applicants will also need to

avoid death by a thousand cuts. And it will hurt the public

at large, as important projects could be delayed through

the ancient tactic of war by attrition.

But the injury to federalism is enough, all on its own,

to turn the Ninth Circuit’s adventuresome approach to

finality around. Especially considering how it’s not even

certain that “Congress and the President in 1970 actually

intended or anticipated judicial review of agency

compliance with NEPA,” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure

Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 179 n.2 (2025), the Court

should not use that statute as a means to topple the

sovereign bargain reflected in cooperative-federalism

statutes like RCRA.

II.

The Ninth Circuit improperly layered a needless

NEPA review on top of RCRA’s comprehensive

provisions.

The Ninth Circuit further erred in thinking that

NEPA’s requirements apply at all when an agency

submits a RCRA application. Heaping cumulative NEPA

requirements on top of an already comprehensive RCRA

16

regime ignores ordinary principles of statutory

construction—and invites nothing but more delay and

obstruction. Yet Congress intended NEPA to “inform

agency decisionmaking, not to paralyze it.” Seven Cnty.,

605 U.S. at 173; see also San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water

Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 644 (9th Cir. 2014)

(condemning “efforts to use NEPA as an obstructionist

tactic” (cleaned up)).

A. Under the functional equivalence doctrine,

NEPA review was not required.

1. In passing NEPA, Congress created a process by

which federal agencies were to consider the

environmental effects of their actions. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 4321. NEPA doesn’t dictate outcomes, but instead

“imposes only procedural requirements to ensure that the

agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and

will carefully consider, detailed information concerning

significant environmental impacts.” Winter v. Nat. Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) (cleaned up).

But implementing this seemingly understated goal is a

bit trickier than it might first appear, as NEPA’s

requirements are subject to a host of statutory exceptions.

See 42 U.S.C. § 4336(a); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11.

Likewise, NEPA compliance is not required where it

results in overly burdensome practical consequences

tantamount to a “clear and fundamental conflict of

statutory duty.” Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers

Ass’n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 788-89, 791 (1976). And

compliance is also unnecessary “where an agency has no

ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited

statutory authority over the relevant [environmental]

actions.” DOT v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004).

17

These exceptions reflect how NEPA “is subject to a

construction of reasonableness.” Portland Cement Ass’n

v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1973),

cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). Put differently,

“inherent in NEPA and its implementing regulations is a

rule of reason.” Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767 (cleaned up).

And “[w]here the preparation of a[ NEPA environmental

document] would serve no purpose in light of NEPA’s

regulatory scheme as a whole, no rule of reason worthy of

that title would require an agency to prepare” one. Id.

(cleaned up). “Application of the ‘rule of reason’ thus turns

on the value of the new information to the still pending

decisionmaking process.” Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council,

490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).

One of the best manifestations of this “rule of reason”

is the functional equivalence doctrine. Under that

doctrine, federal agencies need not comply with NEPA’s

requirements under “organic legislation [that] mandate[s]

specific procedures for considering the environment that

are functional equivalents of the impact statement

process.” Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d

499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990). This exception avoids duplicative

administrative burdens on federal agencies where they

are already “set[ting] forth the environmental

considerations” and providing an opportunity for public

comment. Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247,

1255-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Courts recognize that “[t]o

require a ‘statement’ in addition to a decision setting forth

the same considerations, would be a legalism carried to

the extreme.” Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478

F.2d 615, 650 n.130 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Imposing further

NEPA requirements would provide no new information—

and it would thus serve no statutory purpose. This

functional equivalence doctrine thus “strike[s] a workable

balance between some of the advantages and

18

disadvantages of full application of NEPA.” Env’t Def.

Fund, 489 F.2d at 1256 (cleaned up).

The doctrine is consistent with the Court’s precedents

“as a matter of judicial construction.” Siegelman, 911

F.2d at 505 n.12. This Court has already recognized

reasonable NEPA exceptions outside the express

statutory exceptions—at least twice, in fact. When NEPA

and the Interstate Sales Full Disclosure Act would have

required the Department of Housing and Urban

Development to file an EIS, this Court found it

“inconceivable that an environmental impact statement

could, in 30 days, be drafted, circulated, commended upon,

and then reviewed and revised in light of the comments.”

Flint Ridge Dev., 426 U.S. at 788-89. And the Court

excused the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

when it lacked discretion to regulate cross-border

operations, such that it could not control their

environmental impacts. See Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 770.

Just as in those cases, the functional equivalence doctrine

denotes “inconceivable” circumstances where imposing

NEPA requirements does nothing but impair ordinary

agency operations.

And it implements the ordinary rule of statutory

construction that “a specific statute will not be controlled

… by a general one.” Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,

550-51 (1974). “That is particularly true where …

Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has

deliberately targeted specific problems with specific

solutions.”

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v.

Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (cleaned up).

Because NEPA applies to all federal agencies, it

necessarily speaks in generalized terms. Thus, NEPA

must give way to other statutes’ more “precisely drawn,

detailed” requirements. United States v. Bormes, 568

19

U.S. 6, 12 (2012) (cleaned up). Holding otherwise would

allow NEPA to “sabotage the delicate machinery that

Congress

designed”

in

other

comprehensive

environmental statutes. Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776,

779 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).

The doctrine also comports with NEPA’s purpose. In

NEPA, Congress declared “sweeping policy goals” for “a

broad national commitment to protecting and promoting

environmental quality.” Robertson v. Methow Valley

Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348, 350 (1989). But as in

the Sherman Act, Congress “did not intend the text” of

NEPA to “delineate the full meaning of the statute or its

application in concrete situations.” Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l

Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). That’s

why it expressly recognizes places where it cannot apply.

42 U.S.C. § 4332 (requiring compliance only “to the fullest

extent possible” (emphasis added)). That’s also why it

defers to other environmental statutes. See id. §§ 4334,

4335. NEPA is thus “best read[],” Loper Bright Enters.

v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 395 (2024), as simply requiring

federal agencies to be aware of a project’s environmental

impacts and make the public aware of them, too, Balt. Gas

& Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97

(1983). Whether it achieves those aims under the banner

of NEPA or some other statute does not matter, as

Congress’s policy goals are satisfied either way.

Practical experience confirms the doctrine serves

these purposes. Virtually all the federal courts of appeal

have applied this doctrine.3 “Courts have upheld the

See, e.g., Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 384-85 (applying the doctrine

to the Clean Air Act); Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 750 (D.C.

Cir. 1974) (same); Getty Oil Co. (Eastern Operations), Inc. v.

Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

3

20

functional equivalency doctrine exception where the

fundamental purpose of the statute was environmental

protection,” including cases “involving the Toxic

Substances Control Act, the Ocean Dumping Act, the Safe

Drinking Water Act, and the Federal Insecticide,

Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.” L. Diane Schenke &

Sharon Shutler, The Application of NEPA to Restoration

Plans Under the Oil Pollution Act, 45 BAYLOR L. REV.

345, 352 (1993) (cleaned up). Even some States apply it to

State Environmental Protection Acts, or SEPAs. See,

e.g., Holtz & Krause, Inc. v. DNR, 270 N.W.2d 409, 420

(Wis. 1978); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.5(a), (b)(1). But

if the Ninth Circuit has its way, then five decades of

authority will fall by wayside, introducing broad new

uncertainties as to capital-intensive projects that require

certainty.

So the functional equivalence doctrine has a role to

play in cases like these.

2. NEPA review should not have applied here

because the RCRA application process is functionally

equivalent to NEPA’s procedures. See, e.g., Siegelman,

911 F.2d at 504-05; Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs.

1125 (1973) (same); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 508

(4th Cir. 1973), abrogated on other grounds by Union Elec. Co. v.

EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1976); Tex. Comm. on Nat. Res. v.

Bergland, 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978) (applied to the National Forest

Management Act); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 173-74

(6th Cir. 1973), abrogated on other grounds by Union Elec. Co., 427

U.S. at 254-55 (applied to the CAA); Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA,

509 F.2d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); W. Neb. Res. Council v. EPA,

943 F.2d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1991) (applied to the Safe Drinking

Water Act); Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 71-72 (10th Cir.

1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976) (same); Siegelman, 911 F.2d at

504-05 (applied to RCRA); cf. Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779 (referring to

the doctrine in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

Act).

21

Indus., No. 4:93CV0083, 1993 WL 134861, at *10 (N.D.

Ohio Mar. 5, 1993); accord 40 C.F.R. § 124.9(b)(6).

The statute’s processes closely track one another.

NEPA requires a State to identify whether its action will

affect the environment, seek public comment, and then

publish its decision after reviewing and revising it. 42

U.S.C. § 4336(a)-(b). RCRA does the same. “For

instance, the standards of performance for the handling of

hazardous waste must be such as may be necessary to

protect human health and the environment.” EPA, Off. of

Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Directive No.

9522.1979(01), Opinion Letter on Applicability of the

National Environmental Policy Act's Environmental

Impact Statement Requirements to EPA's Actions Under

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Mar. 22,

1979), 1979 WL 51519 (cleaned up). RCRA requires

agencies to identify the amount of hazardous waste it may

generate in a calendar month, whether it receives, treats,

stores, disposes, transports, and recycles the waste. See

42 U.S.C. §§ 6922, 6930, 6921(d); 40 C.F.R. § 262.13.

Agencies must minimize hazards “from fires, explosions,

or any unplanned sudden or non-sudden release of

hazardous waste or hazardous waste constituents to air,

soil, or surface water,” 40 C.F.R. § 264.51, and “assess

possible hazards to human health or the environment,

including direct and indirect effects,” id. § 264.56. States

and EPA publish public notice and comment for the

proposed permit application. 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b)(1)-(2).

Then they issue the permit with a plethora of conditions

on all the activities to ensure environmental safety.

Altogether, these procedures ensure that the Air Force

will take account of all relevant environmental issues; the

public will then have an opportunity to weigh in on them,

too.

22

Aside from procedural similarity, RCRA also fulfills

NEPA’s basic purposes. RCRA protects the environment

in a specific way: requiring specific hazardous waste

standards, an application for a permit, and public

comment. One could say it acts as “extra protection” for

NEPA review. Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 383-84. At

a minimum, by ensuring that the relevant environmental

considerations are all brought out into the light, RCRA

makes NEPA “redundant” (even if “less stringent” in

some subjective sense). Lori Hackleman Patterson,

NEPA’s Stronghold: A Noose for the Endangered Species

Act?, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 753, 763 (1997).

And given how NEPA and its attendant litigation so

often produces delay, RCRA’s delineated timing

requirements—what one might call a need for an

“unusually expeditious decision”—could “be thwarted by

a NEPA impact statement requirement.” Portland

Cement, 486 F.2d at 384. Indeed, “it would only serve to

impede” the Air Force’s “efforts” at orderly,

environmentally conscious waste disposal “to compel it to

stop what it is doing so as to file an impact statement.”

Hathaway, 525 F.2d at 71. Congress intended RCRA to

put all waste disposal issues under a single umbrella for

reasons precisely like these; bolting on a NEPA review

contravenes that intent. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 4

(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6242, 1976

WL 14072 (House committee describing its hope that

RCRA would “permit the environmental laws to function

in a coordinated and effective way”).

In holding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit did too much

flyspecking. Contra Birckhead v. FERC, 925 F.3d 510,

515 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (confirming a NEPA court’s role is not

to flyspeck). It correctly acknowledged that NEPA’s

procedural requirements and Guam EPA’s RCRA

23

permitting process “[b]oth require some analysis of the

environmental impact of a proposed action and some

degree of public involvement.” Pet.App.27. But it then

mistakenly fixated on the timing and breadth of RCRA’s

environmental considerations. See Pet.App.37a-39a.

The purported timing issue is of no moment. For one,

the Air Force had to consider specific environmental

issues when it submitted its application in the first place.

See 42 U.S.C. § 6925(b); see also 40 C.F.R. Pt. 270, Subpt.

B. For another, environmental considerations will be

further developed, and public comment will be had, once

Guam EPA considers the application. Trying to segment

and separately evaluate those two aspects of an integrated

process serves no purpose, as it would just require the

agency to memorialize the same facts over and over.

NEPA’s purpose was never “to generate paperwork—

even excellent paperwork.” 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c).

And as for the breadth of the environmental

considerations, “NEPA imposes no substantive

environmental obligations or restrictions.” Seven Cnty.,

605 U.S. at 173. It does not even require an agency to

“weigh environmental consequences in any particular

way.” Id. Rather, “the central principle of judicial review

in NEPA cases is deference” to the agency’s decision. Id.

at 179.

RCRA thus ensures that environmental

considerations would have been “reasonably” weighed

upon the application’s determination. Id. at 173. The

Ninth Circuit should have recognized as much and moved

on. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.

Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (“[T]he only role for a

court is to insure that the agency has considered the

environmental consequences.”).

At bottom, if the Court does not perceive RCRA’s

comprehensive procedures to be functionally equivalent to

24

NEPA’s, then every RCRA permit application submitted

to a state agency—for any federal facility, anywhere in the

country—could require a separate, prior round of NEPA

review. The practical consequence would be to interpose

a federal procedural layer before every stateadministered permitting decision. And like the Ninth

Circuit’s decision about “final agency action,” that holding

would undermine the efficiency and autonomy that

Congress sought to preserve when it allowed for a

delegation of RCRA authority to the States.

So, far from “shunt[ing] aside” “the duty NEPA

imposes upon the agencies to consider environmental

factors,” Flint Ridge Dev., 426 U.S. at 787, RCRA is

“comprehensive in its field of application” and “ensure[s]

that EPA [and the States] consider[] fully, with the

assistance of meaningful public comment, environmental

issues involved in the permitting of hazardous waste

management facilities,” Siegelman, 911 F.2d at 505. The

Air Force was quite right to think that a further round of

NEPA review was uncalled for in the face of such

sweeping protections.

B. Considering the harms, the Court should

exercise

caution

before

extending

burdensome NEPA review.

The Court has sometimes construed NEPA’s scope

with an eye toward its practical consequences. See, e.g.,

Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 190. And here, requiring further

NEPA review where it would not serve any useful function

would not just be some innocuous belt-and-suspenders

approach. Rather, it would allow NEPA to impede

essential activities (like the mission-critical ordnance

disposal at issue here) with little-to-no discernible

return—an all too familiar story when it comes to NEPA.

25

Recall how we got here. “Since its enactment more

than thirty years ago, [NEPA] has assumed quasiconstitutional status as one of the foundational laws of the

modern administrative state.” Bradley C. Karkkainen,

Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 333, 333 (2004)

(cleaned up). It was enacted without much fanfare. Albert

C. Lin, Revamping Our Approach to Emerging

Technologies, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1336 n.152 (2011)

(“[M]any legislators viewed the statute as an

uncontroversial way to burnish their environmental

credentials, and the legislation received relatively little

attention from lobbyists and interest groups.”). But it has

since become the most heavily litigated federal

environmental statute. KRISTEN HITE, CONG. RSCH.

SERV., IF11932, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

ACT: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND REMEDIES 1 (2025).

Concomitantly, “NEPA has morphed into one of the most

exacting burdens on the federal government.”

Appalachian Voices v. FERC, 139 F.4th 903, 921 (D.C.

Cir. 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring).

The reason is easy to spot: “NEPA quickly became a

main weapon of NIMBYs”—that is, those screaming,

“Not in my backyard!”—“because of its universality.”

Denis Binder, NEPA at 50: Standing Tall, 23 CHAP. L.

REV. 1, 43 (2020). In early cases, litigants tried to use

“NEPA to block or delay proposed construction of

government projects-low-income housing, federal

detention centers, Job Corps centers, postal service

facilities,” and more. People Against Nuclear Energy v.

U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n, 678 F.2d 222, 229 (D.C. Cir.

1982), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Metro. Edison Co.

v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).

And over time, particularly when paired with the APA,

NEPA “transformed from a modest procedural

requirement into a blunt and haphazard tool employed by

26

project opponents (who may not always be entirely

motivated by concern for the environment) to try to stop

or at least slow down new infrastructure and construction

projects.” Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 183. Now, the statute

“is notorious for special interest abuse” and “can be used

by anyone interested in frustrating or delaying a major

government action.” Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and

Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 375 (1999).

Not surprisingly, then, painful consequences follow

when a given action finds itself caught up in NEPA.

Most obviously, even NEPA fans concede that “NEPA

compliance does come with costs”—big ones, actually.

Alan Masinter, The National Environmental Policy Act

and the Value of Information, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.

POL’Y 465, 471-72 (2020). First come the costs of

conducting a NEPA review—a process that requires

hundreds of pages of analysis and years of work, leading

to millions of dollars of total expenses. See CEQ,

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TIMELINES (20102018) 1 (2020), https://perma.cc/RL9L7HDE. Then comes

the expensive slog of litigation. See CHIAPPA, supra, at 56 (finding that NEPA challenges took an average of more

than four years). If a NEPA challenge succeeds, the

plaintiff might even collect attorneys’ fees. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d). On top of all those costs come the financing

expenses, price changes, and other burdens that come

with delay and uncertainty. And often, this expense

proves fatal to the endeavor. Cronin v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.)

(describing how “costly and time-consuming” NEPA

evaluations “ha[ve] been the kiss of death to many a

federal project”).

If costs don’t push a project into oblivion, delay

becomes the name of the game—and it might still be

27

enough to kill a project off in the end. Take the Atlantic

Coast Pipeline, for instance. Quoting NEPA and Dr.

Seuss, the Fourth Circuit had paused the project. See

Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d

150, 183 (4th Cir. 2018). Although this Court stepped in

and reversed, see generally U.S. Forest Serv. v.

Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 590 U.S. 604 (2020), that

action proved to be too late to save the needed energy

project. Project sponsors withdrew it because of the

“ongoing delays and increasing cost uncertainty which

threaten[ed] the economic viability of the project.” Press

Release, Duke Energy, Dominion Energy and Duke

Energy Cancel the Atlantic Coast Pipeline (July 5, 2020),

https://tinyurl.com/3mx8sere. This kind of story isn’t

unusual, either, as government agencies have taken more

than five years to complete the average environmental

assessment. See Mark C. Rutzick, A Long and Winding

Road: How the National Environmental Policy Act Has

Become the Most Expensive and Least Effective

Environmental Law in the History of the United States,

and How to Fix It 12, REGUL. TRANSPARENCY PROJECT

(Oct. 16, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/3br559z5. Though

Congress has now passed time limits, 42 U.S.C. § 4336a(g),

agencies have sometimes ignored even those

prescriptions.

And the States suffer at every turn. Most directly, the

unchecked expansion of NEPA review threatens to

federalize projects that States are already regulating.

When courts construe NEPA’s reach broadly, a single

minor federal permit can swallow an entire statepermitted project. And the displacement is not merely

procedural. When a federal court vacates an agency

action for insufficient NEPA analysis, the state-level

permits, investments, and regulatory decisions built

around the federal approval are thrown into uncertainty.

28

More broadly, the economic consequences for the

States are substantial. When NEPA litigation delays or

kills a project, the State loses not just the project itself but

the tax revenue, employment, economic activity, and

affordability benefits that would have accompanied it.

States rich in energy and mineral resources are

particularly exposed: capital flows to jurisdictions with

more predictable regulatory environments, whether that

means other countries or simply other States with less

federal land and fewer federal permitting triggers. And

because the States cannot control the scope of federal

NEPA review or predict how a federal court will assess its

adequacy, they cannot offer the regulatory certainty that

project sponsors need to commit investment. So States

bear the economic costs of federal procedural excess

without having any meaningful ability to prevent it.

Maybe such consequences could be justified where the

environment demands it, though even that idea warrants

scrutiny. But certainly not where other protective

measures (like those embodied in the RCRA process) are

well taken care of. And even less so at a time when energy

crises, housing crises, and infrastructure needs call for

more efficient permitting and processes.

So the answer should be plain. Where another

statute—like RCRA—already ensures that the relevant

environmental considerations are addressed, and where

the State is already exercising the regulatory authority

that Congress delegated to it, more process serves no

informational purpose.

It simply displaces state

judgment with federal litigation, trading the ability of

state regulators for the uncertainty of judicial review.

Adding injury to insult, it also does harm to the State’s

economy along the way.

29

Just recently, this Court offered “[a] course correction

of sorts … to bring judicial review under NEPA back in

line with the statutory text and common sense.” Seven

Cnty., 605 U.S. at 184. The Court should do so again here.

Otherwise, the Ninth Circuit's rule will invite challengers

to short-circuit state regulatory processes across the

country—turning every preliminary step in a cooperative

federalism scheme into an occasion for federal litigation,

and every comprehensive environmental statute into a

backdrop for redundant NEPA review.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN B. MCCUSKEY

Attorney General

OFFICE OF THE

WEST VIRGINIA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

State Capitol Complex

Building 1, Room E-26

Charleston, WV 25305

mwilliams@wvago.gov

(304) 558-2021

MICHAEL R. WILLIAMS

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MATTHEW K. NIU

Caldwell Fellow

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of West Virginia

30

ADDITIONAL LEGAL

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATES

STEVE MARSHALL

Attorney General

State of Alabama

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

CORI MILLS

Acting Attorney General

State of Alaska

RUSSELL COLEMAN

Attorney General

State of Kentucky

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

LIZ MURRILL

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General

State of Florida

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

State of Montana

CHRIS CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

RAÚL LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

DREW WRIGLEY

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

State of Indiana

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

State of Ohio

31

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

MARTY JACKLEY

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General &

Reporter

State of Tennessee

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General

State of Texas

DEREK BROWN

Attorney General

State of Utah

KEITH KAUTZ

Attorney General

State of Wyoming