Opposition Brief — Department of the Air Force, et al., Petitioners v. Prutehi Guahan, fka Prutehi Litekyan

Supreme Court briefJan 16, 2026

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No. 25-579

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

PRUTEHI GUAHAN,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

DAVID L. HENKIN

EARTHJUSTICE

850 Richards Street

Suite 400

HONOLULU, HI 96813

LINNET DAVIS-STERMITZ

EARTHJUSTICE

810 Third Avenue

Suite 610

Seattle, WA 98104

CAROLINE A. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

THIEN T. CHAU

EARTHJUSTICE

1001 G Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 797-4316

cflynn@earthjustice.org

Counsel for Respondent

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Under the National Environmental Policy Act of

1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., federal

agencies must prepare a statement evaluating

environmental effects and considering potential

alternatives before taking a major federal action. The

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976

(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq., requires facilities,

including those operated by federal agencies, to secure

a permit to dispose of hazardous waste. Pursuant to

a regulation of the RCRA permitting authority in this

case (the Guam Environmental Protection Agency), a

facility’s submission of a permit-renewal application

automatically extends the prior permit term until the

permitting authority acts on the application.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the court of appeals correctly

concluded that the Air Force’s decision to dispose of

hazardous-waste munitions for a three-year period

using particular technologies at a particular site,

reflected in its submission of a RCRA permit-renewal

application, constitutes final agency action.

2. Whether the court of appeals correctly

concluded that NEPA applies to the Air Force’s

decision to dispose of hazardous-waste munitions

using particular technologies at a particular site, even

though that activity also requires a RCRA permit

from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency.

(i)

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Under Supreme Court Rule 29.6, respondent

Prutehi Guahan states that it is a nonprofit

organization that has no parent corporation and no

publicly held company has any ownership interest in

it.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........... ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ v

INTRODUCTION ........................................................1

STATEMENT ..............................................................4

A. Legal Background ............................................4

B. Factual And Procedural Background .............6

REASONS TO DENY THE PETITON ..................... 12

I.

No Further Review Is Warranted Of The Finding

Of Final Agency Action ....................................... 12

A. There Is No Split On The First Question

Presented ....................................................... 13

B. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Identified Final

Agency Action ................................................ 16

II. No Further Review Is Warranted Of The Ruling

That NEPA Applies Here ................................... 19

A. There Is No Split On The Second Question

Presented ....................................................... 20

B. The Ninth Circuit Was Correct ..................... 23

III. The Questions Presented Do Not Call For The

Court’s Intervention At This Juncture .............. 31

iv

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 36

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136 (1967) .............................................. 17

Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA,

911 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1990) .................. 20, 21, 24

Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,

477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973) ................................ 22

Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc.,

462 U.S. 87 (1983) ..................................................5

Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154 (1997) ........................ 9, 10, 13, 16, 17

California Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA,

934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .................... 2, 15, 16

Chemours Co. FC, LLC v. EPA,

109 F.4th 179 (3d Cir. 2024) ....................................

City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Department of

Transp.,

123 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1997) .............................. 32

Conservation Council for Haw. v. National Marine

Fisheries Serv.,

97 F. Supp. 3d 1210 (D. Haw. 2015).................... 32

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.

Page(s)

Cutter v. Wilkinson,

544 U.S. 709 (2005) .............................................. 35

Dalton v. Specter,

511 U.S. 462 (1994) .............................................. 18

Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Department of Navy,

733 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 2013) ............................ 32

Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt,

48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................ 22

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,

584 U.S. 497 (2018) ........................................ 25, 27

Franklin v. Massachusetts,

505 U.S. 788 (1992) .............................................. 18

FTC v. Standard Oil,

449 U.S. 232 (1980) .............................................. 18

Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA,

509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975) ................................ 22

Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.

Comm’n,

869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989) ................................. 22

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) .............................................. 29

Merrell v. Thomas,

807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................ 22

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.

Page(s)

Niz-Chavez v. Garland,

593 U.S. 155 (2021) .............................................. 29

Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus,

657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981) ................................ 22

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,

486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........................ 21, 23

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,

490 U.S. 332 (1989) .......................................... 5, 30

Sackett v. EPA,

566 U.S. 120 (2012) ........................................ 10, 18

Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty.,

605 U.S. 168 (2025) ...................................... 4, 5, 30

Sierra Club v. EPA,

955 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ....................................

Sierra Club v. Gates,

499 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Ind. 2007) ................ 32

South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,

504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) ................................ 22

Texas Comm. on Nat. Res. v. Bergland,

573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978) ................................ 21

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,

578 U.S. 590 (2016) .......................... 1, 2, 14, 17, 18

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.

Page(s)

United States v. Johnston,

268 U.S. 220 (1925) .............................................. 15

Western Neb. Res. Council v. EPA,

943 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1991) ................................ 22

Wyoming v. Hathaway,

525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975) ................................ 22

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 704 ..............................................................9

42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2018) ...............................................4

42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018) ............................................. 25

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018)................................ 4, 23

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2018) ................................ 23

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2018) .............................. 24

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. V 2023) ..................... 26

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (Supp. V 2023) ................ 30

42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (Supp. V 2023)...................... 30

42 U.S.C. § 4336(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 2023) ............... 26

42 U.S.C. § 4336c (Supp. V 2023) ...............................5

42 U.S.C. § 6901 ..........................................................1

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.

Page(s)

42 U.S.C. § 6925 ..........................................................5

42 U.S.C. § 6925(b) .................................................... 30

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 118-5,

137 Stat. 38 .......................................................... 25

Regulations

22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30107(a) ................... 30

22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(a) .....................6

22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(m) ....................6

22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(o) .....................6

22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30110(h) ................... 27

32 C.F.R. § 651.14(e)(9) (2021).................................. 28

32 C.F.R. pt. 989, app. B, at A2.1 (2021) .................. 28

40 C.F.R. § 124.9 ....................................................... 27

40 C.F.R. § 124.9(a) ................................................... 27

40 C.F.R. § 124.9(b) ................................................... 27

40 C.F.R. § 124.9(b)(6) ............................................... 27

40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2021) ............................................5

40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2021) ........................................4

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.

Page(s)

40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(a) (2021) ........................................4

40 C.F.R. § 1502.24(b) (2021) .................................... 28

40 C.F.R. § 1503.3(d)-(e) (2021) ................................ 28

40 C.F.R. § 265.382 ................................................... 30

40 C.F.R. § 266.204 ................................................... 32

40 C.F.R. § 270.1(c)(3)(i)(D) ...................................... 32

40 C.F.R. § 270.13(i) ....................................................5

40 C.F.R. § 270.14(b)(2) ...............................................5

40 C.F.R. § 270.14(b)(8) ...............................................5

40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a) ............................................. 6, 19

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A,

§ I(b)(8) ................................................................. 28

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A,

§ I(b)(9) ................................................................. 29

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A,

§ III(37) ................................................................. 29

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 1.8 ...... 33

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.1 ...... 33

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.12 .... 32

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.

Page(s)

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.2 ...... 33

Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.8 ...... 33

Other Authorities

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) ............. 26

H.R. 4776 (119th Cong., 1st Sess.) (engrossed in

House Dec. 18, 2025)............................................ 35

45 Fed. Reg. 33290 (May 19, 1980) ........................... 27

90 Fed. Reg. 27857 (June 30, 2025) .......................... 29

INTRODUCTION

In 2021, the Department of the Air Force decided

to destroy hazardous-waste munitions by detonating

and burning them on an oceanfront beach in northern

Guam. The Air Force then submitted an application

to a Guam permitting authority detailing where and

how it will conduct that activity. The court of appeals

determined that the Air Force’s decision to conduct

those operations for a new three-year period, formally

memorialized in the permit application, constitutes

final agency action. The court further determined

that the Air Force was required to comply with the

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., before making that decision.

And the court rejected petitioners’ contention that the

Guam permitting authority’s later analysis under a

different law, the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et

seq., relieved the Air Force of its own NEPA obligation

at the threshold. Those two holdings were correct,

created no split of authority, and do not otherwise

warrant this Court’s review.

On the first question presented, the analysis below

reflects an unremarkable application of this Court’s

well-trod, “pragmatic” approach to final agency action.

U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S.

590, 599 (2016) (citation omitted). Petitioners dispute

whether the Air Force’s decision was technically final

and imposed legal consequences before the Guam

authority approves the new permit. But the Air

Force’s decision to conduct its operations in a

particular place under a certain protocol undoubtedly

marked the consummation of its own deliberations.

(1)

2

And it is well established that agency action is

reviewable even if its full implementation is

contingent upon a future event. See id. at 599-600.

Petitioners identify no other court of appeals

decision employing contrary reasoning on remotely

similar facts. And because the final-agency-action

inquiry is notoriously fact-dependent and lacks “onesize-fits-all heuristic[s],” California Cmtys. Against

Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2019),

petitioners’ dissimilar cases analyzing things like

non-binding agency guidance say little about the

scenario presented here. In any event, the court of

appeals also properly determined that the Air Force’s

submission of its renewal application had the concrete

legal effect of extending the term of the prior permit.

The court’s final-agency-action finding can rest on

that even narrower ground—which, again, no circuit

has ever disagreed with.

Petitioners’ second question presented also falls

far short of the ordinary bar for certiorari. Once

again, there is no split. No court of appeals has held

that an agency’s NEPA obligation is superseded by

the need to obtain a RCRA permit (or a permit under

any other regime). Indeed, petitioners’ cited cases all

adhere to the same framework the court of appeals

employed here. What distinguishes those cases from

this one is not the Ninth Circuit’s rule; it is the fact

that those decisions evaluated whether an agency

enforcing an environmental statute has to comply

with NEPA in administering the statute’s

requirements. So while those decisions speak to

whether the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) must complete a NEPA analysis when it

3

approves a RCRA application (a question not

implicated here), they do not bear on whether the

agency seeking the permit may shirk its NEPA

responsibilities.

Here, as the court of appeals

correctly recognized, the two statutes have distinct

roles to play at distinct junctures.

Nor have petitioners provided sound reason for

this Court to intervene now, rather than waiting to

see if disagreement ever arises. Petitioners offer little

to support their vague assertion that the fact-driven

decision in this case will newly burden agencies’

permitting processes.

Agencies, including the

Department of Defense, already have procedures in

place that take as a given that NEPA applies when

environmental permits are needed. As a result of

those procedures and other sensible efficiency

measures, agencies seeking renewed permits will

rarely need to complete a full-blown NEPA analysis

from scratch.

On the other side of the ledger, there is substantial

reason not to rush in. NEPA is much in flux. It has

already been amended once, in ways that support the

holding below, during the pendency of this case. But

petitioners convinced the court of appeals that it could

consider only the pre-amendment version of NEPA—

a position that, if correct, would make this petition a

terrible vehicle for deciding the interaction of NEPA

and RCRA going forward. Moreover, at this very

moment,

Congress

is

considering

further

amendments to NEPA that may shift the landscape

once again. The Court should let the legislative

process play out, and the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be denied.

4

STATEMENT

A. Legal Background

1. Congress enacted NEPA to protect the

environment by requiring federal agencies to carefully

evaluate environmental concerns and consider

alternatives before carrying out major federal actions.

See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2018). 1 When the events of this

case took place, NEPA’s core procedural provision

required all federal agencies to prepare a “detailed

statement” for all “major Federal actions significantly

affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42

U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018). This environmental

impact statement (EIS) “must address the significant

environmental effects of a proposed project and

identify feasible alternatives.”

Seven Cnty.

Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 184

(2025); see Pet. App. 5a-6a.

If an agency does not know whether the

environmental effects of its proposed project will be

significant, it must prepare an environmental

assessment (EA) to help make that determination. 40

C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2021); see Pet. App. 6a. If the

agency determines that the proposed action will not

have significant effects, then it prepares a “finding of

no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(a) (2021);

see Pet. App. 6a. Under the NEPA regulations

applicable to this case (and the law in effect today),

agencies may also adopt “categorical exclusions” for

actions that normally do not have a significant

Unless otherwise stated, citations to NEPA and its

implementing regulations are to those in effect at the time of the

Air Force’s 2021 decision.

1

5

environmental effect, and then issue statements

invoking an exclusion for applicable projects. 40

C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2021); see Pet. App. 7a n.4; see also 42

U.S.C. § 4336c (Supp. V 2023).

NEPA is a “procedural statute” designed to “help[]

agencies to make better decisions and to ensure good

project management.” Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 177.

It does this by mandating that agencies “take a ‘hard

look’ at the environmental consequences before taking

a major action.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)

(emphasis added; citation omitted). That timing

ensures that environmental impacts are not

“overlooked or underestimated” by the action agency,

only to be discovered “after resources have been

committed or the die otherwise cast.” Robertson v.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349

(1989).

2. Another federal law, RCRA, governs public and

private management of hazardous waste. To treat,

store, or dispose of such waste, a facility generally

must obtain a RCRA permit from EPA or from a state

or territorial program administrator. 42 U.S.C.

§ 6925. A RCRA permit applicant must submit,

among other things, a description of the processes to

be used for treating the hazardous waste at the

facility; chemical and physical analyses of the waste;

and a description of the procedures, structures, or

equipment used to prevent hazards to the

surrounding area and personnel.

40 C.F.R.

§§ 270.13(i), 270.14(b)(2) and (b)(8); see also Pet. App.

9a-10a.

EPA has authorized the Guam Environmental

6

Protection Agency (Guam EPA) to administer Guam’s

RCRA permitting program. Pet. App. 10a. Guam

EPA administers RCRA under its Hazardous Waste

Management regulations, which incorporate some,

but not all, of EPA’s RCRA regulations. Id. Under the

Guam program, a RCRA permit has a fixed three-year

term. 22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(m). If a

facility applies for renewal, the conditions of the

expired permit “continue in force . . . until the

effective date of a new permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a);

see 22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(a), (o)

(adopting that regulation).

B. Factual And Procedural Background

1. a. Beginning in 1982, the Air Force has

destroyed hazardous-waste munitions through open

burning and open detonation (OB/OD) at a detonation

range on Andersen Air Force Base in northern Guam.

Pet. App. 12a. Andersen’s detonation range is on

Tarague Beach, “a multifaceted site for the wildlife

and people of the island.” Id. at 2a. The detonation

range sits above Guam’s sole-source aquifer, which

provides drinking water to more than 80% of Guam’s

population. Id. Local residents recreate on Tarague

Beach and fish offshore; communities harvest

traditional medicines nearby; and the beach is a

habitat for endangered green sea turtles and

migratory seabirds. Id.

The Air Force has conducted open-detonation

operations at Tarague Beach under each of its past

RCRA permits but suspended its open-burning

operations in the 2000s. Pet. App. 12a. The Air

Force’s most recent RCRA permit, issued in 2018, was

set to expire on September 3, 2021. Id.

7

In 2021, the Air Force decided to continue OB/OD

operations on Tarague Beach. Pet. App. 12a, 18a, 22a23a, 27a; see also C.A. E.R. 93. Accordingly, on May

17, 2021, the Air Force submitted a RCRA permitrenewal application. Pet. App. 12a. The 2021

application details where the Air Force decided to

conduct its operations, the design of the OB/OD

units—including its plan to construct a new openburning device to replace the decommissioned one—

and the procedures for OB/OD operations. C.A. E.R.

105-08; see, e.g., id. at 54, 61, 65-72. The Air Force

also specified the types of waste it plans to open-burn

and open-detonate, including “common military

ordnance material (such as black powder, white/red

phosphorus, tear gas, ammunitions, propellants, and

explosive materials),” bombs, mortars, antipersonnel

and antitank mines, and grenades. Id. at 107; see id.

at 86-89. Those specifications and representations

will be binding on the Air Force if the permit issues.

Pet. App. 31a.

b. As the terms suggest, “open” burning and

detonation are inherently uncontrolled, and toxic byproducts are released directly into the environment.

C.A. E.R. 93-94, 108-09; see Pet. App. 11a-12a. OB/OD

operations on Tarague Beach could eject unexploded

ordnance and fragments into the ocean and reef. C.A.

E.R. 109. Such operations also release contaminants

directly into the air, and fuel used during open

burning can spill onto the beach. Id. at 108-09. In

addition, hazardous-waste constituents could reach

the aquifer under the detonation range and

contaminate Guam’s water supply. Id. at 109.

Since the time the Air Force submitted its 2018

8

application, new research has highlighted safer

munitions-disposal technologies. C.A. E.R. 110. In

2019, the National Academies of Sciences,

Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies)

published a report concluding that “[v]iable

alternative technologies exist . . . for almost all

munitions currently being treated within the

[Department of Defense] conventional munitions

demilitarization stockpile via OB/OD.” Id. The

National Academies report further explained that

“there are no significant technical, safety, or

regulatory barriers to the full-scale deployment of

[those] alternative technologies,” all of which would

have “lower emissions and less of an environmental

and public health impact” than OB/OD. Id. at 110-11.

Also in 2019, EPA issued its own report on

alternatives to OB/OD, which similarly concluded

that “safe alternatives exist and are being used.” Id.

at 111.

c. Notwithstanding the known environmental

hazards of conducting OB/OD operations on Tarague

Beach, the Air Force made its most recent decision to

treat hazardous-waste munitions on that site, and

submitted its May 2021 permit application, without

completing an EIS or EA. Pet. App. 12a-13a. Nor did

the Air Force invoke one of NEPA’s categorical

exclusions. Id. And while the Air Force’s 2021

application copied and pasted a brief discussion of

technological alternatives to OB/OD from its 2018

application, C.A. E.R. 53-54, 61; C.A. S.E.R. 583-84,

591, it did not address the findings in the 2019

National Academies and EPA reports. Nor did the

application address alternative locations.

9

To date, Guam EPA has not issued a decision on

the May 2021 application. As a result, the Air Force

has been operating under the terms of its prior RCRA

permit for over four additional years. Pet. App. 13a;

see supra at 6.

2. Respondent Prutehi Guahan is a Guam-based

organization dedicated to protecting the island’s

natural and cultural resources.

Pet. App. 2a.

Respondent’s members include local residents who

own land near Tarague Beach, who recreate there,

and who fish offshore. Id. at 14a, 17a n.5.

Respondent filed suit under the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704, to challenge the

Air Force’s failure to comply with NEPA before

deciding to engage in OB/OD operations for an

additional period. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The district court

granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 75a-91a.

As relevant here, the court concluded that there was

no final agency action. Id. at 81a. Alternatively, the

court held that respondent failed to state a claim

because RCRA implicitly displaces the Air Force’s

obligation to complete a NEPA analysis. Id. at 89a.

3. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for

additional proceedings. Pet. App. 1a-46a.

a. Applying the two-prong test from Bennett v.

Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), see Pet. App. 21a, the

court of appeals determined that “the Air Force’s

decision to engage in OB/OD operations over the next

three years under particular protocols, reflected by

the content of the 2021 permit application,” is final

agency action reviewable under the APA. Id. at 22a23a (emphasis omitted).

10

With respect to Bennett’s first prong—whether the

agency had reached the culmination of its

decisionmaking process—the court of appeals

explained that the Air Force’s “ ‘definitive position’ ”

was reflected in, and effected by, its permit-renewal

application, which “described how the agency would

carry out OB/OD activities between 2021 and 2024.”

Pet. App. 22a (citation omitted). The court observed

that the Air Force “has not suggested it is still in the

middle of trying to figure out its position on OB/OD

operations at Tarague Beach, or that the plan

memorialized in its application was tentative.” Id. at

23a (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation

omitted). And the court noted that the possibility the

Air Force might revisit some facet of its decision “at

Guam EPA’s request” “ ‘does not suffice to make an

otherwise final agency action nonfinal.’ ” Id. (quoting

Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 127 (2012)).

With respect to Bennett’s second prong—whether

the agency’s decision “determined” “rights or

obligations” or gave rise to “legal consequences,” 520

U.S. at 178 (citation omitted)—the court of appeals

observed that the Air Force’s decision to conduct

OB/OD operations for another three-year period

“commit[ed] the Air Force to a particular course of

action—waste removal operations under the protocol

proposed in the application.” Pet. App. 31a (citation

omitted). Because the Air Force would be bound by

the plans and representations in its application,

submitting the application determined the Air Force’s

rights and obligations going forward. Id. at 29a. As

an alternative basis for finding the second Bennett

prong met, the court concluded that the Air Force’s

2021 renewal application had the “legal consequence

11

of prolonging the life of its 2018 permit,” by virtue of

the Guam EPA regulation. Id. at 31a n.9.

b. The court of appeals next held that RCRA does

not excuse the Air Force’s duty to comply with NEPA

before commencing a major federal action. Pet. App.

33a-46a. The court reasoned that another statute can

supplant NEPA if there is “an irreconcilable and

fundamental statutory conflict” between the two

regimes, or if the non-NEPA statute’s provisions

“ ‘displace[]’ ” NEPA’s requirements.

Id. at 34a

(citation omitted).

The court of appeals did not identify any conflict

between NEPA’s and RCRA’s provisions. Pet. App.

34a-35a. The court further determined that NEPA’s

procedures were not the functional equivalent of

RCRA’s because “the timing of each statute’s

prescribed environmental review is entirely distinct.”

Id. at 37a.

NEPA governs the Air Force’s

decisionmaking at the time it considers whether to

undertake the waste-disposal action, while RCRA

governs Guam EPA’s decisionmaking on any

subsequent permit application. Id. at 37a-38a.

The court of appeals further noted that “[o]ther

circuit courts have taken a similar approach” to the

NEPA-displacement analysis, including the Eleventh

Circuit in the only other decision to consider RCRA.

Pet. App. 40a-41a. The court explained that those

other decisions have exempted environmental

agencies from NEPA when those agencies are

performing duties under statutes that independently

require them to undertake environmental inquiries.

Id. at 40a-41a. But the court observed that because

the Air Force is not such an agency, it makes good

12

sense for NEPA to focus the Air Force’s attention on

environmental concerns at the time it makes its own

decision about the course it will take. Id. at 41a.

c. Judge VanDyke dissented from the finding of

final agency action. Pet. App. 46a-74a. He expressed

no view on the majority’s holding that RCRA does not

supplant NEPA’s application to the Air Force here.

Id. at 47a n.1.

4. The court of appeals denied rehearing en banc.

Pet. App. 92a. Only Judge VanDyke voted to grant

the petition, and no judge requested a vote. Id.

REASONS TO DENY THE PETITON

I.

No Further Review Is Warranted Of The

Finding Of Final Agency Action

Petitioners first ask (Pet. 19-24) this Court to

grant certiorari to review the holding that the Air

Force’s decision to carry out munitions-disposal

operations on Tarague Beach constitutes reviewable

final agency action. But the lower court’s application

of the settled legal test for final agency action—which

petitioners do not ask this Court to modify—does not

warrant this Court’s review. Indeed, the United

States recently urged this Court to deny another

petition seeking review of a “fact-bound” final-agencyaction question for that reason. Br. in Opp. at 7, 13,

Jake’s Fireworks, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety

Comm’n (No. 24-693). This Court likewise routinely

denies review of final-agency-action disputes. 2 It

See, e.g., Jake’s Fireworks, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety

Comm’n, 145 S. Ct. 2700 (2025) (No. 24-693); Elldakli v.

Garland, 144 S. Ct. 487 (2023) (No. 23-115); American Petroleum

Inst. v. Environmental Def. Ctr., 143 S. Ct. 2582 (2023) (No. 222

13

should follow the same course here.

A. There Is No Split On The First Question

Presented

1. Under this Court’s longstanding test for

identifying final agency action, “[f]irst, the action

must mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s

decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.

154, 177-78 (1997) (citation omitted). “[S]econd, the

action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations

have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal

consequences will flow.’ ” Id. at 178 (citation omitted).

Here, the court of appeals determined that the Air

Force’s decision to carry out OB/OD operations on

Tarague Beach for an additional three-year period—

memorialized in its 2021 RCRA application—met

both Bennett prongs. On the first prong, the court

found that the Air Force had arrived at a final internal

decision about whether to conduct hazardous-wastemunitions disposal on this site under particular

conditions and protocols, as evidenced by its formal

application reflecting that choice. See supra at 10. On

the second prong, the court reached two alternative

holdings: (a) the 2021 renewal application determined

the Air Force’s rights and obligations because it bound

the agency to the application’s commitments, and

(b) the 2021 renewal application had the legal

consequence of extending the prior permit’s term,

enabling the Air Force to continue munitions-disposal

703); Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 587 U.S. 937 (2019) (No. 18-722);

Marquette Cnty. Road Comm’n v. EPA, 586 U.S. 1207 (2019) (No.

18-555); Joshi v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 577 U.S. 1120

(2016) (No. 15-672).

14

operations between September 2021 and the present.

See supra at 10-11.

There is no conflict of authority on any of those

fact-driven conclusions. Petitioners fail to identify

any appellate decision holding that an agency’s

decision to pursue a course of action does not

constitute final agency action because that course

requires the agency to secure a permit from some

other authority. Indeed, despite claiming a split on

the first question presented (Pet. 29), petitioners do

not cite a single case arising in the context of an

agency seeking or renewing a permit (RCRA or

otherwise). Their inability to point to any divergence

of opinion on equivalent facts should doom their

request for certiorari. 3

Instead, petitioners argue that the decision below

conflicts with decisions of other circuits “holding that

agency actions are not final where a separate actor . . .

must take an additional action to create any legal

consequence.” Pet. 29 (emphasis, internal quotation

marks, and citation omitted). But each of those cases

followed a materially distinct fact pattern: an agency

(specifically, EPA) issuing non-binding guidance or

recommendations to other government authorities

about those authorities’ regulation of third parties.

See Chemours Co. FC, LLC v. EPA, 109 F.4th 179,

Notably, when this Court most recently granted

certiorari to review a final-agency-action question in U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590 (2016), there was

a square split regarding the specific agency action at issue (the

Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdictional determination that

property contains “waters of the United States” under the Clean

Water Act). See Pet. at 11-13, Hawkes, supra (No. 15-290).

3

15

182-83, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2024); Sierra Club v. EPA, 955

F.3d 56, 59-60, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 2020); California

Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 637-39

(D.C. Cir. 2019). None of those cases involved an

agency submitting self-binding plans for its own

course of action—and certainly not a circumstance

where the submission itself enabled that agency to

carry out its plans on the ground.

Petitioners also assert (Pet. 29), with little

explanation, that the decision below conflicts with

Village of Bald Head Island v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 714 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2013), and Chemical

Weapons Working Group v. U.S. Department of the

Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997). But as the

court of appeals recognized, respondent does not

challenge the Air Force’s day-to-day implementation

of a decision already made; respondent challenges the

2021 decision itself. See Pet. App. 27a & n.7; see also

Village of Bald Head, 714 F.3d at 193-94 (challenge to

Army Corps of Engineers’ “physical activities in the

field”); Chemical Weapons, 111 F.3d at 1494-95

(challenge to the Army’s ongoing operations).

Perhaps petitioners intend those citations to

renew their contention (made unsuccessfully below)

that, before submitting its 2021 application, the Air

Force did not in fact make a decision to engage in

OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach. Cf. Pet. App.

59a-60a (VanDyke, J., dissenting). But that would at

most amount to a factual dispute that is not

cognizable at the motion-to-dismiss stage and would

be unworthy of this Court’s review regardless. See

Pet. App. 4a n.2, 26a-28a; see also United States v.

Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925) (this Court does

16

“not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss

specific facts”).

In sum, petitioners have not provided any reason

to believe that another court of appeals would reach a

different decision on these facts. To the contrary, one

of their cited authorities specifically cautions against

such generalized analogies in this context, explaining

that courts deciding final-agency-action questions

should avoid “comparing [the action] to superficially

similar actions in the caselaw.” California Cmtys.,

934 F.3d at 631-32. As explained below, the court of

appeals properly conducted that context-specific

analysis here and reached the right result.

B. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Identified

Final Agency Action

1. The court of appeals’ finding of final agency

action in this case reflected a straightforward

application of this Court’s precedents. In 2021, the

Air Force reached a final “decision to conduct OB/OD

operations” at Tarague Beach “according to specified

protocols, as evidenced by the content of its RCRA

permit renewal application.” Pet. App. 20a; see also

id. at 22a. Although Guam EPA has not yet approved

that plan, that does not make the Air Force’s decision

“tentative or interlocutory.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178;

see also id. (asking about “the agency’s decisionmaking

process” (emphasis added)). And once the Air Force

reached that decision and submitted its plan, it

committed itself to a particular course of action upon

the application’s approval. Pet. App. 29a (explaining

that the Air Force will not be free to “deviate

unilaterally” from the issued permit’s terms and

conditions).

Thus, submitting the application

17

“determine[d]” the Air Force’s “rights [and]

obligations” with respect to its OB/OD operations at

Tarague. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (citation omitted).

That reasoning “tracks the ‘pragmatic’ approach

[this Court] has long taken to finality.” U.S. Army

Corps. of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 599

(2016) (citation omitted); see also Abbott Labs. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 150 (1967) (emphasizing the

Court’s “flexible view of finality”). And even if

reasonable minds could disagree, the court of appeals’

holding can rest on the even narrower ground that, by

virtue of the Guam EPA regulation, the Air Force’s

2021 application had the concrete legal effect of

extending the 2018 permit’s term. Pet. App. 31a n.9.

In other words, deciding to seek another term and

submitting the application “afford[ed] [the Air Force]

the legal right to continue disposal operations under

its prior permit,” id. at 32a n.9—a right the agency is

actively exercising to this day.

2. Petitioners’ criticisms lack merit. They contend

(Pet. 19-20) that the first Bennett prong is absent

because the Air Force could theoretically make

changes to its permit application at Guam EPA’s

request. But that possibility does not make the

application a preliminary draft. As the court of

appeals emphasized, the Air Force “has not suggested

it is still in the middle of trying to figure out its

position on OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach, or

that the plan memorialized in its application was

tentative from the agency’s perspective.” Pet. App.

23a (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation

omitted). And this Court has already rejected the

argument that the “mere possibility” an agency might

18

change its mind in response to third-party feedback

“suffice[s] to make an otherwise final agency action

nonfinal.” Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 127 (2012);

see also Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 598 (explaining that the

possibility of revision is a “common characteristic of

agency action”).

With respect to the second Bennett prong,

petitioners argue (Pet. 21) that the Air Force’s

decision to conduct OB/OD operations at Tarague

Beach carried no direct legal consequences absent

further action by Guam EPA. But again, this Court’s

precedents find the second prong met even if the

practical effect of agency action is contingent on a nonpreordained future event, such as an enforcement

action. See Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 598-99; Sackett, 566

U.S. at 126.

Ignoring those decisions, petitioners instead rely

on cases where agency officials delivered reports to

the President that functioned “like a tentative

recommendation.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505

U.S. 788, 798-99 (1992); see also Dalton v. Specter, 511

U.S. 462, 469-70 (1994) (similar). But respondent’s

suit

does

not

challenge

a

subordinate’s

recommendation to an intra-branch superior about

what that superior should do. Petitioners do not

contend that the Air Force’s decision to continue

OB/OD operations past September 2021 was still

under review within the federal government. See Pet.

App. 23a.

Petitioners’ attacks on the court of appeals’

alternative prong-two holding are weaker still. They

barely dispute whether the triggered extension of the

prior permit term counts as a legal effect (Pet. 23),

19

offering only a cite to FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S.

232 (1980). But Standard Oil holds that agency

action that merely carries automatic procedural

ramifications—namely, an agency’s filing of a

complaint that obligates the other side to respond—

does not count. Id. at 242. That is a far cry from the

situation here, where the permit-renewal application

enabled the Air Force to engage in destructive

operations on Tarague Beach for over four years and

counting—indeed, for longer than the three-year term

the application sought. See supra at 9.

Instead, petitioners argue (Pet. 20) that this legal

effect “flow[ed]” from the 2018 permit, not from the

2021 renewal application. That is wrong: By the

plain terms of the relevant regulation, the renewal

application was necessary to trigger the extension of

the prior permit’s term. 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a) (“the

conditions of an expired permit continue in force . . .

until the effective date of a new permit . . . if . . . [t]he

permittee has submitted a timely application [for a

new permit]” (emphasis added)). 4 And even if this

narrow point of contention were debatable, it is surely

not a debate worthy of this Court’s resources.

II. No Further Review Is Warranted Of The

Ruling That NEPA Applies Here

Petitioners also urge the Court to grant certiorari

to decide whether NEPA applies when an agency

(here, the Air Force) proposes to undertake an action

that it cannot carry out without first obtaining a

For this reason, petitioners’ complaint (Pet. 23) that

respondent did not separately challenge the 2018 permit is

irrelevant.

4

20

RCRA permit from a separate entity (here, Guam

EPA). But this second question likewise falls far

below this Court’s traditional bar for review. There is

no split: Petitioners identify no court of appeals

decision holding that an agency seeking a RCRA

permit need not comply with NEPA. And there is no

reason to think that this Court would be the first to

break that ground, as the holding below follows from

the statutory text and the well-established principle

that courts should strive to read statutory enactments

harmoniously. The Court should deny review of this

question as well.

A. There Is No Split On The Second

Question Presented

1. Petitioners do not cite any appellate decision

holding that a federal agency is excused from

complying with NEPA when deciding whether to take

a major federal action that will require a RCRA

permit. Instead, petitioners discuss an Eleventh

Circuit case (Pet. 29-30) and list others (Pet. 30 n.6)

that address whether an agency tasked with enforcing

an environmental statute must, in the course of

exercising that regulatory authority, also conduct a

NEPA analysis.

But those cases are in no

disagreement whatsoever with the decision below.

They simply reflect the understanding—“recognized”

in “most circuits,” the Ninth Circuit among them—

that an agency need not comply with NEPA when it

administers a statute that mandates its own

“examination of environmental questions” and that

imposes “ ‘specific procedures for considering the

environment that are functional equivalents of the

[NEPA] impact statement process.’ ” Alabama ex rel.

21

Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990)

(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Texas Comm. on

Nat. Res. v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 207 (5th Cir.

1978)); see also Pet. App. 35a-36a, 40a-41a.

Take petitioners’ only case involving RCRA, the

Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Siegelman. Siegelman

addressed whether the environmental agency tasked

with issuing RCRA permits—not the agency applying

for one—was obligated “to comply with NEPA when

exercising its permitting authority.” 911 F.2d at 503;

see also id. at 505. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned

that, because RCRA’s “substantive and procedural

standards [were] intended to ensure that EPA

considers . . . environmental issues involved in the

permitting of hazardous waste management

facilities,” “Congress did not intend for EPA” to

undertake a NEPA analysis in making that decision

as well. Id. at 505 (emphasis added). Siegelman thus

bears on the distinct question whether, when EPA is

the RCRA permitting authority, that agency must

conduct a NEPA analysis before approving an

application. But that question is not implicated here.

Guam EPA (a non-federal entity with no NEPA

obligations) is the permitting authority, and

respondent challenges a different agency’s earlier

decisionmaking.

Petitioners’ non-RCRA cases all fit the mold of

Siegelman.

Each concludes or suggests that

environmental agencies enforcing environmental

statutes with requirements functionally equivalent to

NEPA’s need not also comply with NEPA. 5 The Ninth

See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,

384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (when EPA makes determinations under

5

22

Circuit has reached similar conclusions in prior

cases. 6 But not one of those courts has excused a nonSection 111 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), it is not obligated to

comply with NEPA), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); South

Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 676 (1st Cir. 1974) (under

a statutory exemption, when EPA takes action under the CAA,

“NEPA does not apply to EPA”); Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v.

U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 729 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989)

(suggesting that if the Atomic Energy Act required the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission to conduct the “ ‘functional equivalent’ of

NEPA’s environmental review process,” the Commission need

not undertake a similar review under NEPA); Appalachian

Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 508 (4th Cir. 1973) (when EPA

approves a CAA state implementation plan, EPA is not required

to include an EIS), abrogated on other grounds by Union Elec.

Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v.

EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 842-43 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); Pacific Legal

Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 834-38 (6th Cir. 1981)

(suggesting that if the Endangered Species Act (ESA) required

the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to “prepare the functional

equivalent” of an EIS when listing a species as endangered, the

FWS need not also prepare an EIS); Western Neb. Res. Council v.

EPA, 943 F.2d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1991) (“EPA does not need

to comply with the formal requirements of NEPA in performing

its environmental protection functions under” the Safe Drinking

Water Act); Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 68-69, 71-72

(10th Cir. 1975) (“an organization like EPA, whose regulatory

activities are necessarily concerned with environmental

consequences, need not stop in the middle of its proceedings”

cancelling a chemical-toxicants registration under the Federal

Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to prepare

an EIS), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).

See Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1503-04 (9th

Cir. 1995) (FWS’s ESA obligations displace FWS’s NEPA

obligations), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996); Merrell v.

Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986) (EPA’s FIFRA

obligations displace EPA’s NEPA obligations), cert. denied, 484

U.S. 848 (1987).

6

23

environmental agency like the Air Force from

complying with NEPA before selecting a course of

action that requires authorization from another

entity. To the contrary, one of petitioners’ favored

decisions emphasizes that “NEPA must be accorded

full vitality as to non-environmental agencies.”

Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,

387 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (cited at Pet. 26, 27, 30). Thus,

as the court of appeals took care to underscore, its

analytical approach to the NEPA-displacement issue

is consistent with that of other circuits, including the

Eleventh Circuit in Siegelman. Pet. App. 40a.

B. The Ninth Circuit Was Correct

Given the absence of a conflict, petitioners once

again must ask this Court to grant certiorari to correct

what they believe is a mistake. They urge the Court

to be the first appellate tribunal to hold that even if

an agency is not tasked with enforcing RCRA’s permit

requirement—and indeed has no core environmental

competencies at all—RCRA implicitly supplants the

agency’s NEPA obligation at its own decisionmaking

stage. But even if the Court were in the business of

splitless error correction, there was no error here.

1. Respondent’s claim calls for a plain application

of NEPA’s text: The Air Force’s proposal to dispose of

hazardous-waste munitions via open detonation and

open burning on Tarague Beach was a “major Federal

action[]” that may have significant environmental

effects. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018). So, before the

Air Force “proposed” to undertake that action, it was

required to examine and report on the action’s

“environmental impact” and to consider reasonable

“alternatives,” id. § 4332(2)(C)(i), (iii)—such as the

24

alternative methods for munitions disposal evaluated

by the National Academies and EPA in 2019, and

alternative locations. See supra at 7-8.

The court of appeals’ conclusion that this proposed

action is not exempt from NEPA merely because the

Air Force also needed a RCRA permit to carry it out

reflected the prevailing framework for NEPA

displacement. See supra at 20-23. The Air Force is

not “engaged primarily in an examination of

environmental questions,” such that its decision to

conduct OB/OD operations on Tarague Beach was

“necessarily infused with . . . environmental

considerations.” Pet. App. 41a (quoting Siegelman,

911 F.2d at 504 & n.11). And even if that factor were

overlooked, when it comes to the permit applicant,

RCRA does not mandate “specific procedures for

considering the environment that [are] functional

equivalents of [NEPA’s] impact statement process.”

Id. (first set of brackets in original; quoting

Siegelman, 911 F.2d at 504).

Most significantly, “[u]nder the circumstances of

this case,” the “timing” of each statute’s prescribed

environmental review is “entirely distinct.” Pet. App.

37a (emphasis omitted). While NEPA requires action

agencies to prepare an environmental analysis and

engage with the public “before reaching a final

decision to undertake a particular activity that may

have significant environmental impact,” id., RCRA

does not require an environmental evaluation until

after the action agency has reached that decision, id.

at 38a-39a. The Ninth Circuit therefore correctly

reasoned that Guam EPA’s evaluation of

environmental factors at the permit-approval stage is

25

no substitute for the Air Force’s due consideration of

the environmental consequences of its proposed

hazardous-waste disposal project, including available

alternatives, before committing itself to a permit for

particular operations in a particular location. See id.

at 37a-39a.

That conclusion accords with the ordinary rule

that displacement by implication is disfavored. As

this Court has instructed, “[w]hen confronted with

two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on the same

topic,” courts are “not at liberty to pick and choose

among congressional enactments and must instead

strive to give effect to both.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,

584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). When, as here, a party

“suggest[s] that two statutes cannot be harmonized,

and that one displaces the other,” that party “bears

the heavy burden of showing a clearly expressed

congressional intention that such a result should

follow.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

NEPA’s text reinforces this background rule of

construction. To begin with, Congress specifically

“authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent

possible . . . public laws of the United States should be

interpreted and administered with the policies [that

NEPA] set[s] forth.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018). In

addition, Congress amended NEPA in 2023 to

explicitly resolve the statute’s interaction with other

laws. See Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L.

No. 118-5, §§ 321(a)(3)(A) and (b), 137 Stat. 38-39

(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C), 4336). As

relevant here, the amended text relieves agencies

26

from preparing a NEPA analysis only where NEPA

compliance “is excluded pursuant to . . . another

provision of law,” or where “the preparation of [a

NEPA] document would clearly and fundamentally

conflict with the requirements of another provision of

law.” 42 U.S.C. § 4336(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 2023)

(emphasis added); see also id. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. V

2023) (mandating that agencies comply with NEPA

“except where compliance would be inconsistent with

other statutory requirements”).

RCRA does not exclude permit-seeking agencies

from the obligation to prepare a NEPA analysis. And

petitioners have not carried their burden to show a

clear and fundamental conflict between the two laws’

respective provisions. There are no “near-conflicts” or

even “legislative cross-purposes” between NEPA and

RCRA;

rather,

the

two

statutes

achieve

“fundamentally different, but complementary goals.”

Pet. App. 45a.

2. Petitioners’

unavailing.

contrary

arguments

are

a. Petitioners lean heavily (Pet. 4, 24-26, 28) on

the specific-governs-the-general canon of statutory

construction. But that principle applies only when

two statutory provisions are irreconcilable. See

Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012). As noted,

petitioners have not attempted to claim a direct

conflict between the two laws. For good reason: “It is

possible and practicable for the Air Force to comply

with both NEPA and RCRA.” Pet. App. 34a. And even

if the canon were implicated here, it is not at all clear

that it favors petitioners’ interpretation—since it is

27

NEPA, not RCRA, that specifically addresses the

process applicable to the Air Force’s go/no-go decision.

Given the slippery nature of the canon, the better

course is to adhere to an “interpretation that gives

effect to all of Congress’s work.” Epic Sys., 584 U.S.

at 524; see also id. at 523-24 (rejecting an invocation

of the specific-governs-the-general canon).

b. Petitioners also repeatedly invoke (Pet. 4, 9-10,

26, 28) an EPA regulation stating that “RCRA . . .

permits are not subject to the environmental impact

statement provisions of [NEPA].”

40 C.F.R.

§ 124.9(b)(6). But that regulation has no bearing here

for several reasons.

First, by its title, the EPA regulation applies only

“when EPA is the permitting authority.” 40 C.F.R.

§ 124.9; see Pet. App. 42a-43a.

As petitioners

acknowledge (Pet. 10 n.3), Guam EPA has not adopted

this regulation for its own RCRA permitting process—

so it does not govern this case. See 22 Guam Admin.

R. & Regs. § 30110(h).

Second, the EPA regulation speaks to the

obligations of “the permitting authority” in preparing

a “draft permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.9(a)-(b); see also 45

Fed. Reg. 33290, 33406 (May 19, 1980) (explaining

EPA’s “position that [NEPA] does not require

preparation of an [EIS] when permits are issued under

the RCRA . . . program[]”) (emphasis added). It says

nothing about the NEPA obligations of an applicant

for a RCRA permit.

Third, that straightforward interpretation of the

EPA regulation accords with the view—reflected

elsewhere in the Executive Branch—that the fact that

a proposed action requires an environmental permit

28

does not obviate the action agency’s NEPA

obligations.

For instance, the Council on

Environmental Quality NEPA regulations in effect

during the events of this case expressly contemplate

that action agencies will comply with NEPA even if

the action requires a permit.

See 40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.24(b) (2021) (action agency’s draft EIS “shall

list all Federal permits, licenses, and other

authorizations

that

must

be

obtained

in

implementing the proposal”); id. § 1503.3(d)-(e) (2021)

(referencing comments on action agencies’ draft EISs

by permitting agencies).

Similarly, the Army’s

previously operative NEPA regulations envision that

NEPA analyses will be conducted alongside

environmental review required under other laws—

including RCRA specifically.

See 32 C.F.R.

§ 651.14(e)(9) (2021).

Department of Defense components have also

adopted categorical exclusions to NEPA built on the

premise that components bear NEPA obligations

when they need permits. For example, at the time the

Air Force applied for the 2021 permit, its own NEPA

regulation specified that reliance on a categorical

exclusion “does not relieve” the proponent “of

responsibility for complying with all other

environmental requirements related to the proposal,

including requirements for permits.” 32 C.F.R. pt.

989, app. B, at A2.1 (2021) (emphasis added). More

recently (and after the court of appeals’ decision), the

Department of Defense adopted a categorical

exclusion for “[c]onstruction, in accordance with

applicable permits,” of certain water crossings. Dep’t

of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A, § I(b)(8)

(DoD NEPA Proc.) (emphasis added), available at

29

https://www.denix.osd.mil/nepa/; see also id. § I(b)(9)

(waterfront-facility renovations “in accordance with

applicable permits” (emphasis added)); id. § III(37)

(maintenance dredging and debris disposal where

“applicable permits are secured” (emphasis added)); 90

Fed. Reg. 27857 (June 30, 2025) (adopting those

procedures). If petitioners truly believed that a

permit requirement relieves components of NEPA

compliance, such NEPA exclusions would be

unnecessary.

Fourth, even if the EPA RCRA regulation were

understood as expansively as petitioners urge—

notwithstanding its wording and obvious tension with

other Executive Branch pronouncements—it would

deserve minimal weight in the analysis. Petitioners

do not claim that the view the regulation reflects is

entitled to deference. Federal courts, not federal

agencies, have the last word on the meaning of federal

statutes. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603

U.S. 369, 394, 401-04 (2024).

c. That leaves petitioners with policy arguments.

They argue that applying the two statutes according

to their text would be “redundant and a waste of

resources.” Pet. 4 (citation omitted). Petitioners also

contend that there is “no sound reason” to require

action agencies to complete NEPA analyses if the

RCRA permitting authority is not required to conduct

one too. Pet. 28.

Of course, this Court requires more than “policytalk” to “overcome a plain statutory command.” NizChavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 171 (2021).

Regardless, the good reason to require an agency like

the Air Force to undertake a NEPA analysis before

30

seeking a hazardous-waste-disposal permit is selfevident: to force that agency to consider the

environmental consequences of its proposed course of

action before it chooses that course. As the court of

appeals observed, “building in environmental

analyses at the planning and decisional stages allows

nuanced adjustments of the proposed project by those

most familiar with the project’s goals and practical

limitations.” Pet. App. 38a. That timing also ensures

that environmental impacts are not “overlooked or

underestimated” by the action agency and then

discovered, if at all, “after resources have been

committed or the die otherwise cast.” Robertson v.

Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349

(1989).

Nor do the two statutes call for the same analysis.

See Pet. App. 37a-39a. Most notably, one of NEPA’s

touchstones (both in 2021 and now) is the requirement

that agencies evaluate feasible alternatives to the

proposed action. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii)

and (2)(F) (Supp. V 2023); Seven Cnty. Infrastructure

Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 172, 177 (2025).

RCRA, by contrast, typically does not require facilities

to present information on alternatives—such as

different waste-treatment technologies or off-site

locations—to the treatment plan they propose. See 42

U.S.C. § 6925(b); Pet. App. 39a. 7 And RCRA does not

This case happens to be a partial exception, because a

RCRA implementing regulation prohibits OB/OD unless

military-waste explosives “cannot safely be disposed of through

other modes of treatment.” 40 C.F.R. § 265.382; see 22 Guam

Admin. R. & Regs. § 30107(a). That may be why the Air Force’s

2021 application briefly dismissed the viability of alternative

technologies (though the Air Force simply copied the discussion

7

31

require (for instance) Guam EPA to deny a permit on

the basis that the munitions could be destroyed

through OB/OD in a non-Guam location with less

environmental harm.

Thus, had the Air Force undertaken a compliant

NEPA analysis before deciding to seek renewal, it

“might have chosen a different place or method for

handling the waste munitions.” Pet. App. 3a. The

court of appeals correctly recognized the statute’s

crucial role in this context.

III. The Questions Presented Do Not Call For

The Court’s Intervention At This Juncture

Petitioners’ attempts to imbue this dispute with

broader significance and urgency (Pet. 31) are

likewise underwhelming.

In truth, there is no

compelling reason not to wait to see if any substantial

disagreement arises in the lower courts. Caution is

all the more prudent because this dispute took place

under an outdated version of NEPA, and Congress is

actively considering additional amendments that

could bear on these kinds of cases in the future. At

most, further percolation is warranted.

1. As an initial matter, petitioners are wrong to

suggest that respondent’s case will affect the Air

Force’s ability to address “potentially dangerous

munitions that must be quickly destroyed” on Guam.

Pet. 11. If military munitions or explosives give rise

to an immediate threat to public safety or property, no

from earlier applications and ignored recent authoritative

studies on the subject). See supra at 8. If anything, this unusual

feature makes this case an even more awkward vehicle for

exploring NEPA and RCRA’s typical interaction.

32

RCRA permit or NEPA review is required. See 40

C.F.R. §§ 266.204, 270.1(c)(3)(i)(D); DoD NEPA Proc.

pt. 3.12(a) (excusing NEPA compliance in emergency

circumstances).

2. Petitioners’ claims of administrative upheaval

(Pet. 31) are likewise ill-founded. They vaguely assert

that the decision below “threaten[s] . . . to impede”

agencies’ pursuit of environmental and naturalresources permits, claiming that “the Executive

Branch generally has not engaged in NEPA analysis

before submitting permit-renewal applications.” Id.

But petitioners themselves cite a case where a

military component completed an EIS before

obtaining permits, including a RCRA permit. See

Chemical Weapons, 111 F.3d at 1487-88 (cited at Pet.

29). Other cases present similar fact patterns. 8 And

as discussed, the Department of Defense’s own NEPA

procedures (as well as prior agency regulations) take

as a given that agency projects are subject to NEPA

See, e.g., City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Department

of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1148, 1150-52 (9th Cir. 1997)

(evaluating Federal Highway Administration’s EIS for NEPA

compliance even though the project would require a Clean Water

Act permit); Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Department of Navy,

733 F.3d 1106, 1108-13 (11th Cir. 2013) (Navy completed an EIS

to conduct training activity that also required ESA

authorization); Conservation Council for Haw. v. National

Marine Fisheries Serv., 97 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1215 (D. Haw. 2015)

(Navy completed an EIS to conduct training and testing

activities that required ESA and Marine Mammal Protection Act

authorizations); Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101,

1103-04, 1132-36 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (Army complied with NEPA

by, inter alia, preparing an EA and relying on a categorical

exclusion before conducting hazardous-waste-disposal activities

that required RCRA and CAA permits).

8

33

even where permits are required. See supra at 28-29.

Petitioners’ assertion that the court of appeals’

understanding came out of left field is hard to square

with those precedents and practices.

As for petitioners’ enigmatic warning that the

decision below implicates the Department of Defense’s

renewal of “2500 environmental permits” (Pet. 31), it

is difficult to respond without the government

specifying the permitting regimes it is supposedly

worried about. Suffice it to say, however, that it is

unusual for permit renewals to require an agency to

complete a new, full-blown EIS in every permitting

cycle.

Many of the underlying actions may qualify for a

NEPA categorical exclusion. See supra at 4-5, 28-29.

And even where a NEPA analysis of some kind is

required, there are multiple ways for agencies to rest

on prior analyses without reinventing the wheel.

They can rely on “programmatic environmental

documents” for actions with relevant similarities or

actions occurring in a particular location. E.g., DoD

NEPA Proc. pt. 3.1; see also DoD NEPA Proc. pt.

1.8(e). If the agency prepared a NEPA analysis for the

last permitting cycle and nothing material has

changed since, it can incorporate the prior analysis by

reference. E.g., DoD NEPA Proc. pt. 3.2. And if there

is overlap between the environmental factors

considered in the RCRA-permitting analysis and the

mandated NEPA analysis, those analyses can be

consolidated and streamlined, as the Department’s

NEPA procedures explicitly contemplate. See DoD

NEPA Proc. pt. 3.8 (“To the fullest extent possible,

DoD will prepare environmental documents

34

concurrently with and integrated with analyses and

related surveys and studies required by other Federal

statutes.”). Compliance will not be overly burdensome

or gum up the permit-renewal process.

3. Tellingly, even though the court of appeals’

decision issued nearly a year ago, petitioners do not

point to any other pending case (in the Ninth Circuit

or elsewhere) challenging a similar agency decision by

relying on the analysis below. But if, as petitioners

predict (Pet. 31), there is a sudden deluge of cases

newly challenging agencies’ failure to comply with

NEPA before seeking permits to carry out

environmentally destructive activities, more courts of

appeals will have occasion to weigh in on these

questions soon. This Court need not jump at this

particular opportunity.

Preemptive intervention would be all the more

misguided because NEPA is an ongoing subject of

congressional attention. The Air Force took the action

at issue—and this case has largely been litigated—

under the pre-2023 version of NEPA. But in 2023,

Congress amended NEPA to explicitly provide that

agencies are relieved of their NEPA obligations when

another statute specifically excludes them or when

the other statute gives rise to a clear conflict. See C.A.

Doc. No. 34, at 1-2 (Sept. 8, 2023); see also supra at 2526.

The court of appeals took the view, at petitioners’

urging, that the 2023 amendments cannot be

considered in this case because they do not “purport

to apply retroactively.” Pet. App. 5a n.3; see also C.A.

Doc. No. 35, at 1-2 (Sept. 19, 2023). But if that is

correct (which respondent does not concede), it would

35

be all the more reason why this case presents an awful

vehicle for deciding the second question presented. At

a minimum, because petitioners convinced the lower

court that it could not take the 2023 amendments into

account, this Court would be evaluating those changes

as a court “of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.

709, 718 n.7 (2005).

And NEPA may change further. In December

2025, the House of Representatives passed a bill that

would amend NEPA in significant ways, including by

exempting agencies’ compliance when “the proposed

agency action is an action for which such agency’s

compliance with another statute’s requirements

serves the function of agency compliance with

[NEPA].” H.R. 4776, § 2(b) (119th Cong., 1st Sess.)

(engrossed in House Dec. 18, 2025). That bill is

currently under consideration in the Senate, which of

course could make different or additional changes. So

this Court could end up addressing a moving target,

or else issue an opinion whose shelf life has already

expired. Relatedly, if petitioners’ dire predictions

have any substance, there is nothing preventing them

from taking their concerns across the street—

especially now that legislators are acutely interested

in the subject.

In short, this is the wrong case at the wrong time.

Even if the Court were interested in the issues

underlying either question presented, it can and

should wait for a dispute that can provide more

meaningful guidance.

36

CONCLUSION

The petition should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID L. HENKIN

EARTHJUSTICE

850 Richards Street

Suite 400

Honolulu, HI 96813

LINNET DAVIS-STERMITZ

EARTHJUSTICE

810 Third Avenue

Suite 610

Seattle, WA 98104

CAROLINE A. FLYNN

Counsel of Record

THIEN T. CHAU

EARTHJUSTICE

1001 G Street NW

Suite 1000

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 797-4316

cflynn@earthjustice.org

Counsel for Respondent

January 16, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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