Opposition Brief — Department of the Air Force, et al., Petitioners v. Prutehi Guahan, fka Prutehi Litekyan
Supreme Court briefJan 16, 2026
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No. 25-579
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
PRUTEHI GUAHAN,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
DAVID L. HENKIN
EARTHJUSTICE
850 Richards Street
Suite 400
HONOLULU, HI 96813
LINNET DAVIS-STERMITZ
EARTHJUSTICE
810 Third Avenue
Suite 610
Seattle, WA 98104
CAROLINE A. FLYNN
Counsel of Record
THIEN T. CHAU
EARTHJUSTICE
1001 G Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 797-4316
cflynn@earthjustice.org
Counsel for Respondent
1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Under the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., federal
agencies must prepare a statement evaluating
environmental effects and considering potential
alternatives before taking a major federal action. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq., requires facilities,
including those operated by federal agencies, to secure
a permit to dispose of hazardous waste. Pursuant to
a regulation of the RCRA permitting authority in this
case (the Guam Environmental Protection Agency), a
facility’s submission of a permit-renewal application
automatically extends the prior permit term until the
permitting authority acts on the application.
The questions presented are:
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly
concluded that the Air Force’s decision to dispose of
hazardous-waste munitions for a three-year period
using particular technologies at a particular site,
reflected in its submission of a RCRA permit-renewal
application, constitutes final agency action.
2. Whether the court of appeals correctly
concluded that NEPA applies to the Air Force’s
decision to dispose of hazardous-waste munitions
using particular technologies at a particular site, even
though that activity also requires a RCRA permit
from the Guam Environmental Protection Agency.
(i)
ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Under Supreme Court Rule 29.6, respondent
Prutehi Guahan states that it is a nonprofit
organization that has no parent corporation and no
publicly held company has any ownership interest in
it.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES........................................ v
INTRODUCTION ........................................................1
STATEMENT ..............................................................4
A. Legal Background ............................................4
B. Factual And Procedural Background .............6
REASONS TO DENY THE PETITON ..................... 12
I.
No Further Review Is Warranted Of The Finding
Of Final Agency Action ....................................... 12
A. There Is No Split On The First Question
Presented ....................................................... 13
B. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Identified Final
Agency Action ................................................ 16
II. No Further Review Is Warranted Of The Ruling
That NEPA Applies Here ................................... 19
A. There Is No Split On The Second Question
Presented ....................................................... 20
B. The Ninth Circuit Was Correct ..................... 23
III. The Questions Presented Do Not Call For The
Court’s Intervention At This Juncture .............. 31
iv
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 36
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967) .............................................. 17
Alabama ex rel. Siegelman v. EPA,
911 F.2d 499 (11th Cir. 1990) .................. 20, 21, 24
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA,
477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973) ................................ 22
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87 (1983) ..................................................5
Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154 (1997) ........................ 9, 10, 13, 16, 17
California Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA,
934 F.3d 627 (D.C. Cir. 2019) .................... 2, 15, 16
Chemours Co. FC, LLC v. EPA,
109 F.4th 179 (3d Cir. 2024) ....................................
City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Department of
Transp.,
123 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 1997) .............................. 32
Conservation Council for Haw. v. National Marine
Fisheries Serv.,
97 F. Supp. 3d 1210 (D. Haw. 2015).................... 32
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.
Page(s)
Cutter v. Wilkinson,
544 U.S. 709 (2005) .............................................. 35
Dalton v. Specter,
511 U.S. 462 (1994) .............................................. 18
Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Department of Navy,
733 F.3d 1106 (11th Cir. 2013) ............................ 32
Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt,
48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995) ................................ 22
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
584 U.S. 497 (2018) ........................................ 25, 27
Franklin v. Massachusetts,
505 U.S. 788 (1992) .............................................. 18
FTC v. Standard Oil,
449 U.S. 232 (1980) .............................................. 18
Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA,
509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975) ................................ 22
Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regul.
Comm’n,
869 F.2d 719 (3d Cir. 1989) ................................. 22
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024) .............................................. 29
Merrell v. Thomas,
807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) ................................ 22
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.
Page(s)
Niz-Chavez v. Garland,
593 U.S. 155 (2021) .............................................. 29
Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus,
657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981) ................................ 22
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ........................ 21, 23
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
490 U.S. 332 (1989) .......................................... 5, 30
Sackett v. EPA,
566 U.S. 120 (2012) ........................................ 10, 18
Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty.,
605 U.S. 168 (2025) ...................................... 4, 5, 30
Sierra Club v. EPA,
955 F.3d 56 (D.C. Cir. 2020) ....................................
Sierra Club v. Gates,
499 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Ind. 2007) ................ 32
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974) ................................ 22
Texas Comm. on Nat. Res. v. Bergland,
573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978) ................................ 21
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co.,
578 U.S. 590 (2016) .......................... 1, 2, 14, 17, 18
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.
Page(s)
United States v. Johnston,
268 U.S. 220 (1925) .............................................. 15
Western Neb. Res. Council v. EPA,
943 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1991) ................................ 22
Wyoming v. Hathaway,
525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975) ................................ 22
Statutes
5 U.S.C. § 704 ..............................................................9
42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2018) ...............................................4
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018) ............................................. 25
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018)................................ 4, 23
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i) (2018) ................................ 23
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2018) .............................. 24
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. V 2023) ..................... 26
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (Supp. V 2023) ................ 30
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (Supp. V 2023)...................... 30
42 U.S.C. § 4336(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 2023) ............... 26
42 U.S.C. § 4336c (Supp. V 2023) ...............................5
42 U.S.C. § 6901 ..........................................................1
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.
Page(s)
42 U.S.C. § 6925 ..........................................................5
42 U.S.C. § 6925(b) .................................................... 30
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 118-5,
137 Stat. 38 .......................................................... 25
Regulations
22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30107(a) ................... 30
22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(a) .....................6
22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(m) ....................6
22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(o) .....................6
22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30110(h) ................... 27
32 C.F.R. § 651.14(e)(9) (2021).................................. 28
32 C.F.R. pt. 989, app. B, at A2.1 (2021) .................. 28
40 C.F.R. § 124.9 ....................................................... 27
40 C.F.R. § 124.9(a) ................................................... 27
40 C.F.R. § 124.9(b) ................................................... 27
40 C.F.R. § 124.9(b)(6) ............................................... 27
40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2021) ............................................5
40 C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2021) ........................................4
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.
Page(s)
40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(a) (2021) ........................................4
40 C.F.R. § 1502.24(b) (2021) .................................... 28
40 C.F.R. § 1503.3(d)-(e) (2021) ................................ 28
40 C.F.R. § 265.382 ................................................... 30
40 C.F.R. § 266.204 ................................................... 32
40 C.F.R. § 270.1(c)(3)(i)(D) ...................................... 32
40 C.F.R. § 270.13(i) ....................................................5
40 C.F.R. § 270.14(b)(2) ...............................................5
40 C.F.R. § 270.14(b)(8) ...............................................5
40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a) ............................................. 6, 19
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A,
§ I(b)(8) ................................................................. 28
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A,
§ I(b)(9) ................................................................. 29
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A,
§ III(37) ................................................................. 29
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 1.8 ...... 33
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.1 ...... 33
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.12 .... 32
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued.
Page(s)
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.2 ...... 33
Dep’t of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., pt. 3.8 ...... 33
Other Authorities
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) ............. 26
H.R. 4776 (119th Cong., 1st Sess.) (engrossed in
House Dec. 18, 2025)............................................ 35
45 Fed. Reg. 33290 (May 19, 1980) ........................... 27
90 Fed. Reg. 27857 (June 30, 2025) .......................... 29
INTRODUCTION
In 2021, the Department of the Air Force decided
to destroy hazardous-waste munitions by detonating
and burning them on an oceanfront beach in northern
Guam. The Air Force then submitted an application
to a Guam permitting authority detailing where and
how it will conduct that activity. The court of appeals
determined that the Air Force’s decision to conduct
those operations for a new three-year period, formally
memorialized in the permit application, constitutes
final agency action. The court further determined
that the Air Force was required to comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq., before making that decision.
And the court rejected petitioners’ contention that the
Guam permitting authority’s later analysis under a
different law, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et
seq., relieved the Air Force of its own NEPA obligation
at the threshold. Those two holdings were correct,
created no split of authority, and do not otherwise
warrant this Court’s review.
On the first question presented, the analysis below
reflects an unremarkable application of this Court’s
well-trod, “pragmatic” approach to final agency action.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S.
590, 599 (2016) (citation omitted). Petitioners dispute
whether the Air Force’s decision was technically final
and imposed legal consequences before the Guam
authority approves the new permit. But the Air
Force’s decision to conduct its operations in a
particular place under a certain protocol undoubtedly
marked the consummation of its own deliberations.
(1)
2
And it is well established that agency action is
reviewable even if its full implementation is
contingent upon a future event. See id. at 599-600.
Petitioners identify no other court of appeals
decision employing contrary reasoning on remotely
similar facts. And because the final-agency-action
inquiry is notoriously fact-dependent and lacks “onesize-fits-all heuristic[s],” California Cmtys. Against
Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2019),
petitioners’ dissimilar cases analyzing things like
non-binding agency guidance say little about the
scenario presented here. In any event, the court of
appeals also properly determined that the Air Force’s
submission of its renewal application had the concrete
legal effect of extending the term of the prior permit.
The court’s final-agency-action finding can rest on
that even narrower ground—which, again, no circuit
has ever disagreed with.
Petitioners’ second question presented also falls
far short of the ordinary bar for certiorari. Once
again, there is no split. No court of appeals has held
that an agency’s NEPA obligation is superseded by
the need to obtain a RCRA permit (or a permit under
any other regime). Indeed, petitioners’ cited cases all
adhere to the same framework the court of appeals
employed here. What distinguishes those cases from
this one is not the Ninth Circuit’s rule; it is the fact
that those decisions evaluated whether an agency
enforcing an environmental statute has to comply
with NEPA in administering the statute’s
requirements. So while those decisions speak to
whether the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) must complete a NEPA analysis when it
3
approves a RCRA application (a question not
implicated here), they do not bear on whether the
agency seeking the permit may shirk its NEPA
responsibilities.
Here, as the court of appeals
correctly recognized, the two statutes have distinct
roles to play at distinct junctures.
Nor have petitioners provided sound reason for
this Court to intervene now, rather than waiting to
see if disagreement ever arises. Petitioners offer little
to support their vague assertion that the fact-driven
decision in this case will newly burden agencies’
permitting processes.
Agencies, including the
Department of Defense, already have procedures in
place that take as a given that NEPA applies when
environmental permits are needed. As a result of
those procedures and other sensible efficiency
measures, agencies seeking renewed permits will
rarely need to complete a full-blown NEPA analysis
from scratch.
On the other side of the ledger, there is substantial
reason not to rush in. NEPA is much in flux. It has
already been amended once, in ways that support the
holding below, during the pendency of this case. But
petitioners convinced the court of appeals that it could
consider only the pre-amendment version of NEPA—
a position that, if correct, would make this petition a
terrible vehicle for deciding the interaction of NEPA
and RCRA going forward. Moreover, at this very
moment,
Congress
is
considering
further
amendments to NEPA that may shift the landscape
once again. The Court should let the legislative
process play out, and the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be denied.
4
STATEMENT
A. Legal Background
1. Congress enacted NEPA to protect the
environment by requiring federal agencies to carefully
evaluate environmental concerns and consider
alternatives before carrying out major federal actions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2018). 1 When the events of this
case took place, NEPA’s core procedural provision
required all federal agencies to prepare a “detailed
statement” for all “major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018). This environmental
impact statement (EIS) “must address the significant
environmental effects of a proposed project and
identify feasible alternatives.”
Seven Cnty.
Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 184
(2025); see Pet. App. 5a-6a.
If an agency does not know whether the
environmental effects of its proposed project will be
significant, it must prepare an environmental
assessment (EA) to help make that determination. 40
C.F.R. § 1501.5(a) (2021); see Pet. App. 6a. If the
agency determines that the proposed action will not
have significant effects, then it prepares a “finding of
no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6(a) (2021);
see Pet. App. 6a. Under the NEPA regulations
applicable to this case (and the law in effect today),
agencies may also adopt “categorical exclusions” for
actions that normally do not have a significant
Unless otherwise stated, citations to NEPA and its
implementing regulations are to those in effect at the time of the
Air Force’s 2021 decision.
1
5
environmental effect, and then issue statements
invoking an exclusion for applicable projects. 40
C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2021); see Pet. App. 7a n.4; see also 42
U.S.C. § 4336c (Supp. V 2023).
NEPA is a “procedural statute” designed to “help[]
agencies to make better decisions and to ensure good
project management.” Seven Cnty., 605 U.S. at 177.
It does this by mandating that agencies “take a ‘hard
look’ at the environmental consequences before taking
a major action.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)
(emphasis added; citation omitted). That timing
ensures that environmental impacts are not
“overlooked or underestimated” by the action agency,
only to be discovered “after resources have been
committed or the die otherwise cast.” Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349
(1989).
2. Another federal law, RCRA, governs public and
private management of hazardous waste. To treat,
store, or dispose of such waste, a facility generally
must obtain a RCRA permit from EPA or from a state
or territorial program administrator. 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925. A RCRA permit applicant must submit,
among other things, a description of the processes to
be used for treating the hazardous waste at the
facility; chemical and physical analyses of the waste;
and a description of the procedures, structures, or
equipment used to prevent hazards to the
surrounding area and personnel.
40 C.F.R.
§§ 270.13(i), 270.14(b)(2) and (b)(8); see also Pet. App.
9a-10a.
EPA has authorized the Guam Environmental
6
Protection Agency (Guam EPA) to administer Guam’s
RCRA permitting program. Pet. App. 10a. Guam
EPA administers RCRA under its Hazardous Waste
Management regulations, which incorporate some,
but not all, of EPA’s RCRA regulations. Id. Under the
Guam program, a RCRA permit has a fixed three-year
term. 22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(m). If a
facility applies for renewal, the conditions of the
expired permit “continue in force . . . until the
effective date of a new permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a);
see 22 Guam Admin. R. & Regs. § 30109(a), (o)
(adopting that regulation).
B. Factual And Procedural Background
1. a. Beginning in 1982, the Air Force has
destroyed hazardous-waste munitions through open
burning and open detonation (OB/OD) at a detonation
range on Andersen Air Force Base in northern Guam.
Pet. App. 12a. Andersen’s detonation range is on
Tarague Beach, “a multifaceted site for the wildlife
and people of the island.” Id. at 2a. The detonation
range sits above Guam’s sole-source aquifer, which
provides drinking water to more than 80% of Guam’s
population. Id. Local residents recreate on Tarague
Beach and fish offshore; communities harvest
traditional medicines nearby; and the beach is a
habitat for endangered green sea turtles and
migratory seabirds. Id.
The Air Force has conducted open-detonation
operations at Tarague Beach under each of its past
RCRA permits but suspended its open-burning
operations in the 2000s. Pet. App. 12a. The Air
Force’s most recent RCRA permit, issued in 2018, was
set to expire on September 3, 2021. Id.
7
In 2021, the Air Force decided to continue OB/OD
operations on Tarague Beach. Pet. App. 12a, 18a, 22a23a, 27a; see also C.A. E.R. 93. Accordingly, on May
17, 2021, the Air Force submitted a RCRA permitrenewal application. Pet. App. 12a. The 2021
application details where the Air Force decided to
conduct its operations, the design of the OB/OD
units—including its plan to construct a new openburning device to replace the decommissioned one—
and the procedures for OB/OD operations. C.A. E.R.
105-08; see, e.g., id. at 54, 61, 65-72. The Air Force
also specified the types of waste it plans to open-burn
and open-detonate, including “common military
ordnance material (such as black powder, white/red
phosphorus, tear gas, ammunitions, propellants, and
explosive materials),” bombs, mortars, antipersonnel
and antitank mines, and grenades. Id. at 107; see id.
at 86-89. Those specifications and representations
will be binding on the Air Force if the permit issues.
Pet. App. 31a.
b. As the terms suggest, “open” burning and
detonation are inherently uncontrolled, and toxic byproducts are released directly into the environment.
C.A. E.R. 93-94, 108-09; see Pet. App. 11a-12a. OB/OD
operations on Tarague Beach could eject unexploded
ordnance and fragments into the ocean and reef. C.A.
E.R. 109. Such operations also release contaminants
directly into the air, and fuel used during open
burning can spill onto the beach. Id. at 108-09. In
addition, hazardous-waste constituents could reach
the aquifer under the detonation range and
contaminate Guam’s water supply. Id. at 109.
Since the time the Air Force submitted its 2018
8
application, new research has highlighted safer
munitions-disposal technologies. C.A. E.R. 110. In
2019, the National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies)
published a report concluding that “[v]iable
alternative technologies exist . . . for almost all
munitions currently being treated within the
[Department of Defense] conventional munitions
demilitarization stockpile via OB/OD.” Id. The
National Academies report further explained that
“there are no significant technical, safety, or
regulatory barriers to the full-scale deployment of
[those] alternative technologies,” all of which would
have “lower emissions and less of an environmental
and public health impact” than OB/OD. Id. at 110-11.
Also in 2019, EPA issued its own report on
alternatives to OB/OD, which similarly concluded
that “safe alternatives exist and are being used.” Id.
at 111.
c. Notwithstanding the known environmental
hazards of conducting OB/OD operations on Tarague
Beach, the Air Force made its most recent decision to
treat hazardous-waste munitions on that site, and
submitted its May 2021 permit application, without
completing an EIS or EA. Pet. App. 12a-13a. Nor did
the Air Force invoke one of NEPA’s categorical
exclusions. Id. And while the Air Force’s 2021
application copied and pasted a brief discussion of
technological alternatives to OB/OD from its 2018
application, C.A. E.R. 53-54, 61; C.A. S.E.R. 583-84,
591, it did not address the findings in the 2019
National Academies and EPA reports. Nor did the
application address alternative locations.
9
To date, Guam EPA has not issued a decision on
the May 2021 application. As a result, the Air Force
has been operating under the terms of its prior RCRA
permit for over four additional years. Pet. App. 13a;
see supra at 6.
2. Respondent Prutehi Guahan is a Guam-based
organization dedicated to protecting the island’s
natural and cultural resources.
Pet. App. 2a.
Respondent’s members include local residents who
own land near Tarague Beach, who recreate there,
and who fish offshore. Id. at 14a, 17a n.5.
Respondent filed suit under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704, to challenge the
Air Force’s failure to comply with NEPA before
deciding to engage in OB/OD operations for an
additional period. Pet. App. 2a-3a. The district court
granted petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 75a-91a.
As relevant here, the court concluded that there was
no final agency action. Id. at 81a. Alternatively, the
court held that respondent failed to state a claim
because RCRA implicitly displaces the Air Force’s
obligation to complete a NEPA analysis. Id. at 89a.
3. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for
additional proceedings. Pet. App. 1a-46a.
a. Applying the two-prong test from Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), see Pet. App. 21a, the
court of appeals determined that “the Air Force’s
decision to engage in OB/OD operations over the next
three years under particular protocols, reflected by
the content of the 2021 permit application,” is final
agency action reviewable under the APA. Id. at 22a23a (emphasis omitted).
10
With respect to Bennett’s first prong—whether the
agency had reached the culmination of its
decisionmaking process—the court of appeals
explained that the Air Force’s “ ‘definitive position’ ”
was reflected in, and effected by, its permit-renewal
application, which “described how the agency would
carry out OB/OD activities between 2021 and 2024.”
Pet. App. 22a (citation omitted). The court observed
that the Air Force “has not suggested it is still in the
middle of trying to figure out its position on OB/OD
operations at Tarague Beach, or that the plan
memorialized in its application was tentative.” Id. at
23a (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted). And the court noted that the possibility the
Air Force might revisit some facet of its decision “at
Guam EPA’s request” “ ‘does not suffice to make an
otherwise final agency action nonfinal.’ ” Id. (quoting
Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 127 (2012)).
With respect to Bennett’s second prong—whether
the agency’s decision “determined” “rights or
obligations” or gave rise to “legal consequences,” 520
U.S. at 178 (citation omitted)—the court of appeals
observed that the Air Force’s decision to conduct
OB/OD operations for another three-year period
“commit[ed] the Air Force to a particular course of
action—waste removal operations under the protocol
proposed in the application.” Pet. App. 31a (citation
omitted). Because the Air Force would be bound by
the plans and representations in its application,
submitting the application determined the Air Force’s
rights and obligations going forward. Id. at 29a. As
an alternative basis for finding the second Bennett
prong met, the court concluded that the Air Force’s
2021 renewal application had the “legal consequence
11
of prolonging the life of its 2018 permit,” by virtue of
the Guam EPA regulation. Id. at 31a n.9.
b. The court of appeals next held that RCRA does
not excuse the Air Force’s duty to comply with NEPA
before commencing a major federal action. Pet. App.
33a-46a. The court reasoned that another statute can
supplant NEPA if there is “an irreconcilable and
fundamental statutory conflict” between the two
regimes, or if the non-NEPA statute’s provisions
“ ‘displace[]’ ” NEPA’s requirements.
Id. at 34a
(citation omitted).
The court of appeals did not identify any conflict
between NEPA’s and RCRA’s provisions. Pet. App.
34a-35a. The court further determined that NEPA’s
procedures were not the functional equivalent of
RCRA’s because “the timing of each statute’s
prescribed environmental review is entirely distinct.”
Id. at 37a.
NEPA governs the Air Force’s
decisionmaking at the time it considers whether to
undertake the waste-disposal action, while RCRA
governs Guam EPA’s decisionmaking on any
subsequent permit application. Id. at 37a-38a.
The court of appeals further noted that “[o]ther
circuit courts have taken a similar approach” to the
NEPA-displacement analysis, including the Eleventh
Circuit in the only other decision to consider RCRA.
Pet. App. 40a-41a. The court explained that those
other decisions have exempted environmental
agencies from NEPA when those agencies are
performing duties under statutes that independently
require them to undertake environmental inquiries.
Id. at 40a-41a. But the court observed that because
the Air Force is not such an agency, it makes good
12
sense for NEPA to focus the Air Force’s attention on
environmental concerns at the time it makes its own
decision about the course it will take. Id. at 41a.
c. Judge VanDyke dissented from the finding of
final agency action. Pet. App. 46a-74a. He expressed
no view on the majority’s holding that RCRA does not
supplant NEPA’s application to the Air Force here.
Id. at 47a n.1.
4. The court of appeals denied rehearing en banc.
Pet. App. 92a. Only Judge VanDyke voted to grant
the petition, and no judge requested a vote. Id.
REASONS TO DENY THE PETITON
I.
No Further Review Is Warranted Of The
Finding Of Final Agency Action
Petitioners first ask (Pet. 19-24) this Court to
grant certiorari to review the holding that the Air
Force’s decision to carry out munitions-disposal
operations on Tarague Beach constitutes reviewable
final agency action. But the lower court’s application
of the settled legal test for final agency action—which
petitioners do not ask this Court to modify—does not
warrant this Court’s review. Indeed, the United
States recently urged this Court to deny another
petition seeking review of a “fact-bound” final-agencyaction question for that reason. Br. in Opp. at 7, 13,
Jake’s Fireworks, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm’n (No. 24-693). This Court likewise routinely
denies review of final-agency-action disputes. 2 It
See, e.g., Jake’s Fireworks, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm’n, 145 S. Ct. 2700 (2025) (No. 24-693); Elldakli v.
Garland, 144 S. Ct. 487 (2023) (No. 23-115); American Petroleum
Inst. v. Environmental Def. Ctr., 143 S. Ct. 2582 (2023) (No. 222
13
should follow the same course here.
A. There Is No Split On The First Question
Presented
1. Under this Court’s longstanding test for
identifying final agency action, “[f]irst, the action
must mark the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s
decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 177-78 (1997) (citation omitted). “[S]econd, the
action must be one by which ‘rights or obligations
have been determined,’ or from which ‘legal
consequences will flow.’ ” Id. at 178 (citation omitted).
Here, the court of appeals determined that the Air
Force’s decision to carry out OB/OD operations on
Tarague Beach for an additional three-year period—
memorialized in its 2021 RCRA application—met
both Bennett prongs. On the first prong, the court
found that the Air Force had arrived at a final internal
decision about whether to conduct hazardous-wastemunitions disposal on this site under particular
conditions and protocols, as evidenced by its formal
application reflecting that choice. See supra at 10. On
the second prong, the court reached two alternative
holdings: (a) the 2021 renewal application determined
the Air Force’s rights and obligations because it bound
the agency to the application’s commitments, and
(b) the 2021 renewal application had the legal
consequence of extending the prior permit’s term,
enabling the Air Force to continue munitions-disposal
703); Soundboard Ass’n v. FTC, 587 U.S. 937 (2019) (No. 18-722);
Marquette Cnty. Road Comm’n v. EPA, 586 U.S. 1207 (2019) (No.
18-555); Joshi v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 577 U.S. 1120
(2016) (No. 15-672).
14
operations between September 2021 and the present.
See supra at 10-11.
There is no conflict of authority on any of those
fact-driven conclusions. Petitioners fail to identify
any appellate decision holding that an agency’s
decision to pursue a course of action does not
constitute final agency action because that course
requires the agency to secure a permit from some
other authority. Indeed, despite claiming a split on
the first question presented (Pet. 29), petitioners do
not cite a single case arising in the context of an
agency seeking or renewing a permit (RCRA or
otherwise). Their inability to point to any divergence
of opinion on equivalent facts should doom their
request for certiorari. 3
Instead, petitioners argue that the decision below
conflicts with decisions of other circuits “holding that
agency actions are not final where a separate actor . . .
must take an additional action to create any legal
consequence.” Pet. 29 (emphasis, internal quotation
marks, and citation omitted). But each of those cases
followed a materially distinct fact pattern: an agency
(specifically, EPA) issuing non-binding guidance or
recommendations to other government authorities
about those authorities’ regulation of third parties.
See Chemours Co. FC, LLC v. EPA, 109 F.4th 179,
Notably, when this Court most recently granted
certiorari to review a final-agency-action question in U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590 (2016), there was
a square split regarding the specific agency action at issue (the
Army Corps of Engineers’ jurisdictional determination that
property contains “waters of the United States” under the Clean
Water Act). See Pet. at 11-13, Hawkes, supra (No. 15-290).
3
15
182-83, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2024); Sierra Club v. EPA, 955
F.3d 56, 59-60, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 2020); California
Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 934 F.3d 627, 637-39
(D.C. Cir. 2019). None of those cases involved an
agency submitting self-binding plans for its own
course of action—and certainly not a circumstance
where the submission itself enabled that agency to
carry out its plans on the ground.
Petitioners also assert (Pet. 29), with little
explanation, that the decision below conflicts with
Village of Bald Head Island v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 714 F.3d 186 (4th Cir. 2013), and Chemical
Weapons Working Group v. U.S. Department of the
Army, 111 F.3d 1485 (10th Cir. 1997). But as the
court of appeals recognized, respondent does not
challenge the Air Force’s day-to-day implementation
of a decision already made; respondent challenges the
2021 decision itself. See Pet. App. 27a & n.7; see also
Village of Bald Head, 714 F.3d at 193-94 (challenge to
Army Corps of Engineers’ “physical activities in the
field”); Chemical Weapons, 111 F.3d at 1494-95
(challenge to the Army’s ongoing operations).
Perhaps petitioners intend those citations to
renew their contention (made unsuccessfully below)
that, before submitting its 2021 application, the Air
Force did not in fact make a decision to engage in
OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach. Cf. Pet. App.
59a-60a (VanDyke, J., dissenting). But that would at
most amount to a factual dispute that is not
cognizable at the motion-to-dismiss stage and would
be unworthy of this Court’s review regardless. See
Pet. App. 4a n.2, 26a-28a; see also United States v.
Johnston, 268 U.S. 220, 227 (1925) (this Court does
16
“not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss
specific facts”).
In sum, petitioners have not provided any reason
to believe that another court of appeals would reach a
different decision on these facts. To the contrary, one
of their cited authorities specifically cautions against
such generalized analogies in this context, explaining
that courts deciding final-agency-action questions
should avoid “comparing [the action] to superficially
similar actions in the caselaw.” California Cmtys.,
934 F.3d at 631-32. As explained below, the court of
appeals properly conducted that context-specific
analysis here and reached the right result.
B. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Identified
Final Agency Action
1. The court of appeals’ finding of final agency
action in this case reflected a straightforward
application of this Court’s precedents. In 2021, the
Air Force reached a final “decision to conduct OB/OD
operations” at Tarague Beach “according to specified
protocols, as evidenced by the content of its RCRA
permit renewal application.” Pet. App. 20a; see also
id. at 22a. Although Guam EPA has not yet approved
that plan, that does not make the Air Force’s decision
“tentative or interlocutory.” Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178;
see also id. (asking about “the agency’s decisionmaking
process” (emphasis added)). And once the Air Force
reached that decision and submitted its plan, it
committed itself to a particular course of action upon
the application’s approval. Pet. App. 29a (explaining
that the Air Force will not be free to “deviate
unilaterally” from the issued permit’s terms and
conditions).
Thus, submitting the application
17
“determine[d]” the Air Force’s “rights [and]
obligations” with respect to its OB/OD operations at
Tarague. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178 (citation omitted).
That reasoning “tracks the ‘pragmatic’ approach
[this Court] has long taken to finality.” U.S. Army
Corps. of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 599
(2016) (citation omitted); see also Abbott Labs. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 150 (1967) (emphasizing the
Court’s “flexible view of finality”). And even if
reasonable minds could disagree, the court of appeals’
holding can rest on the even narrower ground that, by
virtue of the Guam EPA regulation, the Air Force’s
2021 application had the concrete legal effect of
extending the 2018 permit’s term. Pet. App. 31a n.9.
In other words, deciding to seek another term and
submitting the application “afford[ed] [the Air Force]
the legal right to continue disposal operations under
its prior permit,” id. at 32a n.9—a right the agency is
actively exercising to this day.
2. Petitioners’ criticisms lack merit. They contend
(Pet. 19-20) that the first Bennett prong is absent
because the Air Force could theoretically make
changes to its permit application at Guam EPA’s
request. But that possibility does not make the
application a preliminary draft. As the court of
appeals emphasized, the Air Force “has not suggested
it is still in the middle of trying to figure out its
position on OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach, or
that the plan memorialized in its application was
tentative from the agency’s perspective.” Pet. App.
23a (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation
omitted). And this Court has already rejected the
argument that the “mere possibility” an agency might
18
change its mind in response to third-party feedback
“suffice[s] to make an otherwise final agency action
nonfinal.” Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 127 (2012);
see also Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 598 (explaining that the
possibility of revision is a “common characteristic of
agency action”).
With respect to the second Bennett prong,
petitioners argue (Pet. 21) that the Air Force’s
decision to conduct OB/OD operations at Tarague
Beach carried no direct legal consequences absent
further action by Guam EPA. But again, this Court’s
precedents find the second prong met even if the
practical effect of agency action is contingent on a nonpreordained future event, such as an enforcement
action. See Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 598-99; Sackett, 566
U.S. at 126.
Ignoring those decisions, petitioners instead rely
on cases where agency officials delivered reports to
the President that functioned “like a tentative
recommendation.” Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505
U.S. 788, 798-99 (1992); see also Dalton v. Specter, 511
U.S. 462, 469-70 (1994) (similar). But respondent’s
suit
does
not
challenge
a
subordinate’s
recommendation to an intra-branch superior about
what that superior should do. Petitioners do not
contend that the Air Force’s decision to continue
OB/OD operations past September 2021 was still
under review within the federal government. See Pet.
App. 23a.
Petitioners’ attacks on the court of appeals’
alternative prong-two holding are weaker still. They
barely dispute whether the triggered extension of the
prior permit term counts as a legal effect (Pet. 23),
19
offering only a cite to FTC v. Standard Oil, 449 U.S.
232 (1980). But Standard Oil holds that agency
action that merely carries automatic procedural
ramifications—namely, an agency’s filing of a
complaint that obligates the other side to respond—
does not count. Id. at 242. That is a far cry from the
situation here, where the permit-renewal application
enabled the Air Force to engage in destructive
operations on Tarague Beach for over four years and
counting—indeed, for longer than the three-year term
the application sought. See supra at 9.
Instead, petitioners argue (Pet. 20) that this legal
effect “flow[ed]” from the 2018 permit, not from the
2021 renewal application. That is wrong: By the
plain terms of the relevant regulation, the renewal
application was necessary to trigger the extension of
the prior permit’s term. 40 C.F.R. § 270.51(a) (“the
conditions of an expired permit continue in force . . .
until the effective date of a new permit . . . if . . . [t]he
permittee has submitted a timely application [for a
new permit]” (emphasis added)). 4 And even if this
narrow point of contention were debatable, it is surely
not a debate worthy of this Court’s resources.
II. No Further Review Is Warranted Of The
Ruling That NEPA Applies Here
Petitioners also urge the Court to grant certiorari
to decide whether NEPA applies when an agency
(here, the Air Force) proposes to undertake an action
that it cannot carry out without first obtaining a
For this reason, petitioners’ complaint (Pet. 23) that
respondent did not separately challenge the 2018 permit is
irrelevant.
4
20
RCRA permit from a separate entity (here, Guam
EPA). But this second question likewise falls far
below this Court’s traditional bar for review. There is
no split: Petitioners identify no court of appeals
decision holding that an agency seeking a RCRA
permit need not comply with NEPA. And there is no
reason to think that this Court would be the first to
break that ground, as the holding below follows from
the statutory text and the well-established principle
that courts should strive to read statutory enactments
harmoniously. The Court should deny review of this
question as well.
A. There Is No Split On The Second
Question Presented
1. Petitioners do not cite any appellate decision
holding that a federal agency is excused from
complying with NEPA when deciding whether to take
a major federal action that will require a RCRA
permit. Instead, petitioners discuss an Eleventh
Circuit case (Pet. 29-30) and list others (Pet. 30 n.6)
that address whether an agency tasked with enforcing
an environmental statute must, in the course of
exercising that regulatory authority, also conduct a
NEPA analysis.
But those cases are in no
disagreement whatsoever with the decision below.
They simply reflect the understanding—“recognized”
in “most circuits,” the Ninth Circuit among them—
that an agency need not comply with NEPA when it
administers a statute that mandates its own
“examination of environmental questions” and that
imposes “ ‘specific procedures for considering the
environment that are functional equivalents of the
[NEPA] impact statement process.’ ” Alabama ex rel.
21
Siegelman v. EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1990)
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Texas Comm. on
Nat. Res. v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 207 (5th Cir.
1978)); see also Pet. App. 35a-36a, 40a-41a.
Take petitioners’ only case involving RCRA, the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Siegelman. Siegelman
addressed whether the environmental agency tasked
with issuing RCRA permits—not the agency applying
for one—was obligated “to comply with NEPA when
exercising its permitting authority.” 911 F.2d at 503;
see also id. at 505. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that, because RCRA’s “substantive and procedural
standards [were] intended to ensure that EPA
considers . . . environmental issues involved in the
permitting of hazardous waste management
facilities,” “Congress did not intend for EPA” to
undertake a NEPA analysis in making that decision
as well. Id. at 505 (emphasis added). Siegelman thus
bears on the distinct question whether, when EPA is
the RCRA permitting authority, that agency must
conduct a NEPA analysis before approving an
application. But that question is not implicated here.
Guam EPA (a non-federal entity with no NEPA
obligations) is the permitting authority, and
respondent challenges a different agency’s earlier
decisionmaking.
Petitioners’ non-RCRA cases all fit the mold of
Siegelman.
Each concludes or suggests that
environmental agencies enforcing environmental
statutes with requirements functionally equivalent to
NEPA’s need not also comply with NEPA. 5 The Ninth
See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,
384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (when EPA makes determinations under
5
22
Circuit has reached similar conclusions in prior
cases. 6 But not one of those courts has excused a nonSection 111 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), it is not obligated to
comply with NEPA), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 676 (1st Cir. 1974) (under
a statutory exemption, when EPA takes action under the CAA,
“NEPA does not apply to EPA”); Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v.
U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 869 F.2d 719, 729 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989)
(suggesting that if the Atomic Energy Act required the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to conduct the “ ‘functional equivalent’ of
NEPA’s environmental review process,” the Commission need
not undertake a similar review under NEPA); Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 508 (4th Cir. 1973) (when EPA
approves a CAA state implementation plan, EPA is not required
to include an EIS), abrogated on other grounds by Union Elec.
Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v.
EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 842-43 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); Pacific Legal
Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 834-38 (6th Cir. 1981)
(suggesting that if the Endangered Species Act (ESA) required
the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to “prepare the functional
equivalent” of an EIS when listing a species as endangered, the
FWS need not also prepare an EIS); Western Neb. Res. Council v.
EPA, 943 F.2d 867, 871-72 (8th Cir. 1991) (“EPA does not need
to comply with the formal requirements of NEPA in performing
its environmental protection functions under” the Safe Drinking
Water Act); Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 68-69, 71-72
(10th Cir. 1975) (“an organization like EPA, whose regulatory
activities are necessarily concerned with environmental
consequences, need not stop in the middle of its proceedings”
cancelling a chemical-toxicants registration under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to prepare
an EIS), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 906 (1976).
See Douglas Cnty. v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1503-04 (9th
Cir. 1995) (FWS’s ESA obligations displace FWS’s NEPA
obligations), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1042 (1996); Merrell v.
Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986) (EPA’s FIFRA
obligations displace EPA’s NEPA obligations), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987).
6
23
environmental agency like the Air Force from
complying with NEPA before selecting a course of
action that requires authorization from another
entity. To the contrary, one of petitioners’ favored
decisions emphasizes that “NEPA must be accorded
full vitality as to non-environmental agencies.”
Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,
387 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (cited at Pet. 26, 27, 30). Thus,
as the court of appeals took care to underscore, its
analytical approach to the NEPA-displacement issue
is consistent with that of other circuits, including the
Eleventh Circuit in Siegelman. Pet. App. 40a.
B. The Ninth Circuit Was Correct
Given the absence of a conflict, petitioners once
again must ask this Court to grant certiorari to correct
what they believe is a mistake. They urge the Court
to be the first appellate tribunal to hold that even if
an agency is not tasked with enforcing RCRA’s permit
requirement—and indeed has no core environmental
competencies at all—RCRA implicitly supplants the
agency’s NEPA obligation at its own decisionmaking
stage. But even if the Court were in the business of
splitless error correction, there was no error here.
1. Respondent’s claim calls for a plain application
of NEPA’s text: The Air Force’s proposal to dispose of
hazardous-waste munitions via open detonation and
open burning on Tarague Beach was a “major Federal
action[]” that may have significant environmental
effects. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2018). So, before the
Air Force “proposed” to undertake that action, it was
required to examine and report on the action’s
“environmental impact” and to consider reasonable
“alternatives,” id. § 4332(2)(C)(i), (iii)—such as the
24
alternative methods for munitions disposal evaluated
by the National Academies and EPA in 2019, and
alternative locations. See supra at 7-8.
The court of appeals’ conclusion that this proposed
action is not exempt from NEPA merely because the
Air Force also needed a RCRA permit to carry it out
reflected the prevailing framework for NEPA
displacement. See supra at 20-23. The Air Force is
not “engaged primarily in an examination of
environmental questions,” such that its decision to
conduct OB/OD operations on Tarague Beach was
“necessarily infused with . . . environmental
considerations.” Pet. App. 41a (quoting Siegelman,
911 F.2d at 504 & n.11). And even if that factor were
overlooked, when it comes to the permit applicant,
RCRA does not mandate “specific procedures for
considering the environment that [are] functional
equivalents of [NEPA’s] impact statement process.”
Id. (first set of brackets in original; quoting
Siegelman, 911 F.2d at 504).
Most significantly, “[u]nder the circumstances of
this case,” the “timing” of each statute’s prescribed
environmental review is “entirely distinct.” Pet. App.
37a (emphasis omitted). While NEPA requires action
agencies to prepare an environmental analysis and
engage with the public “before reaching a final
decision to undertake a particular activity that may
have significant environmental impact,” id., RCRA
does not require an environmental evaluation until
after the action agency has reached that decision, id.
at 38a-39a. The Ninth Circuit therefore correctly
reasoned that Guam EPA’s evaluation of
environmental factors at the permit-approval stage is
25
no substitute for the Air Force’s due consideration of
the environmental consequences of its proposed
hazardous-waste disposal project, including available
alternatives, before committing itself to a permit for
particular operations in a particular location. See id.
at 37a-39a.
That conclusion accords with the ordinary rule
that displacement by implication is disfavored. As
this Court has instructed, “[w]hen confronted with
two Acts of Congress allegedly touching on the same
topic,” courts are “not at liberty to pick and choose
among congressional enactments and must instead
strive to give effect to both.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
584 U.S. 497, 510 (2018) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). When, as here, a party
“suggest[s] that two statutes cannot be harmonized,
and that one displaces the other,” that party “bears
the heavy burden of showing a clearly expressed
congressional intention that such a result should
follow.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
NEPA’s text reinforces this background rule of
construction. To begin with, Congress specifically
“authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible . . . public laws of the United States should be
interpreted and administered with the policies [that
NEPA] set[s] forth.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2018). In
addition, Congress amended NEPA in 2023 to
explicitly resolve the statute’s interaction with other
laws. See Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L.
No. 118-5, §§ 321(a)(3)(A) and (b), 137 Stat. 38-39
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C), 4336). As
relevant here, the amended text relieves agencies
26
from preparing a NEPA analysis only where NEPA
compliance “is excluded pursuant to . . . another
provision of law,” or where “the preparation of [a
NEPA] document would clearly and fundamentally
conflict with the requirements of another provision of
law.” 42 U.S.C. § 4336(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. V 2023)
(emphasis added); see also id. § 4332(2)(C) (Supp. V
2023) (mandating that agencies comply with NEPA
“except where compliance would be inconsistent with
other statutory requirements”).
RCRA does not exclude permit-seeking agencies
from the obligation to prepare a NEPA analysis. And
petitioners have not carried their burden to show a
clear and fundamental conflict between the two laws’
respective provisions. There are no “near-conflicts” or
even “legislative cross-purposes” between NEPA and
RCRA;
rather,
the
two
statutes
achieve
“fundamentally different, but complementary goals.”
Pet. App. 45a.
2. Petitioners’
unavailing.
contrary
arguments
are
a. Petitioners lean heavily (Pet. 4, 24-26, 28) on
the specific-governs-the-general canon of statutory
construction. But that principle applies only when
two statutory provisions are irreconcilable. See
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012). As noted,
petitioners have not attempted to claim a direct
conflict between the two laws. For good reason: “It is
possible and practicable for the Air Force to comply
with both NEPA and RCRA.” Pet. App. 34a. And even
if the canon were implicated here, it is not at all clear
that it favors petitioners’ interpretation—since it is
27
NEPA, not RCRA, that specifically addresses the
process applicable to the Air Force’s go/no-go decision.
Given the slippery nature of the canon, the better
course is to adhere to an “interpretation that gives
effect to all of Congress’s work.” Epic Sys., 584 U.S.
at 524; see also id. at 523-24 (rejecting an invocation
of the specific-governs-the-general canon).
b. Petitioners also repeatedly invoke (Pet. 4, 9-10,
26, 28) an EPA regulation stating that “RCRA . . .
permits are not subject to the environmental impact
statement provisions of [NEPA].”
40 C.F.R.
§ 124.9(b)(6). But that regulation has no bearing here
for several reasons.
First, by its title, the EPA regulation applies only
“when EPA is the permitting authority.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 124.9; see Pet. App. 42a-43a.
As petitioners
acknowledge (Pet. 10 n.3), Guam EPA has not adopted
this regulation for its own RCRA permitting process—
so it does not govern this case. See 22 Guam Admin.
R. & Regs. § 30110(h).
Second, the EPA regulation speaks to the
obligations of “the permitting authority” in preparing
a “draft permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 124.9(a)-(b); see also 45
Fed. Reg. 33290, 33406 (May 19, 1980) (explaining
EPA’s “position that [NEPA] does not require
preparation of an [EIS] when permits are issued under
the RCRA . . . program[]”) (emphasis added). It says
nothing about the NEPA obligations of an applicant
for a RCRA permit.
Third, that straightforward interpretation of the
EPA regulation accords with the view—reflected
elsewhere in the Executive Branch—that the fact that
a proposed action requires an environmental permit
28
does not obviate the action agency’s NEPA
obligations.
For instance, the Council on
Environmental Quality NEPA regulations in effect
during the events of this case expressly contemplate
that action agencies will comply with NEPA even if
the action requires a permit.
See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.24(b) (2021) (action agency’s draft EIS “shall
list all Federal permits, licenses, and other
authorizations
that
must
be
obtained
in
implementing the proposal”); id. § 1503.3(d)-(e) (2021)
(referencing comments on action agencies’ draft EISs
by permitting agencies).
Similarly, the Army’s
previously operative NEPA regulations envision that
NEPA analyses will be conducted alongside
environmental review required under other laws—
including RCRA specifically.
See 32 C.F.R.
§ 651.14(e)(9) (2021).
Department of Defense components have also
adopted categorical exclusions to NEPA built on the
premise that components bear NEPA obligations
when they need permits. For example, at the time the
Air Force applied for the 2021 permit, its own NEPA
regulation specified that reliance on a categorical
exclusion “does not relieve” the proponent “of
responsibility for complying with all other
environmental requirements related to the proposal,
including requirements for permits.” 32 C.F.R. pt.
989, app. B, at A2.1 (2021) (emphasis added). More
recently (and after the court of appeals’ decision), the
Department of Defense adopted a categorical
exclusion for “[c]onstruction, in accordance with
applicable permits,” of certain water crossings. Dep’t
of Def. NEPA Implementing Proc., app. A, § I(b)(8)
(DoD NEPA Proc.) (emphasis added), available at
29
https://www.denix.osd.mil/nepa/; see also id. § I(b)(9)
(waterfront-facility renovations “in accordance with
applicable permits” (emphasis added)); id. § III(37)
(maintenance dredging and debris disposal where
“applicable permits are secured” (emphasis added)); 90
Fed. Reg. 27857 (June 30, 2025) (adopting those
procedures). If petitioners truly believed that a
permit requirement relieves components of NEPA
compliance, such NEPA exclusions would be
unnecessary.
Fourth, even if the EPA RCRA regulation were
understood as expansively as petitioners urge—
notwithstanding its wording and obvious tension with
other Executive Branch pronouncements—it would
deserve minimal weight in the analysis. Petitioners
do not claim that the view the regulation reflects is
entitled to deference. Federal courts, not federal
agencies, have the last word on the meaning of federal
statutes. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603
U.S. 369, 394, 401-04 (2024).
c. That leaves petitioners with policy arguments.
They argue that applying the two statutes according
to their text would be “redundant and a waste of
resources.” Pet. 4 (citation omitted). Petitioners also
contend that there is “no sound reason” to require
action agencies to complete NEPA analyses if the
RCRA permitting authority is not required to conduct
one too. Pet. 28.
Of course, this Court requires more than “policytalk” to “overcome a plain statutory command.” NizChavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 171 (2021).
Regardless, the good reason to require an agency like
the Air Force to undertake a NEPA analysis before
30
seeking a hazardous-waste-disposal permit is selfevident: to force that agency to consider the
environmental consequences of its proposed course of
action before it chooses that course. As the court of
appeals observed, “building in environmental
analyses at the planning and decisional stages allows
nuanced adjustments of the proposed project by those
most familiar with the project’s goals and practical
limitations.” Pet. App. 38a. That timing also ensures
that environmental impacts are not “overlooked or
underestimated” by the action agency and then
discovered, if at all, “after resources have been
committed or the die otherwise cast.” Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349
(1989).
Nor do the two statutes call for the same analysis.
See Pet. App. 37a-39a. Most notably, one of NEPA’s
touchstones (both in 2021 and now) is the requirement
that agencies evaluate feasible alternatives to the
proposed action. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii)
and (2)(F) (Supp. V 2023); Seven Cnty. Infrastructure
Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 172, 177 (2025).
RCRA, by contrast, typically does not require facilities
to present information on alternatives—such as
different waste-treatment technologies or off-site
locations—to the treatment plan they propose. See 42
U.S.C. § 6925(b); Pet. App. 39a. 7 And RCRA does not
This case happens to be a partial exception, because a
RCRA implementing regulation prohibits OB/OD unless
military-waste explosives “cannot safely be disposed of through
other modes of treatment.” 40 C.F.R. § 265.382; see 22 Guam
Admin. R. & Regs. § 30107(a). That may be why the Air Force’s
2021 application briefly dismissed the viability of alternative
technologies (though the Air Force simply copied the discussion
7
31
require (for instance) Guam EPA to deny a permit on
the basis that the munitions could be destroyed
through OB/OD in a non-Guam location with less
environmental harm.
Thus, had the Air Force undertaken a compliant
NEPA analysis before deciding to seek renewal, it
“might have chosen a different place or method for
handling the waste munitions.” Pet. App. 3a. The
court of appeals correctly recognized the statute’s
crucial role in this context.
III. The Questions Presented Do Not Call For
The Court’s Intervention At This Juncture
Petitioners’ attempts to imbue this dispute with
broader significance and urgency (Pet. 31) are
likewise underwhelming.
In truth, there is no
compelling reason not to wait to see if any substantial
disagreement arises in the lower courts. Caution is
all the more prudent because this dispute took place
under an outdated version of NEPA, and Congress is
actively considering additional amendments that
could bear on these kinds of cases in the future. At
most, further percolation is warranted.
1. As an initial matter, petitioners are wrong to
suggest that respondent’s case will affect the Air
Force’s ability to address “potentially dangerous
munitions that must be quickly destroyed” on Guam.
Pet. 11. If military munitions or explosives give rise
to an immediate threat to public safety or property, no
from earlier applications and ignored recent authoritative
studies on the subject). See supra at 8. If anything, this unusual
feature makes this case an even more awkward vehicle for
exploring NEPA and RCRA’s typical interaction.
32
RCRA permit or NEPA review is required. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 266.204, 270.1(c)(3)(i)(D); DoD NEPA Proc.
pt. 3.12(a) (excusing NEPA compliance in emergency
circumstances).
2. Petitioners’ claims of administrative upheaval
(Pet. 31) are likewise ill-founded. They vaguely assert
that the decision below “threaten[s] . . . to impede”
agencies’ pursuit of environmental and naturalresources permits, claiming that “the Executive
Branch generally has not engaged in NEPA analysis
before submitting permit-renewal applications.” Id.
But petitioners themselves cite a case where a
military component completed an EIS before
obtaining permits, including a RCRA permit. See
Chemical Weapons, 111 F.3d at 1487-88 (cited at Pet.
29). Other cases present similar fact patterns. 8 And
as discussed, the Department of Defense’s own NEPA
procedures (as well as prior agency regulations) take
as a given that agency projects are subject to NEPA
See, e.g., City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. U.S. Department
of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1148, 1150-52 (9th Cir. 1997)
(evaluating Federal Highway Administration’s EIS for NEPA
compliance even though the project would require a Clean Water
Act permit); Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Department of Navy,
733 F.3d 1106, 1108-13 (11th Cir. 2013) (Navy completed an EIS
to conduct training activity that also required ESA
authorization); Conservation Council for Haw. v. National
Marine Fisheries Serv., 97 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1215 (D. Haw. 2015)
(Navy completed an EIS to conduct training and testing
activities that required ESA and Marine Mammal Protection Act
authorizations); Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101,
1103-04, 1132-36 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (Army complied with NEPA
by, inter alia, preparing an EA and relying on a categorical
exclusion before conducting hazardous-waste-disposal activities
that required RCRA and CAA permits).
8
33
even where permits are required. See supra at 28-29.
Petitioners’ assertion that the court of appeals’
understanding came out of left field is hard to square
with those precedents and practices.
As for petitioners’ enigmatic warning that the
decision below implicates the Department of Defense’s
renewal of “2500 environmental permits” (Pet. 31), it
is difficult to respond without the government
specifying the permitting regimes it is supposedly
worried about. Suffice it to say, however, that it is
unusual for permit renewals to require an agency to
complete a new, full-blown EIS in every permitting
cycle.
Many of the underlying actions may qualify for a
NEPA categorical exclusion. See supra at 4-5, 28-29.
And even where a NEPA analysis of some kind is
required, there are multiple ways for agencies to rest
on prior analyses without reinventing the wheel.
They can rely on “programmatic environmental
documents” for actions with relevant similarities or
actions occurring in a particular location. E.g., DoD
NEPA Proc. pt. 3.1; see also DoD NEPA Proc. pt.
1.8(e). If the agency prepared a NEPA analysis for the
last permitting cycle and nothing material has
changed since, it can incorporate the prior analysis by
reference. E.g., DoD NEPA Proc. pt. 3.2. And if there
is overlap between the environmental factors
considered in the RCRA-permitting analysis and the
mandated NEPA analysis, those analyses can be
consolidated and streamlined, as the Department’s
NEPA procedures explicitly contemplate. See DoD
NEPA Proc. pt. 3.8 (“To the fullest extent possible,
DoD will prepare environmental documents
34
concurrently with and integrated with analyses and
related surveys and studies required by other Federal
statutes.”). Compliance will not be overly burdensome
or gum up the permit-renewal process.
3. Tellingly, even though the court of appeals’
decision issued nearly a year ago, petitioners do not
point to any other pending case (in the Ninth Circuit
or elsewhere) challenging a similar agency decision by
relying on the analysis below. But if, as petitioners
predict (Pet. 31), there is a sudden deluge of cases
newly challenging agencies’ failure to comply with
NEPA before seeking permits to carry out
environmentally destructive activities, more courts of
appeals will have occasion to weigh in on these
questions soon. This Court need not jump at this
particular opportunity.
Preemptive intervention would be all the more
misguided because NEPA is an ongoing subject of
congressional attention. The Air Force took the action
at issue—and this case has largely been litigated—
under the pre-2023 version of NEPA. But in 2023,
Congress amended NEPA to explicitly provide that
agencies are relieved of their NEPA obligations when
another statute specifically excludes them or when
the other statute gives rise to a clear conflict. See C.A.
Doc. No. 34, at 1-2 (Sept. 8, 2023); see also supra at 2526.
The court of appeals took the view, at petitioners’
urging, that the 2023 amendments cannot be
considered in this case because they do not “purport
to apply retroactively.” Pet. App. 5a n.3; see also C.A.
Doc. No. 35, at 1-2 (Sept. 19, 2023). But if that is
correct (which respondent does not concede), it would
35
be all the more reason why this case presents an awful
vehicle for deciding the second question presented. At
a minimum, because petitioners convinced the lower
court that it could not take the 2023 amendments into
account, this Court would be evaluating those changes
as a court “of first view.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 718 n.7 (2005).
And NEPA may change further. In December
2025, the House of Representatives passed a bill that
would amend NEPA in significant ways, including by
exempting agencies’ compliance when “the proposed
agency action is an action for which such agency’s
compliance with another statute’s requirements
serves the function of agency compliance with
[NEPA].” H.R. 4776, § 2(b) (119th Cong., 1st Sess.)
(engrossed in House Dec. 18, 2025). That bill is
currently under consideration in the Senate, which of
course could make different or additional changes. So
this Court could end up addressing a moving target,
or else issue an opinion whose shelf life has already
expired. Relatedly, if petitioners’ dire predictions
have any substance, there is nothing preventing them
from taking their concerns across the street—
especially now that legislators are acutely interested
in the subject.
In short, this is the wrong case at the wrong time.
Even if the Court were interested in the issues
underlying either question presented, it can and
should wait for a dispute that can provide more
meaningful guidance.
36
CONCLUSION
The petition should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. HENKIN
EARTHJUSTICE
850 Richards Street
Suite 400
Honolulu, HI 96813
LINNET DAVIS-STERMITZ
EARTHJUSTICE
810 Third Avenue
Suite 610
Seattle, WA 98104
CAROLINE A. FLYNN
Counsel of Record
THIEN T. CHAU
EARTHJUSTICE
1001 G Street NW
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 797-4316
cflynn@earthjustice.org
Counsel for Respondent
January 16, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.