Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Fathiree Uddin Ali, Petitioner v. Stephen E. Adamson, Chaplain, et al.
Supreme Court briefJul 29, 2025
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RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0069p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Fathiree Uddin Ali,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 24-1540
v.
Stephen E. Adamson, Chaplain; David M. Leach,
Special Activities Coordinator; Shane Jackson,
Warden; Michigan Department of Corrections,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. l:21-cv-00071—Hala Y. Jarbou, District Judge.
Argued: March 19, 2025
Decided and Filed: March 28, 2025
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: D Dangaran, RIGHTS BEHIND BARS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Christopher Alex, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan,
for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Samuel Weiss, RIGHTS BEHIND BARS, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Christopher Alex, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees.
OPINION
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Fathiree Ali, a Muslim inmate, asked the Michigan Department
of Corrections to serve him only halal food, a special diet required by his religion. After the
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prison chaplain directed him to apply for the prison’s vegan meal option,, another official rejected
his application upon learning that he had purchased over one hundred non-halal items from the
prison commissary.
The district court dismissed Ali’s claim against the Department of
Corrections and granted summary judgment to the officers. We dismiss Ali’s appeal, in part for
lack of jurisdiction and affirm the rest of the district court’s decision.
I.
Eating and fasting are central to many faith groups.
Michigan prisons seek to
accommodate a wide range of inmates whose beliefs require distinct' diets. They offer three
options: a regular menu, a vegetarian menu, and a vegan menu. The vegan menu complies with
most kosher and halal dietary restrictions.
Not everyone is eligible for the vegan meal plan. To qualify, a prisoner must make a
written request to the,prison warden, who refers the request to the prison’s special activities
coordinator for; approval. , If the vegan meal “does not meet” an inmate’s “religious dietary,
needs,” the Department permits the inmate to request an alternative menu, subject to the
“approval of the Deputy Director” of the Department of Corrections.
R.33-3 at 7., The
Department may rescind its approval if the inmate repeatedly , eats food inconsistent with his,
professed faith.
.
r
Fathiree Ali is a Muslim inmate who used to be confined in Michigan’s Carson City
Correctional Facility. His faith contains two dietaiy restrictions. He must “consume a [halal]
diet,” which “must include meat,” “dairy, chicken, eggs, honey, fish' cheese, lamb,” and animal
“fats.” R.53-2 at 3. To “exclude any” is haram, “a major sin and act of disbelief.” R.53-2 at 3.
In addition, Ali must ayoid certain foods, like porkj and meats slaughtered in a manner
inconsistent with Islamic law.
Because the Carson City prison provided only haram meat entrees, Ali asked chaplain
Steve Adamson for a “[halal] diet.” R.53-2 at 3. Adainson indicated that he-needed approval for
a vegan diet first. He added that the Department ‘‘has not ever approved a meat diet for Muslim
prisoners.” R.53-2 at 5. Ali left the meeting with the impression that he needed approval for the
vegan diet before he could request an alternative menu with halal meat.
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Ali requested the vegan diet in 2017. After an interview, Adamson recommended the
prison approve his request because he found Ali “sincere in the practice of his faith.” R.33-7 at
2. But David Leach, then the activities coordinator, did not. He noticed that, even though the
prison commissary offered two halal meat items, Ali had purchased three sausages and over a
hundred meat-flavored ramen noodles—all haram—in the three months before his application.
Leach denied the request.
Ali sued Adamson, Leach, warden Shane Jackson, and the Michigan Department of
Corrections under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free
Exercise Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed Ali’s claims against the
Department of Corrections and granted summary judgment in favor of the officials.
n.
Before reaching the merits of Ali’s appeal, we must pause, indeed stop, to assure
ourselves ofjurisdiction over his claims. Article HI Extends the “judicial Power” orily to “Cases”
and “Controversies.”
U.S. Const, art. HI, §2.
That “irreducible constitutional minimum”
demands an injury in fact, traceable to the defendant’s actions, and redressable by a favorable
decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Redressability, the relevant
lens in this case, asks if it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,” that a favorable decision
would rectify Ali’s injury. See id. at 561 (quotation omitted). Because these constitutional
requirements persist from a lawsuit’s cradle to its grave, we must dismiss an appeal as moot once
the federal courts can.no longer grant effectual relief. Brown v. Yost, 122 F.4th 597, 601 (6th
Cir. 2024) (en banc) (per curiam).
.. .
.
■ . '
Ali’s claims against the chaplain (Adamson) and the warden (Jackson) for injunctive
relief will not redress his injury. Only the special activities coordinator may approve requests for
vegan meals. And only a “Deputy Director” may approve requests for alternative menus, such as
those containing halal meat. R.33-3 at 7. Adamson and Jackson have no power to do either.
Even if the chaplain and warden could help Ali by referring his application for the vegan
meal plan to the special activities coordinator, Ali’s claims are moot anyway. Both of them
worked at the Carson City Correctional Facility. Ali how resides at the Thumb Correctional
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Facility. He has.not produced any evidence that the chaplain and warden at his old prison can
obtain this requested meal plan at his new prison.
Ali’s § 1983 claim against Leach for injunctive relief under the Free Exercise Clause
suffers from a different mootness problem. Unlike Adamson and Jackson, Leach (the special
activities coordinator) works for the Department of Corrections, not one prison. Ali> may sue
Leach only in his individual capacity because “officials acting in their official capacities are” not
“persoiis” under § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). And
Leach, the individual, has left the job. He no longer works for the Department. An injunction
against him would “amount to no more than a declaration” of the law. California v. Texas, 593
U.S. 659, 673 (2021). This claim, too, is moot.
That leaves four sets of merits claims. We consider each in turn.
,
...
............... III.
.
Does RLUIPA authorize a money-damages claim against Leach, Adamson, and Jackson?
No.
RLUIPA does not authorize damages against officials sued in their official capacity,
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 293 (2011), or their individual capacity, Haight v. Thompson,
763 F.3d 554, 568 (6th Cir. 2014).
...
.,,,
Congress must speak unambiguously when it “legislates through the spending power.”'
Id. That clear-statement requirement reflects the breadth of Congress’s spending power. The
federal government possesses “only the powers granted to it” as enumerated in the Constitution.
McCulloch v; Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819). The States retain the remainder.
But Congress may “regulate where it otherwise could not’—beyond its enumerated powers, in
other words—by imposing conditions on federal funds afforded to state governments if “States
consent to the bargain.” Haight, 763 F.3d at 569. To make a fair offer and receive a knowing
acceptance, Congress must set its conditions “unambiguously.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
A clear-statement imperative ensures that the, States
“exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” Id.
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That principle informs the scope of RLUIPA’s conditions on state prisons receiving
“Federal financial assistance.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). If a government imposes “a
substantial burden” on “religious exercise” in such a prison, inmates may seek “appropriate
relief’ against the culpable entity or officer. Id. §§ 2000cc-l(a), 2000cc-2(a). Because “the
word ‘appropriate’ is inherently context dependent,” the term “‘[appropriate relief is open-
ended and ambiguous about what types of relief it includes.” Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 286; cf.
Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 13, 22, 24—26 (holding that a spending condition giving developmentally
disabled people “a right to appropriate treatment” was too “indeterminate” to compel states to
hind treatment facilities). That open-textured term “plausibly covers just injunctive, declaratory,
and other non-monetary relief’ and does not unambiguously notify Michigan that taking federal
funds would open its employees to private damages suits. Haight, 763 F.3d at 568.
Unable to dodge our on-point caselaw, Ali faces it head on.
He suggests that the
Supreme Court abrogated Haight and demands that we overrule it. The Court did not, and we
.r . ..
may not.
..
,
. , . . .
. ,
In 2020, the Court held in Tanzin v. Tanvir that plaintiffs seeking “appropriate relief’
under a different statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), may seek damages
against federal officials sued in their individual capacity.
592 U.S. 43, 48-49 (2020).
It
observed, as the. Sossamon Court did, that “appropriate relief’ is. “open-ended.on its face,”
making its contours “inherently context dependent.” Id. at 49 (quotation omitted). Noting that
courts historically awarded damages at common law against officials in many settings, the Court
concluded that RFRA’s “appropriate relief’ encompassed damages. Id. In doing so, it did not
impose a clear-statement.requirement.
,
■
Ali points out that RLUIPA also entitles a plaintiff to “appropriate relief against a
government,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a), suggesting that the two laws permit similar damages
actions. But this argument asks too much of Tanzin. While Congress enacted RFRA under its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-36
(1997), it enacted RLUIPA under its spending power, Haight, 763 F.3d at 559. “[T]he same
words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things ” Yates v. United States,
574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (plurality op.). Just so here. While RLUIPA and RFRA share
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similarly restrictive ends-means tests of state action, only the former—as a spending condition-
must clearly state its terms and conditions. That indeed explains why the Court would invalidate
RFRA as applied to the States when it turned on its enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment, see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533-36, but has never invalidated RLUIPA as
applied to the States. / RFRA exceeded Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. But the spending power allows Congress to exceed its enumerated powers, as it
did in RLUIPA, by giving the States the choice to accept the regulation in return for federal
money. So long as the congressional offer is clearly stated—including as to money damages—
the States may permit this extra-constitutional regulation. Casually grafting Tanzm's RFRA
holding as to federal officials onto RLUIPA and its application to state officials would violate,
not vindicate, the “inherently context dependent” nature of “appropriate relief.” Tanzin, 592
U.S. at 49 (quotation omitted).
When? two statutes have distinct constitutional sources, they may, sometimes they must,
have distinct meanings. Take District of Columbia v. Carter, in which the Supreme Court held
that the District of Columbia did not count as a “State or Territory” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 409
U.S. 418, 420-21 (1973). The plaintiff invoked precedent that the District of Columbia fell
within “every State and Territory” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Id. But while Congress
enacted § 1982 under its-Thirteenth Amendment powers,, the Court explained, it enacted § 1983
under its Fourteenth Amendment powers.
Id. at 421-24. The former enabled Congress to
enforce the abolition of slavery “within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.” U.S. Const, amend. XHI. But “the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are
addressed only to the State.” Carter, 409 U.S., at 423. Therefore, the Court reasoned, the
District of Columbia was not a “State” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
the District’s officers fell outside § 1983’s scope, id. at 424-25—at least until Congress later
amended § 1983, Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284.
This case is hewed from the same mold. Ali relies on precedent holding that “appropriate
relief’ under RFRA encompasses individual-capacity damages actions to insist that “appropriate
relief’ under RLUIPA does too. But after City ofBoerne, RFRA does not apply to state officials.
521 U.S. at 532-36. By contrast, its constitutional application to “the internal operations of the
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national government”—and to federal officials—“rests securely on” Congress’s power to
“determine how the national government will conduct its own affairs.” O’Bryan v. Bureau of
Prisons. 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003). RLUIPA extends to state officials due only to
Congress s spending power to “implement federal policy it could not impose directly under its
enumerated powets” by offering the States money to comply with this extra-constitutional
regulation: Nat’lFed’n oflndep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S: 519, 578 (2012).
That makes all the difference.
One source of congressional authority, the spending
power, requires careful scrutiny and a clear statement to ensure that state officials made “a
legitimate choice whether to accept” otherwise unconstitutional regulations “in exchange for
federal funds.” Id. The other source of congressional authority does not. When Congress
simply limits the authority of federal prison officials to burden the free exercise of religion, it
does not need a special source of power. See O’Bryan, 349 F.3d at 401; City ofBoerne, 521 U.S.
at 536. No clarity imperative thus applies. Neither Ali nor any court we know of has identified a
historically or constitutionally grounded noim[-]” against individual-capacity dainages lawsuits
such that courts Would require a clear statement from Congress to unsettle it. Jones v. Hendrix,
599 U.S. '465, 492 (2023).
Tanzin, which involved an individual-capacity claim for money
damages against federal prison officials under RFRA, ‘required no such’ clear statement either.
See 592-U.S. at 490—93'. That silence is■ telling because the-Supreme'Court typically tells us
when Congress must speak with unmistakable clarity. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, Nd. 23824, — U.S. —, 2025 WL 906502, at *8 (2025); Fin. Oversight &'Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Centro
De Periodismo InvesHgativo, Inc., 598 U.S. 339, 342 (2023). Because RLUIPA’s remedies
demand clarity and RFRA’s do not, “appropriate relief’ warrants a narrower definition under
RLUIPA.
-
'
- ?
. .
.
This conclusion also respects Tanzin. Recall that it reasoned that the ordinary meaning of
“appropriate relief’ required “inherently context dependent” determinations of what remedies
were “specially fitted or suitable.” Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 48-49 (quotation omitted). In “light of
RFRA’s origins,” the Court found “damages under § 1983” “particularly salient” in
circumscribing “appropriate relief.” Id. at 50. • But in light of RLUIPA’s origins under the
spending power, a different set of expectations and requirements applies. In the same way that
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asking your own child to do the dishes sheds little light on the propriety of asking other children
to do your dishes, Congress’s inherent prerogative to regulate federal officials does not mean it
may regulate state officials.
Our sister circuits agree—-both before and after Tanzin. Since Tanzin, the Second, Fifth,
and Ninth Circuits reaffirmed that RLUIPA does not permit individual-capacity damages suits
against state officials. See, e.g., Landor v. La. Dep’t of Corr. & Pub. Safety, 82 F.4th 337, 341—
44 (5th Cir.
petition for cert, filed, No. 23-1197 (May 3, 2024); Tripathy v. McKoy, ,103
F.4th 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2024), petition for cert, filed, No. 24-229 (Aug. 27, 2024); Fuqua v.
Raak, 120 F.4th 1346, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 2024). They reasoned, as we do, that RLUIPA’s
spending power underpinnings convey a narrower scope to “appropriate relief’ that excludes
damages, given Congress’s failure to say otherwise unambiguously. Landor, 82 F.4th at 341;
Tripathy, 103 F.4th at114; Fuqua, 120 F.4th at 1360. Before Tanzin, the. Third Circuit, like our
circuit in Haight, distinguished RLUIPA’s spending-power roots from RFRA’s Fourteenth-
Amendment ones., See Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 303—04 (3d Cir. 2016).
The Court’s spending-power conditions,, qonfrary to Ali’s argument, demand clarity
regardless of whether state or individual pocketbooks are on the line. They apply when the
federal government conditions highway funds on adopting national minimum-drinking ages,
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-07 (1987), or conditions child-education funds on
accepting fee-shifting in iater individuals with Disabilities Education Act suits by families
against state school districts, Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist: Bd. ofEduc. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,
295-96(2006).
‘
.
Ali points out that RLUIPA permits the federal government to seek only “injunctive or
declaratory relief’ when it sues a State, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f), but used the broader term
“appropriate relief’ for individual-capacity lawsuits against government officials, id. § 2000cc2(a). That shows, he claims, .that Congress knew how to narrow the range of such lawsuits and
chose not to do so here. But that inference is just that, a mere inference. It does not signal
“clearly,” “expressly,” “unequivocally,” and “unambiguously” that Congress imposed money
damages remedies in using the term “appropriate relief.” Sossamon, 563 U.S. at 285, 290; see
Haight, 763 F.3d at 568.
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rv.
Does Ali have a cognizable claim for injunctive or declaratory relief against just Leach
under RLUIPA? (Recall, by the way, that Adamson and Jackson no longer have power to adjust
Ali’s meal plan because he has moved to a different prison.) No as well.
RLUIPA bars States from imposing a “substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in 'or confined to an institution” unless it is the “least restrictive means” of
furthering a “compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a). To obtain relief, an
inmate must show that he has a “sincerely held religious belief’ and that the government
“substantially burdened [his] exercise of religion.” Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015).
Only then may the prisoner insist that the State satisfy a “daunting compelling-interest and least-
restrictive-means test.” Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2019). A
substantial burden exists if the government “effectively forc[es prisoners] to choose between
engaging in conduct that violates sincerely held religious beliefs and facing a serious
consequence.” New Doe Child #1 v. Cong, of U.S., 891 F.3d 578,589 (6thCir. 2018).
Ali seems to seek relief from two features of Michigan prisons. He believes that they
serve non-haram food cross-contaminated by haram meat. And he requests that the prison
affirmatively serve him halal meat.
As to the first complaint, Ali can already obtain relief by signing up for the vegan meal
plan.
The vegan meals comply with “[h]alal religious tenets” and thus provide adequate
nutrition without cross-contamination from haram meat. R.33-3 at 7. Better still, Ali can re
apply for the vegan diet today. Under Department policy, a prisoner “whose request” for a vegan
meal “is denied” may apply again the next year. R 33-3 at 7. Because the record suggests that
the prison last denied Ali’s meal request in 2017, he could have re-applied any time after 2018.
And his new request would go to a new special activities coordinator with a more recent record
of his commissary purchases.
Even if those purchases contained haram items, his new
application could explain why. That Ali has not re-applied for a vegan meal in seven years—
despite this ready alternative to eating cross-contaminated food—undermines his request for
relief from this court.
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The second complaint fares no better because Ali has two alternatives to access halal
meat. First, he may apply today for an alternative meal plan if the vegan menu is inadequate.
The Department’s policy accommodates him, as it provides that a prisoner who finds the vegan
menu inadequate to meet his dietary needs may request an alternative menu. Second, Ali may
supplement his diet by purchasing halal sausages from the prison commissary, as he routinely
did in 2017. Keep in mind, moreover, that Ali’s claim is against Leach. The special activities
coordinator’s denial of the vegan diet eight years ago has no effect on Ali’s affirmative need to
consume halal meat. In this case, as with the others, appropriate relief comes from Michigan
prisons and not federal courts.
Ali maintains that Leach’s rejection of his request, combined with Adamson’s statement
of prison policy,, made it impossible for him to consume a diet without haram foods and with
halal meat. That’s not true. Ali could make a new request for a vegan meal—now with a new
chaplain, in a new prison, with a new special activities coordinator.
Ali also contends that his prison salary does not cover the halal meats in the commissary.
BUt the undisputed record says that he carl afford them. Ali spent roughly ninety dollars each
month on various food items in the commissary. The presence of alternative sources of halal
meats undercuts his charge of coercive pressure by Michigan prisons.
. ■
.
' All of this helps to explain why Haight v. Thompson does not help him. 763 F.3d 554
(6th Cir. 2014). It held that “barring access” to certain foods constituted a substantial burden for
inmates celebrating an annual powwow as part of the Native American Church. Id. at 564-65.
No such bar exists here because Ali may re-apply today for a vegan menU or supplement his diet
today with food from the commissary.
...
.
•
.
;
.
"
v?
■
'
Has Ali pleaded a cognisable RLUIPA claim against the Michigan Department of
Corrections? No. While Ali may sue the Department under RLUIPA for declaratory and
injunctive relief, Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326-27 (5th Cir. 2009),
aff'd, 563 U.S. 277 (2011); Haight, 763 F.3d at 568, his complaint fails to state a claim for relief
against the agency because he does not identify a policy that violates RLUIPA.
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All must show that a “governmental entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(i), imposed “a
substantial burden on” his religious exercise, id. § 2000cc-l(a). But he has not identified any
Department policy that does so. In truth, the Department’s policies accommodate him. They
permit prisoners to request a vegan menu that complies with “[h]alal religious tenets” and so
does not contain haram meat or cross-contaminated food. R.33-3 at 7. If a prison does not offer
vegan meals, they permit prisoners with religious dietary restrictions to transfer to one that does.
And they allow prisoners to propose an alternative menu for the Deputy Director’s approval if
the vegan menu “does not meet his/her religious dietary needs.” R.33-3 at 7.
Ali’s only theory of harm attacks the “refusal to approve” his “request for a [halal] diet.”
R.lat6. But the Department of Corrections did not refuse that request. Leach did. Because Ali
does not challenge the Department’s policies themselves, he fails to show that it imposed a
“substantial burden” on his religious exercise.
’
• .. -
■
VI.
Does Ali have a cognizable money-damages claim against Adamson and Leach under the
Free Exercise Clause and § 1983? No.
...
Qualified immunity protects officials from damages liability if their conduct “does not
violate clearly established ... constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.-800, 818
(1982). That command contains two conjunctive requirements:.. (1) that the officers violated a
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563
U.S. 731, 735 (2011). At a minimum, Ali’s claims fail the second requirement.
Adamson. At issue is whether Adamson violated clearly established free-exercise law by
telling Ah he needed to request the vegan menu before requesting an alternative menu. A
sentence in prison, it is true, does not eliminate an individual’s constitutional protections. Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
But the “complex and intractable problems of prison
administration” require due consideration in applying constitutional guarantees.
Shaw v.
Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001) (quotation omitted). Only when a policy “singles out and
substantially burdens a prisoner’s sincere beliefs” do we ask if it serves a legitimate “penological
interest.” Cavin, 927 F.3d at 460. While prisoners have a right to “an adequate diet” consistent
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with their religious beliefs, Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation
omitted), an “isolated, intermittent, or otherwise de minimis” disruption of that diet does not
substantially burden that right, Mbonyunkiza v. Beasley, 956 F.3d 1048,1054 (8th Cir. 2020).
Adamson did not violate Ali’s clearly established free-exercise rights. He used his power
at the outset to help, not hinder, Ali by recommending him for vegan meals and by reporting that
Ali was “sincere in the practice of his faith.” R.33-7 at 2. In doing so, he noted that Ali
consistently “practic[ed] his faith” and “[a]ttend[ed] all” available services. R.33-7 at 2.
<
Ali also has not produced evidence that Adamson’s targeted action—requesting that Ali
receive approval for a vegan meal before seeking an alternative meal
sirigle[d] out and
substantially burden[ed]” his request to eat halal meat. Cavin, 927 F.3d at 460. This procedural
requirement at worst made Ali fill but two forms to request an alternative diet, not one. And
both requests made Ali confirm the same things: that a different menu was “necessary to the
practice of [his] designated religion,” R.33-3 at 7, and that his beliefs required him to avoid
haram meat and consume halal meat. Neither request forced Ali to choose between his faith and
his food.
Ali insists that Adamson’s recommendation, when combined with Leach’s denial,
deprived him of halal-compliant meals. But that argument would make Adamson liable for
Leach’s conduct. Section 1983 liability turns “only on” each officer’s “own unconstitutional
behavior.” Heyerman v. County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012). Adamson s
burden required only that Ali receive approval for a vegan meal first. If Leach wrongfully
denied that request, it was'he who violated Ali’s First Amendment right unless Adamson
“implicitly authorized, approved, dr knowingly acquiesced” in Leach’s denial. Hays v. Jefferson
County, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982). Adamson did not. He recommended Ali for the
vegan meal plan. Ali did not offer any evidence that the Deputy Director would have approved
his request for a custom diet had he asked. All in all, Adamson did not deprive Ali of the chance
to eat meals consistent with his faith.
, l
Leach. Leach also did not violate clearly established First Amendment principles by
denying Ali’s request for a vegan meal. Because Turner’s flexible test established the law for
Case: 24-1540
No. 24-1540
Document: 20-2
Filed: 03/28/2025
Page: 13
Ali v. Adamson et al.
Page 13
only obvious violations, we look for similarity “in light of the specific context of the case.”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Ali must identify published “on-point caselaw” at the
time of Leach’s 2017 denial with “facts similar enough that it squarely governs this one.” Moore
v. Oakland County, 126 F.4th 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted).
But Ali does not present any on-point precedent. Our cases hold that prison officials
must “provide an adequate diet” consistent with an inmate’s “religious dietary restrictions.”
Colvin, 605 F.3d at 290 (quotation omitted). Even in the more demanding context of RLUIPA,
zero-tolerance policies rescinding an inmate’s religious meal for “mere possession” of one noncomphant snack just “may be overly restrictive.” Id. at 296 (emphasis added). That statement
about a statute does not put every administrator on notice of free-exercise constitutional
requirements. In this context, our cases routinely permit officials to. withdraw prisoners from
religious meal plans if they find that a prisoner possessed or consumed food violating their stated
religious precepts. E.g., Berryman v. Granholm, 343 F. App’x 1, 6 (6th.Cir..2009); Russell v.
Wilkinson, 79 F. App x 175, 177 (6th Cir. 2003). (order). That explains why an official may
revoke an inmate’s pork-free dietary accommodation if he repeatedly purchases pork products
from the commissary. Miles v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-2218, 2020 WL 6121438, at *3 (6th
dfr. Aug. 20, 2020) (order).
,m
Ali suggests that Berryman and Russell, do not apply because they involved revocations
of religious-meal privileges already granted, not denials of religious-meal applications.
In
Michigan, he, adds, prisoners, receive a hearing and a second chance if officials catch them
violating their professed dietary restrictions. But a prison administrator still may reasonably
conclude that an applicant with myriad haram purchases does not have an authentic commitment
to a halal diet without violating clearly established freerexercise law. .
Ali insists that Leach denied his request for unreasonable reasons—and clearly violated
Turner in doing so—because other individuals attested that they had received approval for a
vegan diet despite having purchased non-halal foods. But no evidence shows that these inmates
purchased as many haram items as Ali did.
Case: 24-1540
No. 24-1540
Document: 20-2
Filed: 03/28/2025
Ali v. Adamson et al.
Page: 14
Page 14
The one case Ali presents—an unpublished order from 2021—does not help. See Ewing
v. Finco, No. 20-1012, slip op. at 5-6 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2021) (order). In addition to being nonprecedential, Ewing did not specify how many non-halal purchases those prisoners made
and
thus could not show whether those inmates’ actions fairly compare to Ali’s purchases of over a
hundred such meals in three months.
We dismiss this appeal in part and affirm in part.
Page 1 of 1
Ah v. Adamson, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 10646
© Neutral
As of: July 24, 2025 2:27 PM Z
Ali v. Adamson
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
May 1, 2025, Filed
No. 24-1540
Reporter
2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 10646 *; 2025 LX 16712; 2025 WL 1409094
decision of the case. The petition then was circulated to
FATHIREE UDDIN ALI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEPHEN
the full court. No judge has requested a vote on the
E. ADAMSON, Chaplain; DAVID M. LEACH, Special
suggestion for rehearing en banc.
Activities Coordinator; SHANE JACKSON, Warden;
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Therefore, the petition is denied.
Defendants-Appellees.
Prior History: AH v. Adamson, 132 F.4th 924, 2025
U.S. App. LEXIS 7205, 2025 WL 941291 (6th Cir, Mich,,
Mar. 28, 2025)
Core Terms
petition for rehearing, en banc
Counsel: [*1] For FATHIREE UDDIN ALI, PlaintiffAppellant: D Dangaran, Rights Behind Bars,
Washington, DC.
FATHIREE UDDIN ALI, Plaintiff-Appellant, Pro se,
Freeland, Ml.
For FATHIREE UDDIN ALI, Plaintiff - Appellant: Samuel
Weiss, Rights Behind Bars, Washington, DC.
For STEPHEN E. ADAMSON, Chaplain, DAVID M.
LEACH, Special Activities Coordinator, SHANE
JACKSON, Warden, Defendants - Appellees:
Christopher Alex, Office of the Attorney General,
Lansing, Ml.
Judges: BEFORE: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GRIFFIN
and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
ORDER
The court received a petition for rehearing en banc. The
original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing
and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were
fully considered upon the original submission and
End of Document
Case l:21-cv-00071-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PagelD.503 Filed 05/31/24 Page 1 of 6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
FATHIREE ALI,
Plaintiff,
Case No. l:21-cv-71
v.
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
STEVE ADAMSON, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________ I
ORDER
Plaintiff Fathiree Ali, a state prisoner, brought this civil action against several MDOC
employees. His complaint centered on the Michigan Department of Corrections’ (“MDOC”)
denial of his religious meal accommodation request. On December 12, 2023, Magistrate Judge
Phillip J. Green issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Court
grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 32) and dismiss the case. (ECF
No. 57.) On January 25, 2024, the Court adopted the R&R over Ali’s objections (ECF No. 65)
and entered judgment dismissing the case (ECF No. 68). Ali now seeks relief from this Court’s
order and judgment (ECF No. 71).
Ali submitted the present motion within 28 days of the entry of judgment, thus the Court
will construe his motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e). Ali presents several arguments for how the Court’s opinion erred. None is
persuasive.
Qualified Immunity. Defendant Leach denied Ali’s request for the vegan-based universal
religious meal because Ali had made conflicting commissary purchases prior to his application.
As discussed in the Court’s opinion, the Sixth Circuit had routinely upheld this approach at the
Case l:21-cv-00071-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PagelD.504 Filed 05/31/24 Page 2 of 6
time of the denial. (1/25/2024 Op. 8, ECF No. 64.) One unpublished opinion has since cast doubt
on this approach, Ewing v. Finco, Nos. 20-1012, 20-1022, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 182 (6th Cir.
Jan. 5, 2021), but that case was decided after the denial in this case. Thus, the Court granted Leach
qualified immunity based on the “clearly established” aspect of the analysis.
Ali argues that this conclusion was palpable error because both the Sixth Circuit and the
Supreme Court had clearly established that “zero-tolerance” policies are unconstitutional. He
primarily cites Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010) and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124 (2007) for his position. Both cases are inapposite. To quickly dispose of it, Gonzales dealt
with federal statutes regulating abortion procedures and is plainly irrelevant. Gonzales, 550 U.S.
at 132.
Colvin is more on-point. That case involved a prisoner who was automatically removed
from the religious meal program based on a one-time violation involving possession of noncompliant (non-kosher) protein powder. Colvin, 605 F.3d at 287. The court of appeals noted
“MDOC’s policy of removing a prisoner from the kosher-meal program for mere possession of a
nonkosher food item may be overly restrictive of inmates’ religious rights.” Id. at 296. First, the
plaintiff in Colvin differs from Ali in that he had already been approved for the religious meal plan.
Second, Colvin preceded cases in which the Sixth Circuit upheld consequences for purchasing
non-conforming items from the commissary both before and after approval of the meal
accommodation request. See, e.g., Miles v. Mich. Dep’t of Corrs., No. 19-2218, 2020 WL
6121438, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Aug. 20, 2020) (upholding denial of a religious meal accommodation
request because plaintiff had purchased non-conforming products from the commissary prior to
his request); Swansbrough v. Martin, No. 1:14-CV-1246,2017 WL 64917, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan.
6, 2017) (same); Ewing, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS at *8 (“There is no dispute that a prisoner, once
2
Case l:21-cv-00071-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PagelD.506 Filed 05/31/24 Page 4 of 6
interpretation. Conversely, the MDOC did make Ali aware of its definition of halal. There is no
factual dispute to resolve—a prisoner cannot complain of a denial of a religious accommodation
request when he did not make that request known.
Ali's Kite Request. One piece of evidence the Court considered when determining whether
Ali requested the standard vegan halal diet rather than a non-vegan halal diet was his religious
interview and kite. Here, the Court examined the language Ali used and determined “one could
reasonably conclude that a diet excluding non-compliant meat could be considered halal and could
conform with Ali’s request.” (Id.) Further, the Court noted Ali’s acknowledgment on his request
of MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 which clearly states that the religious meal being requested
was vegan.
Ali takes issue with the Court’s characterization of his kite as one attached to the religious
interview request and claims that the kite was instead submitted on September 17, 2017, days
before the interview which took place on September 25, 2017. It is unclear what impact this has
on the analysis. Regardless, the Court was merely pointing to the same evidence that Ali cited in
his objection to the R&R, which was labeled “Ali’s Kite Request (R.33-7, PgDD.196)” (Pl.’s Obj.s
to R&R 5, ECF No. 60). That document clearly shows a date of September 25, 2017 and was
accurately described in this Court’s opinion. There is no error to correct and, even if there were,
Ali has failed to explain how it would alter the analysis.
Request Conversion. The Court disagreed with Ali’s contention that Defendant Adamson,
who conducted the religious accommodation interview, improperly converted Ali’s request from
a halal diet to a vegan diet. It noted, “Properly framed ... Adamson did what Ali requested—he
recommended approval of the universal religious diet that Ali initially sought.” (1/25/2024 Op. 7.)
At the time, Ali had yet to present evidence to the contrary. He has no new evidence to present
4
‘ Case l:21-cv-00071-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PagelD.505 Filed 05/31/24 Page 3 of 6
approved for religious meals, is prohibited from possessing food items forbidden by the teaching
of the prisoner’s religion.”). These later conclusions by the Sixth Circuit more closely resemble
the instant case and thus have more bearing on the qualified immunity analysis.
Colvin is
insufficient to dislodge the Court’s qualified immunity conclusion.
Ali cites a few other cases in his qualified immunity section, but all suffer from similar
flaws. The Court’s qualified immunity conclusion stands.
Halal Definition Dispute. Both the magistrate judge and the Court concluded that Ali’s
request for a halal diet inclusive of halal meat—as opposed to a halal diet which could be satisfied
by the MDOC’s vegan-based universal religious diet—was raised for the first time in this lawsuit.
To that point, the Court noted:
Ali contends that “[tjhe record evidence demonstrates that [his] request was
specific, it was for a ‘halaal’ diet, not vegan diet.” (Pl.’s Objs. 5, ECF No. 60.) But
there appears to be a fundamental disagreement as to what is and is not halal. The
mDOC, and indeed other Muslims according to Ah (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. 4, ECF No. 53), interpret the universal religious diet offered by MDOC
as a halal diet. The universal religious diet also happens to be vegan, but vegan and
halal are not mutually exclusive. Conversely, Ali believes that a vegan diet and a
halal diet are mutually exclusive. The parties appear to have used the same term to
mean different things.
(1/25/2024 Op. 6.) The Court cited other aspects of the record which indicated that the MDOC
was reasonable in assuming that Ali was requesting the universal religious diet, not an alternative
religious diet (which has a separate approval process).
Ali contends that the disagreement as to the definition of halal is the sort of factual dispute
that must be decided by a jury. Not so. The Court need not define what is or is not halal. That is
immaterial to the outcome of this case. Rather, the Court was explaining where the parties’ wires
crossed. The MDOC interpreted Ali’s request as a request for a vegan diet. That interpretation
was reasonable based on the facts before it. That Ali has an idiosyncratic view of the definition
of halal is immaterial because the Court found that he did not make the MDOC aware of that
3
Case l:21-cv-00071-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PagelD.507 Filed 05/31/24 Page 5 of 6
today. Still, he disagrees with the result, arguing that the Court’s conclusion flows from its
improper crediting of the MDOC’s definition of halal rather than his own. Again, that is not what
the Court did. Adamson recommended approval of the vegan diet based on what Ali requested as
shown by the evidence. Ali offers argument—not evidence—to the contrary, and that argument is
unpersuasive.
Ali points to no legal error that warrants a different result; he merely rehashes the same
arguments he made initially. That is insufficient to obtain relief under Rule 59(e).
New Evidence. Ali’s complaint included an Equal Protection class-of-one claim. The
Court examined the affidavits Ali placed into evidence and concluded that he had “not provided
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that he is similarly situated to [the affiants] in all
relevant respects.” (1/25/2024 Op. 7.) Each affidavit featured some defect that precluded Ali from
establishing that he was similarly situated to the affiant. Ali now attempts to cure those defects by
attaching updating affidavits. It is too late to do so.
To consider new evidence at this stage, the evidence must be “newly discovered evidence,”
meaning that it “must have been previously unavailable.” GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int ’I Underwriters,
178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing the new evidence standard of Federal Rule 59(e))
(internal quotations omitted). The evidence must not have been discoverable through the exercise
of reasonable diligence. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) (courts apply the same standards to motions
under rules 59(e) and 60(b), see Wright, Miller, & Kane, Fed. Prac. & Proc.: Civ. § 2859 (3d)
(collecting cases))
*
Here, Ali submits updated affidavits from the same affiants he relied upon earlier, including
himself. He submits these affidavits in response to defects identified by this Court. But these
affidavits are not newly discovered evidence. A party cannot tweak evidence already submitted
5
Case l:21-cv-00071-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 77, PagelD.508 Filed 05/31/24 Page 6 of 6
to respond to the Court’s conclusions. It is axiomatic that these types of motions do not present a
losing party with an opportunity for a second bite at the apple.
Ali suggests that he should be granted leeway to submit these updated affidavits because
he is proceeding pro se. While it is true that Courts generally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings
more liberally, they are still “expected to know and follow the court’s rules.” Field v. Cnty. of
Lapeer, 238 F.3d 420, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (table). The Court cannot give Ali a second shot at
substantiating his claims merely because he is proceeding pro se. He may only present newly
discovered evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence; that is not the case here.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Ali’s motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 71), which this
Court construes as a motion to alter or amend the judgment, is DENIED.
Dated: May 31, 2024
/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6
Page 1 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228
Positive
Asof: July 29, 2025 1:51 PM Z
Ali v. Adamson
United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division
January 25, 2024, Decided; January 25, 2024, Filed
Case No. 1:21-cv-71
Reporter
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228 *; 2024 WL 277517
FATHIREE ALI, Plaintiff, v. STEVE ADAMSON, et al.,
Defendants.
Subsequent History: Reconsideration denied by Ali v.
Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist LEXIS 112115. 2024 WL
3107571 (W.D. Mich., May 31. 2024)
Affirmed by, in part, Appeal dismissed by, in part, As
moot Ali v. Adamson. 2025 U.S. Add. LEXIS 7205 (6th
Cir. Mich.. Mar. 28. 2025)
Prior History: Ali v. Adamson. 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
234310 (W.D. Mich., Dec. 12. 2023)
Core Terms
religious, diet, halal, magistrate judge, accommodation,
meal, recommended, vegan, universal, qualified
immunity, requests, objects, food, meat, deputy director,
discovery, notice, menu, summary judgment, questions,
kite
Counsel: [*1] Fathiree Ali #175762, plaintiff, Pro se,
Freeland, Ml USA.
For Steve Adamson, Chaplain, David Leach, Special
Activities Coordinator, Shane Jackson, Warden,
defendants: Jennifer Ann Foster, Ml Dept Attorney
General (MDOC), Lansing, Ml USA.
For Mediator, mediator: Philip A. Grashoff, Jr., LEAD
ATTORNEY, Smith Haughey Rice & Roegge PC (Grand
Rapids), Grand Rapids, Ml USA.
Judges: Hon. HALA Y. JARBOU, CHIEF UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Opinion by: HALA Y. JARBOU
Opinion
Plaintiff Fathiree Ali, a state prisoner, brings this civil
action under 42 U.S.C. 6 1983 and the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. $ 2000cc et sec., against several Michigan
Department of Corrections ("MDOC") employees.
Specifically, he claims that Defendants Steve Adamson,
David Leach, and Shane Jackson violated his First
Amendment Free Exercise right, his Fourteenth
Amendment right to Equal Protection, and RLUIPA
when they denied his request for a halal diet. Ali also
claims that Defendants' actions violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause.
On December 12, 2023, Magistrate Judge Phillip J.
Green issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R")
recommending that the Court grant Defendants' motion
for summary judgment (ECF No. 32) and dismiss the
case (ECF No. 57). Before the Court are Ali's objections
to the R&R (ECF No. 60).
I. STANDARD
Under Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
the district judge must determine de novo [*2] any
part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has
been properly objected to. The district judge may
accept, reject, or modify the recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
Proper objections require specificity. "The objections
must be clear enough to enable the district court to
discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious." Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.
1995). Vague, conclusory objections are insufficient, as
Page 2 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228
are mere restatements of a plaintiffs complaints. See id.
Because Ali is proceeding pro se, this Court will
construe his objections liberally. See Haines v. Kerner.
404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594. 30 L. Ed. 2d 652
(1972).
II. BACKGROUND
Ali is a devout Muslim whose faith requires him to
consume only "halal" food—food prepared in
accordance with Islamic law. The MDOC offers a
universal religious meal that is vegan, kosher, and halal.
If a prisoner believes this meal does not accommodate
his particular religious needs, he may request an
alternative religious menu. Both diets must be approved,
albeit by different people—the universal religious meal
must be approved by the Special Activities Coordinator
("SAC") while any alternative menu must be approved
by the MDOC Deputy Director.
To Ali, a halal [*3] diet is one that must include halal
meat; a vegetarian or vegan meal is insufficient, even
though it may be sufficient for other Muslims. In August
2017, Ali requested a religious meal accommodation.
Procedurally, Ali believed he first needed to request to
be put on the prison's universal religious diet program,
the diet approved by the SAC, Defendant Leach. He
believed he could then later request a separate
accommodation to include halal meat.
To process his religious meal accommodation request,
Defendant Adamson, the chaplain, first interviewed Ali
and administered a "faith-test." Adamson forwarded to
Leach his recommendation that Ali's request be granted
and that he be placed on the universal religious diet.
Leach reached a different conclusion and denied the
request. Leach asserts that he denied Ali's request
because Ali had purchased, prior to his religious
accommodation request, food from the prison
commissary that conflicted with the religious
accommodations he was requesting.
The magistrate judge recommended granting summary
judgment to each of the three remaining Defendants.
For Defendant Jackson, the magistrate judge concluded
that Ali failed to present any evidence of Jackson's [*4]
involvement in the events giving rise to the complaint.
For Defendant Adamson, the magistrate judge
concluded that Ali presented no evidence that Adamson
did anything to impede or deny the only request properly
before the court—the request for the universal religious
diet. Finally, for Defendant Leach, the magistrate judge
concluded that while Ali may have adduced sufficient
evidence to put into question whether Leach violated his
Free Exercise rights, Leach was nevertheless protected
by qualified immunity. The magistrate judge also
recommended that Leach be granted summary
judgment on Ali's remaining claims (RLUIPA, Equal
Protection, and Establishment Clause) because Leach
is an improper defendant under RLUIPA and Ali
produced no evidence that Leach treated him differently
than other similarly situated prisoners or otherwise
favored one religion over another.
III. ALI'S OBJECTIONS TO THE R&R
Ali lodges several objections to the R&R, some
generally applicable and some specific to Defendants
Adamson and Leach. Note, Ali makes no objection to
the R&R's recommendations related to Defendant
Jackson. For the reasons herein, the Court will overrule
each of Ali's objections.
A. General Case Management Objections [*5]
Ali first makes two broad objections related to some
case management aspects of this action, which he
styles "Argument 1." Several of the magistrate judge's
recommendations relate to Ali's failure to adduce
sufficient evidence despite a full and fair opportunity to
participate in discovery. Ali objects to this conclusion,
arguing that Defendants refused to participate in
discovery and withheld material evidence. Ali also
objects to an earlier ruling by the magistrate judge
denying Ali's motion to amend his complaint. Although
the objections are combined, the Court will address
them separately.
1. Discovery
Ali previously filed a motion to compel following the
close of discovery (ECF No. 31) which the magistrate
judge denied on October 12, 2023 (ECF No. 40). In his
objection to the R&R, Ali makes no new discoveryrelated arguments and points to no specific discovery
requests. Thus, the Court will construe his objection as
a motion for reconsideration of a nondispositive order
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).
Rule 72(a) requires Courts to review for clear error any
nondispositive order timely objected to. Fed R. Civ P.
72(a). To be timely, a party must object within fourteen
days after being served with a copy of the order. Id.
Even allowing [*6] for a liberal prison mailbox rule, the
Page 3 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228
time for Ali to file his objection has long passed. This
alone is sufficient reason to overrule Ali's objection. See,
e.g., Green v. Bel Hendersonville, LLC, No. 3:19-CV0833, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22580, 2020 WL 619842,
at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2020} (citing Pilgrim v.
Littlefield. 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) ("the lenient
treatment generally accorded pro se litigants has
limits"); Greer v. Home Realty Co. of Memphis, Inc., No.
2:07-CV-02639-SHM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142817,
2010 WL 6512339, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. July 12, 2010)
("Although district courts may liberally construe the
federal and local rules for pro se litigants, even pro se
litigants are obligated to follow these rules.")).
Regardless, Ali points to no clear error in the magistrate
judge's October 12, 2023 order that would warrant
modification. The magistrate judge concluded that Ali's
motion was untimely per the Case Management Order
("CMO") (EOF No. 23), that Ali failed to articulate good
cause for the delay, and that Ali failed to attach or
sufficiently describe the discovery requests in dispute,
as required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(b). Ali
clearly disagrees with the October 12, 2023 order, but
he offers no case law, evidence, or argument as to why
this Court should modify it. The Court thus declines to
do so.
2. Amendment
Ali filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint on
August 10, 2023 (ECF No. 29), eighty days after the
deadline set in the CMO. (See CMO
3.) The
magistrate judge denied this motion in his October [*7]
12, 2023 order, the same order in which he denied Ali's
motion to compel. Ali's objection to this portion of the
order fails for similar reasons.
First, Ali's objection is again untimely under Federal
Rule 72(a). Second, Ali identifies no clear error for
which the order should be disturbed. The magistrate
judge rejected Ali's motion to amend because Ali failed
to show good cause, as required by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16. The magistrate judge also
concluded that any amendment would be futile. In his
present objection, Ali addresses neither conclusion.
Thus, the Court will reject Ali's objection to the
magistrate judge's order denying his motion to amend
the complaint.
In summary, the Court will overrule both of Ali's general
objections.
B. Objections #2 and #3—Vegan vs. Halal
Accommodation
At bottom, Ali seeks in this action a religious diet
accommodation that includes halal meat. Defendants
contend that Ali made this request—a diet including
halal meat rather than the universal religious meal
diet—for the first time in this lawsuit. The magistrate
judge agreed. But Ali objects, arguing that his requests,
dating back to 2017, specifically requested his version
of a halal diet. Thus, Ali argues that Defendants
Adamson and Leach improperly [*8] "converted" his
request for a halal accommodation to a request for a
vegan accommodation. Ali labels these objections as
objections #2 and #3.
Ali contends that "[t]he record evidence demonstrates
that [his] request was specific, it was for a 'halaal' diet,
not vegan diet." (Pl.'s Objs. 5, ECF No. 60.) But there
appears to be a fundamental disagreement as to what is
and is not halal. The MDOC, and indeed other Muslims
according to Ali (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.
4, ECF No. 53), interpret the universal religious diet
offered by MDOC as a halal diet. The universal religious
diet also happens to be vegan, but vegan and halal are
not mutually exclusive. Conversely, Ali believes that a
vegan diet and a halal diet are mutually exclusive. The
parties appear to have used the same term to mean
different things.
Ali points specifically to his "kite" requesting a religious
meal accommodation as evidence clearly establishing
that he sought a non-vegan halal diet from the
beginning. (See generally Accommodation Interview
and Kite, ECF No. 33-7.) A review of the kite suggests
otherwise. In the religious meal interview questions
administered by Adamson and attached to the kite, Ali
repeatedly [*9] referred to a halal diet’s exclusion of
meat not "handled in accordance to Islamic tene[]ts."
(Id. at 3-4.) But nowhere did Ali refer to a halal diet as
one requiring compliant meat. In other words, based on
Ali's responses to Adamson's interview questions, one
could reasonably conclude that a diet excluding noncompliant meat could be considered halal and could
conform with Ali's request.
To remove any remaining doubt, the kite also
specifically included a declaration by Ali that he
understood the policies of the Religious Meal Program,
including Policy Directive ("PD") 05.03.150. This PD
provides that the MDOC "offers a vegan menu to meet
the religious dietary needs of prisoners" and that the
"Vegan menu shall comply with Kosher and Halal
religious tenets." (PD 05.03.150 IT OO, ECF No. 33-3.) It
Page 4 of 7
AH v. Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228
further states that "[a] prisoner who believes the Vegan
menu does not meet his/her religious dietary needs may
request an alternative menuj,]" which must be
"developed and provided only with approval of the
Deputy Director[.]" Id- Ali was thus on notice that the
accommodation he was seeking was defined as one
where vegan was not mutually exclusive with halal.
The evidence does not support Ali's [*10] contention
that Defendants Adamson and Leach improperly
converted Ali's request for a halal diet into a request for
a vegan diet. Instead, the evidence establishes that Ali
submitted a request for the MDOC's definition of a halal
diet—a diet that could also be vegan. Ali's objections #2
and #3 will thus be overruled.
C. Objection #1—Defendant Adamson's Approval of
Ali's Request
Ali makes one additional objection related to Defendant
Adamson. Properly framed, Ali's "Objection #1" related
to Adamson falls away. The magistrate judge concluded
that Adamson submitted sufficient evidence establishing
that Adamson recommended approval of Ali's request,
not denial. (Adamson Aff. If If 7-9, EOF No. 33-8.) Ali
objects to this conclusion, but his argument rests on
viewing Adamson's "conversion" of Ali's request as a
denial. In other words, to Ali, Adamson's nominal
recommendation that Ali's request for the universal
religious diet be approved did not cure the initial
violation of Adamson's "improper conversion." But this
Court disagrees with Ali's contention that Adamson
converted the request. Thus, Adamson did what Ali
requested—he recommended approval of the universal
religious diet that Ali initially [*11] sought. Without
evidence to the contrary, Ali's objection will be
overruled. Ali has failed to establish that Defendant
Adamson in any way impeded his religious
accommodation request, and thus summary judgment
for Adamson is appropriate.
The magistrate judge decided Ali's Free Exercise claim
against Leach on qualified immunity grounds. The Sixth
Circuit "follows a two-tiered inquiry to determine if an
officer is entitle to qualified immunity." Martin v. City of
Broadview Heights. 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). First, the court
"determine^] if the facts alleged make out a violation of
a constitutional right." Id. Second, the court "askfs] if the
right at issue was 'clearly established' when the event
occurred such that a reasonable officer would have
known that his conduct violated it." Id. A court may
resolve the two steps in any order. "If either one is not
satisfied, qualified immunity will shield [*12] the officer
from civil damages." Id.
Leach denied Ali's request for the universal religious
meal because Ali had purchased, prior to his
accommodation request, items from the commissary
that conflicted with his stated religious requirements. At
the time of Leach's denial, courts in the Sixth Circuit had
routinely upheld religious accommodation denials in
such circumstances. See, e.g., Miles v. Mich. Dep't of
Corrs., No. 19-2218, 2020 U.S. Add. LEXIS 26666.
2020 WL 6121438, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Aug. 20. 2020)
(finding no Free Exercise or RLUIPA violation where the
MDOC denied a prisoner's religious accommodation
request because he had purchased non-conforming
products from the commissary prior to his request);
Swansbrough v. Martin. No. 1:14-CV-1246, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2004, 2017 WL 64917, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Jan. 6, 2017) (same). However, the Sixth Circuit has
since cast doubt on this approach. In an unpublished
opinion, the Sixth Circuit noted, "there is no dispute that
a prisoner, once approved for religious meals, is
prohibited from possessing food items forbidden by the
teachings of the prisoner's religion," but questioned the
reasonableness of a denial where the prisoner "had yet
to seek approval for religious meals when they
purchased non-compliant food items." Ewing v. Finco,
Nos. 20-1012/20-1022, order at 5 (6th Cir. Jan. 5,
2021).
Ali makes two additional objections related to Leach.
Objection #4 relates to the magistrate judge's
conclusion that Leach is protected by qualified immunity
for Ali's Free Exercise claim. Objection #5 relates to Ali's
Equal Protection claim.
The magistrate judge did not reach a conclusion as to
whether Leach's alleged actions violated Ali's Free
Exercise rights; however, he concluded that even [*13]
if they did, Leach is nevertheless protected by qualified
immunity because his actions would not have been
considered violative at the time. In other words, Ali failed
at the "clearly established" step of the qualified immunity
analysis.
1. "Objection #4"—Qualified Immunity
Ali objects to this conclusion, arguing that "the law had
long been clearly established]." (Pl.'s Objs. 8.) To
D. Objections Related to Defendant Leach
Page 5 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228
support his objection, Ali cites several out-of-circuit
cases including Borkholder v. Lemmon. 983 F. Sudd. 2d
1013 (N.D. Ind. 2013); Reed v. Faulkner. 842 F.2d 960
(7th Cir, 1988); Vinning-EI v. Evans. 657 F.3d 591 (7th
Cir. 2011); and Isbell v. Ryan, No. CV 11-0391-PHXJAT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140469, 2011 WL 6050337
(D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2011). These cases are inapposite. As
the Sixth Circuit has observed, "our sister circuits'
precedents are usually irrelevant to the 'clearly
established' inquiry." Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d 798,
804 (6th Cir. 2020). An exception is made only for
"'extraordinary cases' where out-of-circuit decisions
'both point unmistakably to' a holding and are 'so clearly'
foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave
no doubt regarding that holding." Id. (quoting Ohio Civil
Serv. Emos. Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th
Cir. 1988)}.
Ali has failed to explain how this is the sort of
"extraordinary case" where out-of-circuit decisions are
relevant to the clearly established inquiry. Indeed, the
Sixth Circuit had approved of the MDOC's approach
until as recently as 2020. See Miles. 2020 U.S. Add.
LEXIS 26666, 2020 WL 6121438, at *2-3. Thus,
"applicable direct authority" at the time of Leach's
actions in October 2017 pointed in the opposite
direction—denying [*14]
a
religious
meal
accommodation request based on prior conflicting
purchases was not considered violative of a prisoner's
Free Exercise rights. Ali's qualified immunity objection
will thus be overruled.
2. "Objection #6"—Equal Protection
The magistrate judge found that Ali failed to present
evidence that Leach had granted other prisoners'
religious meal accommodation requests despite
conflicting food purchases or possessions. Thus, the
magistrate judge concluded that Ali has failed to
substantiate his "class-of-one" Equal Protection claim.
Ali objects, arguing that affidavits from other prisoners
demonstrate that Leach did treat Ali differently from
other similarly situated prisoners, i.e., Muslim prisoners
who were approved a religious diet despite prior
conflicting food purchases.
Ali points to two affidavits which he attached to his
summary judgment motion and asks this Court to take
judicial notice of three affidavits which were submitted
by the parties in the Ewing litigation. As an initial matter,
affidavits submitted as evidence in another case are not
the sort of facts which this Court may take judicial notice
of. Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also, e.g., Reaves v. Int'l
Paper Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, No. 07-2168
M1/P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47263, 2008 WL 2437574,
at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 13, 2008). The contents of these
affidavits are neither [*15] generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court nor capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot be questioned. Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)(1), (2). It may be appropriate for this Court to
take judicial notice of the fact that the affidavits were
filed, see Reaves. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47263, 2008
WL 2437574, at *2. but Ali is asking the Court to take
notice of the content of the affidavits. That is not an
appropriate application of Federal Rule of Evidence
201(b). Id. The Court thus declines to take judicial notice
of the Ewing affidavits.
For the two affidavits properly before this Court, only
one could potentially substantiate Ali's claim. First, Ali's
reliance on the affidavit of Johnny Jenkins is misplaced
because that affidavit does not relate to Leach. (Jenkins
Aff. fl 3, ECF No. 52-2.) A plaintiff in a $ 1983 suit must
prove "that each Government-official defendant, through
his own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). Thus, Ali cannot
use the affidavit of another prisoner whose request was
approved by another government official to show that
this particular prisoner, Ali, was treated differently by
this particular defendant, Leach.
That leaves the affidavit of Daw'ud ibn Clark. Unlike the
Jenkins affidavit, this affidavit [*16] does specifically
mention Leach. (Clark Aff. fl 8.) Clark's affidavit
indicates that he was eventually approved for the
universal religious diet, despite having previously
purchased non-conforming foods. (Id. fl 6.) But the
affidavit also indicates that Clark's request was initially
denied in 2014 and that it was only ultimately approved
after he reapplied in 2015. (Id. flfl 8-9.) The affidavit
offers no clues as to why Clark's initial request was
denied or when he purchased non-conforming foods.
But these are the critical questions that need to be
answered in order to evaluate Ali's class-of-one Equal
Protection claim. In other words, Ali has not provided
sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that he is
similarly situated to affiant Clark in all relevant respects.
See Tree of Life Christian Sch v. City of Upper
Arlington, 905 F.3d 357, 368 (6th Cir. 2018). As such,
Ali's equal protection objection will be overruled.
E. "Objection #5"—RLUIPA
Page 6 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228
A plaintiff can only obtain prospective relief under
RLUIPA. See Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 570
(6th Cir. 2014) ("RLUIPA does not permit money
damages against state prison officials!.]"); see also
Mitchell v. Schroeder, No. 2:21-CV-109, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16172, 2022 WL 263212, at *8-9 (W.D. Mich.
Jan. 28, 2022). Ali is seeking such prospective relief—
he seeks an order requiring Defendants to grant his
request for an alternative religious diet that includes
halal meat. However, the magistrate [*17] judge
concluded that Ali failed to name a proper defendant.
The proper defendants in an action for injunctive relief
"are the ones who have the power to provide the relief
sought, whether or not they were involved in the
allegedly illegal conduct at issue." Hall v. Trump, No.
3:19-07-00628, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38349, 2020 WL
1061885, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2020) (discussing
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L.
Ed. 714 (1908) and quoting Taafe v. Drake. No. 2:15CV-2870, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57397, 2016 WL
1713550, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 29, 2016)). Thus, the
R&R recommends dismissal of Aii's RLUIPA claim
because neither Leach, nor Adamson, nor Jackson has
the power to authorize Aii's requested relief—that relief
can only come from the MDOC Deputy Director. (See
PD 05.03.1501100.)
Ali objects, arguing that this policy "is not set in stone"
and that it is "arbitrarily enforced" based on three cases,
Spearman v. Mich., No 1:18-07-463, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 85163, 2018 WL 2315786 (W.D. Mich. May 22,
2018); Drum v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 2-15-0700109, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80255, 2019 WL 2076996
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2019); and Martin v. McKee, No
2:18-07-00066, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105635, 2020
WL 3259524 (W.D. Mich. May 26, 2020). None is
convincing. In Spearman, for example, the plaintiff
submitted religious accommodation requests directly to
the MDOC Deputy Director without going through lowerlevel prison officials first. Spearman, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 85163, 2018 WL 2315786, at *4. The requests
were denied, in part because the plaintiff should have
sent his request to the warden first. Id.
Ali takes this to mean that the warden had the power to
approve the plaintiffs request, and thus that the MDOC
policy requiring deputy director approval is selectively
enforced. Ali is mistaken. An administrative process that
involves lower-level [*18] employees screening a
request before sending it on to the ultimate decision
maker is unremarkable. It certainly does not mean that
lower-level employees have the decision-making
authority within the meaning of the MDOC policy. In fact,
the plaintiff in Spearman did what Ali failed to do—he
named both the lower-level employees involved in
screening other requests and the Deputy Director who
had ultimate authority to issue the relief he sought. Id. at
*1.
Aii's other cited cases suffer from similar flaws. They
also involve suits naming the Deputy Director and thus
do not involve the incorrect defendant issue Ali faces
here. Aii's objection as to his RLUIPA claim will be
overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
None of Aii's objections convince this Court to reach a
different conclusion than that reached by the magistrate
judge. This Court also agrees with the portions of the
R&R that Ali did not object to. To summarize, Ali has
failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as
to his Free Exercise, Establishment Clause, and Equal
Protection claims against all remaining Defendants. He
has also failed to name a proper defendant for his
RLUIPA claim. As such, the Court will grant Defendants'
summary judgment motion and terminate the [*19]
case.
An order will enter consistent with this Opinion.
Dated: January 25, 2024
Isl Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion entered this date:
IT IS ORDERED that the report and recommendation
("R&R") of the magistrate judge (ECF No. 57) is
APPROVED and ADOPTED as the opinion of the
Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all of Plaintiffs
remaining claims are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to
certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
Page 7 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228
Because all claims have been dismissed, the Court will
enter a judgment consistent with this Order dismissing
the case.
Dated: January 25, 2024
Is/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
End of Document
Page 1 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310
5? Positive
As of: July 24, 2025 2:20 PM Z
Ali v. Adamson
United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Southern Division
December 12, 2023, Decided; December 12, 2023, Filed
Case No. 1:21-cv-71
Reporter
2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310 *
FATHIREE ALp #175762, Plaintiff, v. STEVE
ADAMSON, et al., Defendants.
Subsequent History: Adopted by, Objection overruled
by, Summary judgment granted by, Dismissed by Ali v.
Adamson. 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13228 (W.D. Mich.,
Jan. 25, 2024)
Prior History: Ali v. Adamson, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
60535, 2021 WL 1186229 (W.D. Mich., Mar. 30, 2021)
Core Terms
religious, recommends, vegan, accommodation, meals,
diet, summary judgment, alleges, halal, menu,
undersigned, food, religion, inmates, constitutional right,
requests, non-moving, violates, rights, summary
judgment motion, equal protection claim, penological
interest, injunctive relief, religious belief, regulation,
approve
Counsel: [*1] Fathiree Ali #175762, plaintiff, Pro se,
Freeland, Ml USA.
For Steve Adamson, Chaplain, David Leach, Special
Activities Coordinator, Shane Jackson, Warden,
defendants: Jennifer Ann Foster, Ml Dept Attorney
General (MDOC), Lansing, Ml USA.
For Mediator, mediator: Philip A. Grashoff, Jr., LEAD
ATTORNEY, Smith Haughey Rice & Roegge PC (Grand
Rapids), Grand Rapids, Ml USA.
Judges: PHILLIP J. GREEN, United States Magistrate
Judge. Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou.
Opinion by: PHILLIP J. GREEN
Opinion
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 32). Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Defendants' motion be granted and this action
terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Saginaw
Correctional Facility (SRF). The events giving rise to this
action occurred at the Carson City Correctional Facility
(DRF). Plaintiff initiated this action against DRF
Chaplain Steve Adamson, MDOC Special Activities
Coordinator David Leach, DRF Warden Shane Jackson,
and the MDOC. In his complaint (ECF No. 1) Plaintiff
alleges the following.
Plaintiff is a devout Muslim whose faith obligates him to
abstain from eating [*2] food that is not prepared in
accordance with Islamic law. Plaintiff must, therefore,
consume only "halal" foods. Moreover, a vegetarian or
vegan diet is insufficient as Plaintiffs diet must include
halal meat and dairy products. In August 2017, Plaintiff
submitted a request to receive a halal diet. On
September 25, 2017, Defendant Adamson interviewed
Plaintiff and administered a "faith test." Adamson
subsequently forwarded his recommendation on the
matter to Defendant Leach. Plaintiffs request for a halal
diet was denied in October 2017.
Plaintiff alleges that the decision to deny his request for
a halal diet: (1) violates his First Amendment right to
freely exercise his religion; (2) violates the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause', (3) violates the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
Page 2 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310
(RLUIPA); and (4) violates his right to the equal
protection of the laws. Plaintiffs claims against the
MDOC were dismissed on screening. (ECF No. 7-8).
Defendants Adamson, Leach, and Jackson now move
for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded to
Defendants' motion. The Court finds that oral argument
is unnecessary. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
burden of proof at trial." Daniels, 396 E3d at 735.
Stated differently, the "ultimate question is whether the
evidence presents a sufficient factual disagreement to
require submission of the case to the jury, or whether
the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties
should prevail as a matter of law." Harden, 993 F.3d at
474.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment "shall" be granted "if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute [*3] as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Whether a fact is
"material" depends on "whether its resolution might
affect the outcome of the case." Harden v. Hillman, 993
F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its
burden by demonstrating that the non-moving party,
"having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no
evidence to support an essential element of his or her
case." Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F3d 751, 761 (6th
Cir 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing,
the non-moving party "must identify specific facts that
can be established by admissible evidence, which
demonstrate a genuine issue for trial." Amini v. Oberlin
College, 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006). The
existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
the non-moving party s position, however, is insufficient.
Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir.
2005).
'
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, that party "must do
more than simply show that there is Some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." Amini, 440 F.3d at 357.
The non-moving party "may not rest upon [his] mere
allegations," but must instead present "significant
probative evidence" establishing that "there is a genuine
issue for trial." Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810,
813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party
cannot merely "recite the incantation, credibility, and
have a trial [*4] on the hope that a jury may disbelieve
factually uncontested proof." Fogerty v. MGM Group
Holdings Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir.
2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate "against
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party s case, and on which that party will bear the
I. Defendant Jackson
In his complaint, Plaintiff specifically references
Defendant Jackson in the caption and in the section
identifying the parties. (E.CF No. 1). Defendant Jackson
is not identified anywhere else in Plaintiffs complaint
and no factual allegations are advanced against him
specifically. Instead, Plaintiff repeatedly alleges in his
complaint that "the defendants" took, or failed to take,
some particular action. As Defendant Jackson argues,
however, such allegations are insufficient to maintain a
claim against him.
To sustain a claim against Jackson, Plaintiff must allege
and demonstrate that Jackson took [*5] some action
that violated his rights. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009) ("each government official. . .is only liable for his
or her misconduct"). Vague allegations of "collective
wrongdoing" do not suffice. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Grayson County, Kentucky, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
214465, 2022 WL 17327308 at *4 (W.D. Ky, Nov. 29,
2022) ("[t]o avoid dismissal of a claim, a plaintiff must
allege, With particularity, facts that demonstrate what
each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional
right") (citations omitted); Baytops v. Slominski, 2023
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134115, 2023 WL 5822760 at *3 (ED.
Mich., June 30, 2023) ("[section] 1983 plaintiffs may not
lump all defendants together in each claim and provide
no factual basis to distinguish their conduct"); Collins v.
Godbee, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156601, 2019 WL
4393550 at *3 (ED. Mich., Sept. 13, 2019) (same).
Despite having had the opportunity to conduct
discovery, Plaintiff has failed to present or identify any
evidence that Defendant Jackson was involved in the
conduct giving rise to his claims. Accordingly, the
undersigned recommends that Defendant Jackson's
motion for summary judgment be granted.
II. Defendant Adamson
Page 3 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310
With respect to Defendant Adamson, the only specific
allegation Plaintiff advances is that, after submitting his
request for a halal diet, Adamson "interviewed [Plaintiff],
administered a 'faith test' and submitted his
recommendation [to] Defendant Leach." (ECF No. 1 at
PagelD.4). Plaintiff does not allege whether Adamson
recommended that his request be [*6] granted or
denied, however.
In support of his motion for summary judgment,
Defendant
Adamson
has
presented
evidence
establishing that (1) he was not authorized to approve or
deny Plaintiffs request but instead could only make a
recommendation regarding such, and (2) that he
recommended to Defendant Leach that Plaintiffs
request for a special religious diet accommodation be
granted. (ECF No. 33 at PagelD.191-201). Plaintiff has
presented no evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff instead
argues' that Defendant Adamson denied or impeded
other requests
he
made for religious diet
accommodations. (ECF No. 53). But Plaintiff has not
asserted in his complaint any claims related to these
alleged subsequent events. The only claims properly
before the Court relate to Plaintiffs August 2017 request
for a religious diet accommodation. With respect to
these events, Defendant Adamson is entitled to
summaryjudgment because Plaintiff has presented no
evidence that Adamson did anything to deny or impede
his* request . for accommodation. Accordingly, the
unldefeigried 'recommends that Defendant Adamson's
■m'otiorFfor summary judgment be granted. -
III. Defendant Leach-
Ackerman v. Washington, 16 F.4th 170, 176 (6th Cir.
2021). These "universal .religious meals" are vegan as
well as kosher and halal. Ackerman, 16 F.4th at 176
(recognizing that the MDOC's vegan meals are kosher);
Al-Shimary v. Dirschell, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147296,
2023 WL 5385414 at *3 (ED. Mich., Aug. 22, 2023)
(recognizing that the MDOC's vegan meals are halal).
Pursuant to the Policy Directive in effect during the time
period relevant to this action, a prisoner was permitted
to receive the MDOC's vegan meal "only with approval
of the CFA Special Activities Coordinator." MDOC Policy
Directive [*8] 05.03.150 fl PP (eff. Sept. 15, 2015).
During the time period relevant here, Defendant Leach
was the Special Activities Coordinator. (ECF No. 33 at
PagelD.203). If a prisoner believes that the vegan meal
option does not meet his religious needs, he can
request an "alternative" religious menu, but any such
request must be approved by the MDOC Deputy
■Director. MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 fl OO (eff.
Sept. 15, 2015)..
.5
On or about September 25, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a
request for a "religious meal" accommodation. (ECF No.
33 at PagelD 191-96). Defendants Adamson and Leach
interpreted Plaintiffs request as a desire to. receive the
.MDOC's vegan m,eal. (ECF No. 33 at.PagelD. 174-77,
198-201). Accordingly, Plaintiffs, request was .ultimately
decided.- by Defendant Leach not the MDOC Deputy
Director. In his response td’the present motion, Plaintiff
indicates that he understood that securing access to the
MDOC's vegan menu was a necessary prerequisite to
obtaining an "alternative" religious menu which was his
ultimate desire. (ECF No. 53 at PagelD.297, 315). Thus,
Plaintiff did not initiate the present action seeking
approval to receive the MDOC's vegan menu. Instead,
Plaintiff is , seeking an [?9] "alternative" religious,,diet.
Specifically, Plaintiff is requesting that the Court enter
an order "requiring defendant to approve" his request to
receive< halal, meals,. which include meat and . dairy
products. (ECF.Isio.. 33. at PagelD.187; ECF No, .53 at
PagelD.293-94).' •
Plaintiff alleges that Leach denied his request [*7] -for
religious diet accommodation. Plaintiff alleges that
Leach's action violated (1) his F/rsf Amendment right .to
freely;, exercise his religion; (2) the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause; (3) the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); and (4) his right
to the equal protection of the laws. Defendant Leach
does not dispute that he denied Plaintiffs request, but B.FreeExercise
asserts that he did so because Plaintiff was purchasing
from the prison commissary certain foods that As- the ‘ Supreme Court has observed, "convicted
"conflicted with [Plaintiffs] adamantly professed prisoners do .not forfeit all constitutional protections by
religious dietary needs." (ECF No. 33 at PagelD.176).
.reason of their conviction and confinement in prison."
Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L.
A. Plaintiffs Claim
Ed. 2d 447 (1979); see also, Turnery. Safley, 482 U.S.
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify the relief Plaintiff 78, 84, 107 S: Ct: 2254, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987)
is seeking in this court. To accommodate prisoners' ("[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison
religious beliefs, the MDOC "serves a universal religious inmates from the protections of the Constitution"). Thus,
diet to all prisoners with religious dietary needs." while "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary
Page 4 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,"
inmates nevertheless retain the First Amendment
protection to freely exercise their religion. See O'Lone v.
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 96 L. Ed.
2d 282 (1987).
To demonstrate that his right to freely practice his
religion has been violated, Plaintiff must establish that:
(1) the belief or practice he seeks to protect is religious
within his own "scheme of things," (2) his belief is
sincerely held, and. (3) Defendant's behavior infringes
upon his practice or belief. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d
1220, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1987): see also, Flaqner v.
Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (same).
Even if Plaintiff makes this showing, such does not end
the analysis because the fact that "prison inmates
retain [*10] certain constitutional rights does not mean
that these rights are not subject to restrictions and
limitations." Wolfish, 441 U.S, at 545: see also, Arauz v.
Bell, 307 Fed: Appx. 923, 928 (6th Cir., Jan. 22, 2009)
(even if a prisoner demonstrates a,violation of his First
Amendment rights, the defendant is entitled to relief if
his action is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests).
.
Operating a prison is a difficult task requiring "expertise,
planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which
are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of government." Turner, 482 U.S, at
85. Accordingly, courts have consistently held, that
issues involving "the adoption and execution of policies
and practices that in [the] judgment [of prison officials]
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and
to maintain institutional security" in most circumstances
"should be accorded wide-ranging deference." Flaqner
v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Wolfish, 441 U.S, at 547): see also, Bazzetta v.
McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774, 779 (6th Cir. 1997) (issues
involving prison administration are properly resolved by
prison officials, and the solutions-at which-they arrive
should be accorded' deference).
'
When reviewing an inmate's claim of constitutional
violation, courts must balance this policy of judicial
restraint with the need to protect inmates' constitutional
rights. See Turner, 482 U.S, at 85. The standard
by [*11] which this balancing occurs was articulated by
the Turner Court, which held that "when a prison
regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests." Id.. . at 89. This standard
represents a "reasonableness test less restrictive than
that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of
fundamental constitutional rights." Flaqner, 241 F.3d at
481 (quoting Shabazz, 482 U.S, at 349). The Turner
Court identified four factors . that are relevant in
determining the reasonableness of a challenged prison
regulation:
1. there must be a valid, rational connection
between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it;
2. whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain, open to prison
inmates;
3. the impact that accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources
generally; and
4. whether there are ready alternatives available
that fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests.
Turner, 482 U.S, at 89-91.
Failure to satisfy the first factor renders the regulation
unconstitutional, without regard to the remaining three
factors. [*12] If the first factor is satisfied, the remaining
three factors are considered and balanced together;
however, they are "not necessarily weighed evenly," but
instead represent "guidelines" by which the court can
assess whether the actions at issue are reasonably
related to a legitimate penological interest. It should
further be noted that the Turner standard is not:a "least
restrictive alternative" test requiring prison officials "to
set up and then shoot down every conceivable
alternative method of accommodating the claimant's
constitutional complaint." Instead, the issue is simply
whether the policy at issue is reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest. Flaqner, 241 F.3d at 484.
As of the time period relevant in this action, the MDOC
offered "a vegan menu to meet the religious dietary
needs of prisoners." MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.150 fl
00 (eff. Sept. 15, 2015). Prisoners were required to
obtain approval from the Special Activities Coordinator
to access the vegan menu, however. Id. at fl PP. MDOC
policy provided that such approval "shall be granted only
if it is necessary to the practice of the prisoner's
designated religion, including the prisoner's sincerely
held religious beliefs." Id. MDOC policy [*13] further
provided that a prisoner, once approved to "eat meals
prepared from the religious menu," shall not possess or
consume "food that violates a tenet., of his/her
designated religion." Id. at fl SS.
MDOC policy did not, however,, require prisoners to
Ali v. Adamson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310
abstain from foods that violate their religious beliefs
prior to requesting access to the vegan menu.
Nonetheless, the MDOC for many years interpreted its
policies as incorporating this requirement. Thus,
requests for access to the vegan menu or similar
accommodation were ‘routinely denied on the ground
that the prisoner, prior to making such request, had
eaten or possessed food which was contrary to their
stated religious beliefs. Moreover, courts routinely
concluded that such action did not violate the prisoner's
First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Swansbrough v.
Martin. 2017 U.S Dist. LEXIS 2004, 2017 WL 64917
(W.D. Mich., Jan. 6, 2017); Miles v. Michigan
Department of Corrections, 2020 U.S. App: LEXIS
26666, 2020 WL 6121438 at *2-3 (6th Cir.; Aug 20,
2020).
In 2021, however, the Sixth Circuit, in an unpublished
decision, rejected this approach. See Ewing v. Finco,
case no. 20-1012/1022, Order (6th Cir., Jan. 5, 2021). In
Ewing, the defendants took the same action that is
presently being challenged. Specifically, the defendants
denied a prisoner's request to receive vegan meals on
the ground that the-prisoner, prior to making his request,
purchased and/or consumed food items inconsistent
with his stated religious beliefs. Id. at 1-2. [*14] The
district court granted summary judgment to: the
defendants. Id. at;2. The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected
this conclusion, observing that "[tjhe cases upon .which
the?defendants and the district court relied. . .involved
situations where the prisoner, after receiving approval
for religious meals, purchased or possessed food .items
inconsistent with the prisoner's claimed dietary
restrictions and was then removed from the religious
meal program." Id: at 5. While the viability of the
approach employed in this matter has now been called
into question, Defendant Leach argues that, even if his
actions are how considered improper;, such was not
clearly established when he denied Plaintiffs request to
eat from the vegan menu. As such, Defendant argues
that he is entitled to qualified immunity. The
undersigned agrees.
The doctrine of qualified immunity recognizes that
government officials must be able to carry out their
duties without fear of litigation. See Davis v. Scherer,
468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S. Ct. 3012, 82 L. Ed. 2d 139
(1984). They can do so only if they reasonably can
anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for
damages and if unjustified lawsuits are quickly
terminated. Ibid. When government officials perform
discretionary functions, they [*15] are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct.
2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982); see also, Behrens v.
Pelletier. 516 U.S. 299, 301, 116 S. Ct. 834, 133 L. Ed.
2d 773 (1996).
For a right to be clearly established there must exist
"binding precedent from the Supreme Court, the Sixth
Circuit, the district court itself, or other circuits that is
directly on point." Wenk v. O'Reilly, 783 F.3d 585, 598
(6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Court decisions
examining matters at a "high level of generality" do not
constitute clearly established law because such "avoids
the crucial question whether the official acted
reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or
she faced." Ibid, (citation omitted). The plaintiff need not
locate authority in which "the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful," but "in light of pre
existing law the unlawfulness [of the defendant's
actions] must be apparent." Ibid, (citation omitted). This
does not require the plaintiff to identify, "a case directly
on point, but,existing precedent must have placed the
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate."
Ashcroft v. al- Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S. Ct. 2074,
179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011).
,
O
Because Defendant has asserted a viable claim , to
qualified immunity, the burden shifts to Plaintiff "to [*16]
demonstrate both that the challenged conduct violated a
constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was-so
clearly established at the time of. the conduct 'that every
reasonable, official would have understood that what he
[was] doing violate[d] that right.'" T.S: v. Doe, 742 F.3d
632, 635 (6th: Cir. .2014) (quoting al- Kidd, 563 U.S, at
741).
Plaintiff has failed to identify any authority holding, or
even-suggesting, that the approach employed by
Defendant Leach in,this case was considered improper
or unlawful as of the date Leachi.acted.- Likewise, the
Court has identified no such authority. To the contrary,
as recently as 2020, both this Court and the Sixth Circuit
continued to approve of the approach employed by
Defendant Leach in this matter. See Miles v. Michigan
Department of Corrections, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS
26666, 2020 WL 6121438 at *2-3 (6th Cir., Aug. 20,
2020); O'Connor v. Leach, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79559, 2020. WL 2187814 at *1 (W.D. Mich., May 6,
2020). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that
Defendant Leach is entitled to qualified immunity as to
Plaintiffs First Amendment Free Exercise claim.
C. RLUIPA
Page 6 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310
RLUIPA prohibits any government from imposing a
"substantial burden on the religious exercise" of a
prisoner, unless such burden constitutes the least
restrictive
means
of furthering
a compelling
governmental interest. 42 UCC^§2000cc2l(a}.
RLUIPA does not define the phrase "substantial
burden." The Sixth Circuit, however, has concluded that
the phrase "has the same meaning under [*17] RLUIPA
as provided by the Supreme Court in its 'free exercise'
decisions." Mitchell v. Schroeder, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16172, 2022 WL 263212 at *4-5 (W.D. Mich., Jan. 28,
2022) (citations omitted). Accordingly, a burden is
substantial "where it forces an individual to choose
between the tenets of his religion and foregoing
governmental benefits or places substantial pressure on
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs." 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16172, [WL] at *5
(citations omitted). Likewise, a burden is less than
"substantial" where it imposes merely an "inconvenience
on religious exercise." Ibid, (citations omitted). The
Court need not decide whether Defendant Leach's
actions imposed a substantial burden on Plaintiffs
religious exercise because Plaintiff has failed to assert
this action against any defendant who can provide the
relief he seeks.
Under RLUIPA, Plaintiff can only obtain injunctive relief.
See Mitchell, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16172, 2022 WL
263212 at *8-9. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief in this
case, specifically an order requiring "defendant" to grant
his request for an "alternative" religious diet that
includes halal meat and dairy products. As noted above,
however, none of the defendants in this action possess
the authority to approve such a request. Only the MDOC
Deputy Director possesses the authority to approve the
specific
accommodation [*18]
Plaintiff requests.
Because Plaintiff has failed to assert this action against
a defendant with the authority to grant the specific relief
he requests, Defendant Leach is entitled to relief. See,
e.g., Hall v. Trump. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38349, 2020
WL 1061885 at *3-5 (M.D. Tenn., Mar. 5, 2020) (to
obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must bring an action
against an individual "who ha[s] the power to provide the
relief sought"); Walker v. Scott, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
122467, 2015 WL 5450497 at *4 (C.D. III., Sept. 15,
2015) ("[a]s injunctive relief is the sole remedy available
to a plaintiff under RLUIPA, the proper defendants are
those with the responsibility to ensure that such relief is
carried out"); Wolf v. Tewalt, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53471, 2021 WL 1093089 at *5 (D. Idaho, Mar. 22,
2021) (prisoner's RLUIPA claims dismissed as to
defendants lacking the authority to grant the injunctive
relief requested). Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends that Defendant Leach is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs RLUIPA claim.
D. Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
prohibits "the enactment of any law 'respecting an
establishment of religion.'" Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d 1076,
1084 (6th Cir. 2019). Thus, "one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another." Ibid.
(citation omitted). An official violates the Establishment
Clause when he "confers a privileged status on any
particular religious sect or singles out a bona fide faith
for disadvantageous treatment." Ibid. While Plaintiff has
presented evidence that Defendant Leach took
action [*19]
that arguably ' "disadvantaged"’ him
personally, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that
Defendant Leach took action that preferred or
disadvantaged one religious denomination over another,
a failure that is fatal to his claim. See, e.g., Rains v.
Wash., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63179, 2020 WL
1815839 at (W.D. Mich., Apr. 10, 2020). Accordingly,
the undersigned recommends that Defendant Leach is
entitled
to
summary judgment
on
Plaintiffs
Establishment Clause claim.
.
E. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution '.provides
that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const,
amend. XIV, § 1. To state an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff "must adequately plead that the government
treated the plaintiff disparately as compared to similarly
situated persons and that such disparate treatment
either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect
class, or has no rational basis." Center for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc, v. Napolitano, 648 R3d 365, 379 (6th Cir.
2011). The Supreme Court has also recognized what is
referred to as a "class-of-one" equal protection claims in
which the plaintiff does not allege membership in a
particular class or group, but instead alleges that he
"has been intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment." Davis v. Prison Health
Services, 679 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiffs Equal Protection claim fails because he has
failed [*20] to demonstrate that he has been treated
differently from other similarly situated prisoners.
Specifically, Plaintiff has not presented evidence that
other
prisoners'
requests
for religious
meal
accommodation were granted by Defendant Leach
Page 7 of 7
Ali v. Adamson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234310
despite having purchased or possessed foods which
violated their stated religious requirements. See Rains,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63179, 2020 WL 1815839 at *1314 (an equal protection claim fails absent evidence that
the plaintiff was treated differently to others who are
similarly situated "in all relevant respects"). Accordingly,
the undersigned recommends that as to Plaintiffs Equal
Protection Claim, Defendant Leach is entitled to
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned
recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No.. 32) be granted and this action
terminated.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation
must be filed with the. Clerk of Court within fourteen
days of the date of service of this notice. 28 US.C. ■$
636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the
specified time waives the right to appeal the District
Court s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.
Ct. 466, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1985)-, United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Isl Phillip J,. Green
...
p
i ■)' I ■
;
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate. Judge
Date: December'12, 2023
End of Document
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.