Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Anthony E. Ntamere, Petitioner v. Amerihealth Administrators, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 2, 2025

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SEP 02 2025

no.-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Anthony E. Ntamere,

Petitioners,

AmeriHealth Administrators, Inc' Jane Doe, in her individual and official

capacity, also known as AHA-000252; Michele Schumacher, in her individual

and official capacity; Minnesota Department of Human Rights: U.S. Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission' Charlotte Czarnecki, in her individual

and official capacity; Independence Blue Cross of P.A.; John Clayton, in his

individual and official capacity; Jeffrey Kearns, in his individual and official

capacity; Tashima Waller, m her individual and official capacity; Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission; Keith M. Ellison, in his official capacity

as Minnesota Attorney General; Rebecca Lucero, in her official capacity as

Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Right; Tom Bemette, in

his official capacity as Lead Investigatoryf the Minnesota Department of Human

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Anthony E. Ntamere

Proceeding Pro se

179 McKmght Road North

Suite 309

St. Paul, Minnesota 55119

Ph: 612-237-8229

antamere@outlook.com

SEP - 8 203S

QUESTIONS PRESENTED1

I. Cause of Action as Property Right Under the Fourteenth

Amendment

Whether a state-created statutory right to file discrimination charges and

receive notice of their disposition, which constitutes a cause of action recognized as

a property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment as discussed in Logan u.

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, protect against intentional interference by

federal and state officials—such as overriding EEOC regulations, misfiling charges,

or withholding required notices—that deprive claimants of access to local

adjudication and judicial review, thereby violating procedural due process and the

protections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, especially when such actions result in

the exclusion of similarly situated individuals from statutory grievance processes

and undermine the constitutional requirement that all such individuals be treated

equally

II. Color of Law and Federal-State Collusion

- Whether, consistent with the pleading standards articulated in Gomez v.

Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, and Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, and the

federal-state actor analysis set forth in Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742—43, a

plaintiff states a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985—and establishes the

necessary “symbiotic relationship” for federal officials to be considered state

actors—by alleging that federal and state officials conspired to intentionally

1 To prevent a later improvidently granted dismissal, I have listed these numerous questions to

secure my right to jury trial. See Stanley v. City of Sanford, Fla., 145 S. Ct. 2058 (2025)

obstruct access to state statutory remedies for employment discrimination,

including the misfiling of charges, denial of statutory grievance procedures,

withholding of mandatory notice, and thereby depriving the plaintiff of protected

property interests, equal protection, and due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment—and whether such conduct may fairly be attributed to the state for

purposes of constitutional review.

III. Heighten the Pleading Standard and Violation of Rule 12(d): Failure

to Convert to Summary Judgment

Whether, in fight of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema

N.A., Johnson v. City of Shelby, Erickson v. Pardus, federal courts may dismiss

employment discrimination claims at the pleading stage by requiring factual

allegations that exceed the notice standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2), effectively mandating plaintiffs to plead a prima facie case under the

McDonnell Douglas framework and applying heightened plausibility standards,

notwithstanding the Court’s explicit rejection of heightened pleading standards and

in potential violation of the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury,

thereby deepening a circuit split, disproportionately burdening pro se litigants, and

undermining access to judicial review.

IV. Individual Immunity Under § 1981

Whether management-level human resources personnel (or any employee)

and their subordinates, may be held individually liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for

purposeful, intentional discrimination, and, if so, whether a plaintiff must plead

detailed evidence of discriminatory intent or whether allegations of personal

involvement and animus suffice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and

Swierkiewicz; and whether inconsistent pleading standards and the absence of

controlling appellate precedent in the Eighth Circuit warrant review to resolve the

deepening circuit split and to ensure equal access to judicial remedies pursuant to

the Fourteenth Amendment.

V. Threshold question regarding pleading requirement to establish

specific personal jurisdiction in an out-of-state employment case

Whether out-of-state corporate officials who repeatedly enter a forum state to

conduct mandatory training and enforce disciplinary policy against a forum-based

employee have sufficient minimum contacts to support personal jurisdiction under

the Due Process Clause and Minnesota’s long-arm statute.

VI. Constitutionality of Eighth Circuit Rule 47A(a)

Whether the Eighth Circuit’s application of Rule 47A(a) to summarily dismiss

the petitioner’s claims without citation to any standard of review violates

constitutional guarantees of due process and access to judicial review.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court of Minnesota

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs, Inc., No. 22-CV-2682, 2023 WL 8378532

(D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2023), Report and Recommendations adopted [ECF No. 8]

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682, 2023 WL 7545511

(D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2023), Order adopting R&R [ECF No. 58]

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm 'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682, 2023 WL 7678018

(D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2023), MTD Order [ECF No. 59] vacated Nov. 16, 2023

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682, 2023 WL 8627759

(D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2023), Order on “restricted Leave to Amend” [ECF No. 63]

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs, Inc., No. 22-CV-2682, 2024 WL 3185972

(D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2024), Report and Recommendation, adopted [ECF No. 85]

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm 'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-2682, 2024 WL 3580766

(D. Minn. July 30, 2024), [ECF No. 89] Judgment entered July 31, 2024

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit

Ntamere v. Amerihealth Adm'rs, Inc., No. 24-2771, 2024 WL 5431481

(8th Cir. Nov. 26, 2024) Dismiss under Circuit Rule 47A(a); timely petition for

Rehearing En Banc denied on April 02, 2025.TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

QUESTIONS PRESENTED...............................................................................................2

I. Cause of Action as Property Right Under the Fourteenth Amendment.............. 2

IL Color of Law and Federal—State Collusion....................... ;................................... 2

III. Heighten the Pleading Standard and Violation of Rule 12(d): Failure to

Convert to Summary Judgment.................................................................................... 3

IV. Individual Immunity Under § 1981........................................................................3

V. Threshold question regarding pleading requirement to establish specific

personal jurisdiction in an out-of-state employment case.......................................... 4

VI. Constitutionality of Eighth Circuit Rule 47A(a)................................................... 5

RELATED PROCEEDINGS............................................................................................... 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................... 7

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI...................................................................... 9

OPINIONS BELOW......................................................................................................... 10

JURISDICTION................................................................................................................. 10

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED......................................................................10

INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................................................................... 15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..........................................................................................17

ARGUMENTS.................................................................................................................... 19

A. The Lower Courts Misapplied Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and Ignored

Minnesota’s Statutory Protections for Filing and Notice......................................... 19

B. The Lower Courts Misapplied Equal Protection Doctrine by Misidentifying the

Comparator Class.......................................................................................................... 21

C. EEOC Officials Acted Under Color of State Law by Colluding with MDHR to

Obstruct Access to Minnesota’s Statutory Filing and Review Process...................23

D. The Lower Courts Applied Improper Pleading Standards..................................25

I) Contravention of Swierkiewicz and Rule 8....................................

II) Dubious McDonnell Douglas Framework Analysis......................................... 32

III) Complaint Made A Prima Facie Case For Personal Jurisdiction................. 33

E. The Lower Courts Failed to Acknowledge the Circuit Split on Individual

Liability Under § 1981 and Applied an Improper Pleading Standard................. .. 35

CONCLUSION................................................................................................................... 38

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE................................................................................. 40

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE......................................................................................... 41

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)...................................................... 2, 24

Albert v. Dungarvin Minn., Inc., 2009 WL 511015.......................................................22

Albert v. Dungarvin Minnesota, Inc., No. A07-2436, 2009 WL 511015 (Minn. Ct.

App. Mar. 3, 2009)......................................................................................................... 20

Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1986)..............................36

Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1991)..................................... 36

Benner v. Saint Paul Pub. Sch., Civil No. 17-01568 (SRN/KMM), 2017 WL 6001736,

(D. Minn. Dec. 4, 2017)................................................................................................. 30

BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 348 F.3d 685 (Sth Cir. 2003))....................... 31

Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2016)

passim

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (Sth Cir. 2009).................................. 31

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).................................................33

Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1992)............................................... 2, 24, 25

Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001).......................................................... 36

Carlson v. Ameriprise Fin., No. CV 08-5303, 2009 WL 10678283 (D. Minn. May 21,

2009................................................................................................................................. 20

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)........................... 21

Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 145 S. Ct. 1020 (2025).................................................32

Custom Conveyor Corp. v. Hyde, 237 F. Supp. 3d 895 (D. Minn. 2017)................... 33

Dalomba v. Simonsen, No. 15-CV-272-PB, 2016 WL 1257891....................................38

Daramola v. Dungarvin Inc.. No. 24-CV-761 (KMM/DJF), 2025 WL 607256, (D.

Minn. Feb. 25, 2025)..................................................................................................... 30

Dietz v. Dodge Cntv.. 487 N.W.2d 237 (Minn. 1992).....................................................20

Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005)............................................ 24

Educadores Puertorriquenos en Action v. Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004).. 26

Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014).............................................................. 37

Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989............................................................. 36

Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975)..............................................

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021)............... 35

Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences LLC. 2017 WL 4443431, at (D. Minn. Oct. 5,

2017)

Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014)

Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980)

Hager v. Ark. Dep't of Health, 735 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2013))

Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. 1969)

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)

Johnson v. Chapel Hilllndep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1988)

Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10 (2014)

3, 14, 18, 27

Jones v. Forrest City Grocery Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (E.D. Ark. 2008)

Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994)

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422

2, 19

Lopez Prater v. Trs. of Hamline Univ, of Minnesota, 693 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (D. Minn.

2023)("

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973):

Njaka v. Wright Cty., 560 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 (D. Minn. 2008)

Northern District of New York in Coleman v. B.G. Sulzle, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 403

(N.D.N.Y. 2005)

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682, 2023 WL 7545511

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682, 2023 WL 7678018

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682, 2023 WL 7678018 (D.

Minn. Nov. 14, 2023

................................................................................37

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682, 2023 WL 8627759

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-2682, 2024 WL 3580766

5,10

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs, Inc., No. 22-CV-2682, 2023 WL 8378532

Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs, Inc., No. 22-CV-2682, 2024 WL 3185972

Olson v. Norman, 830 F.2d 811, (8th Cir. 1987)

Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2004)

Payne v. Peter Kiewit Sons’Inc., No. 8:06CV686, 2007 WL 1319535, (D. Neb. Apr. 3,

2007)

Ratfield v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.. 686 F. Supp. 3d 780 (D. Minn. 2023)

Rodriguez-Reyes u. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013)

26, 27, 31

Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013)

Rowe v. Tennessee, 609 F.2d 259, (6th Cir. 1979)

......................24

See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982)... 35

Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012)

Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002)

Strickland v. Shalala, 123 F.3d 863, (6th Cir. 1997)

Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)

passim

Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981)

Toyota Motor Sales. U.S.A.. Inc, v. Allen Interchange, LLC. No. 22-CV-1681

(KMM/JFD), 2025 WL 1520310 (D. Minn. May 28, 2025)

West Publishing Corp. v. Stanley, No. CIV. 03-5832 (JRT/FLN), 2004 WL 73590 (D.

Minn. Jan. 7, 2004)

Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2000)

Wilson v. Ark. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 850 F.3d 368 (8th Cir. 2017)

Wright v. Xerox Corp., 882 F. Supp. 399 (D.N.J. 1995)

Yang v. Robert Halflnt'l, Inc., 79 F.4th 949, 962 (8th Cir. 2023)

Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001)

Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2003)

Statutes

42 U.S.C. § 1981

42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(3)

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)

passim

Treatises

3,12, 19, 39

passim

U.S.C. Const. Amend. VII

U.S.C. Const, amend. XIV, Section 1

Minnesota Statutes

Minn. Stat. § 14.03

Minn. Stat. § 14.69

Minn. Stat. § 363A.28

Minn. Stat. § 363A.34

Minn. Stat. § 543.19

Minn. Stat. § 606.01

12,14, 19

passim

13,16, 22, 25

EEOC Regulation

29 C.F.R. § 1601.13

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(2)

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Rule 12(b)

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Rule 12(b)(6)

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Rule 56

Fed.R.Civ.Proc. Rule 8(a)(2)

Fed.R.Civ.Proc.l2(d),

29, 32

Circuit Court Local Rules

Local Rule 47A(a)

Local Rule 47A(a),

..............................................................................................39

Supreme Court Rules

S.Ct Rule 29.........................................................................................................

S.Ct Rule 30.....................

.................................................................................. 10

S.Ct Rule 33.1(d)................................................................................................................ 40

S.Ct Rule 33.1(h)................................................................................................................40

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Anthony Ntamere respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Eighth Circuit's opinion is not published in the Federal Reporter but can

be found at 2024 WL 5431481, and is included in the appendix of this petition at

App. la. Similarly, the district court’s order on Respondent’s motion to dismiss is

not published in the Federal Reporter; it is available at Slip Copy, 2024 WL

3580766, and is also included in the appendix at App. 4a.

JURISDICTION

The Eighth Circuit issued its opinion on November 26, 2024. A timely

petition for rehearing en banc and by the panel was filed, and the court issued the

judgment denying the petition on April 2, 2025. Justice Kavanaugh approved an

extension for filing the petition for a writ of certiorari, moving the deadline from

July 1, 2025, to August 30, 2025. Under Rule 30, this deadline is further extended

to September 2, 2025, due to the weekend and Labor Day holiday.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) provides:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against

any of his employees *** because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful

employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing

under this subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(c) provides:

(a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in

every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give

evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the

security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject

to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,

and to no other.

(b) “Make and enforce contracts” defined

For purposes of this section, the term “make and enforce contracts” includes the

making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual

relationship.

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by

nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)(3) provides:

Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force,

intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from

attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully,

and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on

account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict,

presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure

such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or

indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or

if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing,

or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with

intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his

property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or

class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws;

U.S.C. Const, amend. XIV, Section 1. provides:

Amendment XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal

Protection;

All persons horn or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S.C. Const. Amend. VII. provides:

Amendment VII. Civil Trials

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,

the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be

otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the

rules of the common law.

Minn. Stat. § 14.69

Scope of judicial review

In a judicial review under sections 14.63 to 14.68, the court may affirm the decision

of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or

modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been

prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions

are:

(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or

(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or

(d) affected by other error of law; or

(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious

Minn. Stat. § 14.03, Effective: July 1, 2016 to July 31, 2025, provides:

Nonapplicability

Subd. 1. Generally. The Administrative Procedure Act in sections 14.001 to 14.69

does not apply to (a) agencies directly in the legislative or judicial branches, (b)

emergency powers in sections 12.31 to 12.37, (c) the Department of Military Affairs,

(d) the Comprehensive Health Association provided in section 62E.10, or (e) the

regents of the University of Minnesota.

Subd. 2. Contested case procedures. The contested case procedures of the

Administrative Procedure Act provided in sections 14.57 to 14.69 do not apply to (a)

proceedings under chapter 414, except as specified in that chapter, (b) the

commissioner of corrections, (c) the unemployment insurance program and the

Social Security disability determination program in the Department of Employment

and Economic Development, (d) the commissioner of mediation services, (e) the

Workers' Compensation Division in the Department of Labor and Industry, (f) the

Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals, or (g) the Board of Pardons.

Minn. Stat. § 363A.28

to credit the allegations of the unfair discriminatory practice, the commissioner

shall, within ten days of the determination, serve upon the charging party and

respondent written notice of the determination. Within 30 days after receipt of

notice, the charging party may request in writing, on forms prepared by the

department, that the commissioner reconsider the determination. The request shall

contain a brief statement of the reasons for and new evidence in support of the

request for reconsideration. At the time of submission of the request to the

commissioner, the charging party shall deliver or mail to the respondent a copy of

the request for reconsideration. The commissioner shall reaffirm, reverse, or vacate

and remand for further consideration the determination of no probable cause within

20 days after receipt of the request for reconsideration, and shall within ten days

notify in writing the charging party and respondent of the decision to reaffirm,

reverse, or vacate and remand for further consideration.

A decision by the commissioner that no probable cause exists to credit the

allegations of an unfair discriminatory practice shall not be appealed to the court of

appeals pursuant to section 363A.34 or sections 14.63 to 14.68.

Minn. Stat. § 606.01

Certiorari, within what time writ issued

No writ of certiorari shall be issued, to correct any proceeding, unless such writ

shall be issued within 60 days after the party applying for such writ shall have

received due notice of the proceeding sought to be reviewed thereby. The party shall

apply to the court of appeals for the writ.

INTRODUCTION

This petition arises from a series of coordinated actions by federal and state

officials that obstructed the petitioner’s access to Minnesota’s statutory

discrimination grievance process. The petitioner—a Minnesota resident and

employee—attempted to file a charge of employment discrimination with the

Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR), as authorized under Minn. Stat.

§ 363A.28. Instead, EEOC officials misfiled his charge to the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Commission (PHRC), an agency with no jurisdiction over his claims.

MDHR then refused to permit direct filing and declined to issue the mandatory

notice of determination required to trigger judicial review under Minn. Stat. §§

14.69 and 606.01.

The petitioner alleges that this misfiling was not a clerical error but a

deliberate act of obstruction, coordinated between EEOC and MDHR officials. He

further alleges that senior employees of his former employer participated in this

scheme, effectively denying him access to both administrative and judicial remedies.

The district court dismissed all claims—including those brought under 42 U.S.C. §§

1981, 1983, and 1985—by applying heightened pleading standards that conflict

with this Court’s decisions in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., Erickson v. Pardus, and

Johnson v. City of Shelby. The court also rejected the petitioner’s equal protection

and due process claims by narrowly defining the comparator class and refusing to

recognize Minnesota’s statutory filing and notice rights as protected interests under

the Fourteenth Amendment.

This case presents urgent constitutional and statutory questions: whether

federal officials act under color of state law when they conspire with state agencies

to obstruct access to state remedies; whether state-created procedural entitlements

trigger due process protections; whether heightened pleading standards violate Rule

8 and the Seventh Amendment; and whether supervisory employees (or any

employee) may be held individually liable under § 1981 for intentional

discrimination. These questions implicate deep circuit splits and recurring barriers

to justice for pro se litigants. Review is warranted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Anthony Ntamere is a Minnesota resident who was employed by

Independent Blue Cross LLC and its affiliates. In 2019, he sought to file a charge of

employment discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights

(MDHR), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of state and

federal law. Pursuant to the work-sharing agreement between MDHR and the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), petitioner submitted his

intake materials to the EEOC’s Minneapolis office.

Instead of cross-filing the charge with MDHR, as required by 29 C.F.R. §

1601.13 and the terms of the work-sharing agreement, EEOC Investigator

Charlotte Czarnecki misfiled the charge to the Pennsylvania Human Relations

Commission (PHRC)—an agency with no jurisdiction over petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner never received any communication from PHRC, and MDHR refused to

permit direct filing or issue a notice of determination. MDHR Lead Investigator

Tom Bemette cited the PHRC filing as a jurisdictional bar, despite petitioner’s

residence and employment in Minnesota.

Petitioner filed suit in federal district court, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981,1983, and 1985, as well as constitutional claims under the Fourteenth

Amendment. He alleged that EEOC and MDHR officials conspired to obstruct his

access to Minnesota’s statutory grievance process, and that senior employees of

Independent Blue Cross—including Executive Vice President Jeanie Heffernan—

participated in this scheme. He further alleged that MDHR’s refusal to issue notice

deprived him of the ability to seek judicial review under Minn. Stat. § 606.01.

The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. It held that

petitioner failed to state a due process claim because MDHR’s procedures did not

implicate a protected property interest. It rejected the equal protection claim by

narrowly defining the comparator class as individuals whose charges were misfiled.

It dismissed the § 1983 claim against EEOC officials on the ground that they did

not act under color of state law. It dismissed the § 1981 claims for failure to plead

individual liability with sufficient specificity, despite allegations of personal

involvement and discriminatory animus.

The Eighth Circuit has not resolved whether supervisory employees(or any

employee) may be held individually liable under § 1981, nor has it clarified the

pleading standard required to state such a claim. District courts within the circuit

apply inconsistent approaches, and the magistrate judge in this case applied a

heightened standard that conflicts with this Court’s precedent. Petitioner now seeks

review.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case presents a convergence of unresolved constitutional and statutory

questions that warrant this Court’s review. At its core, the petitioner alleges that

federal and state officials conspired to obstruct access to Minnesota’s statutory

discrimination grievance process—denying him the right to file a charge with the

Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR), misfiling his complaint to an

out-of-state agency, and refusing to issue the mandatory notice required to trigger

judicial review. These actions deprived the petitioner of procedural protections

guaranteed by Minnesota law and the Fourteenth Amendment.

The lower courts dismissed these claims by misapplying both procedural due

process and equal protection doctrine. They failed to recognize that Minnesota law

creates a protected property interest in filing and receiving notice from MDHR, and

they defined the comparator class so narrowly that it excluded all victims of the

alleged misconduct—effectively immunizing discriminatory procedural exclusions

from constitutional scrutiny.

The courts also erred in rejecting the petitioner’s § 1983 claim against EEOC

officials. Federal officials may act under color of state law when they conspire with

state actors to obstruct access to state remedies. This Court and multiple circuits

have recognized that such “symbiotic” ventures are attributable to the state. The

petitioner’s allegations of coordinated misfiling and procedural obstruction fall

squarely within this framework.

Equally troubling is the lower court’s application of heightened pleading

standards to dismiss the petitioner’s employment discrimination claims. Despite

this Court’s clear guidance in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., Erickson v. Pardus, and

Johnson v. City of Shelby, the court required detailed factual allegations of

discriminatory intent and comparator evidence—standards that exceed Rule 8 and

violate the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee of trial by jury. This doctrinal drift has

created a deep and growing circuit split, particularly in the treatment of pro se

employment claims.

Finally, the petitioner’s § 1981 claims raise a critical question that remains

unresolved in the Eighth Circuit: whether and under what standard supervisory

employees (or any employee) may be held individually liable for intentional

discrimination. While most circuits recognize such liability based on personal

involvement and discriminatory animus, the Eighth Circuit has yet to issue a

definitive ruling. District courts within the circuit apply inconsistent standards,

leaving plaintiffs without clear guidance and undermining uniform enforcement of

federal civil rights law.

This case offers an ideal vehicle to resolve these doctrinal fractures, clarify

the pleading standards for employment discrimination and civil rights claims, and

reaffirm the constitutional protections that safeguard access to justice. The

questions presented implicate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of due

process and equal protection, the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial right, and the

proper interpretation of Rule 8 in light of this Court’s precedent. Review is urgently

needed.

ARGUMENTS

A. The Lower Courts Misapplied Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and

Ignored Minnesota’s Statutory Protections for Filing and Notice

In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982), this Court held that

a state-created entitlement to adjudication—once conferred—cannot be

extinguished by procedural error without due process. The Illinois statute at issue

required the Fair Employment Practices Commission to convene a factfinding

conference within 120 days. When the agency failed to do so, the plaintiffs claim

was dismissed. This Court found that the plaintiff had a protected property interest

in the adjudication process and that the deprivation, caused by state procedural

failure, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.

Minnesota law similarly creates a statutory entitlement to file a

discrimination charge with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR)

and to receive notice of its disposition. Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6(a), the

MDHR “shall notify the charging party and respondent of the determination and

the reasons for the determination. ” This notice is not discretionary—it is a

mandatory procedural safeguard that triggers the complainant’s right to judicial

review under Minn. Stat. §§ 14.69 and Minn. Stat. § 606.01. Without such notice,

the 60-day certiorari window never begins, effectively extinguishing the

complainant’s right to challenge the agency’s decision. Dietz v. Dodse Cntv., 487

N.W.2d 237. 239 (Minn, 1992)

In this case, the plaintiff alleges that MDHR officials, including

Commissioner Rebecca Lucero, refused to permit him to file a charge directly with

MDHR and failed to issue any notice of determination. These actions—combined

with EEOC officials’ misfiling of the charge to the Pennsylvania Human Relations

Commission (PHRC), despite the plaintiff’s residence and employment in

Minnesota—constitute a coordinated obstruction of access to adjudication and

judicial review. The plaintiff received no feedback from PHRC, confirming that the

misfiling was not merely clerical but jurisdictionally void.

This deprivation is not analogous to the facts in Carlson v. Ameriprise Fin.,

No. CV 08-5303, 2009 WL 10678283 at *6 (D. Minn. May 21, 2009), affd, 409 F.

App'x 976 (8th Cir. 2011), where the court found no protected interest in MDHR’s

investigative procedures and no interference with the plaintiff’s ability to pursue

claims(“His claims are based on the fact that the MDHR did not allow Carlson to fill

out his own charge form, but, instead, drafted the charge for him based on his

questionnaire and then provided it to him for his approval and signature.”);

Nor is it similar to Albert v. Dungarvin Minnesota, Inc., No. A07-2436, 2009

WL 511015 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2009), where the MDHR issued a formal notice

of dismissal and informed the complainant of his right to pursue claims in district

court. In Albert, the court held that the Minnesota Human Rights Act does not

confer a protected property interest in having one’s grievance fully investigated. But

critically, Albert was not denied the right to file a charge, nor was he deprived of the

statutory notice required to seek judicial review.

Here, the plaintiff alleges that MDHR and EEOC officials conspired to

prevent him from filing altogether and then withheld the required notice—actions

that exceed discretionary case prioritization and constitute a procedural deprivation

of a state-created entitlement. This is precisely the kind of injury that Logan

prohibits.

B. The Lower Courts Misapplied Equal Protection Doctrine by

Misidentifying the Comparator Class

The magistrate judge dismissed the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim on the

grounds that he failed to allege differential treatment compared to similarly

situated individuals. Citing Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.

1994), and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985),

the court reasoned that “dissimilar treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does

not violate equal protection.” It concluded that because the plaintiff did not allege

that MDHR declined to consider his complaint while considering complaints of

“similarly situated persons—persons who filed a charge with the EEOC and then

had that charge erroneously cross-filed in the wrong state,” he failed to state a

plausible claim.

This framing is legally flawed. It defines the comparator class too narrowly

and circularly—limiting it to individuals whose charges were misfiled, rather than

to individuals who properly filed with MDHR and received access to its procedures.

The correct comparator group is Minnesota residents who file discrimination

complaints with MDHR, not those whose filings were obstructed by cross-filing

misconduct. The plaintiff is similarly situated to other Minnesota citizens who

sought to file with MDHR under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 1, and who were

entitled to receive notice of determination under subd. 6(a). Unlike those

individuals, the plaintiff was denied access to MDHR’s intake process and never

received the statutorily mandated notice—effectively barring him from judicial

review under Minn. Stat. § 606.01.

This distinction is critical. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits arbitrary or

discriminatory exclusion from government processes afforded to others similarly

situated. The plaintiff alleges that MDHR officials, in concert with EEOC staff,

denied him access to MDHR’s pretext his charge was misfiled—an error he did not

cause and which MDHR refused to correct. This is not a case of discretionary

prioritization {Albert v. Dungarvin Minn., Inc., 2009 WL 511015, at *3); it is a case

of procedural exclusion from a statutory process available to all other Minnesota

residents who file discrimination charges.

Moreover, the plaintiffs allegations of intentional obstruction and conspiracy

to deny access to MDHR—combined with the refusal to permit filing and the

absence of required notice—raise a plausible inference of discriminatory treatment.

The Equal Protection Clause does not require proof of identical comparators at the

pleading stage; it requires a plausible showing that the plaintiff was treated

differently than others similarly situated. The lower court’s comparator framing

effectively immunizes procedural misconduct by defining the class to exclude all

victims of that misconduct. This doctrinal error warrants review. It misapplies

Klinger and Cleburne by collapsing the comparator class into the very harm alleged,

and it ignores the broader principle that “access to government processes must be

afforded equally to those entitled by law to use them.”

C. EEOC Officials Acted Under Color of State Law by Colluding with

MDHR to Obstruct Access to Minnesota’s Statutory Filing and Review

Process

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements:

(1) that a person deprived him of a federal right, and (2) that the person acted under

color of state or territorial law. As the Supreme Court held in Gomez v. Toledo, 446

U.S. 635, 640 (1980), “[b]y § 1983’s plain terms, the plaintiff is required to make

only two allegations in order to state a cause of action under the statute.” The

burden of pleading good faith lies with the defendant as an affirmative defense—not

with the plaintiff.

Here, the plaintiff alleges that EEOC Investigator Charlotte Czarnecki,

acting in concert with MDHR officials, intentionally misfiled his discrimination

charge to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC), despite his

residence and employment in Minnesota. This misfiling deprived him of access to

MDHR’s statutory procedures, including the right to file directly and receive notice

of determination under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6(a). The plaintiff further

alleges that MDHR Lead Investigator Tom Bemette refused to correct the error and

denied him the opportunity to file locally, falsely citing the PHRC filing as a

jurisdictional bar. It is unlikely that the Minneapolis EEOC branch can cross-file to

an out-of-state FEP—worksharing agreement contracts are limited to local

agencies.

This conduct satisfies the “color of state law” requirement under § 1983.

While federal officials typically act under color of federal law, courts have long

recognized that they may act under color of state law when they engage in a

conspiracy or “symbiotic” venture with state officials to violate constitutional rights.

As the Sixth Circuit explained in Strickland v. Shalala, 123 F.3d 863, 866-67 (6th

Cir. 1997), “[t]he evaluation of whether particular conduct constitutes action taken

under the color of state law must focus on the actual nature and character of that

action.” Courts have found federal officials liable under § 1983 when there is

evidence of joint action or a shared understanding with state actors. See Rowe v.

Tennessee, 609 F.2d 259, 263-64 (6th Cir. 1979); Olson v. Norman, 830 F.2d 811,

821 (8th Cir. 1987); Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1992).

The plaintiff’s allegations meet this standard. He asserts that EEOC officials,

including Czarnecki, colluded with MDHR officials to obstruct his access to

Minnesota’s statutory review process. This is not a case of mere administrative

error. It is a coordinated denial of procedural rights conferred by state law. As the

Court held in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,158 (1970), a jury may infer

a “meeting of the minds” from the sequence of events and circumstantial evidence.

The Eighth Circuit applied this principle in Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d

940, 947 (8th Cir. 2005), instructing that joint action under § 1983 requires a

“voluntary understanding*’ between the federal and state actors.

By contrast, Youngblood v. Hy-VeeFood Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 2001), is

inapposite. In Youngblood, the court rejected § 1983 liability for a private employer

who merely reported suspected misconduct to police. There was no allegation of

joint action or conspiracy. Here, the plaintiff alleges direct coordination between

EEOC and MDHR officials to block his access to MDHR’s filing process and to deny

him the statutory notice required for judicial review under Minn. Stat. § 606.01.

This is precisely the kind of “symbiotic relationship” that transforms federal

conduct into state action under § 1983. The EEOC’s misfiling of the charge—

combined with MDHR’s refusal to permit filing or issue notice—constitutes a joint

venture to deprive the plaintiff of his procedural rights under Minnesota law. The

challenged action can “fairly be attributed to the state,” as required by Cabrera, 973

F.2d at 742-43.

Accordingly, the plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that EEOC officials

acted under color of state law when they conspired with MDHR to obstruct his

access to Minnesota’s statutory discrimination review process. This claim warrants

further factual development and cannot be dismissed at the pleading stage.

D. The Lower Courts Applied Improper Pleading Standards

D Contravention of Swierkiewicz and Rule 8

In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), this Court held

unequivocally that a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination is not required to

plead a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework to survive a

motion to dismiss. The Court emphasized that the prima facie model is an

evidentiary standard—not a pleading requirement—and that Rule 8(a)(2) requires

only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.”

This principle was reaffirmed in Educadores Puertorriquenos en Action v.

Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004), which overruled prior First Circuit cases

that had imposed heightened pleading standards. Educadores recognized

Swierkiewicz as controlling and emphasized that courts may not require detailed

factual allegations unless mandated by statute or rule. The First Circuit has

continued to apply this standard in Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d

49 (1st Cir. 2013), and Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina, 747 F.3d 15 (1st

Cir. 2014), both of which reaffirm that the elements of a prima facie case may

inform plausibility but do not define the pleading threshold.

By contrast, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly applied Twombly and Iqbal in

ways that effectively resurrect the very pleading burdens Swierkiewicz rejected. In

Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2016), the court required plaintiffs to

plead facts that “affirmatively and plausibly suggest” entitlement to relief—an

elevated standard that demands more than Rule 8 permits and more than

Swierkiewicz allows. The court acknowledged Swierkiewicz but subordinated it to

Iqbal, stating that “[t]he plausibility standard asks for more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

This doctrinal drift is especially harmful to pro se litigants, who rely on the

simplicity and accessibility of Rule 8. In Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), this

Court reaffirmed that pro se complaints must be liberally construed and that

factual allegations need not be detailed . In Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10

(2014), the Court held that plaintiffs need not even cite the correct legal theory if

the facts plausibly allege a constitutional violation. (“In particular, no heightened

pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional

rights to invoke § 1983 expressly in order to state a claim”)

The district court in this case ignored these precedents. It dismissed the

plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims by applying a heightened plausibility

standard that required detailed factual allegations of discriminatory intent and

comparator evidence—despite the fact that such evidence is rarely available pre

discovery. This approach contradicts Swierkiewicz, Erickson, and Johnson, and

reflects a broader circuit split that undermines access to justice.

Notably, the Eighth Circuit has established a counter-precedent to

Rodriguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013), allowing judges to treat EEOC or

MDHR “no probable cause” findings as grounds for dismissal at the pleading stage,

as was done by the district in the case before this court—simply because such

findings are attached to the complaint. This practice sidesteps Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(d), enabling courts to dismiss cases before any responsive pleading is

filed, effectively rubberstamping “no probable cause” determinations as dispositive.

In Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2016), the Eighth Circuit

decision reflects a skeptical posture toward Swierkiewicz’s rejection of prima facie

pleading requirements. At page 1056, the panel quotes Rodriguez-Reyes but

immediately reframes the Swierkiewicz standard as merely contextual:

“In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506,122 S.Ct. 992,152 L.Ed.2d 1

(2002), the Supreme Court negated any need to plead a prima facie

case in the discrimination context and emphasized that the prima facie

model is an evidentiary, not a pleading, standard.” Rodriguez-Reyes v.

Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Swierkiewicz,

534 U.S. at 510, 512).

Under Swierkiewicz, “[i]t is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish

a prima facie case at the pleading stage.” Id. at 54 (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at

512). “The prima facie standard is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading

standard, and there is no need to set forth a detailed evidentiary proffer in a

complaint.” Id.

Yet Blomker immediately tempers this with a caveat:

“However, elements of the prima facie case are [not] irrelevant to a plausibility

determination in a discrimination suit.” Id. Instead, such “elements are part of the

background against which a plausibility determination should be made.” Id.

In summary, “the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed

light upon the plausibility of the claim.” Id.

This doctrinal pivot—recasting Swierkiewicz’s evidentiary model as a “prism”

for plausibility—signals a narrowing of Swierkiewicz’s reach and a reintroduction of

prima facie elements into the pleading calculus.

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir.

2016), reflects not only a circuit-level departure from Swierkiewicz but a fracture

within the panel itself. Judge Beam’s dissent underscores the doctrinal misstep:

‘The Department of the Interior has litigated Blomker's sexual

harassment and retaliation action as though it was being decided on a

motion for summary judgment rather than based upon the Rule 12(b)

dismissal motion before the court. The district court continued this

course of action, and in my view, improvidently dismissed the case.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.” Id. at 1061.

This dissent identifies a critical procedural error: the majority’s reliance on

evidentiary standards and factual parsing more appropriate to Rule 56 than Rule

12(b)(6). The court’s emphasis on the absence of “actual touching” or “definitively

sexual” conduct—despite Swierkiewicz’s clear rejection of rigid pleading

thresholds—sets a dangerous precedent for harassment plaintiffs.

Judge Beam further notes: “At this stage of the proceedings, Blomker has

satisfied her burden to plausibly plead hostile environment sexual harassment and

retaliation.” Id. The dissent also flags the improper use of attached EEO complaints

and administrative records to dismiss the claim—documents that should not

override the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of accepting well-pleaded facts as true.

The following are cases involving the same judge as in the current case,

where Swierkiewicz and/or Blomker are applied capriciously—no logic as to when a

prima facie case is or isn’t relevant.

Ratfield v. Delta Air Lines. Inc., 686 F. Supp. 3d 780, 805 (D. Minn. 2023)

(The bottom line is that plaintiff “need not plead facts establishing a prima facie

case ... under McDonnell Douglas in order to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Benner v.

Saint Paul Pub. Sch., Civil No. 17-01568 (SRN/KMM), 2017 WL 6001736, at *6 (D.

Minn. Dec. 4, 2017) (quoting Hager v. Ark. Dep't of Health, 735 F.3d 1009,1014

(8th Cir. 2013)). Under this “simplified notice pleading standard” for McDonnell

Douglas claims, “summary judgment motions—not motions to dismiss—should

dispose of most unmeritorious claims.” Wilson v. Ark. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 850

F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512,122 S.Ct. 992).

“The plaintiff’s burden at the prima facie case stage of the analysis is not onerous.”

Id. (citation omitted).)

Daramola v. Dunsarvin Inc.. No. 24-CV-761 (KMM/DJF), 2025 WL 607256,

at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2025) (The elements of a prima facie Title VH case “are

‘part of the background against which a plausibility determination should be made,’

” and the court may use them “as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the

claim.” Id. (quoting Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051,1056 (8th Cir. 2016))).

Lopez Prater v, Trs. of Hamline Univ, of Minnesota. 693 F. Supp. 3d 1009,

1027 (D. Minn. 2023)("Ms. Lopez Prater may have difficulty proving her case at

later stages, especially because demonstrating that Hamline would have treated her

differently if she was Muslim seems very hard to establish." *** "But the Court

must assume the facts in the complaint are true and take all reasonable inferences

in the light favorable to Ms. Lopez Prater." *** "Finally, even if Ms. Lopez Prater's

allegations are lacking with respect to the fourth element, she is not required to

allege every element of a prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss. Blomker v.

Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051,1056 (8th Cir. 2016). Evidence of a discriminatory intent is

more likely to surface through discovery than through the information available to

the plaintiff at the time she hies her complaint.")

Toyota Motor Sales. U.S.A., Inc, v. Allen Interchange. LLC, No. 22-CV-1681

(KMM/JFD), 2025 WL 1520310, at *1 (D. Minn. May 28, 2025)(Allen's claim is

plausible if the facts in the pleading allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference

that Toyota is liable. Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051,1055 (8th Cir. 2016). The

Court must read Alien's pleading as a whole, rather than taking its allegations

piecemeal, Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009), and

the Court focuses only on the face of the Second Amended Counterclaim, without

considering evidentiary materials “in support of or in opposition to the pleading,”

BJC Health Sys. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 348 F.3d 685, 687-88 (8th Cir. 2003)).

Friedlander v. Edwards Lifesciences LLC. 2017 WL 4443431, at *4 (D. Minn.

Oct. 5, 2017) (Thus, it is not necessary to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima

facie case at the pleading stage. Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1056 (citing Rodriguez-Reyes,

711 F.3d at 54); see also Njaka v. Wright Cty., 560 F. Supp. 2d 746, 751 (D. Minn.

2008) (“[T]o survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need not

even plead a prima facie case.”).

Recent decisions such as Cunningham v. Cornell Univ., 145 S. Ct. 1020

(2025), illustrate the ongoing confusion. The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve

a circuit split over ERISA pleading standards—highlighting the Court’s concern

with judicially imposed barriers to statutory claims.

II) Dubious McDonnell Douglas Framework Analysis

Despite the petitioner’s detailed description and the specific factual

allegations in the complaint that establish a prima facie case, the district court

concluded that the first element could not be met. This was because the petitioner’s

actions on the company’s intranet forum—created not by the petitioner or any third

party—were deemed not to meet the employer’s legitimate expectations, even

though the defendant had not claimed any job performance issues. The petitioner

respectfully disagrees, asserting that it is impossible to determine whether conduct

falls outside Title VII protections before the defendants file a responsive pleading.

This stance is contrasted with two Supreme Court cases where actual criminal

behavior did not lead to dismissal.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): The Supreme Court

reversed the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff had stated a viable claim under

Title VII by alleging that his rejection for reemployment was racially motivated.

Although the employer cited the plaintiff’s prior unlawful protest as its reason, the

Court emphasized that Title VII prohibits using such conduct as a pretext for racial

discrimination. The plaintiff was entitled to a fair opportunity to prove that the

employer’s stated reason was not the true motive.

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976): The Court reversed

the dismissal, holding that Title VII protects white employees from racial

discrimination to the same extent as minority employees. The plaintiffs alleged they

were terminated for theft while minority employees who committed similar offenses

were retained. The Court found that such allegations, if true, constituted actionable

racial discrimination and warranted further judicial review.

Ill) Complaint Made A Prima Facie Case For Personal Jurisdiction

Petitioner contends that the district court erred in dismissing claims against

Schumacher, Clayton, and Waller for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court

misapplied standards under Minnesota’s long-arm statute § 543.19 (App. 78- 80a)

and the Due Process Clause and relied on inapposite citations that overlooked the

relevance of employment-based contacts.

As Director of Human Resources, Schumacher repeatedly visited Minnesota,

enforced company policy, issued disciplinary notices, and directed internal

compliance—targeting Petitioner in Minnesota. Such actions constitute purposeful

avaihnent under Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), and Custom

Conveyor Corp. v. Hyde, 237 F. Supp. 3d 895 (D. Minn. 2017). Courts have

established that employment-related enforcement directed into the forum state

satisfies minimum contacts, particularly when initiated by high-level officers, as

held in Wright v. Xerox Corp., 882 F. Supp. 399 (D.N.J. 1995).

Clayton and Waller traveled to Minnesota to conduct mandatory DEI training

central to Petitioner’s claims. The court’s characterization of their visit as “random”

contradicts West Publishing Corp. v. Stanley, No. CIV. 03-5832 (JRT/FLN), 2004

WL 73590 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2004), which upheld jurisdiction where defendant-led

training was directly tied to the claims.

The court cited Mountaire Feeds, Laver, and WinRed to support dismissal, but these

cases involved no employment relationship, supervisory enforcement, or forumdirected discipline. In contrast, Speraneo, Wright, and C.H. Robinson support

jurisdiction based on employment-related contacts. Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285

Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. 1969), further confirms jurisdiction is proper

when the defendant’s conduct foreseeably causes injury in the forum state, even if

originating elsewhere.

Schumacher’s 13 Minnesota visits, his HR enforcement, and Clayton and Waller’s

mandatory training were employer-directed and directly tied to the claims,

satisfying the minimum contacts standard and not offending traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice under International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310 (1945).

At the Rule 12(b)(2) stage, factual disputes and inferences must favor the plaintiff.

The court’s failure to credit Schumacher’s visits, Clayton’s training, and the DEI

workshop’s centrality was procedural error. This error warrants reversal, as the

dismissal undermined the fact-intensive inquiry required under Ford Motor Co. v.

Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021), and deprived Petitioner of

the opportunity for jurisdictional discovery

E. The Lower Courts Failed to Acknowledge the Circuit Split on Individual

Liability Under § 1981 and Applied an Improper Pleading Standard

This case presents a critical and unresolved question: whether and under

what pleading standard an individual may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for

discriminatory conduct in the employment context. The Supreme Com! has long

recognized that § 1981 reaches private conduct and prohibits intentional racial

discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. See Gen. Bldg.

Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). Yet federal courts

remain deeply divided on whether and how individual liability attaches under §

1981—and what factual allegations are required to survive dismissal.

The Seventh Circuit in Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2012), held that

individuals may be liable under § 1981 if they personally participated in the

discriminatory conduct or conspired to violate the plaintiffs rights. Although Smith

was later overruled on unrelated grounds, its § 1981 analysis remains influential.

Similarly, district courts within the Eighth Circuit have acknowledged the absence

of controlling appellate precedent and have adopted varying standards. In Payne v.

Peter Kiewit Sons’Inc., No. 8:06CV686, 2007 WL 1319535, at *3 (D. Neb. Apr. 3,

2007), the court held that individual liability may attach where the defendant “was

personally involved in the discrimination” or “authorized, directed, or participated”

in the conduct. Jones v. Forrest City Grocery Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (E.D.

Ark. 2008), echoed this view, noting that supervisory employees may be liable under

§ 1981 even if the employer itself is not.

Other circuits have adopted similar standards:

•

The Second Circuit in Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d

62 (2d Cir. 2000), and Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir.

2004), held that individuals may be liable under § 1981 for personal

involvement in discriminatory acts, including hostile work environments.

•

The Third Circuit in Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001), and

Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1986), affd, 481

U.S. 604 (1987), recognized individual liability where the defendant

authorized or directed the discrimination.

•

The Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375

(5th Cir. 1988), and Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975), held

that supervisors may be personally liable upon proof of intentional

discrimination.

•

The Ninth Circuit in Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020 (9th

Cir. 2003), and Evans v. McKay, 869 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1989), affirmed

liability where management-level employees acted with discriminatory

animus.

•

The Tenth Circuit in Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978 (10th Cir.

1991), overruled on other grounds, held that personal involvement in

discrimination supports § 1981 liability.

Despite this broad consensus, the Eighth Circuit has yet to issue a definitive

ruling. District courts within the circuit continue to apply inconsistent standards,

leaving plaintiffs without clear guidance. In Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (Sth Cir.

2014), the court addressed § 1983 supervisory liability but did not resolve the § 1981

question. Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981), predates modern § 1981

jurisprudence and does not address individual liability. In Yang v. Robert Half Int'l,

Inc., 79 F.4th 949, 962 (8th Cir. 2023), as an issue of first impression, the court did

not decide whether coworkers must have supervisory authority to be personally

liable under § 1981, instead finding the plaintiff had not established a prima facie

case of race discrimination.

In the present case (Ntamere v. AmeriHealth Adm'rs Inc., No. 22-CV-02682,

2023 WL 7678018 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2023), MTD Order [ECF No. 59]), the district

court dismissed the § 1981 claim based solely on the assertion that the defendant,

Jeffrey Kearns, the Learning/Onboarding Manager responsible for DEI training

across the organization, was deemed a coworker to the Petitioner by the judge. This

decision relied entirely on the defendants' motion to dismiss, which asserted the

coworker relationship and the Yang precedent, without providing any supporting

evidence.

Inconsistent pleading standards compound the lack of clarity. Courts like the

Northern District of New York in Coleman u. B.G. Sulzle, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 403

(N.D.N.Y. 2005), have held that allegations of personal involvement and

discriminatory intent suffice. Others, like the District of New Hampshire in

Dalomba v. Simonsen, No. 15-CV-272-PB, 2016 WL 1257891, at *9, require detailed

factual allegations of direct participation—effectively imposing a heightened

standard inconsistent with Swierkiewicz and Bule 8.

This doctrinal fragmentation undermines uniform enforcement of § 1981 and

disproportionately burdens pro se litigants, who are often unable to access discovery

to uncover the internal decision-making necessary to meet these elevated

thresholds. The Supreme Court’s guidance in Swierkiewicz, Erickson, and Johnson

makes clear that plaintiffs need not plead detailed evidence or establish a prima

facie case at the pleading stage. The district court in the case before this court based

the dismissal on unfounded grounds, namely that defendant Jeffrey Kearns was the

petitioner’s coworker without any basis, even though the complaint alleges personal

involvement and discriminatory animus.

This case presents an ideal vehicle to resolve the circuit split and clarify the

pleading standard for individual liability under § 1981. The plaintiff alleged that

specific individuals—including management-level employees—acted with

discriminatory intent and obstructed his access to statutory remedies. These

allegations meet the standard adopted by multiple circuits and district courts.

CONCLUSION

This petition presents a rare convergence of unresolved constitutional

questions, statutory conflicts, and procedural irregularities that merit this Court’s

review. The lower courts dismissed meritorious claims by misapplying pleading

standards, ignoring protected property interests under Logan, and refusing to

recognize coordinated federal-state obstruction as state action under § 1983. The

Eighth Circuit’s summary dismissal under Rule 47A(a), without citation to any

standard of review, compounds the error and forecloses meaningfill appellate

scrutiny. The questions presented implicate core protections under the Fourteenth

and Seventh Amendments, deepen acknowledged circuit splits, and

disproportionately burden pro se litigants seeking redress for racial discrimination.

This case offers a clean vehicle to resolve those splits, clarify the scope of § 1981 and

§ 1983, and restore access to justice. Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted

Zs/ Anthony Ntamere

ANTHONY NTAMERE

179 McKnight Road North

St. Paul, Minnesota 55119

Ph: 612-237-8229

antamere@outlook. com

Dated: September 2,2025,

CIRTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

As required by Supreme Court Rule 33.1(h), I certify that the document contains

8385 words, excluding the parts of the document that are exempted by Supreme

Court Rule 33.1(d).

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

/s/ Anthony Ntamere

ANTHONY NTAMERE

79 McKnight Road North

St. Paul, Minnesota 55119

Ph: 612-237-8229

antamere@outlook .com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

No.ANTHONY E NTAMERE

Applicant

AMERIHEALTH ADMINISTRATOR INC., ET AL.

Respondent

As required by Rule 29,1, Anthony Ntamere, do hereby certify that, on

this 2nd day of September 2025,1 caused three copies of the application

for Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the foregoing case to be served via

United States Postal Service by overnight/priority mail and via email on

the following.

Defendants

Independent Blue Cross, LLC

AmeriHealth Administrator, Inc

Michelle Schumacher

John Clayton

Jeffrey Kearns

Tashima Waller

c/o Attorney on record

Michael T. Burke, ID No. 0397401

Paul William Fling

33 South Sixth Street, Suite 3600

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402

Telephone: (612) 607-7000

Facsimile: (612) 607-7100

mtburke@foxrothschild.com

pfling@foxrothschild.com

Defendants:

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Charlotte Czarnecki, in her individual and official capacity

Solicitor General

United States Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20530-0001

PH: 202-514-2217

SUPREMECTBRIEFS@USDOJ.GOV

Defendants:

Keith Ellison, Attorney General

Rebecca Lucero, MDHR commissioner

Tom Bernette, Lead Investigator of the MDHR

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

State of Minnesota

Liz Kramer

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Peter J. Farrell

Deputy Solicitor General

445 Minnesota St, Suite 1100

St. Paul, Minnesota 55101-2128

Telephone: (651) 757-1010

liz.kramer@ag.state.mn.us

/s/ Anthony Ntamere

ANTHONY NTAMERE

179 McKnight Road North

St. Paul, Minnesota 55119

Ph: 612-237-8229

antamere@outlook.com

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.