Opposition Brief — Hector Cristobal Mejia-Estrada, Petitioner v. United States

No. 25-5348

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

HECTOR CRISTOBAL MEJIA-ESTRADA, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

_______________

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MATTHEW R. GALEOTTI

Acting Assistant

Attorney General

JOHN P. TADDEI

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether petitioner is entitled to plain-error relief on his

claim

that

Sentencing

the

supervised-release

Guidelines

§

condition

5D1.3(c)(12)

recommended

(2023)

delegates judicial authority to a probation officer.

(I)

in

impermissibly

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_______________

No. 25-5348

HECTOR CRISTOBAL MEJIA-ESTRADA, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

_______________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

_______________

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. at 1a-2a) is

available at 2025 WL 1367823.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on May 12,

2025.

The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on August

11, 2025 (Monday). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Following a bench trial in the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas, petitioner was convicted of

2

unlawfully reentering the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C.

1326(a) and (b)(1).

Judgment 1.

He was sentenced to 30 months of

imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.

Judgment 2-3.

1.

The court of appeals affirmed.

Pet. App. 1a-2a.

Petitioner, a national of Honduras, was removed from the

United States in 2014, but found there again in October 2023.

Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 4; Indictment 1; Trial

Tr. 88.

A federal grand jury charged petitioner with unlawfully

reentering the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and

(b)(1).

Indictment 1.

petitioner guilty.

At a bench trial, the district court found

Judgment 1; Trial Tr. 88.

The district court

sentenced petitioner to 30 months of imprisonment, to be followed

by three years of supervised release.

Judgment 2-3.

Under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), a sentencing court may impose any

condition

of

supervised

release

that

“it

considers

appropriate,” as long as three requirements are satisfied.

to

be

First,

the condition must be “reasonably related” to the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics

of the defendant, as well as to the objectives of deterring

criminal conduct; protecting the public from further crimes; and

providing needed training, medical care, or effective correctional

treatment.

18 U.S.C. 3583(d)(1) (incorporating factors set forth

in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)).

Second, the condition must involve “no

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to

3

deter criminal conduct and to protect the public.

3583(d)(2).

18 U.S.C.

Finally, the condition must be “consistent with any

pertinent policy statements” of the Sentencing Commission.

18

U.S.C.

the

3583(d)(3);

Sentencing

see

Commission

28

U.S.C.

994(a)(2)(B)

to

issue

policy

(directing

statements

regarding

conditions of supervised release).

Shortly after its creation, the Sentencing Commission issued

a list of standard conditions of supervised release.

Guidelines § 5B1.4 (1987).

Sentencing

Those standard conditions included

(and still include), for example, requirements that a defendant

report

to

officer’s

a

probation

officer

instructions,

answer

in

keeping

all

with

questions

the

probation

posed

by

the

probation officer, and notify the probation officer of changes in

residence

or

employment.

See

ibid.;

Sentencing

Guidelines

§ 5D1.3(b)(2)(current version).

Standard

Condition

13

of

the

initial

list

of

standard

conditions provided that, “as directed by the probation officer,

the defendant shall notify third parties of risks that may be

occasioned by the defendant’s criminal record or personal history

or characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make

such notifications and to confirm the defendant’s compliance with

such

notification

§ 5B1.4(a)(13) (1987).

requirement.”

Sentencing

Guidelines

The current version of the recommended

condition, adopted in response to judicial “criticism

* * *

4

regarding potential ambiguity in how the condition is

* * *

phrased,” Sentencing Guidelines App. C Supp., Amend. 803 (Nov. 1,

2016), and known as Standard Condition 12, provides:

If the probation officer determines that the defendant poses

a risk to another person (including an organization), the

probation officer may require the defendant to notify the

person about the risk and the defendant shall comply with

that instruction. The probation officer may contact the

person and confirm that the defendant has notified the person

about the risk.

Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.3(b)(2)(L); see Sentencing Guidelines

§ 5D1.3(c)(12) (2023) (prior version).*

At

petitioner’s

sentencing,

the

district

court

reviewed

petitioner’s criminal history, including his prior conviction for

manslaughter, and found that petitioner’s view of his situation

“minimiz[ed]”

his

prior

conduct

and

“appear[ed]

not

consistent with someone fully accepting responsibility.”

Tr. 21, 28; see PSR ¶¶ 22-23.

to

be

Sent.

The court imposed all of the

recommended standard conditions of supervised release, including

Standard Condition 12.

Judgment 4-6; Sent. Tr. 29; see also

Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.3(c)(12) (2023).

object.

2.

Petitioner did not

Pet. 2.

For the first time on appeal, petitioner challenged

Standard Condition 12, contending that it improperly delegates

*

At the time of petitioner’s sentencing, Standard

Condition 12 appeared in Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.3(c)(12)

(2023). As a result of an amendment in 2025, Standard Condition

12 now appears in § 5D1.3(b)(2)(L).

5

judicial

authority

to

the

probation

officer.

Pet.

App.

2a.

Relying on its prior decision in United States v. Mejia-Banegas,

32 F.4th 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam), the court of

appeals granted the government’s request for summary affirmance.

Pet. App. 1a-2a.

In Mejia-Banegas, the court of appeals had explained that

Standard Condition 12 “does not impermissibly delegate the court’s

judicial authority to the probation officer.”

32 F.4th at 452.

The court observed that, under the condition, “the probation

officer does not unilaterally decide whether the defendant is

subject to the condition.”

Ibid.

“Rather,” the court observed,

“the risk-notification condition only allows the probation officer

to direct when, where, and to whom the defendant must give notice.”

Ibid.

“That limited scope of authority,” the court continued,

“neither leaves to the probation officer the ‘final say’ on whether

to impose a condition of supervised release nor implicates a

significant deprivation of liberty.”

Ibid.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner

standard

renews

condition

Sentencing

of

Commission

(Pet.

supervised

in

to

be

removed

his

from

contention

release

Sentencing

(2023) is unconstitutional.

likely

4-10)

that

recommended

Guidelines

§

by

the

the

5D1.3(c)(12)

As an initial matter, petitioner is

this

country

when

his

term

of

imprisonment ends in December 2025, so the condition will not have

6

any effect on him unless he returns to the United States, and he

would have an opportunity to challenge the condition if it remains

in place and ever has the potential to cause him harm upon his

release.

In any event, the court of appeals correctly denied

relief; petitioner’s claim of a circuit conflict is overstated;

and

if

any

Sentencing

meaningful

circuit

Commission

could

conflict

amend

the

were

to

condition

develop,

to

the

address

concerns raised by the courts -- as it has previously done.

See

pp. 3-4, supra; cf. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348

(1991).

And this case does not cleanly present the legal issue,

because petitioner failed to raise it in the district court, and

therefore review would solely be for plain error.

This Court has previously denied review of similar claims.

See Janis v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 483 (2021) (No. 21-68); see

also Robertson v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 298 (2020) (No. 198608).

It should follow the same course here.

1.

As a threshold matter, certiorari is unwarranted because

the question presented will take on practical importance, if ever,

only after petitioner concludes his term of imprisonment and is

released.

Petitioner is an alien who is serving a term of

imprisonment for illegal reentry.

He is likely to be removed from

the country once his prison term expires, and is therefore unlikely

to be subject to the supervision of the Probation Office, let alone

any enforcement of the particular standard condition he challenges

7

in his petition.

See Judgment 5 (stating that “[i]f the defendant

is excluded, deported, or removed upon release on probation or

supervised

release,

the

term

of

supervision

shall

be

a

non-

reporting term of probation or supervised release”).

Even if petitioner were to become subject to supervision, the

law governing supervised release might change; the Sentencing

Commission might amend the recommended condition, as it did in

2016, see pp. 3-4, supra; or the probation officer might decline

to require petitioner to notify anyone of a risk that he presents.

If the condition ever has the potential to cause petitioner any

practical

harm,

condition.

moreover,

he

can

seek

modification

of

the

18 U.S.C. 3583(e); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c).

Accordingly, no need exists to review his challenge at this time.

Cf. United States v. Williams, 840 F.3d 865, 865 (7th Cir. 2016)

(per

curiam)

(affirming

district

court

decision

to

deny

as

premature a motion to revise conditions of supervised release where

the defendant had 14 years of incarceration remaining because “the

governing law

* * *

may change between now and then,” and the

defendant could raise claims regarding his supervised release

later).

2.

In any event, petitioner’s challenge lacks merit and

does not warrant further review.

While probation officers are

Judicial Branch officials, see 18 U.S.C. 3602(c), the court below

has stated that “a district court cannot delegate to a probation

8

officer the ‘core judicial function’ of imposing a sentence,

‘including

the

terms

and

conditions

of

supervised

release.’”

United States v. Mejia-Banegas, 32 F.4th 450, 451–452 (5th Cir.

2022) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see, e.g., United States v.

Nash, 438 F.3d 1302, 1303-1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam);

United States v. Cruz, 49 F.4th 646, 654 (1st Cir. 2022).

The

court of appeals has nonetheless recognized that the standard risknotification

condition

–-

Standard

Sentencing

Guidelines

§

5D1.3(c)(12)

impermissible delegation.

Condition

12

(2023)

--

is

under

not

an

See Pet. App. 2a (citing Mejia-Banegas,

32 F.4th at 452).

Nothing in the record indicates the district court ever

abdicated

its

ultimate

authority

to

enforce

the

challenged

condition, much less empowered the probation officer to punish

petitioner or otherwise undertake any action that would curtail

his liberty interest without the court’s approval.

See United

States v. Robertson, 948 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,

141 S. Ct. 298 (2020) (denying constitutional challenge to Standard

Condition

12

because

the

district

court

had

not

“disclaimed

ultimate authority over [the defendant’s] supervision”); United

States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th 624, 634-635 (6th Cir. 2024) (same),

cert. denied, No. 25-5179 (Oct. 6, 2025); see also, e.g., Cruz, 49

F.4th

at

654

(rejecting

nondelegation

challenge

to

Standard

Condition 12); Nash, 438 F.3d at 1306 (same); United States v.

9

Janis, 995 F.3d 647, 653 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 142 S.

Ct. 483 (2021); United States v. Hull, 893 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th

Cir. 2018) (same).

Petitioner asserts that Standard Condition 12 “grants the

probation officer sole authority to decide whether a defendant

poses a risk to anyone.”

Pet. 9.

But courts have recognized that

the identification of the risk is inherently tied to a defendant’s

particular criminal conduct, and does not grant an undue amount of

discretion to the probation officer.

See Hull, 893 F.3d at 1226

(describing probation officer’s task as “ministerial” because risk

assessment

focuses

on

history);

see

also

vagueness

challenge

offenses

of

conviction

Campbell,

122

F.4th

against

Standard

at

634

Condition

and

criminal

(rejecting

a

12

a

because

defendant’s criminal history cabined the assessment of risk);

United

States

v.

Gibson,

998

F.3d

415,

423

(similar), cert denied, 142 S. Ct. 832 (2022).

(9th

Cir.

2021)

And the district

court retains authority to “modify” any onerous or inappropriately

applied requirements, see 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(2), as well as sole

authority

to

determine

whether

any

alleged

violation

of

the

condition should be sanctioned, see 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3).

3.

rejection

Petitioner contends (Pet. 7) that the court of appeals’

of

his

delegation

claim

conflicts

with

the

Tenth

Circuit’s decision in United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687 (2019).

But the decision in Cabral was limited to invalidating the “risk-

10

notification condition, as imposed by the district court” in that

case.

Id. at 699 (emphasis added).

that

the

district

court

in

The Tenth Circuit emphasized

Cabral

had

“express[ly]

* * *

refus[ed] to limit” the potential breadth of Standard Condition

12, and had instead “emphatically opened the door to boundless

scenarios implicating various liberty interests,” including family

relationships and potential employment.

Id. at 698.

This case

does not involve a similar record -- indeed, petitioner did not

object to or seek clarification of Standard Condition 12 in the

district court.

And the Tenth Circuit upheld Standard Condition

12 in another case that did not present those facts and where the

case’s background provided sufficient guidance for the probation

office.

the

See Hull, 893 F.3d at 1226 (upholding condition because

circumstances

did

not

show

that

the

probation

officer’s

discretion was unfettered).

Petitioner also briefly asserts (Pet. 8) that the “Second

Circuit

has

likewise

recognized

that

Standard

contains an improper delegation of authority.”

Condition

12

But the decision

he invokes for that asserted conflict, United States v. Boles, 914

F.3d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 587 U.S. 1034 (2019), did not

mention the nondelegation doctrine.

It did state that “the ‘risk’

condition is vague and affords too much discretion to the probation

officer,” because it “extend[ed] to warning employers of risk and

gives the probation office unfettered discretion with respect to

11

the notification requirement.”

Id. at 112.

It therefore followed

its prior decision in United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d

Cir. 2001) (per curiam), in which it had vacated the condition and

remanded “for clarification of the nature and scope of employer

notification of the offense of conviction.”

112.

Boles, 914 F.3d at

That decision does not present a square conflict on the more

general nondelegation issue that petitioner raises, and it is far

from clear that the Second Circuit would grant relief in the

circumstances here.

Moreover, even if a conflict existed, certiorari would remain

unwarranted because the Sentencing Commission could amend the

condition to address the concerns raised by the courts.

See

Braxton, 500 U.S. at 348 (“Congress necessarily contemplated that

the Commission would periodically review the work of the courts,

and would make whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines

conflicting judicial decisions might suggest.”).

As noted, that

is precisely what the Commission did several years ago with respect

to this condition.

See pp. 3-4, supra.

The Commission could do

so again if meaningful circuit differences develop.

v.

United

Sotomayor,

States,

J.,

141

S.

Ct.

respecting

the

978,

979

denial

(2021)

of

Cf. Longoria

(statement

certiorari)

of

(“The

Sentencing Commission should have the opportunity to address this

issue in the first instance, once it regains a quorum of voting

members.”).

12

4.

At a minimum, this case would be a poor vehicle for

addressing petitioner’s challenge to Standard Condition 12.

As

petitioner acknowledges (Pet. 2), because he did not preserve that

challenge in district court, review would be for plain error. That

standard of review that would impede this Court’s review of the

question presented.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

On plain-error

review, petitioner bears the burden to establish (1) error that

(2)

was

“clear

or

obvious,”

(3)

“affected

the

defendant’s

substantial rights,” and (4) “seriously affect[ed] the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Rosales-

Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134-135 (2018) (citation

omitted).

be.’”

“Meeting all four prongs is difficult, ‘as it should

Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting

United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n.9 (2004)).

In light of the many decisions rejecting the kind of claim that

petitioner

raises,

see

demonstrate

that

any

“obvious,”

United

States

pp.

error

v.

8-9,

was

supra,

“plain”

Olano,

507

petitioner

--

i.e.,

U.S.

725,

cannot

“clear”

734

or

(1993)

(citation omitted) -- let alone prejudicial given the likelihood

that this condition may never be applied to him at all, see pp. 12, supra.

13

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

MATTHEW R. GALEOTTI

Acting Assistant

Attorney General

JOHN P. TADDEI

Attorney

DECEMBER 2025