Petition for Writ of Certiorari — David Keith Nutter, Petitioner v. United States

NO. __________________

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

DAVID KEITH NUTTER, Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Wesley P. Page

Federal Public Defender

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Lex A. Coleman

Senior Litigator

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Southern District of West Virginia

300 Virginia Street, East, Room 3400

Charleston, West Virginia 25301

304/347-3350

lex_coleman@fd.org

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: August 8, 2025

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), this Court

adopted a two-step approach for analyzing whether regulation of the possession of

firearms violated the Second Amendment. The first step of that analysis involves

determining whether the conduct at issue is protected by the Second Amendment.

Lower courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have concluded that the first step of

Bruen is satisfied only if the challenger is a “law-abiding” citizen.

In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), this Court clarified how a

tradition of firearm regulation may be established by a historical analogue sharing

the same “why” and “how” in terms of Second Amendment burdens as the modern

firearm

regulation

being

challenged.

This

Court

upheld

the

temporary

disarmament imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), based on Founding era civil surety

laws and criminal affray laws collectively as historical analogues. Relying on both

Rahimi and the analogues it analyzed, the Fourth Circuit in this case also found

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) facially constitutional.

This Petition presents two issues:

1.

as-applied,

Whether § 922(g)(9) runs afoul of the Second Amendment, facially and

where

(a)

ambiguous

historical

regulation

of

generalized

“dangerousness” justifies the “why,” (b) the relevant proxy for such “dangerousness”

is a misdemeanor conviction categorically requiring no more than reckless nonconsensual touching to establish use of physical force as an element, and (c) the

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statute exacts the much greater burden than any referenced historical analogues in

Rahimi by permanently disarming citizens who sustained such convictions.

2.

Whether the Fourth Circuit erred by concluding that Nutter’s as-

applied challenge to § 922(g)(9) had been waived.

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II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...................................................... 1

II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................... 3

III.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................... 5

IV.

LIST OF ALL DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS ................................... 9

V.

OPINIONS BELOW............................................................................................ 9

VI.

JURISDICTION .................................................................................................. 9

VII.

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED ............................................. 10

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 11

A.

Federal Jurisdiction ............................................................................... 11

B.

Relevant Second Amendment Jurisprudence. ...................................... 12

C.

IX.

1.

This Court sets forth the individual right to keep

and bear arms in Heller. .............................................................. 12

2.

Lower courts read Heller narrowly and give effect

to its broad dicta. ......................................................................... 13

3.

This Court reinforces the proper analytic

framework for the Second Amendment in Bruen,

but little changes in lower courts. ............................................... 17

Facts Pertinent to the Issue Presented. ................................................ 22

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......................................................... 25

A.

Nutter’s Petition should be granted so this Court may

articulate a clear standard for measuring generalized,

indeterminate “dangerousness” (or alternately reject it) if

that term is to serve as a historical “principle” justifying any

modern firearm regulation. Without clearly defined guard

rails, lower courts are left to use whatever metric they want

– making “dangerousness” (a word not found anywhere in the

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Second Amendment’s plain text) no different, no less

ambiguous, and no easier to consistently apply than the illconceived “responsible” standard Rahimi rejected. .............................. 25

X.

B.

Rahimi’s historical analogues do not impose a comparable

burden to § 922(g)(9)’s “how” – permanent disarmament

enforced by criminal prosecution and imprisonment.

Conviction for a misdemeanor offense defining “use of

physical force” as no more than reckless, nonconsensual

touching – is an inadequate proxy for establishing

indeterminate dangerousness sufficient to justify permanent

disarmament in a home for purposes of self defense. ........................... 27

C.

Nutter moved to dismiss his indictment based on the new

substantive standard Bruen established. Bruen articulated a

standard that did not distinguish Second Amendment

challenges based on facial and as-applied grounds. Until

Rahimi clarified Salerno’s continued application, Bruen as

written either applied or it did not. Nutter’s as-applied

position was that he was convicted of misdemeanor offenses

twenty years before he possessed the guns seized from his

home. The Fourth Circuit should have analyzed his asapplied Second Amendment claim......................................................... 32

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 33

APPENDIX A: Published Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

decided May 14, 2025 ...................................................................... A-1

APPENDIX B: Published Opinion of

United States District Court for the

Southern District of West Virginia United States

entered August 29, 2022 ................................................................. B-1

APPENDIX D: Judgment of the

United States District Court for the

Southern District of West Virginia

entered September 15, 2022 ........................................................... C-1

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III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bianchi v. Brown,

111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024)(en banc) ...................................................... 19, 20

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) ............................................................... 12-15, 17-21, 26, 33

Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145 (1968) ........................................................................................... 30

Friedman v. Highland Park,

136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) ......................................................................................... 22

Hamilton v. Pallozzi,

848 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2017) ........................................................... 16, 17, 20, 22

Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco,

135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015) ....................................................................................... 22

McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) ........................................................................................... 21

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC,

603 U.S. 707 (2024) ..................................................................................... 28, 29

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) .......................................................................... 1, 11, 16-28, 30

New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York,

590 U.S. 336 (2020) ........................................................................................... 21

Parker v. District of Columbia,

478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ........................................................................... 12

Peruta v. California,

137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017) ....................................................................................... 21

Range v. Att’y Gen.,

69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) ................................................................................. 27

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Range v. Att’y Gen.,

124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) ............................................................................. 26

Rogers v. Grewal,

140 S. Ct. 1865 (2020) ....................................................................................... 21

Silvester v. Becerra,

138 S. Ct. 945 (2018) ......................................................................................... 21

Snope v. Brown,

145 S. Ct. 1534 (2025) ....................................................................................... 18

United States v. Bernard,

136 F.4th 762 (8th Cir. 2025) ........................................................................... 24

United States v. Canada,

123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024) ......................................................... 19, 20, 24, 30

United States v. Castleman,

572 U.S. 157 (2014) ..................................................................................... 28, 29

United States v. Chester,

514 F. App’x 393 (4th Cir. 2013)........................................................... 16, 17, 19

United States v. Chester,

628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010) ....................................................................... 14, 15

United States v. Chester,

847 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. W. Va. 2012) ........................................................... 16

United States v. Cruikshank,

92 U.S. 542 (1875) ............................................................................................. 14

United States v. Emerson,

270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................. 12

United States v. Gailes,

118 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2024) ........................................................................... 24

United States v. Hunt,

123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024) ................................................................ 16, 20-22

United States v. Miller,

307 U.S. 174 (1939) ........................................................................................... 12

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United States v. Moore,

666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................. 20

United States v. Nutter,

137 F.4th 224 (4th Cir. 2025) ........................................................... 9, 24, 30, 32

United States v. Nutter,

624 F. Supp. 3d 636 (S.D. W. Va. 2022) ....................................................... 9, 23

United States v. Price,

111 F.4th 392 (4th Cir. 2024)(en banc) ................................................ 18, 19, 22

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) ........................................................... 1, 19-21, 24-28, 30, 32

United States v. Salerno,

481 U.S. 739 (1987) ...................................................................................... 29-32

United States v. Staten,

666 F.4th 154 (4th 2011) ............................................................................. 15, 16

Voisine v. United States,

579 U.S. 686 (2016) .......................................................................... 22, 27-29, 31

Constitutional Provision

U.S. Const. amend. I .................................................................................................... 29

U.S. Const. amend. II ........................................................................ 1, 10, 12-28, 30-33

U.S. Const. amend. V................................................................................................... 29

U.S. Const. amend. VI ................................................................................................. 30

U.S. Const. amend. VIII .............................................................................................. 29

Federal Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) .................................................................................................. 10

18 U.S.C. § 922 ............................................................................................................. 10

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ........................................................................................................ 28

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18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) .............................................................................................. 19, 20

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) .................................................................................... 1, 24, 27, 28

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) .................................................... 1, 10-12, 14-16, 22-25, 27-39, 31

18 U.S.C. § 922(k) ........................................................................................................ 18

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) .................................................................................................... 11

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ........................................................................................................... 11

18 U.S.C. § 3731 ........................................................................................................... 12

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ............................................................................................................. 9

Rules

Sup. Ct. R. 10(c) ........................................................................................................... 25

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1 .............................................................................................................. 9

Sup. Ct. R. 13.3 .............................................................................................................. 9

Other Authorities and Sources

Antonin Scalia, Opening Statement on American Exceptionalism

to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 5, 2011),

https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/antoninscaliaamericanexception

alism.htm (last viewed Aug. 5, 2025) .......................................................................... 31

Misdemeanor, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) .............................................. 30

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, QuickFacts: Section 922(g) Firearms (May 2025),

https://www.ussc.gov/research/quick-facts/section-922g-firearms

(last viewed May 26, 2025) .......................................................................................... 28

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IV. LIST OF ALL DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

•

United States v. Nutter, No. 2:21-cr-00142, U.S. District Court for

the Southern District of West Virginia. Judgment entered

September 15, 2022.

•

United States v. Nutter, Appeal No. 22-4541, U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judgment entered on May 14,

2025.

V. OPINIONS BELOW

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Nutter’s motion to dismiss in a

published decision, United States v. Nutter, 137 F.4th 224 (4th Cir. 2025), that is

attached to this Petition as Appendix A. The district court’s written memorandum

opinion denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss was also a published decision, United

States v. Nutter, 624 F. Supp. 3d 636 (S.D. W. Va. 2022), and is attached to this

Petition as Appendix B. The judgment order is unpublished and is attached to this

Petition as Exhibit C.

VI. JURISDICTION

This Petition seeks review of a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit entered on May 14, 2025. No petition for rehearing was filed.

This Petition is filed within 90 days of the date the court’s entry of its judgment.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1254 and Rules 13.1 and 13.3

of this Court.

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VII. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

This Petition requires interpretation and application of the Second

Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of

a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,

shall not be infringed.

As well as 18 U.S.C. § 922, which provides, in pertinent part:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person –

***

(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor

crime of domestic violence,

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or

possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or

ammunition, or to receive any firearm or ammunition

which has been shipped or transported in interstate or

foreign commerce.

And 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33), which provides also in pertinent part:

(A) . . . the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”

means an offense that –

(i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, Tribal, or local

law; and

(ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical

force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed

by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the

victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in

common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has

cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian,

by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent or

guardian of the victim, or by a person who has a current or

recent former dating relationship with the victim.

***

(C) . . . Provided, That, in the case of a person who has not

more than 1 conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic

violence against an individual in a dating relationship, and

is not otherwise prohibited under this chapter, the person

shall not be disqualified from shipping, transport,

possession, receipt, or purchase of a firearm under this

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chapter if 5 years have elapsed from the later of the

judgment of conviction or the completion of the person’s

custodial or supervisory sentence, if any, and the person

has not subsequently been convicted of another such

offense, a misdemeanor under Federal, State, Tribal, or

local law which has, as an element, the use or attempted

use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly

weapon, or any other offense that would disqualify the

person under section 922(g). The national instant criminal

background check system established under section 103 of

the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (34 U.S.C.

40901) shall be updated to reflect the status of the person.

Restoration under this subparagraph is not available for a

current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim,

a person with whom the victim shares a child in common,

a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the

victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or a person

similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the

victim.

VIII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Federal Jurisdiction

On August 11, 2021, a federal grand jury sitting in the Southern District of

West Virginia returned a single count indictment charging David Keith Nutter with

possessing a firearm after sustaining a conviction for misdemeanor crime of domestic

violence, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2). JA008-JA009. 1 Because that

charge constitutes an offense against the United States, the district court had original

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The district court denied petitioner’s Bruenbased motion to dismiss, JA122-JA137, subsequent to which Nutter persisted in his

revised pre-Bruen plea agreement. JA178-JA184. This is an appeal from a final

judgment and sentence imposed on September 15, 2022. JA187-JA194. Nutter timely

1 “JA” refers to the Joint Appendix that was filed with the Fourth Circuit in this

appeal.

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filed a notice of appeal on September 21, 2022. JA195. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

B.

Relevant Second Amendment Jurisprudence.

The Second Amendment provides that a “well regulated Militia, being

necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,

shall not be infringed.” For generations courts interpreted that text as limiting the

right to bear arms to being associated with militia service. That changed in 2008 with

this Court’s decision in Heller. Since then, however, lower courts have not given the

individual right enshrined by the Second Amendment full deference and have

continued to insulate regulations, such as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) from sufficient

scrutiny.

1.

This Court sets forth the individual right to keep and bear

arms in Heller.

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), this Court rejected the

collectivist, militia-based construction of the Second Amendment which had prevailed

since 1939, see United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Parker v. District of

Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2007); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d

203, 218-20 (5th Cir. 2001), with an individual right to self-defense disconnected from

militia service. Foundational to that individual right, this Court defined the “people”

in the Second Amendment’s plain text as including all members of the political

community, not an unspecified subset. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579-580. This Court went

on to define “the substance of the right” (i.e. conduct) protected by the Second

Amendment as possessing and/or carrying “arms” for purposes of individual self- 12 -

defense. Id. at 581-595. Rejecting Justice Breyer’s interest balancing approach for

defining the scope of that individual right, this Court held that the Second

Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding,

responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 635.

This Court emphasized that it was not reading the Second Amendment to

protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, and that the

right secured by the Second Amendment “is not unlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 595,

626. This Court further added, without identifying what specific longstanding

prohibitions it was relying on: “[a]lthough we do not undertake an exhaustive

historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our

opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession

of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .” Id. at 626; see also id. at 627 n.26 (“We

identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples”). This

Court concluded by acknowledging that Heller was its first in-depth examination of

the Second Amendment, that it was not intended to clarify the field, and that “[t]here

will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions

. . . when those exceptions come before us.” Id. at 635.

2.

Lower courts read Heller narrowly and give effect to its

broad dicta.

After Heller, the Government seized upon the “longstanding prohibitions,”

“presumptively lawful,” and “law-abiding and responsible citizen” language as if they

were the controlling substance of this Court’s holding. Based upon Heller’s dicta, the

Government has consistently maintained since 2008 that Second Amendment

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protections only apply to law-abiding and responsible citizens. The Fourth Circuit (as

well as other lower courts), ultimately accepted the Government’s assertions,

adopting an intermediate scrutiny standard to conclude that diminished Second

Amendment protections applied to persons who were not perfect “law-abiding and

responsible” citizens (however those terms were supposed to be defined). See, e.g.,

United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 678 (4th Cir. 2010). Because the Second

Amendment codified a pre-existing right, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542

(1875), and because Heller said the scope of Second Amendment protections is subject

to historical limitation, Chester adopted a two-step test for analyzing Second

Amendment challenges. Chester’s first step combined a textual and historical inquiry

regarding the Second Amendment’s scope at the time of its ratification with whether

the challenged regulation burdened otherwise protected conduct. Chester, 628 F.3d.

at 680. If the regulation did, then Chester’s second step was to apply the appropriate

level of means end scrutiny. Ibid. Chester placed the burden for the historical step

one inquiry on the defendant, and for the step two means-end scrutiny inquiry

justifying the regulation on the Government.

Thereafter,

as

Heller-based

Second

Amendment

litigation

on

the

constitutionality of different Gun Control Act sections ensued, the Fourth Circuit held

that § 922(g)(9) survived post-Heller Second Amendment scrutiny. As part of

establishing intermediate scrutiny review, Chester found that with respect to

disarming entire categories of persons (as is the case with several provisions of the

1968 Gun Control Act) the inquiry focused on whether the person, rather than their

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conduct with a firearm, is protected by the Second Amendment. Chester, 628 F.3d at

680. 2 After debating what Heller could have meant by “presumptively lawful”

regulatory

measures,

Chester

observed

even

if

Heller’s

listed

categorical

disarmaments were not historical limitations on the scope of the Second Amendment,

the Court could have still believed that they were valid on their face under any level

of means-end scrutiny. Chester then importantly acknowledged that if historical

evidence of disarming felons was inconclusive, it would likely be even more so with

respect to domestic violence misdemeanants, given that § 922(g)(9) was not enacted

until 1996. Id. at 681. The Court assumed without holding that domestic violence

misdemeanants’ Second Amendment rights were intact, before adopting intermediate

means-end scrutiny as a less demanding standard for reviewing § 922(g)(9) under the

Second Amendment. Chester then remanded to the district court to apply

intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(9). Id. at 682-683. Notably, the Chester majority

opinion did not mention, much less distinguish between, post-Heller facial and asapplied challenges to § 922(g)(9). Id.

United States v. Staten, 666 F.4th 154 (4th 2011), was decided while Chester

was on remand. Using Chester’s intermediate scrutiny standard to analyze Staten’s

as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(9), 3 the court found a reasonable fit between the

challenged regulation and a substantial government objective – reducing domestic

2

A position this Court has never taken either before or after Chester.

3 Staten had previously asserted a facial challenge before the District Court, which

was abandoned on appeal.

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gun violence. Id. at 160-167. After the Chester district court found a similar

“reasonable fit” for § 922(g)(9) relying on the “intervening decision” of Staten, United

States v. Chester, 847 F. Supp. 2d 902 (S.D. W. Va. 2012), the Fourth Circuit found

Staten indistinguishable, affirmed the district court, and rejected Chester’s Second

Amendment facial overbreadth challenge. United States v. Chester, 514 F. App’x 393,

395 (4th Cir. 2013). Until Bruen, Staten and Chester remained the controlling Second

Amendment precedents respecting the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) in the Fourth

Circuit.

Four years later, the Fourth Circuit decided Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d

614, 625 (4th Cir. 2017), a civil challenge to Maryland firearm regulations. Hamilton

ultimately held that as-applied challenges to felon disarmament laws were foreclosed

unless that citizen had received a pardon or the law forming the basis of the predicate

conviction had been declared unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful. Crucial for this

Petition’s purposes, given the Fourth Circuit’s post-Bruen reliance on Hamilton 4 is

that any historical inquiry regarding the Second Amendment’s scope was supplanted

by “the more direct question of whether the challenger’s conduct is within the

protected Second Amendment right of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms

in defense of hearth and home.’” Hamilton, 848 F.3d at 624. For Hamilton, any

disrespect for the law was sufficient to deny Second Amendment protection, no matter

how old the prior conduct, whether it was non-violent, and no matter what steps the

Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024). In combination with

Hamilton, Hunt’s law-abiding citizen limitation was identified as controlling

precedent by at least one panelist during oral argument of Nutter’s case.

4 See United States v.

- 16 -

individual citizen had taken after the fact to rehabilitate themselves and avoid

further recidivism. Instead, Hamilton not only limited as-applied Second Amendment

challenges to felon disarmament laws to law-abiding and responsible citizens, it

expressly held that the relative seriousness of the predicate conviction, or evidence of

rehabilitation, the likelihood of recidivism, and the passage of time, “may not be

considered at the first step of the Chester inquiry.” Id. at 626-629.

3.

This Court reinforces the proper analytic framework for

the Second Amendment in Bruen, but little changes in

lower courts.

Five years after Hamilton, and fourteen years after Heller, in New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), this Court dispensed with means end

scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges altogether. Bruen effectively eliminated

Chester’s step two, instead establishing a “text and history” framework for analyzing

whether a firearm regulation violates the Second Amendment. Specifically, when the

Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution

presumptively protects that conduct. To justify its regulation, the Government must

then demonstrate that the challenged regulation is consistent with this Nation’s

historical tradition of firearm regulation. Id. at 17. Structurally, Bruen’s text and

history standard now involves two distinct inquiries or steps, much the way Chester’s

post-Heller standard did. The Fourth Circuit’s post-Heller steps, however, were

substantially different from this Court’s post-Bruen steps. Where Chester’s step one

combined a textual and historical inquiry regarding the scope of Second Amendment

protections, Bruen split the analysis into two separate inquiries allocating different

- 17 -

burdens on the parties. The first is textual, simple, and arguably intended to provide

meaningful deference to Second Amendment protections of arms possessing and

carrying conduct. See Snope v. Brown, 145 S. Ct. 1534, 1536-1537 (2025)(Thomas, J.,

dissenting denial of certiorari). The second consults history, and requires an

affirmative showing of a well-established and representative tradition of firearm

regulation consistent with the statute being challenged. Bruen’s second step places

the burden squarely on the Government to establish the historical tradition

supporting the challenged modern firearm regulation.

Yet, in the Fourth Circuit, little has changed in the wake of this Court’s

decision in Bruen. In United States v. Price, 111 F.4th 392 (4th Cir. 2024)(en banc),

the court addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which makes it a crime to possess a

firearm with an altered serial number, violates the Second Amendment. In

overturning the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on that basis, the court

concluded that “the conduct regulated by § 922(k) does not fall within the scope of the

right enshrined in the Second Amendment because a firearm with a removed,

obliterated, or altered serial number is not a weapon in common use for lawful

purposes.” Id. at 397. Recognizing that “Bruen set forth a new framework” from the

one that developed in the wake of Heller, the court stated that “[f]irst, we must ask

whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the context [not conduct] at

issue. If not, that ends the inquiry.” Id. at 398 (emphasis added). Only if that conduct

is covered must the court “ask whether the Government has justified the regulation

as consistent with the ‘principles that underpin’ our nation’s historical tradition of

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firearm regulation.” Ibid. citing United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 692 (2024).

The court rejected Price’s argument that “our inquiry at step one is extremely narrow”

and “the only relevant question is whether the regulation criminalizes ‘keep[ing] and

bear[ing]’ any ‘Arms,’” Id. at 398, concluding that “we can only properly apply the step

one of the Bruen framework by looking to the historical scope of the Second

Amendment right.” Id. at 401. Accord Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438, 448 (4th Cir.

2024)(en banc)(citing Price). In substance, Price opted to continue using the combined

Chester step one as if it was this Court’s Bruen step one.

The Fourth Circuit addressed facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) in United States

v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159 (4th Cir. 2024). Noting that the “law of the Second

Amendment is in flux, and courts (including this one) are grappling with many

difficult questions” in the wake of Bruen and Rahimi, the court concluded that “the

facial constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1) is not one of them.” Id. at 161. The court

concluded that it “need not – and thus do[es] not – resolve whether Section 922(g)(1)’s

constitutionality turns on the definition of the ‘people’ at step one of Bruen,” or “a

history and tradition of disarming dangerous people considered at step two of Bruen,”

or even this Court’s “repeated references to longstanding and presumptively lawful

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Ibid. (cleaned up). Nor did the

court decide “whether Bruen or Rahimi sufficiently unsettled the law in this area to

free use from our otherwise-absolute obligation to follow this Court’s post-Heller but

pre-Bruen and pre-Rahimi holdings rejecting” challenges to § 922(g)(1). Ibid. Instead,

the court concluded that § 922(g)(1) “is facially constitutional because it has a plainly

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legitimate sweep and may be constitutional in at least some set of circumstances,”

Ibid. (cleaned up), noting examples such as those convicted “of a drive-by-shooting,

carjacking, armed bank robbery, or even assassinating the President of the United

States.” Id. at 161-162. Canada is thus noteworthy as much for what it did not decide

as for what it did.

In United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024), the Fourth Circuit

further addressed as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). Deciding one of the issues left

unsettled after Canada, the Court concluded that “neither Bruen nor Rahimi

abrogates this Court’s precedent foreclosing as-applied challenges to Section

922(g)(1),” as well as that “in the alterative . . . that Section 922(g)(1) would pass

constitutional muster even if we were unconstrained by circuit precedent.” Id. at 702.

Noting that the court had concluded in a related Second Amendment area that

neither Bruen nor Rahimi changed existing law, 5 it reached the same conclusion with

regard to § 922(g)(1), finding that United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313 (4th Cir.

2017), remained good law, as it relied on Heller’s dicta regarding longstanding

prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons. Hunt at 702-703.

While recognizing that Moore “left open the possibility that some hypothetical

challenger” could prevail in an as-applied challenge, “this Court’s later decisions

repeatedly rejected such challenges, including those brought by allegedly non-violent

felons.” Hunt, 123 F.4th. at 703 (cleaned up). Relying on Hamilton, the court

See Bianchi v. Brown, 111 F.4th 438 (4th Cir. 2024)(en banc)(rejecting Second

Amendment challenge to Maryland assault weapons regulations).

5

- 20 -

reiterated its post-Heller holding that felons are excluded from the “category of law

abiding, responsible citizens” protected by the Second Amendment. Ibid. (cleaned up).

Such decisions are “neither impossible to reconcile with Bruen and Rahimi nor rest

on a mode of analysis that has been rendered untenable by them.” Ibid. For purposes

of this Petition, Hunt’s wholesale acceptance of the “law-abiding citizen” construction

of the Second Amendment obviously extends to other law breakers, including

excluding domestic violence misdemeanants from Second Amendment protections.

See id. at 705-706 (“legislatures had the ability to disarm particular people ‘to address

a risk of dangerousness,’ which readily attaches to people who have already

been found guilty of having broken the law”)(emphasis added).

Increased Second Amendment deference was an intended consequence of

Bruen, which does not make the step one inquiry complicated or difficult. This

approach did not just materialize out of thin air in 2022. Prior to Bruen, for fourteen

years Justice Thomas had consistently observed both the states and lower federal

courts were resisting this Court’s decisions in Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago,

561 U.S. 742 (2010), by failing to protect Second Amendment rights to the same

extent they protected other constitutional rights. 6 Bruen was the predictable reaction

6 See, e.g., Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1866 (2020)(appeal of New Jersey may

issue carry permit requirement and near-total prohibition on public carry: “many

courts have resisted our decisions in Heller and McDonald.”); New York State Rifle &

Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 590 U.S. 336, 340-341 (2020)(appeal of New York

firearm license ordinance, dismissed as moot when city amended ordinances during

appeal; Justice Alito dissent joined by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas); Silvester

v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 950-951 (2018)(appeal of California’s 10-day waiting/

cooling off period for firearm purchases); Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999

(2017)(appeal of California’s prohibition of public carry and carrying concealed

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to this. The Fourth Circuit, including the panel in this case, has now similarly

misapplied Bruen’s step one, in a manner that imitates intermediate means-end

scrutiny by continuing to avoid meaningful historical justification of regulations

burdening Second Amendment protections. Hunt relies on Price for the proposition

historical limits on the scope of Second Amendment protections are properly assessed

at Bruen’s step one. Hunt, 123 F.4th at 705. Yet Hunt’s reliance on Hamilton conflates

Bruen’s intended historical inquiry entirely with merely confirming that a citizen has

an underlying predicate conviction, thereby ensuring the challenging citizen “flunks”

the law-abiding citizen test (a test which does not exist within the plain text of the

Second Amendment).

C.

Facts Pertinent to the Issue Presented.

In July of 2019, a sheriff’s deputy received information that Nutter had

firearms in his home. The deputy investigated and learned that Nutter had prior

convictions in Ohio related to domestic violence. JA073. Officers executed a search

warrant at Nutter’s home, recovering a revolver, two shotguns, and a .22 caliber rifle.

JA074. As a result of the search, Nutter was charged by indictment with violating

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) for possessing firearms after having sustained convictions for

firearms in public); Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 714-716 (2016)(appeal of

denying Second Amendment protections based on reckless misdemeanor conduct);

Friedman v. Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015)(appeal of Illinois’ AR-style

rifle and large capacity magazine bans); Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco,

135 S. Ct. 2799, 2800-02 (2015)(appeal of California ordinance requiring trigger locks

for handguns stored in residences).

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misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. JA008-009. Specifically, one conviction was

sustained in 1998, the other two in 2002, both in Ohio. JA009.

Nutter filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, on two grounds. JA010-015.

As relevant to this Petition, he argued that “18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) violates the Second

Amendment, as applied to him,” noting that since 2002 he had “lived as a law abiding

citizen, who should retain and enjoy the fundamental core right to individual self

defense protected by the Second Amendment.” JA011, JA014-015. On May 17, 2022,

the district court denied Nutter’s motion to dismiss the indictment in a written

opinion and order. JA049-057. Nutter pleaded guilty pursuant to a conditional plea

agreement, in which Nutter agreed to plead guilty to the indictment while retaining

his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. JA093-099.

After his guilty plea but prior to sentencing, and following this Court’s decision

in Bruen, Nutter renewed his motion to dismiss. JA102-105. The district court denied

the renewed motion in a published memorandum and order, United States v. Nutter,

624 F. Supp. 3d 636 (S.D. W. Va. 2022). In doing so, the district court “presume[d]

without deciding that” Nutter’s conduct was covered by the Second Amendment. Id.

at 639 n.5. However, the district court ultimately concluded that § 922(g)(9) “fits

easily within [the] framework of regulation consistent with the history and purposes

of the Second Amendment and designed to keep firearms away from dangerous

people.” Id. at 643.

Nutter renewed his challenge to § 922(g)(9) before the Fourth Circuit. After

cabining Nutter’s appeal to a strictly facial challenge, the Court of Appeal’s treatment

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of § 922(g)(9) closely tracked Rahimi and Canada. United States v. Nutter, 137 F.4th

224, 229 (4th Cir. 2025). The court declined to apply Bruen’s step one to resolve

whether Nutter was part of the “people” enjoying Second Amendment protections

because it felt Nutter’s challenge was decided by Bruen’s step two. Id. at 230. “In

short” the Court held Nutter failed to show that § 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional in

all its applications. Id. at 231. Relying on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States

v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822 (6th Cir. 2024), and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United

States v. Bernard, 136 F.4th 762 (8th Cir. 2025), the Fourth Circuit concluded that

§ 922(g)(9) disarming every person convicted of an offense “in which they had been

adjudicated by a court of law to have used . . . physical force . . . against their victim”

was on par with Rahimi’s finding that temporarily disarming persons found to pose

a credible threat of physical safety to others was consistent with the historical

tradition of civil surety and criminal affray laws. Thus the court concluded that the

historical regulatory tradition relied on by Rahimi to uphold § 922(g)(8) was

materially indistinguishable and thus similarly applied to § 922(g)(9). Ibid. The court

also held that § 922(g)(9)’s permanent disarmament was not truly that much greater

a burden or “permanent” because the affected citizen’s conviction could be vacated,

pardoned, set aside and otherwise expunged. Id. at 232-233. The court also concluded

that Gailes’ conduct as a serial domestic violence offender, with two convictions,

constituted a case proving that § 922(g)(9) would not be unconstitutional in every

circumstance. Ibid.

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IX. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A.

Nutter’s Petition should be granted so this Court may

articulate a clear standard for measuring generalized,

indeterminate “dangerousness” (or alternately reject it) if

that term is to serve as a historical “principle” justifying

any modern firearm regulation. Without clearly defined

guard rails, lower courts are left to use whatever metric

they want – making “dangerousness” (a word not found

anywhere in the Second Amendment’s plain text) no

different, no less ambiguous, and no easier to consistently

apply than the ill-conceived “responsible” standard

Rahimi rejected.

Nutter seeks this Court’s review of the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals which has decided an important question of federal constitutional law that

has not been, but certainly should be, settled by this Court: that is (a) the facial

constitutionality of Section 922(g)(9) under the Second Amendment post-Bruen, and

(b) that historical regulations based on generalized notions of “dangerousness”

constitute

a

well-established

representative

tradition

supporting

the

constitutionality of disarming citizens convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence

offense despite the disproportionate burdens imposed on Second Amendment

protections by permanent disarmament under § 922(g)(9). See Rules of the Supreme

Court 10(c).

This Court has expressly held that an individual may not be disarmed,

consistent with the Second Amendment, simply because they are not “responsible,”

concluding that the Government’s “responsible” standard was vague. Rahimi, 602

U.S. at 701. As Justice Thomas explained, the Government “argue[d] that the Second

Amendment allows Congress to disarm anyone who is not ‘responsible’ and ‘law-

- 25 -

abiding,’” but “[n]ot a single Member of the Court adopts the Government's theory.”

Id. at 772-773 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This Court further found it unclear what such

a rule would entail, and that the standard did not derive from any Supreme Court

caselaw. Id. at 701. While the Court acknowledged using the term “responsible” in

both Heller and Bruen to “describe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly

enjoy the Second Amendment right,” those decisions did not define the term or

exclude citizens who were not responsible from Second Amendment protections. Id.

at 701-702.

The Fourth Circuit’s resort to a generalized, indeterminate historical

“dangerousness” standard, without more, suffers from the same defects as any

“responsible” or “law-abiding” filter for historically examining Second Amendment

protections. The terms easily lend themselves to segregating Second Amendment

protections into the discrete subsections of the people Heller rejected. Without precise

direction from this Court now, this overgeneralized, undefined “principle” of who may

be “dangerous” is free to consume the Second Amendment indiscriminately through

virtually any legislative, executive, or judicial whim. See Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 772,

777 (Thomas, J., dissenting)(the “Framers and ratifying public understood ‘that the

right to keep and bear arms was essential to the preservation of liberty’ . . . Yet, in

the interest of ensuring the Government can regulate one subset of society, today’s

decision puts at risk the Second Amendment rights of many more.”). The en banc

Third Circuit recognized this danger and its practical consequences in Range v. Att’y

Gen., 124 F.4th 218, 226-228 (3d Cir. 2024), as well as in its pre-Rahimi decision,

- 26 -

69 F.4th 96, 102-103 (3d Cir. 2023)(“. . .such ‘extreme deference gives legislatures

unreviewable power to manipulate the Second Amendment by choosing a label.’”).

B.

Rahimi’s historical analogues do not impose a comparable

burden to § 922(g)(9)’s “how” – permanent disarmament

enforced by criminal prosecution and imprisonment.

Conviction for a misdemeanor offense defining “use of

physical force” as no more than reckless, nonconsensual

touching – is an inadequate proxy for establishing

indeterminate dangerousness sufficient to justify

permanent disarmament in a home for purposes of self

defense.

In the context of a Second Amendment challenge, Rahimi requires a court to

ascertain whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws “our tradition is

understood to permit.” Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 692. Why and how the regulation burdens

the right are central to this inquiry. Analyzing the historical how and why between

Founding era civil surety laws and criminal affray laws and § 922(g)(8)’s temporary

disarmament during the pendency of a domestic violence protection order, this Court

found a historical tradition of firearm regulation supporting § 922(g)(8). Ibid. Doing

so, it characterized the resulting temporary disarmament as “narrow” as opposed to

being “broad” like the public carry law struck down by Bruen. Id. at 700.

Unlike § 922(g)(8), the burden imposed by § 922(g)(9) is broad and quite

substantial. “Section 922(g)(9) does far more than ‘close [a] dangerous loophole’ by

prohibiting individuals who had committed felony domestic violence from possessing

guns simply because they pleaded guilty to misdemeanors.” Voisine v. United States,

579 U.S. 686, 715 (2016)(Thomas, J., dissenting). It imposes a lifetime ban on

possessing a gun for all nonfelony domestic offenses, for which individuals typically

- 27 -

do not have any right to trial by jury. Conviction for such offenses can be obtained for

recklessly causing nonconsensual contact or touching with a family member, and then

trigger a lifetime ban on gun ownership. Ibid.; see also United States v. Castleman,

572 U.S. 157 (2014). In these contexts, whether an application of § 922(g)(9) involves

a serial domestic violence offender (who otherwise should be convicted for felony

offenses, not pled down to a misdemeanor), there is inconclusive evidence felonies

resulted in permanent firearm disarmament at the time of the Founding, much less

what is known today as a misdemeanor. Where the resulting burden on Second

Amendment protections is so much greater than that imposed by § 922(g)(8) or its

supporting historical analogues, § 922(g)(9) does not pass either Bruen’s or Rahimi’s

comparable burden requirement to find support in § 922(g)(8)’s supporting historical

analogues. And the reach of § 922(g)(9) impacts thousands of defendants every year. 7

The misdemeanor element, and resulting permanent disarmament, do not just

go to the comparable “how” of Bruen’s step two, but also to the Fourth Circuit’s

conclusion that § 922(g)(9) still has a legitimate sweep in at least some of its

applications.

Petitioner does not dispute (generally) that a facial challenge to a legislative

Act is the most difficult to mount successfully, because the challenger must establish

that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. See Moody v.

7 61,678 cases were reported to the Sentencing Commission for FY 2024, of which

7,419 involved felony convictions under § 922(g). See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, QuickFacts:

Section 922(g) Firearms (May 2025), https://www.ussc.gov/research/quickfacts/section-922g-firearms (last viewed May 26, 2025).

- 28 -

NetChoice, LLC, 603 U.S. 707, 723 (2024). This Court has held the fact the Act might

operate unconstitutionally under some sets of circumstances is insufficient to render

it wholly invalid, because this Court has not recognized an “overbreadth” doctrine

outside the “limited context” of the First Amendment. United States v. Salerno, 481

U.S. 739, 745 (1987)(addressing Fifth Amendment due process and Eighth

Amendment challenges to the Bail Reform Act basing detention on prospective future

conduct).

In contrast to Salerno and operation of the Bail Reform Act, however, the Gun

Control Act does not speak to misdemeanor domestic violence convictions and any

disarmament enforced by criminal prosecution in terms of “circumstances.” Instead,

since 1996, § 922(g)(9) disarms citizens categorically based on a misdemeanor

conviction requiring the use of physical force against a family member, which this

Court confirmed includes reckless nonconsensual offensive touching. United States v.

Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 163-164 (2014); Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686, 688

(2016). The definition of the required conviction is itself categorical. Not surprisingly,

the Fourth Circuit’s comparable burden analysis between civil surety and criminal

affray laws and § 922(g)(9) is also categorical, finding the decisive element is court

conviction for an offense involving use of physical force against a family member. The

actual degree of force used, the frequency of violative conduct, the severity of any

resulting injury and number of convictions do not change this. Instead, the categorical

element is still a misdemeanor conviction for conduct involving use of physical force

defined as no more than reckless, nonconsensual offensive touching. This type of

- 29 -

misdemeanor conviction necessarily includes offenses for which citizens have no right

to a trial by jury. 8

Bruen similarly does not speak in terms of “circumstances,” requiring only that

a firearm regulation burden the keeping and bearing of Second Amendment protected

arms. Provided the regulation burdens that conduct, the inquiry focuses on

consistency with a national historical tradition of firearm regulation, not

circumstances, as evidenced by relevantly similar analogous regulations.

Comparing the “why” and “how” of such regulations is necessarily a categorical

exercise examining comparable elements of regulations and the comparable burdens

they impose on Second Amendment rights. Bruen’s whole text and history approach,

therefore, does not effectively lend itself to Salerno’s facial/as-applied dichotomy,

particularly in the absence of any Second Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 9 Instead,

where Salerno’s invalid-in-all-possible-circumstances standard is forced onto Bruen facial Second Amendment challenges to any firearm regulation are effectively

foreclosed. This is easily evidenced by this Court’s approach to Rahimi, and the

Fourth Circuit’s approach in Canada and Nutter, and only reenforces Justice Thomas’

ongoing objections to the Second Amendment being relegated to a second class right.

8 A misdemeanor is simply a “crime that is less serious than a felony,” a “minor crime.”

Misdemeanor, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). It thus encompasses petty

offenses, to which the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee does not extend. See

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968)(“[c]rimes carrying possible penalties

up to six months do not require a jury trial”).

9 For example,

analysis of the “how” and “why” of a relevantly similar historical

analogue to a modern firearm regulation would be the same whether challenged

“facially” or “as-applied.”

- 30 -

As a consequence, two evolving material constitutional questions are now presented

by the Fourth Circuit’s § 922(g)(9) analysis: (a) whether Salerno’s standard is

necessarily categorical in the Second Amendment context, and (b) whether Salerno’s

facial/as-applied dichotomy should even apply in the Second Amendment context at

all.

The Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that § 922(g)(9) has a legitimate sweep in at

least some applications is simply not correct from a categorical perspective given its

misdemeanor context and high burden of permanent disarmament under Bruen. No

other constitutional right is treated as cavalierly. Without further review and

intervention, the Second Amendment will continue to be relegated as a second-class

right, if not an outright “parchment guarantee.” Antonin Scalia, Opening Statement

on American Exceptionalism to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Oct. 5, 2011),

https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/antoninscaliaamericanexceptionalism.h

tm (last viewed August 5, 2025); Voisine, 579 U.S. at 715-716 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

For that reason, this Court should grant the Petition.

- 31 -

C.

Nutter moved to dismiss his indictment based on the new

substantive

standard

Bruen

established.

Bruen

articulated a standard that did not distinguish Second

Amendment challenges based on facial and as-applied

grounds. Until Rahimi clarified Salerno’s continued

application, Bruen as written either applied or it did not.

Nutter’s as-applied position was that he was convicted of

misdemeanor offenses twenty years before he possessed

the guns seized from his home. The Fourth Circuit should

have analyzed his as-applied Second Amendment claim.

The Fourth Circuit held that Nutter waived any as-applied challenge on

appeal. Nutter, 137 F.4th at 228-229. Nutter, however, did more than just use the

“magic words” of “as-applied” before the district court and on appeal.

At oral argument, Nutter gave the Court multiple joint appendix references

where his briefings referenced his also making an as-applied challenge. Nutter’s

opening briefing was also guided by Bruen itself, Nutter Opening Brief at 9-38, which

made no distinction between facial and as-applied challenges. Id. Until this Court

clarified Salerno’s further application to Bruen and the Second Amendment in

Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 693, 701, Bruen was just Bruen. Either the regulation

burdened conduct protected by the Second Amendment or it did not, and, if it did,

either there was an applicable historical tradition of firearm regulation or there was

not. A failure of the regulation under that standard seemingly doomed the regulation

under the Second Amendment in any application, whether the challenge was facial

or as-applied. Nutter should not have been penalized where the as-applied part of his

case was short and simple: that the domestic violence misdemeanor convictions he

sustained were roughly twenty years old, and he had been conducting himself as a

law abiding citizen up to the time authorities seized his firearms.

- 32 -

So at a minimum, with respect to an issue solely significant to Nutter and other

defendants whose Bruen-based cases arose immediately after Bruen had been

decided, this Court should grant certiorari to correct an error materially prejudicing

the party-defendant.

X. CONCLUSION

In 2008 this Court stated “[t]here will be time enough to expound upon the

historical justifications for [Second Amendment limitations] . . . when those

exceptions come before us.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. This Petition squarely presents

the controlling federal constitutional question of whether the Second Amendment

textual/historical analysis involves some type of “dangerousness” test, and, if so whether it is categorical, and then whether any misdemeanor conviction involving

use of physical force defined as reckless, nonconsensual touching, can be historically

justified to permanently disarm citizens in their own homes. Given how lower courts

are using ambiguous purportedly historical “dangerousness” metrics to broadly

exclude individual citizens from fundamental Second Amendment protections, it is

past time for this Court to correct practical enshrinement of virtually every modern

firearm regulation at the expense of Second Amendment protections intended by our

Constitution. For the reasons stated, therefore, this Court should grant this Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID NUTTER

By Counsel

- 33 -

WESLEY P. PAGE

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

Lex A. Coleman

Senior Litigator

Counsel of Record

Jonathan D. Byrne

Appellate Counsel

Dated: August 8, 2025

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