Opposition Brief — Byron Lewis Black, Petitioner v. Tennessee

Nos. 25-5262; 25A137

In the Supreme Court of the United States

IN RE:

BYRON LEWIS BLACK,

PETITIONER

___________________________

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION AND ON

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Jonathan Skrmetti

Attorney General & Reporter

J. Matthew Rice

Solicitor General

John H. Bledsoe

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, TN 37202

(615) 741-3451

John.Bledsoe@ag.tn.gov

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit correctly

determine that Black’s “idiocy” argument is not a newly ripened competency claim

and thus requires second-or-successive authorization?

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 2

A.

Legal Background .................................................................................... 2

1.

Competency for Execution ............................................................. 2

2.

Authorization for Second or Successive Petition .......................... 4

B.

Factual Background ................................................................................. 5

C.

Procedural Background ............................................................................ 7

1.

Black’s death sentence survives exhaustive review. .................... 7

2.

The state courts reject Black’s competency claim. ....................... 9

3.

Black files a second federal habeas corpus petition. .................. 11

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ..................................................................... 14

I.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Is Properly Understood as an Intellectual

Disability Claim and Is Procedurally Barred........................................ 15

II.

Even If Black’s Idiocy Claim Is Not an Intellectual Disability

Claim, It Is Not Newly-Ripened and Requires Second-orSuccessive Authorization. ...................................................................... 17

III.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Conflicts with Settled Precedent. ........................ 20

IV.

Black’s Tactical Delay Is Reason Enough to Deny a Stay. ................... 23

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 25

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................ 26

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Atkins v. Virginia,

536 U.S. 304 (2002) ................................................................................... 1, 8, 16

Banister v. Davis,

590 U.S. 504 (2020) ............................................................................................. 4

Black v. Bell,

No. 3:00-0764, 181 F. Supp. 2d 832 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) ............................... 8, 16

Black v. Carpenter,

866 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2017) ......................................................................... 8, 19

Black v. Colson,

No. 3:00-0764, 2013 WL 230664 (Jan. 22, 2013) ...................................... 16, 19

Black v. Mays,

584 U.S. 1015 (2018) ........................................................................................... 8

Black v. State,

No. M2000-00641-SC-DPE-CD, 2025 WL 1927568 (Tenn. 2025) ......... 9, 10, 11

Black v. State,

No. M2000-00641-SC-DPE-CD, order (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2025) ............................. 9

Black v. State,

No. M2022-00423-CCA-R3-PD, 2023 WL 3843397

(Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2023) ........................................................................ 9

Black v. State,

No. M2004-01345-CCA-R3-PD, 2005 WL 2662577

(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 2005) .................................................................. 8, 16

Black v. State,

No. 01C01-9709-CR-00422, 1999 WL 195299

(Tenn. 1999)......................................................................................................... 7

Black v. State,

No. 01C01-9709-CR-00422, 1999 WL 195299

(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 1999) ......................................................................... 7

iii

Black v. Tennessee,

549 U.S. 852 (2006) ............................................................................................. 8

Black v. Tennessee,

528 U.S. 1192 (2000) ........................................................................................... 7

Bowles v. Inch,

140 S. Ct. 26 (2019) ........................................................................................... 17

Bowles v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corr.,

935 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2019) ......................................................................... 19

Bucklew v. Precythe,

587 U.S. 119 (2019) ..................................................................................... 24, 25

Calderon v. Thompson,

523 U.S. 538 (1998) ..................................................................................... 24, 25

Florida Dept. of Corr.,

935 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2019) ......................................................................... 19

Ford v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 399 (1986) ................................................................................... passim

Heller v. Doe,

509 U.S. 312 (1993) ........................................................................................... 16

Hill v. McDonough,

547 U. S. 573 (2006) .......................................................................................... 23

Hill v. Shoop,

11 F.4th 373 (6th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................. 16

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U. S. 183 (2010) .......................................................................................... 24

In re Hill,

574 U.S. 1143 (2015) ......................................................................................... 17

Madison v. Alabama,

586 U.S. 265 (2019) ............................................................. 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 18, 21

Nelson v. Campbell,

541 U.S. 637 (2004) ........................................................................................... 25

iv

Panetti v. Quarterman,

551 U.S. 930 (2007) ................................................................................... passim

Penry v. Lynaugh,

492 U.S. 302 (1989) ........................................................................................... 18

Price v. Dunn,

587 U.S. 999 (2019) ..................................................................................... 24, 25

Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269 (2005) ........................................................................................... 24

Rivers v. Guerrero,

145 S Ct. 1634 (2025) .......................................................................................... 4

State v. Black,

815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991) ...................................................................... 5, 6, 7

Van Tran v. State,

6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999) ........................................................................ 3, 9, 10

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 2244 ........................................................................................................... 17

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) ...................................................................................................... 20

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) .......................................................................................... passim

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) .............................................................................................. 1, 14

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) ......................................................................................... 2, 17

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a) .................................................................................. 16

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(g) .................................................................................... 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Tenn. Const. art I, § 35 ................................................................................................ 24

Sup. Ct. R. 10 ............................................................................................................... 14

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) ........................................................................................................... 14

v

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4)(A) ............................................................................................. 3

2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 399, § 2 ................................................................................ 8

2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 399, § 3 ................................................................................ 8

vi

INTRODUCTION

Byron Lewis Black comes to this Court days before his execution attempting

to overturn decades of precedent through habeas review. This Court’s established

competency test asks whether a prisoner has “a rational understanding of the reason

for [his] execution.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957-58 (2007). Everyone

agrees—even Black’s own expert—that Black satisfies that standard.

So Black

attempts to refashion the competency test to include a categorical exclusion for

“idiots.” Far from showing a circuit split on this issue, Black fails to identify a single

court that has even entertained the idiocy argument, much less adopted his position

on it. Worst still, Black presses his novel idiocy argument through a successive

habeas petition. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

allows no such thing.

Black’s claim is premised on the notion that he qualifies as the “kind of person

(an ‘idiot’) who by [Black’s] own definition has personal characteristics that are

present at birth or very early in life.” Pet.App.35a-36a (emphasis added). As the Sixth

Circuit rightly concluded, this claim dresses up in competency garb Black’s thrice

rejected intellectual disability claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

For that reason alone, the new petition is subject to dismissal under § 2244(b)(1).

Pet.App.6a.

But even if Black’s novel idiocy claim were regarded as somehow distinct from

his rejected intellectual disability claim, the new petition still requires authorization

under § 2244(b)(2) because the claim is not newly ripened.

1

As Black readily

acknowledges, his alleged idiocy status existed very early in his life and is permanent

in nature. Pet. at 8-10. Black could (and should) have raised this idiocy argument in

his first petition—a reality highlighted by Black’s reliance on the same evidence

previously offered in support of intellectual disability claim. And the fact that Black

has subsequently marshaled cumulative evidence to bolster his intellectual disability

and idiocy claims does not render the latter newly-ripened.

Absent second-or-

successive authorization, Black may not prosecute his idiocy claim days before his

scheduled execution. And he has not—and cannot—obtain that authorization. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

This Court should deny Black’s petition for certiorari and deny a stay.

STATEMENT

A.

Legal Background

1.

Competency for Execution

In Ford v. Wainwright, this Court held that prisoners have a common law and

Eighth Amendment right to challenge their competency to be executed. 477 U.S. 399,

409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment). The “standard for competency” is whether a prisoner

can “reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” Panetti, 551

U.S. at 957-58. In other words, “[t]he critical question is whether a prisoner’s mental

state is so distorted ... that he lacks a rational understanding of the State’s rationale

for his execution.”

Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 269 (2019).

“[R]ational

understanding of the State’s reasons for resorting to punishment” is the “kind of

2

comprehension [that] is the Panetti standard’s singular focus.” Id. at 276 (emphasis

added).

The Ford Court was careful not to “suggest that only a full trial on the issue of

sanity will suffice to protect the federal interests,” and it “le[ft] to the State[s] the

task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its

execution of sentences.” 477 U.S. at 416-17 (plurality opinion). “It may be,” the Court

explained, “that some high threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner will be found

a necessary means to control the number of nonmeritorious or repetitive claims of

insanity.” Id. at 417 (plurality opinion). Because a criminal defendant must have

been competent to stand trial, “[t]he State therefore may properly presume that [he]

remains sane at the time sentence is to be carried out, and may require a substantial

threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing process.” Id. at 426

(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see Panetti, 551 U.S.

at 949 (“Justice Powell’s opinion … sets the minimum procedures a State must

provide to a prisoner raising a Ford-based competency claim.”).

The Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257

(Tenn. 1999), governs the procedure for deciding Tennessee prisoners’ competency to

be executed.

See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4)(A) (citing Van Tran in reference to

proceedings on competency for execution). Under that procedure, a prisoner may

assert incompetence in response to the State’s motion to set an execution date. Van

Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 267. Upon setting an execution date, the Tennessee Supreme Court

remands to the trial court to adjudicate the competency claim. Id.

3

2.

Authorization for Second or Successive Petition

Federal law places stark limitations on second or successive habeas corpus

petitions. Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). A habeas corpus petitioner

may not raise an old claim that was “presented in a prior application.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(1). Nor may a petitioner raise a new claim in a second or successive petition

unless he makes a prima facie showing to the court of appeals that the claim “relies

on a new and retroactive rule of constitutional law” or “alleges previously

undiscoverable facts that would establish his innocence.” Banister, 590 U.S. at 509

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) and (b)(3)(C)). “The point of § 2244(b)’s gatekeeping

restrictions is to conserve judicial resources, reduce piecemeal litigation, and lend

finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time.” Rivers v. Guerrero, 145

S Ct. 1634, 1644 (2025) (cleaned up).

The Court has carved out a small number of exceptions when numerically

second petitions do not require authorization under § 2244(b). As relevant here, the

Court concluded in Panetti that, because a Ford-based incompetency claim does not

ripen until execution is imminent, a second petition filed shortly before the execution

asserting incompetency does not require authorization as a second-or-successive

petition.

551 U.S. at 942-45.

But beyond this “unusual posture [of] a § 2254

application raising a Ford-based incompetency claim filed as soon as that claim is

ripe,” any additional “last-minute filings that are frivolous and designed to delay

executions can be dismissed in the regular course.” Id. at 946 (citing Stewart v.

Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1998)).

4

B.

Factual Background

Almost four decades ago, Black brutally murdered his girlfriend, Angela Clay,

and her two young daughters, Latoya (age nine) and Lakeisha (age six), amid a

jealous lover’s quarrel.

Black, 815 S.W.2d at 170-72.

About a year before the

murders, Angela separated from her husband, Bennie Clay, and started dating Black.

Id. at 170. But “at times she was seeing both.” Id. And in December 1986, “during

a dispute over Angela,” Black shot Bennie twice, chased him down the street, and

“stood over him” with a cocked gun before Angela pushed him away. Id. at 170-71.

Black pled guilty to the non-lethal shooting but received a workhouse sentence that

allowed weekend furloughs. Id. at 171.

With Black on furlough, the violence continued. He kicked in the front door of

Angela’s apartment when she refused to let him enter.

Id. at 172.

He later

threatened Angela: “If I can’t have you, won’t nobody have you.” Id. Three weeks

before the murders, Angela’s neighbor heard Black again threaten to kick in Angela’s

apartment door. Id. And days before the killings, Black was seen arguing with

Angela. Id.

Tragically, early in the morning on March 28, 1988, Black murdered Angela,

Latoya, and Lakeisha in their Nashville home.

Police first found the bodies of Angela and nine-year-old Latoya in the master

bedroom. Angela had been shot in the head while asleep in her bed. Id. at 171.

Latoya was found wedged between the bed and a chest of drawers. Id. She had been

5

shot once through the neck and chest while lying in bed. Id. But death was not

instantaneous; she bled out over the course of three to ten minutes. Id.

In the other room, police found the body of six-year-old Lakeisha lying face

down on the floor next to her bed. Id. She had been shot once in the chest and once

in the pelvis while lying in bed. Id. at 171-72. “Abrasions on her arm indicated a

bullet had grazed her as she sought to protect herself from the attacker.” Id. at 172.

And “bloody finger marks . . . running from the head of the bed to the foot of the bed”

showed that the six-year-old struggled before her death. Id.

Trial evidence clearly pointed at Black. Id. at 175. He was with the victims

the evening they were murdered. Id. He had been fighting with Angela just days

before, having previously threatened to kill her. Id. Inside the victims’ house, police

found the receiver from the kitchen phone in the master bedroom. Id. at 172. And

the phone from the master bedroom was lying in the hallway between the two

bedrooms. Id. Black’s fingerprints were recovered from both phones. Id.

Ballistics evidence also directly tied Black to the murders.

The evidence

showed that the same weapon fired the .44 caliber bullet recovered from Latoya’s

pillow, the .44 caliber bullet removed from Lakeisha’s body, a bullet fragment

recovered from the automobile driven by Bennie the day Black shot him, and the .44

caliber bullet removed from Bennie’s body. Id. at 173. So, Black used the same gun

to murder Angela and her children that he had previously used to shoot Bennie.

The night the bodies were discovered, the police interviewed Black. Id. at 172.

When a detective informed Black that his girlfriend was found murdered in her

6

apartment, he initially looked distraught, and he began crying. Id. But when two

other detectives entered the interview room, Black’s demeanor changed, the tears

ceased, and he became “dull.” Id.

Black initially claimed that the last time he saw Angela was about 10 p.m. the

previous night, when he dropped her off at her mother’s house after picking her up

from work. Id. But during a later interview, Black admitted returning to Angela’s

house that night, finding the victims dead inside, and simply leaving because he

“didn’t want to get involved.” Id. at 173. After seeing his girlfriend and her children

dead, Black said he simply went to his mother’s house and “got ... at least seven or

eight hours of sleep.” Id. He did not report the deaths or tell anyone what he had

seen that night until his third police interview. Id.

C.

Procedural Background

A jury convicted Black of murdering Angela, Latoya, and Lakeisha, under “six

aggravating circumstances.” Id. at 170. He was sentenced to death. Id.

1.

Black’s death sentence survives exhaustive review.

In 1991, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed Black’s murder convictions

and death sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 170. For decades after, Black attempted

to overturn his convictions and death sentence in state and federal courts.

He

unsuccessfully sought relief under the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

Black v. State, No. 01C01-9709-CR-00422, 1999 WL 195299, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Apr. 8, 1999), perm. app. denied (Sept. 13, 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1192 (2000).

He then petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus, but the U.S. District Court for

7

the Middle District of Tennessee denied relief. Black v. Bell, No. 3:00-0764, 181 F.

Supp. 2d 832 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).

While Black’s federal habeas corpus appeal was pending in the Sixth Circuit,

he reopened his state post-conviction petition to litigate an intellectual disability

claim under Atkins. Black v. State, No. M2004-01345-CCA-R3-PD, 2005 WL 2662577

(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 21, 2006). But the

trial court ultimately found that Black “failed to prove that he was mentally retarded

and that the weight of the proof was that he was not mentally retarded.” Id. at *1.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the Tennessee Supreme

Court denied further review. Id. This Court denied certiorari. Black v. Tennessee,

549 U.S. 852 (2006).

Black then raised his intellectual disability arguments on federal habeas

corpus review, where he received de novo review. Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734,

740 (6th Cir. 2017). The Sixth Circuit concluded that Black failed to show “that he

has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that manifested before

Black turned eighteen.” Id. at 750. This Court denied certiorari. Black v. Mays, 584

U.S. 1015 (2018).

In 2021, the Tennessee General Assembly amended Tennessee’s intellectual

disability statute. See 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 399, § 3. The revision established a

procedure for certain death-row inmates to raise an intellectual disability claim if it

was not “previously adjudicated on the merits.” See id. at § 2 (codified at Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-13-203(g)).

8

Black sought to relitigate his intellectual disability claim through a motion

under that 2021 amendment. Black v. State, No. M2022-00423-CCA-R3-PD, 2023

WL 3843397, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2023). But he had already litigated

intellectual disability. Twice. So the trial court summarily dismissed that motion as

statutorily barred by the prior adjudications of Black’s intellectual disability claim.

Id. at *4. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and Black did not seek

further review from the Tennessee Supreme Court or from this Court. Id. at *14.

2.

The state courts reject Black’s competency claim.

On September 20, 2019, the State filed a motion for the Tennessee Supreme

Court to set Black’s execution date. D.Ct.Doc.182-1. Black filed a response asserting

incompetency under Madison. D.Ct.Doc.182-2. On March 3, 2025, the Tennessee

Supreme Court set Black’s execution for August 5, 2025, and remanded to the trial

court for “competency proceedings . . . in accordance with the timelines and

procedures established in Van Tran.” Black v. State, No. M2000-00641-SC-DPE-CD

(Tenn. Mar. 3, 2025) (order); see also D.Ct.Doc.182-9.

Black filed his competency petition and attached 25 exhibits, including May

2025 reports from psychologists Dr. Daniel Martell, Dr. Ruben Gur, and Dr. Lea Ann

Preston Baecht. Black, 2025 WL 1927568, at *5-*7; see also D.Ct.Doc.182-10 at 3070, 96-114. Only Dr. Baecht conducted “a mental health evaluation to assess [Black’s]

competency to be executed.” D.Ct.Doc.182-10 at 102. She centered that evaluation

on the relevant legal standard through detailed discussion of Van Tran, Ford, Panetti,

and Madison.

D.Ct.Doc.182-10 at 113.

9

She correctly understood that Black’s

competency turned on his ability to “reach a rational understanding of the reason for

the execution.” Id. Dr. Baecht concluded that Black “likely meets this low bar for

competency to be executed” because he “understands that he is scheduled to be

executed on August 5, 2025, and he recognizes that death is permanent.” Id. He

“also understands that the reason the [S]tate seeks to execute him is because it is

believed that he murdered Lakeisha Clay.” Id.

The state court denied relief under Ford, largely based on Dr. Baecht’s

assessment.

D.Ct.Doc.182-15 at 20-36.

The court concluded that it lacked

jurisdiction to review Black’s idiocy claim because the Tennessee Supreme Court’s

remand order “contemplated no such common law claim.” D.Ct.Doc.182-15 at 35.

The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. Black, 2025

WL 1927568, at *1. “In this Van Tran proceeding,” the court said, “Mr. Black was

required to make a threshold showing that a genuine, disputed issue exists regarding

his present competence to be executed under the Panetti standard.” Id. at *8. The

Court held that “Mr. Black has failed to make a threshold showing that he is

presently incompetent to be executed under this standard.”

Id.

The Court

emphasized that “Mr. Black’s own expert, Dr. Baecht, found him likely competent to

be executed under the Panetti standard.” Id. Black’s “other two experts,” the Court

said, “did not expressly address the Panetti standard in their assessments, and

neither expert undermined Dr. Baecht’s assessment so as to create a genuine,

disputed issue regarding Mr. Black’s present competency to be executed.” Id.

10

The Tennessee Supreme Court also held that “to the extent Mr. Black seeks to

relitigate intellectual disability or argue for a new categorical exclusion from

execution, his argument regarding common law idiocy is procedurally barred.” Id. at

*7.

The Court found that Black “had ample opportunities” to raise his idiocy

argument “at an earlier stage” but “did not do so.” Id. at *9.

Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court declined Black’s request “to reconsider

the standard for competency to be executed, [because] he offer[ed] no compelling

reason . . . to adopt a standard that differs from longstanding precedent.” Id. A

certiorari petition and related stay motion are pending on that decision, docketed as

Nos. 25-5129 and 25A65.

3.

Black files a second federal habeas corpus petition.

Weeks before his scheduled execution, on July 18, 2025, Black filed a second

habeas corpus petition in the district court, raising his idiocy claim. Pet.App.41a120a. In an order filed July 29, 2025, the district court concluded that Black’s new

idiocy claim is not newly ripened. Pet.App.09a-40a. After exhaustively reviewing

Ford, Panetti, and Madison, the district court seriously questioned whether Black’s

idiocy claim qualifies as a competency claim instead of an ineligibility claim, like

intellectual disability or age. Pet.App.32a n.25, 34a n.27, 39a n.31. But either way,

the court concluded, Black’s idiocy claim is not a newly-ripened “Ford-based”

competency claim. Pet.App.33a-40a.

The district court reasoned that “Ford-based” competency claims relate to the

dual rationales that the execution offends morality and that the execution serves no

11

retributive purpose. Pet.App.26a. And “there simply is no room under Madison for

treating Ford-based claims as protecting a separate and distinct category of persons

(such as common law ‘idiots’)” because doing so “based merely and solely on his being

a particular kind of person” ignores “whether his execution would serve no retributive

purpose.” Pet.App.27a. This would “sidestep the Panetti standard,” and “a claim that

sidesteps the Panetti standard is not a Ford-based claim.” Id.

Given the retributive-purpose rationale, “Ford-based” competency claims

protect “only those defendants that cannot reach a rational understanding for their

executions.” Id. And Black’s claim is not a “Ford-based” competency claim because

it does not concern whether he can “rationally understand the reasons for his death

sentence.” Pet.App.35a.

As for ripeness, the district court found no basis to excuse Black’s failure to

raise an idiocy claim in his first habeas petition. The claim is premised on Black

“being a kind of person (an ‘idiot’) who by [Black’s] own definition has personal

characteristics that are present at birth or very early in life.” Pet.App.35a-36a. In

fact, it is “virtually impossible that the kinds of characteristics that make an offender

an ‘idiot’ could somehow remain unrecognized until the offender is old enough to

reach the federal habeas phase of a capital case.” Pet.App.36a. So the district court

transferred Black’s petition to the Sixth Circuit for consideration as a second-orsuccessive petition

Upon transfer to the Sixth Circuit, Black challenged the district court’s

transfer order through a motion to remand.

12

He also filed a motion for stay of

execution and a corrected second-or-successive authorization motion. By order filed

August 1, 2025, the Sixth Circuit denied Black’s motions and declined to authorize

consideration of his second or successive petition.

Pet.App.1a-8a.

The court

acknowledged that Black bases his idiocy claim on an argument “that he belongs to a

class of individuals (those with ‘idiocy’) who could not be executed under common

law.” Pet.App.6a. But his argument “runs headlong into precedent, specifically the

Supreme Court’s holding in Madison that the Panetti Court set out the appropriate

standard for competency.” Pet.App.7a (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).

Instead, Black’s claim “[a]t bottom” is an intellectual disability claim under

Atkins “masquerading as a claim of incompetency” and “based on the same arguments

advanced in his first habeas petition.” Id. A reasserted intellectual disability claim

is not new and “cannot be considered newly ‘ripe’ so as to render his latest § 2254

petition non-successive for § 2244(b) purposes.” Id. For these reasons, the new

petition is barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Id.

Addressing Black’s alternative request for second-or-successive authorization,

the Court determined that Black failed to make the requisite showing. Pet.App.8a.

“To the extent that Black submits that he is ineligible for the death penalty under

the Ford exception, his argument fails as a matter of law [because] Black’s

purportedly new evidence makes no showing that he does not have a rational

understanding of the State’s reasons for his execution.” Id. To the extent that he

attempts to relitigate his intellectual disability claim, his purported new evidence

merits no further exploration “because his ‘idiocy’ claim is based on the same

13

operative facts offered on his first habeas petition in support of his intellectual

disability claim.” Id.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

This Court grants a writ of certiorari “only for compelling reasons.” Sup. Ct.

R. 10.

But Black’s petition tees up no “compelling reason[]”—from Rule 10 or

otherwise—to justify this Court’s review. The petition does not suggest that the

decision below “conflict[s] with the decision of a United States court of appeals on the

same important matter” or “conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort.”

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). Indeed, no court has heard and resolved the unique idiocy claim

that Black presents at this late hour. Also, the petition does not claim that the court

below “departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or

sanctioned such a departure by a lower court.” Id.

Instead, the petition presses a novel and unprecedented common-law idiocy

claim, and it declares that the decision below “decided an important question of

federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.” Pet. at 12. But

the Sixth Circuit did no such thing. The lower court unsurprisingly concluded that a

previously-rejected intellectual disability claim repackaged into a second habeas

corpus petition as a common-law idiocy claim must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(1). And even if the idiocy claim were more appropriately characterized as

new, it is not newly-ripened and cannot secure second-or-successive authorization

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). There is no reason to grant certiorari or stay the

execution.

14

I.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Is Properly Understood as an Intellectual

Disability Claim and Is Procedurally Barred.

The Sixth Circuit correctly held that Black’s idiocy claim “at bottom” is a

reasserted intellectual disability argument under Atkins that should be dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). Black lacks a procedural pathway to litigate intellectual

disability for the umpteenth time. And he certainly cannot create one by affixing the

label “competency” onto his challenge and presenting it as a newly-ripened Fordbased competency claim (which his own proof does not support).

Black’s certiorari petition bears out in stark terms how his request for relief is

based on intellectual disability. He starts by defining “idiots” as those who “exhibited

deficits in intellectual functioning from early in life, if not from birth.” Pet. at 5. And

he admits that “low intellectual functioning is at the core of ‘idiocy.’” Id. at 6. In his

view, “key indicators of ‘idiocy’ included unsound memory, brain malformations, and

the inability to manage one’s own affairs.” Id. at 8. Still, idiocy “at common law was

a condition defined by low intellectual functioning.” Id.

From this, Black argues that he satisfies the common-law standard for idiocy

because he “is intellectually disabled.” Id. at 8. Stated differently, he has shown

“significant intellectual limitations that were a historical analogue to ‘idiocy.’” Id.

While he presents additional bases to support his idiocy argument—brain

malformations, dementia/ profound memory loss, and an inability to manage his own

affairs—it is his purported intellectual disability manifesting early in his life that

marks when he first supposedly met the common-law standard for idiocy. Pet. at 810.

15

This Court has already exempted the intellectually disabled from execution in

Atkins by reference to clinical definitions of that class as those with “subaverage

intellectual functioning [and] significant limitations in adaptive skills . . . that

became manifest before age 18.” 536 U.S. at 318; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13203(a) (using this same definition of intellectual disability). That is, intellectual

disability claims rest on a person’s permanent cognitive state. Hill v. Shoop, 11 F.4th

373, 386 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Atkins supports the conclusion that intellectual disability

is not a transient condition.”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993) (noting, in a

different context, that intellectual disability “is a permanent, relatively static

condition”).

Simply put, Black has repeatedly tried and failed to prove his intellectual

disability under Atkins. He litigated intellectual disability in state court. And he

lost. Black, 2005 WL 2662577 at *1. Then, in his first habeas petition, he proved

neither subaverage intellectual functioning nor significant limitations in adaptive

skills manifesting before the age 18 under de novo review. Black, 664 F.3d at 743-50;

Black, 2013 WL 230664, at *6-*19. For over twenty years, Black has trotted out his

intellectual disability claim in state and federal courts. It has failed consistently at

every level. On the eve of his execution, he tries once again, in a new habeas corpus

petition raising an old claim, while relying on intellectual disability principles to

prove it. Pet.App.113a-116a.

This is not the first instance in which a capital petitioner has asked the Court

shortly before an execution to intervene and consider an intellectual disability claim

16

via a second or successive petition. This Court denied those requests. See Bowles v.

Inch, 140 S. Ct. 26 (2019); In re Hill, 574 U.S. 1143 (2015). And it should deny Black’s

request here. The Sixth Circuit rightly rejected Black’s attempt and dismissed the

claim as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1).

II.

Even If Black’s Idiocy Claim Is Not an Intellectual Disability Claim, It

Is Not Newly-Ripened and Requires Second-or-Successive

Authorization.

Assuming arguendo that Black’s idiocy claim is not an intellectual disability

argument, it is not newly-ripened, as a true Ford claim would be under Panetti. Black

asserts no lack of rational understanding under Ford.

Instead, his purported

“competency” claim is grounded in a condition that, by Black’s own admission,

presented early in his life and is permanent in nature. And the claim relies on facts

long in existence, indeed the very same evidence on which Black based his intellectual

disability claim in the first petition. The claim did not ripen once execution was

imminent, so it requires second-or-successive authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

And Black has no basis for satisfying 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)’s requirements or for

challenging the Sixth Circuit’s denial of authorization, see id. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Although Black characterizes his idiocy claim as a Ford-based competency

claim, the categorical bar he seeks finds no support in Ford or its progeny. Ford

decided only “that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments

precludes executing a prisoner who has ‘lost his sanity’ after sentencing.” Madison,

586 U.S. at 268 (cleaned up) (emphasis added). The “sole question” under Ford is

17

whether the defendant has a rational understanding of why the State seeks his

execution. Madison, 586 U.S. at 275, 283.

Black cannot point to a single decision treating his proposed idiocy rule as an

issue of competency—no district court, no Court of Appeals, and certainly no Supreme

Court decision. That is unsurprising. As the district court rightly concluded, this

Court resolved any doubt that competency protections focus on dual rationales, (1)

the morality of execution, and (2) the lack of a retributive purpose in it. Pet.App.22a28a. Black’s idiocy argument relies solely on the former and speaks in no way to the

latter. It is not a newly-ripened “Ford-based” competency claim.

That the claim is not newly ripened is bolstered by Black’s acknowledged early

onset of idiocy status. Pet. at 8-10. Under Black’s own definition, “[i]diocy was

understood as ‘a defect of understanding from the moment of birth,’ in contrast to

lunacy, which was ‘a partial derangement of intellectual faculties, the senses

returning at uncertain intervals.’”

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)

(quoting 1 W. Hawkins, Plea of the Crown, 2 n.2 (7th ed. 1795)); Pet.App.95a-97a,

103a. “There was no one definition of idiocy at common law, but the term ‘idiot’ was

generally used to describe persons who had a total lack of reason or understanding,

or an inability to distinguish between good and evil.” Id. at 331-32. “[T]he old

common law notion of ‘idiocy’” placed an “emphasis on a permanent, congenital

mental deficiency.” Id. at 332.

Due to the early onset and permanence of idiocy, any purported claim for

sentencing relief based on idiocy could and should be raised much sooner than when

18

an execution date is set. Even if an idiocy claim were somehow distinct from an

intellectual disability claim, the early onset of these statuses means that each claim

“ripens” well before a first habeas corpus petition is filed. See Bowles v. Secretary,

Florida Dept. of Corr., 935 F.3d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 2019) (“If Bowles has an

intellectual disability now, then he had an intellectual disability when he filed his

first federal habeas petition.”). Just as an impending execution date does not ripen

an intellectual disability claim, it likewise fails to ripen an idiocy-based Eighth

Amendment claim.

Finally, even if some hypothetical idiocy claim (which no court has never

recognized) could be newly ripened in some circumstances (which no court has ever

held), Black’s specific claim is not newly ripened. Black relies almost exclusively on

facts in existence at the time of the first habeas corpus petition to support his request

for relief. Black first relies on various intelligence quotient (I.Q.) tests conducted over

a span of many years. Pet.App.65a-67a, 114a. He relied on those same test results

(while ignoring others) to support his intellectual disability claim in prior federal

court proceedings. Black, 866 F.3d at 738. Black also relies on facts about his

childhood, his poor performance in school, and circumstances surrounding his

overarching assertion that he “has always been incapable of managing his own

affairs.”

Pet.App.67a-71a, 114a-116a.

Again, he offered this same evidence

previously when litigating his intellectual disability claim. Black, 2013 WL 230664,

at *15-*19.

19

Black attempts to avoid the early onset of his supposed idiocy status by relying

on his more recent expert opinion reports and by also arguing that persons can qualify

for idiocy later in life. But in so doing, he ignores his own argument throughout that

he has qualified for idiocy status since very early in life. Pet.App.67a-72a, 75a-77a,

114a-115a. That is his claim, based upon old facts and despite any newly-developed,

cumulative evidence. And that claim is not newly ripened.

Black could have raised an idiocy claim in his first habeas corpus petition when

he fully litigated an intellectual disability claim under the same proof. He elected not

to so. At this late juncture, his idiocy claim is not newly ripened—meaning his new

petition is barred as second or successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

III.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Conflicts with Settled Precedent.

Beyond the procedural limitations stemming from the belated presentation on

federal habeas corpus review, Black’s idiocy claim still presents no unsettled question

of federal law that calls for this Court’s resolution in this abbreviated federal habeas

corpus appeal. This is not a petition teeing up a constitutional issue that has divided

lower courts. Far from it. No court has resolved the idiocy theory presented. And

Black’s novel theory departs from this Court’s well-established competency test,

which fully accounts for the common-law’s approach to idiocy.

1. Black’s idiocy claim flouts this Court’s established precedent. In Panetti,

this Court carefully defined the category of incompetent persons the Eighth

Amendment exempts from execution.

“The Eighth Amendment,” Panetti held,

“prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him from

20

‘rational[ly] understanding’ why the State seeks to impose that punishment.”

Madison, 586 U.S. at 267 (quoting Panetti, 551 U. S. at 959). In Madison, the Court

clarified that this “standard has no interest in establishing any precise cause:

Psychosis or dementia, delusions or overall cognitive decline are all the same under

Panetti, so long as they produce the requisite lack of comprehension.” Id. at 278.

“The critical question,” the Court said, “is whether a prisoner’s mental state is so

distorted ... that he lacks a rational understanding of the State’s rationale for his

execution.” Id. at 269 (cleaned up). And Madison reiterated that Ford claims only

concern the ban on “executing a prisoner who has lost his sanity after sentencing.”

Id. at 268 (cleaned up).

Black openly rejects that test. Pet.App.93a-116a. But that is nothing more

than a request for this Court to overhaul the well-established Panetti test. Black

cannot satisfy the governing standard, so he wants this Court to overrule its

precedent to craft a new test. That is an extraordinary request that the Court should

not entertain in a procedurally barred second or successive habeas petition.

2.

Black suggests that this Court’s Panetti test overlooks common-law

protections for a much broader class of persons generally unable to manage their

affairs. Pet. at 1. But far from ignoring the common law, Panetti and its lineage

rested on it.

Ford lays bare Panetti’s common-law roots.

In “keep[ing] faith with our

common-law heritage,” Ford held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing

the insane. 477 U.S. at 401. To get there, the Court acknowledged that the common

21

law sets the floor for Eighth Amendment protections.

Id. at 406 (“The Eighth

Amendment’s proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the

common law.”). Describing that floor, the Court specifically mentioned “[i]diots.” Id.

But given the variable and imprecise descriptions of idiocy, the Court rested its

analysis on common-law principles. Id. at 406-10. Chief among them, the Court said,

is the diminished “retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension

of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.” Id. at

409. The Court also cited “the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing

one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity.” Id. And

lastly, the Court acknowledged the “intuition that such an execution simply offends

humanity.” Id.

Ford’s careful integration of common-law principles and protections is even

more evident from the Court’s conclusion with “a principle that has long resided

there.” Id. at 417. That is, “[i]t is no less abhorrent today than it has been for

centuries to exact in penance the life of one whose mental illness prevents him from

comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications.” Id. Justice Powell’s

concurring opinion in Ford restated the same basic principle: “[T]he Eighth

Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment

they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”

Id. at 422-23 (opinion

concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Panetti “clarified the scope of that category . . . by focusing on whether a

prisoner can ‘reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.’”

22

Madison, 586 U.S. at 268 (quoting Panetti, 551 U. S. at 958).

And the Court

reaffirmed that scope in 2019, stating that “[t]he critical question is whether a

prisoner’s mental state is so distorted . . . that he lacks a rational understanding of

the State’s rationale for his execution.” Id. at 269 (cleaned up). “But Ford had

explored what lay behind the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition,” including among

other things, the common-law protection of idiots. Id. at 269; Ford, 477 U.S. at 406

(recognizing and accounting for “idiots”).

The protection under Ford and its progeny fully encompasses that under the

common law. Black’s idiocy claim is no less than a foundational attack on three

decades of this Court’s precedent that already fully accounts for the common law in

construing the Eighth Amendment.

Even if procedural barriers did not impact

Black’s ability to pursue his belated idiocy claim on federal habeas corpus review, the

claim itself is devoid of legal footing, which is reason enough to deny cert.

IV.

Black’s Tactical Delay Is Reason Enough to Deny a Stay.

“[A] stay of execution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a matter of

right, and equity must be sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its

criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal courts.” Hill v.

McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 584 (2006). An applicant for a stay of execution must

satisfy all the traditional stay factors and therefore must show that there is “a

reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently

meritorious to grant certiorari,” that there is “a fair prospect that a majority of the

Court will vote to reverse the judgment below,” and, in a close case, that the equities

23

favor the granting of relief. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per

curiam). For the reasons stated above, there is no reason to grant certiorari or reverse

the judgment below.

Even setting aside the question of certworthiness, Black’s tactical delay in

waiting only four days before his execution to present this Court with an idiocy claim

that he could have pursued decades ago is reason enough to deny a stay. It is well

known that “capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to

prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of a sentence of death.” Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). “[I]t is the same strategy adopted by many deathrow inmates with an impending execution: bring last-minute claims that will delay

the execution, no matter how groundless.” Price v. Dunn, 587 U.S. 999, 1008 (2019)

(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

But given the significant interests at stake, “[l]ast-minute stays should be the

extreme exception, not the norm.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 150 (2019)

(cleaned up). The State and victims have a “powerful and legitimate interest in

punishing the guilty.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (cleaned up).

They also “have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a [death]

sentence.” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 149 (cleaned up). In Tennessee, victims have the

constitutional right to “a prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction

or sentence.” Tenn. Const. art I, § 35. Once post-conviction proceedings “have run

their course ... finality acquires an added moral dimension.” Calderon, 523 U.S. at

556. “Only with an assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment

24

in a case” and “the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judgment will

be carried out.” Id. “To unsettle these expectations is to inflict a profound injury.”

Id.

To avoid such injury, “the last-minute nature of an application that could have

been brought earlier, or an applicant’s attempt at manipulation, may be grounds for

denial of a stay.” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 150 (cleaned up). Indeed, this Court applies

“a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could have

been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring

entry of a stay.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004). Black “had ample

opportunities to raise” his idiocy claim “at an earlier stage”—given that it is

fundamentally an intellectual disability argument, as the Sixth Circuit properly

concluded. Pet.App.6a. Yet, Black waited thirty-six years to present his new-fangled

theory. “The proper response to this maneuvering is to deny [Black’s] meritless

request[] expeditiously.” Price, 587 U.S. at 1008. Black’s tactical delay is reason

enough to deny a stay.

CONCLUSION

The application for stay of execution and petition for writ of certiorari should

be denied.

25

Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General & Reporter

State of Tennessee

J. MATTHEW RICE

Solicitor General

/s/John H. Bledsoe

JOHN H. BLEDSOE

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

500 Dr. Martin L. King, Jr. Blvd.

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207

Phone: (615) 741-4351

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing document was emailed to

petitioner’s counsel, Kelley J. Henry, at kelley_henry@fd.org, on August 3, 2025, and

a paper copy will be sent by first class mail to Ms. Henry, at 810 Broadway Ste 200,

Nashville, Tennessee 37203-3861, on August 4, 2025.

/s/John H. Bledsoe

JOHN H. BLEDSOE

Deputy Attorney General

26