Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jesus Garcia, Jr., Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJul 24, 2025

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JESUS GARCIA, JR., PETITIONER,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MAUREEN SCOTT FRANCO

Federal Public Defender

CARL R. HENNIES

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

300 Convent Street, Suite 2300

San Antonio, Texas 78205

Carl_Hennies@fd.org

(210) 472-6700

Counsel for Petitioner

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the detailed Judiciary Sentencing Information (JSIN)

statistics compiled by the United States Sentencing Commission

are relevant to considering whether a defendant’s sentence creates

an unwarranted sentencing disparity compared to similarly

situated defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court for the Western District of Texas:

United States v. Jesus Garcia, Jr., No. 2:21-cr-410 (Mar. 18, 2024)

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:

United States v. Jesus Garcia, Jr., No. 24-50257 (Apr. 25, 2025)

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question presented ........................................................................... i

Related proceedings ......................................................................... ii

Table of authorities ......................................................................... iv

Introduction .......................................................................................1

Opinion below....................................................................................3

Jurisdiction........................................................................................4

Statutory provision involved ............................................................4

Statement ..........................................................................................4

A. Legal background. ..........................................................4

B. Proceedings below. .........................................................7

Reasons for granting the petition ................................................. 10

The courts of appeals are divided. .................................... 10

II. This is a critically important question. ............................ 12

III. The decision below is wrong. ............................................ 14

IV. This case is an ideal vehicle. ............................................. 17

Conclusion ...................................................................................... 18

Appendix

Court of appeals opinion (Apr. 25, 2025) ...................................... 1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

James v. United States,

550 U.S. 192 (2007)....................................................................... 6

Mistretta v. United States,

488 U.S. 361 (1989)....................................................................... 4

Rita v. United States,

551 U.S. 338 (2007)....................................................................... 4

United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005) .................................................... 1, 2, 4–6, 12

United States v. Boukamp,

105 F.4th 717 (5th Cir. 2024) ...................................................... 10

United States v. Brewster,

116 F.4th 1051 (9th Cir. 2024) ...............................................11, 12

United States v. Cortez,

139 F.4th 1146 (10th Cir. 2025) .......................................11, 13, 16

United States v. Garcia,

946 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2020) ....................................................11

United States v. Huckaby,

43 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 1995) ......................................................... 16

United States v. Lucero,

130 F.4th 877 (10th Cir. 2025) ...............................................11, 17

United States v. Martin,

2025 WL 1835928 (6th Cir. July 3, 2025) ............................ 12, 13

United States v. Thibodeaux,

2025 WL 1177266 (5th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025) ................................. 10

United States v. Willingham,

497 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2007) ...................................... 9, 10, 14–16

United States v. Zuniga-Peralta,

442 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2006) ......................................................... 6

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) ........................................................ 1, 4, 5, 12

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)....................................................................... 5

21 U.S.C. § 952(a)............................................................................. 8

21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1) ........................................................................ 8

21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1) ........................................................................ 8

28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) .................................................................... 5

28 U.S.C. § 994(f) .............................................................................. 5

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .......................................................................... 4

Other Authorities

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2023 Annual Report ....................................... 6

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n,

Judiciary Sentencing Information (JSIN) ........................... 6, 7, 9

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Sentencing Resources Guide .......................... 6

Sentencing Guidelines

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) ...................................................................... 8

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4) ....................................................................... 8

JESUS GARCIA, JR., PETITIONER,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Jesus Garcia, Jr., respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

INTRODUCTION

Congress’s basic aim when enacting the Sentencing Reform Act

of 1984 was “ensuring similar sentences for those who have

committed similar crimes in similar ways.” United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220, 252 (2005). So Congress instructed sentencing courts

to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). And when courts of appeals review whether a

sentence is reasonable, a crucial purpose is “helping to avoid

excessive sentencing disparities.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.

To help courts with this admittedly difficult task, the United

States Sentencing Commission has compiled comprehensive,

nationwide sentencing data in an online resource known as

Judiciary Sentencing Information (JSIN). JSIN provides courts

with

detailed

information—like

the

average

sentence—for

similarly situated defendants: defendants who were sentenced

under the same guideline with the same total offense level and the

same criminal history category. It is hard to imagine more precise

or pertinent information for considering whether a defendant’s

sentence diverges from similarly situated defendants nationwide.

The Fifth Circuit, however, refused to consider JSIN statistics

showing that Jesus Garcia, Jr.’s sentence was more than double the

sentence received by similarly situated defendants. The court

deemed Garcia’s reliance on JSIN “misguided” and the JSIN

statistics themselves “basically meaningless.” App. 5a (cleaned up).

The court’s flat rejection of these statistics frustrates Congress’s

goal of achieving increased uniformity in sentencing. And the

court’s decision is indefensible on the merits. The court relied

entirely on circuit precedent rejecting reliance on much less precise

pre-JSIN sentencing statistics. But the court ignored that JSIN’s

granular information remedies the court’s criticisms of those

earlier statistics. And if the detailed JSIN statistics are not enough

to show an unwarranted sentencing disparity, the Fifth Circuit has

made it impossible for defendants to ever make such a showing.

The courts of appeals are split over this issue. Like the Fifth

Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has held that JSIN statistics are

immaterial to analyzing unwarranted sentencing disparities based

solely on circuit precedent rejecting broader pre-JSIN sentencing

statistics. By contrast, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have reached

the commonsense conclusion that JSIN is relevant—although not

dispositive—when evaluating whether a sentence creates an

unwarranted sentencing disparity. The government should also be

concerned about the Fifth and Tenth Circuit’s flat rejection of the

JSIN data because the government acknowledges that JSIN is

relevant to § 3553(a)(6) and routinely cites JSIN to show that a

defendant’s sentence does not create a sentencing disparity.

This Court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split on

this critically important sentencing issue.

OPINION BELOW

The Fifth Circuit’s opinion is not reported but is available at

2025 WL 1202209 and is reproduced at App. 1a–6a.

JURISDICTION

The Fifth Circuit entered its judgment on April 25, 2025. This

Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 3553(a)(6) of Title 18 of the United States Code

provides: “The court, in determining the particular sentence to be

imposed, shall consider … the need to avoid unwarranted sentence

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been

found guilty of similar conduct.”

STATEMENT

Legal background.

1. Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to

address “[f]undamental and widespread dissatisfaction” with the

then-prevailing regime of discretionary sentencing. Mistretta v.

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989). That earlier regime

resulted in “great variation among sentences imposed by different

judges upon similarly situated offenders.” Id. So a basic goal of the

Sentencing Reform Act was to ensure “uniformity in sentencing by

narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different

federal courts for similar criminal conduct.” Rita v. United States,

551 U.S. 338, 349 (2007) (cleaned up); see Booker, 543 U.S. at 253

(“Congress’ basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was to move

the sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.”).

Congress advanced this goal in several ways. First, Congress

directed the Sentencing Commission to develop the Sentencing

Guidelines, paying particular attention to the goal of “reducing

unwarranted sentencing disparities.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(f); see also id.

§ 991(b)(1)(B). Second, Congress required sentencing courts to

impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range absent

circumstances justifying a departure. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1). Third,

Congress instructed sentencing courts to consider “the need to avoid

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id.

§ 3553(a)(6).

Of course, this Court struck down the statutory provision

requiring sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the

Guidelines range, as well as a provision requiring de novo review

of departures. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259. But the Court emphasized

that the remaining system—advisory Guidelines with sentencing

decisions subject to appellate review for reasonableness—would

“continue to move sentencing in Congress’ preferred direction,

helping

avoid

excessive

sentencing

disparities

while

maintaining flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences where

necessary.” Id. at 264–65. After all, appellate courts are guided by

the § 3553(a) factors—including the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities—when determining whether a sentence is

unreasonable. Id. at 261. So the Court explained that appellate

review would “tend to iron out sentencing differences.” Id. at 263.

2. The Sentencing Commission developed JSIN to provide

judges “access to sentencing data for similarly situated individuals,

including the types of sentences imposed and average and median

sentences.” U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 2023 Annual Report 2; see U.S.

Sent’g

Comm’n,

Judiciary

Sentencing

Information

(JSIN),

http://jsin.ussc.gov/. The Commission “collects detailed sentencing

data on virtually every federal criminal case” and “maintain[s] a

comprehensive database on all federal sentences.” James v. United

States, 550 U.S. 192, 206 (2007) (cleaned up) (first quote); United

States v. Zuniga-Peralta, 442 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (second

quote). In 2021, the Commission harnessed this extensive database

and launched JSIN “with the needs of judges in mind.” U.S. Sent’g

Comm’n, Sentencing Resources Guide 12.

In particular, JSIN allows a user to filter by the primary offense

guideline—the guideline producing the highest final offense level—

that a defendant is sentenced under. See U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, JSIN,

supra. After clicking on the cell in the sentencing table

corresponding to a particular total offense level and criminal history

category, JSIN will show information for other defendants who have

been sentenced under the same guideline over the past five years

with the same total offense level and the same criminal history

score. See id. JSIN will show what percentage of those defendants

received a sentence of imprisonment; how many of those defendants

received a sentence within, above, and below the Guidelines range;

and the average and median length of imprisonment. See id. For

controlled substance offenses, the data is even more granular. JSIN

allows users to select the particular substance that produced the

highest base offense level. See id.

Proceedings below.

1. This appeal arises from a routine drug-importation case. In

early 2021, Garcia entered the United States from Mexico through

a port of entry in Eagle Pass, Texas. C.A. ROA 57. After noticing

several air fresheners hanging from the rearview mirror of

Garcia’s truck, an officer directed Garcia to the secondary

inspection area. Id. While searching his truck, officers found 15

plastic-wrapped bricks in the truck’s dashboard. Id. A laboratory

analysis confirmed that the substance was cocaine with a net

weight of 15.007 kilograms. Id. at 58.

2. An indictment charged Garcia with importing 5 kilograms or

more of a mixture containing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1), (b)(1). C.A. ROA 14. Garcia pleaded guilty.

Id. at 127–28.

At sentencing, the district court adopted a Sentencing

Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months. C.A. ROA 146. That range was

calculated using the base offense level for offenses involving at least

15 kilograms but less than 50 kilograms of cocaine. Id. at 170; see

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(4). During a bench conference, the

district court noted that, “given the quantity” of cocaine, it did not

“like the guidelines range.” C.A. ROA 163. The government then

asked for an above-Guidelines sentence based on “the quantity of

the cocaine.” Id. at 146. Finding that “the advisory guidelines are

not adequate,” the court upwardly varied and sentenced Garcia to

108 months in prison. Id. at 65–66, 149.

3. Garcia appealed, arguing that the district court’s upward

variance in an otherwise unremarkable drug-importation case was

unreasonable. First, Garcia argued that the district court

improperly relied on drug quantity to justify its upward variance.

As he explained, the Guidelines accounted for the drug quantity—

an objective, empirical measurement—and he was on the very low

end of the weight range (15 to 50 kilograms) used to calculate his

offense level. Second, Garcia argued that the district court created

a vast and unjustified sentencing disparity. He cited JSIN

statistics showing that defendants sentenced under the same

guideline (§ 2D1.1) whose offense involved the same drug (cocaine)

with the same offense level (25) and the same criminal history

category (I) received an average sentence of just 47 months. See

U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, JSIN, supra. Garcia, by contrast, received a

sentence more than twice as long—108 months.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed. App. 1a–6a. The court held that

“though Garcia avers that he received a higher sentence than other

similarly situated defendants, his reliance on sentencing statistics

is misguided.” Id. at 5a. According to the court, “[s]uch averages

‘only reflect a broad grouping of sentences imposed on a broad

grouping of criminal defendants and are basically meaningless in

considering whether a disparity with respect to a particular

defendant is warranted or unwarranted.’” Id. (quoting United

States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541, 544–45 (5th Cir. 2007)). The

court also held that the district court acted within its discretion by

varying based on drug quantity. Id. at 5a–6a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The courts of appeals are divided.

The courts of appeals are divided over whether the JSIN

statistics are relevant to analyzing unwarranted sentencing

disparities under § 3553(a)(6). The Fifth and Tenth Circuits each

hold that the JSIN statistics offer no insight into whether a

sentencing disparity is unwarranted. By contrast, the Sixth and

Ninth Circuits have held that JSIN is relevant to this inquiry. This

entrenched circuit split warrants the Court’s review.

1. Below, the Fifth Circuit deemed Garcia’s reliance on JSIN

“misguided.” App. 5a. The Court relied on an earlier decision

holding that average sentences “only reflect a broad grouping of

sentences imposed on a broad grouping of criminal defendants” and

“are basically meaningless in considering whether a disparity with

respect to a particular defendant is warranted or unwarranted.” Id.

(quoting Willingham, 497 F.3d at 544–45). In other cases—

including a published, precedential decision—the Fifth Circuit has

likewise dismissed JSIN data as “irrelevant” or “unavailing” based

on its earlier precedent. See United States v. Boukamp, 105 F.4th

717, 738 (5th Cir. 2024) (first quote); United States v. Thibodeaux,

2025 WL 1177266, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 23, 2025) (second quote).

2. The Tenth Circuit has also held that JSIN is not relevant to

analyzing sentencing disparities. United States v. Cortez, 139 F.4th

1146, 1156 (10th Cir. 2025). In the court’s view, “bare national

statistics do not shed light on the extent to which the sentences that

the statistics pertain to involve defendants that are similarly

situated to [the current defendant].” Id. (quoting United States v.

Garcia, 946 F.3d 1191, 1215 (10th Cir. 2020)).

A concurring opinion, however, disagreed. The concurrence

explained that the circuit precedent the majority relied on in

rejecting national sentencing statistics involved “broad statistics”

for all “firearms defendants.” Id. at 1157–58 (McHugh, J.,

concurring). By contrast, “the JSIN statistics encompass defendants

with the same criminal history score—meaning defendants with

similar, but not identical, records—who were found guilty of the

same conduct.” Id. at 1158. In the concurrence’s view, JSIN

statistics “may provide an important data point when selecting a

sentence.” Id.; see United States v. Lucero, 130 F.4th 877, 890 (10th

Cir. 2025) (McHugh, J., concurring) (“while the JSIN data do not

dictate a particular decision, … they are relevant to [§ 3553(a)(6)]”).

3. Unlike the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has

held that the JSIN statistics are “highly relevant” to the task of

avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities. United States v.

Brewster, 116 F.4th 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2024). As the court

explained, the JSIN statistics come from “a reliable source” and are

“designed specifically for judges to use during sentencing to fulfill

their obligations under § 3553(a)(6).” Id. at 1062.

4. The Sixth Circuit has also held that JSIN statistics are

relevant to analyzing unwarranted sentencing disparities. United

States v. Martin, 2025 WL 1835928, at *3 (6th Cir. July 3, 2025). In

Martin, the “the district court recognized that JSIN offered ‘the best

tool ... we have to discern’ unwarranted sentencing disparities” and

sentenced the defendant “in line with the average sentence under

the JSIN statistics.” Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the district

court was well within its discretion to consider JSIN. Id. As the

court explained, JSIN statistics “provide a snapshot of how judges

nationally have sentenced individuals with comparably serious

offenses and criminal histories.” Id.

II.

This is a critically important question.

The Court should grant the petition because the question is

critically important. Congress has instructed sentencing courts to

“avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). And when a court of appeals reviews whether a

sentence is unreasonable, a crucial purpose is “helping to avoid

excessive sentencing disparities.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. But the

Fifth and Tenth Circuits have cut off the “‘the best tool ... we have

to discern’ unwarranted sentencing disparities.” Martin, 2025 WL

1835928, at *3 (quoting district court). Indeed, if the Sentencing

Commission’s comprehensive JSIN statistics are “meaningless,”

App. 5a, “it is unclear … what further information a defendant could

provide that would be relevant to this factor,” Cortez, 139 F.4th at

1158 (McHugh, J., concurring); see infra 16–17.

Even the government agrees that “JSIN data … ties into a

Section 3553(a) factor, specifically, the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities.” Gov’t Br. 30, United States v. McDaniel,

No. 22-1448 (8th Cir. Sept. 2, 2022). And the government routinely

cites JSIN as evidence that a defendant’s sentence does not create

a sentencing disparity. See, e.g., Gov’t Br. 10 n.4, United States v.

Hines, No. 24-60172 (5th Cir. July 24, 2024) (citing JSIN to argue

that the median sentence was not “disproportionately lower” than

the defendant’s sentence); Gov’t Br. 26, United States v. Butler, No.

21-5589 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) (citing JSIN to argue that “Butler’s

sentence is typical rather than disparate”).

In short, this question is critically important because the Fifth

and Tenth Circuits prevent both defendants and the government

from citing the most relevant information for evaluating whether a

defendant’s sentence diverges from similarly situated defendants

and, by doing so, gut a central aim of the Sentencing Reform Act—

nationwide uniformity in sentencing.

III.

The decision below is wrong.

The Fifth Circuit’s refusal to consider the JSIN statistics is

wrong on the merits. The court relied entirely on its earlier

Willingham decision. App. 5a (quoting 497 F.3d at 544–45). But

Willingham rejected reliance on more rudimentary pre-JSIN

sentencing statistics, and the court’s criticisms of those statistics

do not apply to the detailed, more granular JSIN data.

In Willingham, the district court relied on statistics showing

the average sentence imposed under the same guideline with no

further details. 497 F.3d at 543. The Fifth Circuit held that the

district court clearly erred. Id. at 544. The court explained that

“[n]ational averages of sentences that provide no details

underlying the sentences are unreliable to determine unwarranted

disparity because they do not reflect the enhancements or

adjustments for the aggravating or mitigating factors that

distinguish individual cases.” Id. For example, the court was

concerned that the average sentence did not reflect “serious

aggravating factors” that added 13 levels to the defendant’s base

offense level. Id. The statistics also said “nothing about the

similarity (or lack thereof) of [the defendant’s] record” compared to

other defendants. Id. at 545. In other words, the average sentence

“only reflect[s] a broad grouping of sentences” and is “basically

meaningless in considering whether a disparity with respect to a

particular defendant is warranted or unwarranted.” Id. at 544–45.

The JSIN statistics, by contrast, are far more detailed. First,

unlike the average sentence at issue in Willingham, JSIN

“reflect[s] the enhancements or adjustments for the aggravating or

mitigating factors that distinguish individual cases.” See 497 F.3d

at 544. After all, JSIN shows the average sentence for offenders

sentenced under the same guideline with the same total offense

level, reflecting aggravating or mitigating factors based on specific

offense characteristics in Chapter 2 of the Guidelines and any

adjustments in Chapter 3. Second, JSIN differs from the statistics

at issue in Willingham because it accounts for “the similarity (or

lack thereof) of [a defendant’s] record.” See 497 F.3d at 545. Indeed,

JSIN provides the average sentence for defendants with the same

criminal history category. Unlike the bare-bones statistics in

Willingham, the granular JSIN statistics provide a valid basis to

evaluate the factors that § 3553(a)(6) is concerned with: whether the

defendant and other offenders committed “similar conduct” and

have “similar records.” So the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of JSIN data

based on inapposite precedent was wrong. 1

Even more concerning, the Fifth Circuit’s flat refusal to consider

JSIN makes it effectively impossible for a defendant to ever

establish an unwarranted sentencing disparity. A defendant would

presumably start by searching for other defendants nationwide

convicted of the same crime. Even putting aside the time-consuming

nature of that task, a defendant would soon run into roadblocks. A

defendant could not determine the “enhancements or adjustments

for the aggravating or mitigating factors” that applied in each case

or the criminal records of these other defendants. See Willingham,

497 F.3d at 544–45. To be sure, a presentence report usually has a

detailed account of the offense conduct and a Guidelines calculation.

But those reports are “ordinarily kept confidential to protect the

sentencing process, the defendant’s privacy interest, and those

people who have cooperated with criminal investigations.” United

States v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 136 (5th Cir. 1995). Although the

Sentencing Commission has access to that information—and has

compiled it in JSIN—individual defendants do not. Thus, the Fifth

1 The Tenth Circuit’s rejection of JSIN data also incorrectly relied on

circuit precedent analyzing less detailed pre-JSIN statistics. See Cortez,

139 F.4th at 1157–58 (McHugh, J., concurring) (distinguishing earlier

“broad statistics” from JSIN and concluding that “not all sentencing

statistics are alike”).

Circuit’s rejection of JSIN statistics directly tracking the factors in

§ 3553(a)(6) effectively reads that provision out of the statute—not

only on appellate review but also in district courts at sentencing.

IV.

This case is an ideal vehicle.

This case presents an ideal vehicle for addressing whether JSIN

statistics are relevant to analyzing unwarranted sentencing

disparities. There are no jurisdictional problems, factual disputes,

or preservation issues. Garcia cited JSIN statistics to argue that his

sentence was unreasonable, and the Fifth Circuit directly

addressed—and rejected—his argument. App. 5a. And this was a

run-of-the-mill drug-importation prosecution. Some cases may

implicate other statutory sentencing factors justifying a sentencing

disparity. See Lucero, 130 F.4th at 891 (McHugh, J., concurring)

(explaining that defendant’s “egregious conduct underlying the

offense of conviction and his long history of similar conduct”

warranted a sentence more than double the average sentence). Not

so here. Garcia is as close to the mine-run defendant as possible. So

if national uniformity is the goal, he deserved a sentence close to

the nationwide average. The sentence the district court imposed—

more than double the average sentence received by similarly

situated defendants—creates a clearly unwarranted sentencing

disparity.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.