Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ahmad Abouammo, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJul 16, 2025

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No. 25IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

_____________

AHMAD ABOUAMMO,

v.

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

_____________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

_____________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_____________

CARMEN SMARANDOIU

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA

450 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102

TOBIAS S. LOSS-EATON

Counsel of Record

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-8427

tlosseaton@sidley.com

JEFFREY T. GREEN

DANIELLE HAMILTON

THE CARTER G. PHILLIPS/

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

SUPREME COURT CLINIC

NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER

SCHOOL OF LAW

375 East Chicago Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611

JAMES R. HORNER

ANA PAJAR BLINDER

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

787 7th Avenue

New York, NY 10019

Counsel for Petitioner

July 16, 2025

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

As part of an investigation into a scheme to disclose

nonpublic Twitter account information to foreign actors, San Francisco–based FBI agents visited Petitioner Ahmad Abouammo at his home in Seattle.

While they were there, Mr. Abouammo went upstairs

and emailed them an allegedly falsified document. Mr.

Abouammo’s only interaction with the agents occurred

in Seattle.

A grand jury in the Northern District of California

indicted Mr. Abouammo for (among other things) falsifying documents with the intent to impede an investigation. The parties then agreed to toll the statute of

limitations for other uncharged offenses. On the day

the tolling agreement expired, the government filed a

superseding information adding various felony counts.

Mr. Abouammo never waived prosecution by indictment. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). Four months after

the limitations period had expired, the government

dismissed this placeholder information and replaced it

with a superseding indictment containing the same

charges.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether venue is proper in a district where no

offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur

there.

2. Whether a criminal information unaccompanied

by a waiver of indictment is an “information charging

a felony” that allows the government to unilaterally

extend the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3288.

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner is Ahmad Abouammo.

Respondent is the United States of America.

No corporate parties are involved in this case.

iii

RELATED CASES

This case arises from the following proceedings in

the District Court for the Northern District of California and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:

United States v. Abouammo

No. 22-10348 (9th Cir.); and

United States v. Abouammo

No. 19-cr-621-EMC-1 (N.D. Cal.).

No other proceedings directly relate to this case.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions presented .................................................... i

Parties to the proceeding ............................................ ii

Related cases ..............................................................iii

Table of authorities................................................... .vi

Petition for a writ of certiorari ................................... 1

Opinions and orders below ......................................... 1

Statement of jurisdiction ............................................ 1

Constitutional and statutory provisions

involved .................................................................. 1

Introduction ................................................................ 3

Statement of the case ................................................. 5

Reasons for granting the petition .............................. 9

I. The Court should grant review to decide

when an offense’s intended effects can

establish venue. ..................................................... 9

A. The circuits are openly split on when

an offense’s intended effects can

support venue. ............................................ 9

B. The decision below is wrong. .................... 14

C. This case is an ideal vehicle to decide

this important and recurring issue. ......... 17

II. The Court should grant review to decide

whether a waiverless felony information tolls

the statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3288. .................................................................. 19

Conclusion ................................................................. 26

v

Appendices

Appendix A: Opinion and Concurrence, United

States v. Abouammo, No. 22-10348 (9th Cir.

Dec. 4, 2024).......................................................

1a

Appendix B: Order Denying Defendant’s Motion

for Judgment of Acquittal (Rule 29), and Motion for New Trial (Rule 33), United States v.

Abouammo, No. 3:19-CR-00621-EMC-1 (N.D.

Cal. Dec. 12, 2022) ............................................. 48a

Appendix C: Order Denying Rehearing, United

States v. Abouammo, No. 22-10348 (9th Cir.

Mar. 18, 2025) .................................................... 98a

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988) ..........

5

Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214

(1965) ........................................................ 22, 23

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213

(1967) .........................................................

20

Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959)...

21

Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112

(1970) .........................................................

23

United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699

(1946) ........................................................ 14, 15

United States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539 (9th

Cir. 1997), abrogated by United States v.

Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998) .......... 10, 16, 17, 18

United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525

(3d Cir. 2014) ...................................... 10, 11, 18

United States v. B.G.G., 53 F.4th 1353

(11th Cir. 2022) ........................................ 20, 22

United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d 302 (4th

Cir. 2000) ........................................ 4, 11, 12, 15

United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1

(1998) ......................................................... 16, 17

United States v. Clenney, 434 F.3d 780 (5th

Cir. 2005) ........................................... 4, 5, 12, 16

United States v. Gatz, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1317

(S.D. Fla. 2023) ................................. 22, 24, 25

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307

(1971) ......................................................... 19, 20

United States v. Miller, 808 F.3d 607 (2d

Cir. 2015) .................................................. 15, 16

United States v. Peloquin, 810 F.2d 911

20

(9th Cir. 1987) ...........................................

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526

U.S. 275 (1999) ..................................... 3, 15, 19

United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161 (1st

Cir. 2004) .................................... 4, 9, 10, 13, 16

United States v. Smith, 22 F.4th 1236

(11th Cir. 2022), aff’d on other grounds,

599 U.S. 236 (2023) ............................ 12, 13, 16

United States v. Spirito, 36 F.4th 191 (4th

Cir. 2022) ...................................................

15

United States v. Swann, 441 F.2d 1053

(D.C. Cir. 1971) .........................................

13

United States v. Teran, 98 F.3d 831 (5th

Cir. 1996) ...................................................

21

United States v. Webster, 127 F.4th 318

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1461

(2025) .........................................................

20

United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267 (D.C.

Cir. 1989) ...................................................

13

Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885) ..........

24

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. V ................................... 1, 21

U.S. Const. amend. VI.................................. 1, 14

U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 3 ......................... 1, 14

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) ..................................

10

§ 1030 ...........................................

10

§ 1071 ...........................................

11

§ 1343 ...........................................

6

§ 1346 ...........................................

6

§ 1349 ...........................................

6

§ 1519 ........................................... 2, 15

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued

Page

18 U.S.C. § 1542 ........................................

9

§ 1832(a) ....................................

12

§ 1956.........................................

6

§ 3282.........................................

22

§ 3282(a) ....................................

2

§ 3288...................... 2, 5, 8, 19, 20, 25

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) .....................................

1

Anti-Drug

Abuse

Act

of

1988,

Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 .........

23

RULES

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 .........................................

Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 .......................................

21

14

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

S. Rep. No. 88-1414 (1964) ...........................

134 Cong. Rec. S17360-02 (daily ed. Nov. 10,

1998), 1988 WL 182529 ............................

25

24

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Charge, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.

2024) ..........................................................

Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts

§ 43 (5th ed. 1994) .....................................

21

18

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Ahmad Abouammo respectfully petitions

for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion is reported at 122 F.4th

1072 and reproduced at Pet. App. 1a–47a. The unreported order denying panel rehearing and rehearing

en banc is reproduced at Pet. App. 98a. The district

court’s opinion is available at 2022 WL 175844238 and

reproduced at Pet. App. 48a–97a.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Ninth Circuit issued its judgment on December

4, 2024 and denied a timely rehearing petition on February 18, 2025. On June 9, 2015, Justice Kagan extended the time to file this petition to July 16, 2025.

The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article III provides, as relevant:

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall

be held in the State where the said Crimes shall

have been committed . . . .

The Fifth Amendment provides, as relevant:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .

The Sixth Amendment provides, as relevant:

2

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an

impartial jury of the State and district wherein

the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by

law . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1519 provides:

Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates,

conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object

with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence

the investigation or proper administration of any

matter within the jurisdiction of any department

or agency of the United States or any case filed

under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation

of any such matter or case, shall be fined under

this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or

both.

18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no

person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for

any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is

found or the information is instituted within five

years next after such offense shall have been committed.

18 U.S.C. § 3288 provides:

Whenever an indictment or information charging

a felony is dismissed for any reason after the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations has expired, a new indictment may be returned in the appropriate jurisdiction within six

calendar months of the date of the dismissal of

the indictment or information, or, in the event of

3

an appeal, within 60 days of the date the dismissal of the indictment or information becomes final, or, if no regular grand jury is in session in the

appropriate jurisdiction when the indictment or

information is dismissed, within six calendar

months of the date when the next regular grand

jury is convened, which new indictment shall not

be barred by any statute of limitations.

INTRODUCTION

This case raises two important questions of federal

criminal procedure, one of which has generated an

acknowledged circuit split.

First: When can a criminal offense’s intended effects

establish venue for prosecution?

Article III and the Sixth Amendment mandate that

crimes be prosecuted where they were committed.

Thus, proper venue turns on the location of “the conduct constituting the offense”—meaning its “essential

conduct elements.”

United States v. RodriguezMoreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279–80 (1999). This Court has

reserved the question of whether venue “may permissibly be based upon the effects of a defendant’s conduct

in a district other than the one in which the defendant

performs the acts constituting the offense.” Id. at 279

n.2.

Absent guidance on that question, the circuits have

openly split. The Ninth Circuit held below that Mr.

Abouammo could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1519 in San Francisco for allegedly falsifying documents in Seattle. Because § 1519 requires that the defendant have acted “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” an investigation, the court concluded that “the contemplated [obstructive] effects are

part of the ‘essential conduct’ of the offense for venue

4

purposes.” Pet. App. 37a. And, the court said, there is

“no . . . requirement that the statute proscribe conduct

that . . . actually affects or interferes with something

in the venue.” Id. at 42a.

At least six circuits disagree—with some explicitly

rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as “dubious,”

“unpersuasive,” and “inconsistent with” this Court’s

decisions. E.g., United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161,

168 (1st Cir. 2004). These other courts hold, in various

contexts, that venue can be based on an offense’s effects “only when an essential conduct element is itself

defined in terms of its effects”—for example, when an

element requires conduct “‘affecting’ interstate commerce” or “‘obstructing’ or ‘impeding’ the administration of justice.” E.g., United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d

302, 311, 313 (4th Cir. 2000). It is not enough that the

statute required the defendant to intend a particular

effect; such an intent element “is plainly not an ‘essential conduct element’” for venue purposes. E.g., United

States v. Clenney, 434 F.3d 780, 782 (5th Cir. 2005)

(per curiam).

The other circuits are right and the Ninth Circuit is

wrong. If a statute “contemplates” effects only through

an intent requirement, then those effects are not part

of any essential conduct element. Intent is not conduct. In any event, the relevant element in this situation is the intent itself, not the intended effects. And

“the intent element is a mental state that cannot have

been ‘committed’ anywhere but where [the defendant]

was physically present.” Id. Because Mr. Abouammo

allegedly formed and acted on his obstructive intent in

Seattle, venue in San Francisco is improper.

Second: Can the government unilaterally extend the

statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3288 by filing

a felony information—even if the defendant never

waived indictment for felony charges?

5

Below, the Ninth Circuit blessed a novel maneuver

by which the government bought itself several extra

months, beyond the limitations period, to file additional felony charges. Section 3288 gives the government six months after the dismissal of “an indictment

or information charging a felony” to refile charges in

“a new indictment” without timeliness problems (provided the dismissal was not based on a time bar to

begin with). The government used this procedure to

effectively extend the limitations period from April to

July 2020 by filing a placeholder information on the

day the limitations period was set to expire, which it

then dismissed once it was finally ready to file a superseding indictment containing identical charges.

This was improper. Federal felonies “must be prosecuted by indictment, unless the defendant waives this

right.” FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 n.10 (1988).

Mr. Abouammo never did so. Thus, the information

the government filed within the limitations period was

a nullity—it could not be used to prosecute him. In

§ 3288’s terms, a felony information filed without a

waiver of indictment is not an “information charging a

felony” because it does not validly charge anything.

The Court should grant review to make clear that Congress has not authorized this sort of naked gamesmanship.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. As part of its investigation into the disclosure of

nonpublic Twitter account information to an associate

of now-Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin

Salman, the FBI flew agents from its San Francisco

office to Mr. Abouammo’s home in Seattle. Pet. App.

10a. Mr. Abouammo was a former Twitter employee

who allegedly accessed company databases about the

platform’s users and provided personal information

6

about a Saudi dissident user to a Saudi national. After

leaving Twitter, he started a freelance social media

consultancy. Id. at 9a.

Upon meeting Mr. Abouammo, the agents identified

themselves as “FBI agents from the San Francisco office.” Pet. App. 10a. They then spoke with him in his

home for several hours. Id. During this conversation,

Mr. Abouammo said that he had worked with a particular Saudi official after leaving Twitter. When the

agents asked for documentation, he went upstairs and

created and emailed them an allegedly false invoice for

these consulting services. Id. at 11a.

2. Mr. Abouammo was indicted in the Northern District of California in November 2019 for one count of

acting as an agent of a foreign government under 18

U.S.C. § 951 and one count of falsifying records under

§ 1519. Pet. App. 11a–12a. In February 2020, the parties agreed to toll the statute of limitations to April 7,

2020 to discuss a possible plea deal. Id.

When the government asked for another tolling

agreement, Mr. Abouammo declined. Thus, on April

7—the day the existing agreement was set to expire—

the government filed a superseding information adding fifteen counts of wire and honest services fraud, 18

U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, one count of conspiracy to commit those offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and three counts

of international money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956.

At the time, Mr. Abouammo had not (and still has not)

waived indictment for these felony charges.

In July 2020, after grand jury proceedings resumed—having been halted in light of the Covid-19

pandemic—the grand jury returned a superseding indictment containing the same charges as the April

2020 information. Pet. App. 12a.

7

3. Mr. Abouammo moved to dismiss the § 1519 falsifying-records charge for improper venue and the wire

fraud, conspiracy, and money laundering charges as

time-barred. Pet. App. 12a. The district court denied

the motion.

After a two-week jury trial, Mr.

Abouammo was convicted on six counts of the superseding indictment. Id.

After trial, Mr. Abouammo again sought dismissal of

his conviction for falsification of records for lack of

venue. Pet. App. 77a. The district court again rejected

his argument. Id.

4. The Ninth Circuit upheld Mr. Abouammo’s convictions.

As to venue, the court emphasized that § 1519’s intent element “expressly contemplates the effect of influencing the action of another.” Pet. App. 37a (cleaned

up). Given this “express connection between the actus

reus and its contemplated effect,” the court said, “the

contemplated effects are part of the ‘essential conduct’

of the offense for venue purposes.” Id. Thus, “the statute of conviction need not . . . require ‘actual’ adverse

effects or interference in a district for effects-based

venue to be proper there.” Id. at 42a. That is, “language such as ‘for the purpose of’ or ‘with the intent

to’” suffices to expand venue to any district where the

intended-but-not-required effect could have occurred.

Id. On this view, Mr. Abouammo’s “act of making a

false document” with obstructive intent “continued until”—and occurred wherever—“the document was received by the person or persons whom it was intended

to affect or influence,” even if he did not know who or

where those particular people were. Id. at 39a

(cleaned up).

On the statute of limitations, the Ninth Circuit held

that the government’s April 2020 information—filed

8

without any waiver of indictment—sufficed to toll the

limitations period. That holding relied on 18 U.S.C.

§ 3288, which provides that, if “an indictment or information charging a felony is dismissed for any reason

after the [applicable limitations] period . . . has expired,” the government may bring “a new indictment”

within six months of the dismissal without being timebarred. See Pet. App. 26a. The court held that this

requirement was met because “the superseding information was filed on April 7, 2020, within the statute of

limitations,” and the “superseding indictment in this

case was returned within six months of the dismissal

of the April 7, 2020 information” (indeed, on the same

day). Id.

The court thus rejected Mr. Abouammo’s argument

that this tolling mechanism requires an “information

accompanied by a waiver of indictment.” Pet. App.

26a. The court noted that the statute previously referred to an “information filed after the defendant

waives in open court prosecution by indictment,” but

Congress omitted that language in 1988. Id. at 27a

(emphasis omitted) (cleaned up).

Judge Lee concurred to agree that, under circuit

precedent, “the Northern District of California was a

proper venue.” Pet. App. 46a. He also warned that

courts “should be wary of . . . attempts by the government to cherry-pick favored venues through pretextual

reliance on out-of-district agents,” though he did not

believe this was such a case. Id. at 47a.

The Ninth Circuit denied Mr. Abouammo’s timely

petition for panel and en banc rehearing.

9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The Court should grant review to decide

when an offense’s intended effects can establish venue.

There is an acknowledged six-to-one circuit split on

whether venue can rest on an offense’s intended effects

that are not essential to conviction. Courts on both

sides have had ample time to consider this question in

light of Rodriguez-Moreno and each other’s positions.

And the Ninth Circuit’s rule violates the Constitution’s

command to focus on acts the defendant committed.

This Court should resolve this split.

A. The circuits are openly split on when an

offense’s intended effects can support

venue.

Most courts of appeals—at least the First, Third,

Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits— hold correctly that an offense’s effects can support venue only

when the effects are themselves an element of the offense. The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, reasons that

venue is proper whenever the statute “contemplates”

effects through an intent element.

1. The First Circuit holds that venue for passport

fraud—“knowingly mak[ing] any false statement . . .

with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport,” 18 U.S.C. § 1542—is proper where “an applicant

makes a knowingly false statement,” not where “the

false statement is actually communicated to” the relevant officials. United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161,

165–66 (1st Cir. 2004). In so holding, the court rejected the premise—adopted by the Ninth Circuit below—that a false-statement statute’s intent requirement “create[s] a continuing offense.” Id. at 168. If

the text “requires intent only at the moment the false

10

statement is made,” the crime is “a point-in-time offense, which can be prosecuted at the place of the false

statement but not at some different place where the

government” receives or acts on the statement. Id. at

169. “Allowing specific intent to continue a crime into

any district in which that intent has consequences,”

the court warned, “would significantly expand the

range of permissible venues.” Id.

The First Circuit also rejected the government’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s Angotti decision—the key

precedent underlying the decision below. See Pet.

App. 36a (holding that “Angotti governs” here); United

States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1997), abrogated by United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1

(1998). Angotti, the First Circuit said, “was decided

prior to the Supreme Court’s clarification of the standards [for] venue in Rodriguez-Moreno and Cabrales.”

Salinas, 373 F.3d at 168. Because “Angotti is inconsistent with those decisions,” it is “dubious” precedent

on its own terms, and its “reasoning [is] unpersuasive,”

the First Circuit “decline[d] to follow it.” Id.

The Third Circuit likewise determines venue

based on whether Congress defined a statutory violation “in terms of its effects.” See United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 537 (3d Cir. 2014). Auernheimer was charged in New Jersey with unauthorized

access to, and obtaining information from, a computer,

18 U.S.C. § 1030, and identity fraud, id. § 1028(a)(7).

The Third Circuit held that venue was improper. It

did not matter that the defendant allegedly had “the

intent to violate the New Jersey computer crime statute,” because “no essential conduct element of the alleged violation of New Jersey law occurred in New Jersey.” Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 536; see id. at 533–35.

Nor did it matter that thousands of email addresses

“belong[ing] to New Jersey residents” were among the

11

information unlawfully obtained. Id. at 536. The

Third Circuit could not find “any case where the locus

of the [offense’s] effects, standing by itself, was sufficient to confer constitutionally sound venue.” Id. at

537. Although “there are some instances where the location in which a crime’s effects are felt is relevant to

determining whether venue is proper,” “those cases

are reserved for situations in which an essential conduct element is itself defined in terms of its effects.”

Id. (cleaned up).

The Fourth Circuit, too, focuses on whether “the

terms of the statute itself forbid affecting [conduct] in

particular ways.” United States v. Bowens, 224 F.3d

302, 313 (4th Cir. 2000). Bowens was charged in Virginia with “harbor[ing] or conceal[ing]” a fugitive “so

as to prevent his discovery and arrest.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1071. The court held venue improper. “The only conduct proscribed by § 1071 is the act of harboring or concealing the fugitive,” so “venue will lie only where acts

of harboring or concealing take place.” Bowens, 224

F.3d at 309. And those acts occurred in South Carolina. Id. at 304–06.

It did not matter, the Bowens court explained, that

the harbored fugitives were being sought by federal officials in Virginia. While Congress may have criminalized fugitive harboring because of its harmful effects

on the administration of justice—which were felt in

Virginia—the statute’s “essential conduct element . . .

is not defined in terms of its particular effects.” Id. at

313. Though the statute contains the language “so as

to prevent the fugitive’s discovery and arrest,” that

phrase “defines the requisite intent for the offense”—

which is “not an essential conduct element.” Id.

(cleaned up).

In so holding, the Fourth Circuit recognized that this

Court’s decisions in Cabrales and Rodriguez-Moreno

12

had abrogated circuit precedent holding “that in prosecutions for crimes in the nature of obstruction of justice, venue is proper in the district where the obstruction would take effect.” Id. at 311.

The Fifth Circuit agrees. United States v. Clenney

addressed venue for the offense of removing a child

from the United States “with intent to obstruct the

lawful exercise of parental rights.” 434 F.3d 780, 781

(5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1204).

Though “none of the acts complained of in the indictment” occurred in the forum district, the government

said venue was proper because obstructive intent “is

an element of the offense, and [the other parent’s] parental rights were violated in” the forum district. Id.

at 781–82. The Fifth Circuit held otherwise. The obstructive-intent element “merely speaks to the offender’s mens rea as he commits the conduct essential

to the crime; it is plainly not an ‘essential conduct element’ as required by Rodriguez-Moreno.” Id. at 782. In

any event, the requisite intent “was formed and existed solely in the mind” of the defendant, so it “cannot

have been ‘committed’ anywhere but where he was

physically present.” Id.

The Eleventh Circuit likewise holds that “the effects of a crime are a permissible basis for venue” only

if the statute “contain[s] an essential element . . . defined in terms of the effects of the act.” United States

v. Smith, 22 F.4th 1236, 1243–44 (11th Cir. 2022), aff’d

on other grounds, 599 U.S. 236 (2023). Smith involved

theft of trade secrets, which requires as an element

that the defendant “intend[] or know[] that the offense

will[] injure any owner of that trade secret.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1832(a). Even so, venue was improper in a district

where the victim was located but none of the defendant’s conduct took place. As Chief Judge Pryor ex-

13

plained for the court, the “theft-of-trade-secrets statute does not define any essential conduct element of

the offense in terms of its effects on the owner of the

trade secret.” Smith, 22 F.4th at 1244. That theft necessarily involves “interference with the possessory interest of the owner” does not change the offense’s conduct elements. Id.

The D.C. Circuit also holds that venue “lies only in

a district in which the defendant committed unlawful

acts and is not proper in a district where only the effects of the crime occur,” unless those effects are elements of the offense. United States v. White, 887 F.2d

267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.). White

concerned a bribery prosecution under 18 U.S.C.

§ 201(c). Foreshadowing this Court’s approach in Rodriguez-Moreno, then-Judge Ginsburg’s opinion focused on whether any “acts necessary to establish the

crime of bribery occurred” in the District of Columbia.

Although the bribes apparently had their intended effect in the District because the recipient committed

“many official acts” there in exchange for payment,

that did not matter; “proof that [the bribee] was actually influenced in any such acts is not an element of

the bribery offense.” Id.; see also United States v.

Swann, 441 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (venue

for attempting to influence a witness was proper only

where the attempt took place, not where the witness

would testify).

2. The Ninth Circuit held below, by contrast, that

effects can establish venue whenever a statute “expressly contemplates” those effects. Pet. App. 42a. Relying on Angotti—which the First Circuit explicitly rejected in Salinas, 373 F.3d at 168—the Ninth Circuit

reasoned that “contemplated effects” are part of the essential conduct of an offense if the statute requires a

14

defendant to intend that his conduct have those effects, whether or not the effects are actually required

for conviction. Pet. App. 37a–38a. Though Mr.

Abouammo allegedly created and delivered the false

document to agents in his Seattle residence, the Ninth

Circuit held that the act of making a false document

continued until it was received by “‘the person or persons whom it [was] intended to affect or influence,’”

who happened to be in San Francisco. Id. at 39a (quoting Angotti, 105 F.3d at 543). It did not matter that

§ 1519 requires no actual influence or obstruction—

the intent element sufficed to permit venue wherever

the intended effects may be felt. Id. at 39a, 41a.

*

*

*

In at least the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh,

and D.C. Circuits, this case would come out the other

way. These courts all hold that an offense’s effects are

not grounds for venue unless those effects are themselves essential elements for conviction—which is not

the case just because the defendant must intend those

effects to occur.

B. The decision below is wrong.

The Constitution forecloses the Ninth Circuit’s rule

basing venue on an offense’s “contemplated” effects.

Article III commands that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes . . .

shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall

have been committed.” U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 3.

The Sixth Amendment adds that every accused shall

be tried “by an impartial jury of the State and district

wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Id.

amend. VI (emphasis added); accord Fed. R. Crim. P.

18. The crux of the constitutional venue analysis is

thus “the place of committing the crime”—the locus delicti. United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703

(1946).

15

In turn, “the locus delicti must be determined from

the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the

act or acts constituting it.” Id. Rodriguez-Moreno underscored this focus on the defendant’s “act or acts” by

holding that only an offense’s “essential conduct elements” can establish venue. 526 U.S. at 279–80.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision, however, looks not to

conduct, but to effects—and not effects that are required elements of the offense, but merely those the

defendant must intend, even if they never materialize.

As other circuits recognize, effects-based venue is

proper only “when an essential conduct element is itself defined in terms of its effects.” Bowens, 224 F.3d

at 311. That is not the case here.

As relevant, § 1519 criminalizes “knowingly . . . falsif[ying] . . . any record, document, or tangible object

with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the

investigation or proper administration of any matter

within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of

the United States.” This language requires three elements. The defendant must (1) knowingly (2) falsify a

document (3) with the intent to impede a federal investigation. See United States v. Spirito, 36 F.4th 191,

202 (4th Cir. 2022). The investigation need not actually exist; it can be merely “contemplat[ed].” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1519.

Under Rodriguez-Moreno, determining venue for a

§ 1519 prosecution turns on which of these elements

“are essential conduct elements.” 526 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added). The word “conduct” is important—Rodriguez-Moreno did not focus “simply [on] the essential

elements” of the offense, but on “where physical conduct occurred.” United States v. Miller, 808 F.3d 607,

615 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). “The determination of

criminal venue” thus turns on “the place of the relevant physical acts,” “not where criminal intent was

16

formed.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Clenney, 434 F.3d

at 782 (distinguishing between “an element of the offense” and “an essential conduct element”).

Only § 1519’s second element—falsifying the document—involves conduct. And it is undisputed that all

the conduct encompassed in that element occurred in

Seattle, not San Francisco. Pet. App. 10a–11a. Nor

does this conduct element refer in any way to the effects of the alleged falsification.

The first and third elements, by contrast, are mens

rea requirements. And “mens rea elements [are] irrelevant to venue.” Smith, 22 F.4th at 1243 (citing Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279). But even if the intent element could be deemed a conduct element, the

Ninth Circuit still erred by focusing on the location of

the intent’s object, rather than where the intent itself

was formed. Obstructive intent is “formed and exist[s]

solely in the mind” of the offender, so it cannot be “committed” anywhere but where the offender was physically present. Clenney, 434 F.3d at 782. There is no

contention that Mr. Abouammo formed the requisite

obstructive intent anywhere other than Seattle. Either way, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is wrong.

In holding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit relied almost

entirely on Angotti—a pre-Rodriguez-Moreno decision

whose venue analysis on a separate count this Court

has already rejected. See Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6. The

court below did not pause to examine Angotti for consistency with this Court’s later decisions. Cf. Salinas,

373 F.3d at 168. And Angotti itself did not focus on

essential conduct. Instead, it reasoned that “the act of

making a communication continues until the communication is received by the person or persons whom it

is intended to affect or influence,” even if “the statements did not have to reach their intended destination

in order to constitute a crime.” 105 F.3d at 543. That

17

holding, however, “has no support in the Sixth Amendment, in case law or in logic.” Id. at 546 (Norris, J.,

dissenting); id. at 547 (arguing that “crime was committed—it was over—when Angotti delivered the

fraudulent documents” in his home district).

The court below then mashed together Angotti’s continuing-communication theory with § 1519’s intent element to uphold venue on the theory that “§ 1519 expressly contemplates the effect of influencing” an investigation—even though it does not require any such effect. Pet. App. 37a (cleaned up). None of this comports

with Rodriguez-Moreno’s approach or the Constitution’s text.

Angotti aside, the Ninth Circuit also emphasized

that Mr. Abouammo “can hardly feign surprise at the

existence of a federal investigation being conducted in

the Northern District of California,” since “many other

features of this case . . . connect Abouammo to the

Northern District, most obviously his employment

with Twitter, which gave rise to the entire case.” Pet.

App. 43a. These considerations are improper. They

have nothing to do with where the offense was “committed” for constitutional venue purposes. The decision below is wrong.

C. This case is an ideal vehicle to decide

this important and recurring issue.

This petition presents a perfect chance to resolve the

split on effects-based venue. The facts are simple and

undisputed, the issue was pressed and passed upon at

each level below, and the Ninth Circuit denied Mr.

Abouammo’s rehearing petition, making clear that it

will not budge from its outlier position.

And this issue is vitally important. “Proper venue in

criminal proceedings was a matter of concern to the

Nation’s founders.” Cabrales, 524 U.S. at 6. It is a

18

bedrock principle that the accused stand trial only

where his alleged crime occurred. “In criminal cases

venue involves important considerations of policy,

with deep historical roots,” Charles A. Wright, Law of

Federal Courts § 43, at 271 (5th ed. 1994)—which led

to the Constitution “twice safeguard[ing] the defendant’s venue right” in express terms. Cabrales, 524 U.S.

at 6. Indeed, the proper place to be tried “was so important to the founding generation that it was listed

as a grievance in the Declaration of Independence.”

Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 532.

This issue also has significant practical importance.

The Ninth Circuit’s rule invites the government to forum-shop by sending investigators from its chosen

venue to the defendant’s location, or even just by forwarding materials around within its own offices. Indeed, while the agents here happened to mention that

they were from San Francisco, Pet. App. 43a, the

Ninth Circuit’s rule does not require the defendant to

know “where the information would ultimately be received”—it is enough for him to know that someone,

somewhere will receive it. Angotti, 105 F.3d at 543.

Nor does an offense end once a document first reaches

the recipient entity or agency; according to the Ninth

Circuit, the offense “continues” until—so venue is

proper wherever—the communications reach their final recipient. See id.; id. at 547 (Norris, J., dissenting). Thus, so long as federal agents duly forward a

defendant’s documents or statements to an office in

San Francisco, every defendant in the Ninth Circuit

can be prosecuted there. On a national level, the Ninth

Circuit’s rule is a recipe for many federal criminal

prosecutions to flow to Washington, D.C., or to any

other forum where the government feels it has an advantage. Cf. Pet. App. 47a (Lee, J., concurring) (expressing concern about “government officials trying to

19

game the system by involving agents from a particular

district with an eye towards asserting venue in what

they view as a favorable district”).

This question also arises often, as the sheer volume

of post-Rodriguez-Moreno cases attests. Indeed, this

issue can arise in every single prosecution based on a

government investigation, a false mortgage application, stolen trade secrets, computer hacking, international parental kidnapping, and any other offenses involving potential effects that can cross state or district

lines. The Court should grant review here to resolve

the question it reserved in Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S.

at 279 n.2.

II. The Court should grant review to decide

whether a waiverless felony information

tolls the statute of limitations under 18

U.S.C. § 3288.

Independently, the Ninth Circuit wrongly allowed

the government to bootstrap its way into a longer statute of limitations by filing a felony information on the

last day of the limitations period, knowing full well

that Mr. Abouammo did not and would not waive his

right to indictment by a grand jury. Absent a waiver,

this information was invalid, a mere placeholder.

Thus, it did not properly “charg[e] a felony” as required

to extend the limitations period under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3288.

This issue is critical to the administration of the

criminal justice system. Statutes of limitations “represent legislative assessments of relative interests of

the State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; they are made for the repose of society

and the protection of those who may (during the limitation) have lost their means of defence.” United

States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322 (1971) (cleaned

20

up). “These statutes provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant’s right to a fair trial would

be prejudiced.” Id. “Such a time limit may also have

the salutary effect of encouraging law enforcement officials promptly to investigate suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 323.

These interests, however, are gutted by a rule that

allows prosecutors to decide how much time they

should have to prosecute. Cf. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221–22 (1967) (the Sixth Amendment prohibited a state criminal procedure that allowed the prosecutor to toll the statute of limitations

indefinitely by entering a nolle prosequi). And the

Ninth Circuit is not the only court to bless such an aberrant rule. See United States v. Webster, 127 F.4th

318, 324 (11th Cir.) (holding that “filing an information without a waiver tolls the statute of limitations”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1461 (2025); Pet. App.

25a (citing cases).

Nothing in § 3288 contemplates such a dangerous result. This provision merely serves to “discourage defendants from delaying their motions to dismiss until

after the statute of limitations has run.” United States

v. Peloquin, 810 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1987) (A. Kennedy, J.). Before the Covid-19 pandemic, § 3288 was

“rarely used and [was] unheard of by most prosecutors.” United States v. B.G.G., 53 F.4th 1353, 1370 n.1

(11th Cir. 2022) (Wilson, J., dissenting). Since then,

however, prosecutors across the country have dusted

it off and used it “to achieve a tactical advantage in

derogation of [defendants’] rights.” Id. at 1371. This

Court should put a stop to that practice.

Section 3288 provides a six-month grace period only

if the government timely files “an indictment or information charging a felony,” which is then dismissed. 18

21

U.S.C. § 3288. The government did not indict Mr.

Abouammo for money laundering or wire fraud within

the limitations period. Pet. App. 23a–24a. So the key

question is whether the information it filed in April

2020, just as the limitations period was expiring, was

an “information charging a felony.” If not, § 3288 was

never triggered and the eventual indictment on these

counts was untimely.

The answer is no—the April 2020 information did

not trigger the statute. Under the Fifth Amendment,

“[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V.

Thus, a federal felony “must be prosecuted by an indictment” unless “the defendant—in open court and after being advised of the nature of the charge and of the

defendant’s rights—waives prosecution by indictment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a)–(b). Only after such a

waiver may a felony “be prosecuted by information.”

Id. So, absent indictment, a valid waiver is required

to “confer power on the convicting court to hear the

case.” Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959)

(emphasis added); United States v. Teran, 98 F.3d 831,

835 (5th Cir. 1996).

Against this backdrop, a felony information that is

not accompanied by a valid waiver of indictment does

not “charg[e] a felony,” as § 3288 requires. To “charge”

is to “accuse (a person) of an offense”—to bring a “formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to

prosecution.” See Charge, Black’s Law Dictionary

(12th ed. 2024). A waiverless information does not do

so, because it does not and cannot begin a felony prosecution. In the Constitution’s terms, a defendant need

not “answer for” felony allegations in an information

unless he waives indictment. U.S. Const. amend. V.

In turn, the government “should not be able to grant

22

itself a six-month extension of the statute of limitations whenever it wants, in every case, simply by filing

a patently defective and meaningless charging document, and then immediately dismissing it to invoke

the savings provisions of § 3288.” United States v.

Gatz, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2023). Trying to extend the limitations period by filing “a legal

nullity” is a “bad-faith gambit.” B.G.G., 53 F.4th at

1374–75 (Wilson, J., dissenting).

This analysis finds further support in the general

statute-of-limitations provision, which requires that

the “indictment [be] found or the information [be] instituted” within the prescribed limitations period. 18

U.S.C. § 3282. A waiverless indictment is “insufficient

to ‘institute’ a prosecution under section 3282.”

B.G.G., 53 F.4th at 1374 (Wilson, J., dissenting); see

also Gatz, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1325 (collecting cases).

This Court’s decision in Jaben v. United States illustrates the point. That case similarly involved a limitations period that could be extended if “a complaint

[was] instituted” within the initial six-year period. 381

U.S. 214, 215 (1965). On the day before the six-year

period expired, the government filed a complaint. Id.

at 216. The defendant was later indicted; that indictment was timely only “if the complaint . . . was valid

for the purpose of bringing the nine-month extension

into play.” Id. The government argued that, “regardless of the complaint’s adequacy for any other purposes, it was valid for the purpose of triggering the

nine-month extension of the limitation period whether

or not it showed probable cause.” Id. at 217. This

Court disagreed: “[T]he complaint, to initiate the time

extension, must be adequate to begin effectively the

criminal process,” meaning it “must be sufficient to

justify the next steps in the process.” Id. at 220; accord

23

id. at 226–27 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For the reasons just explained, the

information here was not “adequate to begin effectively the criminal process.”

The statute thus speaks clearly. But even if it were

ambiguous, the canon in favor of repose require that a

felony information be accompanied by the defendant’s

waiver of indictment to satisfy and potentially extend

the statute of limitations. See Toussie v. United

States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970).

In holding otherwise, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that “a felony cannot be prosecuted by information unless the defendant waives prosecution by indictment.” Pet. App. 25a. But it never grappled with

the implications of that fact for whether the April 2020

information actually “charg[ed]” a felony. It simply declared that “[n]othing in this language requires that

the information be ‘instituted’ or otherwise accompanied by a waiver.” Id. at 26a. It thus skipped over the

meaning of “instituted” altogether. Id. at 25a.

The crux of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was instead a 1988 amendment to § 3288, in which “Congress

specifically removed language requiring a waiver of indictment.” Pet. App. 27a. From 1964 to 1988, the statute applied “[w]henever an indictment is dismissed for

any error, defect, or irregularity with respect to the

grand jury, or an indictment or information filed after

the defendant waives in open court prosecution by indictment is found otherwise defective or insufficient

for any cause.” See Id. at 27a n.4 (strikeout omitted).

In 1988, Congress adopted the law’s current language:

“Whenever an indictment or information charging a

felony is dismissed for any reason . . . .” Id. (emphasis

omitted); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.

100-690, tit. VII, § 7081(a), 102 Stat. 4181, 4407.

24

The court’s narrow focus on this change was erroneous in two ways. First, the court “presume[d]” that

Congress intended the 1988 deletion to “have real and

substantial effect.” Pet. App. 28a. To be sure—but

what effect? Congress answered that question: This

amendment served merely to overrule a Ninth Circuit

decision holding “that a Speedy Trial Act violation is

neither an ‘irregularity with respect to the grand jury’

nor a defect or insufficiency in the indictment itself,”

such that § 3288 did not apply to a dismissal for speedtrial violations. Section Analysis of Judiciary Committee Issues in H.R. 5210 (Senate), 134 Cong. Rec.

S17360-02, 17372 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1998), 1988 WL

182529 (citing Peloquin, 810 F.2d 911). Congress gave

no indication that the change was meant to do anything beyond what it thought the statute already accomplished. See id. (explaining that the prior statute

already “appear[ed] to permit the extension no matter

what the reason for the dismissal of the charges”).

Second, the Ninth Circuit ignored the rest of the

statutory history. Although indictments and informations have existed for centuries, informations were

never used for felonies until the twentieth century.

See Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423–25 (1885);

Gatz, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1326. Thus, when Congress

first used the phrase “information is instituted” in

§ 3282’s predecessor provision in 1790, it cannot have

intended to include a waiverless felony information.

There was no such thing. This language could have

referred only to a charging document validly alleging

a lesser offense. See Gatz, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1326.

the modern usage of the same phrase carries the old

soil with it.

Likewise, § 3288’s predecessor statute did not refer

to informations at all, only indictments. See id. at

25

1327–28. Congress added the reference to informations in 1964, in response to Criminal Rule 7 “authoriz[ing] the prosecution of a noncapital felony by information if the defendant in open court waives prosecution by indictment.” S. Rep. No. 88-1414, at 2 (1964),

as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3257, 3257–58.

That is, Congress “recognize[d] that felony prosecutions may be instituted by informations and that dismissals of such prosecutions because of technical defects in the informations should be accorded treatment

similar to that accorded prosecutions instituted by indictments.” Id. The added reference to informations

would thus “permit reindictment in similar cases

where an information was filed after the defendant

waived in open court prosecution by indictment.” Id. at

1 (emphasis added).

This history “demonstrates that Congress intended

[§] 3288 . . . to toll the limitations period at § 3282 for

dismissed informations where those informations comported with Rule 7(b)”—meaning where the defendant

waived indictment. Gatz, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1328. In

other words, Congress assumed throughout this process that “the filed information would constitute a

valid charging document.” Id. “The idea that an ineffective information could be instituted to toll the limitations period, but not to prosecute the accused, could

not have been a consideration at [§ 3282’s] inception,

nor at the time § 3288 or its predecessor were enacted.”

Id.

This Court should grant review to make clear that

§ 3288’s requirement of an “information charging a felony” has teeth and does not allow the Government to

use a constitutionally defective, waiverless information to circumvent the limitations period. The contrary rule invites abuse.

26

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

CARMEN SMARANDOIU

OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL

PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA

450 Golden Gate Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102

TOBIAS S. LOSS-EATON

Counsel of Record

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

1501 K Street NW

Washington, DC 20005

(202) 736-8427

tlosseaton@sidley.com

JEFFREY T. GREEN

DANIELLE HAMILTON

THE CARTER G. PHILLIPS/

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

SUPREME COURT CLINIC

NORTHWESTERN PRITZKER

SCHOOL OF LAW

375 East Chicago Avenue

Chicago, IL 60611

(312) 503-1486

JAMES R. HORNER

ANA PAJAR BLINDER

SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP

787 7th Avenue

New York, NY 10019

Counsel for Petitioner

July 16, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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