Opposition Brief — Byron Lewis Black, Petitioner v. Tennessee

No. 25-5129; 25A65

In the Supreme Court of the United States

BYRON LEWIS BLACK,

PETITIONER

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

RESPONDENT

___________________________

ON APPLICATION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION AND ON

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE TENNESSEE SUPREME COURT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Jonathan Skrmetti

Attorney General & Reporter

J. Matthew Rice

Solicitor General

Nicholas W. Spangler

Associate Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

OFFICE OF THE TENNESSEE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, TN 37202

(615) 741-3486

Nick.Spangler@ag.tn.gov

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Did the Tennessee Supreme Court correctly reject Byron Lewis Black’s “idiocy”

claim as procedurally barred and foreclosed by decades of precedent?

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ............................................................................................. i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT ................................................................................................................. 2

A.

Legal Background .................................................................................... 2

B.

Factual Background ................................................................................. 5

C.

Procedural Background ............................................................................ 8

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ..................................................................... 12

I.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Is Procedurally Barred. ....................................... 12

II.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Conflicts with Settled Precedent. ........................ 16

III.

The Decision Below Is Correct. .............................................................. 19

IV.

Black’s Tactical Delay Is Reason Enough to Deny a Stay. ................... 24

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 27

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................ 28

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Atkins v. Virginia,

536 U.S. 304 (2002) ................................................................................. 8, 14, 22

Black v. Bell,

No. 3:00-0764, 181 F. Supp. 2d 832 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) ..................................... 8

Black v. Carpenter,

866 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................... 9

Black v. Mays,

584 U.S. 1015 (2018) ........................................................................................... 9

Black v. State,

No. M2000-00641-SC-DPE-CD, Order (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2025) ...................... 9, 13

Black v. State,

No. M2022-00423-CCA-R3-PD, 2023 WL 3843397

(Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2023) ........................................................................ 9

Black v. State,

No. M2000-00641-SC-DPE-CD, Setting execution for Oct. 8, 2020

(Tenn. Feb. 24, 2020) .......................................................................................... 1

Black v. State,

No. M2004-01345-CCA-R3-PD, 2005 WL 2662577

(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 2005) ...................................................... 8, 15, 22, 23

Black v. State,

No. 01C01-9709-CR-00422, 1999 WL 195299

(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 1999) ......................................................................... 8

Black v. Tennessee,

549 U.S. 852 (2006) ............................................................................................. 8

Bucklew v. Precythe,

587 U.S. 119 (2019) ..................................................................................... 25, 26

Calderon v. Thompson,

523 U.S. 538 (1998) ........................................................................................... 26

iii

Ford v. Wainwright,

477 U.S. 399 (1986) ........................................................... 2, 3, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24

Heller v. Doe,

509 U.S. 312 (1993) ........................................................................................... 14

Hill v. McDonough,

547 U. S. 573 (2006) .......................................................................................... 24

Hill v. Shoop,

11 F.4th 373 (6th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................. 14

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

558 U. S. 183 (2010) .......................................................................................... 25

Madison v. Alabama,

586 U.S. 265 (2019) ................................................... 2, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22

Nelson v. Campbell,

541 U.S. 637 (2004) ........................................................................................... 26

Panetti v. Quarterman,

551 U.S. 930 (2007) ..................................................... 1, 2, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 25

Price v. Dunn,

587 U.S. 999 (2019) ..................................................................................... 25, 26

Rhines v. Weber,

544 U.S. 269 (2005) ........................................................................................... 25

Rogers v. Peck,

199 U.S. 425 (1905) ........................................................................................... 16

State v. Bell,

512 S.W.3d 167 (Tenn. 2015) ............................................................................ 22

State v. Black,

815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991) ........................................................ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15

State v. Irick,

320 S.W.3d 284 (Tenn. 2010) .............................................................................. 4

Thompson v. State,

134 S.W.3d 168 (Tenn. 2004) .......................................................................... 4, 5

iv

United States v. Wilson,

No. 16-20460, 2022 WL 3044634 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 2, 2022) ........................... 22

Van Tran v. State,

6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999) ........................................................ 3, 4, 5, 13, 23, 24

Wainwright v. Goode,

464 U.S. 78 (1983) ............................................................................................. 16

West v. Schofield,

468 S.W.3d 482 (Tenn. 2015) .............................................................................. 5

STATUTES

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501 ...................................................................................... 15

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a) .................................................................................. 14

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(g) .................................................................................... 9

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Tenn. Const. art I, § 35 ................................................................................................ 26

Sup. Ct. R. 10 ............................................................................................................... 12

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) ........................................................................................................... 12

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4)(A) ............................................................................................. 3

2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 399, § 2 ................................................................................ 9

2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 399, § 3 ................................................................................ 9

v

INTRODUCTION

Over thirty-seven years ago, Byron Lewis Black brutally murdered his

girlfriend, Angela Clay, and her two young daughters, Latoya (age nine) and

Lakeisha (age six). A jury convicted Black after considering overwhelming proof of

his guilt. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 172-73 (Tenn. 1991). And it sentenced

Black to death for the murder of six-year-old Lakeisha. Id. at 170.

The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed that sentence in 1991, noting that

Black “deliberately killed an innocent, helpless, frightened child[,] [that] [h]is acts

were those of a cold-blooded executioner who showed a total disregard for human

life[,] [and that] [t]his brutal and senseless murder place[d] [him] into the class of

defendants deserving capital punishment ….” Id. at 191.

But Lakeisha’s family has yet to see justice done. Over thirty years after

Lakeisha’s murder, Black completed the standard three-tier review process—direct

review, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas review—prompting the

Tennessee Supreme Court to set an execution date. Black v. State, No. M2000-00641SC-DPE-CD (Tenn. Feb. 24, 2020) (setting execution for October 8, 2020). Since then,

Black has had his execution delayed three times.

Black now seeks further delay through a so-called competency challenge.

When analyzing competency for execution, this Court asks whether a prisoner has “a

rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551

U.S. 930, 957-58 (2007). No one disputes that Black meets that standard. Indeed,

the only expert to opine on Black’s competency under that standard—Black’s own

1

expert—confirmed that he “likely meets th[e] low bar for competency to be executed.”

Pet. Appx. at 98. Over three separate interviews with that expert in May 2025, id.

at 97-98, Black clearly demonstrated his “rational understanding of the reason for

[his] execution.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 957-58.

Boxed in by his own expert’s unhelpful opinion, Black presses the novel claim

that he is exempt from execution because he meets the common-law definition of an

idiot. But the Tennessee Supreme Court correctly held that Black’s idiocy claim is

procedurally barred. That holding—rooted in the application of state procedural

rules—leaves this Court with no federal question to review. And in any event, Black’s

idiocy argument seeks to overturn decades of precedent by reworking Panetti’s

established competency standard. That argument could—and should—have been

raised at Black’s trial in 1989, not on the eve of execution 36 years later.

This Court should deny Black’s petition for certiorari and deny a stay.

STATEMENT

A.

Legal Background

In Ford v. Wainwright, this Court held that prisoners have a common law and

Eighth Amendment right to challenge their competency to be executed. 477 U.S. 399,

409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment). The “standard for competency” is whether a prisoner

can “reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” Panetti, 551

U.S. at 957-58. In other words, “[t]he critical question is whether a prisoner’s mental

state is so distorted . . . that he lacks a rational understanding of the State’s rationale

for his execution.” Madison v. Alabama, 586 U.S. 265, 269 (2019).

2

The Ford Court was careful not to “suggest that only a full trial on the issue of

sanity will suffice to protect the federal interests,” and it “le[ft] to the State[s] the

task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its

execution of sentences.” 477 U.S. at 416-17. “It may be,” the Court explained, “that

some high threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner will be found a necessary

means to control the number of nonmeritorious or repetitive claims of insanity.” Id.

at 417.

The Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257

(Tenn. 1999), governs the procedure for deciding Tennessee prisoners’ competency to

be executed.

See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 12(4)(A) (citing Van Tran in reference to

proceedings on competency for execution). Under that procedure, a prisoner may

assert incompetence in response to the State’s motion to set an execution date. Van

Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 267. Upon setting an execution date, the Tennessee Supreme Court

remands to the trial court to adjudicate the competency claim. Id.

On remand, the prisoner must file a petition that “clearly set[s] forth the facts

alleged to support the claim that execution should be stayed due to present mental

incompetence.” Id. To obtain an evidentiary hearing, the prisoner must make a

“threshold showing” of incompetency. Id. at 269. That is, the prisoner must submit

“affidavits, depositions, medical reports, or other credible evidence sufficient to

demonstrate that there exists a genuine question regarding petitioner’s present

competency.”

Id.

Generally, this evidence “should be from psychiatrists,

psychologists, or other mental health professionals.”

3

Id.

“[T]he unsupported

conclusory assertions of a family member of the prisoner or an attorney representing

the prisoner will ordinarily be insufficient.” Id. And “the proof required to meet the

threshold showing must relate to present incompetency,” so “at least some of the

evidence submitted must be the result of recent mental evaluations or observations

of the prisoner.” Id. The threshold showing “cannot be satisfied if the only evidence

offered is stale in the sense that it relates to the prisoner’s distant past competency

or incompetency.” Id.

This threshold-showing requirement is grounded in two key rationales. “First,

death penalty litigation engenders the potential for false claims and intentional

delay.” See Thompson v. State, 134 S.W.3d 168, 176 (Tenn. 2004), abrogated on other

grounds, State v. Irick, 320 S.W.3d 284, 295 n.9 (Tenn. 2010). And the issue of

competency “is particularly troublesome because [it] can be repeatedly litigated by

the same prisoner until the very moment of execution.” Thompson, 134 S.W.3d at

176. Without a substantial threshold requirement, “eleventh hour petitions asserting

insanity would be encouraged because the death row petitioner would know that the

mere filing of a conclusory petition would result in a stay of execution. Placing no

initial burden on the petitioner is an invitation to specious insanity claims.” Id.

(quoting Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 269).

“Second, the prisoner is presumed to be

competent because the prisoner is asserting incompetency ‘following a trial and

sentencing hearing at which his sanity was either conceded or determined by the

court.’” Id. (quoting Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 271 n.15). “Given these compelling

rationales,” prisoners shoulder the initial burden “to raise genuine disputed issues

4

about [their] mental capacity to understand or be aware of the fact of the impending

execution and the reason for it.” Id. at 176-77.

After reviewing the prisoner’s competency petition, the trial court must then

enter a preliminary order deciding “whether the prisoner has made the required

threshold showing that his or her competency to be executed is genuinely in issue.”

Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 269. In making that determination, the trial court is “not

required to accept as true assertions that are merely legal arguments or ‘legal

conclusions’ couched as facts.” West v. Schofield, 468 S.W.3d 482, 489 (Tenn. 2015).

The Tennessee Supreme Court “will automatically review decisions of the trial

court in competency proceedings arising out of [an] order setting an execution date.”

Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 271-72.

B.

Factual Background

Almost four decades ago, Black brutally murdered his girlfriend, Angela Clay,

and her two young daughters, Latoya (age nine) and Lakeisha (age six), amid a

jealous lover’s quarrel.

Black, 815 S.W.2d at 170-72.

About a year before the

murders, Angela separated from her husband, Bennie Clay, and started dating Black.

Id. at 170. But “at times she was seeing both.” Id. And in December 1986, “during

a dispute over Angela,” Black shot Bennie twice, chased him down the street, and

“stood over him” with a cocked gun before Angela pushed him away. Id. at 170-71.

Black pled guilty to the non-lethal shooting but received a workhouse sentence that

allowed weekend furloughs. Id. at 171.

5

With Black on furlough, the violence continued. He kicked in the front door of

Angela’s apartment when she refused to let him enter.

Id. at 172.

He later

threatened Angela: “If I can’t have you, won’t nobody have you.” Id. Three weeks

before the murders, Angela’s neighbor heard Black again threaten to kick in Angela’s

apartment door. Id. And days before the killings, Black was seen arguing with her.

Id.

Tragically, early in the morning on March 28, 1988, Black murdered Angela,

Latoya, and Lakeisha in their Nashville home.

Police first found the bodies of Angela and nine-year-old Latoya in the master

bedroom. Angela had been shot in the head while asleep in her bed. Id. at 171.

Latoya was found wedged between the bed and a chest of drawers. Id. She had been

shot once through the neck and chest while lying in bed. Id. But death was not

instantaneous; she bled out over the course of three to ten minutes. Id.

In the other room, police found the body of six-year-old Lakeisha lying face

down on the floor next to her bed. Id. She had been shot once in the chest and once

in the pelvis while lying in bed. Id. at 171-72. “Abrasions on her arm indicated a

bullet had grazed her as she sought to protect herself from the attacker.” Id. at 172.

And “bloody finger marks . . . running from the head of the bed to the foot of the bed”

showed that the six-year-old struggled before her death. Id.

Trial evidence clearly pointed at Black. Id. at 175. He was with the victims

the evening they were murdered. Id. He had been fighting with Angela just days

before, having previously threatened to kill her. Id. Inside the victims’ house, police

6

found the receiver from the kitchen phone in the master bedroom. Id. at 172. And

the phone from the master bedroom was lying in the hallway between the two

bedrooms. Id. Black’s fingerprints were recovered from both phones. Id.

Ballistics evidence also directly tied Black to the murders.

The evidence

showed that the same weapon fired the .44 caliber bullet recovered from Latoya’s

pillow, the .44 caliber bullet removed from Lakeisha’s body, a bullet fragment

recovered from the automobile driven by Bennie the day Black shot him, and the .44

caliber bullet removed from Bennie’s body. Id. at 173. So, Black used the same gun

to murder Angela and her children that he had previously used to shoot Bennie.

The night the bodies were discovered, the police interviewed Black. Id. at 172.

When a detective informed Black that his girlfriend was found murdered in her

apartment, he initially looked distraught, and he began crying. Id. But when two

other detectives entered the interview room, Black’s demeanor changed, the tears

ceased, and he became “dull.” Id.

Black initially claimed that the last time he saw Angela was about 10 p.m. the

previous night, when he dropped her off at her mother’s house after picking her up

from work. Id. But during a later interview, Black admitted returning to Angela’s

house that night, finding the victims dead inside, and simply leaving because he

“didn’t want to get involved.” Id. at 173. After seeing his girlfriend and her children

dead, Black said he simply went to his mother’s house and “got . . . at least seven or

eight hours of sleep.” Id. He did not report the deaths or tell anyone what he had

seen that night until his third police interview. Id.

7

C.

Procedural Background

1.

Black’s death sentence survives exhaustive review.

In 1991, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed Black’s murder convictions

and death sentence on direct appeal. Id. at 170. The Court also affirmed Black’s

competency to stand trial, citing the supporting opinions of two psychiatrists, a

clinical psychologist, and a social worker. Id. at 173-75.

For decades after, Black attempted to overturn his convictions and death

sentence in state and federal courts. He unsuccessfully sought relief under the

Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act. Black v. State, No. 01C01-9709-CR-00422,

1999 WL 195299, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 1999). He then petitioned for a

federal writ of habeas corpus, but the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of

Tennessee denied relief. Black v. Bell, No. 3:00-0764, 181 F. Supp. 2d 832 (M.D. Tenn.

2001).

While Black’s federal habeas appeal was pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit, he reopened his state post-conviction petition to litigate an

intellectual disability claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Black v.

State, No. M2004-01345-CCA-R3-PD, 2005 WL 2662577 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19,

2005). But the trial court ultimately found that Black “failed to prove that he was

mentally retarded and that the weight of the proof was that he was not mentally

retarded.” Id. at *1. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, and the

Tennessee Supreme Court denied further review. Id. This Court denied certiorari.

Black v. Tennessee, 549 U.S. 852 (2006).

8

After the federal district court rejected Black’s intellectual disability claim, the

Sixth Circuit denied habeas relief. Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2017).

This Court denied certiorari. Black v. Mays, 584 U.S. 1015 (2018).

In 2021, the Tennessee General Assembly amended Tennessee’s intellectual

disability statute. See 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 399, § 3. The revision established a

procedure for certain death-row inmates to raise an intellectual disability claim by

filing a motion with the trial court; but the amended statute prohibited such a motion

for any inmate whose intellectual disability claim had been “previously adjudicated

on the merits.” See id. at § 2 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(g)).

Black sought to relitigate his intellectual disability claim through a motion

under that 2021 amendment. Black v. State, No. M2022-00423-CCA-R3-PD, 2023

WL 3843397, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 6, 2023). But the trial court summarily

dismissed that motion as statutorily barred by the prior adjudication of Black’s

intellectual disability claim. Id. at *4. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

affirmed, and Black did not seek further review from the Tennessee Supreme Court

or from this Court. Id. at *14.

2.

Black fails to make a threshold showing of incompetency.

On March 3, 2025, the Tennessee Supreme Court set Black’s execution for

August 5, 2025, and remanded to the trial court for “competency proceedings . . . in

accordance with the timelines and procedures established in Van Tran.” Black v.

State, No. M2000-00641-SC-DPE-CD (Tenn. Mar. 3, 2025) (order).

9

Black filed his competency petition and attached 25 exhibits, including May

2025 reports from psychologists Dr. Daniel Martell, Dr. Ruben Gur, and Dr. Lea Ann

Preston Baecht. Pet. Appx. at 31-36, 74-99.

After preliminary review of the petition, the trial court entered an order

denying a hearing. Id. at 14-30. Black’s petition, the court said, “wholly fails to allege

that Mr. Black lacks a rational understanding of his impending execution and the

reason for it.” Id. at 23. The court noted that Black’s first expert, Dr. Martell, “never

opines on the . . . standard for competency to be executed, and he was never asked to

do so.” Id. at 24. Similarly, Black’s second expert, Dr. Gur, “does not connect his

interpretation of the brain imaging to Mr. Black’s competency nor opine on Mr.

Black’s ability to rationally understand his impending execution and the reason for

it.” Id. at 27. Only Black’s third expert, Dr. Baecht, “was hired ‘for a mental health

evaluation to assess his [Mr. Black’s] competency to be executed.’” Id. at 24. And she

“found Mr. Black is competent to be executed under the controlling standard.” Id. at

26. Black’s other 22 exhibits, the court said, “dat[e] back many years” and “contain

evaluations entered as exhibits or testimony in prior court hearings where Mr. Black

did not prevail.” Id. at 28. “These exhibits,” the court noted, “do not opine on Mr.

Black’s competency for execution.” Id. at 28. The court concluded that “there is no

genuine disputed issue regarding the present competency of Mr. Black under the . . .

controlling precedent.” Id. at 29.

The trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction “to consider [Black’s] allegation

of ‘idiocy’ under the asserted common law claim set out in the petition.” Id. at 29.

10

The court recognized its limited jurisdiction under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s

remand order, which “contemplated no such common law claim.” Id. at 29.

The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. Id. at 1. “In

this Van Tran proceeding,” the Court said, “Mr. Black was required to make a

threshold showing that a genuine, disputed issue exists regarding his present

competence to be executed under the Panetti standard.” Id. at 11. The Court held

that “Mr. Black has failed to make a threshold showing that he is presently

incompetent to be executed under this standard.” Id. at 11. The Court emphasized

that “Mr. Black’s own expert, Dr. Baecht, found him likely competent to be executed

under the Panetti standard.” Id. at 11. Black’s “other two experts,” the Court said,

“did not expressly address the Panetti standard in their assessments, and neither

expert undermined Dr. Baecht’s assessment so as to create a genuine, disputed issue

regarding Mr. Black’s present competency to be executed.” Id. at 11.

The Tennessee Supreme Court also held that “to the extent Mr. Black seeks to

relitigate intellectual disability or argue for a new categorical exclusion from

execution, his argument regarding common law idiocy is procedurally barred.” Id. at

11.

The Court found that Black “had ample opportunities” to raise his idiocy

argument “at an earlier stage” but “did not do so.” Id. at 12.

Finally, the Tennessee Supreme Court declined Black’s request “to reconsider

the standard for competency to be executed, [because] he offer[ed] no compelling

reason . . . to adopt a standard that differs from longstanding precedent from this

Court and the United States Supreme Court.” Id.

11

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

This Court grants a writ of certiorari “only for compelling reasons.” Sup. Ct.

R. 10.

But Black’s petition tees up no “compelling reason[]”—from Rule 10 or

otherwise—to justify this Court’s review. The petition does not suggest that the

decision below “conflict[s] with the decision of a United States court of appeals on the

same important matter” or “conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort.”

Sup. Ct. R. 10(a). And it does not claim that the court below “departed from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by

a lower court.” Id. Instead, the petition presses a novel common-law idiocy claim and

argues that the decision below “decided an important question of federal law that has

not been, but should be, settled by this Court.” Pet. at 5. But the Tennessee Supreme

Court decided no federal question in finding that claim procedurally barred under

state law. And the idiocy claim conflicts with nearly thirty years of settled precedent

from this Court on the clear competency standard. There is no reason to grant

certiorari or stay the execution.

I.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Is Procedurally Barred.

The Tennessee Supreme Court correctly held that Black’s idiocy claim is

procedurally barred under state law. Pet. Appx. at 12 (citing Weston v. State, 60

S.W.3d 57, 59 (Tenn. 2001) (“Neither a trial court nor an intermediate court has the

authority to expand the directive or purpose of this Court imposed on remand.”)). At

its core, Black’s idiocy claim is an intellectual-disability challenge dressed up in

competency garb. And Black lacks a procedural pathway to litigate intellectual

12

disability for the umpteenth time. The Tennessee Supreme Court properly rejected

Black’s idiocy claim on state procedural grounds, leaving this Court no federal

question to review.

The Tennessee Supreme Court set out precise procedures for analyzing

competency in Van Tran. And the Court invoked them here. Upon setting Black’s

execution date, the Court remanded to the trial court for one clear purpose: to conduct

“competency proceedings . . . in accordance with the timelines and procedures

established in Van Tran.” Black v. State, No. M2000-00641-SC-DPE-CD (Tenn. Mar.

3, 2025) (order).

Consistent with Ford, the Van Tran competency inquiry looks only to whether

a prisoner lost his sanity after sentencing. Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (“[The Eighth

Amendment claim at issue can arise only after the prisoner has been validly convicted

of a capital crime and sentenced to death.”) (Powell, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment); see also Madison, 586 U.S. at 268 (reiterating that Ford

held that “the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments precludes

executing a prisoner who has ‘lost his sanity’ after sentencing”). That precise timing

for Van Tran claims also tracks the recognition that “the issue of competency to be

executed is generally not considered ripe for determination until execution is

imminent.” 6 S.W.3d at 267. And for that narrow issue, “[t]he critical question is

whether a prisoner’s mental state is so distorted . . . that he lacks a rational

understanding of the State’s rationale for his execution.” Madison, 586 U.S. at 269.

13

That inquiry differs from the intellectual disability determination. This Court

exempted the intellectually disabled from execution in Atkins by reference to clinical

definitions of that class as those with “subaverage intellectual functioning [and]

significant limitations in adaptive skills . . . that became manifest before age 18.” 536

U.S. at 318 (emphasis added); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a) (using this

same definition of intellectual disability). That is, intellectual disability claims rest

on a person’s permanent cognitive state. Hill v. Shoop, 11 F.4th 373, 386 (6th Cir.

2021) (“Atkins supports the conclusion that intellectual disability is not a transient

condition.”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993) (noting, in a different context,

that intellectual disability “is a permanent, relatively static condition”).

So as to exemption from execution, this Court and the Tennessee Supreme

Court divide mental-capacity claims into two categories: (1) competency claims based

on a sometimes transient loss of sanity “after sentencing,” Madison, 586 U.S. at 268,

and (2) intellectual disability claims based on permanent cognitive conditions that

manifest from a young age, Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.

In this case, Tennessee law provided Black a procedural pathway only to raise

a challenge in the former category—competency.

But Black’s idiocy theory fits

squarely in the latter category—intellectual disability.

His own definitions for idiocy show as much. For example, Black says that an

idiot “is one that hath had no understanding from his nativity; and there is by law

presumed never likely to attain any.” Pet. at 10 (quoting William Blackstone, 1

Commentaries on the Laws of England 302 (1826)). Another cited source defines

14

“idiots” as “those who are person of unsound memory and understanding from their

nativity. . . .” Id. at 15 (quoting Thomas W. Powell, Analysis of American Law 550

(1878)).

Yet another cited treatise describes the “ideota” as one who suffers a

“perpetual infirmity” “from his nativity.” Id. at 11 (quoting Edward Coke, 1 Institutes

of the Laws of England 247 (1633)). And a final cited source describes “idiocy” as a

“defect dat[ing] back to a period in which the brain was still in process of formation;

consequently to a period preceding birth; or, at least, to a period very early in life.”

Id. at 14-15 (quoting Francis Wharton, et al., Wharton and Stille’s Medical

Jurisprudence 858 (1905)).

The decision below correctly held that Black’s idiocy claim exceeded the scope

of the remand order for a competency inquiry. Id. at 12. And it correctly noted that

Black had “ample opportunities” to present this idiocy claim at “an earlier stage.” Id.

If Black meets his own definitions for idiocy, and his mental defects persisted from

birth, he could and should have presented that theory long ago during trial or state

post-conviction proceedings.

Tennessee law gave Black the chance to bring an

insanity defense at trial. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501. But he did not pursue that

defense at trial, on direct appeal, or in the wake of Atkins. Black, 815 S.W.2d at 17391; Black, 2005 WL 2662577 at *1-18. Because Black’s idiocy claim falls outside the

competency inquiry, the decision below correctly held that the claim is procedurally

barred under state law. Id. at 10.

The upshot is that the Tennessee Supreme Court’s application of state

procedural bars is “entirely a question of state procedure, presenting no Federal

15

question for review here.” Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 435 (1905). Because these

“views of the State’s highest court with respect to state law are binding on the federal

courts,” they present no compelling reason for review. Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S.

78, 84 (1983).

II.

Black’s Idiocy Claim Conflicts with Settled Precedent.

Even setting aside the procedural bar, Black’s idiocy claim presents no

unsettled question of federal law that this Court needs to resolve. On the contrary,

the claim departs from this Court’s well-established competency test, which fully

accounts for the common-law’s approach to idiocy.

1. Black’s idiocy claim flouts this Court’s established precedent. In Panetti,

this Court carefully defined the category of incompetent persons the Eighth

Amendment exempts from execution.

“The Eighth Amendment,” Panetti held,

“prohibits the execution of a prisoner whose mental illness prevents him from

‘rational[ly] understanding’ why the State seeks to impose that punishment.”

Madison, 586 U.S. at 267 (quoting Panetti, 551 U. S. at 959). In Madison, the Court

clarified that this “standard has no interest in establishing any precise cause:

Psychosis or dementia, delusions or overall cognitive decline are all the same under

Panetti, so long as they produce the requisite lack of comprehension.” Id. at 278.

“The critical question,” the Court said, “is whether a prisoner’s mental state is so

distorted . . . that he lacks a rational understanding of the State’s rationale for his

execution.” Id. at 269 (cleaned up). And Madison reiterated that Ford claims only

16

concern the ban on “executing a prisoner who has lost his sanity after sentencing.”

Id. at 268 (cleaned up).

Black openly rejects that test. Pet. at 7-8. He argues that Panetti’s “rationality

standard did not and could not govern all competency determinations.” Pet. at 8.

And he further contends that “Panetti’s rule . . . is ill-suited to a common law claim

of ‘idiocy,’ which has never historically inquired into an inmate’s rationality.” Pet. at

8. But that is nothing more than a request for this Court to overhaul the wellestablished Panetti test. Black cannot satisfy the governing standard, see infra 1924, so he wants this Court to overrule its precedent to craft a new test. That is an

extraordinary request that the Court should not entertain in this posture.

2. Black’s argument fails. He suggests that this Court’s Panetti test overlooks

common-law protections for a much broader class of persons generally unable to

manage their affairs, Pet. at 11-16, and that this Court “has not engaged with the

definition of common law idiocy,” id. at 20. But far from ignoring the common law,

Panetti and its lineage rested on it.

Ford lays bare Panetti’s common-law roots.

In “keep[ing] faith with our

common-law heritage,” Ford held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing

the insane. 477 U.S. at 401. To get there, the Court acknowledged that the common

law sets the floor for Eighth Amendment protections.

Id. at 406 (“The Eighth

Amendment’s proscriptions are not limited to those practices condemned by the

common law.”). Describing that floor, the Court specifically mentioned “[i]diots.” Id.

But given the variable and imprecise descriptions of idiocy, the Court rested its

17

analysis on common-law principles. Id. at 406-10. Chief among them, the Court said,

is the diminished “retributive value of executing a person who has no comprehension

of why he has been singled out and stripped of his fundamental right to life.” Id. at

409. The Court also cited “the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing

one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity.” Id. And

lastly, the Court acknowledged the “intuition that such an execution simply offends

humanity.” Id.

Ford’s careful integration of common-law principles and protections is even

more evident from the Court’s conclusion with “a principle that has long resided

there.” Id. at 417. That is, “[i]t is no less abhorrent today than it has been for

centuries to exact in penance the life of one whose mental illness prevents him from

comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications.” Id. Justice Powell’s

concurring opinion in Ford restated the same basic principle: “[T]he Eighth

Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment

they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”

Id. at 422-23 (opinion

concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Panetti “clarified the scope of that category . . . by focusing on whether a

prisoner can ‘reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.’”

Madison, 586 U.S. at 268 (quoting Panetti, 551 U. S. at 958).

And the Court

reaffirmed that scope in 2019, stating that “[t]he critical question is whether a

prisoner’s mental state is so distorted . . . that he lacks a rational understanding of

the State’s rationale for his execution.” Id. at 269 (cleaned up). “But Ford had

18

explored what lay behind the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition,” including among

other things, the common-law protection of idiots. Id. at 269; Ford, 477 U.S. at 406

(recognizing and accounting for “idiots”).

The protection under Ford and its progeny fully encompasses that under the

common law. Black’s idiocy claim is no less than a foundational attack on three

decades of this Court’s precedent that already fully accounts for the common law in

construing the Eighth Amendment.

III.

The Decision Below Is Correct.

Black does not dispute the lower Court’s application of Panetti. For good

reason. Under Panetti, Black needed to make a threshold showing that he lacked a

“rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” 551 U.S. at 957-58. But

Black’s own expert, Dr. Lea Ann Preston Baecht, concluded that he is competent for

execution. And no other evidence undermines that conclusion.

While Black attached three recent expert reports to his petition, only Dr.

Baecht conducted “a mental health evaluation to assess [Black’s] competency to be

executed.” Pet. Appx. at 87. She centered that evaluation on the relevant legal

standard through detailed discussion of Ford, Panetti, and Madison. Id. at 98. She

correctly understood that Black’s competency turned on his ability to “reach a

rational understanding of the reason for the execution.” Id. Dr. Baecht concluded:

Mr. Black likely meets this low bar for competency to be executed. That

is, Mr. Black understands that he is scheduled to be executed on August

5, 2025, and he recognizes that death is permanent. Mr. Black also

understands that the reason the state seeks to execute him is because it

is believed that he murdered Lakeisha Clay.

19

Id.

Dr. Baecht based her opinion on three clinical interviews spanning 7.5 hours

in May 2025, during which Black repeatedly displayed a capacity for rational

understanding and self-care. Id. at 88-90, 96-98. Before the interviews, Dr. Baecht

“informed Mr. Black of the nature and purpose of the evaluation, as well as the limits

of confidentiality of the information to be obtained.” Id. at 88. According to Dr.

Baecht, “Black demonstrated a sufficient understanding of this information and

agreed to proceed with the interview.” Id. During all three interviews, Black’s

“hygiene and grooming were good.”

Id. at 89.

He “was easily engaged in

conversation.” Id. He “was properly oriented to person, place, time, and situation.”

Id. “He smiled and laughed at socially appropriate times.” Id. at 90. And he “largely

expressed his thoughts in a coherent and logical fashion.” Id. at 89.

Black also demonstrated a rational understanding of the reason for his

execution. During the first interview, Dr. Baecht asked Black if he had an execution

date. Id. at 97. He replied, “August 5.” Id. When asked what would happen on that

date, he added, “I will be put to death.” Id. When asked why, Black said, “Because

they think I committed murder.”

Id. He also correctly recalled that his death

sentence was for the murder of the youngest victim. Id.

During the second interview, Black “correctly recalled that he is scheduled to

be executed on August 5 and that he was sentenced to death for the murder of

Lakeisha.” Id. He mentioned “the protocol” and “the electric chair” as potential

methods of execution. Id.

20

During the third interview, Black “again correctly recalled that he had been

convicted of murdering Angela Clay and her two daughters, Latoya and Lakeisha.”

Id. “He also correctly stated that he was scheduled to be executed on August 5, for

the murder of Lakeisha.” Id. And once again, he identified the two potential methods

of execution as the electric chair and the “protocol.” Id. at 97-98.

No court could find Black incompetent based on Dr. Baecht’s conclusion that

he “likely meets th[e] low bar for competency to be executed.” Id. at 98. Black’s other

evidence does not raise a genuine, disputed issue about his competency for three

reasons.

First, Black’s two other experts—Dr. Martell and Dr. Gur—did not opine about

Black’s competency under the relevant legal standard, and his counsel never asked

them to do so. Id. at 31-36, 74-75. Black’s counsel merely asked Dr. Martell to opine

about whether Black is intellectually disabled, whether he can manage his finances

or live independently, and whether he would meet counsel’s provided criteria for

being “non compos mentis.”

Id. at 74-75.

Dr. Martell interviewed Black and

performed several intellectual and neuropsychological tests on April 28, 2025. Id. at

76-77.

But nothing in Dr. Martell’s report shows that Black lacks a rational

understanding of why the State wants to execute him. On the contrary, the report

shows that Black was able to give “informed consent” to the interview, that he

expressed his thoughts in a “coherent and logical fashion,” and that “[h]is insight was

fair.” Id.

21

Although Dr. Martell repeated his opinion from years earlier that Black is

intellectually disabled, id. at 83, that is insufficient to create a genuine question about

his present competency.

“Intellectual disability and incompetency are not

coterminous.” United States v. Wilson, No. 16-20460, 2022 WL 3044634, at *12 (E.D.

Mich. Aug. 2, 2022). Because having an intellectual disability “does not per se mean

that the defendant lacks a rational understanding of the proceedings against him,” it

follows that “not all individuals who have an intellectual disability are incompetent.”

Id.; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (“Mentally retarded persons frequently know the

difference between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial.”) And Dr.

Martell’s diagnosis of “moderate dementia,” Pet. Appx. at 81, is similarly unhelpful

because “dementia also has milder forms” which allow a person to maintain a

“rational understanding” of why the State is seeking execution. See Madison, 589

U.S. at 279.

Regardless, Dr. Martell’s opinion cannot be credited. Intellectual disability

presents a mixed question of law and fact for a court to decide. State v. Bell, 512

S.W.3d 167, 183 (Tenn. 2015). No court could accept Dr. Martell’s opinion given the

rejection of Black’s intellectual disability claim twenty years ago. Black, 2005 WL

2662577 at *1.

Dr. Gur’s report also does not speak to Black’s competency for execution. He

did not even interview Black or perform any psychological testing. Pet. Appx. at 3136. He only analyzed older images of Black’s brain scans from May 10, 2022. Id. at

31. And he merely opined inconclusively that Black “may” suffer from cognitive

22

impairments in “executive and memory functions.” Id. at 31, 35. But Dr. Gur did not

attempt to relate his brain scan analysis to Black’s capacity to “reach a rational

understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 957-58. Nothing

in Dr. Gur’s report creates a genuine issue about Black’s present competency.

Second, Black’s other collateral evidence—mostly expert reports, medical

records, and family/attorney declarations prepared years ago—does not speak to his

present competency for execution. As with Dr. Martell’s and Dr. Gur’s reports, this

older evidence simply “do[es] not opine on Mr. Black’s competency for execution.” Pet.

Appx. at 28. Instead, “[m]ost of the documents attached as exhibits to the petition

relate to the previously determined claim that Mr. Black is intellectually disabled.”

Id. at 27. But that claim failed twenty years ago, with “the weight of the proof [being]

that [Black] was not [intellectually disabled].” Black, 2005 WL 2662577 at *1. And

as discussed above (at 22), even if Black were intellectually disabled, that does not

mean he is incompetent.

This other collateral evidence is also stale. “[T]he proof required to meet the

threshold showing must relate to present incompetency,” so “at least some of the

evidence submitted must be the result of recent mental evaluations or observations

of the prisoner.” Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 269. The threshold showing “cannot be

satisfied if the only evidence offered is stale in the sense that it relates to the

prisoner’s distant past competency or incompetency.” Id. Except for four exhibits

that all relate to Black’s failed attempt to relitigate his unsuccessful intellectual

disability claim, all other evidence attached to his petition was more than fifteen

23

years old. This type of “stale” evidence, standing alone, cannot support a threshold

showing of present incompetency. Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 269.

Third, Dr. Martell’s 2025 report, Dr. Gur’s 2025 report, and Black’s other stale

evidence does not raise a genuine issue about his competency because Dr. Baecht

fully accounted for all that evidence in confirming Black’s competency under the

relevant legal standard. Pet. Appx. at 88-89. As part of her evaluation, Dr. Baecht

reviewed a list of twenty-eight documents that nearly matches the other twenty-four

exhibits attached to Black’s petition, including Dr. Martell’s and Dr. Gur’s 2025

reports. Id. But that review did not hinder Dr. Baecht’s conclusion that “Black likely

meets th[e] low bar for competency to be executed.” Id. at 98.

In short, Black’s evidence did not just fail to raise a genuine, disputed issue

about his competency; it affirmatively proved it.

No court could find Black

incompetent based on Dr. Baecht’s opposite conclusion, which fully accounted for all

of Black’s other tenuous and stale evidence. Thus, the Tennessee Supreme Court

correctly denied an evidentiary hearing based on Black’s failure to make the required

“high threshold showing” expressly contemplated by this Court in Ford. 477 U.S. at

417.

IV.

Black’s Tactical Delay Is Reason Enough to Deny a Stay.

“[A] stay of execution is an equitable remedy. It is not available as a matter of

right, and equity must be sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its

criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal courts.” Hill v.

McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 584 (2006). An applicant for a stay of execution must

24

satisfy all the traditional stay factors and therefore must show that there is “a

reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently

meritorious to grant certiorari,” that there is “a fair prospect that a majority of the

Court will vote to reverse the judgment below,” and, in a close case, that the equities

favor the granting of relief. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U. S. 183, 190 (2010) (per

curiam).

For the reasons stated above (at 12-24), there is no reason to grant certiorari

or reverse the judgment below. The Tennessee Supreme Court faithfully applied the

established competency standard from Panetti to deny a hearing based on Black’s

failure to make the sort of threshold showing of incompetency that Ford empowered

the States to require.

Even setting aside the question of certworthiness, Black’s tactical delay in

waiting only 21 days before his execution to present this Court with an idiocy claim

that he could have pursued decades ago is reason enough to deny a stay. It is well

known that “capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to

prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of a sentence of death.” Rhines v.

Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 (2005). “[I]t is the same strategy adopted by many deathrow inmates with an impending execution: bring last-minute claims that will delay

the execution, no matter how groundless.” Price v. Dunn, 587 U.S. 999, 1008 (2019)

(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).

But given the significant interests at stake, “[l]ast-minute stays should be the

extreme exception, not the norm.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 150 (2019)

25

(cleaned up). The State and victims have a “powerful and legitimate interest in

punishing the guilty.” Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 556 (1998) (cleaned up).

They also “have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a [death]

sentence.” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 149 (cleaned up). In Tennessee, victims have the

constitutional right to “a prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction

or sentence.” Tenn. Const. art I, § 35. Once post-conviction proceedings “have run

their course . . . finality acquires an added moral dimension.” Calderon, 523 U.S. at

556. “Only with an assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment

in a case” and “the victims of crime move forward knowing the moral judgment will

be carried out.” Id. “To unsettle these expectations is to inflict a profound injury.”

Id.

To avoid such injury, “the last-minute nature of an application that could have

been brought earlier, or an applicant’s attempt at manipulation, may be grounds for

denial of a stay.” Bucklew, 587 U.S. at 150 (cleaned up). Indeed, this Court applies

“a strong equitable presumption against the grant of a stay where a claim could have

been brought at such a time as to allow consideration of the merits without requiring

entry of a stay.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004). Black “had ample

opportunities to raise” his idiocy claim “at an earlier stage”—given that it is

fundamentally an intellectual disability argument. Pet. Appx. at 12. Yet, he waited

thirty-six years to present his new-fangled theory. “The proper response to this

maneuvering is to deny [Black’s] meritless request[] expeditiously.” Price, 587 U.S.

at 1008. Black’s tactical delay is reason enough to deny a stay.

26

CONCLUSION

The application for stay of execution and petition for writ of certiorari should

be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General & Reporter

State of Tennessee

J. MATTHEW RICE

Solicitor General

/s/Nicholas W. Spangler

NICHOLAS W. SPANGLER

Associate Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

500 Dr. Martin L. King, Jr. Blvd.

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, Tennessee 37202-0207

Phone: (615) 741-3486

27

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing document has been sent by

first class mail to petitioner’s counsel, Kelley J. Henry, at 810 Broadway Ste 200,

Nashville, Tennessee 37203-3861, on the 18th day of July 2025.

/s/Nicholas W. Spangler

NICHOLAS W. SPANGLER

Associate Solicitor General

28