Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr., Petitioner v. Marshals, 7th Judicial, Spartanburg, South Carolina, et al.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-6249

CECIL JEROME QUINN, JR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA MARSHALS, 7th Judicial, Spartanburg; AGENT

DILLION, 7th Judicial Parole Officer; WARDEN ROBERT MICHAEL,

Stevenston, III; WARDEN NELSON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at

Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior, District Judge. (8:23-cv-06176-HMH)

Submitted: February 20, 2025

Decided: February 25, 2025

Before AGEE, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr., appeals the district court’s order accepting the

recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.

See Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (providing standard of review).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.

Quinn v State of South Carolina

Marshals, No. 8:23-cv-06176-HMH (D.S.C. Feb. 8, 2024).

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr.,

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

C.A. No. 8:23-6176-HMH-KFM

)

)

vs.

OPINION & ORDER

)

State of South Carolina Marshals, Agent

Dillion, Warden Robert Michael

Stevenston III, Warden Nelson,

)

)

)

)

)

Defendants.

)

This matter is before the court with the Report and Recommendation of United States

Magistrate Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and District

of South Carolina Local Civil Rule 73.02. Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that Defendants violated his

constitutional rights. In her Report and Recommendation filed on January 16, 2024, Judge

Austin recommended dismissing Plaintiffs claims without issuance and service of process

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. (R&R 9, ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff filed a number of motions for

miscellaneous relief that the court construes as objections to the Report and Recommendation

and a motion to appoint counsel. (Objs., ECF No. 24.)

Objections to a report and recommendation must be specific. A report and

recommendation carries no “presumptive weight,” and the responsibility for making a final

determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 271 (1976). The court

reviews de novo “those portions of the report... to which objection is made” and “may accept,

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reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge” or “recommit the matter... with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “To trigger de

novo review, an objecting party ‘must object to the finding or recommendation on that issue with

sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the

objection.’” Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 460 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v.

Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007)). In the absence of specific objections, the court

reviews only for clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315

(4th Cir. 2005), and need not give any explanation for adopting the report, Camby v. Davis, 718

F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983).

Upon review, Plaintiff has not filed any specific objections to the substance of the

magistrate judge’s findings or conclusions. Further, Plaintiff is attempting to submit filings on

behalf of a person who is not a party to this action. Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26

(4th Cir. 1981) (stating that a prisoner cannot act as a “knight-errant” for other prisoners). In

addition, even if the court were to consider Plaintiffs objections as an attempt to amend his

complaint, amendment would be futile as Plaintiffs allegations are patently frivolous and do not

present a plausible claim for relief. See Save Our Sound OBX, Inc, v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp.,

914 F.3d 213,228 (4th Cir. 2019). As with Plaintiffs previous filings, the allegations are largely

incomprehensible, delusional, and plainly fail to meet the Twomblv/Iqbal plausibility standard.

See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Thomas v. Salvation

Army S. Territory, 841 F.3d 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting that a dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). Therefore, having reviewed the Report and Recommendation, the

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court adopts Judge Austin’s Report and Recommendation and incorporates it herein.

It is therefore

ORDERED that the motion to appoint counsel, docket number 24, is denied. It is further

ORDERED that this action is dismissed without issuance and service of process pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Henry M. Herlong, Jr.

Senior United States District Judge

Greenville, South Carolina

February 8, 2024

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL

Plaintiff is hereby notified that he has the right to appeal this order within thirty (30) days

from the date hereof, pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure.

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Pagel of 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION

Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr.,

) C/A No. 8:23-cv-06176-HMH-JDA

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

v.

)

State of South Carolina Marshals, Agent )

Dillion, Warden Robert Michael Stevenston III, )

Warden Nelson,

)

)

Defendants.

)

)

Cecil Jerome Quinn, Jr. (“Plaintiff’), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings

this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.1

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections

(“SCDC”) and is presently confined at the Broad River Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1-8

at 2.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d),

D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such complaints for relief

and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below,

the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing approximately 200 pages of documents

including handwritten allegations and documents from Plaintiffs state court proceedings.

1 The caption above includes the Defendants identified on the Complaint form. [Doc. 1-8

at 2, 4.] Plaintiff has attached a page to the Complaint form listing numerous other

individuals and entities. [Id. at 3.] It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends to name those

individuals and entities as Defendants in this case. Regardless, the Complaint as a whole

is subject to dismissal for the reasons herein notwithstanding who Plaintiff intends to name

as Defendants.

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[Docs. 1; 1-1; 1-2; 1-3; 1-4; 1-5; 1-6.] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 on the standard form [Doc. 1-8] along with an additional 254 pages of

documents [Docs. 1-9; 1-10; 1-11; 1-12; 1-13]. The Court has carefully reviewed all of

Plaintiffs filings.

Although the Complaint is confusing and difficult to decipher, the Court is able to

glean the following pertinent allegations. Plaintiff purports to bring this action to address

“100% true capital criminalistic crimes.” [Doc. 1-8 at 5.] Plaintiff contends he was

subjected to a “conspiracy by all accu[]sed” in violation of the Eighth Amendment, resulting

in torture, “[insane] asylum methods,” and electro-convulsive practices. [Id.] Plaintiff

alleges he was subjected to “mental mind manipulation” from 2012 through 2015, and

“mind invasion, tele-communication, [and insane] asylum” methods from 2016 through

2023, and someone “entered the mind of a 9 year old girl.” [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff contends

that Defendant Dillion “was tele-communicating by way of mind invasion” and “using mental

mind manipulation” on Plaintiffs step-daughter such that he controlled “her every thought”

and “she was continually explaining that she was talking to the same man that was talking

to [Plaintiff] for 3 years.” [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff contends that Defendant Dillion and other state

officials “destroyed [his] life in order to [illegally] set [Plaintiff] up ... so he could use

emulated simulation of [Plaintiffs] DNA [and his] entire [neurological] system.” [Id.]

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dillion is “using [insane] asylum methods to mentally and

physically torture [Plaintiff] with electricity and he is being allowed to do this by [SCDC].”

[Id.]

For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he has been mentally and physically tortured

through various “[insane] asylum methods of electro-[convulsion], electrolysis,

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electrocution, [and] electro-magnetic pulse.” [Id. at 9.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests a

judgment from the Court against Defendants for “the maximum sentence.” [Id.]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute.

This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C.

Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full

filing fee, this Court would be charged with screening Plaintiffs lawsuit to identify

cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it were frivolous, malicious, or failed to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) if it sought monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction

and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent

standard, Plaintiffs Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal

construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the

pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district

court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v.

Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128,1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiffs legal arguments for

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him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions

never squarely presented” to the court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274,1278

(4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can

ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a

federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’tofSoc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387,391 (4th Cir. 1990).

Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not

required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings,

the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588

F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation

process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer,

562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise

legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.’” Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 7Q7 F.3d 379,388

(4th Cir. 2014).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“And, although the pleading

requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald

statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v.

Rowe Price-Fleming Infl, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal

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quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal,

based upon each defendant’s own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d

391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be

affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the

plaintiffs rights. ... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of

and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]’s rights in order to be liable.” Wright

v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). While

Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter

in his Complaint, he must allege facts that support a claim for relief. Bass v. DuPont, 324

F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723-74 (4th Cir.1989)

(dismissing complaint dismissed because it “failed to contain any factual allegations

tending to support his bare assertion”).

DISCUSSION

As noted, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which ‘“is not itself

a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights

elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private

right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356,361 (2012).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the

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alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. (Vest v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Here, the Complaint as a whole is subject to summary dismissal because it is

frivolous and fails to allege facts to support a plausible claim for relief. Indeed, Plaintiffs

Complaint is devoid of any allegations that can be construed as asserting a cognizable

claim for relief. The Complaint is patently frivolous and subject to dismissal.

As noted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to proceed in forma

pauperis, which allows the litigant to commence a federal court action without prepaying

the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. See Staley v. Witherspoon, No.

9:07-cv-195-PMD-GCK, 2007 WL 1988272, at *1 (D.S.C. July 3, 2007). However, the

statute provides limitations to such actions by permitting the Court to dismiss the case

upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is

“frivolous or malicious.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). A complaint is deemed

frivolous when it is “clearly baseless” and includes allegations that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,”

or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,32-33 (1992) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

In reviewing for frivolousness or malice, the Court looks to see whether the

Complaint raises an indisputably meritless legal theory or is founded upon clearly baseless

factual contentions, such as fantastic or delusional scenarios. See Harley v. United States,

349 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981 (M.D.N.C. 2004). Although the Court must accept all well-pled

allegations and review the Complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiff, Mylan Lab’ys, Inc.

v. Matkari, 1 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993), it is well-settled that the Court has the

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authority to dismiss claims that are obviously “fantastic” or “delusional,” Adams v. Rice, 40

F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994).

Here, the Complaint contains assertions that are barely comprehensible and

manifestly delusional. Even if Plaintiff has set forth his statements sincerely, as assertions

of fact, they cannot be given credibility. The Court finds that Plaintiffs allegations—to the

extent they can be understood—clearly fall within the statute’s definition of frivolity.

McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting examples of frivolous

claims include those whose factual allegations are “so nutty,” “delusional,” or “wholly

fanciful” as to be simply “unbelievable.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)),

abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 1408. Ct. 1721 (2020). Plaintiffs

conclusory assertions—i.e. that he has been subjected to mind control and “[insane]

asylum” torture tactics—fail to show any arguable basis in fact or law and Plaintiff fails to

present allegations to support a claim for relief that is plausible. See Neitzke v. Williams,

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.”);

see also Brock v. Angelone, 105 F.3d 952, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a prisoner’s

claim, that he was being poisoned or experimented upon via an ingredient in pancake

syrup served at his prison, was fanciful or delusional, and dismissing the appeal as

frivolous with sanctions); Ghouralal v. Rambo, No. 2:20-cv-02875-BHH-MGB, 2020 WL

6749348, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 25,2020) (concluding that the “Plaintiffs allegations—that the

Government and others are stealing her technology and perpetrating a high-tech

mind-control plot upon her in order to cover up illegal acts—are not believable”), Report

and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 6749026 (D.S.C. Nov. 17, 2020); Boyd v.

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United States, No. 7:20-cv-178-BHH-JDA, 2020 WL 823099, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2020)

(finding the complaint was frivolous and subject to dismissal where the plaintiff alleged the

defendants were using a mind-control program on her and “shooting electromagnet

impulses in [her] head”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 816077

(D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2020). In sum, “Plaintiff’s filings are so outlandish and unmoored from

reality that the Court finds this entire action to be frivolous.” Anderson v. Dye, No.

5:21-cv-00168-MR, 2022 WL 1213619, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2022).

CONCLUSION

Consequently, for the reasons stated above, it is recommended that the District

Court dismiss this action without issuance and service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A.2

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

s/Jacquelyn D. Austin

United States Magistrate Judge

January 16, 2024

Greenville, South Carolina

Plaintiffs attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

2 The undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his Complaint by mere

amendment and therefore recommends that the instant action be dismissed without

affording Plaintiff an opportunity to amend because further amendment would be futile.

See Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 610-12, 614-15 (4th Cir. 2020).

8

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.