Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mike Fitzhugh, Sheriff, Rutherford County, Tennessee, et al., Petitioners v. Bradley Patton

Supreme Court briefJul 11, 2025

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No. _______

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

MIKE FITZHUGH, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

BRADLEY PATTON,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

NICK C. CHRISTIANSEN

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

HUDSON, REED &

CHRISTIANSEN, PLLC

16 Public Square North

Murfreesboro, TN 37130

(615) 893-5522

J. MATTHEW RICE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JOSHUA DANIEL MINCHIN

Assistant Solicitor General

OFFICE OF TENNESSEE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, TN 37202

(615) 532-6026

Matt.Rice@ag.tn.gov

Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Article III permits a plaintiff with moot

claims to continue a putative class action based on the

possibility that a future class-certification motion

might later confer standing on some undefined class.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Petitioners (defendants-appellees below) are Mike

Fitzhugh, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Rutherford County, Tennessee; Melissa Harrell, in her official capacity as Clerk of the Rutherford County Circuit

and General Sessions Courts; and Howard Wilson,

James Turner, and Barry R. Tidwell, each in their official capacities as Circuit Judges for the Sixteenth Judicial District.

Respondent (plaintiff-appellant below) is Bradley

Patton, who purports to bring suit on behalf of himself

and others similarly situated.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from the following proceedings:

• Patton v. Fitzhugh, No. 24-5639 (6th Cir.) (opinion and judgment issued March 13, 2025).

• Patton v. Fitzhugh, No. 3:23-cv-00637 (M.D.

Tenn.) (memorandum opinion issued July 9,

2024).

There are no other proceedings in state or federal

trial or appellate courts, or in this Court, directly related to this case within the meaning of this Court’s

Rule 14.1(b)(iii).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................. 1

Opinions Below ............................................................ 3

Jurisdictional Statement ............................................. 3

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ...... 3

Statement of the Case ................................................. 3

A. Legal Background ............................................. 3

B. Factual and Procedural Background ................ 7

Reasons for Granting the Petition ............................. 10

The Courts of Appeals Are Split on

the Question Presented...................................... 11

II. The Question Presented Is Important,

Recurring, and Squarely Presented. ................. 17

III. The Decision Below Is Incorrect. ....................... 20

Conclusion ............................................................... 25

Appendix A

Opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit (Mar. 13, 2025) ................. 1a

Appendix B

Memorandum of the United

States District Court for the

Middle District of Tennessee

(July 9, 2024)............................... 27a

Appendix C

U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1-2 .......... 37a

Appendix D

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ........................ 39a

Appendix E

16th Cir. L.R. 16.07 .................... 51a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

A. A. R. P. v. Trump,

145 S. Ct. 1364 (2025) ......................................... 20

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer,

601 U.S. 1 (2023) ................................................. 18

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,

568 U.S. 85 (2013) ........................................... 4, 21

Alvarez v. Smith,

558 U.S. 87 (2009) ............................................... 21

Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn,

563 U.S. 125 (2011) ............................................. 20

Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc.,

798 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2015) ................................. 25

Bertrand ex rel. Bertrand v. Maram,

495 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2007) ............................... 23

Breda v. Cellco P’ship,

934 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019) ................................... 13

Bunting v. Mellen,

541 U.S. 1019 (2004) ........................................... 23

Califano v. Yamasaki,

442 U.S. 682 (1979) ............................................. 19

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,

577 U.S. 153 (2016) ....................................... 12, 21

Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin,

500 U.S. 44 (1991) ............................................... 21

Cristiano v. Cts. of Justs. of the Peace,

115 F.R.D. 240 (D. Del. 1987) ............................. 14

Cruz v. Farquharson,

252 F.3d 530 (1st Cir. 2001) ............................... 13

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,

547 U.S. 332 (2006) ............................................. 18

Damasco v. Clearwire Corp.,

662 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2011) ............... 2, 12, 23, 25

Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper,

445 U.S. 326 (1980) ............................................. 23

FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med.,

602 U.S. 367 (2024) ................................. 17, 18, 23

Flast v. Cohen,

392 U.S. 83 (1968) ............................................... 17

Fontenot v. McCraw,

777 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2015) ................... 11, 12, 25

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs.

(TOC), Inc.,

528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................................. 24

Gawry v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

395 F. App’x 152 (6th Cir. 2010)......................... 14

Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk,

569 U.S. 66 (2013) ................................... 4, 5, 6, 21

Gerstein v. Pugh,

420 U.S. 103 (1975) ............................................... 5

Greenlee Cnty. v. United States,

487 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................. 18

Haddock v. United States,

161 Fed. Cl. 6 (2022) ........................................... 18

vii

Horvath v. United States,

149 Fed. Cl. 735 (2020) ....................................... 16

Kowalski v. Tesmer,

543 U.S. 125 (2004) ............................................. 24

Kremens v. Bartley,

431 U.S. 119 (1977) ............................................... 4

Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc.,

639 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2011) ............... 15, 22, 24

Lusardi v. Xerox Corp.,

975 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1992) ................................ 15

Murthy v. Missouri,

603 U.S. 43 (2024) ........................................... 2, 18

Nestler v. Bd. of Law Exam’rs of N.C.,

611 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1980) ............................. 14

Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble

Bee Foods LLC,

31 F.4th 651 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) ............... 19

Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc.,

653 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) ............................. 15

Raines v. Byrd,

521 U.S. 811 (1997) ......................................... 2, 17

Richardson v. Bledsoe,

829 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................ 16

Richardson v. Ramirez,

418 U.S. 24 (1974) ............................................... 24

Sannon v. United States,

631 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1980) ............................. 22

Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,

426 U.S. 26 (1976) ......................................... 17, 21

viii

Sosna v. Iowa,

419 U.S. 393 (1975) ............................. 1, 4, 5, 6, 21

Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles,

568 U.S. 588 (2013) ............................................... 4

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998) ............................................... 19

Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship,

772 F.3d 698 (11th Cir. 2014) ....................... 15, 16

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President &

Fellows of Harvard Coll.,

600 U.S. 181 (2023) ............................................. 24

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,

573 U.S. 149 (2014) ............................................... 3

Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A.,

590 U.S. 538 (2020) ............................................. 19

Thorpe v. Clarke,

37 F.4th 926 (4th Cir. 2022) ............................... 18

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413 (2021) ....................................... 18, 19

U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,

445 U.S. 388 (1980) ......................................... 5, 22

United States v. Sanchez-Gomez,

584 U.S. 381 (2018) ....................... 1, 5, 6, 9, 22, 23

United States v. Texas,

599 U.S. 670 (2023) ............................................. 18

Uviles v. City of New York,

673 F. Supp. 3d 225 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) ................. 22

Uviles v. City of New York,

130 F.4th 27 (2d Cir. 2025) ................................. 22

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski,

592 U.S. 279 (2021) ............................................... 4

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,

564 U.S. 338 (2011) ............................................. 19

Warth v. Seldin,

422 U.S. 490 (1975) ............................................... 4

Webber v. Norwalk,

No. CV 05-04219-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL

7698736 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2007) .......................... 14

Weiss v. Regal Collections,

385 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2004) ................................ 15

Williams v. City of Cleveland,

771 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2014) ............................... 18

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 ................................................ 3

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ...................................................... 3

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-715 ...................................... 7

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) ............................................ 9

Other Authorities

1 Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions

§ 2:11 (6th ed.) ..................................................... 17

3 Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions

§ 7:9 (6th ed.) ....................................................... 18

M. Andrew Campanelli, You Can Pick Your

Friends, But You Cannot Pick Off the Named

Plaintiff of a Class Action: Mootness and

Offers of Judgment Before Class Certification,

4 Drexel L. Rev. 523 (2012)................................. 16

Justiciability—Class Action Mootness—

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 130 Harv. L.

Rev. 427 (2016) .................................................... 16

Johnathan Lott, Moot Suit Riot: An Alternative

View of Plaintiff Pick-Off in Class Actions,

2013 U. Chi. Legal F. 531 (2013) ............ 10, 16, 22

Tyler B. Lindley, The Constitutional Model of

Mootness, 48 BYU L. Rev. 2151 (2023) ........ 22, 25

Zariski, et al., Mootness in the Class Action

Context: Court-Created Exceptions to the

“Case or Controversy” Requirement of Article

III, 26 Rev. Litig. 77 (2007)................................. 16

INTRODUCTION

This petition tees up an acknowledged split over

the scope of Article III jurisdiction in class actions.

Article III requires plaintiffs to maintain a personal

stake in the outcome of the lawsuit at all stages of litigation. In class actions, that personal stake usually

comes from a named plaintiff with standing. If a

named plaintiff’s claim becomes moot, a case may

nonetheless proceed if the “class of unnamed persons

described in the certification” has “acquired a legal

status separate from the interest asserted by” the

named representatives. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,

399 (1975). That class-based interest typically arises

only upon certification—meaning, in the normal

course, “a class action would be moot if no named class

representative with an unexpired claim remained at

the time of class certification.” United States v.

Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 386 (2018). But this

Court’s cases sometimes permit a class’s interest to

support standing prior to certification. The question

here is when any such interest arises for Article III

purposes—immediately upon the filing of any putative

class complaint, or only upon the filing of a class-certification motion. That issue has divided the circuits

and implicates fundamental questions about the federal judiciary’s power to coerce parties absent a live

case or controversy.

Five circuits—including the Sixth Circuit in the

decision below—permit class actions to proceed even

when the named plaintiff’s claims become moot before

the filing of a motion for class certification. Citing

practical concerns, those circuits treat the mere filing

of a class complaint as creating an Article III interest,

untethering class-based standing from certification.

Four circuits reject that approach as violative of Article III. They hold that “allow[ing] a case, not certified

as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when

the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake

defies the limits on federal jurisdiction.” Damasco v.

Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). One of these two camps is wrong.

The divide over this jurisdictional question is intolerable. Article III’s requirements are “fundamental

to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). Federal courts have “no business” either “deciding” cases

or “expounding the law in the course of doing so” absent “a proper case or controversy.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (quotations omitted). Yet,

in five circuits, a plaintiff with indisputably moot

claims can string along a case on the theory that he

might one day file a class-certification motion that injects someone else’s live legal interests. In these circuits, federal courts can render merits rulings and issue class-wide injunctive relief even when nobody—

neither the lead plaintiff, whose standing has expired,

nor the unidentified class, which has yet to attain independent legal status—has a concrete stake in the

action. That result cannot be squared with Article III

or with this Court’s jurisprudence. And it clashes with

other rules that govern representative actions.

This Court should grant the petition for certiorari

to resolve the intractable 5-4 split and ensure that the

federal judiciary stays within Article III’s boundaries.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion (Pet.App.1a-26a) is reported at 131 F.4th 383. The district court’s opinion

(Pet.App.27a-36a) is unreported but available at 2024

WL 3366333 (M.D. Tenn. July 9, 2024).

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Sixth Circuit entered judgment on March 13,

2025. Justice Kavanaugh granted an application to

extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari

from June 11, 2025 to July 11, 2025. This Court has

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Article III, §§ 1-2 of the United States Constitution

is reproduced at Pet.App.37a-38a. Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 23 is reproduced at Pet.App.39a-50a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Legal Background

Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the federal “judicial Power” to the adjudication of “Cases” or

“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. The “standing” doctrine “gives meaning to these constitutional

limits by identifying those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” Susan

B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014)

(quotations omitted). Rigorous enforcement of the tripartite standing framework “ensures that the Federal

Judiciary confines itself to its constitutionally limited

role of adjudicating actual and concrete disputes, the

resolutions of which have direct consequences on the

parties involved.” Genesis HealthCare Corp. v.

Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013).

Such a dispute must “exist[] throughout the proceedings,” not merely “at the outset.” Uzuegbunam v.

Preczewski, 592 U.S. 279, 282 (2021). “A case becomes

moot—and therefore no longer a Case or Controversy

for purposes of Article III—when the issues presented

are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike,

Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quotations omitted). That

means that if the party invoking a court’s jurisdiction

loses “a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,

at any point during litigation, the action can no longer

proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Genesis

HealthCare, 569 U.S. at 72 (quotations omitted). A

party cannot base federal jurisdiction “on contingent

future events.” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568

U.S. 588, 593 (2013).

These bedrock principles do not disappear in class

actions. A potential class representative must establish individual standing vis-à-vis the defendant.

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975). When a

court certifies a class, this Court has held that “the

class of unnamed persons described in the certification

acquire[s] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by” the named representatives. Sosna, 419

U.S. at 399. The separate legal interest of a “properly

certified class” allows a case to proceed even if a

named representative’s claim becomes moot. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977) (quotations omitted).

But certification is key. “Normally a class action

would be moot if no named class representative with

an unexpired claim remained at the time of class certification.” Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. at 386.

Starting in the 1970s, this Court created exceptions to the general rule that the named plaintiff must

have standing “at the time the class action is certified.” Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402, and n.11. In Gerstein,

the Court recognized a “limited exception” to the

standing-at-certification rule that “applies when the

pace of litigation and the inherently transitory nature

of the claims at issue conspire to make” standing at

the time of certification “difficult to fulfill.” SanchezGomez, 584 U.S. at 388 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420

U.S. 103, 110-11, and n.11 (1975), and tracing the history of the exception). And Geraghty held that “where

an action would have acquired the independent legal

status . . . but for the district court’s erroneous denial

of class certification, a corrected ruling on appeal ‘relates back’ to the time of the erroneous denial of the

certification motion.” Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.S. at

74-75 (citing U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445

U.S. 388, 404, and n.11 (1980)). In crafting these

mootness exceptions, the Court openly cast aside a

“strict, formalistic perception of Art[icle] III” in favor

of “practicalities and prudential considerations” in the

class-action context. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 n.11.

In recent years, the Court has rebuffed attempts

to expand this leeway, tethering its class-action mootness exceptions to the independent legal status of a

certified class. Genesis HealthCare, for its part, de-

clined to extend Gerstein and its progeny to a “collective action” brought under the Fair Labor Standards

Act (FLSA). Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.S. at 69.

“Rule 23 actions are fundamentally different from collective actions under the FLSA,” the Court explained,

because FLSA actions do not “produce a class with an

independent legal status, or join additional parties to

the action.” Id. at 74-75. “[T]he fact that a putative

class acquires an independent legal status once it is

certified” was “essential to [the] decisions in Sosna

and Geraghty.” Id. at 75. The Court further emphasized that the plaintiff “had not yet moved for ‘conditional certification’ when her claim became moot,”

leaving “no certification decision to which [plaintiff’s]

claim could have related back.” Id.

Similarly, in Sanchez-Gomez, this Court repudiated a flexible mootness inquiry in a criminal case that

did “not involve any formal mechanism for aggregating claims.” 584 U.S. at 389. There, four criminal defendants challenged the constitutionality of using full

restraints during pretrial proceedings. Id. at 383. After their cases concluded, the defendants attempted to

proceed with their litigation under the theory that

their cases raised “a functional class action involving

class-like claims seeking class-like relief.” Id. at 385

(quotations omitted). The Court “reject[ed] the notion

that Gerstein supports a freestanding exception to

mootness outside the class action context.” Id. at 387.

Again, the Court tied Gerstein’s mootness exception

“to the class action setting from which it emerged.” Id.

at 388. “The certification of a suit as a class action has

important consequences for the unnamed members of

the class . . . [as] [t]hose class members may be bound

by the judgment and are considered parties to the litigation in many important respects.” Id. at 387 (quotations omitted). With no class to certify, the Court

held that the case was moot. Id. at 394.

B. Factual and Procedural Background

1. To prevent criminals from using ill-gotten gains

to avoid pretrial detention, Tennessee’s General Assembly empowered state courts to investigate the

source of funds offered for bond. The relevant statute

allows courts to “conduct such hearings and enter such

orders” as necessary to ensure that criminal defendants do not use “any proceeds . . . derived from a criminal offense for the purpose of securing an appearance

bond or to pay the premium for the bond.” Tenn. Code

Ann. § 39-11-715.

Consistent with that provision, Tennessee’s 16th

Judicial District promulgated Local Rule 16.07, which

“require[s] the defendant or bonding agent to prove in

open court the source” of bonds equal to or exceeding

$75,000

for

certain

enumerated

offenses.

Pet.App.53a. That procedure—called a source hearing—ensures that funds used to post bond are not “directly or indirectly derived from a criminal offense.”

Pet.App.53a.

Bradley Patton committed various felony offenses

covered by Rule 16.07. D.Ct.Doc.1 ¶ 6; see also

D.Ct.Doc.20 ¶ 6. He was arrested, charged, and then

released after posting $21,000 in bail. D.Ct.Doc.1 ¶ 7;

see also D.Ct.Doc.20 ¶ 7. But the State later added a

new charge and upgraded one of Patton’s drug offenses. D.Ct.Doc.1 ¶ 9; see also D.Ct.Doc.20 ¶ 9. As a

result, the state trial court increased Patton’s bail obligation to over $100,000. D.Ct.Doc.1 ¶¶ 8-11; see also

D.Ct.Doc.20 ¶¶ 8-11. That increase triggered the

source-hearing requirement. D.Ct.Doc.1 ¶ 12; see also

D.Ct.Doc.20 ¶ 13. So when Patton filed his bail bond

paperwork on June 13, 2023, he had to wait for a hearing to prove the legitimacy of the funds’ source.

D.Ct.Doc.1 ¶ 14; see also D.Ct.Doc.20 ¶ 15. On June

22, 2023, the state trial court conducted the source

hearing. D.Ct.Doc.23-3 at 216. It denied Patton’s bail

request based on findings about certain real estate

posted as bond by Patton’s attorney. Id. at 244-47.

2. Earlier that same day, Patton filed a putative

class action in federal district court challenging Rule

16.07 and naming various county officials and statecourt judges as defendants. D.Ct.Doc.1. Patton

brought the suit on behalf of himself and “[a]ll people

who are, or will be, arrested and charged with criminal

offenses in Rutherford County and detained in jail as

a result of the Defendants’ bail source hearing requirements.” Id. at ¶ 39. He claimed that Rule 16.07 violates the U.S. Constitution and sought declaratory

and injunctive relief. Id. at ¶¶ 33-49; see also id.,

Prayer for Relief.

A few months later, Patton voluntarily amended

his complaint to add a new cause of action.

D.Ct.Doc.20 ¶¶ 47-51. The updated complaint clarified that Patton was no longer in pretrial detention; he

had pleaded guilty and been sentenced to ten years of

probation. Id. at ¶ 12. Defendants then moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that Patton’s case

became moot upon his release and that he lacked

standing to seek prospective relief. D.Ct.Doc.23-1 at

190-93.

Although Patton recognized “his claims [were]

moot,” Pet.App.34a, he made no effort—either before

or after his release—to cure that mootness problem

through class certification. Rule 23 requires that certification happen “[a]t an early practicable time after

a person sues,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). But Patton

never filed any class certification motion. Nor did he

press for discovery to support any such motion. Just

the opposite. On November 13, 2023, Patton asked the

district court to stay all discovery pending resolution

of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. D.Ct.Doc.26 at

280. It was not until February 2024, nearly eight

months after filing his complaint, that Patton sought

discovery purportedly related to class certification.

D.Ct.Doc.45 at 392.

On July 9, 2024, over a year after Patton sued, the

district court dismissed Patton’s complaint.

Pet.App.36a. The court noted that Patton failed to

support his position that “the alleged wrong is capable

of repetition yet evading review.” Pet.App.34a-35a.

Consistent with this Court’s decision in SanchezGomez, the court declined to assume that “Patton

[would] again be subjected to a bail source hearing,”

concluded that he lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief, and dismissed the complaint as moot.

Pet.App.35a-36a.

3. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Pet.App.26a. The

panel, in an opinion authored by Judge Moore,

acknowledged that Patton’s claims were “moot absent

an appropriate exception.” Pet.App.11a. But it construed Patton’s capable-of-repetition argument as an

invocation of Gerstein’s “inherently transitory” exception, even though Patton never filed a motion for class

certification. Pet.App.18a-20a. It then held that “a

class-certification motion need not be pending for a

class-action claimant to assert the ‘inherently transitory’ exception to mootness.” Pet.App.25a. According

to the court, “[t]here are good, practical reasons for

th[at] rule[],” like avoiding premature class-certification motions. Pet.App.25a. The court remanded for

further adjudication of Patton’s indisputably moot

claims. The district court then entered a stay pending

resolution of proceedings before this Court.

D.Ct.Doc.66.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This petition is the ideal vehicle for resolving an

entrenched 5-4 circuit split over mootness in class actions. This Court “has never resolved the issue of what

to do when the named plaintiff’s case becomes moot

before the motion to certify the class has been filed.”

Johnathan Lott, Moot Suit Riot: An Alternative View

of Plaintiff Pick-Off in Class Actions, 2013 U. Chi. Legal F. 531, 531 (2013). And the circuits take different

approaches. The Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow class actions to proceed under

mootness exceptions even if the named plaintiff’s

claims moot out before the filing of a motion for class

certification. The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh

Circuits do not. That division of authority is stark and

implicates a fundamental question of federal courts’

power. And the Sixth Circuit opted for the wrong rule.

Letting the split linger saddles parties like Tennessee

and its localities with the sky-high burdens of class litigation in cases that could not proceed elsewhere—and

should not proceed anywhere. This Court should

grant certiorari to restore uniformity and ensure adherence to Article III’s strictures.

The Courts of Appeals Are Split on the Question Presented.

This case involves a clear, entrenched circuit split

over mootness in class actions. Generally, a class action is moot if no named plaintiff has a live case or

controversy at the time of class certification. This

Court has recognized certain exceptions to that rule

based on the theory that a class can obtain an Article

III interest separate from that of the putative class

representatives. The Courts of Appeals hold diametrically opposed views as to when that interest arises—

on the filing of a class complaint or on the filing of a

class-certification motion. That distinction creates a

make-or-break difference in pre-certification cases: It

dictates whether a case can proceed when the class

representative’s claims are moot.

1. The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits

dismiss class actions when the named plaintiff’s

claims become moot before the filing of a motion for

class certification.

The Fifth Circuit resolved this issue in Fontenot v.

McCraw, 777 F.3d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2015). There, a

group of drivers brought a putative class action seeking to correct certain driving records. Id. at 744. The

State corrected the named plaintiffs’ records about six

months after plaintiffs filed suit, before the plaintiffs

moved for class certification. Id. at 747-48. The plaintiffs argued that even if their claims became “moot before a class certification motion was filed, that motion

‘relates back’ to the filing date of the first amended

complaint in order to keep the class action alive.” Id.

at 748. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining that

the precedent on the inherently transitory exception

does not extend to situations in which there is “no certification motion . . . even pending” at the time a plaintiff’s claims are “mooted.” Id. at 751. Indeed, the court

noted that “the plaintiffs could have filed a class action

certification motion . . . simultaneously with the filing

of their first amended complaint,” but failed to do so.

Id. The court thus concluded that when the plaintiffs’

“individual records correction claims became moot, so

did the class action case.” Id.

The Seventh Circuit likewise recognizes that “allow[ing] a case, not certified as a class action and with

no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer

maintains a personal stake defies the limits on federal

jurisdiction expressed in Article III.” Damasco, 662

F.3d at 896. In Damasco, recipients of unsolicited text

messages filed a putative class action. Id. at 893-94.

The Seventh Circuit held that a settlement offer

mooted the plaintiffs’ claim, id. at 895—a holding

since abrogated by this Court, see Campbell-Ewald Co.

v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 162 (2016). But critically, the

court did not just address whether the individual

claims were moot; it also addressed how the timing of

a mooting event matters in class actions for Article III

purposes. Damasco, 662 F.3d at 895-97. And it drew

the dividing line for mootness at the filing of a class-

certification motion: “Even when a complaint clearly

and in great detail describes the suit as a class action

suit, if the plaintiff does not seek class certification,

then dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim terminates the

suit.” Id. (quotations omitted and emphasis added).

To avoid mootness, the court noted, a plaintiff could

“simply . . . mov[e] to certify a class when filing suit.”

Id. at 897. But no separate class-based legal interest,

the court recognized, arises before the class certification motion. Id. at 896.

The First Circuit applies the same rule. In Cruz

v. Farquharson, a group of plaintiffs brought a suit

against federal immigration officials relating to their

immigration status. 252 F.3d 530, 531-32 (1st Cir.

2001). Before the named plaintiffs moved for class certification, the INS granted the plaintiffs’ adjustment

of status petitions. Id. at 532. The First Circuit recognized that “ordinarily” class actions “must be dismissed as moot if no decision on class certification has

occurred by the time that the individual claims of all

named plaintiffs have been fully resolved.” Id. at 533.

It then noted that some courts allowed “a class action

[to] endure even though the named plaintiff’s claims

have become moot, as long as a motion for class certification is pending at the time that mootness overtakes the plaintiff’s claims.” Id. at 534 n.3. But “no

such motion was pending when the claims of the

named plaintiffs . . . became moot,” so the court dismissed. Id.; see also Breda v. Cellco P’ship, 934 F.3d

1, 6 n.10 (1st Cir. 2019) (“Because the district court

fully resolved Breda’s personal claims before she filed

a motion for class certification, any class claims were

mooted by the judgment for VZW.” (emphasis added)).

It appears that the Fourth Circuit also conditions

the application of the inherently transitory exception

on the filing of a motion for class certification. In Nestler v. Board of Law Examiners of North Carolina, the

court stated that a “class is not considered a separate

entity” for Article III purposes when “no plaintiff class

was certified” and the “plaintiffs never moved for class

certification.” 611 F.2d 1380, 1382 (4th Cir. 1980).

And lower courts have read that decision to stand for

the proposition that a plaintiff “may not invoke Sosna

and Geraghty because she has not filed a motion for

class certification, which is the essential prerequisite

to the inherently transitory class exception.” Webber

v. Norwalk, No. CV 05-04219-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL

7698736, at *8 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2007); see also Cristiano v. Cts. of Justs. of the Peace, 115 F.R.D. 240, 246

n.6 (D. Del. 1987) (noting that Nestler did not allow a

class action to proceed because “the plaintiffs never

moved for certification of a class”).

2. By contrast, the Third, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits have all held that class actions can

proceed even if the named plaintiff’s claims become

moot before the filing of a class-certification motion.

The Sixth Circuit adopted that rule in the decision

below. It explicitly recognized that “Defendants’ primary argument against the application of the [inherently transitory] exception is that Patton never filed a

motion for class certification.” Pet.App.20a. And it

acknowledged that a prior unpublished Sixth Circuit

precedent

supported

Defendants’

argument.

Pet.App.21a (citing Gawry v. Countrywide Home

Loans, Inc., 395 F. App’x 152, 156 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010)).

By the court’s lights, though, “good, practical reasons”

supported accepting that “a class-certification motion

need not be pending for a class-action claimant to assert the ‘inherently transitory’ exception to mootness.”

Pet.App.25a.

That approach aligns with the Ninth, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits. Each holds that nothing “turns on

whether the named plaintiffs’ individual claims become moot before or after the plaintiffs move to certify

a class.” Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 772 F.3d 698,

707 (11th Cir. 2014). In their view, “a nascent interest

attaches to the proposed class upon the filing of a class

complaint.” Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery,

Inc., 639 F.3d 1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011); see also

Stein, 772 F.3d at 707. And they posit that allowing

class actions to proceed, even when a named plaintiff’s

claims become moot before a class certification motion,

“furthers the purposes of Rule 23.” Pitts v. Terrible

Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Third Circuit also appears to have joined this

camp. Initially, that court “require[d] the named

plaintiff to have a personal stake when the class certification motion at issue was filed.” Lusardi v. Xerox

Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 982 (3d Cir. 1992). But it later

wavered, noting that, while “most of the cases applying the relation back doctrine have done so after a motion to certify the class has been filed[,] . . . reference

to the bright line event of the filing of the class certification motion may not always be well-founded.” Weiss

v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 347-48 (3d Cir.

2004). Ultimately, the Third Circuit seems to have

flipped (without going en banc), stating that the class

maintains a “live interest” from “the date of the filing

of the complaint.” Richardson v. Bledsoe, 829 F.3d

273, 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotations omitted).

3. Though the decision below was silent on this

split, Pet.App.21a-23a, other courts have called it out.

The Eleventh Circuit noted the diverging “view[s]” on

whether a case can proceed when mootness of the

named plaintiff’s claim “precedes a class-certification

motion.” Stein, 772 F.3d at 707-08 (citing Damasco’s

conclusion that “the critical issue is the timing of the

class-certification motion”). The Court of Federal

Claims has acknowledged the circuits’ differing approaches, too. See Horvath v. United States, 149 Fed.

Cl. 735, 745 (2020).

Likewise, a host of commentators have highlighted the “split in authority” on mootness when a

named plaintiff’s claims “becom[e] moot prior to the

motion for certification.” Lott, supra, at 541. For over

a decade, law review articles have noted the “significant disagreement” among the circuits on the question

presented. Zariski, et al., Mootness in the Class Action

Context: Court-Created Exceptions to the “Case or Controversy” Requirement of Article III, 26 Rev. Litig. 77,

85 (2007) (noting split); Justiciability—Class Action

Mootness—Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 130 Harv.

L. Rev. 427, 434-35 (2016) (similar); M. Andrew Campanelli, You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Cannot

Pick Off the Named Plaintiff of a Class Action: Mootness and Offers of Judgment Before Class Certification, 4 Drexel L. Rev. 523, 534-35 (2012) (noting that

“the lower courts have split on this issue” by “applying

various temporal cut-off points in class action litigation”). A preeminent class-action treatise similarly

acknowledges the well-established divide over

whether to “relate back to the time at which either the

class certification motion or the class complaint were

filed.” 1 Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions

§ 2:11 (6th ed.).

In short, the circuits’ divergent approaches are solidified and irreconcilable. Either a class-based, Article III interest arises before the filing of a class certification motion, or it does not. Only this Court can

settle the debate.

II. The Question Presented Is Important, Recurring, and Squarely Presented.

The deep division among the circuits does not concern a trifling technicality. It tees up a matter of utmost importance: Whether federal courts are issuing

“advisory opinions” in class-action cases in violation of

“the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal

law of justiciability.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96

(1968) (quotations omitted).

This Court has described the case-or-controversy

requirement as a “bedrock” constitutional principle.

FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378

(2024). Indeed, it has emphasized that “[n]o principle

is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in

our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or

controversies.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 818 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37

(1976)). Put simply, “[i]f a dispute is not a proper case

or controversy, the courts have no business deciding

it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341

(2006). And the Court routinely steps in to ensure adherence to Article III’s boundaries. See, e.g., Murthy,

603 U.S. at 76; All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at

396-97; Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer, 601 U.S. 1, 5

(2023); United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670, 686

(2023); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 442

(2021). It is critical that the Court do so here.

In nearly half the nation’s circuits, a plaintiff

whose claims are indisputably moot can litigate a class

action on the theory that he might one day file a classcertification motion that creates interests for others. That theory “keep[s] cases alive” even if “the

named plaintiffs lose their personal stake” and even if

no “actual class” has been proffered—“leaving federal

courts to preside over litigation driven only by lawyers

without existing clients.” Haddock v. United States,

161 Fed. Cl. 6, 19-20 (2022).

Worse still, courts in the no-mootness camp can

render advisory opinions on the merits. “Given the

early nature of most motions to dismiss, courts will often handle them prior to deciding a motion for class

certification.” 3 Newberg and Rubenstein on Class Actions § 7:9 (6th ed.); see, e.g., Greenlee Cnty. v. United

States, 487 F.3d 871, 880-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Thorpe

v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 931 (4th Cir. 2022); Williams

v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 950-52 (6th Cir.

2014). So with no plaintiff or cognizable class interest,

courts can opine on the merits of a moot claim. That

blatantly presses beyond Article III’s bounds. See

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97

n.2 (1998).

That this question relates to jurisdiction over class

actions makes it all the more important. Class actions

were supposed to be “an exception to the usual rule

that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011) (quoting Califano v.

Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). But in recent

years, class actions have exploded in number to

“around 10,000 . . . annually.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th

651, 686 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (Lee, J., dissenting).

With these suits comes the significant risk that federal

courts will overstep Article III boundaries. See, e.g.,

TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417-18; Thole v. U.S. Bank

N.A., 590 U.S. 538, 541 (2020).

Class actions also come with significant costs. A

single class action can cost millions in taxpayer funds

and impose a significant drain on limited state resources. Cf. 2024 Carlton Fields Class Action Survey,

at 7 (2024), https://perma.cc/U3TX-X84E (noting that

U.S. companies were projected to spend over $4 billion

defending against class actions in 2024 alone). Foisting that burden on States and local governments when

the only plaintiff in the case lacks standing erodes

state sovereignty. It puts parties at the beck and call

of federal courts who may want to proceed with litigation to opine on legal questions, even absent a live case

or controversy.

This Court’s recent recognition that “courts may

issue temporary relief to a putative class” before “decid[ing] whether a class should be certified” further

heightens the stakes. A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.

1364, 1369 (2025). If this Court is going to allow federal courts to issue pre-certification, class-wide injunctive relief, it should at least require a named plaintiff

with a personal stake in the lawsuit. Those concerns

peak in cases like this one, where the requested relief

involves intrusive injunctions that would re-order

state and local operations. In this “era of frequent litigation, class actions, [and] sweeping injunctions with

prospective effect,” the Court must be “more careful”

in ensuring that lower courts adhere to justiciability

doctrines, “not less so.” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition

Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 146 (2011).

And this case presents a clean vehicle for resolving

the important issues at stake. The decision below

squarely resolves the question presented, and no factual or procedural obstacles will complicate this

Court’s review. Mootness has been litigated at each

stage of this case, with both the trial court and the

Sixth Circuit addressing the issue. Pet.App.11a-26a,

32a-36a. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Petitioners’ “primary argument” in support of mootness

was “that Patton never filed a motion for class certification.” Pet.App.20a. This case thus provides the

ideal opportunity to reach the “important matter” implicated by the decision below. Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).

III. The Decision Below Is Incorrect.

The Sixth Circuit’s approach to mootness embeds

multi-step speculation. A putative class plaintiff with

a moot claim can nonetheless proceed to litigate a case

on the theory that he might someday file a class-certification motion, which in turn might solidify a separate legal interest for unnamed class members. That

cannot possibly be squared with Article III’s dictates.

This Court has “repeatedly held that an ‘actual

controversy’ must exist not only ‘at the time the complaint is filed,’ but through ‘all stages’ of the litigation.” Already, 568 U.S. at 90-91 (quoting Alvarez v.

Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009)). If “at any point” during

the litigation the plaintiffs lose their interest “in the

outcome of the lawsuit . . .[,] the action can no longer

proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Genesis

HealthCare, 569 U.S. at 72 (quotations omitted). That

rule applies in the class action context. Cf. Simon, 426

U.S. at 40 n.20 (“That a suit may be a class action . . .

adds nothing to the question of standing.”).

While a putative class can obtain “a legal status

separate from the interest asserted by” the named

plaintiffs, this Court has always tied that separate interest to class certification. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399.

Sosna refers to “the class of unnamed persons described in the certification” acquiring a separate interest. Id. (emphasis added). And Campbell-Ewald reiterates that “a class lacks independent status until certified.” 577 U.S. at 165. It is only “by obtaining class

certification” that “plaintiffs preserve[] the merits of

the controversy for . . . review.” Cnty. of Riverside v.

McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991) (emphasis added).

That separate, class-based interest attaches when

the plaintiffs “move[] the court for class certification.”

Sannon v. United States, 631 F.2d 1247, 1252 (5th Cir.

1980). As Geraghty suggests, “the purported class is

either a class or not a class at the filing of the certification motion.” Tyler B. Lindley, The Constitutional

Model of Mootness, 48 BYU L. Rev. 2151, 2193 (2023).

That is, the class exists, whether properly certified by

the district court or not, when the class certification

motion is filed. Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404-07; see also

Lott, supra, at 554-55 (“Roper and Geraghty imply

that it is the moment of filing the motion for certification that consummates the legal existence of the unnamed class.”).

The contrary view—adopted by the Sixth Circuit

below—flouts this Court’s precedent. Sanchez-Gomez

was very clear: “Normally a class action would be

moot if no named class representative with an unexpired claim remained at the time of class certification.”

584 U.S. at 386. That general rule makes no sense if

“a nascent interest attaches to the proposed class upon

the filing of a class complaint.” Lucero, 639 F.3d at

1249. That is, if the interest arises upon the filing of

the class complaint, then why would the class action

“be moot if no named class representative with an unexpired claim remained at the time of class certification”? Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. at 386. “There comes

a point at which exceptions swallow a rule,” and “expand[ing] the class action exception to mootness to include cases where the plaintiff has not even moved for

class certification” is that point. Uviles v. City of New

York, 673 F. Supp. 3d 225, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2023), aff’d,

130 F.4th 27 (2d Cir. 2025).

The mere filing of a “complaint [that] identifies the

suit as a class action” cannot create a separate class

interest. Damasco, 662 F.3d at 896. That approach

leaves illogical jurisdictional puzzles. A named plaintiff, after all, may never decide to move for class certification. Would the case at some point toggle from unmoot to moot if the prospect of certification ceases? If

so, at what point? When the plaintiff seeks summary

judgment sans certification motion? Or goes to trial?

That thicket points up the problem with letting standing lie based on the theory that a plaintiff might someday move for class certification that creates a separate, class-based interest. And it contradicts the normal rule that “speculation” does not “shield a case

from a mootness determination.” Bunting v. Mellen,

541 U.S. 1019, 1021 (2004) (cleaned up).

Fairness problems abound too. Most notably, recognizing a class-based interest upon the filing of the

complaint also “creates the possibility of asymmetrical

preclusion.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 40203 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Bertrand ex rel.

Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 2007)

(Easterbrook, C.J.). It is the certification that binds

members of the class to the judgment. SanchezGomez, 584 U.S. at 387; Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank

v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 359 n.21 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). Before then, no preclusive effects arise—indeed, it is not even clear who is part of the class. The

rule adopted below thus creates an untenable lose-lose

for class defendants: The putative class’s “nascent interest” counts enough for the case to proceed, but not

enough to bind the class if the defendant prevails on

the merits against the named plaintiff’s claims (on a

motion to dismiss, for example). Lucero, 639 F.3d at

1249. Despite the “class” interest providing the sole

basis for defeating mootness, the class will nonetheless be free to litigate anew. That mismatch underscores the problems with allowing a separate Article

III interest to attach to a class whenever a putative

class complaint is filed.

The theory adopted below also clashes with other

limits on representative actions. This Court, for instance, allows an association without standing to pursue claims only when “its members would otherwise

have standing to sue.” Students for Fair Admissions,

Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S.

181, 199 (2023) (quotations omitted). And the Court

allows a third-party without standing to pursue claims

only when “the party asserting the right has a ‘close’

relationship with” another party “who possesses the

right” and a live “interest[].” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543

U.S. 125, 130, (2004). Those doctrines have been criticized. But they at least require someone with a live

interest for a case to proceed. Not so here.

“[P]ractical” considerations cannot overcome this

Article III deficiency. Pet.App.25a. For one, “purely

practical considerations have never been thought to be

controlling . . . on the issue of mootness.” Richardson

v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974). Convenience and

judicial preference “do[] not license courts to retain jurisdiction over cases in which one or both of the parties

plainly lack a continuing interest.” Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 192 (2000).

Moreover, the practical issues raised by the majority view are easily addressed. As several circuits have

recognized, the potential for defensive “gambits” to

moot a class or transitory claims can be addressed by

“simply fil[ing] motions for class certification with the

complaint.” Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. ACT, Inc.,

798 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2015); Damasco, 662 F.3d at

896; Fontenot, 777 F.3d at 751. That approach would

not cause any problems with “plaintiffs . . . mov[ing]

for certification prematurely,” as plaintiffs could

simply “ask the district court to delay its ruling to provide time for additional discovery or investigation”—a

routine request in federal litigation. Damasco, 662

F.3d at 896; see also Lindley, supra, at 2192 n.180.

And if the circumstances are such that the contours of

the class are so ill-defined that a plaintiff could not

even file a placeholder class certification motion, then

the contours of the class cannot possibly be sufficient

for purposes of recognizing a separate legal interest.

Put simply, courts need not stretch Article III when a

“simple solution” exists. Damasco, 662 F.3d at 896.

Federal courts in nearly half the circuits are overstepping Article III’s bounds. In this case, the result

is a class action proceeding against the State and local

officials for intrusive injunctive relief despite the absence of any party with a live interest. This Court’s

intervention is warranted.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

J. MATTHEW RICE

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

JOSHUA DANIEL MINCHIN

Assistant Solicitor General

OFFICE OF TENNESSEE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

P.O. Box 20207

Nashville, TN 37202

(615) 532-6026

Matt.Rice@ag.tn.gov

NICK C. CHRISTIANSEN

HUDSON, REED & CHRISTIANSEN, PLLC

16 Public Square North

Murfreesboro, TN 37130

(615) 893-5522

nchristiansen@mborolaw.com

Counsel for Petitioners

JULY 11, 2025

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the United States

Cou r t of Appeals for the Si x th Ci rcuit

(Mar. 13, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B: Memorandum of the United

States District Court for the Middle District

of Tennessee (July 9, 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27a

APPENDIX C: U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2 . . . . . . . 37a

APPENDIX D: Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39a

APPENDIX E: 16th Cir. L.R. 16.07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51a

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-5639

BRADLEY PATTON, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF

AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

MIKE FITZHUGH, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY

AS SHERIFF OF RUTHERFORD COUNTY,

TENNESSEE; MELISSA HARRELL, IN

HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CLERK

OF THE RUTHERFORD COUNTY CIRCUIT

AND GENERAL SESSIONS COURTS;

JAMES TURNER, BARRY R. TIDWELL, AND

HOWARD WILSON, IN THEIR OFFICIAL

CAPACITIES AS CIRCUIT JUDGES FOR

THE SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.

No. 3:23-cv-00637—William Lynn Campbell, Jr.,

District Judge.

Before: MOORE, KETHLEDGE, and

BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

Decided and Filed: March 13, 2025

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This

appeal concerns issues of standing and mootness in a

putative class-action suit. According to Bradley Patton,

state and local officials in Rutherford County, Tennessee

unconstitutionally require pre-trial detainees to prove

in a hearing before the state court that any bail funds

equal to or in excess of $75,000 were not derived directly

or indirectly from criminal activities. On June 13, 2023,

Patton requested permission to post $100,000 to cover

outstanding bail. Despite having the funds ready to secure

his release, Patton was not released from custody. Under

Rutherford County’s local rules, Patton had to wait for the

state court to schedule a hearing to determine whether

the bail money was sourced from any criminal activities.

Patton filed this putative class action in federal court

claiming that this local rule violated his and the putative

class’s due-process and Eighth Amendment rights.

For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the

district court’s judgment dismissing Patton’s claims on

jurisdictional grounds and REMAND for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2021, Patton was arrested in

Rutherford County, Tennessee, and charged with a series

of state drug offenses and a firearm offense. R. 20 (Am.

Compl. ¶ 6) (Page ID #157). Patton secured his release

by initially posting $21,000 in bail. Id. ¶ 7 (Page ID #157).

After he missed a subsequent court date, Patton posted

another $5,000 (for a new total of $26,000) to meet his

increased bail obligation. Id. ¶ 8 (Page ID #158). At some

later point, one of Patton’s charges was increased and a

new charge was also added. Id. ¶ 9 (Page ID #158). The

state court once again increased Patton’s bail obligation,

this time by an additional $75,000, for a total of $101,000.

Id. ¶ 10 (Page ID #158). Patton failed to turn himself in

after being notified that his bail was increased. Id. ¶ 11

(Page ID #158). Patton’s failure to surrender earned

him yet another bail increase, for a final time, to a total

of $126,000. Id. In sum, by the time Patton’s obligation

reached its zenith, Patton had already paid $26,000 in

bail but still owed an additional $100,000 to secure his

release. Id.

Because Patton’s obligation reached $75,000 or more,

he had to prove that whatever money or assets he put

up to secure his release were not derived directly or

indirectly from criminal activities. Id. ¶ 13 (Page ID #159).

Rutherford County has adopted Rule 16.07(G) that, for

certain enumerated offenses, if the state court sets bond in

the amount of $75,000 or more, then the state court has to

conduct a “source hearing” to “ensur[e] that any defendant

does not use any proceeds directly or indirectly derived

from a criminal offense for the purpose of securing an

appearance bond or to pay the premium for the bond.” Id.

¶ 32 (Page ID #163–64); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 3911-715. (“Any court may require the defendant or bonding

agent to prove in open court the source of such bond or

premium before accepting the bond . . . .”).

As a consequence, when the state court set Patton’s

bond over $75,000, he needed to prove in a source hearing

that “he did not use any proceeds directly or indirectly

derived from a criminal offense . . . .” R. 20 (Am. Compl.

¶ 32) (Page ID #163–64) (quoting Rule 16.07(G)). Although

it is unclear at what point the state court set Patton’s bond

above the $75,000 threshold triggering Rule 16.07(G),

Patton “sat in jail for multiple months before his attorney

could gather the documentation, in consultation with

family and friends, for the motion to approve the source.”

See id. ¶¶ 10, 17 (Page ID #158, 160). On June 13, 2023,

Patton posted bond to cover his $100,000 outstanding

obligation. Id. ¶ 15 (Page ID #159). He had to wait,

however, until June 22, 2023, for his source hearing. Id.

Earlier that same day, on June 22, 2023, Patton filed

his initial class-action complaint in the United States

District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee

against two county officials—Mike Fitzhugh (the Sheriff

of Rutherford County) and Melissa Harrell (the Clerk

of the Rutherford County Circuit and General Sessions

Court)—and three Circuit Judges for the Sixteenth

Judicial District, James Turner, Barry Tidwell, and

Howard Wilson. R. 1 (Compl. at 1) (Page ID #1). Patton

claimed that Rule 16.07(G) violated his substantive and

procedural due-process rights. Id. ¶¶ 33–38 (Page ID

#12–14). This putative class action was filed on behalf

of all those similarly situated, and sought a declaratory

judgment and prospective injunctive relief. Id. at 14–17

(Page ID #14–17).

On September 6, 2023, the State Defendants (the three

Circuit Judges for the Sixteenth Judicial District), moved

to dismiss Patton’s original complaint. R. 15-1 (State Mem.

in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 1) (Page ID #62). The State

Defendants argued that the district court should abstain

from hearing the case under the Younger abstention

doctrine and that Patton could not properly certify a class.

Id. at 5–15 (Page ID #66–76). On September 8, 2023, the

Local Defendants (Sheriff Fitzhugh and Circuit Court

Clerk Harrell) moved to dismiss Patton’s complaint on

essentially four grounds: (1) the State Defendants, not

the Local Defendants, implemented Rule 16.07(G); (2)

Younger abstention; (3) failure to state a claim under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and

(4) that Patton could not successfully certify a class. R. 17

(Loc. Defs. Mot. to Dismiss at 5–22) (Page ID #133–50).

On September 27, 2023, Patton filed an amended

complaint as a matter of right. R. 20 (Am. Compl. at 1)

(Page ID #155). The amended complaint was roughly the

same as the first except for two key differences. First,

Patton alleged that on June 29, 2023, he pleaded guilty

to two of the charges against him and was sentenced to

ten years of probation. Id. ¶ 12 (Page ID #158). Second,

in addition to re-asserting his due-process claims, Patton

also brought an Eighth Amendment claim alleging that

he was denied his right to non-excessive bail. Id. ¶¶ 47–51

(Page ID #170–71). Patton continued to request that he

represent the class of similarly situated individuals, and he

continued to seek a declaratory judgment and prospective

injunctive relief. Id. at 17–20 (Page ID #170–74).

The State and Local Defendants moved to dismiss

Patton’s amended complaint. Relevantly, the State

Defendants moved to dismiss Patton’s amended complaint

for mootness, R. 23-1 (State Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to

Dismiss Am. Compl. at 6–9) (Page ID #190–93), and

asserted that he could not properly represent a class

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, id. at 9–15

(Page ID #193–99). The Local Defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint on largely similar grounds, as well

as other bases. R. 25 (Loc. Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Am.

Compl. at 8–11, 24–25) (Page ID #261–64, 277–78). The

thrust of Defendants’ arguments on mootness was that

“because Plaintiff has been released, his harm is merely

past harm, which does not entitle him ‘to seek injunctive

or declaratory relief.’” R. 23-1 (State Mem. in Supp. of

Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 8) (Page ID #192) (quoting

Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,

927 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2019)); R. 25 (Loc. Defs. Mot.

to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 10) (Page ID #263) (arguing

exactly the same).

Patton responded that his claims were not moot

because the Supreme Court has carved out an exception

to the mootness doctrine for claims that are “capable of

repetition yet evading review.” R. 35 (Response to Mots.

to Dismiss Am. Compl. at 4) (Page ID #339) (quoting Neb.

Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546–47, 96 S. Ct. 2791,

49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976)). He also argued that the district

court should not dismiss his request for class certification

because “there has been ‘no discovery whatsoever.’” Id. at

7 (Page ID #342) (quoting Smith v. Wash. Post Co., 962

F. Supp. 2d 79, 90 (D.D.C. 2013)).

The district court agreed with Defendants on

mootness. “[T]here is no ongoing harm as Patton is

released and future injury to Patton is speculative.”

Patton v. Fitzhugh, No. 3:23-cv-00637, 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 120024, 2024 WL 3366333, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.

July 9, 2024) (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,

497, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974)). “Granting

relief on the speculative idea that Patton will reoffend is

insufficient to establish a concrete and immediate threat

of future injury.” Id. The district court rejected Patton’s

arguments that the putative class could save his claims,

reasoning that “the class representatives must prove

their own ‘case or controversy’ . . . in order to seek relief

for ‘any other member of the class.’” Id. 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 120024, at *4 (alterations in original) (quoting

Fox v. Saginaw County, 67 F.4th 284, 294 (6th Cir. 2023)).

As for the “capable of repetition yet evading review”

argument, the district court found that “because Patton

has been released from pre-trial custody, there is no

reasonable expectation that Patton will again be subjected

to a bail source hearing.” Id. Patton’s claims were moot,

and he could not rely on the putative class’s standing to

preserve his claims. Id. The district court dismissed the

amended complaint without addressing Defendants’ other

arguments. Id.

During the course of the district-court proceedings,

the parties proposed and the district court issued various

case-management orders. When Patton initially filed this

action, the clerk’s office automatically docketed a notice

regarding case management. R. 3 (Notice) (Page ID #21).

The notice informed Patton that, on his initiative, counsel

was to prepare and submit a proposed case-management

order three days in advance of the telephonic conference

scheduled with the district court for October 5, 2023. Id.

After Patton filed his amended complaint in September,

on the parties’ joint motion, the district court mooted

Defendants’ then-pending motions to dismiss, extended

their deadlines to respond to Patton’s amended complaint,

and rescheduled the case-management conference to

November 16, 2023. R. 22 (Scheduling Order at 1–2) (Page

ID #180–81). On November 17, 2023, the district court

entered an initial case-management order that noted that

the parties continued to dispute class certification and

leaving as “RESERVED” Patton’s deadline to file a motion

for class certification. R. 31 (Initial Case Mgmt. Order at

5, 12–13) (Page ID #309, 316–17). Prior to entering the

initial case-management order, the district court stayed

discovery pending resolution of Defendants’ motions to

dismiss. R. 29 (Order) (Page ID #302). In its final casemanagement order issued two months before granting

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the district court still

left the deadline for a motion for class certification motion

as “RESERVED.” R. 56 (Second Modified Case Mgmt.

Order at 5) (Page ID #466).

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s order granting

Defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction de novo. Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, 69

F.4th 338, 342 (6th Cir. 2023).

III.

SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

This appeal concerns whether the federal courts have

subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Patton’s putative classaction claims. “To uphold the constitutional requirement

that federal courts hear only active cases or controversies,

as required by Article III, section 2 of the federal

constitution, a plaintiff must have a personal interest at the

commencement of the litigation (standing) that continues

throughout the litigation (lack of mootness).” Barry v.

Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 714 (6th Cir. 2016).

Before addressing the parties’ arguments on appeal,

we face a preliminary issue: Which doctrine(s) govern this

appeal, standing or mootness?

A. Standing

The State and Local Defendants argue that Patton

lacked standing when he filed his amended complaint.

Because the first amended complaint replaced the original

complaint, they ask us to assess Patton’s standing solely in

relation to the amended complaint. Our circuit has already

addressed this issue and firmly decided in Patton’s favor.

“Our review of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit

case law informs us that . . . standing does not have to be

maintained throughout all stages of litigation. Instead,

it is to be determined as of the time the complaint is

filed.” Cleveland Branch, NAACP v. City of Parma,

263 F.3d 513, 524 (6th Cir. 2001). “In essence, standing

concerns only whether a plaintiff has a viable claim that

a defendant’s unlawful conduct ‘was occurring at the

time the complaint was filed,’ while mootness addresses

whether that plaintiff continues to have an interest in the

outcome of the litigation.” Id. at 525 (quoting Friends of

the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 184, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000)).

Accordingly, “[s]tanding is determined at the time the

complaint is filed.” Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst.

v. Hargett, 2 F.4th 548, 559 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ohio

Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, 580

(6th Cir. 2012)). However, “[t]he mootness inquiry must

be made at every stage of a case[.]” McPherson v. Mich.

High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.

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1997) (en banc). Thus, “if a plaintiff possesses standing

from the start, later factual changes cannot deprive

the plaintiff of standing. Those changes instead will

create ‘mootness’ issues and trigger that doctrine’s more

forgiving rules.” Fox, 67 F.4th at 295 (internal citation

omitted). Under our precedent, when a plaintiff has filed

an amended complaint, standing is measured by when the

plaintiff initiated the suit, but as explained by allegations

in the operative complaint. Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642,

647 (6th Cir. 2004); accord Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v.

Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 36–37, 145 S. Ct. 41, 220 L. Ed.

2d 289 (2025). Other circuits employ this same approach,

measuring standing by the date of the initial complaint.

See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Palma, 707 F.3d 1143,

1152–53 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Lynch, 382 F.3d at 647);

Gonzalez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 975 F.3d 788,

803 (9th Cir. 2020); Lutter v. JNESO, 86 F.4th 111, 125

(3d Cir. 2023) (citing Conolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)

556, 565, 7 L. Ed. 518 (1829)). Because the district court

dismissed Patton’s claims at the pleading stage, Patton

must “clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating” standing.

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S. Ct. 1540,

194 L. Ed. 2d 635 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L.

Ed. 2d 343 (1975)).

The crux of Defendants’ standing arguments is that

at the time that Patton filed his amended complaint, he

lacked standing. Yet, as the foregoing review of our caselaw

demonstrates, the initial complaint provides the date by

which we must measure Patton’s standing. And there is

no debate that Patton’s amended complaint sufficiently

alleges facts demonstrating that he had standing when he

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first filed suit. See R. 20 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 15, 17) (Page

ID #159–60). Whether Patton continued to have a case or

controversy after the filing of his initial complaint goes

to mootness, not standing. Defendants’ arguments miss

the mark. Defendants have essentially repackaged their

mootness arguments under the label of standing. Rather

than resolving those arguments under the standing

doctrine, we resolve them under the mootness doctrine.

B. Mootness

Patton does not dispute that, because he pleaded

guilty and was released from pretrial custody, his claims

are moot absent an appropriate exception. Patton Br. at 6;

see also Reply at 1. The issue is whether any exception to

the mootness doctrine applies such that the district court

should have reached the merits of Defendants’ motions

to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we hold that an

exception to the mootness doctrine applies to Patton’s

claims, and we remand this case to the district court for

proceedings consistent with this decision.

“A core tenet of Article III is that ‘federal courts may

adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.’”

Wilson v. Gordon, 822 F.3d 934, 941 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Kentucky, Educ. & Workforce Dev. Cabinet, Office for the

Blind v. United States, 759 F.3d 588, 595 (6th Cir. 2014)).

The mootness doctrine “requires that there be a live case

or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the

case.” Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363, 107 S. Ct. 734, 93

L. Ed. 2d 732 (1987). “Thus, when a case at first presents

a question concretely affecting the rights of the parties,

but—as a result of events during the pendency of the

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litigation—the court’s decision would lack any practical

effect, the case is moot.” Ohio v. US EPA, 969 F.3d 306,

308 (6th Cir. 2020). “The test for mootness is whether the

relief sought would, if granted, make a difference to the

legal interests of the parties.” McPherson, 119 F.3d at

458 (quoting Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 975

F.2d 1315, 1318 (7th Cir. 1992)). “This doctrine, however,

is not without its exceptions.” Kentucky, 759 F.3d at 595.

As the district court correctly noted, Patton’s claims

fail under the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review

exception to the mootness doctrine because the Supreme

Court has held that it is inappropriate to assume that an

individual will not “conduct their activities within the

law and so avoid prosecution and conviction . . . .” Patton,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120024, 2024 WL 3366333, at *3

(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S. Ct.

669, 38 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1974)). The only way that Patton’s

action would be capable of repetition is if we assumed

he would be arrested again, and that the state court

would order Patton to pay bail in the amount of $75,000

or more. We can make neither required assumption, and

the capable-of-repetition exception is inapplicable. Thus,

as the parties have appropriately briefed, the question is

whether Patton’s claims satisfy the requirements of the

“inherently transitory” exception to mootness.

Before addressing whether the “inherently transitory”

exception to the mootness doctrine applies to Patton’s

claims, we must first address Defendants’ argument that

Patton has forfeited his right to argue the “inherently

transitory” exception to mootness. See United States v.

Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 526–28 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining

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that arguments not made before the district court are

considered forfeited on appeal).

Forfeiture

Patton has not forfeited his argument that the

“inherently transitory” exception to mootness applies to

his claims. This is because the “inherently transitory”

exception to the mootness doctrine is a “strain” of the

capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review doctrine applied

to class action claims. See Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473,

483 (6th Cir. 2017) (“An argument is not forfeited on appeal

because a . . . strain of the argument was not raised below,

as long as the issue itself was properly raised.”). And, even

if Patton had forfeited this argument, under the Pinney

Dock exception, we would still reach the merits of the

“inherently transitory” exception. See Jackson-Gibson v.

Beasley, 118 F.4th 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2024) (“The Pinney

Dock exception is most commonly applied where the issue

is one of law, and further development of the record is

unnecessary.” (quoting McFarland v. Henderson, 307

F.3d 402, 407 (6th Cir. 2002))).

Before the district court, and in response to

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Patton argued that the

“capable of repetition yet evading review” exception

to the mootness doctrine should apply to his claims.

R. 35 (Response to Mots. to Dismiss Am. Compl. at

3–5) (Page ID #338–40). Thus, the question is whether

Patton’s invocation of the capable-of-repetition doctrine

has preserved his argument regarding the “inherently

transitory” exception for class-action claims. We hold

that it does.

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“Inherently transitory” class-action claims are

simply a “strain” of class-action claims that are capable

of repetition yet avoid review. A review of the major Court

cases cited by the parties confirms this reading. The

“inherently transitory” line of cases traces back, in large

part, to Gerstein v. Pugh and Sosna v. Iowa. Gerstein v.

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54

(1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399–401, 95 S. Ct. 553,

42 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1975). In Gerstein, the Court held that

a plaintiff asserting a class-action claim could continue

to pursue claims on behalf of the class even though the

named-plaintiff’s claims were moot. Wilson, 822 F.3d at

944–45 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11). For the

named plaintiff to pursue an “inherently transitory” (but

otherwise moot) claim on behalf of a class, “the Court

required only that other class members would suffer the

same injury: ‘in this case the constant existence of a class

of persons suffering the deprivation is certain.’” Id. at

945 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11). As the Court

explained, such a “claim, in short, is one that is distinctly

‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Gerstein,

420 U.S. at 110 n.11; see also U.S. Parole Comm’n v.

Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 398–99 (1980) (explaining that

the “inherently transitory” doctrine grew out of the

application of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evadingreview exception to class-action claims). Similarly, in

Sosna v. Iowa, the Court held that the rationale of the

“capable of repetition, yet evading review” cases “controls

the present case. Although the controversy is no longer

live as to appellant Sosna, it remains very much alive for

the class of persons she has been certified to represent.”

Sosna, 419 U.S. at 400–01.

15a

The “inherently transitory” doctrine is simply a

strain of the capable-of-repetition doctrine as it is applied

to a class-action claim. Comparing the application of

the capable-of-repetition doctrine to individual claims

highlights this similarity. For an individual claim to

come within the capable-of-repetition exception, it must

meet two requirements, the second of which is relevant

here: “[T]here must be a reasonable expectation that

the same parties will be subjected to the same action

again.” Wilson, 822 F.3d at 951 (quoting Appalachian

Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co.,

714 F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir. 2013)). For a claim brought on

behalf of an individual alone, it makes sense to require

that the same parties be subject to the same action for the

claim to be capable of repetition. If the challenged action

between the parties will not reasonably recur, then it is

hard to say the action is capable of repetition. The same

practical concern does not apply to a class action. In a class

action that falls into the inherently transitory exception,

a member of the class reasonably will be subjected to the

same challenged action. That a member of the class will

be subjected to the same challenged action guarantees the

“capable of repetition” portion of the traditional doctrine.

Even as the named-plaintiff’s claim becomes moot—as

is the nature with “inherently transitory” claims—the

challenged action is nevertheless capable of repetition

through a member of the class. Instead of the namedplaintiff’s injuries ensuring repetition, the putative class

fills the gap.

This doctrine makes sense in the context of Patton’s

claims. In essence, Patton argues that “[t]he biggest

reason why mootness does not apply here is because if it

did, then the type of wrongdoing alleged here could never

16a

be rectified.” R. 35 (Response to Mots. to Dismiss Am.

Compl. at 4) (Page ID #339). This is the same rationale

articulated by the Supreme Court when it first applied the

capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review doctrine to the

peculiar nature of class-action claims. In Sosna, the Court

recognized that the traditional application of the “capable

of repetition, yet evading review” did not apply neatly to

Sosna’s claims. 419 U.S. at 399–400. Even though Iowa

“might not again enforce the Iowa durational residency

requirement against appellant,” the Court nevertheless

held that the claims presented still were capable of

repetition, yet evading review because “it is clear that

they will enforce it against those persons in the class that

appellant sought to represent and that the District Court

certified.” Id. at 400. “In this sense the case before us is

one in which state officials will undoubtedly continue to

enforce the challenged statute and yet, because of the

passage of time, no single challenger will remain subject

to its restrictions for the period necessary to see such a

lawsuit to its conclusion.” Id. Thus, “[t]he rationale of [a

capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review case] controls

the present case.” Id. at 401 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405

U.S. 330, 333 n.2, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972)).

The same is true in Gerstein, where the Court applied the

rationale of Sosna in the pretrial context:

Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it

is most unlikely that any given individual could

have his constitutional claim decided on appeal

before he is either released or convicted. The

individual could nonetheless suffer repeated

deprivations, and it is certain that other persons

similarly situated will be detained under the

allegedly unconstitutional procedures. The

17a

claim, in short, is one that is distinctly “capable

of repetition, yet evading review.”

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11.

In context, it is clear that the Court did not develop

the “inherently transitory” exception out of whole cloth.

Instead, it is the application of the capable-of-repetition

doctrine to class-action claims. This logic neatly applies

to Patton’s claims. Just as for the plaintiff in Gerstein,

Patton’s time in pretrial detention under the sourcehearing requirement was “by nature temporary” and

so evaded review. Id. Yet, it may be “certain that other

persons similarly situated will be detained under the

allegedly unconstitutional procedures.” Id. Patton’s “claim,

in short, is one that is distinctly ‘capable of repetition, yet

evading review.’” Id.

Indeed, other circuits have observed that whether

a claim is “inherently transitory” speaks to whether

it is capable of repetition yet evading review. See, e.g.,

Corrigan v. Boston Univ., 98 F.4th 346, 353 (1st Cir.

2024) (explaining that the “first element” of the “capableof-repetition-yet-evading-review exception” is that “‘the

claims [must be] inherently transitory . . . .’” (quoting Cruz

v. Farquharson, 252 F.3d 530, 535 (1st Cir. 2001))); Belgau

v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining

that “[s]uch an inherently transitory, pre-certification

class-action claim falls within the ‘capable of repetition

yet evading review’ mootness exception . . . .”); but see

Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding

that the exceptions are “distinct”). In fact, our own

circuit has recognized that “inherently transitory” claims

are substantially similar to claims that are capable of

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repetition, yet evade review: “The class-action mootness

exception for inherently transitory claims resembles the

individual mootness exception for claims that are capable

of repetition yet evading review. Both rest on the premise

that some claims expire too quickly.” Fox, 67 F.4th at 297.

In other words, the “inherently transitory” doctrine

is the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review doctrine

applied in the class-action context. In a class-action case,

for a claim to be capable of repetition, it is not necessary

for the named-plaintiff’s claim to be capable of repetition.

This is because the named plaintiff “presents two

separate issues for judicial resolution”: “One is the claim

on the merits; the other is the claim that he is entitled to

represent a class.” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 402. Even if the

named plaintiff has no continuing interest in their claim on

the merits, they still have an interest in the claims of the

class that they are entitled to represent. This is effectively

a strain of the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review

doctrine: a class-action plaintiff has an “inherently

transitory” claim that evades review, and the challenged

action is capable of repetition because there is a durable

class that continues to suffer from the same harm.

In any event, even if Patton’s claims were forfeited, we

hear such arguments “in exceptional cases or particular

circumstances, or when the rule would produce a plain

miscarriage of justice.” Poss v. Morris (In re Morris),

260 F.3d 654, 664 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pinney Dock

& Transp. Co. v. Penn Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445,

1461 (6th Cir. 1988)). “The Pinney Dock exception is

most commonly applied where the issue is one of law,

and further development of the record is unnecessary.”

Jackson-Gibson, 118 F.4th at 853 (quoting McFarland, 307

19a

F.3d at 407); accord Bryant v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 538 F.3d

394, 400 (6th Cir. 2008); Semaan v. Allied Supermarkets,

Inc. (In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc.), 951 F.2d 718, 725

(6th Cir. 1991).

Patton’s arguments concerning the “inherently

transitory” exception fall into the Pinney Dock exception.

Whether the “inherently transitory” exception to

mootness applies to Patton’s claims is purely a question

of law and does not require any factual development

to resolve. We need only apply the principles of the

“inherently transitory” doctrine to the facts as alleged

in Patton’s complaint. Furthermore, the parties have

fully briefed the doctrine before us. “Given that the issue

before us is purely a question of law, which requires no

further development of the record, we find that this issue

presents an appropriate circumstance for exercising our

discretion to reach an issue not raised below.” Lockhart

v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 261 (6th Cir. 2009). The

similarities between the capable-of-repetition exception

and the “inherently transitory” exception also support

our application of the Pinney Dock exception.

For these reasons, we address the merits of the

“inherently transitory” exception to Patton’s claims.

“Inherently Transitory” Exception

We hold that Patton’s claims fall within the “inherently

transitory” exception to mootness for class-action claims.

Pre-trial detention is, by its very nature, transitory. And,

as other circuits have held, the filing of a class-action

complaint is enough to save the claims from being mooted.

Furthermore, because the district court in this case

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repeatedly declined to set a date for the filing of a motion

for class certification, it would be particularly harsh to

dismiss Patton’s claims for failing to file a motion for class

certification.

“Courts have distilled from Gerstein two requirements

for the ‘inherently transitory’ exception to apply: (1) that

the injury be so transitory that it would likely evade

review by becoming moot before the district court can

rule on class certification, and (2) that it is certain other

class members are suffering the injury.” Wilson, 822 F.3d

at 945.

The first requirement is clearly met in light of Gerstein.

Pretrial detention is by its very nature temporary,

such that claims brought on behalf of the detained are

“inherently transitory.” The second requirement is also

met. Patton has alleged that “[h]ere the precise size of

the class is unknown, . . . [b]ut it is substantial, given

that numerous (likely hundreds of) applicable arrests

are made each year.” R. 20 (Am. Compl. ¶ 54) (Page ID

#171). Neither the State nor Local Defendants dispute

that Patton’s allegations satisfy the second prong of the

“inherently transitory” exception. Instead, Defendants

argue that Patton’s claims are ineligible for the exception

for other reasons. See, e.g., State Br. at 19–23. We address

these arguments in turn.

Defendants’ primary argument against the application

of the exception is that Patton never filed a motion for

class certification. See State Br. at 19–20; Loc. Br. at

12–24. We reject this argument for two reasons. First,

no binding caselaw requires that a plaintiff must file

a motion for class certification in order to argue the

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“inherently transitory” exception.1 But see Gawry v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 395 F. App’x 152, 156

n.2 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[C]ourts of appeals have repeatedly

refused to apply Geraghty’s relation back doctrine when

the named plaintiff’s individual claims became moot before

application for class certification.” (quoting Lusardi v.

Xerox Corp., 975 F.2d 964, 977 (3d Cir. 1992))). 2 In Wilson,

we stated simply that the exception applies “when the

named plaintiff’s claims become moot prior to class

certification.” 822 F.3d at 944 (emphasis added). This is

the case here. Patton’s claims became moot prior to class

certification. Applying the rule in this way makes sense

given the rationale animating the “inherently transitory”

exception. Because the claim is “inherently transitory,”

the named plaintiff for a putative class may be able to file a

1. Both Defendants cite Brunet v. City of Columbus for the

proposition that a court must dismiss a class action if the namedplaintiff’s claims become moot before certification. 1 F.3d 390,

399 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Loc. Defs. Br. at 17; State. Br. at

14–15. Defendants’ reliance on Brunet is unpersuasive. For one,

the case does not address the “inherently transitory” exception

to the mootness doctrine in the class-action context. See Brunet, 1

F.3d at 399. As our subsequent decision in Unan v. Lyon explains,

“[a]lthough dismissal is ordinarily required when the named

plaintiff’s claim becomes moot before certification, we have

recognized some exceptions to this general rule.” 853 F.3d 279,

285 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Brunet, 1 F.3d at 399; Wilson, 822 F.3d

at 942). One such exception to that general rule is the “inherently

transitory” exception. Id. The focus of this appeal is on that

exception to the general rule, not the general rule itself.

2. As explained below, not only has the Third Circuit now

applied the relation-back doctrine to the filing of a class-action

complaint, but also at least three other circuits have done so. See

Richardson v. Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 829 F.3d 273, 283–86 (3d

Cir. 2016).

22a

suit in time to have standing but may not have enough time

to file a supported motion for class certification. In this

scenario, under Defendants’ proposed rule, the plaintiff

would never get the opportunity to file a motion for class

certification to preserve their claims from becoming moot.

Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, other circuits

recognize that the mootness exception for class-action

claims can apply even where there is no pending motion

for certification. For example, the Tenth Circuit, in the

context of a separate exception to mootness, “conclude[d]

that a nascent interest attaches to the proposed class

upon the filing of a class complaint such that a rejected

offer of judgment for statutory damages and costs made

to a named plaintiff does not render the case moot under

Article III.” Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery,

Inc., 639 F.3d 1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added);

accord Richardson v. Dir. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 829

F.3d 273, 283–86 (3d Cir. 2016); Pitts v. Terrible Herbst,

Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1090–92 (9th Cir. 2011). “The relationback doctrine allows a named plaintiff whose individual

claims are moot to represent class members not because

the named plaintiff has moved to certify a class but

because the named plaintiff will adequately present the

class claims and unless the named plaintiff is allowed to

do so the class claims will be capable of repetition, yet

evading review.” Jeffrey M. Stein, D.D.S., M.S.D., P.A.

v. Buccaneers L.P., 772 F.3d 698, 707 (11th Cir. 2014). In

reviewing Supreme Court precedent on the exception,

the D.C. Circuit held that “[t]he relation-back date

depends on the case.” J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291, 1307–11,

441 U.S. App. D.C. 224 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

“Gerstein, Brady, McLaughlin and Preap confirm that

the relation-back doctrine requires us to analyze the

23a

‘practicalities and prudential considerations’ of the class

action under review.” Id. at 1310 (quoting Geraghty, 445

U.S. at 404 n.11). 3 Thus, “[w]here a named plaintiff’s

claim is inherently transitory, and becomes moot prior

to certification, a motion for certification may relate back

to the filing of the complaint.” Id. at 1308 (alteration in

original) (quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk,

569 U.S. 66, 71 n.2, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 185 L. Ed. 2d 636

(2013)).

We adopt the well-reasoned position of our sibling

circuits that the filing of a class-action complaint can

serve as the prerequisite for arguing the “inherently

transitory” exception for class-action claims. Because

a motion for class certification may relate back to the

filing of a complaint, Patton must be afforded the fair

opportunity to litigate claims on behalf of the class

whose interests he seeks to represent. This is because

the named plaintiff has two sets of interests: “One is

the claim on the merits; the other is the claim that he

is entitled to represent a class.” Geraghty, 445 U.S. at

402. Until the district court enters an order on class

certification, Patton retains his interest in representing

the putative class. Both of Patton’s complaints—his

initial and amended—asserted class-action allegations.

Accordingly, he may appropriately argue that his claims

fall within the “inherently transitory” exception to the

mootness doctrine.

3. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d

54 (1975); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 98 S. Ct. 2699, 57 L. Ed.

2d 705 (1978); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111

S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991); Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392,

139 S. Ct. 954, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2019) (plurality op.).

24a

This leads us to a related ground on which Defendants

oppose the exception, that Patton skewered his own claims

by sitting on his right to file a motion for class certification.

Defendants correctly point out that timing matters

when applying the relation-back doctrine. We agree

with the Third and Tenth Circuits that the application

of “inherently transitory” doctrine must consider the

named plaintiff’s litigation strategy. “As Lucero noted,

this mootness exception should apply only in situations

where the mooting of the individual claim ‘occurred at

so early a point in litigation that the named plaintiff

could not have been expected to file a class certification

motion.’” Richardson, 829 F.3d at 286 (quoting Lucero,

639 F.3d at 1249)). Although we agree that timing matters,

Defendants’ arguments on the issue do not square with

the record. The district court declined to set a date for the

filing for a class-certification motion, and Patton should

not have been required to file a placeholder motion simply

to preserve his class-action claims.

As the district court’s two case-management orders

reflect, the district court “reserved” the date by which

Patton was required to file a motion for class certification.

This was despite the fact that on multiple occasions Patton

and Defendants asked the district court to set a date for

filing a motion for class certification. See, e.g., R. 55-1

(Joint Proposed Second Modified Case Mgmt. Order at

4) (Page ID #460) (“Plaintiff must file a motion for class

certification by no later than June 28, 2024.”); R. 43 (Defs.’

Proposed Second Case Mgmt. Order at 11) (Page ID

#388) (“Plaintiff must file a motion for class certification

by no later than May 22, 2024.”). If the district court had

adopted either of the deadlines proposed by the parties,

then Patton would have had a motion for class certification

25a

pending by the date the district court entered the order

dismissing the action on mootness grounds. Instead, the

district court reserved setting a deadline by which Patton

had to file a motion for class certification.

This serves to highlight the importance of the rule

clarified today that a class-certification motion need

not be pending for a class-action claimant to assert the

“inherently transitory” exception to mootness. Were

the case otherwise, plaintiffs would be forced to “file socalled ‘placeholder’ motions for class certification solely

to prevent defendants from mooting the claims of wouldbe class representatives.” Richardson, 829 F.3d at 284

(collecting cases). The problems posed by premature and

meritless placeholder motions for class certification are

not unknown in this circuit and others. See Progressive

Health & Rehab Corp. v. Strategy Anesthesia, LLC, 271

F. Supp. 3d 941, 949–50 (S.D. Ohio 2017); see also Church

v. Accretive Health, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 676, 679 (S.D. Ala.

2014) (“The court file is burdened with an obviously

premature Rule 23 Motion that is devoid of content. . . . Yet

plaintiff advocates a system in which litigants race to the

courthouse to file empty, placeholder motions that may or

may not ever be litigated . . . .”); Richardson, 829 F.3d at

284; Smith v. Interline Brands, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 3d 701,

703 (D.N.J. 2014) (“To permit such a placeholder motion

would also seem contrary to the spirit of [Fed. R. Civ. P.]

11(b) . . . .”). There are good, practical reasons for the rules

clarified today. Forcing plaintiffs to file premature motions

for class certification serves to strain judicial resources,

tax a court’s economy, and force litigants and counsel to

engage in pretense.

26a

Finally, we reject Defendants’ remaining arguments

against applying the exception. See State Br. at 21–23.

Whether Patton cannot serve as a named plaintiff goes to

the merits of class certification. Whether the relief sought

by Patton is properly the subject of a § 1983 motion or

a habeas application is irrelevant to our considerations

herein. These arguments are best left for the district court

to address in the first instance on remand.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

27a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

Case No. 3:23-cv-00637

BRADLEY PATTON ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF

AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Plaintiff,

MIKE FITZHUGH IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF

RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE et al.,

Defendants.

July 9, 2024, Filed

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court are Defendants James

Turner, Barry Tidwell, and Howard Wilson’s and Mike

Fitzhugh and Melissa Harrell’s Motions to Dismiss. (Doc.

Nos. 23, 24). Plaintiff Bradley Patton (“Patton”) filed a

response in opposition (Doc. No. 35) and Defendants filed

replies (Doc. Nos. 39, 41). For the reasons discussed below,

Defendants’ motions (Doc. Nos. 23, 24) will be GRANTED.

28a

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Patton brings this lawsuit against Rutherford County

Circuit Court judges James Turner, Barry Tidwell,

and Howard Wilson, Rutherford County Sheriff Mike

Fitzhugh, and Rutherford County Circuit Court Clerk

Melissa Harrell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations

of Patton’s rights to due process and non-excessive bail.

Patton also requests class certification.

On December 18, 2021, Patton was arrested and

charged with possession of Schedule II drugs with intent

to sell, possession of Schedule IV drugs with intent to sell,

possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during a

dangerous felony, simple possession, simple possession of

methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.

(Doc. No. 20 at ¶ 6). Patton’s total bail was set at $126,000.

(Id. at ¶ 11). On June 29, 2023, Patton pled guilty to

possession of over half a gram of methamphetamine with

intent to sell and attempted possession of a firearm during

a dangerous felony and was sentenced to ten years of

probation. (Id. ¶ 12). Patton alleges that the Rutherford

County Local Rules require a source hearing for any

criminal defendant whose bail is set at $75,000 or greater

if the defendant is charged with certain crimes, including

the drug-related crimes that Patton was charged with. (Id.

at ¶ 32). Specifically, the local rule challenged by Patton

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(G) Any single or total bond for the same

defendant, charged with an offense listed in

Rule 16.07(H) or (I), in an amount of SeventyFive Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00) or more

29a

shall not be made without an order approving

the source. Any hearing upon motion by

defendant or bonding company shall be heard

on an expedited basis requiring three (3) days’

notice to the Court and the District Attorney

General. The Court shall conduct a hearing to

determine compliance with these Rules and

the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated

(T.C.A) § 39-11-715 regarding the source of

the premium of said bond. Any Trial Court or

General Sessions Court, depending upon where

the case is pending, may conduct such hearings

and enter such orders, injunctions, restraining

orders, prohibitions, or issue any extraordinary

process for the purpose of ensuring that any

defendant does not use any proceeds directly

or indirectly derived from a criminal offense

for the purpose of securing an appearance bond

or to pay the premium for the bond. Any court

may require the defendant or bonding agent

to prove in open court the source of such bond

or premium before accepting the bond, and the

burden of proof shall be upon the party seeking

the approval or acceptance of the bond.

(Id. at ¶ 32). Patton alleges that he filed appropriate bail

bond paperwork on June 13, 2023, but that he was forced

to wait until June 22, 2023, to prove the legitimacy of

his bail source. (Id. at ¶ 15). Patton also alleges that the

State of Tennessee and its local government entities

have no legitimate interest in ensuring that bail is paid

without using criminal proceeds and that the bail source

policy is not narrowly tailored to meet any legitimate

30a

interest. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19). Instead, Patton alleges that the

entire purpose behind the bail course policy to “simply

to harass those accused of crimes, and to prevent, delay,

or otherwise make it difficult, tedious, and expensive for

them to gain pretrial release.” (Id. at ¶ 20).

Patton alleges that Defendants’ enforcement of the bail

source policy violated his substantive and procedural due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and his

right to non-excessive bail under the Eighth Amendment.

(Id. at ¶¶ 41-51). On November 3, 2023, Defendants filed

the pending motions seeking dismissal of Patton’s claims

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6).

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is

a “threshold determination” in any action. Am. Telecom

Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th

Cir. 2007). This reflects the fundamental principle that

“[j]urisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it

ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court

is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94,

118 S. Ct. 1003, 140 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1998) (quoting Ex parte

McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L. Ed. 264 (1868)).

The party asserting subject-matter jurisdiction bears the

burden of establishing that it exists. Ammons v. Ally Fin.,

Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 818, 820 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction “can challenge the sufficiency

31a

of the pleading itself (facial attack) or the factual existence

of subject matter jurisdiction (factual attack).” Cartwright

v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal citation

omitted). A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the

pleading and, like a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), requires

the Court to take all factual allegations in the pleading

as true. Wayside Church v. Van Buren Cty., 847 F.3d 812,

816-17 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v.

Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007)).

A factual attack challenges the allegations supporting

jurisdiction, raising “a factual controversy requiring the

district court to ‘weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at

the factual predicate that subject matter does or does not

exist.’” Id. at 817 (quoting Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330). When

analyzing a factual attack as to standing, the court may

undertake “a factual inquiry regarding the complaint’s

allegations only when the facts necessary to sustain

jurisdiction do not implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s

claim.” Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330. District courts reviewing

factual attacks have “wide discretion to allow affidavits,

documents and even a limited evidentiary hearing to

resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.” Ohio Nat’l Life Ins.

Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990).

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits

dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. For purposes of a motion to

dismiss, a court must take all of the factual allegations in

the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). To survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

32a

allegations, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face. Id. at 678. A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. In reviewing a

motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts its allegations

as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.

2007). Thus, dismissal is appropriate only if “it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 679 F.3d 425,

429 (6th Cir. 2012).

III.

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Patton lacks standing because

he is no longer detained as he pled guilty and was released

on probation (Doc. No. 20 at ¶ 12), which Defendants argue

renders the case moot and thus, the Court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction.

To satisfy the “case or controversy” limitation

consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution,

a plaintiff must show that it has (1) “suffered an ‘injury

in fact’—an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest

which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that

there be a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of—the injury must be fairly traceable

to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the

result of the independent action of some third party not

before the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to

33a

merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by

a favorable decision.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167,

117 S. Ct. 1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997) (internal citation

omitted).

An injury in fact “must persist at every stage of review,

or else the action becomes moot.” Friends of the Earth,

Inc. v. Laidlaw Entl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 179,

120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000). When a plaintiff

requests injunctive relief, the inquiry into whether there

is an injury in fact is twofold and “requires plaintiff to

show both ‘past injury and a real and immediate threat

of future injury.” Mosley v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 942

F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).

Past harm “does not entitle a plaintiff to seek injunctive or

declaratory relief” because it “‘does nothing to establish

a real and immediate threat that’ it will occur in the

future, as is required for injunctive relief.” Kanuszewski

v. Michigan Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396,

406 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal citation omitted).

Here, there is no ongoing harm as Patton is released

and future injury to Patton is speculative. O’Shea v.

Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S. Ct. 669, 38 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1974) (holding that no case or controversy existed

where criminal defendants failed to show that they were

serving an allegedly illegal sentence, on trial, or awaiting

trial and holding that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct

does not in itself show a present case or controversy

regarding injunctive relief... if unaccompanied by any

continuing, present adverse effects” and that “the

prospect of future injury rests on the likelihood that

[the defendants] will again be arrested for and charged

with violations of the criminal law and will again be

34a

subjected to bond proceedings, trial, or sentencing” and

the Court “assume[d] [the defendants] will conduct their

activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and

conviction...”). Granting relief on the speculative idea that

Patton will reoffend is insufficient to establish a concrete

and immediate threat of future injury. This is especially

true here, as the bond source hearing policy requires a

charge of specificized crimes and a bond amount greater

than $75,000. Accordingly, the Court finds that this is too

speculative to constitute a future harm sufficient to satisfy

a case or controversy.

Patton’s response, which is largely incoherent, does

not develop the legal precedent cited therein to support

his position and is dismissive of Defendant’s arguments

generally as “weak” and “nonsense.” (Doc. No. 35 at

PageID # 337, 347). Respectfully, the Court, not Patton’s

counsel, will determine what arguments have merit;

counsel would be wise to consider the tone with which he

presents arguments to the Court.

Patton does not seem to dispute that his claims are

moot, but instead argues: (1) the purported class has

members whose claims are not moot; and (2) the alleged

wrong is capable of repetition yet evading review. The

“class” argument puts the cart before the horse: the

named plaintiff must have cognizable claims. O’Shea,

414 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added) (“Moreover, if none

of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class

establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the

defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or

any other member of the class.”); E. Tex. Motor Freight

Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403, 97 S. Ct. 1891,

52 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1977) (internal citation omitted) (“[A]

35a

class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess

the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the class

members.”). Rule 23(a) “ensures that the named plaintiffs

are appropriate representatives of the class whose claims

they wish to litigate.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564

U.S. 338, 349, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011).

Accordingly, Rule 23(a) is limited to class claims that are

“fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.” Gen.

Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S. Ct. 2364,

72 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1982) (internal citation omitted).

Patton’s “capable of repetition argument” fares no

better. The “capable of repetition yet evading review”

doctrine is a narrowly applied exception to mootness and

applies only where: (1) “the challenged action [i]s in its

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation

or expiration”; and (2) “there [i]s a reasonable expectation

that the same complaining party w[ill] be subjected to the

same action again.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482,

102 S. Ct. 1181, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982) (internal citation

omitted).

Here, as Defendants correctly point out, because

Patton has been released from pre-trial custody, there

is no reasonable expectation that Patton will again be

subjected to a bail source hearing. Thus, the Court finds

that Patton lacks standing, and his case is now moot.

Because Patton’s case is moot, Patton is precluded

from seeking “relief on behalf of himself or any other

member of the class.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 494 (emphasis

added); Fox v. Saginaw Cnty., Mich., 67 F.4th 284, 294

(6th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted) (reasoning that

“class representatives must prove their own ‘case or

36a

controversy’... in order to seek relief for ‘any other member

of the class.”).

Having found that Patton’s claims are moot and thus,

the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court

does not need to address the other bases for dismissal

argued by Defendants.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motions to

dismiss (Doc. Nos. 23, 24) will be GRANTED.

An appropriate Order will enter.

/s/ William L. Campbell, Jr.

WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR.

CHIEF UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

37a

APPENDIX C

United States Constitution

Article III

SECTION 1

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be

vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior

Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain

and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and

inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good

Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for

their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be

diminished during their Continuance in Office.

SECTION 2

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in

Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the

Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or

which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all

Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers

and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime

Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United

States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between

two or more States;—between a State and Citizens

of another State,—between Citizens of different

States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming

Lands under Grants of different States, and between

a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,

Citizens or Subjects.

38a

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public

Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State

shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original

Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned,

the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction,

both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and

under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

T he T r ia l of a l l Cr i mes, except i n Ca ses of

Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall

be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have

been committed; but when not committed within any

State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the

Congress may by Law have directed.

39a

APPENDIX D

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23

Rule 23.

Class Actions

(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class

may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of

all members only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common

to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative

parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the

class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.

(b) T ypes of Class Actions. A class action may be

maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:

(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against

individual class members would create a risk of:

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications

with respect to individual class members that

40a

would establish incompatible standards of

conduct for the party opposing the class; or

(B) adjudications with respect to individual

class members that, as a practical matter,

would be dispositive of the interests of the

other members not parties to the individual

adjudications or would substantially impair or

impede their ability to protect their interests;

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or

refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the

class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding

declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class

as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or

fact common to class members predominate over

any questions affecting only individual members,

and that a class action is superior to other available

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings

include:

(A) the class members’ interests in

individually controlling the prosecution or

defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any

litigation concerning the controversy

already begun by or against class members;

of concentrating the litigation of the claims

in the particular forum; and

41a

(D) the likely difficulties in managing

a class action.

Judgment; Issues Classes; Subclasses.

(1)

Certification Order.

(A) Time to Issue. At an early practicable

time after a person sues or is sued as a class

representative, the court must determine by

order whether to certify the action as a class

action.

(B) Defining the Class; Appointing Class

Counsel. An order that certifies a class action

must define the class and the class claims, issues,

or defenses, and must appoint class counsel

under Rule 23(g).

order that grants or denies class certification

may be altered or amended before f inal

judgment.

(2)

Notice.

(A) For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any

class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the

court may direct appropriate notice to the class.

(B) For (b)(3) Classes. For any class

certified under Rule 23(b)(3)—or upon ordering

42a

notice under Rule 23(e)(1) to a class proposed to

be certified for purposes of settlement under

Rule 23(b)(3)—the court must direct to class

members the best notice that is practicable

under the circumstances, including individual

notice to all members who can be identified

through reasonable effort. The notice may be by

one or more of the following: United States mail,

electronic means, or other appropriate means.

The notice must clearly and concisely state in

plain, easily understood language:

(i)

the nature of the action;

(ii) the definition of the class

certified;

(iii) the class claims, issues, or

defenses;

(iv) that a class member may

enter an appearance through an

attorney if the member so desires;

(v) that the court will exclude

from the class any member who

requests exclusion;

(vi) the time and manner for

requesting exclusion; and

(vii) the binding effect of a class

judgment on members under Rule

23(c)(3).

43a

(3) Judgment. Whether or not favorable to the

class, the judgment in a class action must:

(A) for any class certified under Rule

23(b)(1) or (b)(2), include and describe those

whom the court finds to be class members;

and

(B) for any class certified under Rule

23(b)(3), include and specify or describe

those to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice

was directed, who have not requested

exclusion, and whom the court finds to be

class members.

(4) Particular Issues. When appropriate, an

action may be brought or maintained as a class action

with respect to particular issues.

(5) Subclasses. When appropriate, a class may

be divided into subclasses that are each treated as a

class under this rule.

(d)

Conducting the Action.

(1) In General. In conducting an action under

this rule, the court may issue orders that:

(A) determine the course of proceedings

or prescribe measures to prevent undue

repetition or complication in presenting evidence

or argument;

44a

(B) require—to protect class members and

fairly conduct the action—giving appropriate

notice to some or all class members of:

(i)

any step in the action;

(ii) the proposed extent of the

judgment; or

(iii) the members’ opportunity

to signify whether they consider the

representation fair and adequate,

to intervene and present claims or

defenses, or to otherwise come into

the action;

parties or on intervenors;

(D) require that the pleadings be amended

to eliminate allegations about representation

of absent persons and that the action proceed

accordingly; or

(E)

deal with similar procedural matters.

(2) Combining and Amending Orders. An

order under Rule 23(d)(1) may be altered or amended

from time to time and may be combined with an order

under Rule 16.

(e) S e t t l e m e n t , Vo lu n t a r y D i s m i s s a l , o r

Compromise. The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified

class—or a class proposed to be certified for purposes

45a

of settlement—may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or

compromised only with the court’s approval. The following

procedures apply to a proposed settlement, voluntary

dismissal, or compromise:

(1)

Notice to the Class.

(A) Infor mation That Par ties Must

Provide to the Court. The parties must provide

the court with information sufficient to enable

it to determine whether to give notice of the

proposal to the class.

(B) Grounds for a Decision to Give Notice.

The court must direct notice in a reasonable

manner to all class members who would be

bound by the proposal if giving notice is justified

by the parties’ showing that the court will likely

be able to:

(i) approve the proposal under

Rule 23(e)(2); and

(ii) certify the class for purposes

of judgment on the proposal.

(2) Approval of the Proposal. If the proposal

would bind class members, the court may approve it

only after a hearing and only on finding that it is fair,

reasonable, and adequate after considering whether:

(A) the class representatives and class

counsel have adequately represented the class;

46a

(B)

length;

the proposal was negotiated at arm’s

adequate, taking into account:

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of

trial and appeal;

(ii) the effectiveness of any

proposed method of distributing relief

to the class, including the method of

processing class-member claims;

(iii) the terms of any proposed

award of attorney’s fees, including

timing of payment; and

(iv) any agreement required to

be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and

(D) the proposal treats class members

equitably relative to each other.

(3) Identifying Agreements. The parties

seeking approval must file a statement identifying

any agreement made in connection with the proposal.

(4) New Opportunity to Be Excluded. If the

class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)

(3), the court may refuse to approve a settlement

unless it affords a new opportunity to request

exclusion to individual class members who had an

47a

earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not

do so.

(5)

Class-Member Objections.

(A) In General. Any class member may

object to the proposal if it requires court

approval under this subdivision (e). The

objection must state whether it applies only to

the objector, to a specific subset of the class, or

to the entire class, and also state with specificity

the grounds for the objection.

(B) Court Approval Required for Payment

in Connection with an Objection. Unless

approved by the court after a hearing, no

payment or other consideration may be provided

in connection with:

(i) forgoing or withdrawing an

objection, or

(ii) forgoing, dismissing, or

abandoning an appeal from a judgment

approving the proposal.

Appeal. If approval under Rule 23(e)(5)(B) has

not been obtained before an appeal is docketed

in the court of appeals, the procedure of Rule

62.1 applies while the appeal remains pending.

48a

(f) A ppeals . A court of appeals may permit an

appeal from an order granting or denying class-action

certification under this rule, but not from an order under

Rule 23(e)(1). A party must file a petition for permission to

appeal with the circuit clerk within 14 days after the order

is entered, or within 45 days after the order is entered if

any party is the United States, a United States agency,

or a United States officer or employee sued for an act or

omission occurring in connection with duties performed

on the United States’ behalf. An appeal does not stay

proceedings in the district court unless the district judge

or the court of appeals so orders.

(g)

Class Counsel.

(1) Appointing Class Counsel. Unless a statute

provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class must

appoint class counsel. In appointing class counsel,

the court:

(A)

must consider:

(i) the work counsel has done in

identifying or investigating potential

claims in the action;

(i i) cou nsel’s ex per ience i n

handling class actions, other complex

litigation, and the types of claims

asserted in the action;

(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the

applicable law; and

49a

(iv) the resources that counsel

will commit to representing the class;

(B) may consider any other matter

pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and

adequately represent the interests of the

class;

provide information on any subject pertinent

to the appointment and to propose terms for

attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs;

(D) may include in the appointing order

provisions about the award of attorney’s fees

or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h); and

(E) may make fur ther orders in

connection with the appointment.

(2) Standard for Appointing Class Counsel.

When one applicant seeks appointment as class

counsel, the court may appoint that applicant only

if the applicant is adequate under Rule 23(g)(1)

and (4). If more than one adequate applicant seeks

appointment, the court must appoint the applicant

best able to represent the interests of the class.

(3) Interim Counsel. The court may designate

interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class

before determining whether to certify the action as

a class action.

50a

(4) Duty of Class Counsel. Class counsel must

fairly and adequately represent the interests of the

class.

(h) Attorney ’s Fees and Nontaxable Costs. In a

certified class action, the court may award reasonable

attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized

by law or by the parties’ agreement. The following

procedures apply:

(1) A claim for an award must be made by

motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the provisions

of this subdivision (h), at a time the court sets. Notice

of the motion must be served on all parties and, for

motions by class counsel, directed to class members

in a reasonable manner.

(2) A class member, or a party from whom

payment is sought, may object to the motion.

(3) The court may hold a hearing and must find

the facts and state its legal conclusions under Rule

52(a).

(4) The court may refer issues related to

the amount of the award to a special master or a

magistrate judge, as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D).

51a

APPENDIX E

16th Judicial Circuit of Tennessee Local Rule 16.07

16.07

PREMIUMS.

(A) As provided by Tennessee Code Annotated

(T.C.A) § 40-11-126, no bonding company or agent shall

accept anything of value from a principal or anyone

acting on their behalf except the authorized premium

and initiation fee as set out in Tennessee Code Annotated

(T.C.A) § 40-11-316 and as described in the bond contract.

If any property other than cash (or other negotiable

instrument) is accepted for the premium, the agent shall

notify the Presiding Judge and the District Attorney

General in writing.

(B) All funds or negotiable instruments accepted

in payment or satisfaction of the premium and the

initiation fee shall be recorded and itemized by the

bonding company. A copy of the record documenting the

premium and initiation fee received shall be provided to

the defendant, or to the party acting in the defendant’s

behalf, and shall be maintained as a part of the ordinary,

daily business records of said company. If funds or

negotiable instruments are accepted as collateral, the

bonding company shall:

deposit such collateral into a separate trust

account pending its redemption,

identify the account or principal to which

the collateral applies, and

52a

provide the person providing the collateral

with the identity of the institution in which

the collateral is held.

funds for a premium or initiation fee and elects not to post

the bond for the defendant-principal, any funds received

shall be returned immediately to the defendant or person

acting on the defendant’s behalf.

(D) Every bondsman or agent must use a duplicate

receipt book to record all payments for premiums. A copy

of the receipt must be given to the defendant or the person

acting on the defendant’s behalf. Receipts must include:

a specific description of all property,

including cash or checks received from

the defendant or someone acting on the

defendant’s behalf, and

the signature of the defendant or the person

acting on his or her behalf tendering the

said funds.

(E) No bond may be secured, guaranteed, or

otherwise indemnified by a contract which purports to be a

promissory note, indemnification contract, hold-harmless

agreement, or guaranty from a company, or a bonding

person not approved as a bonding company.

(G) Any single or total bond for the same defendant,

charged with an offense listed in Rule 16.07(H) or (I), in

an amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000.00)

53a

or more shall not be made without an order approving

the source. Any hearing upon motion by defendant or

bonding company shall be heard on an expedited basis

requiring three (3) days’ notice to the Court and the

District Attorney General. The Court shall conduct a

hearing to determine compliance with these Rules and the

provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated (T.C.A.) § 39-11715 regarding the source of the premium of said bond. Any

Trial Court or General Sessions Court, depending upon

where the case is pending, may conduct such hearings

and enter such orders, injunctions, restraining orders,

prohibitions, or issue any extraordinary process for the

purpose of ensuring that any defendant does not use any

proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a criminal

offense for the purpose of securing an appearance bond or

to pay the premium for the bond. Any court may require

the defendant or bonding agent to prove in open court the

source of such bond or premium before accepting the bond,

and the burden of proof shall be upon the party seeking

the approval or acceptance of the bond. If the Trial Court

in which the case is pending is unavailable, the source

hearing may be conducted in any Trial Court exercising

criminal jurisdiction. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit

the District Attorney General from filing a motion to

request a source in any case. Further, nothing in this rule

shall prohibit the Court, sua sponte, requiring a source

on its own motion.

(H) Criminal Offenses subject to a source hearing

as required by Rule 16.07(G):

First Degree Murder; 39-13-202

Second Degree Murder; 39-13-210

Voluntary Manslaughter; 39-13-211

54a

Robbery: 39-13-401

Aggravated Robbery: 39-13-402

Especially Aggravated Robbery: 39-13-403

Carjacking: 39-13-404

Criminal Simulation: 39-14-115

Forgery: 39-14-114

Tax Fraud/Evasion: 67-2-121

Felony Theft: 39-14-103-105; 39-14-108; 39-14-110

Identity Theft: 39-14-150

Embezzlement: See Theft and 40-13-221

Credit Card Fraud: 39-14-118

Bribery: 39-16-101-108

Counterfeit Money: See Forgery and 40-13-215

Money Laundering: 39-14-901-909

Financial Exploitation of an Elder/Vulnerable

Person: 39-15-502

Extortion: 39-14-112

Organized Retail Crime: 39-14-113

Trafficking for Forced Labor or Services: 39-13-308

Trafficking for Commercial Sex Act: 39,13-309

Aggravated Gambling Promotion: 39-17-504

Worthless Checks: 39-14-121

Human Trafficking: 39-13-314

Promoting Prostitution: 39-13-515

Aggravated Prostitution: 39-13-516

Promoting Travel for Prostitution: 39-13-533

Fraudulent Qualifying for Set Aside Programs 3914-137

Theft of Trade Secrets: 39-14-138

Sale of Recorded Live Performances without Consent:

39-14-139

Communication Theft: 39-14-149

Use of Counterfeit Mark/Logo: 39-14-152

Home Improvement Fraud: 39-14-154

55a

Illegal Sale of Firearms: 39-17-1301-1304; 1316

Insurance Fraud: 56-53-102

False or fraudulent insurance claims: 39-14-133

(I) Felony Controlled Substance Offenses subject to

a source hearing as required by Rule 16.07(G):

39-17-417(a)

39-17-417(b)

39-17-417(c)

39-17-417(d)

39-17-417(e)(l)

39-17-417(e)(2)

39-17-417(f)

39-17-417(g)

39-17-417(h)

39-17-417(i)

39-17-423

39-17-425(b)(l)

39-17-433

39-17-434

39-17-435

39-17-438

Manufacture, delivery, sale

or possession of Controlled

Substances

Schedule I

Schedule II

Schedule III

Schedule IV-Flunitrazepam

Schedule V

Schedule IV

Schedule VI

Schedule VII

M/D/S/P Controlled Substances

constituting a Class B Felony

Cou nt er feit cont rol led

substances

Unlawful drug paraphernalia

as a Class E Felony

Promotion of methamphetamine

manufacture

M a n u f a c t u r e , d e l i v e r y,

sa le or possession of

methamphetamine

Initiation of a process intended

to result in the manufacture

of methamphetamine.

Production, manufacture,

distribution, or possession of

56a

salvia divinorum or synthetic

cannabinoids

39-17-453(a)

Imitation controlled

substances

39-17-454(c)

Controlled substance

analogues

39-17-455(b)

Manufacture of marijuana

concentrate by process which

includes use of inherently

hazardous substance- Use of

premises.

53-11-401(a)(1)/(2) Un law f u l d ist r ibut ion of

controlled substances

53-11-401(a)(5)

Maintaining a dwelling

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.