Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Donata Edwards, Petitioner v. U.S. Bank National Association, Trustee for RMAC Trust, Series 2016-CTT, et al.

APPENDIX

i

PAGE

TABLE OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX A • Memorandum Opinion and

Judgment of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals (May 1, 2025).............. ........

...-la-

APPENDIX B - Order Granting Plaintiff’s

Motion to Ratify Sale (March 24, 2020)........22aAPPENDIX C - Order Granting Plaintiffs

Motion to Ratify Accounting

(September 21, 2023).............

...-25aAPPENDIX D - Order Granting Plaintiffs

Motion for Summary Judgment

(June 15, 2018)......

.......28a-

(June 15, 2018)

la

APPENDIX A

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIACOURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 23-CV-0343 & 23-CV-0779

Donata Edwards, Appellant

V.

FILED

MAY 01 2025

District of Columbia

Court of Appeals

U.S. Bank National Association

TRUSTEE FOR RMAC TRUST, SERIES 2016'CTT et al.,

Appellees.

Appeals from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(2015-CA-002197-R(RP))

(Hon. Maurice A. Ross, Trial Judge)

(Submitted February 26,2025

decided May 12025)

Before Deahl and Howard, Associate Judges, and

Glickman, Senior Judges

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Per curiam These consolidated appeals

relate to the foreclosure of Donata Edwards’s real

property located at 608 Galveston Place SE in

Washington, D.C. by U.S. Bank National

Association (U.S. Bank or the Bank). Edwards

2a

challenges the Superior Court’s December 12, 2006,

dismissal of her counterclaims for failure to state a

claim, and the court’s June 18, 2018, grant of

summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank and the

court’s subsequent ratification of the foreclosure

sale and the accounting thereof. Appellant argues

that her counterclaims alleging a violation of the

D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA

and fraud were adequately pled and should not have

been dismissed. She also claims that the court

should not have granted summary judgment, nor

ratified the sale and accounting, because (1) U.S.

Rank was without standing to foreclose, (2) a

January 3, 2018, court order was still in effect which

should have stayed the sale, and (3) the foreclosure

sale was held in violation of the Mayor’s March 11,

2020, declarations of public and public health

emergencies because of COVID" 19.

For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court in all

respects.

I. Background

The property at issue, located at 608

Galveston Place SE, was Edwards’s residence,

which she had owned as a tenant in common with

Linda Pellum. On December 8, 2006, Edwards and

Pellum encumbered the property with a deed of

trust securing an adjustable rate note in the

principal amount of $212,000. Both Edwards and

Pellum signed the deed of trust but only Pellum

signed the note. The original lender, Resource

Bank, assigned its rights under the note and deed of

3a

trust to Nationstar Mortgage, LLC., U.S. Bank’s

predecessor-in- interest.

After Pellum defaulted on the note and failed

to cure, Nationstar accelerated the loan and sought

judicial foreclosure in Superior Court pursuant to

D.C. Code § 42-816. In response, Edwards and

Pellum answered and filed a counterclaim

consisting of two counts. Count one asserted that

Nationstar violated the CPPA by initiating

foreclosure proceedings “without giving [Edwards

and Pellum] the right to cure [the] mortgage default

and to reinstate the loan and without providing

[them] with notice of said default.” Count one also

stated that, “[I]stead of providing the amount

necessary to cure default” as required by law.

Nationstar “accelerated the loan and [sought] an

amount that incorrectly represents the amount to

prevent foreclosure.”

Count two of the

counterclaim asserted, without specificity, that

Nationstar “misrepresented the truth” and

“repeatedly ignored requests” made by the

defendants, and that Nationstar’s demanding] full

payment of the loan instead of providing” the right

to cure the default or offering a loan modification

plan was “consistent with a fraudulent intent to

take [the defendants’] property.”

At the initial scheduling conference in

Superior Court, the case was referred to mediation

and the parties reached an agreement in principle

whereby Pellum would quitclaim her interest in the

property to Edwards who could then “assume the

4a

mortgage” or “execute a new promissory note” and

pursue

loss

mitigation

with

Nationstar.

Subsequently, the court granted Nationstar s

motion to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to

state a claim on which relief could be granted.

Eventually, Edwards reported that Pellum

had successfully quitclaimed her interest in the

property to her. However, after nine months went

by without Edwards having either submitted a

complete loss mitigation packet or having responded

to Nationstar’s first discovery requests, Nationstar

moved for summary judgment. While that motion

was pending, the parties informed the court at a

status hearing that Edwards had made the first

payment of a trial modification plan but, after

another four months, Edwards had defaulted on

that plan. Then, on November 1, 2017, Edwards

moved to withdraw or strike Nationstar’s discovery

requests, claiming that she had never received

them. Without ruling on that motion however, on

November 15, 2017, the court entered summary

judgment for Nationstar and issued a decree for the

sale of real property (November 15 Order).

On December 5, 2017, Edwards filed a motion

for reconsideration of the November 15, Order,

arguing that it was issued erroneously before the

court had ruled on her prior motion to

withdraw/strike Nationstar’s discovery requests.

Ten days later, however, before the court had ruled

on the December 5 motion, Edwards filed a notice of

appeal from the November 15 Order. Then, on

5a

January 3, 2018, she filed an emergency motion for

stay of foreclosure and the foreclosure sale pending

her appeal. The trial court granted this latter

motion the same day, ordering “all matters in the[e]

case . . . STAYED pending the resolution of

Defendants’ appeal” (January 3, 2018 Order).

On January 25, 2018, however, this court sua

sponte held the notice of appeal in abeyance because

“one or more timely post'trial tolling motions [were]

pending in the Superior Court” (in particular,

Edwards’s motion for reconsideration).

In

response, the trial court then granted Edwards’s

November 1, motion to withdraw/strike the

discovery! gave Nationstar fourteen days to re "serve

the. discovery requests! and granted in part

Edwards’s December 5 motion for reconsideration,

“holding the previously entered [November 15

Order] in abeyance until the next status hearing”

and giving the defendants thirty days to file an

opposition to Nationstar’s motion for summary

judgment.

After more than three months passed without a

response from the defendants, the trial court on

June 15, 2018, entered an order granting what it

referred to a Nationstar’s “renewed”1 motion for

1 As appellee points out, although the court styled

the June 15, 2018 Order as granting a “renewed”

motion for summary judgment, no new motion had

been filed.

The mistaken characterization is

inconsequential.

6a

summary judgment and a decree for the sale of the

real property (June 15, 2018 Order).

The court denied Edwards’s request that it vacate

the June 15, 2018 Order. Almost a year later, on

May 10, 2019, Edwards filed an emergency motion

for clarification and enforcement of stay in which

she argued that the trial court’s January 3, 2018

Order staying foreclosure and sale pending appeal

was still in effect. The trail court denied that

motion on May 30, 2019, and ordered that the stay

be lifted effective thirty days from the date of the

order (May 30 Order). Shortly thereafter, U.S.

Rank replaced Nationstar as the plaintiff.

The property was sold on March 17, 2020,

and the court ratified the sale. About a month

later, U.S. Bank filed a motion to ratify the

accounting, release the bond, and close the case,

which the court granted. Edwards then filed the

instant appeal.

II. Analysis

On appeal, Edwards argues that the trial

court should not have ratified the sale or the

accounting because U.S. Bank had “no standing to

foreclose” on the property. According to appellant,

“[s]ince Pellum was the sole maker on the Note. . .

she had to be on the title in order for U.S. Bank . . .

to have the right to foreclose on the property in the

event of Pellum’s default on the loan.” Accordingly,

appellant argues, when Pellum quitclaimed her

property interest to Edwards, the note became

7a

“separated’ from the deed of trust and the Bank’s

lien was” no longer secured by the property and in

effect. . . because an unsecured debt was “no longer

secured by the property and in effect . . . became an

unsecured debt against Pellum,” thereby removing

the Bank’s ability to foreclose on the property.

Appellant also claims that the Bank “relinquished

its possession of the Promissory Note,” when it”

requested that Pellum quitclaim her entire interest

in the property to Edwards but filed to have

Edwards execute a new note or assume the existing

note.”

Next appellant claims that the June 15, 2018 Order

entering summary judgment for Plaintiff is void by

operation of the January 3, 2018 Order that stayed

all foreclosure proceedings pending appeal. Thus,

according to appellant, the subsequent foreclosure

sale and ratifications thereof were, in turn also void.

Lastly, appellant argues that the sale was “void”

because the Mayor had issued orders in March 2020

(Mayor’s Order 2020’045 and -046) that declared

public and public health emergencies and

purportedly “stayed all gatherings of individuals”

including “gatherings for foreclosure sales,

foreclosure auctions, and all actions to perfect

foreclosure during the public health emergency.”

Appellant also asserts that the moratorium on

evictions enacted as part of the COVID-19

Response. Emergency Amendment Act of 2020

included “homeowners facing foreclosure” and thus

“prevented the' sale of the property on March 17,

8a

2020.”

In addition, in challenging the dismissal of her

counterclaims, appellant relies on a number of new

arguments raised here for the first time, additional

information not found in her original counterclaim,

and references to events that had not taken place

when the counterclaim was originally filed.2

For its part, U.S. Bank argues that Edwards signed

the deed of trust securing the loan and that the

transfer of Pellum’s property interest to Edwards

had no effect on the Bank’s security interest or its

2 For example, appellant claims that Nationstar

should have sent the notice of default to both

defendants, not just Pellum, and that its failure to

do so was “consistent with a violation Q of the CPPA

and fraud.” Edwards also alleges that Nationstar

committed fraud when, on April 13, 2016' more than

a year after the defendants filed their

counterclaim'it “deceived” her into believing that,

once Pellum quitclaimed her property interest to

Edwards, Nationstar would permit Edwards to

either assume the note, execute a new note, or

obtain a loan modification. Thus, according to

appellant, when Nationstar instead sought to

foreclose on the property without preparing a new

note or an assumption,” it engaged in deceptive

trade practices under the CPPA and committed

fraud.

Edwards acknowledges that Nationstar

took these allegedly illegal actions “after it obtained

a dismissal” of the counterclaims.

9a

right to foreclose when, the loan was not repaid.

The Rank also argues that nothing in the January 3,

2018 Order indicated that subsequent orders would

be void or invalid. Finally, the Bank argues that

the two Mayor’s Orders cited by appellant did not

stay public gatherings or foreclosure proceedings,

and that the 2020 eviction moratorium did not apply

to foreclosure sales.

A. Appeal from Dismissal of Counterclaim

We begin by addressing the trial court’s

dismissal of appellant’s counterclaim. On review of

a dismissal made pursuant to D.C. Sup. Ct. Civ. R.

12(b)(6), the only issue “is the legal sufficiency of the

complaint,”3 which we review de novo.4 The

complaint need only “contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face”5 and we “construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.”6 However, when a complaint alleges

3 Grayson v. AT&TCorp., 15 A.3d 219, 228-29 (D.C.

2011) (en banc).

4 Scott v. Fedchoice Fed. Credit Union, 274 A.3d

318, 322 (D.C. 2022).

5 Potomac. Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28

A.3d 531, 544 (D.C. 2011).

6 Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale &

Dorr, LLP, 68 A.3d 697,709 (D.C. 2013).

10a

fraud, D.C. Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 9(b) holds the pleader to

a higher standard,”7 and we require the pleading to

state the “time, place and content of the false

misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented, and

what was retained or given up as a consequence of

fraud.”8

7 See D.C. Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 9(b) (noting that the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall

be stated with particularity”).

8

D* Ambrosio v. Colonnade Council of Unit

Owners, 717 A.2d 356, 361 (D.C. 1998).

9 See id.

10 See supra, note 2.

11 Grayson, 15 A.3d at 228_29.

12 Nwaneri v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan,

250 A.3d 1079, 1082 (D.C. 2021) (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted).

13 Kate v. District of Columbia, 285 a.3D 1289, 1301

(D.C. 2022).

14 Joeckel v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 793 A.2d 1279,

1281 (D.C. 2002).

Ila

Count One of appellant’s counterclaim, which

purports to assert that Nationstar violated the

CPPA, consists only of three short paragraphs in

which appellant states that Nationstar “Initiated

foreclosure proceedings. . . without giving [her] the

right to cure mortgage default and to reinstate the

loan and without providing [her] the right to cure

mortgage default and to reinstate the loan and

without providing [her] with notice of said default”

and that “[I]nstead of providing the amount

necessary to cure default. . . [Nationstar] has

accelerated the loan and seeks an amount that

incorrectly represents the amount necessary to

prevent foreclosure.” Appellant does not explain

how this alleged behavior constitutes a violation of

the CPPA, nor points to any relevant provision

15 Sibley v. St. Albans Scb., 134 A.3d 789, 809 (D.C.

2002).

16 Kate, 285 A.3d at 1301.

17 Crawford v. Kate, 32 A.3d 418, 436 (D.C. 2011)

(citations and quotations omitted).

18 Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e)(2). See also Magwood v.

Giddings, 672 A.2d 1083, 1087 (D.C. 1996) (“In the

summary judgment context, the court is permitted

to consider the facts asserted by [the movant] as

‘admitted,’ except to the extent that such facts are

‘actually controverted’ in [the] opposition.”).

12a

therein. Thus, even taking the allegations as true,

appellant did not state a plausible claim for relief.9

The second count of appellant’s counterclaim

purports to assert a claim of fraud. It states that

Nationstar “misrepresented the truth” and ignored

various requests for information regarding the loan

sent by appellant and summarily asserts that these

actions were “consistent with a fraudulent intent to

take [appellant’s] property.” Appellant did not

provide any of the specific information required to

sufficiently plead fraud and, consequently, did not

state a plausible claim for relief. 9

In support of its counterclaim on appeal,

appellant advances new arguments and proffers

additional information not found in the pleading.10

However, our review of a dismissal pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6) is limited to the allegations made in the

complaint itself 11 and “[w]e ordinarily do not

consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.12

We see no exceptional circumstances warranting a

13a

departure from that practice here.

B. Appeal from Summary Judgment, Ratification

of Foreclosure Sale, and Ratification of Accounting

We review the grant of a motion for summary

judgment de novo.13 In so doing, “we conduct an

independent review of the record, and our standard

of review is the same as the Superior Court’s

standard in considering the motion for summary

judgement.”14 “At the summary judgment stage,

the trial court does not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence, which are

functions reserved for the trier of fact.”15 Rather,

“the evidence must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion for

summary judgment.”16

Although Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 12-I(e) permits the court

to consider unopposed motions as conceded, in the

summary judgment context we have held that

courts may not do so “given the requirement of rule

15 Sibley v. St. Albans Sch., 134 A.3d 789, 809 (D.C.

2002).

16 Kate, 285 A.3d at 1301.

14a

56(c) that the court itself must examine the record

to confirm that there is no genuine issue of material

fact and that the movant, on the basis of the

undisputed material facts, is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.”17 Even so, “if a party fails to

properly ... address another party’s assertion of fact

as required by Rule 56(c), the court may consider

the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”18

We find no reason to overturn the court’s judgment

in this case. In its motion for summary judgment,

the Bank made a prima facia case for judicial

foreclosure by demonstrating, with supporting

documentary evidence, that it was the current

holder of the note and the beneficiary of the deed of

trust and that Pellum had defaulted on the note and

failed to cure.19 The June 15 Order reflects that

17 Crawford v. Kate, 32 A.3d 418, 436 (D.C. 2011)

(citations and quotations omitted).

18 Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e)(2). See also Magwood v.

Giddings, 672 A.2d 1083, 1087 (D.C. 1996) (“In the

summary judgment context, the court is permitted

to consider the facts asserted by [the movant] as

‘admitted.’ except to the extent that such facts are

‘actually controverted’ in [the] opposition.”).

19 “A plaintiff makes a prima facie case for judicial

foreclosure by showing that it is the current holder

of the Note and the beneficiary of the Deed of Trust!

15a

the court properly examined the record as to whole

and found that, because the defendants never filed

an opposition nor controverted any of the Bank s

factual assertions, there was no genuine issue of

material fact.20 Thus, the Bank was entitled to

summary judgment and the court properly ratified

the foreclosure sale and the accounting thereof.

Edwards’s arguments to the contrary are

unavailing. First, Edwards’s contention that the

Bank did not have standing to foreclose on the

property reflects a misunderstanding of the law of

mortgages. 21

“[A] notion of fundamental

that the defendant defaulted on the Note and failed

to cure the default! and that the plaintiff is entitled

to enforce the Deed of Trust through a judicial

foreclosure sale of the Property.” Stevenson v.

HSBC Bank USA, NatlAss’n, as Tr. ForSGMortg.

Sec. Tr 2006-FRE1 Asset Backed Certificates, Series

2006-FRE1, 324 A.3d 295, 307 (D.C. 2024) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

20 See Sup. Ct. Civ. R. 56(e)(2); Magwood, 672 A.2d

at 1087.

21 Deeds of trust “are viewed as generally

equivalent to common law mortgages, a mortgage,

being by definition an interest in property given as

security for the payment of a debt.” “Yasima v.

Miller, 399 A.2d 68, 71 (D.C. 1979).

16a

importance is that the security. [(i,e., the deed of

trust)]is inseparable from the obligation [(i.e., the

note)] for the [(i,e., the deed of trust’s)] sole function

is to serve as security for the performance of the

obligation. ”22 “Indeed, the note and the [(i,e., the

deed of trust)] can be considered merely different

parts of a single contract.23 Thus, to find that

Pellum’s transfer of her property interest to

Edwards somehow separated the note from the deed

of trust (or, for that matter, caused the Bank to lose

possession of the note), would be to ignore a

fundamental principle of mortgage law. 24

Moreover, even setting that issue aside, it remains

the case that a transfer of property alone does not

affect the right of a holder of a deed of trust to

foreclose^ “the land always remains ’subject to’ the

[the deed of trust], that is bears the principal

22 Id at 71-72.

23 Id at 72.

24 Although appellant suggests that the Supreme

Court case Carpenter v. Longan supports her

argument, in reality the Court there recognized the

same principle that we do here-“the note and

mortgage are inseparable.”

83 U.S. 271, 274

(1872). Besides, Cfe/penfer involved an assignment

of the note and mortgage, not the transfer of a

property interest via quit claim deed. See id.

17a

burden of the [the deed of trust].25 Nor is it of any

consequence that only Pellum signed the note: when

Edwards executed the deed of trust, she agreed to

put her interest in the property up as collateral for

the obligation, regardless of whether she herself

was the borrower.26 Appellant simply gives us no

reason to believe that U.S. Bank and its

predecessors did not have standing to foreclose.

Second, although Edwards is correct that the trial

court did not affirmatively lift the stay imposed by

the January 3, 2018, when we held the appeal in

abeyance pending the court’s resolution f Edwards’s

December 5, 2017, motion for reconsideration. In

accordance with our decision, the trial court

properly proceeded to consider (and grant) that

motion on February 21, 2018" without any objection

from appellant-which in turn, rendered the appeal

moot. Thus, when the court granted summary

judgment on June 15, 2018, the January 3 Order

was no longer in effect.

Lastly Appellant is mistaken that Mayor’s

Order 2020-045 and -046, which were issued on

March 11, 2020, stayed all gatherings, including

foreclosure sales and auctions.

Those orders

declared public and public health emergencies and

provided various directives to. different District

25 Id at 73.

26 See Stevenson, 324 A.3d at 306-07.

18a

government entities on how to respond to the

COVID-19 pandemic.27 Neither order contained a

ban on public gatherings nor even mentioned

foreclosure.28 Likewise, the COVID-19 Response

27 See Mayor’s Order 2020’45, Declaration of

Public Emergency! ■ Coronavirus (COVID-19),

Executive Office of the ! Mayor (March 11, 2020),

https7/perma.cc/VBY9-9ME ;

Mayor’s

Order

2020’46, Declaration of Public Health EmergencyCoronavirus (COVID-19), ), Executive Office of the

Mayor

(March

11,

2020),

https7/perma.cc/2BLY-DG5Q.

28 We note that on March 16, 2020-one day before

the foreclosure sale- the Mayor issued a third Order,

which prohibited certain public gatherings in the

District of Columbia of fifty or more persons.

Mayor Order (March 16, 2020). However, Edwards

has not developed an argument or pointed to a

factual basis for an argument that the March 17

foreclosure sale was impacted by this restriction.

There is no claim or indication, for example, that

fifty or more people would attend a foreclosure sale

but for that restriction, or that anyone who sought

to attend this foreclosure sale was precluded from

doing so by the prohibition.

29 See COVID’19 Response Emergency Amendment

Act of 2020, D.C. Act. 23-247, 67 D.C. Reg, 3093

(Mar. 17, 2020). In its brief, appellee U.S. Bank

19a

notes that two years later, in 2022, the Council of

the District of Columbia enacted legislation

purportedly imposing a moratorium on foreclosures

retroactively to March 11, 2020. See D.C. Act

24-320,

D.C.

Code

§ 42-851.01

(a)(1)(A)

(“Notwithstanding any other provision of District

law, during the time period from March 11, 2020, to

June 30, 2022, m> (A) Residential foreclosure may

be initiated or conducted under § 42-815 or §

42-816”). Edwards did not reply or even mention

this statute in her opening brief on appeal, though

she filed that brief in 2024; moreover, even in her

Reply Brief, Edwards continues to ground her

argument on her interpretation of the 2020 Mayor’s

Orders

as

having

themselves

prohibited

foreclosures. ' Under these circumstances, we

consider Edwards to have forfeited any argument

for relief based on the retroactive effect of the

2022.1egislation on a previous foreclosure sale that

was lawful at the time it was held. See Jacobson

Holman, PLLC v. Gentner, 244 A.3d 690, 700 n.10

(D.C. 2021) (“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed

argumentation in an initial brief are generally

deemed waived, and elaboration in the reply brief

comes too late.” (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted)); Massey v. Massey, 210 A.3d 148,

154 n. 12 (D.C. 2019) (“It is the longstanding policy

of this court not to consider arguments raised for the

first time in a reply brief.”).

20a

Emergency Amendment Act of 2020 cited by

appellant imposed a moratorium only on evictions,

not on foreclosure.29

21a

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal of

Edwards’s counterclaim, the entry of summary

judgment in favor of U.S. Bank, and the ratification

of the foreclosure sale and the accounting there are

hereby

Affirmed

ENTERED BY DIRECTION OF THE COURT

Julio A. Castillo

JULIO A. CASTILLO

Clerk of the Court

Copies email to:

Honorable Maurice A. Ross

Director, Civil Division

QMU

Copies e-serve toEllen Ann Williams, Esquire

Copies mail tab

Donata Edwards

608 Galveston Place, SE

Washington, DC 20032

Linda Pellum

P.O. Box 432

Temple Hills MD 20757

Additional material

from this filing is

available in the

Clerk's Office.