Reply Brief — Michael Poffenbarger, Petitioner v. Troy E. Meink, Secretary of the Air Force, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 29, 2026

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No. 25-448

In the Supreme Court of the United States

________________

MICHAEL POFFENBARGER ET AL., ON BEHALF

OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,

Petitioner,

v.

HON. TROY MEINK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,

________________

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

________________

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

________________

Aaron Siri

Elizabeth A. Brehm

Wendy Cox

SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP

745 Fifth Ave.

Suite 500

New York, NY 10151

aaron@sirillp.com

ebrehm@sirillp.com

wcox@sirillp.com

Thomas B. Bruns

Counsel of Record

BRUNS CONNELL VOLLMAR

& ARMSTRONG

4555 Lake Forrest Drive,

Suite 330

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Tel: 513/312-9890

tbruns@bcvalaw.com

Counsel for Petitioner

(additional counsel listed on inside cover)

Christopher D. Wiest

CHRIS WIEST ATTORNEY AT

LAW, PLLC

50 East Rivercenter Blvd.

Suite 1280

Covington, KY 41011

chris@cwiestlaw.com

Zachery Gottesman

9200 Montgomery Road,

Bldg. E, Ste. 18B

Cincinnati, OH 45242

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities .................................................... ii

Introduction ................................................................ 1

Reasons Review Is Necessary .................................... 2

I.

The case is not moot because effectual relief

remains available............................................. 2

II. Equitable estoppel prohibits Respondents

from claiming mootness based on the

unavailability of relief they previously

identified as adequate ..................................... 4

III. Restorative relief is authorized by RFRA

and within the Court’s equitable powers ........ 6

Conclusion................................................................. 14

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Bell v. Hood,

327 U.S. 678 (1946) ................................................ 13

Bowen v. Massachusetts,

487 U.S. 879 (1988) ...................................... 6, 11, 12

Chafin v. Chafin,

568 U.S. 165 (2013) .................................................. 2

CIGNA Corp. v. Amara,

563 U.S. 421 (2011) .................................................. 8

Davis v. Wakelee,

156 U.S. 680 (1895) .................................................. 5

Downie v. Independent Drivers Ass’n Pension Plan,

934 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991)................................ 8

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.

(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................. 2

Hubbard v. Administrator, EPA,

982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ............................ 9, 11

Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,

Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) ....................................... 10

Oppenheim v. Campbell,

571 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1978) .................................. 8

Poffenbarger v. Kendall,

588 F. Supp. 3d 770 (2022) ...................................... 5

Rankin v. McPherson,

483 U.S. 378 (1987) .................................................. 8

iii

Schelske v. Austin,

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163101

(N.D. Tex. 2023) ................................................. 9, 10

Sibron v. New York,

392 U.S. 40 (1968) ................................................ 3, 4

Tanzin v. Tanvir,

592 U.S. 43 (2020) .......................................... 7, 8, 12

U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden,

27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2021) .................................... 9

United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export

Assn., 393 U.S. 199 (1968) ........................................ 2

Statutes and Regulations

28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (“Little Tucker Act”) ............... 11

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,

42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. .... 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,

114 Stat. 803 (42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.) ................. 7

Other Authorities

18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.30 (3d ed.

2000) ......................................................................... 5

INTRODUCTION

Respondents’ brief in opposition rests on a

fundamental misunderstanding of RFRA’s remedial

framework and basic mootness doctrine. This case

does not seek retrospective damages for past service,

but equitable relief correcting ongoing collateral

consequences of Respondents’ RFRA violations—relief

that remains available and is necessary to make

Petitioner whole.

Most notably, Petitioner seeks restoration of

retirement points wrongfully denied as a result of the

challenged mandate. That relief is independent of any

dispute over back pay, which he also seeks, and

constitutes classic equitable status-restoring relief.

Because such relief will have real legal consequences

for Petitioner’s military record and future benefits, it

defeats Respondents’ mootness argument as a

threshold matter.

Respondents’ focus on pleading formalities and

retrospective compensation elevates form over

substance and obscures the nature of the relief at

issue. RFRA authorizes “appropriate relief” for

violations, and this Court has long recognized that

equitable remedies designed to restore a plaintiff to

his rightful position remain available even after the

challenged conduct has ceased. The decision below

improperly narrows that remedial framework and

leaves service members without any meaningful

remedy for RFRA violations.

(1)

2

Of equal significance is that Respondents’

current position also sits in opposition to their prior

representations regarding the availability of relief,

underscoring the remedial gap created by the Sixth

Circuit’s approach. Under Respondents’ theory, the

government may engage in a RFRA violation, avoid

interim relief by citing the availability of future

remedies, and then avoid review altogether by

denying that any remedy exists. That result is

inconsistent with RFRA’s text, as well as this Court’s

precedents and basic principles of equity.

This case therefore presents a clean and

recurring question of exceptional importance: whether

RFRA permits meaningful post-violation relief for

people whose religious exercise has been unlawfully

burdened. This Court should grant the petition.

REASONS REVIEW IS NECESSARY

I.

The case is not moot because effectual

relief remains available

Respondents have not carried their “heavy

burden” of demonstrating mootness. Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v.

Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199,

203 (1968)). A case is moot only if it is impossible for a

court to grant any effectual relief whatsoever. Chafin

v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013). Under the

collateral consequences doctrine, as long as a

3

prevailing party retains a concrete interest—however

small—in the outcome of the litigation, the case

remains justiciable. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.

40, 53-59 (1968).

Here, Petitioner seeks concrete restorative

relief for completed violations of RFRA, including

restoration of lost reservist pay, retirement points,

and service credit. That relief has not been provided,

and it remains fully capable of being ordered by a

court. The recission of the vaccination mandate does

not itself moot claims for relief designed to remedy the

continuing consequences of past unlawful action.

Respondents’ contrary argument rests on an

artificially narrow concept of equitable relief. They

treat the repeal of the mandate as dispositive while

ignoring concrete collateral consequences from the

denial of religious accommodation—consequences

embedded in his military records and retirement

calculations. Unless corrected by order of the Court,

Petitioner ultimately will draw less retirement pay

when he retires, and all because of the illegal

discipline taken against him for not compromising his

sincere religious beliefs against taking the COVID-19

vaccine. The availability of relief addressing those

ongoing effects defeats a mootness finding.

Respondents’ position also fails to comport with

the collateral consequences doctrine. Even where the

primary conduct has ceased, a case is not moot if

additional harm remains that a court can remedy. See

4

Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-59 (1968).

Petitioner’s loss of pay and retirement points

constitute precisely the type of continuing injury for

which effective relief remains available.

Because Respondents cannot show that

Petitioner has received complete relief—or that no

court possesses the authority to grant the relief

sought—the case is not moot.

II.

Equitable estoppel prohibits Respondents

from claiming mootness based on the

unavailability of relief they previously

identified as adequate

Respondents’ argument concerning judicial

estoppel also fails because they now rest on a position

directly contrary to the one they advanced and

prevailed on earlier in this litigation. In opposing

preliminary injunctive relief, Respondents expressly

argued that the loss of reservist pay and retirement

points did not constitute irreparable harm because

those losses could be remedied later through

reinstatement and backpay if Petitioner prevailed on

the merits. Respondents persuaded the district court

to deny that aspect of preliminary relief on precisely

that basis.

Respondents assert that judicial estoppel does

not apply because, in their view, the district court

“rejected” the government’s prior argument regarding

irreparable harm. (Opp. Br. at 19.) That

5

characterization is incorrect. The district court denied

that specific relief after accepting Respondents’

representation that restoration of pay and retirement

points would be available later and thus was not

irreparable harm. See Poffenbarger v. Kendall, 588 F.

Supp. 3d 770, 796-797 (2022).

“Where a party assumes a certain position in a

legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that

position, he may not thereafter, simply because his

interests have changed, assume a contrary position,

especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has

acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.”

Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895).

Accordingly, having prevailed on the argument

that restoration of pay and retirement points was

available as a final remedy, Respondents cannot now

assert that no court possesses authority to grant that

same relief. This Court has repeatedly rejected such

litigation tactics, which would allow a party to have it

both ways by prevailing on one theory at an earlier

stage and then reversing course to defeat jurisdiction

altogether. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227

n. 8 (2000); see 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.30

(3d ed. 2000) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel

prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal

proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by

that party in a previous proceeding”).

6

At

minimum,

Respondents’

prior

representations confirm that this case does not fall

within the narrow category of disputes in which it is

impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief

whatsoever. Because Respondents themselves

identified restoration of pay and retirement points as

an available remedy, the case remains justiciable.

III.

Restorative relief is authorized by RFRA

and within the Court’s equitable powers

Respondents’ mootness theory also depends on

the erroneous premise that courts lack authority to

grant the restorative relief Petitioner seeks. That

premise is wrong as a matter of law. Respondents

repeatedly characterize Petitioner’s requested relief

as “retrospective compensatory relief” barred by

sovereign immunity. (Opp. Br. at 9.) However,

Petitioner does not seek damages measured by the

value of lost employment or compensation for

independent injury. He seeks equitable, statusrestoring relief that corrects official military records to

eliminate the continuing effects of an unlawful RFRA

violation. Relief that restores a plaintiff to the position

he would have occupied absence illegal government

action is restitutionary and equitable in nature, even

if compliance requires the payment of money. See

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988).

RFRA expressly authorizes “appropriate relief

against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). This

7

Court has explained that the term “appropriate relief”

is open-ended and encompasses the full range of

traditionally available equitable remedies. Tanzin v.

Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 47 (2020). When Congress

authorizes equitable relief against the government,

sovereign immunity does not bar remedies that

restore plaintiff to the status quo ante. Respondents’

insistence on an additional explicit statement

misreads both RFRA’s text and this Court’s precedent.

Nothing in RFRA narrows that authority, and nothing

in this Court’s precedent supports Respondents’

attempt to carve out restorative relief for violations.

Respondents’ reliance on RLUIPA is misplaced

(Opp. Br. at 8, 17.) RFRA and RLUIPA differ

materially in scope, structure, and remedial context.

RFRA applies broadly to federal government action

and expressly authorizes “appropriate relief against a

government,” while RLUIPA’s remedial provisions

operate in a far narrower institutional setting.

Nothing in RLUIPA jurisprudence narrows RFRA’s

remedial reach.

Respondents’ claim that no court has treated

restoration of pay or service credit as available relief

under RFRA ignores both precedent and principle.

(Opp. Br. at 16.) Courts routinely award

reinstatement, back pay, and restoration of benefits as

equitable relief in constitutional and statutory

religious liberty cases. See Downie v. Independent

Drivers Ass’n Pension Plan, 934 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir.

1991); Oppenheim v. Campbell, 571 F.2d 660, 661-63

8

(D.C. Cir. 1978) (retirement credit is equitable relief);

CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011)

(explaining wide-ranging equitable relief available for

similar “appropriate” remedy statute). RFRA’s

“appropriate relief” provision incorporates these wellestablished principles.

In fact, even this Court has treated back pay

and related relief as equitable remedies under § 1983

matters for quite some time. See Rankin v. McPherson,

483 U.S. 378, 382 (1987) (explaining back pay and

related relief is equitable under § 1983). Such relief is

restitutionary in nature, directed at undoing the

effects of illegal conduct rather than compensating for

independent injury. Restoration of reservist pay and

retirement points fits squarely within that

framework.

Respondents further misread Tanzin v. Tanvir.

Tanzin addressed whether RFRA permits damages

actions against federal officials in their personal

capacities. It did not restrict—let alone eliminate—

long recognized official-capacity suits seeking

equitable relief. To the contrary, Tanzin reaffirmed

that RFRA’s remedies are coextensive with those

historically available under § 1983, which include

injunctions, reinstatement, and other status-restoring

relief against government officials acting in their

official capacities. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43

(2020).

9

Respondents’ reliance on cases distinguishing

restitution

from

compensatory

damages

mischaracterizes the relief sought here. (Opp. Br. at

17-19.) Petitioner does not seek damages measured by

the “value” of a lost job. Hubbard v. Administrator,

EPA, 982 F.2d 531, at 539 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en

banc). He seeks restoration of his military service

status and records (points) to what he would have

reflected absent the unlawful denial of religious

accommodation.

For reservists, pay, retirement points, and

service credit flow automatically from that status by

operation of law. Restoring those records therefore

provides the “specific thing” to which Petitioner is

entitled, not compensatory damages untethered to a

legal entitlement. Hubbard v. Administrator, EPA,

982 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Edwards,

J., dissenting)).

Accordingly, lower courts addressing materially

identical claims to those underlying this petition have

recognized this authority. In Schelske v. Austin, for

example, the court held that restoration of pay and

retirement credit following an unlawful denial of a

religious accommodation to the COVID-19 vaccination

mandate constituted equitable relief and remained

justiciable even after the mandate was rescinded. See

Schelske v. Austin, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163101

(N.D. Tex. 2023). See also U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v.

Biden, 27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2021); Lexmark Int'l, Inc.

v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128

10

(2014). That same reasoning applies with equal force

here.

Respondents’ attempt to distinguish Schelske v.

Austin by labeling it an “active duty” case

misunderstands both the holding of that decision and

the nature of the relief sought here. (Opp. Br. at 18.)

Schelske turned on the nature of the relief—not on

plaintiff’s duty classification. Schelske v. Austin, U.S.

Dist., LEXIS 163101, *109 (2023). The relevant

inquiry is not Petitioner’s duty classification, but

whether the relief sought restores Petitioner to the

legal position he would have occupied but for the

Government’s unlawful action. Id at 105-106. Schelske

held that the relief granted was proper because it

returned that plaintiff to the “status quo.” Id at 105.

Petitioner seeks precisely that form of relief

here. He does not seek compensatory damages

untethered from legal entitlement; he seeks correction

of his military records to reflect uninterrupted reserve

service during the period in which he was unlawfully

placed in no-pay, no-points status. Once those records

are corrected, drill pay and retirement points follow as

a matter of law1.

1 Further, Respondents’ focus on whether Petitioner “attended”

particular drills misses the point. (Opp. Br. at 7.) Petitioner was

unlawfully placed in a no-pay, no-points status that barred him

from participating in drills in the first place. The relief sought

corrects the official records that prevented participation and

restores Petitioner to the status he would have held but for the

11

Respondents also suggest that 28 U.S.C.

1346(a)(2) (“Little Tucker Act”) forecloses district

court authority to order restoration of lost pay and

retirement points. (Opp. Br. at 14.) That argument

misunderstands both the nature of Petitioner’s claims

and the scope of the Little Tucker Act. Petitioner does

not seek money damages; he seeks equitable,

restitutionary relief restoring him to the status quo

ante by correcting military records to reflect the

service, pay, and retirement credit wrongfully

withheld. Such relief has long been recognized as

equitable and within the authority of district courts.

See Hubbard v. Adm’r, EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 547–48

(D.C. Cir. 1992); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.

879, 893 (1988). The Little Tucker Act does not divest

district courts of jurisdiction over equitable claims

merely because compliance requires the payment of

money, particularly where Congress has authorized

“appropriate relief” under RFRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1(c).

Accordingly, Respondents err in suggesting

that the Little Tucker Act forecloses the relief sought

here. (Opp Br. at 14.) Petitioner does not rely on the

Little Tucker Act as a source of substantive rights.

Rather, he seeks equitable relief authorized by RFRA.

The fact that compliance with an equitable decree may

require the payment of money does not transform that

RFRA violation. Again, once those records are corrected, pay and

retirement points follow automatically by operation of law.

12

relief into damages or divest courts of jurisdiction.

Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893.

In fact, Respondents’ contrary position would

impermissibly narrow RFRA by allowing the

government to moot claims for violations simply by

ceasing the challenged policy while retaining the

consequences it imposed. RFRA does not permit that

result. Where, as here, Petitioner continues to suffer

concrete consequences from past unlawful action,

courts retain authority to grant restorative relief to

eliminate those effects.

Because RFRA authorizes the relief Petitioner

seeks, and because that relief remains capable of being

ordered, the decisions below erred in concluding that

this case is moot. The petition should be granted to

resolve this conflict and to reaffirm that RFRA

provides meaningful remedies for completed

violations of federally protected religious liberty.

Respondents also suggest that sovereign

immunity forecloses the restorative relief Petitioner

seeks. That contention is likewise incorrect. RFRA

expressly authorizes “appropriate relief against a

government,” and this Court (along with many others)

has held that such language encompasses traditional

equitable remedies. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. at 48.

(2020). Tanzin addressed a narrow question: whether

RFRA’s authorization of “appropriate relief” permits

claims for money damages against federal officials in

their personal capacities. Id. The decision left

13

untouched the settled understanding that RFRA

permits official-capacity suits seeking equitable relief,

including relief necessary to restore plaintiff to the

position he would have occupied absent the unlawful

burden on religious exercise. Nothing in Tanzin

suggested that Congress intended to curtail

traditional equitable relief against the government

itself. Given that various courts at all levels have

recognized that remedies like reinstatement,

restoration of service credit, and back pay constitute

equitable, restitutionary relief rather than damages,

it cannot simultaneously stand that he is categorically

barred by sovereign immunity.

RFRA is not limited to forbearance as

Respondents suggest. (Opp. Br. at 15.) Where a

violation has occurred, courts retain authority to grant

relief necessary to eliminate its continuing effects.

This Court has long recognized that equitable

remedies may require affirmative action by the

government to undo past unlawful conduct. Bell v.

Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).

The decisions below have the effect of stripping

RFRA of an incredibly important equitable relief—

restitutionary relief—such as reinstatement, back

pay, or other remedial relief. It runs contrary to both

the text, and the historical tradition in place when

RFRA was passed. And this Court should grant

certiorari to review the decision below.

14

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted.

Aaron Siri

Elizabeth A. Brehm

Wendy Cox

SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP

745 Fifth Ave.

Suite 500

New York, NY 10151

aaron@sirillp.com

ebrehm@sirillp.com

wcox@sirillp.com

Thomas B. Bruns

Counsel of Record

BRUNS CONNELL VOLLMAR

& ARMSTRONG

4555 Lake Forrest Drive,

Suite 330

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Tel: 513/312-9890

tbruns@bcvalaw.com

Christopher D. Wiest

CHRIS WIEST ATTORNEY AT

LAW, PLLC

50 East Rivercenter Blvd.

Suite 1280

Covington, KY 41011

chris@cwiestlaw.com

Zachery Gottesman

9200 Montgomery Road,

Bldg. E, Ste. 18B

Cincinnati, OH 45242

January 29, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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