Reply Brief — Michael Poffenbarger, Petitioner v. Troy E. Meink, Secretary of the Air Force, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 29, 2026
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No. 25-448
In the Supreme Court of the United States
________________
MICHAEL POFFENBARGER ET AL., ON BEHALF
OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Petitioner,
v.
HON. TROY MEINK, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, ET AL.,
________________
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
________________
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
________________
Aaron Siri
Elizabeth A. Brehm
Wendy Cox
SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP
745 Fifth Ave.
Suite 500
New York, NY 10151
aaron@sirillp.com
ebrehm@sirillp.com
wcox@sirillp.com
Thomas B. Bruns
Counsel of Record
BRUNS CONNELL VOLLMAR
& ARMSTRONG
4555 Lake Forrest Drive,
Suite 330
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Tel: 513/312-9890
tbruns@bcvalaw.com
Counsel for Petitioner
(additional counsel listed on inside cover)
Christopher D. Wiest
CHRIS WIEST ATTORNEY AT
LAW, PLLC
50 East Rivercenter Blvd.
Suite 1280
Covington, KY 41011
chris@cwiestlaw.com
Zachery Gottesman
9200 Montgomery Road,
Bldg. E, Ste. 18B
Cincinnati, OH 45242
Counsel for Petitioner
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities .................................................... ii
Introduction ................................................................ 1
Reasons Review Is Necessary .................................... 2
I.
The case is not moot because effectual relief
remains available............................................. 2
II. Equitable estoppel prohibits Respondents
from claiming mootness based on the
unavailability of relief they previously
identified as adequate ..................................... 4
III. Restorative relief is authorized by RFRA
and within the Court’s equitable powers ........ 6
Conclusion................................................................. 14
(i)
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946) ................................................ 13
Bowen v. Massachusetts,
487 U.S. 879 (1988) ...................................... 6, 11, 12
Chafin v. Chafin,
568 U.S. 165 (2013) .................................................. 2
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara,
563 U.S. 421 (2011) .................................................. 8
Davis v. Wakelee,
156 U.S. 680 (1895) .................................................. 5
Downie v. Independent Drivers Ass’n Pension Plan,
934 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991)................................ 8
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) ............................. 2
Hubbard v. Administrator, EPA,
982 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ............................ 9, 11
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components,
Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) ....................................... 10
Oppenheim v. Campbell,
571 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1978) .................................. 8
Poffenbarger v. Kendall,
588 F. Supp. 3d 770 (2022) ...................................... 5
Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378 (1987) .................................................. 8
iii
Schelske v. Austin,
2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163101
(N.D. Tex. 2023) ................................................. 9, 10
Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40 (1968) ................................................ 3, 4
Tanzin v. Tanvir,
592 U.S. 43 (2020) .......................................... 7, 8, 12
U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v. Biden,
27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2021) .................................... 9
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Assn., 393 U.S. 199 (1968) ........................................ 2
Statutes and Regulations
28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (“Little Tucker Act”) ............... 11
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. .... 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803 (42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq.) ................. 7
Other Authorities
18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.30 (3d ed.
2000) ......................................................................... 5
INTRODUCTION
Respondents’ brief in opposition rests on a
fundamental misunderstanding of RFRA’s remedial
framework and basic mootness doctrine. This case
does not seek retrospective damages for past service,
but equitable relief correcting ongoing collateral
consequences of Respondents’ RFRA violations—relief
that remains available and is necessary to make
Petitioner whole.
Most notably, Petitioner seeks restoration of
retirement points wrongfully denied as a result of the
challenged mandate. That relief is independent of any
dispute over back pay, which he also seeks, and
constitutes classic equitable status-restoring relief.
Because such relief will have real legal consequences
for Petitioner’s military record and future benefits, it
defeats Respondents’ mootness argument as a
threshold matter.
Respondents’ focus on pleading formalities and
retrospective compensation elevates form over
substance and obscures the nature of the relief at
issue. RFRA authorizes “appropriate relief” for
violations, and this Court has long recognized that
equitable remedies designed to restore a plaintiff to
his rightful position remain available even after the
challenged conduct has ceased. The decision below
improperly narrows that remedial framework and
leaves service members without any meaningful
remedy for RFRA violations.
(1)
2
Of equal significance is that Respondents’
current position also sits in opposition to their prior
representations regarding the availability of relief,
underscoring the remedial gap created by the Sixth
Circuit’s approach. Under Respondents’ theory, the
government may engage in a RFRA violation, avoid
interim relief by citing the availability of future
remedies, and then avoid review altogether by
denying that any remedy exists. That result is
inconsistent with RFRA’s text, as well as this Court’s
precedents and basic principles of equity.
This case therefore presents a clean and
recurring question of exceptional importance: whether
RFRA permits meaningful post-violation relief for
people whose religious exercise has been unlawfully
burdened. This Court should grant the petition.
REASONS REVIEW IS NECESSARY
I.
The case is not moot because effectual
relief remains available
Respondents have not carried their “heavy
burden” of demonstrating mootness. Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v.
Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199,
203 (1968)). A case is moot only if it is impossible for a
court to grant any effectual relief whatsoever. Chafin
v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013). Under the
collateral consequences doctrine, as long as a
3
prevailing party retains a concrete interest—however
small—in the outcome of the litigation, the case
remains justiciable. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 53-59 (1968).
Here, Petitioner seeks concrete restorative
relief for completed violations of RFRA, including
restoration of lost reservist pay, retirement points,
and service credit. That relief has not been provided,
and it remains fully capable of being ordered by a
court. The recission of the vaccination mandate does
not itself moot claims for relief designed to remedy the
continuing consequences of past unlawful action.
Respondents’ contrary argument rests on an
artificially narrow concept of equitable relief. They
treat the repeal of the mandate as dispositive while
ignoring concrete collateral consequences from the
denial of religious accommodation—consequences
embedded in his military records and retirement
calculations. Unless corrected by order of the Court,
Petitioner ultimately will draw less retirement pay
when he retires, and all because of the illegal
discipline taken against him for not compromising his
sincere religious beliefs against taking the COVID-19
vaccine. The availability of relief addressing those
ongoing effects defeats a mootness finding.
Respondents’ position also fails to comport with
the collateral consequences doctrine. Even where the
primary conduct has ceased, a case is not moot if
additional harm remains that a court can remedy. See
4
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-59 (1968).
Petitioner’s loss of pay and retirement points
constitute precisely the type of continuing injury for
which effective relief remains available.
Because Respondents cannot show that
Petitioner has received complete relief—or that no
court possesses the authority to grant the relief
sought—the case is not moot.
II.
Equitable estoppel prohibits Respondents
from claiming mootness based on the
unavailability of relief they previously
identified as adequate
Respondents’ argument concerning judicial
estoppel also fails because they now rest on a position
directly contrary to the one they advanced and
prevailed on earlier in this litigation. In opposing
preliminary injunctive relief, Respondents expressly
argued that the loss of reservist pay and retirement
points did not constitute irreparable harm because
those losses could be remedied later through
reinstatement and backpay if Petitioner prevailed on
the merits. Respondents persuaded the district court
to deny that aspect of preliminary relief on precisely
that basis.
Respondents assert that judicial estoppel does
not apply because, in their view, the district court
“rejected” the government’s prior argument regarding
irreparable harm. (Opp. Br. at 19.) That
5
characterization is incorrect. The district court denied
that specific relief after accepting Respondents’
representation that restoration of pay and retirement
points would be available later and thus was not
irreparable harm. See Poffenbarger v. Kendall, 588 F.
Supp. 3d 770, 796-797 (2022).
“Where a party assumes a certain position in a
legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that
position, he may not thereafter, simply because his
interests have changed, assume a contrary position,
especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has
acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.”
Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895).
Accordingly, having prevailed on the argument
that restoration of pay and retirement points was
available as a final remedy, Respondents cannot now
assert that no court possesses authority to grant that
same relief. This Court has repeatedly rejected such
litigation tactics, which would allow a party to have it
both ways by prevailing on one theory at an earlier
stage and then reversing course to defeat jurisdiction
altogether. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227
n. 8 (2000); see 18 Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.30
(3d ed. 2000) (“The doctrine of judicial estoppel
prevents a party from asserting a claim in a legal
proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by
that party in a previous proceeding”).
6
At
minimum,
Respondents’
prior
representations confirm that this case does not fall
within the narrow category of disputes in which it is
impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief
whatsoever. Because Respondents themselves
identified restoration of pay and retirement points as
an available remedy, the case remains justiciable.
III.
Restorative relief is authorized by RFRA
and within the Court’s equitable powers
Respondents’ mootness theory also depends on
the erroneous premise that courts lack authority to
grant the restorative relief Petitioner seeks. That
premise is wrong as a matter of law. Respondents
repeatedly characterize Petitioner’s requested relief
as “retrospective compensatory relief” barred by
sovereign immunity. (Opp. Br. at 9.) However,
Petitioner does not seek damages measured by the
value of lost employment or compensation for
independent injury. He seeks equitable, statusrestoring relief that corrects official military records to
eliminate the continuing effects of an unlawful RFRA
violation. Relief that restores a plaintiff to the position
he would have occupied absence illegal government
action is restitutionary and equitable in nature, even
if compliance requires the payment of money. See
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988).
RFRA expressly authorizes “appropriate relief
against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c). This
7
Court has explained that the term “appropriate relief”
is open-ended and encompasses the full range of
traditionally available equitable remedies. Tanzin v.
Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 47 (2020). When Congress
authorizes equitable relief against the government,
sovereign immunity does not bar remedies that
restore plaintiff to the status quo ante. Respondents’
insistence on an additional explicit statement
misreads both RFRA’s text and this Court’s precedent.
Nothing in RFRA narrows that authority, and nothing
in this Court’s precedent supports Respondents’
attempt to carve out restorative relief for violations.
Respondents’ reliance on RLUIPA is misplaced
(Opp. Br. at 8, 17.) RFRA and RLUIPA differ
materially in scope, structure, and remedial context.
RFRA applies broadly to federal government action
and expressly authorizes “appropriate relief against a
government,” while RLUIPA’s remedial provisions
operate in a far narrower institutional setting.
Nothing in RLUIPA jurisprudence narrows RFRA’s
remedial reach.
Respondents’ claim that no court has treated
restoration of pay or service credit as available relief
under RFRA ignores both precedent and principle.
(Opp. Br. at 16.) Courts routinely award
reinstatement, back pay, and restoration of benefits as
equitable relief in constitutional and statutory
religious liberty cases. See Downie v. Independent
Drivers Ass’n Pension Plan, 934 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir.
1991); Oppenheim v. Campbell, 571 F.2d 660, 661-63
8
(D.C. Cir. 1978) (retirement credit is equitable relief);
CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421 (2011)
(explaining wide-ranging equitable relief available for
similar “appropriate” remedy statute). RFRA’s
“appropriate relief” provision incorporates these wellestablished principles.
In fact, even this Court has treated back pay
and related relief as equitable remedies under § 1983
matters for quite some time. See Rankin v. McPherson,
483 U.S. 378, 382 (1987) (explaining back pay and
related relief is equitable under § 1983). Such relief is
restitutionary in nature, directed at undoing the
effects of illegal conduct rather than compensating for
independent injury. Restoration of reservist pay and
retirement points fits squarely within that
framework.
Respondents further misread Tanzin v. Tanvir.
Tanzin addressed whether RFRA permits damages
actions against federal officials in their personal
capacities. It did not restrict—let alone eliminate—
long recognized official-capacity suits seeking
equitable relief. To the contrary, Tanzin reaffirmed
that RFRA’s remedies are coextensive with those
historically available under § 1983, which include
injunctions, reinstatement, and other status-restoring
relief against government officials acting in their
official capacities. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43
(2020).
9
Respondents’ reliance on cases distinguishing
restitution
from
compensatory
damages
mischaracterizes the relief sought here. (Opp. Br. at
17-19.) Petitioner does not seek damages measured by
the “value” of a lost job. Hubbard v. Administrator,
EPA, 982 F.2d 531, at 539 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en
banc). He seeks restoration of his military service
status and records (points) to what he would have
reflected absent the unlawful denial of religious
accommodation.
For reservists, pay, retirement points, and
service credit flow automatically from that status by
operation of law. Restoring those records therefore
provides the “specific thing” to which Petitioner is
entitled, not compensatory damages untethered to a
legal entitlement. Hubbard v. Administrator, EPA,
982 F.2d 531, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Edwards,
J., dissenting)).
Accordingly, lower courts addressing materially
identical claims to those underlying this petition have
recognized this authority. In Schelske v. Austin, for
example, the court held that restoration of pay and
retirement credit following an unlawful denial of a
religious accommodation to the COVID-19 vaccination
mandate constituted equitable relief and remained
justiciable even after the mandate was rescinded. See
Schelske v. Austin, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163101
(N.D. Tex. 2023). See also U.S. Navy Seals 1-26 v.
Biden, 27 F.4th 336 (5th Cir. 2021); Lexmark Int'l, Inc.
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128
10
(2014). That same reasoning applies with equal force
here.
Respondents’ attempt to distinguish Schelske v.
Austin by labeling it an “active duty” case
misunderstands both the holding of that decision and
the nature of the relief sought here. (Opp. Br. at 18.)
Schelske turned on the nature of the relief—not on
plaintiff’s duty classification. Schelske v. Austin, U.S.
Dist., LEXIS 163101, *109 (2023). The relevant
inquiry is not Petitioner’s duty classification, but
whether the relief sought restores Petitioner to the
legal position he would have occupied but for the
Government’s unlawful action. Id at 105-106. Schelske
held that the relief granted was proper because it
returned that plaintiff to the “status quo.” Id at 105.
Petitioner seeks precisely that form of relief
here. He does not seek compensatory damages
untethered from legal entitlement; he seeks correction
of his military records to reflect uninterrupted reserve
service during the period in which he was unlawfully
placed in no-pay, no-points status. Once those records
are corrected, drill pay and retirement points follow as
a matter of law1.
1 Further, Respondents’ focus on whether Petitioner “attended”
particular drills misses the point. (Opp. Br. at 7.) Petitioner was
unlawfully placed in a no-pay, no-points status that barred him
from participating in drills in the first place. The relief sought
corrects the official records that prevented participation and
restores Petitioner to the status he would have held but for the
11
Respondents also suggest that 28 U.S.C.
1346(a)(2) (“Little Tucker Act”) forecloses district
court authority to order restoration of lost pay and
retirement points. (Opp. Br. at 14.) That argument
misunderstands both the nature of Petitioner’s claims
and the scope of the Little Tucker Act. Petitioner does
not seek money damages; he seeks equitable,
restitutionary relief restoring him to the status quo
ante by correcting military records to reflect the
service, pay, and retirement credit wrongfully
withheld. Such relief has long been recognized as
equitable and within the authority of district courts.
See Hubbard v. Adm’r, EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 547–48
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S.
879, 893 (1988). The Little Tucker Act does not divest
district courts of jurisdiction over equitable claims
merely because compliance requires the payment of
money, particularly where Congress has authorized
“appropriate relief” under RFRA. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb1(c).
Accordingly, Respondents err in suggesting
that the Little Tucker Act forecloses the relief sought
here. (Opp Br. at 14.) Petitioner does not rely on the
Little Tucker Act as a source of substantive rights.
Rather, he seeks equitable relief authorized by RFRA.
The fact that compliance with an equitable decree may
require the payment of money does not transform that
RFRA violation. Again, once those records are corrected, pay and
retirement points follow automatically by operation of law.
12
relief into damages or divest courts of jurisdiction.
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 893.
In fact, Respondents’ contrary position would
impermissibly narrow RFRA by allowing the
government to moot claims for violations simply by
ceasing the challenged policy while retaining the
consequences it imposed. RFRA does not permit that
result. Where, as here, Petitioner continues to suffer
concrete consequences from past unlawful action,
courts retain authority to grant restorative relief to
eliminate those effects.
Because RFRA authorizes the relief Petitioner
seeks, and because that relief remains capable of being
ordered, the decisions below erred in concluding that
this case is moot. The petition should be granted to
resolve this conflict and to reaffirm that RFRA
provides meaningful remedies for completed
violations of federally protected religious liberty.
Respondents also suggest that sovereign
immunity forecloses the restorative relief Petitioner
seeks. That contention is likewise incorrect. RFRA
expressly authorizes “appropriate relief against a
government,” and this Court (along with many others)
has held that such language encompasses traditional
equitable remedies. Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. at 48.
(2020). Tanzin addressed a narrow question: whether
RFRA’s authorization of “appropriate relief” permits
claims for money damages against federal officials in
their personal capacities. Id. The decision left
13
untouched the settled understanding that RFRA
permits official-capacity suits seeking equitable relief,
including relief necessary to restore plaintiff to the
position he would have occupied absent the unlawful
burden on religious exercise. Nothing in Tanzin
suggested that Congress intended to curtail
traditional equitable relief against the government
itself. Given that various courts at all levels have
recognized that remedies like reinstatement,
restoration of service credit, and back pay constitute
equitable, restitutionary relief rather than damages,
it cannot simultaneously stand that he is categorically
barred by sovereign immunity.
RFRA is not limited to forbearance as
Respondents suggest. (Opp. Br. at 15.) Where a
violation has occurred, courts retain authority to grant
relief necessary to eliminate its continuing effects.
This Court has long recognized that equitable
remedies may require affirmative action by the
government to undo past unlawful conduct. Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
The decisions below have the effect of stripping
RFRA of an incredibly important equitable relief—
restitutionary relief—such as reinstatement, back
pay, or other remedial relief. It runs contrary to both
the text, and the historical tradition in place when
RFRA was passed. And this Court should grant
certiorari to review the decision below.
14
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
Aaron Siri
Elizabeth A. Brehm
Wendy Cox
SIRI & GLIMSTAD LLP
745 Fifth Ave.
Suite 500
New York, NY 10151
aaron@sirillp.com
ebrehm@sirillp.com
wcox@sirillp.com
Thomas B. Bruns
Counsel of Record
BRUNS CONNELL VOLLMAR
& ARMSTRONG
4555 Lake Forrest Drive,
Suite 330
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Tel: 513/312-9890
tbruns@bcvalaw.com
Christopher D. Wiest
CHRIS WIEST ATTORNEY AT
LAW, PLLC
50 East Rivercenter Blvd.
Suite 1280
Covington, KY 41011
chris@cwiestlaw.com
Zachery Gottesman
9200 Montgomery Road,
Bldg. E, Ste. 18B
Cincinnati, OH 45242
January 29, 2026
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