Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ted Velleff, Petitioner v. Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff, Cook County, Illinois, et al.

No. _______

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_______________________________

TED VELLEFF, PETITIONER,

v.

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY AND COOK COUNTY,

ILLINOIS, RESPONDENTS.

_______________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_______________________________

KENNETH N. FLAXMAN

Counsel of Record

JOEL A. FLAXMAN

200 S Michigan Avenue

Suite 201

Chicago, IL 60604

knf@kenlaw.com

(312) 427-3200

Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The Seventh Circuit stands alone in its narrow interpretation of the protections afforded to property by the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Sheriff of Cook County enforces its policy to destroy government–issued identification belonging to

prisoners transferred to the penitentiary. While the

Sheriff retains such property during pretrial detention,

and the Department of Corrections stands ready to store

it during imprisonment, the Sheriff declines to transfer

the property to the penitentiary. Instead, unless the

prisoner can engage an agent to retrieve the property,

the Sheriff destroys it—without any stated reason or legitimate governmental purpose.

Every other circuit would recognize such a policy as a

deprivation of property contrary to the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Seventh Circuit upheld the policy in this case in accordance with its

longstanding precedent.

A petition presenting a related question is before the

Court in Carter v. Cook County Sheriff, No. 25-401.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government from depriving individuals of personal property by applying a policy

that serves no legitimate governmental purpose.

2. Whether a plaintiff may seek relief under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for such a deprivation without first exhausting state post-deprivation remedies, when the deprivation results from an official and deliberate policy

rather than a random or unauthorized act.

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner is Ted Veleff.

Respondents are the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook

County, Illinois.

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States District Court (N.D. Ill.):

Elizarri et al. v. Sheriff of Cook County, et al.,

17-cv-8120 (August 21, 2023)

(ruling on motion for summary judgment)

United States Court of Appeals (7th Cir.):

Velleff v. Sheriff of Cook County Sheriff, et al.,

(No. 23-2785, 7th Cir. July 9, 2025)

(affirming district court)

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions Below ................................................................... 1

Jurisdiction ......................................................................... 1

Constitutional Provisions Involved ................................ 1

Statement ............................................................................ 2

Reasons for Granting the Petition .................................. 6

A. The right to own personal property is a

cornerstone of ordered liberty .......................... 7

B. The Due Process Clause protects against

deliberate deprivations of property based

on an irrational policy ......................................... 8

C. The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Parratt

and Hudson is misplaced .................................. 11

D. The Court should reaffirm that established

governmental policies are not shielded

from § 1983 review by the Parratt-Hudson

doctrine ............................................................... 13

E. The destruction of government–issued

identification cards is irrational ...................... 16

Conclusion ......................................................................... 17

App. A – Court of appeals opinion

(July 9, 2025) .................................... 1a

App. B – District court opinion and

Order (August 21, 2023) ................. 8a

(iii)

App. C – Court of Appeals judgment

(July 9, 2025) .................................. 37a

App. D – Constitutional, statutory, and

regulatory provisions:

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV .................................... 38a

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................... 38a

20 Ill. Admin Code § 535.140 ............................. 39a

20 Ill. Admin Code § 701.60 ................................ 39a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adams v. Gardiner, 52 Ky. 197,

1852 WL 391 (1852) ........................................................ 9

Ali v. Ramsdell, 423 F.3d 810

(8th Cir. 2005) ............................................................... 12

Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589

(10th Cir. 2022) ............................................................. 12

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296

(2018) ............................................................................... 9

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad

Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226

(1897) ............................................................................... 8

Collins v. City of Harker Heights,

503 U.S. 115 (1992) ....................................................... 15

Conyers v. City of Chicago, 10 F.4th 704

(7th Cir. 2021) ................................................................. 9

County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833 (1998) ............................................ 15, 16-17

(iv)

Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council—

President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2002) .......... 12

Dean ex rel. Harkness v. McKinney,

976 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2020) ........................................ 12

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) ........................... 10

Hartleib v. McLane, 44 Pa. 510,

1863 WL 4838 (1863) ...................................................... 9

Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100,

423 P.2d 666 (1967) ......................................................... 9

Herring v. State, 43 Md. App. 211,

404 A.2d 1087 (1979) ...................................................... 9

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517

(1984) ......................................................... 3, 6, 10, 12, 13

Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271 (2020) ............................ 7

Kauth v. Hartford Insurance Co. of Illinois,

852 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1988) ................................... 10-11

Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago,

49 F.4th 1124 (7th Cir. 2022) .................................. 5, 11

Kendall v. Morse, 43 N.H. 553,

1862 WL 1462 (1862) ...................................................... 9

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,

544 U.S. 528 (2005) ....................................................... 10

Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 445

(7th Cir. 2003) ...................................................... 5, 10-11

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,

405 U.S. 538 (1972) ......................................................... 7

(v)

McClary v. O’Hare, 786 F.2d 83

(2d Cir. 1986) ................................................................ 12

Mann v. City of Tucson, Dep’t of Police,

782 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1986) ........................................ 12

Moore v. Westervelt, 27 N.Y. 234 (1863) ......................... 9

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527

(1981) ......................................................... 3, 6, 10, 12, 13

People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal.App.2d 248,

305 P.2d 145 (1956) ..................................................................... 9

People v Robinson, 36 A.D.2d 375,

320 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1971) ................................................ 9

Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979) ................... 9

State v. Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794 (Iowa 2018) ............... 9

State v. Peck, 449 P.3d 235,

194 Wash. 2d 148 (2019) ................................................ 9

State v. Phifer, 39 N.C. App. 278,

250 S.E.2d 309 (1979) ..................................................... 9

State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44,

173 N.W.2d 372 (1970) ................................................... 9

Tinker v. Morrill, 39 Vt. 477,

1866 WL 3047 (1866) ...................................................... 9

Walker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. 13 (1867) .................. 9

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) .................. 9, 15

Wilson v. Beebe, F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) ..................... 12

Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1992) ................. 12

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1994) ...................... 12

(vi)

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules

U.S. Const. Amend. IV .......................................... 3, 6, 7-8

U.S. Const. Amend. V ................................................... 3, 8

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV .............................................. 2, 8

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .................................................................. 1

42 U.S.C. § 1983 .............................................................. 2, 4

20 ILL. ADMIN CODE § 535.140 .......................................... 4

20 ILL. ADMIN CODE § 701.60 ........................................... 4

Other Sources

1 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND (1765) ........................................................ 7

2 W. Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS

OF ENGLAND (1768) ....................................................... 9

Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the

Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal

Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946

(2016) ............................................................................... 8

James W. Ely, Jr., The Guardian of Every

Other Right: A Constitutional History of

Property Rights (3d ed 2008) ....................................... 8

Leonard W. Levy, Property as a Human Right,

5 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 169 (1988) ............. 7

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government

(1689) ............................................................................... 7

(vii)

In the Supreme Court of the United

States

_______________________________

TED VELLEFF, PETITIONER,

v.

SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY AND COOK COUNTY,

ILLINOIS, RESPONDENTS.

_______________________________

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

_______________________________

Ted Velleff respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App. 1a-7a) is not

officially reported and appears at 2025 WL 1898374 (7th

Cir. 2025). The opinion of the district court (App. 7a-36a)

is not reported and is available at 2023 WL 5348749

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2023).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

July 9, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

AND STATUTE INVOLVED

Pertinent constitutional, statutory, and regulatory

provisions are reproduced in the appendix.

(1)

-2STATEMENT

This case arises from the Seventh Circuit’s

longstanding outlier view of how the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to personal property.

The case concerns a policy of the Sheriff of Cook

County that results in the destruction of governmentissued identification cards belonging to prisoners who

are transferred from the county jail to the state penitentiary.

When a person is arrested in Illinois, law enforcement officers inventory the arrestee’s property, including official identification such as driver’s licenses or

state identification cards. This property is sent to the

Sheriff, who stores it while the arrestee remains in custody at the county jail.

Upon conviction and sentence to imprisonment in the

penitentiary, Illinois law requires the Sheriff to transfer

the prisoner, along with specified types of property such

as government–issued identification cards, to the penitentiary. It also requires the penitentiary to store that

property for the duration of the prisoner’s confinement.

The Sheriff, however, declines to transfer identification cards to the penitentiary. Unless the prisoner can

engage an agent to retrieve and store the property, the

Sheriff destroys it. The policy leaves individuals who after released from custody after serving their time without the identification necessary to obtain housing,

employment, or government benefits, and serves no legitimate governmental purpose.

In conflict with each circuit to have considered the

issue, the Seventh Circuit holds that exhaustion of state

remedies is required before a district court may hear

and decide an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking

-3damages for the destruction of personal property. Similarly, unlike the rule followed in 9 other circuits, the

Seventh Circuit refuses to consider a claim under the

Due Process Clause arising from the arbitrary denial of

a state-created property right. All that the court of appeals requires before the government may lawfully destroy personal property in its care is to provide notice

that property will be destroyed and an opportunity to

reclaim the property.

The Seventh Circuit’s approach is an outlier among

the courts of appeals for three reasons.

First, due process requires notice and an opportunity

to be heard. Rather than a hearing, the Sheriff’s policy

provides an opportunity to reclaim property before it is

destroyed. The Seventh Circuit stands alone in concluding that such a policy provides due process.

Second, every other circuit to consider the question

has held that a deprivation of property carried out under an established governmental policy can be challenged under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without regard to the

availability of post-deprivation state remedies. Those

courts correctly recognize that Parratt v. Taylor, 451

U.S. 527 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517

(1984), apply only to random or unauthorized acts, not

to deliberate governmental policies such as the one at

issue here.

Third, only two other circuits share the Seventh Circuit’s view that a state-created property interest cannot

form the basis of a substantive due-process claim. The

Court should reject this unreasoned distinction and

adopt the majority view.

The facts of this case illustrate the operation of the

Sheriff’s policy.

-41. Petitioner was arrested and detained at the Cook

County Jail, where the Sheriff safely stored his government-issued identification card. (App. 2a–3a.) Petitioner

later left the Jail to serve a sentence in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). (App. 3a.)

2. Government-issued identification cards are

among the personal property that the Illinois Administrative Code requires the Cook County Jail to send with

a newly sentenced prisoner to the IDOC. 20 Ill. Admin.

Code § 701.60(d)(4) (reproduced infra at App. 26a). The

IDOC then stores those cards until the prisoner is “separated from the Department by death, discharge, or unauthorized absence.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 535.140

(reproduced infra at App. 25a–26a).

3. The Sheriff, however, does not send government-issued identification cards to the IDOC. (App. 2a.)

“[I]f the Sheriff were to send government-issued identification cards to IDOC along with their owners, IDOC

would accept them.” (Id.) Instead, the Sheriff gives each

prisoner a form stating that the property will be destroyed unless the prisoner arranges for an agent to retrieve it. (App. 2a–3a.) Petitioner was unable to arrange

for such an agent, and the Sheriff accordingly applied its

“designate-or-destroy” policy to destroy petitioner’s

identification card.

4. After his release from the penitentiary, petitioner was permitted to join as a plaintiff in an action

pending in the district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

challenging the Sheriff’s policy of destroying government-issued identification cards rather than sending

them with prisoners transferred to the IDOC. (D. Ct.

Dkt. No. 139.)

5. The district court granted summary judgment to

respondents. (App. 8a-36a.) The court acknowledged

the importance of government–issued identification to

-5prisoners upon release. 1 The court also found that the

penitentiary “would have accepted the ID cards if the

Cook County Jail had sent them.” (App. 34a.) Viewing

the case as a request for “free shipping” of identification

cards (App. 35a), the district court relied on circuit precedent to hold that the Due Process Clause requires only

“adequate notice about what would happen to their

property, and … adequate chance to retrieve it.” (App.

35a.)

6. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on its prior

decisions in Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 445 (7th Cir.

2003), and Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, 49 F.4th

1124 (7th Cir. 2022), to conclude that the Sheriff’s policy

did not implicate a “fundamental right.” (App. 6a.) The

court of appeals held that petitioner had failed to show

either “an independent constitutional violation” or “the

inadequacy of state law remedies” as required by circuit

precedent. (App. 7a.)

The decision below rests on the Seventh Circuit’s

longstanding view that the destruction of property pursuant to an established governmental policy does not

implicate the Due Process Clause so long as officials

provide notice of the intended destruction and an opportunity to reclaim the property. That ruling squarely

1

The district court explained (App. 9a-10a):

Detainees and prisoners need to get back on their feet after

they leave incarceration. They need jobs, apartments, and so

on. They often need to drive, too. They need identification to

do many of the things that they need to do to reintegrate into

society. (Try entering a federal courthouse without an ID, and

see what happens.)

Detainees and prisoners might not have a compelling need for

government-issued ID cards while they are incarcerated. But

once they rejoin free society, things change. It is that much

harder for former detainees and prisoners to reintegrate into

the community if they cannot show who they are.

-6presents the questions whether such a policy can escape

review under § 1983 and whether the Fourteenth

Amendment protects the right to possess property. 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The judgment below rests on four fundamental errors.

First, the court of appeals disregarded this Court’s

recognition that the Framers intended to implement

Locke’s view that ownership of property is a cornerstone of ordered liberty and a necessary condition of a

free and independent citizenry.

Second, even if the right to own property is not part

of our system of “ordered liberty,” the Seventh Circuit

erred in its outlier view that state-created property

rights are beyond the substantive protection of the Due

Process Clause.

Third, the court compounded these errors by requiring exhaustion of state remedies for a deprivation carried out under an established governmental policy—an

approach inconsistent with Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

527 (1981), Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), and

the decisions of every other circuit.

Fourth, the court replaced the “notice and an opportunity to be heard” elements of traditional due process

with “notice and an opportunity to reclaim” before the

property is destroyed.

The question of whether the challenged policy abridges rights secured by the Fourth Amendment is before the Court in Carter v.

Cook County Sheriff, No. 25-401.

2

-7A. The right to own personal property is a

cornerstone of ordered liberty.

This Court has long recognized that the right to own

and enjoy personal property is a fundamental component of individual liberty.

In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538

(1972), the Court declared that “[t]he right to enjoy

property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the

right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a ‘personal’ right, whether the ‘property’ in question be a welfare check, a home, or a savings account.” Id. at 552.

That tenet traces to John Locke’s insight that “the great

and chief end” of entering political society is “the

preservation of their property.” Second Treatise of Government § 124 (1689). Sir William Blackstone, “whose

influence on the founding generation was the most profound,” 3 described “the free use, enjoyment, and disposal” of personal property as an “absolute right.” 1 W.

BLACKSTONE, Commentaries 134 (1765). James Madison likewise wrote that property includes “every thing

to which a man may attach a value and have a right.” 4

The Framers embedded those principles in the Constitution they drafted. The Fourth Amendment secures

“persons, houses, papers, and effects” against unreasonable government intrusion, thereby protecting the

Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271, 302 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(quoting Blackstone and noting his influence on the Founding generation).

3

4

Leonard W. Levy, Property as a Human Right,

5 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 169, 177 n.34 (1988) (quoting

James Madison, National Gazette (Philadelphia), March 29,

1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (C. Hobson, R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1986)).

-8possession of tangible property. 5 The Fifth Amendment

extends that protection by forbidding the deprivation of

“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 6

Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Nation reaffirmed that guarantee against state action, ensuring

that no government may arbitrarily strip a person of

property that the law recognizes as his own. The Court

confirmed that understanding in Chicago, Burlington &

Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226

(1897), holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the same just compensation guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment when a state

or local government takes private property for public

use.

The rule the Seventh Circuit applied in this case cannot be squared with this constitutional history.

B. The Due Process Clause protects against

deliberate deprivations of property based

on an irrational policy.

The rule the Seventh Circuit applied in this case cannot be squared with the right to own property enshrined in the Constitution.

Recent scholarship confirms that “effects” was included in the

Fourth Amendment “because of the risk of mishandling or damage

generally associated with interferences with personal property,” as

well as the “harms to privacy and dignity that could be incurred by

their inspection.” Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the

Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection,

125 YALE L.J. 946, 987 (2016).

5

Professor Ely observed that “the Fifth Amendment explicitly incorporated into the Constitution the Lockean conception that protection of property is a chief aim of government.” James W. Ely,

Jr., The Guardian of Every Other Right: A Constitutional History

of Property Rights 38 (3d ed 2008).

6

-9The court of appeals applied in this case its established rule that a state official, who is responsible for

storing property inventoried incident to an arrest, may

lawfully destroy that property by giving notice that the

property must be reclaimed by a specific date lest it be

destroyed. 7 This “notice of right to reclaim” is not the

same as the hearing “required at some time before a

person is finally deprived of his property.” Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).

Substituting a “notice of right to reclaim” for a hearing is also inconsistent with the generally accepted view

that the officer holding detainee property is a “gratuitous” or “involuntary” bailee under “a legal duty to keep

the item safe.” Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296,

399 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). This duty was well

known to the framers, 8 applied throughout the nineteenth century,9 and is recognized in many states today. 10

Conyers v. City of Chicago, 10 F.4th 704, 712-15 (7th Cir. 2021)

(notice on a website that inventoried property would be destroyed

if not claimed within 30 days “is not enough to support a due-process violation”).

7

2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

452 (1766).

8

9

See, e.g., Adams v. Gardiner, 52 Ky. 197, 1852 WL 391 (1852) at

*1; Tinker v. Morrill, 39 Vt. 477, 1866 WL 3047 at *2 (1866); Kendall v. Morse, 43 N.H. 553, 1862 WL 1462 *3 (1862); Hartleib v.

McLane, 44 Pa. 510, 514, 1863 WL 4838 *4 (1863); Moore v. Westervelt, 27 N.Y. 234, 239 (1863); Walker v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. 13,

43 (1867).

See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 736–37 (Alaska 1979); People v. Ortiz, 147 Cal.App.2d 248, 249, 305 P.2d 145, 147 (1956); Herring v. State, 43 Md.App. 211, 404 A.2d 1087, 1091–92 (1979);

Heffley v. State, 83 Nev. 100, 103, 423 P.2d 666, 668 (1967); State v.

Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 47, 173 N.W.2d 372, 374 (1970); People v Robinson, 36 A.D.2d 375, 378, 320 N.Y.S.2d 665, 669 (1971); State v.

10

-10The “notice of intent to destroy” approved by the

court below does not further any “important governmental or general public interest.” Fuentes v. Shevin,

407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972). On the contrary, the notice of intent to destroy and the subsequent destruction of the

government–issued identification is “so arbitrary and

irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause.”

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005).

Rather than afford personal property the respect envisioned by the Framers, the Seventh Circuit has long

required a plaintiff to show either an independent constitutional violation or the inadequacy of state remedies

before challenging a deprivation of property under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. That rule, first articulated in Kauth v.

Hartford Insurance Co. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 951 (7th

Cir. 1988), and later expanded in Lee v. City of Chicago,

330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2003), effectively insulates deliberate government policies from constitutional scrutiny.

The Court of Appeals held in Kauth that a substantive due process claim requires proof of “a violation of

some other substantive constitutional right [other than

a deprivation of a state created property right] or that

the available state remedies are inadequate.” Kauth,

330 F.3d at 958. The court derived that rule from a brief

and cryptic reference to this Court’s then recent decisions in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). 11

Ingram, 914 N.W.2d 794, 818-19 (Iowa 2018); State v. Phifer, 39

N.C. App. 278, 286, 250 S.E.2d 309, 314 (1979); State v. Peck, 449

P.3d 235, 239, 194 Wash.2d 148, 155–56 (2019).

“Given the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Parratt and Hudson, however, we believe that in cases where the

plaintiff complains that he has been unreasonably deprived of a

state-created property interest, without alleging a violation of

some other substantive constitutional right or that the available

11

-11The Seventh Circuit extended Kauth in Lee v. City

of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2003), a case that involved the seizure of an automobile for investigation after the driver was struck by stray gunfire. Id. at 458.

The City of Chicago conditioned return of the vehicle on

payment of towing and storage fees, threatening to destroy it if payment was not made. The motorist paid the

fees, retrieved the car, and then brought suit under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City’s policy deprived

him of property without due process of law. Id. at 459.

In affirming the denial of relief, the Seventh Circuit expanded Kauth beyond state-created interests to any

property deprivation, holding that a plaintiff must show

“either the inadequacy of state law remedies or an independent constitutional violation.” Id. at 467. This is the

rule the Seventh Circuit applied in this case. (App. 7a.)

The Seventh Circuit rejected a request to revisit its

rule in Kelley-Lomax v. City of Chicago, 49 F.4th 1124

(7th Cir. 2024). There, while the court of appeals agreed

“that property is a fundamental right,” id. at 1125, the

court characterized the plaintiff’s claim as an unwarranted demand “that the City must serve as unpaid custodian of his goods for as long as it takes for him (or his

designee) to retrieve the items.” 12 Id. Treating that

characterization as dispositive, the court again required

state remedies are inadequate, the plaintiff has not stated a substantive due process claim.” Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Illinois,

852 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 1988).

Kelley-Lomax arose from a decision of the Sheriff of Cook

County to refuse to accept all arrestee property, requiring the arresting authority (there, the City of Chicago) to store and retain it.

Chicago claimed that limitations on storage space required it to

adopt the “sell or destroy” policy unsuccessfully challenged in that

case. 49 F.4th at 1126.

12

-12proof either of an independent constitutional violation

or of the inadequacy of state remedies.

By reaffirming Lee in Kelley–Lomax, the Seventh

Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to a restrictive view

of due process. The decision below simply applies that

same rule, holding that the Sheriff’s destruction of government-issued identification is immune from federal

review so long as a theoretical state remedy exists.

C. The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on Parratt and

Hudson is misplaced.

The Seventh Circuit’s rule rests on a fundamental

misreading of Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), and

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). Those cases concern random and unauthorized deprivations of property—instances in which the State cannot practicably

provide a pre-deprivation hearing because the challenged conduct is unpredictable or contrary to established policy. Extending Parratt and Hudson to cover

an official policy of destruction, as the Seventh Circuit

has done, transforms a narrow procedural exception

into a blanket immunity from constitutional scrutiny.

This Court made plain in Zinermon v. Burch, 494

U.S. 113 (1994) that Parratt has no application when the

plaintiff complains of “arbitrary, wrongful government

actions,” i.e., raises a substantive due process claim. Id.

at 125. Eights circuit hold that that Parratt and Hudson

apply only to random and unauthorized acts of government employees, rather than to deprivations required

by an established governmental policies or practices. 13

13

The circuits that have squarely considered this issue recognize

that Parratt and Hudson apply only to random and unauthorized

acts of government employees, rather than to deprivations carried

out pursuant to established governmental policies or practices. As

the Second Circuit noted in McClary v. O’Hare, 786 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.

1986), application of Parratt “where the deprivation would be

-13Those courts correctly understand that when the government itself creates the procedure that causes the

deprivation, the State cannot invoke the Parratt-Hudson rule to avoid providing pre-deprivation process.

The Seventh Circuit’s contrary approach extends Parratt and Hudson beyond their rationale and leaves no

federal forum for deliberate, officially authorized violations of property rights.

This case presents that issue in its clearest form. The

Sheriff’s “designate-or-destroy” policy is formal, deliberate, and uniformly applied; it does not involve the unpredictable misconduct of a rogue employee. By

extending Parratt and Hudson to such a policy, the Seventh Circuit converted an exception meant for random

errors into a rule insulating official decisions from constitutional review. The Court’s intervention is warranted to restore the uniform understanding that the

Due Process Clause requires a pre-deprivation

unjustified regardless of what procedures preceded it, seems hard

to fathom.” Id. at 86 n.3. See, e.g., Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 695–

96 (3d Cir. 1992) (Parratt “is limited to the procedural due process

context); Dean ex rel. Harkness v. McKinney, 976 F.3d 407, 420–21

(4th Cir. 2020) (“the Parratt-Hudson doctrine does not bar the

plaintiff’s substantive due process claim”); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa

Parish Council—President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 290 (5th Cir.

2002) (“violations of substantive due process rights do not fall

within the doctrine’s limitations”); Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578,

580 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Parratt applies “where the claimed

deprivation is one of procedural due process’); Mann v. City of Tucson, Dep’t of Police, 782 F.2d 790, 792–93 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Parratt

rationale does not apply to a denial of substantive due process”);

Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th 589, 603 (10th Cir. 2022). Contra Ali

v. Ramsdell, 423 F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2005) (Parratt applies to

substantive and procedural due process claims).

-14opportunity to be heard when the State itself adopts

and enforces the procedure that causes the loss.

D. The Court should reaffirm that established

governmental policies are not shielded from § 1983

review by the Parratt-Hudson doctrine.

If the Court rejects petitioner’s argument that the

Sheriff’s policy deprived petitioner of personal property

without due process, the Court should resolve the conflict between the circuits and adopt the majority rule

that the Due Process Clause safeguards state-created

property interests against arbitrary and purposeless

government action.

The state-created property interest in this case is the

duty of the Illinois Department of Corrections to store

prisoner property “until the committed person … has

been separated from the Department by death, discharge, or unauthorized absence.” 20 ILL. ADMIN CODE

§ 535.140 (App. 39a.) The deprivation of property resulting from violating this rule would be actionable in

eight circuits, which hold that the Due Process Clause

safeguards state-created property interests against arbitrary and purposeless government action.14 Assuming

14

See, e.g., Winston v. City of Syracuse, 887 F.3d 553, 566-67 (2d

Cir. 2018) (continued water service); United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir.

2003) (land use dispute); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409,

1418 (4th Cir. 1983) (“cognizable property interest, rooted in state

law”); Wigginton v. Jones, 964 F.3d 329, 336 n.6 (5th Cir. 2020) (substantive due process rights can be derived from state law, rejecting

Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Ewing); Cooperrider v.

Woods, 127 F.4th 1019, 1040–41 (6th Cir. 2025) (deprivation of alcohol license); Minnesota Deer Farmers Assoc. v. Strommen, 146

F.4th 664, 670-71 (8th Cir. 2025) (regulation prohibiting whitetailed deer farming); North Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526

F.3d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 2008) (delay in processing land use permit

request); Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir.

-15arguendo that the right to possess personal property is

not itself secured by the Constitution, that right nonetheless qualifies for substantive protection under the

prevailing view of the courts of appeals.

The First and Seventh circuits would reach a different result because these circuits hold that substantive

due process protects only those rights arising directly

from the Federal Constitution.15

This Court has repeatedly assumed that state-created property interests receive substantive protection

when government action is arbitrary or wholly without

justification. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998); Collins v. City of Harker

Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992). Cf. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (“a person’s liberty is

equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of the State”). The circuits following this

approach correctly recognize that the text of the Due

Process Clause and its history protect individuals from

2008) (governmental action that does not abridge a “fundamental

right or liberty interest” is actionable under Due Process class if it

”shocks the judicial conscience”); DiMassimo v. City of Clearwater,

805 F.2d 1536, 1541 (11th Cir. 1986) (municipal water service).

The First Circuit adopted the contrary rule in Gonzalez-Fuentes

v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 880 n. 13 (1st Cir. 2010) on a misreading of

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1977). There, the Court

stated that the Due Process clause “specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in

this Nation’s history and tradition.” Id. at 703. The First Circuit

cites Glucksberg for the incorrect tule that “substantive due process protects only those interests that implicate one of ‘those fundamental rights and liberties …’”–Neither in Glucksberg nor any

other case has this Court held that substantive due process “protects only … fundamental rights and liberties.”

15

-16the irrational destruction of legally recognized property

interests, whatever their source.

The Seventh Circuit’s rule is irreconcilable with that

understanding. By categorically excluding state-created property interests from substantive due-process

protection, the court below permits government officials to destroy lawfully possessed property for no reason at all, so long as notice of destruction is provided.

That approach strips the Due Process Clause of its core

function—to prevent arbitrary exercises of governmental power—and creates a right without a remedy for

those whose property is deliberately destroyed by application of an official policy. The Court should make

clear that the Fourteenth Amendment protects property from arbitrary deprivation, whether the property

right originates in the Constitution or in state law.

E. The destruction of government-issued

identification cards is irrational.

Petitioners argued in the district court (App. 20a21a) and in the court of appeals (App. 13a-15a) that the

Sheriff’s policy of destroying government-issued identification cards was arbitrary and unreasonable. The

court of appeals found that “if the Sheriff were to send

government-issued identification cards to IDOC along

with their owners, IDOC would accept them.” (App. 2a.)

Despite this undisputed finding, the Sheriff has

never sought to justify its policy. That is, the Sheriff has

never offered any “legitimate government objective,”

Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005),

for its policy of refusing to send government-issued

identification cards to the penitentiary. The Sheriff’s

policy is the paradigmatic example of an “exercise of

power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective” condemned

by the Due Process clause. County of Sacramento v.

-17Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). The Court should protect “the individual against arbitrary action of government,” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), and

reverse the judgment below.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

KENNETH N. FLAXMAN

Counsel of Record

JOEL A. FLAXMAN

200 S Michigan Avenue

Chicago, IL 60604

knf@kenlaw.com

(312) 427-3200

OCTOBER 2025

Attorneys for Petitioner