Amicus Curiae Brief — Cangrejeros de Santurce Baseball Club, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Liga de Béisbol Professional de Puerto Rico, Inc., et al.

No. 25-416

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

CANGREJEROS DE SANTURCE CLUB, LLC, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

LIGA DE BEISBOL PROFESSIONAL

DE PUERTO RICO, INC., et al.,

Respondents.

————

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

————

BRIEF OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL

PLAYERS ASSOCIATION AS AMICUS CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

————

BRUCE S. MEYER

MATTHEW R. NUSSBAUM

MAJOR LEAGE BASEBALL

PLAYERS ASSOCIATION

1325 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

(212) 826-0808

GREGORY SILBERT

Counsel of Record

YEHUDAH L. BUCHWEITZ

WEIL, GOTSHAL &

MANGES LLP

767 Fifth Avenue

New York, NY 10153

(212) 310-8000

gregory.silbert@weil.com

ANDREW H. GREINETZ

WEIL, GOTSHAL &

MANGES LLP

1395 Brickell Ave.

Miami, FL 33131

(305) 577-3118l

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

November 6, 2025

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE MAJOR LEAGUE

BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION .........

1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................

3

ARGUMENT ........................................................

4

I.

THE BASEBALL EXEMPTION SHOULD

BE ELIMINATED BECAUSE IT IS

WRONG AND HAS SIGNIFICANT ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES ........

4

A. The Genesis of the Curt Flood Act and

Its Significance In this Case ...............

5

B. Eliminating the Baseball Exemption

Would have Pro-Competitive Benefits

in the Baseball Industry .....................

12

CONCLUSION ....................................................

16

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,

50 F.3d. 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ..................

15

Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,

518 U.S. 231 (1996) ................................... 4, 14

Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball

Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994) ...........

7

Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,

433 U.S. 36 (1977) .....................................

5

Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp.,

467 U.S. 752 (1984) ...................................

5

Egbert v. Boule,

596 U.S. 482 (2022) .....................................

12

Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League

of Prof. Baseball Clubs,

259 U.S. 200 (1922) ...................................

1, 6

Flood v. Kuhn,

407 U.S. 258 (1972) ........................ 1, 4-6, 10, 15

Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n,

401 U.S. 1204 (1971) ....................................

4

In re Nat’l League & Am. League Clubs

& MLBPA,

66 Lab. Arb. 101 (1975), aff’d

Kan. City Royals v. MLBPA,

532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) .....................

6

Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC,

576 U.S. 446 (2015) ................................... 5, 11

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.

PSKS, Inc.,

551 U.S. 877 (2007) ...................................

5

Major League Baseball v. Crist,

331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003) .................

11

Minn. Twins P’ship v. State ex rel. Hatch,

592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999)...................

7

NCAA v. Alston,

594 U.S. 69 (2021) ................................. 4, 12, 13

NLRB v. Katz,

369 U.S. 736 (1962) ...................................

14

Piazza v. Major League Baseball,

831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993) .............. 6-7, 11

Radovich v. Nat’l Football League,

352 U.S. 445 (1957) ...................................

5

State Oil Co. v. Kahn,

522 U.S. 3 (1997) .......................................

5

Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc.,

346 U.S. 356 (1953) ...................................

1, 6

United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y.,

348 U.S. 236 (1955) ...................................

4

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

El Cerrito Mill & Lumber Co.,

316 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1995) .........................

15

In Matter of Arbitration Between the

MLBPA and the 26 Major League

Baseball Clubs, Grievance No. 86-2

(1986) .........................................................

6

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

In Matter of Arbitration Between the

MLBPA and the 26 Major League

Baseball Clubs, Grievance No. 87-3

(1987) .........................................................

6

In Matter of Arbitration Between the

MLBPA and the 26 Major League

Baseball Clubs, Grievance No. 88-1

(1988) .........................................................

6

STATUTES

15 U.S.C. § 26b(a) .........................................

2, 8

15 U.S.C. § 26b(b) .........................................

8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

34 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Docs. 2150 (Oct.

27, 1998) ....................................................

10

144 Cong. Rec. S9496 (July 30, 1998) ..........

9

144 Cong. Rec. S9621 (July 31, 1998) ..........

10

Ed Edmunds, Over Forty Years in the OnDeck Circle: Congress and the Baseball

Antitrust Exemption, 19 T. Marshall L.

Rev. 627 (1994)..........................................

4

M.R. McCarthy, Revenue Sharing in Major

League Baseball: Are Cuba’s Political

Managers on Their Way Over Too? 7

Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 555 (2020) .........

7

N. Grow, Reevaluating the Curt Flood Act

of 1998, 87 Neb. L. Rev. 747 (2008) ..........

7

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 1997

Basic Agreement (Mar. 1997) ...................

7, 8

Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 20222026 Basic Agreement, Attachment, https://

bit.ly/3LpoUqs (last accessed Nov. 3,

2025) ..........................................................

14

S. Fehr, The Curt Flood Act and Its Effect

on the Future of the Baseball Antitrust

Exemption, 14 Antitrust 25 (Spring

2000) ..........................................................

7

S. Rep. No. 104-231 (1996) ...........................

10

Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v.

Kuhn, 12 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev.

169 (1995) ..................................................

4

William N. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory

Precedent, 76 Geo. L. J. 1361 (1987-88) ...

5

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE MAJOR LEAGUE

BASEBALL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION1

Since 1966, the Major League Baseball Players

Association (“MLBPA”) has represented professional

baseball players who are signed to a Major League

Uniform Players’ Contract in collective bargaining with

Major League Baseball and its 30 Clubs. In September

2022, MLBPA also became the exclusive collective

bargaining representative for the approximately 5,500

Minor League players employed by the Major League

Clubs. On March 31, 2023, Minor League players

ratified an historic first collective bargaining agreement, achieving significant improvements in player

salaries and other terms and conditions of employment.

For decades, professional baseball players were subject

to Major League Baseball’s unilaterally-imposed “reserve

system” and other restrictions on their freedom of

contract. This Court protected these restrictions through

a judicially created baseball exemption from the

federal antitrust laws. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258

(1972); Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of

Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v.

N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam).

From its inception, MLBPA has worked to eliminate

or limit the scope of Major League Baseball’s antitrust

exemption and supported the efforts of others aggrieved

by the exemption. MLBPA’s consistent position has

1

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, amicus curiae states

that no counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in

part and no entity or person, aside from amicus curiae, its members,

or its counsel, made any monetary contribution intended to fund

the preparation or submission of this brief. Both parties received

notice of the filing of this brief as required in Rule 37.2.

2

been that Major League Baseball should not have an

exemption and that the exemption harms players,

fans, cities, states, and other businesses.

On October 27, 1998, MLBPA’s efforts to eliminate

the exemption as applied to Major League players

succeeded when Congress passed the Curt Flood Act

of 1998. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(a). The Act makes all

matters “directly relating to or affecting employment

of major league baseball players” subject to the federal

antitrust laws. Id.

The MLBPA offers a unique perspective to this

Court on the Curt Flood Act. That legislation resulted

from Major League Baseball and MLBPA’s agreement

to remove the exemption as it pertained to anything

affecting player employment after the season-ending

strike that cancelled the 1994 World Series. The Act is

frequently mischaracterized as proof that Congress

ratified the baseball exemption in other areas. MLBPA

will show that Congress’s intent—reflected in the Act’s

unambiguous text—was quite the opposite.

But MLBPA’s interests continue to be adversely

affected by baseball’s special exemption from the

antitrust laws. MLBPA now represents Minor League

players.2 Major League Baseball and its 30 Clubs can

continue to manage the Minor Leagues without regard

to anti-competitive intent and effect. But for the

baseball exemption, Minor League players would, like

2

Specifically, MLBPA represents all players who are employed

by one of the 30 Major League Clubs and signed to a current

Minor League Uniform Player Contract, excluding players

assigned to Minor Leagues located entirely outside the United

States and Canada.

3

other professional athletes, have antitrust recourse for

restraints in the labor market in the event they choose

at some point no longer to be represented by a union.

Brown, 518 U.S. at 235-36.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

MLBPA supports the Petition’s request that this

Court correct its mistake and overturn the baseball

exemption, or in the alternative, limit the exemption

to the precise context in which it arose. MLBPA’s brief

focuses on two points in support of review.

First, MLBPA can offer a distinctive perspective on

the origins, purposes, and implications of the Curt

Flood Act because the legislation was the result of a

collective bargaining agreement between MLBPA and

Major League Baseball. The history leading up to

Congress’s enactment of the Curt Flood Act and the

text of the Act itself eviscerate any argument that the

Act supports baseball’s antitrust exemption. The Act’s

text expressly states that it should not be interpreted

to have any implications beyond elimination of the

antitrust exemption in the market for Major League

players’ services. The Act also calls out ongoing

litigation about the scope of the exemption and makes

clear that Congress is not weighing in on the courts’

assessment of that question.

Second, eliminating the baseball exemption would

result in significant pro-competitive benefits in the

baseball industry, including in the market for player

services. This case provides a useful example. In

addition, if Minor League players were to choose in the

future to cease being represented by a union, or if

Major League Baseball were otherwise to take action

that affected players outside of the collective bargaining

process, Major League Baseball would likely lose its

4

nonstatutory labor exemption under this Court’s

decision in Brown, 518 U.S. 231. In that situation, if

the judicially-created baseball exemption were eliminated, employees would be able to avail themselves of

the same antitrust rights as employees in any other

industry. Absent that change, Major League Baseball

can engage in anticompetitive conduct in the market

for Minor League players’ services with impunity.

ARGUMENT

I. THE BASEBALL EXEMPTION SHOULD

BE ELIMINATED BECAUSE IT IS

WRONG AND HAS SIGNIFICANT ANTICOMPETITIVE CONSEQUENCES

MLBPA supports the Petition in arguing that the

baseball exemption from the federal antitrust laws is

undisputedly wrong as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is also bad for baseball, baseball fans and

affected communities, as well as for all economic

sectors professional baseball affects. It is universally

acknowledged to be error, including by this Court. See

NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 94 (2021); (“aberrational”

(cleaned up)); Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (an “anomaly”);

Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)

(basketball enjoys no antitrust exemption); Radovich

v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (refusing

to give professional football an antitrust exemption);

United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236

(1955) (applying antitrust laws to boxing); Stephen F.

Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. Miami Ent. &

Sports L. Rev. 169 (1995); Ed Edmonds, Over Forty

Years in the On-Deck Circle: Congress and the Baseball

Antitrust Exemption, 19 T. Marshall L. Rev. 627 (1994).

The statutory stare decisis rationale that has

propped up the baseball exemption for decades can no

5

longer bear its weight. This Court has increasingly

made clear that statutory stare decisis is a relatively

weak presumption especially with respect to federal

statutes that create common law frameworks for

judicial lawmaking, e.g., statutes like the Sherman

Act. The Court now “view[s] stare decisis as having

less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman

Act.” Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 461

(2015). See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.

PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (overruling Sherman

Act prece dent); State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3, 20-22

(1997) (same); Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp.,

467 U.S. 752 (1984) (same); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE

Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (same); see also

William N. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedent,

76 Geo. L. J. 1361, 1376-81 (1987-88). Baseball’s

unique status as a beneficiary of “excessively strict”

stare decisis is out step with the rest of the law.

Eskridge, 76 Geo. L. J. at 1380.

Moreover, as MLBPA details below, any argument

that the Curt Flood Act reflects acquiescence by

Congress in the continued existence of the exemption

is fatally undermined by the text, purpose and

legislative history of the Act. In light of that reality,

and the continuing anticompetitive harm that the

baseball exemption inflicts on players, fans and

communities, this Court should correct this error in its

caselaw and reverse the First Circuit’s expansion of

the baseball exemption.

A. The Genesis of the Curt Flood Act and

Its Significance In this Case

In light of the Curt Flood Act and its history

described below, this Court should reverse its

decision in Flood v. Kuhn to hold its nose and allow the

baseball exemption to survive based on Congressional

6

acquiescence. In fact, Congress has made clear that

courts are free to determine the scope, if any, of

baseball’s exemption.

From 1966 until the Curt Flood Act took effect in

1998, MLBPA represented private-sector employees

who did not have the protection of federal or state

antitrust laws under Federal Baseball Club and

Toolson. As a result, going back to 1879, players were

subject to professional baseball’s reserve clause. The

reserve clause “centers in . . . the confinement of the

player to the club that has him under the contract; the

assignability of the player’s contract; and the ability of

the club annually to renew the contract unilaterally,

subject to a stated salary minimum.” Flood, 407 U.S.

at 259 n.1.

For decades, in the absence of antitrust protection,

MLBPA fought for players’ basic freedom to contract

through collective bargaining and the grievance arbitration process. In 1975, through grievance arbitration,

MLBPA won a limited right of “free agency” for

players. See In re Nat’l League & Am. League Clubs &

MLBPA, 66 Lab. Arb. 101 (1975), aff’d Kan. City Royals

v. MLBPA, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). MLBPA has

vigorously protected this right in every ensuing

collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., In Matter of

Arbitration Between the MLBPA and the 26 Major

League Baseball Clubs, 86-2, 87-3, and 88-1 (challenging Major League Baseball owners’ colluding to suppress

player salaries by eliminating bidding on free agents).

MLBPA maintained its opposition to the baseball

exemption throughout this period. It supported the

lawsuit that led to this Court’s decision in Flood v.

Kuhn. After Flood, it supported parties seeking to limit

the scope of the baseball exemption to the reserve

clause, with multiple courts agreeing. See Piazza v.

7

Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa.

1993); Butterworth v. Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs,

644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994); but see Minn. Twins P’ship

v. State ex rel. Hatch, 592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999).

There can be no argument that the applicability of

the baseball exemption somehow promotes labor peace.

Eight times between 1972 and 1995, the collective

bargaining agreement—known as the Basic Agreement—

expired, and eight times, Major League Baseball

experienced either a strike or a lockout. See M.R.

McCarthy, Revenue Sharing in Major League Baseball:

Are Cuba’s Political Managers on Their Way Over Too?

7 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 555, 558-60 (2020).

The August 1994 strike, which cancelled the rest of

the 1994 season and its World Series, proved a turning

point for baseball. In the aftermath of that strike

Major League Baseball and MLBPA agreed jointly to

eliminate baseball’s antitrust exemption in the market

for Major League players’ services. MLBPA, however,

wanted Congress to eliminate the baseball exemption

in that labor market without endorsing the continued

application of the baseball exemption to other baseballrelated markets. See, e.g., S. Fehr, The Curt Flood Act

and Its Effect on the Future of the Baseball Antitrust

Exemption, 14 Antitrust 25, 27-28 (Spring 2000).

The result of this effort was a provision in the

parties’ 1997 Basic Agreement. That provision

required the league and union to work together “to

pass a law that will clarify that Major League Baseball

Players . . . have the same rights under the antitrust

laws as do other professional athletes.” Nat’l League of

Pro. Baseball Clubs, 1997 Basic Agreement, Article

XXVIII (Mar. 1997).

8

This agreement came to fruition in the Curt Flood

Act, where the language of the Basic Agreement is

repeated almost verbatim in the Act’s purpose section:

Major league baseball subject to antitrust laws.

Subject to subsections (b) through (d) [of this

section], the conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized

professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major league

baseball players to play baseball at the major

league level are subject to the antitrust laws to the

same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or

agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws

if engaged in by persons in any other professional

sports business affecting interstate commerce.

15 U.S.C. § 26b(a).

In addition, the Act states:

No court shall rely on the enactment of this section

as a basis for changing the application of the

antitrust laws to any conduct, acts, practices or

agreements other than those set forth in

subsection (a).

Id. § 26b(b) (emphasis added). Put differently, the Curt

Flood Act—the culmination of a process agreed to in

bargaining between the League and MLBPA—was

intended to have no effect one way or the other on the

question whether and to what extent professional

baseball’s antitrust exemption exists in areas not

“directly relate[d] to or affect[ing]” the employment of

Major League players.

Senator Hatch made this clear on the Senate floor:

This amendment, while providing major league

players with the antitrust protections of their

9

colleagues in the other professional sports, such as

basketball and football, is absolutely neutral with

respect to the state of the antitrust laws between

all entities and in all circumstances other than in

the area of employment as between major league

owners and players. Whatever the law was the day

before this bill passes in those other areas it will

continue to be after the bill passes. Let me emphasize that the bill affects no pending or decided

cases except to the extent a court would consider

exempting major league clubs from the antitrust

laws in their dealings with major league players.

144 Cong. Rec. S9496, S9496 (July 30, 1998) (emphasis

added). At the time of Senator Hatch’s floor statement,

multiple cases regarding the scope of the baseball

exemption were pending. Senator Hatch thus explained

why a “bill that ought to be rather simple to write

goes to such lengths to emphasize its neutrality” on

that question. Id.; see also id. (“the parties and the

Committee agree that Congress is taking no position

on the current state of the law one way or the other”)

(emphasis added); id. at S9497 (“Nor can the courts

use the enactment of this Act to glean congressional

intent as to the validity or lack thereof of [actions

described in subsection (b) of the Act]”).

Senator Wellstone was equally clear in a colloquy

with the Act’s co-sponsors Senators Hatch and Leahy:

Several lower courts have recently found that

baseball currently enjoys only a narrow exemption

from antitrust laws and that this exemption

applies only to the reserve system. It is my

understanding that [the Curt Flood Act] will have

no effect on the courts’ ultimate resolution of the

scope of the antitrust exemption on matters beyond

10

those related to owner-player relations at the

major league level.

144 Cong. Rec. S9621, S9621 (July 31, 1998) (emphasis

added). Senator Leahy responded that “the bill has no

impact on the recent decisions in federal and state

courts . . . concerning baseball’s status under the

antitrust laws.” Id.3

Finally, in his presidential signing statement,

President Clinton confirmed that the Act “in no way

codifies or extends the baseball exemption.” 34 Weekly

Comp. of Pres. Docs. 2150 (Oct. 27, 1998).

The Curt Flood Act vitiates the supposed Congressional

inaction on which this Court’s decision in Flood rested.

407 U.S. at 268. That decision opens with Justice

Blackmun’s (in)famous tribute to “The Game,” which

focuses the stability of rosters and traditions resulting

from the unfair reserve system that held players

captive to specific teams. If that wholly unfair labor

arrangement was, indeed, part of a tradition Congress

wished to preserve, surely the Curt Flood Act banished

that rationale for good. The act terminates the baseball

exemption in the market for Major League players’

services, going even further than the reserve system alone.

Further, Congress went out of its way to make clear

that it did not want the Curt Flood Act to have any

effect at all on pending litigation regarding the scope

3

See also S. Rep. No. 104-231, at 15 (1996) (“The Committee

wishes to make clear that by supporting these particular modifications of baseball’s judicially created antitrust exemption in S.

627, it does not intend to imply that more comprehensive change

is not also justified – or to imply that the courts should not act

decisively themselves to limit further baseball’s exemption in appropriate cases. Indeed, a Federal court and the highest court of

a State have already taken such action.”)

11

of the baseball exemption.4 Instead, Congress left to

the courts the question of the scope of the baseball

exemption and whether enactment of the Curt Flood

Act effectively eliminated it. Far from ratifying the

baseball exemption, the history of Congress’s enactment

of the Curt Flood Act frees this Court from concerns

about Congressional acquiescence and allows it to

consider the issue on its merits.

The continued existence of the baseball exemption

does not serve the goals of statutory stare decisis. It

does not “promote[] the evenhanded, predictable, and

consistent development of legal principles . . . .”

Kimble, 576 U.S. at 455. This Court’s trilogy of baseball

exemption cases is so widely disparaged as inconsistent with antitrust law that no reasonable litigant

would rely on their legal principles (or lack thereof) in

other cases. For similar reasons, the baseball exemption cannot “foster[] reliance on judicial decisions.” Id.

Instead, practitioners, academics, those adversely

affected by the exemption, and this Court itself,

wonder why baseball alone remains above the law. And

it does not “contribute[] to the actual and perceived

integrity of the judicial process,” id., when the Court

openly allows one highly visible entity to get away

with unlawful conduct.

Even if stare decisis could have saved a narrow

version of the baseball exemption in the past, the

First Circuit’s expansion of the exemption warrants

4

MLBPA acknowledges that courts have since disagreed with

Piazza, see, e.g., Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177

(11th Cir. 2003). But what is critical is that at the time the Curt

Flood Act passed, Congress was aware of the cases holding that

the baseball exemption was confined to the reserve system and

explicitly instructed that its enactment of the Curt Flood Act

should not be used to affect that judicial decision making.

12

reversal. This Court has hesitated before expanding

judicially created doctrines to “new context[s]” when

Congress is better positioned to weigh the relevant

tradeoffs. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498

(2022). That’s exactly what happened here. The decision

below grants the exemption to a new league in a new

context, decades after Congress showed its capacity to

legislate on the issue and refused to bless baseball

with any kind of antitrust immunity. This Court has

unanimously recognized that the baseball exemption

is “aberrational.” Alston 594 U.S. at 95 (cleaned up).

Instead of merely disparaging the exemption, this

Court should “exercise the truer modesty of ceding an

ill-gotten gain, and forthrightly return the power to”

create antitrust exemptions to Congress. Egbert,

596 U.S. at 504 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

B. Eliminating the Baseball Exemption

Would have Pro-Competitive Benefits

in the Baseball Industry

Although the Curt Flood Act eliminated the baseball

exemption in the market for the services of Major

League players, the exemption, as long as it survives,

will continue to have a pernicious effect on Major and

Minor League baseball players, fans, and communities.

First, this case illustrates the kinds of anticompetitive abuses blessed by baseball’s antitrust exemption.

Petitioner Thomas Axon allegedly took over the

Cangrejeros de Santurce baseball club, intending to

transform the club from a struggling historical relic

into a competitive entity. Pet. at 8–9. This effort

supposedly included millions of dollars in investments,

increased player quality, and improved fan experience.

Id. The rest of the league was unhappy about this

additional competition, and so allegedly shut down

13

the effort by suspending Axon and preventing his

improvements. Id. at 9. This is the kind of nakedly

anticompetitive conduct which would “be flatly illegal

in almost any other industry in America.” Alston, 594

U.S. at 109 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Despite this,

the First Circuit saw these allegations as just part of

the “business of baseball.” But the business of baseball,

now a multi-billion-dollar, international enterprise, is

“not above the law.” Id. at 112. And the law, duly

enacted by Congress, requires baseball to play by the

same rules as every other industry and refrain from

anticompetitive conduct. Contrary to Major League

Baseball’s assertions, these rules do not strangle or

ruin sports. Football and basketball fared just fine

after this Court refused to grant them their own

version of the baseball exemption, with Professional

football even surpassing baseball to become the

nation’s most popular sport.

Second, Major League Baseball has abused its

antitrust exemption in recent history to wreak havoc

on the lives and livelihoods of Minor League players,

teams, and the communities that support them. In

2020, Major League Baseball took control over previously

independent Minor Leagues. The 30 Clubs agreed that

each Club would have exactly four Minor League

affiliates, handpicked by Major League Baseball.

Roughly 40 Minor League clubs lost their affiliation.

They and the communities supporting them suffered

significant harm. Id. There are also significantly fewer

jobs for Minor League players than existed before

Major League Baseball unilaterally contracted 40 clubs.

Major League Baseball and its Clubs will undoubtedly

seek to rely on the baseball exemption for any similar

14

efforts in the future, with corresponding negative

effects on players, communities and baseball itself.5

Third, the baseball exemption unfairly conditions

protection for players on the collective bargaining

process. This Court has found a “nonstatutory” antitrust exemption for labor market restraints imposed

by employers under a collective bargaining agreement.

See Brown, 518 U.S. at 235-36.

This Court, however, has not defined the “outer

boundaries” of the nonstatutory labor exemption. Id.

at 250. And it cautioned that it does not insulate from

antitrust review every joint imposition of terms by

employers, for an agreement among employers could

be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances

from the collective-bargaining process that a rule

permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly interfere with that process. See Brown v.

Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d. 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

5

In this regard, while the parties’ Minor League collective

bargaining agreement contains an agreement by Major League

Baseball not to further contract minor league teams until

December 2027, Major League Baseball refused to extend its

commitment not to contract affiliates beyond that point. In

addition, Major League Baseball and MLBPA disagree about

whether Major League Baseball would be required to bargain

with MLBPA about a decision to eliminate Clubs. In labor law

parlance, the issue is whether contraction is a mandatory subject

of bargaining. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) (identifying

certain issues as mandatory subjects of bargaining). MLBPA

asserts that bargaining about contraction is mandatory, but

Major League Baseball says it is not. See Nat’l League of Pro.

Baseball Clubs, 2022-2026 Basic Agreement, Attachment 8,

https://bit.ly/3LpoUqs (last accessed Nov. 3, 2025). Major League

Baseball agreed not to contract for the duration of its Minor

League collective bargaining agreement, but the agreement

states that neither party waives its rights as to this issue.

15

(suggesting that exemption lasts until collapse of the

collective-bargaining relationship, as evidenced by the

decertification of the union); El Cerrito Mill & Lumber

Co., 316 N.L.R.B. at 1006-1007 (1995) (suggesting that

‘extremely long’ impasse, accompanied by ‘instability’ or

‘defunctness’ of multiemployer unit, might justify

union withdrawal from group bargaining). Id.

As a result, if Minor League players were to choose

for whatever reason in the future to cease being

represented by a union, or if Major League Baseball

were to otherwise take action that affected players

outside of the collective bargaining process, Major League

Baseball would lose its nonstatutory labor exemption.

In that situation, players would be able to avail

themselves of the same antitrust rights as employees

in any other industry if and only if Flood is overturned.

16

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant the petition, overrule its

prior decisions, and eliminate the baseball exemption.

The decision of the Second Circuit should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE S. MEYER

MATTHEW R. NUSSBAUM

MAJOR LEAGE BASEBALL

PLAYERS ASSOCIATION

1325 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

(212) 826-0808

GREGORY SILBERT

Counsel of Record

YEHUDAH L. BUCHWEITZ

WEIL, GOTSHAL &

MANGES LLP

767 Fifth Avenue

New York, NY 10153

(212) 310-8000

gregory.silbert@weil.com

ANDREW H. GREINETZ

WEIL, GOTSHAL &

MANGES LLP

1395 Brickell Ave.

Miami, FL 33131

(305) 577-3118l

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

November 6, 2025