Amicus Curiae Brief — Cangrejeros de Santurce Baseball Club, LLC, et al., Petitioners v. Liga de Béisbol Professional de Puerto Rico, Inc., et al.

No. 25-416

In the Supreme Court of the United States

CANGREJEROS DE SANTURCE BASEBALL CLUB, LLC,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

LIGA DE BÉISBOL PROFESIONAL DE PUERTO RICO,

INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

SENATORS MIKE LEE AND CORY BOOKER

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

JOEL F. WACKS

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

425 Market Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

DEANNE E. MAYNARD

Counsel of Record

ALEXANDER OKULIAR

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

2100 L Street NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 887-8740

DMaynard@mofo.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

NOVEMBER 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................... ii

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI

CURIAE ........................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT .................................................... 3

ARGUMENT ............................................................ 5

I.

II.

THIS COURT SHOULD OVERRULE

FEDERAL BASEBALL RATHER THAN

REQUIRING CONGRESS TO CORRECT

THE COURT’S MISTAKE ............................... 5

A.

Continued Adherence To Admittedly

Wrong Precedent Usurps

Congressional Authority .......................... 5

B.

Congress’s Silence Is Not Approval Of

A Baseball Antitrust Exemption ............. 7

C.

A Judicially Criticized, Atextual

Antitrust Exemption Benefiting A

Single Industry Undermines Rule-OfLaw Values Stare Decisis Is Meant To

Support ................................................... 10

PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL’S

ANTITRUST EXEMPTION IS

INCONSISTENT WITH SOUND

COMPETITION POLICY ............................... 17

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 20

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL,

560 U.S. 183 (2010)........................................... 18

Citizens United v. FEC,

558 U.S. 310 (2010)........................................... 15

Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l

League of Pro. Baseball Clubs,

259 U.S. 200 (1922)......... 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

........................................ 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20

Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,

411 U.S. 726 (1973)........................................... 18

Flood v. Kuhn,

407 U.S. 258 (1972)................... 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12,

.............................................. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20

Gamble v. United States,

587 U.S. 678 (2019)......................................... 6, 7

Haywood v. NBA,

401 U.S. 1204 (1971)....................................12, 18

Helvering v. Hallock,

309 U.S. 106 (1940)......................................... 7, 8

Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston

Sports Ass’n, Inc.,

541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Tex. 1982) .................... 11

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31,

585 U.S. 878 (2018)..........................10, 11, 12, 13

Laumann v. NHL,

56 F. Supp. 3d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ................. 18

iii

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024).............. 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) .............................. 6

NCAA v. Alston,

594 U.S. 69 (2021)............................................. 18

Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808 (1991)........................................... 16

Radovich v. NFL,

352 U.S. 445 (1957).................... 11, 12, 15, 16, 18

Ramos v. Louisiana,

590 U.S. 83 (2020)..........................................7, 10

Toolson v. New York Yankees,

346 U.S. 356 (1953).......................5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,

.................................................... 14, 15, 16, 18, 20

Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles

O. Finley & Co.,

512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975) .......................... 11

United States v. Int’l Boxing Club,

348 U.S. 236 (1955)..............................6, 9, 18, 19

United States v. Lopez,

514 U.S. 549 (1995)........................................... 11

United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank,

374 U.S. 321 (1963)........................................... 18

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,

405 U.S. 596 (1972)........................................... 17

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 ...................................... 8

iv

Legislative Materials

H.R. Rep. No. 82-2002 (1952) ................................ 19

Other Authorities

2025 MLB Travel Schedule, MLB

Savant (last visited Nov. 6, 2025),

https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/vis

uals/map?team=&year=2025 ........................... 13

Maury Brown, MLB Revenues Hit

Record $12.1 Billion in 2024,

Forbes (Jan. 27, 2025),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/maur

ybrown/2025/01/27/mlb-revenueshit-record-121-billion-in-2024 .......................... 13

Benjamin Hill, With Tarpons, Tampa

throws back to the future, Minor

League Baseball (Dec. 11, 2017),

https://www.milb.com/news/gcs263154244 ......................................................... 14

Justin Teitelbaum, The NFL’s Most

Valuable Teams 2025, Forbes

(Aug. 28, 2025),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/justin

teitelbaum/2025/08/28/the-nflsmost-valuable-teams-2025 ............................... 15

IDENTITY AND INTEREST

OF AMICI CURIAE1

Amici curiae are United States senators with

varying committee assignments and political perspectives regarding antitrust policy. Amici took an oath

to defend the Constitution and are committed to the

separation of powers it guarantees. Amici, collectively and with their colleagues in Congress, are

responsible for writing, repealing, and amending federal legislation setting antitrust policy for the United

States. They hold unique perspectives on both the direct subject matter of this litigation—professional

baseball’s exemption from the antitrust laws—and

the assumptions about the meaning of Congressional

inaction that have been used to justify the exemption’s continued vitality. Amici have an interest in

restoring the antitrust laws to their full force as applied to the business of baseball, and in ensuring that

the judicial branch does not encroach upon Congress’s

exclusive exercise of the legislative function. Amici

maintain that a sound antitrust policy unencumbered

by judicial overreach is essential to a free market and

healthy economy.

Senator Mike Lee is the senior United States

Senator from Utah, who has served since 2011. Senator Lee is the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary

Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and

Consumer Rights.

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6,

amici state that no counsel or

party authored this brief in whole or in part and that no person

other than amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution

to its preparation or submission. Counsel of record for all parties

received notice of this brief at least 10 days before its due date.

2

Senator Cory Booker is the senior United States

Senator from New Jersey, who has served since 2013.

Senator Booker is the Ranking Member of the U.S.

Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights.

3

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In 1922, this Court created an exemption to the

antitrust laws for professional baseball, holding that

professional baseball is not interstate commerce. See

Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of

Pro. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). This Court

subsequently concluded that Federal Baseball’s rationale is fundamentally flawed. Despite reaching

that conclusion decades ago, the Court has continued

to exempt professional baseball from the antitrust

laws based on stare decisis, insisting that Congress

must correct the Court’s error by amending the antitrust laws to remove a supposed constitutionally

mandated exemption that never existed.

Such rigid application of stare decisis to preserve

an admittedly incorrect decision should not stand.

The Court’s continued adherence to Federal Baseball

is inconsistent with its judicial power under the Constitution to interpret the law, not make it. Stare

decisis cannot change this basic precept of our constitutional order. Age does not transform this Court’s

precedent from an interpretation of the law into the

law itself. When that interpretation is wrong—as this

Court has already acknowledged about Federal Baseball—the law must govern, not the erroneous

interpretation. The decisions that elevate Federal

Baseball’s mistaken understanding above the statutory text cannot be reconciled with this foundational

constitutional principle.

Moreover, Congress should not be required to act

to fix a mistaken interpretation—this Court can and

should overrule Federal Baseball now. This Court

4

routinely corrects its own mistakes, especially in

cases turning on questions of constitutional interpretation, and even when Congress possesses the power

to overrule an erroneous opinion. Doing so is particularly appropriate here because the error is

universally acknowledged and produces inconsistent

application of the antitrust laws. In these circumstances, the factors this Court considers when

deciding whether to overrule incorrect precedent—

the quality of Federal Baseball’s reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with

other decisions, subsequent developments, and reliance interests—favor abandoning Federal Baseball’s

incorrect rule.

The ultimate purpose of stare decisis does too.

Stare decisis is not an end in itself and should be followed only when doing so furthers the fundamental

values safeguarded by deciding like cases alike: consistency, fairness, and the rule of law. The Court’s

treatment of Federal Baseball and its progeny has resulted in the opposite. Rather than applying uniform

principles to identically situated parties, the Court

has applied contradictory standards: total exemption

for baseball, none at all for every other sport. With no

basis in the text of the laws enacted by Congress, that

approach undermines rather than strengthens the

rule of law.

The Court should grant the petition and overrule

Federal Baseball and its progeny.

5

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS

COURT

SHOULD

OVERRULE

FEDERAL BASEBALL RATHER THAN

REQUIRING CONGRESS TO CORRECT

THE COURT’S MISTAKE

A.

Continued Adherence To Admittedly

Wrong Precedent Usurps Congressional Authority

This Court recognized decades ago that professional baseball’s antitrust exemption derived from a

demonstrably incorrect understanding of interstate

commerce and the business of baseball. Pet. 3-6. It

has been clear for over half a century not only that

“[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is engaged

in interstate commerce” but also that professional

baseball’s judge-made exemption from the antitrust

laws is “an aberration,” “an anomaly,” “unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical.” Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,

282 (1972).

Although professional baseball’s antitrust exemption was created entirely by this Court, with no

statutory basis, it has persisted because this Court

has insisted that Congress must fix the Court’s mistake, and that Congress’s decision not to do so

requires leaving the error intact. Toolson v. New York

Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (per curiam); Flood,

407 U.S. at 283-284. First, in Toolson, the Court reaffirmed Federal Baseball’s holding “[w]ithout reexamination of the underlying issues.” 346 U.S. at

357. Instead, the Court reasoned that “Congress has

had the ruling under consideration but has not seen

fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation.” Ibid. Then, in Flood, the Court acknowledged

6

that Federal Baseball was wrongly decided but again

declined to correct its mistake, reasoning that the “aberration” was “to be remedied by the Congress and not

by this Court.” Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-284.

That logic undermines the Constitution’s separation of powers. Although Flood made clear that

Congress has the authority to overrule Federal Baseball, this Court can and should fix its own mistake.

The Court’s insistence on following its own incorrect

precedent instead of the laws passed by Congress

usurps the legislative power that the Constitution reserves to the political branches. The Constitution

vests federal courts only with “the power ‘to say what

the law is.’ ” Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678,

713 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury

v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). “Unelected judges” have no power to make law—that is

reserved to “the American people * * * through democratically responsive processes.” Loper Bright Enters.

v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 423 (2024) (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring). Stare decisis therefore cannot “elevate[]

demonstrably erroneous decisions * * * over the text

of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal

law.” Gamble, 587 U.S. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Toolson and Flood went astray by elevating Federal Baseball over the plain text of the antitrust laws.

In the century since Federal Baseball was decided,

this Court has rightly recognized that only Congress—not the courts—can establish an exemption

from the antitrust laws in the first instance. United

States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 243 (1955).

But what Toolson and Flood failed to recognize is that

continuing to apply such an atextual judicial

7

exemption also usurps Congress’s legislative power.

“By applying demonstrably erroneous precedent instead of the relevant law’s text,” such decisions

“exercise[] ‘force’ and ‘will’ ”—legislative powers reserved to the political branches. Gamble, 587 U.S. at

711-712 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Stare decisis does not license courts to legislate,

whether by making law in the first instance or by

treating their past mistakes as law. Loper Bright, 603

U.S. at 423 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). No matter how

longstanding a precedent is, it can only ever say what

the law means. Accordingly, this Court has not hesitated to overrule its own precedent when it was

contrary to the law. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83,

115-118 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)

(collecting cases); Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 424 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that, in recent years, the

Court has overruled one to two prior decisions per

Term). When this Court’s interpretation is wrong—

as the Court has long acknowledged Federal Baseball

is—it is the statute, not the interpretation, that

should govern.

B.

Congress’s Silence Is Not Approval Of

A Baseball Antitrust Exemption

Congressional inaction cannot constitute an endorsement of Federal Baseball’s judge-made

exemption from the antitrust laws. Toolson’s and

Flood’s reliance on Congressional inaction wrongly ignored this Court’s precedent establishing that it need

not force Congress to correct the Court’s own interpretive errors. Indeed, this Court has warned against

placing excessive interpretive weight on Congressional inaction. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,

8

119 (1940). “To explain the cause of non-action by

Congress when Congress itself sheds no light is to

venture into speculative unrealities.” Id. at 119-120.

That is in part because, although “[v]arious considerations of parliamentary tactics and strategy might be

suggested as reasons for the inaction,” they “would

only be sufficient to indicate that we walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective

legislation a controlling legal principle.” Id. at

120-121. Inferring Congressional intent from Congressional silence thus plays a dangerous game of

speculation. For that reason, stare decisis is not an

inexorable command even in the statutory context, regardless of Congress’s ability to fix the error. See, e.g.,

Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 423-424 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Indeed, for at least two reasons, professional

baseball’s antitrust exemption is an interpretive misstep that this Court should correct itself. First, when

the Toolson Court initially invoked Congressional inaction to preserve the exemption, Congress would

have believed it had no authority to overrule Federal

Baseball. The core of Federal Baseball’s holding is

that professional baseball is not interstate commerce.

259 U.S. at 208-209. Under Federal Baseball, Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to

bring professional baseball within the scope of the antitrust laws. See U.S. Const. art. I., § 8, cl. 3 (giving

Congress power “to regulate Commerce with foreign

Nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes”). Congress’s decision not “to bring

[professional baseball] under these laws by legislation

having prospective effect” therefore reflected the

Court’s reasoning in Federal Baseball that Congress

9

lacked power to do so. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. Despite that Congress’s inaction might have been due to

a desire not to be in defiance of the Court’s reasoning

in Federal Baseball, the Toolson Court nevertheless

concluded that Congress must have “had no intention

of including the business of baseball within the scope

of the federal antitrust laws.” Ibid.

Second, regardless of Congress’s authority to end

professional baseball’s antitrust exemption, the Court

was aware that there were other explanations for

Congress’s inaction besides its supposed accession to

Federal Baseball’s interpretive error. In fact, Congress had considered legislation that would clarify the

application of the antitrust laws to professional sports

but rejected a broad exemption for “all professional

sports enterprises.” Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. at

243-244. Specifically, “[w]ith respect to baseball, the

Subcommittee recommended a postponement of any

legislation until the status of Federal Baseball was

clarified in the courts.” Id. at 244. So even while this

Court waited for Congress to take some action regarding professional baseball’s antitrust exemption,

Congress was waiting for the courts to do the same,

perhaps in light of the uncertainty about Congress’s

authority to act at all. That détente offers no interpretive aid and demonstrates that this Court should

fix this legal aberration rather than asking Congress

to do it.

10

C.

A Judicially Criticized, Atextual

Antitrust Exemption Benefiting A

Single Industry Undermines Rule-OfLaw Values Stare Decisis Is Meant To

Support

Toolson’s and Flood’s applications of stare decisis

are as flawed as Federal Baseball’s understanding of

interstate commerce. “Stare decisis is not an inexorable command.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 407

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he doctrine of

stare decisis does not dictate, and no one seriously

maintains, that the Court should never overrule erroneous precedent.”

Ramos, 590 U.S. at 118

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (original emphasis).

The most salient factors that this Court

considers when deciding whether to overrule a past

decision—as well as the values underlying stare decisis—confirm that the Court should abandon the

mistaken result in Federal Baseball.

First, Federal Baseball rested on poor reasoning.

See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 585 U.S. 878, 917

(2018) (overruling previous decision partly because it

“was poorly reasoned”). Federal Baseball’s conclusion

that the business of baseball is not interstate commerce ignored the innumerable aspects of

professional baseball that rely on interstate activity

or have interstate effects; was contrary even to the

Court’s existing and contemporaneous decisions; and

is impossible to reconcile with the more expansive understanding of interstate commerce that prevails

today. Pet. 3-6, 16-19. Although there are reasonable

differences of opinion regarding the correct understanding of interstate commerce, there can be no

serious doubt that it encompasses professional

11

baseball under even the most restrictive modern

views. Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,

585-587 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining

that, when the Constitution was ratified, “commerce”

would have been understood to mean trade or transportation of goods and services), with Federal

Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-209 (acknowledging that,

even in 1922, professional baseball required transportation across state lines). Indeed, this Court has

already said so. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. That makes

Federal Baseball and its progeny the rare example of

precedent that is not just “egregiously” or “demonstrably” wrong but admittedly so. See Loper Bright,

603 U.S. at 425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

Second, the rule announced in Federal Baseball

is unworkable. See Janus, 585 U.S. at 917 (overruling

prior decision partly because it had “proved unworkable”). This Court’s repeated refusal to extend Federal

Baseball’s logic in increasingly similar circumstances

amply demonstrates the decision’s impracticality.

Pet. 5-6. And even though the Court has since made

explicit that Federal Baseball’s rule is “specifically

limit[ed] * * * to the facts there involved, i.e., the business of organized professional baseball” (Radovich v.

NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957)), difficult line-drawing

questions abound, as the decision below amply illustrates. See Pet. App. 21a-24a (collecting cases). What

exactly constitutes “the business of organized professional baseball”? Agreements to broadcast games?

See Pet. App. 24a (citing Henderson Broad. Corp. v.

Houston Sports Ass’n, Inc., 541 F. Supp. 263 (S.D.

Tex. 1982)). Concession sales in baseball stadiums?

Pet. App. 24a (citing Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v.

Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir.

12

1975)). And is Federal Baseball’s exemption limited

to baseball, or is it even more exclusive, benefiting

only the baseball leagues involved in Federal Baseball

itself ? Pet. App. 18a-21a; see Pet. i (second question

presented). In this case, the court of appeals struggled with this question because it is difficult to define

the precise scope of a judge-made exemption to Congress’s laws when the exemption’s application

depends solely on the facts of century-old precedent.

Third, Federal Baseball is inconsistent “with

other related decisions.” Janus, 585 U.S. at 917 (considering this factor in overruling precedent). Its

conclusion that professional baseball is not interstate

commerce is impossible to reconcile with “the Court’s

expanding concept of interstate commerce.” Flood,

407 U.S. at 282. And, as already explained, this Court

has repeatedly declined to extend Federal Baseball’s

benefits to identically situated defendants, including

other major American sports leagues such as the NFL

and the NBA. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451-452; Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205-1206 (1971)

(Douglas, J., in chambers); Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-283

(noting that “football, boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf” are not exempt from the

antitrust laws). This Court long ago abandoned any

effort to reconcile those results with the solicitude afforded baseball. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451-452

(acknowledging the possibility of “error or discrimination” but declining to either overrule Federal Baseball

or extend its logic to identical facts).

Fourth, although Federal Baseball’s core conclusion that professional baseball is not interstate

commerce was wrong even in 1922, “developments

since the decision was handed down” remove any

13

conceivable doubt. Janus, 585 U.S. at 917 (considering this factor in overruling precedent). Professional

baseball in the twenty-first century is a multi-billiondollar international industry. Maury Brown, MLB

Revenues Hit Record $12.1 Billion in 2024, Forbes

(Jan. 27, 2025).2 Producing that revenue requires

considerable interstate activity. As even Federal

Baseball acknowledged, exhibitions of baseball games

between clubs located in different States require extensive transportation and travel over state lines.

259 U.S. at 208-209. As of late September 2025, the

league’s most-traveled team this year, the then-reigning and now-repeat World Series champion Los

Angeles Dodgers, has traveled 48,649 miles to play

games in every corner of the country. 2025 MLB

Travel Schedule, MLB Savant.3 Even the league’s

least-traveled team, the Cleveland Guardians, has

racked up 25,453 miles in 2025, repeatedly crossing

state lines in travel that makes the business of baseball possible. Ibid.

Modern professional baseball also relies on interstate commerce in other ways that Federal Baseball

entirely failed to consider. Professional baseball relies on selling unending streams of merchandise and

tickets, both in stadiums and online, which follow

fans across state borders. The games are broadcast in

every State (and around the world) on television, radio, and the internet. Major League Baseball clubs

even own and operate Minor League teams located in

2 https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2025/01/27/

mlb-revenues-hit-record-121-billion-in-2024/.

3 https://baseballsavant.mlb.com/visuals/map?team=&

year=2025 (last visited Nov. 6, 2025).

14

other States. E.g., Benjamin Hill, With Tarpons,

Tampa throws back to the future, Minor League Baseball (Dec. 11, 2017).4

All four of these stare decisis considerations were

before the Court or even expressly acknowledged in

Toolson and Flood. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-284 (acknowledging that Federal Baseball was wrong,

inconsistently applied, and contrary to modern conceptions of interstate commerce); Toolson, 346 U.S. at

357-358 (Burton, J., dissenting) (recounting the many

ways in which professional baseball was “engaged in

interstate trade or commerce” by 1953). Toolson and

Flood nonetheless refused to overrule Federal Baseball based on two factors: Congressional inaction and

Major League Baseball’s supposed reliance interests.

Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; Flood, 407 U.S. at 283-284.

As explained above, Congress’s silence on this topic

does not justify continued adherence to Federal Baseball’s mistaken result. Supra pp. 7-9.

As for Major League Baseball’s reliance interests, Toolson and Flood placed excessive weight on

any such interests. Toolson emphasized that professional baseball had “been left for thirty years to

develop, on the understanding that it was not subject

to existing antitrust legislation.” 346 U.S. at 357. But

as Justice Gorsuch has explained, “reliance” will “not

often supply reason enough on [its] own to abide a

flawed decision, for almost any past decision is likely

to benefit some group eager to keep things as they are

and content with how things work.” Loper Bright, 603

U.S. at 425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). So, although

4 https://www.milb.com/news/gcs-263154244.

15

the professional baseball leagues are “content with”

their sui generis exemption from antitrust regulation,

that can hardly be sufficient reason on its own to uphold Federal Baseball’s mistaken rule.

Regardless, the experience of the other professional sports leagues that do not enjoy baseball’s

special status shows that the reliance concerns voiced

in Toolson and Flood were overstated. To the extent

Toolson was animated by the Court’s fear that America’s pastime could not exist in its current form

without a judge-made exemption from the antitrust

laws, that fear was unfounded. To take just one example: Over half a century ago, the business of

professional football was denied the exemption baseball enjoys.

Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451-452.

Nonetheless, professional football has thrived for over

fifty years without such an exemption. Justin Teitelbaum, The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams 2025, Forbes

(Aug. 28, 2025).5

Toolson’s and Flood’s misapplication of stare decisis to preserve Federal Baseball’s erroneous ruling

is particularly concerning because it undermines the

very values that stare decisis should secure. See

Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 411 (overruling past precedent was particularly appropriate where that decision

undermined the values justifying stare decisis).

“[S]tare decisis is not an end in itself.” Citizens United

v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378-379 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring). “Its greatest purpose is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law.” Ibid. By ensuring

that like cases are decided alike, stare decisis

5 https://www.forbes.com/sites/justinteitelbaum/2025/08/

28/the-nfls-most-valuable-teams-2025/.

16

“promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters

reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the

actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).

The overly rigid and narrow version of stare decisis applied by Toolson and Flood, which preserves a

single admittedly mistaken decision to the benefit of

just one industry, undermines those values. The application of Federal Baseball has not been

evenhanded and predictable. Instead, the Court has

repeatedly refused to extend its rule to parties who

were, in every relevant respect, identically situated to

professional baseball. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 451-452;

see also id. at 456 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing

that stare decisis required extending Federal Baseball’s rule to professional football). The Court has

justified that special treatment on the basis that “[n]o

other business * * * has such an adjudication” in its

favor. Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452 (majority opinion).

So, rather than applying the same rule to similarly

situated parties, Toolson and Flood require applying

different rules depending on the identity of the parties. See Pet. 5-6. Stare decisis cannot justify—let

alone require—a result so at odds with basic notions

of fairness and the rule of law.

And while other parties are denied the advantages of the “inconsistent” and “illogical” antitrust

exemption enshrined by Toolson and Flood, baseball

benefits from those decisions’ incoherence twice over.

Flood endorsed the lower courts’ conclusion that the

baseball-player plaintiff ’s state antitrust law claims

were preempted “because state antitrust regulation

would conflict with federal policy.” 407 U.S. at 284.

17

Because the potential “burden on interstate commerce outweigh[ed] the [S]tates’ interests in

regulating baseball’s reserve system,” the Court concluded that “the Commerce Clause precludes the

application here of state antitrust law.” Ibid. Flood

thus applied a doctrine born from the conclusion that

baseball is not interstate commerce to preempt state

antitrust law, reasoning that the burden of state regulation on interstate commerce outweighed the

States’ interest. A doctrine that exists to ensure consistent, evenhanded, and predictable decision making

cannot support logic so at war with itself.

II.

PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL’S ANTITRUST

EXEMPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH

SOUND COMPETITION POLICY

In addition to the serious separation-of-powers

concerns described above, professional baseball’s antitrust exemption is contrary to this Court’s

recognition that the importance of marketplace competition requires narrowly interpreting any

exemptions from the antitrust laws. That interpretive canon reflects not only appropriate deference to

Congress’s policy determinations, but also the particular importance of the antitrust laws.

The same year it decided Flood, this Court recognized that the antitrust laws are “as important to

the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the

protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.”

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610

(1972). This Court explained that, under the antitrust laws, “the freedom guaranteed each and every

business, no matter how small, is the freedom to

18

compete.” Ibid. “Implicit in such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one

sector of the economy.” Ibid.

Because the freedom to compete is so foundational, “[i]t is settled law that ‘immunity from the

antitrust laws is not lightly implied.’ ” United States

v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963).

This canon of construction reflects the “indispensable

role of antitrust policy in the maintenance of a free

economy.” Ibid. Since then, both this Court and the

lower courts have applied the canon to narrowly construe antitrust exemptions. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v.

Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973) (“[A]

broad reading * * * would conflict with our frequently

expressed view that exemptions from antitrust laws

are strictly construed.”); Laumann v. NHL, 56 F.

Supp. 3d 280, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Exceptions to the

antitrust laws are to be construed narrowly.”).

This Court has honored that approach by repeatedly refusing to afford broad antitrust exemptions to

the other major sports leagues, such as the NFL and

NBA. See Am. Needle Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183,

202-203 (2010); Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205-1206

(Douglas, J., in chambers); Radovich, 352 U.S. at

451-452; Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. at 240-244;

NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 88 (2021). Yet the Court

has failed to complete the logical progression by eliminating professional baseball’s judge-made antitrust

exemption. Even aside from the significant concerns

about Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood described

above, no sound competition policy justifies applying

a different rule to baseball than to every other professional sports league. Baseball is analytically identical

19

to other professional sports and should be subject to

the same rules ensuring robust competition.

As this Court has also recognized, Congress has

considered and rejected a broad exemption for professional sports as inconsistent with the competition

policy underlying the antitrust laws. Int’l Boxing

Club, 348 U.S. at 243-244. International Boxing Club

quoted at length from a 1952 Report by the House

Subcommittee on Monopoly Power entitled “Organized Baseball,” in which the Subcommittee declared

its opposition to four proposed bills forbidding the application of the antitrust laws to “organized

professional sports.” Id. at 243 (quoting H.R. Rep.

No. 82-2002, at 230 (1952)). The report explained:

The requested exemption would extend to

all professional sports enterprises and to all

acts in the conduct of such enterprises. The

law would no longer require competition in

any facet of business activity of any sport

enterprise. Thus, the sale of radio and television rights, the management of stadia, the

purchase and sale of advertising, the concession industry, and many other business

activities, as well as the aspects of baseball

which are solely related to the promotion of

competition on the playing field, would be

immune and untouchable. Such a broad exemption could not be granted without

substantially repealing the antitrust laws.

H.R. Rep. No. 82-2002, at 230.

Both Congress and the Court have thus recognized that professional baseball’s antitrust exemption

is inconsistent with the guarantee of free competition

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underlying the antitrust laws. Although Congress

has the authority to do so, it is not Congress’s job to

fix this Court’s mistakes. The Court has both the

power and the duty to do so itself. The Court should

grant review to overturn Federal Baseball and its

progeny, ensuring competition in the sport of professional baseball both on and off the field.

* * * * *

For a century, professional baseball has been

shielded from antitrust laws by a court-created exemption that this Court acknowledges rests on

incorrect legal reasoning. This anomaly flouts basic

constitutional principles by allowing a judicial mistake to stand above the law and undermine the

separation of powers. Modern professional baseball

bears no resemblance to the localized exhibitions the

1922 Court imagined; it is a multi-billion-dollar interstate enterprise indistinguishable from other

professional sports.

For these reasons, amici urge the Court to grant

certiorari and overrule Federal Baseball, Toolson, and

Flood. In doing so, the Court will correct a longstanding error and reaffirm constitutional principles by

restoring the separation of powers. The time has

come for America’s pastime to compete on a level playing field, subject to the same laws as other interstate

businesses.

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted.

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Respectfully submitted,

JOEL F. WACKS

DEANNE E. MAYNARD

MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

Counsel of Record

425 Market Street

ALEXANDER OKULIAR

San Francisco, CA 94105 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP

2100 L Street NW

Washington, DC 20037

(202) 887-8740

DMaynard@mofo.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

NOVEMBER 2025