Petition for Writ of Certiorari — AdvanFort Company, Petitioner v. Zamil Offshore Services Company, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 29, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. ______

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

________________

ADVANFORT COMPANY,

Petitioner,

ZAMIL OFFSHORE SERVICES COMPANY and SAUDI

PORTS AUTHORITY, a foreign sovereign state,

_______________

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

________________

H. Brent McKnight, Jr.

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

501 Fayetteville St.

Suite 500

Raleigh, NC 27601

(919) 755-6600

Jonathan Y. Ellis

Counsel of Record

Grace Greene Simmons

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

888 16th Street N.W.

Suite 500

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 828-2887

jellis@mcguirewoods.com

Counsel for Petitioner

September 29, 2025

QUESTION PRESENTED

In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981),

this Court held that “[a]t the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there

exists an alternative forum.” The courts of appeals are divided on whether this requirement is met where, to proceed elsewhere, a case must be split between multiple

courts. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit held that

Piper Aircraft’s initial requirement is satisfied even when

a plaintiff would have to split its case between multiple foreign courts, as long as those courts are in the same country. The question presented is as follows:

Whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens requires the existence of a single foreign court in which a

plaintiff has the right to bring its entire case against all

defendants, or whether the plaintiff may be forced to split

its case across multiple courts.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner AdvanFort Company is not a publicly held

corporation, has no parent corporation, and no publicly

held corporation owns ten percent (10%) or more of its

outstanding stock.

iii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case arises from and is directly related to the

following proceedings:

AdvanFort Company v. Zamil Offshore Services

Company, No. 24-1007 (4th Cir. 2025), judgment

entered April 22, 2025; petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc denied on May 30, 2025.

AdvanFort Company v. Zamil Offshore Services

Company, No. 1:23-cv-906 (E.D. Va.), order granting motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens entered December 1, 2023; notice of appeal filed December 26, 2023.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED .......................................... i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......... ii

STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ... iii

APPENDIX .................................................................... v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vi

INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ..................................................... 3

JURISDICTION............................................................ 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.................................... 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 10

The Court of Appeals’ Decision Deepens

a Circuit Split on Whether Forum Non

Conveniens Allows Case-Splitting ........... 10

The Decision Below Is Wrong on the

Merits........................................................... 14

The Question Presented is Important

and Recurring ............................................. 20

This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle for

Addressing the Question Presented ......... 23

CONCLUSION ............................................................ 24

APPENDIX

Appendix A — Opinion of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Filed April

22, 2025 .................................................................... 1a

Appendix B — Opinion of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of

Virginia, Filed December 1, 2023 ....................... 33a

Appendix C — Denial of Rehearing of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit, Dated May 30, 2025 ................................ 53a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aenergy, S.A. v. Rep. of Angola,

31 F.4th 119 (2d Cir. 2022)........................................... 14

Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco,

205 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000) ......................................... 13

Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller,

510 U.S. 443 (1994) ....................................................... 16

Associação Brasileira de Medicina de

Grupo v. Stryker Corp.,

891 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2018) ............................. 11, 18, 23

Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for

W. Dist. Texas,

571 U.S. 49 (2013) ......................................................... 20

Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp.,

981 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993) ......................................... 11

Canada Malting Co. v. Patterson

Steamships,

285 U.S. 413 (1932) ....................................................... 19

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32 (1991) ......................................................... 21

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.

United States,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) ................................................... 3, 21

Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,

364 U.S. 19 (1960) ......................................................... 16

vii

Curtis v. Galakatos,

19 F.4th 41 (1st Cir. 2021)............................................ 11

Dietz v. Bouldin,

579 U.S. 40 (2016) ......................................................... 21

DIRTT Env’t Sols., Inc. v. Falkbuilt Ltd.,

65 F.4th 547 (10th Cir. 2023) .................... 2, 9-15, 19, 22

Dole Food Co. v. Watts,

303 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................. 11-13

Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt.,

777 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2015) ......................................... 11

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,

330 U.S. 501 (1947) ....................................... 3, 19, 21, 22

Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas.

Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947) ................................................ 19

Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,

932 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1991) .......................................... 11

Leon v. Million Air, Inc.,

251 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) ..................................... 11

Moreno v. LG Elecs., USA Inc.,

800 F.3d 692 (5th Cir. 2015) ......................................... 20

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,

454 U.S. 235 (1981) ....................... 1, 9, 10, 14, 16-18, 20

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

517 U.S. 706 (1996) ................................................... 3, 22

viii

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,

447 U.S. 752 (1980) ....................................................... 21

Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l

Shipping Corp.,

549 U.S. 422 (2007) .............................. 15, 16, 18, 20, 23

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69 (2013) ......................................................... 21

Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer,

218 Fed. App’x 860 (11th Cir. 2007)...................... 11, 20

Van Dusen v. Barrack,

376 U.S. 612 (1964) ................................................. 16, 20

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .................................................................... 3

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ............................................................. 16

Other Authorities

Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common

Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008) ................................... 21

Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl., DIRTT

Env’t Sols., Inc. v. Henderson,

No. 1:19-cv-144 (D. Utah Nov. 19, 2020),

ECF No. 134 ................................................................. 11

Forum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th

ed. 2024) ......................................................................... 15

Forum Conveniens, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) ............................................... 15

Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, The Federal

Courts, & Forum Non Conveniens:

Friction on the Frontier of Inherent

Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147 (2006)........................... 22

Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non

Conveniens, 92 N.Y. UNIV. L. REV. 390

(2017) .............................................................................. 22

14D Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc.

Juris. § 3828 (4th ed.) ................................................... 15

INTRODUCTION

This case concerns when an American plaintiff can be

stripped of its home forum and forced to proceed in a foreign country under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Under Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), a

district court deciding a motion to dismiss on grounds of

forum non conveniens must first ask “whether there exists an alternative forum.” Id. at 254 n.22. If the answer

is no, the court’s analysis is complete; it may not dismiss

the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Although one

might think—and most courts of appeals have found—

that “an alternative forum” means a single alternative

court, this Court has not specifically addressed whether

the moving party must identify one foreign court in which

a plaintiff has the right to bring its entire case against all

defendants, or whether the plaintiff may be forced to split

its case across multiple courts.

This case presents that question. Petitioner AdvanFort Company sued Respondents Zamil Offshore Services

Company and the Saudi Ports Authority after AdvanFort’s maritime security vessel, the M/V Seaman Guard

Virginia, was looted and destroyed while docked at the

Jeddah Shipyard in Saudi Arabia for maintenance. AdvanFort, a Virginia business, brought its case against both

Respondents in its home forum, the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Ports Authority defaulted, but Zamil appeared and moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The district court

granted the motion, requiring AdvanFort to proceed, if at

all, in the Saudi courts, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed—

even though no one Saudi court affords AdvanFort the

right to bring all its claims against both Respondents.

This Court should grant review and reverse. The decision below deepens and entrenches a circuit split over

whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a

case to be dismissed if it means that case would be divided

among multiple foreign courts. The majority rule is that

a party seeking dismissal for forum non conveniens must

identify a forum in which the entire case can be brought

against all defendants. In other words, there must be a

single alternate court in which the plaintiff has the right

to bring its entire case and join all defendants to the action. The Fourth Circuit’s published decision below departs from that view, joining the Second Circuit. Over

Judge Thacker’s dissent, the majority rejected AdvanFort’s demand that Zamil identify a single court in Saudi

Arabia in which AdvanFort could bring all its claims.

The court of appeals’ decision is also wrong. Forum

non conveniens demands that a single forum—that is, a

single court—in the foreign country be able to hear the

entire case against all defendants. This requirement prevents a defendant from “split[ting] or bifurcat[ing]” a single case into two or more proceedings in multiple forums

and ensures that forum non conveniens functions as designed. DIRTT Env’t Sols., Inc. v. Falkbuilt Ltd., 65 F.4th

547, 555 (10th Cir. 2023). As the name suggests, the doctrine is intended to move a case to a more convenient forum. Requiring a plaintiff to split its claims, rather than

litigate a single suit in its chosen forum, creates double the

work in different venues that might well result in inconsistent judgments. Nothing about that is convenient.

The bar against splitting cases also ensures that forum non conveniens does not unduly intrude on federal

courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the

jurisdiction given to them.” Colo. River Water Conser-

vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). The

doctrine of forum non conveniens is, and must be, a narrow exception to that duty. See Quackenbush v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722 (1996) (noting only “[i]n rare

circumstances” can “federal courts relinquish their jurisdiction” under forum non conveniens); Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) (explaining forum non

conveniens only applies in “rather rare cases”). By demanding that the party seeking dismissal identify a single

alternate court where the plaintiff has the right to bring

its entire case, the majority rule helps keep the doctrine

within its narrow bounds; the minority position impermissibly expands it.

This case thus raises an important question, with significant consequences, that is squarely presented and dispositive. It warrants this Court’s review.

OPINIONS BELOW

The court of appeals’ opinion is reported at 134 F.4th

760 and reproduced at App., infra, 1a-32a. The opinion of

the district court is reported at 704 F. Supp. 3d 669 and is

reproduced at App., infra, 33a-52a.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its published opinion and

judgment on April 22, 2025. App., infra, 1a. The court of

appeals denied a timely filed petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc on May 30, 2025. App., infra, 53a. On

August 28, 2025, Chief Justice Roberts extended the time

in which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari until

September 29, 2025. This Court has jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. AdvanFort is a Virginia company that deploys security vessels and guards to protect oil tankers and other

vulnerable ships against piracy in international waters.

CA4 App. 7 (¶ 1). One of AdvanFort’s vessels, the M/V

Seaman Guard Virginia, was sailing in the Red Sea when

it needed routine maintenance and repair. Id. at 7-8, 16

(¶¶ 2, 39). AdvanFort sent the Virginia to the Jeddah

Shipyard in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 21 (¶ 67).

The Jeddah Shipyard is jointly operated by the Saudi

Ports Authority and Zamil Offshore Services Company.

CA4 App. 10 (¶ 13). The Ports Authority is an arm of the

Saudi government. Id. at 10 (¶ 12). Zamil is a Saudi company controlled by the Zamil family, which has significant

ties to the Saudi royal family. Id. at 9 (¶ 10).

A fire broke out while Jeddah Shipyard was working

on the Virginia, causing damage to the vessel. CA4 App.

23 (¶ 79). Zamil tried to blame AdvanFort for the fire, refusing to repair the damage and threatening to “undock”

the vessel unless AdvanFort “sign[ed] a statement of responsibility for the fire.” Id. at 24, 27 (¶¶ 86, 99-100). The

Saudi fire inspectors performed a perfunctory inspection

of the fire and, in a six-line report, attributed the fire to

AdvanFort. Id. at 24-25 (¶¶ 87-89).

AdvanFort immediately sued Zamil in Saudia Arabia

in the Third Commercial Circuit of Jeddah. CA4 App. 28

(¶ 105). The Saudi judiciary is not independent. Id. at 233

(¶ 17). The King of Saudi Arabi is the head of the Saudi

judicial system, and he maintains ultimate authority over

the judiciary’s organization and operations. Id. at 232

(¶ 16). Judges that issue decisions perceived to be contrary to the interests of the government are met with retribution, and judges have been arrested and tortured for

rulings. Id. at 233-34 (¶¶ 19-20) (explaining that 10 judges

currently “face the death penalty”). “Occasionally, the

Saudi government permits cases against it to succeed and

allows the court to award nominal judgments,” which are

“publicized to generate positive public relations for the

government.” Id. at 240 (¶ 33). Otherwise, it is well-recognized that Saudi courts do not provide a fair or impartial

forum for adjudicating claims against the Saudi government or entities or individuals associated with the royal

family. Id. at 230-31 (¶ 11).

This bias was borne out in AdvanFort’s case. The

Saudi court declined to appoint an independent expert to

assess the source of the fire, relying only on the reports

prepared by the Saudi government and deeming them dispositive. CA4 App. 31-32 (¶¶ 121-22); id. at 108. One witness refused to testify for fear of retribution from the

Zamil family, telling AdvanFort “this is not America.” Id.

at 31 (¶ 119). And Zamil openly attempted to bribe the

Virginia’s captain, demanding that he testify in favor of

Zamil and threatening “that he would face dire consequences” if he did not. Id. at 30 (¶¶ 112-16). When he refused, the Saudi court deemed his testimony to be “unacceptable.” Id. at 108. In a cursory opinion, the Saudi court

ruled against AdvanFort and awarded Zamil $40,000 in

damages, plus unspecified berthing fees. Id. at 31 (¶ 121);

see id. at 107-08.

Five years later, in 2022, Zamil finally gave AdvanFort access to the Virginia, demanding that AdvanFort

come retrieve the vessel or else they would “dispos[e]” of

it. CA4 App. 32 (¶ 124). When it did, AdvanFort discovered that Zamil and the Ports Authority had stripped everything from the vessel—from its engines to a stray set of

binoculars—and allowed the vessel to rust in the ele-

ments. Id. at 33, 35 (¶¶ 127, 135). Hatches and windows

had been left open, and debris was strewn around the vessel. Id. at 33 (¶ 128). The vessel was “utterly unseaworthy.” Id. at 33 (¶ 128); see id. at 33-34 (¶¶ 129-131) (pictures

of the disrepair). AdvanFort could not even tow the vessel

out of the shipyard. Id. at 35 (¶ 133).

2. In 2023, AdvanFort filed a second suit—this suit—

against Zamil and the Ports Authority. AdvanFort asserted claims of conversion, breach of bailment, negligence, and gross negligence in stripping and trashing the

vessel. CA4 App. 37-40. And having learned its lesson,

this time AdvanFort filed in its home district of the Eastern District of Virginia.

The Ports Authority defaulted and never appeared.

CA4 App. 356. Zamil moved to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction and forum non conveniens, arguing that AdvanFort should be required to bring its claims in Saudi

courts. AdvanFort opposed.

AdvanFort submitted an expert declaration by Dr.

Abdullah Alaoudh, a Saudi legal scholar. CA4 App. 22948. Dr. Alaoudh reiterated that the Saudi judiciary is not

independent and so does not provide a fair forum for foreign parties suing the government, especially in cases “alleg[ing] malfeasance by government actors and irregularities in Saudi court proceedings.” Id. at 230-31 (¶¶ 11-12).

He noted that any AdvanFort employees that traveled to

Saudi Arabia for litigation “would be at risk of detention,”

or “at least . . . surveillance.” Id. at 231 (¶ 12). And he

explained that “it would be extremely difficult for AdvanFort to obtain counsel to represent it in prosecuting its

claims,” as attorneys “face retribution for supporting lawsuits against the Saudi government or allied families.” Id.

at 231, 235 (¶¶ 12, 21).

Importantly, Dr. Alaoudh also explained that AdvanFort’s claims against the two defendants, if litigated in

Saudi Arabia, would have to be split between two forums.

CA4 App. 242 (¶ 39). The claims against the Ports Authority would have to be brought before the Board of Grievances, which “has exclusive jurisdiction over . . . lawsuits

filed against government bodies.” Ibid. The claims

against Zamil, on the other hand, would have to be

brought before the Commercial Court. Ibid. “There is no

forum in Saudi Arabia where AdvanFort could bring its

claims against both Defendants.” Ibid.

Zamil’s expert did not disagree. In his supplemental

expert report, he speculated that the Board of Grievances

might be willing to allow “eligible litigants” to intervene in

a proceeding. CA4 App. 323-24. But he did not explain

who counted as “eligible” to join a suit against the government and identified no prior instances of the Board of

Grievances allowing a plaintiff to join a private entity to a

suit. See ibid.

3. The district court granted Zamil’s motion and dismissed the suit against both defendants based on forum

non conveniens. App., infra, 42a-52a.

The district court first concluded that alternative forums were available in Saudia Arabia, dismissing the concern that AdvanFort would have to sue the defendants in

two different forums. App., infra, 43a-44a. The court recognized that other courts had held that forum non conveniens should not be used to split claims between defendants, but it declined to follow that rule, as AdvanFort

would not be forced “to litigate in two different countries,”

just two different courts. Id. at 44a.

The district court further concluded that the Saudi

courts would be adequate. App., infra, 44a-48a. The court

ignored the overwhelming proof of bias, calling it “anecdotal evidence of corruption and delay.” Id. at 45a. The

court then wrongfully asserted that AdvanFort’s prior suit

proved that the Saudi court system was not biased, as the

Saudi Commercial Court had only granted Zamil $40,000

when it requested $147,000. Id. at 46a. And, citing decades-old cases, the court reasoned that Saudia Arabia had

been found to be an adequate forum in the past. Id. at 46a.

Finally, the district court found that the public and

private interests favored litigation in Saudia Arabi, discounting AdvanFort’s interest in suing in the United

States and reasoning that the court “would be forced to

apply Saudi law.” App., infra, 48a-52a.

Because the court had dismissed the entire suit based

on forum non conveniens, it declined to address Zamil’s

challenge to personal jurisdiction and rejected AdvanFort’s request for jurisdictional discovery. See App., infra,

33a-35a & n. 2.

4. In a divided, published opinion, the court of appeals

affirmed. App., infra, 15a-28a.

Judge King, writing for the majority, held that “the

Saudi courts are an available and adequate forum.” App.,

infra, 15a. On availability, the majority accepted that an

“alternate forum must be available as to all defendants.”

Id. at 16a (internal quotation marks omitted). But the majority disagreed that there must be “a single tribunal in a

foreign jurisdiction where all claims brought by a plaintiff

may be heard and resolved.” Id. at 17a. AdvanFort would

have to split its claims between courts in Saudi Arabia, but

it would not have to bring its claims “in two different countries.” Id. at 17a-19a (internal quotation marks omitted).

So, the majority concluded, Saudi Arabia served as an alternative forum. Like the district court, the court of

appeals also declined to reach personal jurisdiction. Id. at

12a n.4.

Judge Thacker dissented. App., infra, 29a-32a. Citing to precedent from this Court and the Tenth Circuit,

she explained that for forum non conveniens to apply,

there must be “an alternat[ive] forum” to bring all the

claims at issue against all defendants. Id. at 29a (quoting

Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22). “[F]orum non conveniens ‘is not available as a tool to split or bifurcate cases’

as that ‘fundamentally contradicts the central purpose of ”

the doctrine—“it only increases the possibility of overlapping, piecemeal litigation that is inherently inconvenient

for both the parties and the courts.” Id. at 31a (quoting

DIRTT, 65 F.4th at 555). So “[d]ismissal for forum non

conveniens requires the existence of one alternate, adequate, and available forum.” Id. at 29a.

No alternative forum exists here, Judge Thacker explained. Instead, AdvanFort would need to split its claims

into two suits in two different courts, “creat[ing] piecemeal litigation,” “increas[ing] the possibility of overlapping and inconsistent judgments,” and “forc[ing] AdvanFort to incur the costs and inconvenience associated with

litigating . . . in separate tribunals.” App., infra, 31a-32a.

In her view, the bar against case splitting was “dispositive.” Id. at 29a. AdvanFort should be permitted “to proceed on its claims in its home forum, the Eastern District

of Virginia.” Id. at 32a.

AdvanFort petitioned for rehearing and rehearing en

banc, emphasizing that the Fourth Circuit had deviated

from its sister circuits. The Fourth Circuit denied rehearing. App., infra, 53a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

For forum non conveniens to require the dismissal of

a suit and denial of a plaintiff ’s chosen forum, there must

be “an alternative forum” where the suit could be brought.

Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. But the lower courts

are divided on whether that requires the moving party to

identify a single alternative court in which a plaintiff can

bring its entire case against all defendants, or whether the

plaintiff may be forced to split its case across multiple

courts. The question is important and recurring, and it is

squarely presented here. The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted to resolve it.

A. The Court of Appeals’ Decision Deepens a

Circuit Split on Whether Forum Non Conveniens Allows Case-Splitting.

The majority of the courts of appeals recognize that a

party seeking dismissal for forum non conveniens must

identify a single forum in which the entire case may be

brought against all defendants. These circuits thus reject

efforts to split or bifurcate the case between forums—

whether between courts in different countries or between

different courts in the same country. But the Second and

Fourth Circuits depart from that view. These circuits hold

that a plaintiff may be forced to split its claims between

different courts in foreign countries, rather than allow

them to proceed in a single suit in a U.S. court. That circuit conflict warrants review.

1. Most circuits hold that forum non conveniens cannot “be used to split cases.” DIRTT, 65 F.4th at 554. “[A]ll

parties (and by extension the entire case) must be subject

to the jurisdiction of an alternative forum in order for it to

be considered available under forum non conveniens.”

Ibid. At least the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,

Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have forum non conveniens standards aimed at identifying whether the entire

case may be brought against all defendants in a single alternative forum—that is, “a particular foreign court.” Associação Brasileira de Medicina de Grupo v. Stryker

Corp., 891 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2018); see, e.g., Curtis v.

Galakatos, 19 F.4th 41, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2021) (forum adequate if “there’s another suitable court to hear the plaintiff ’s case”); Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170,

177, 180 (3d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he foreign jurisdiction must

have jurisdiction over all defendants.”); Baumgart v.

Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 835 (5th Cir. 1993)

(forum available “when the entire case and all parties can

come within the jurisdiction of that forum”); Associação

Brasileira, 891 F.3d at 620 (forum not “truly available” if

“the foreign court cannot exercise jurisdiction over both

parties”); Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d

847, 867 (7th Cir. 2015) (forum available because “all parties [were] subject to jurisdiction”); Dole Food Co. v.

Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A foreign forum

is available when the entire case and all parties can come

within the jurisdiction of that forum.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218

Fed. App’x 860, 865 (11th Cir. 2007) (forum available if the

foreign “court can assert jurisdiction over the entire case”

(citing Leon v. Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th

Cir. 2001)).

The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in DIRTT is illustrative.

There, a Canadian construction company filed suit against

a former employee and his spin-off businesses in an Alberta court. 65 F.4th at 550-51; see Mot. to Dismiss First

Am. Compl. at 5-6, DIRTT Env’t Sols., Inc. v. Henderson,

No. 1:19-cv-144 (D. Utah Nov. 19, 2020), ECF No. 134 (describing existing suit in the Court of Queen’s Bench of

Alberta). The Canadian company’s U.S. subsidiary then

filed another suit in Utah federal court and eventually

joined the Canadian parent as a plaintiff. 65 F.4th at 551.

Some of the defendants moved to dismiss for forum non

conveniens; the remaining defendants, all based in Utah,

refused to consent to jurisdiction in Canada. Ibid. The

district court dismissed the claims against the moving defendants, concluding that the Canadian court provided a

more convenient forum for those parties, “while allowing

the other part[ies] to proceed before it”—splitting the

case. Id. at 549; see id. at 553.

The Tenth Circuit reversed, “holding that forum non

conveniens is not available as a tool to split or bifurcate

cases.” Id. at 555. As the court of appeals explained, for a

forum to be “available,” “the entire case and all parties”

must “come within the jurisdiction” of that forum. Id. at

554 (internal quotation marks omitted). That requirement

was not satisfied: The moving defendants might already

be proceeding in Alberta court, but the Utah-based defendants could not be sued there. Id. at 555. There was

thus no available alternative forum in Canada. Ibid. And

the defendants could not use forum non conveniens to

“split” this singular case into two. Id. at 554.

The Ninth Circuit provided a similar application of

the bar against case splitting in Dole Food Co. v. Watts,

supra. There, a corporation sued two former employees

in California for fraudulently inducing it into leasing a

warehouse in The Netherlands. Dole, 303 F.3d at 1107-08.

The employees moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens, asserting that the District Court of Rotterdam could

hear “all the claims” the corporation had asserted against

them. Id. at 1118; see id. at 1116 (defendants offering “the

District Court in Rotterdam [as] an adequate alternative

forum”). But neither of the defendants resided in or were

citizens of The Netherlands, and only one defendant had

“agreed to submit to personal jurisdiction” in the Rotterdam court. Id. at 1118. The defendants thus had not identified “an alternative forum in The Netherlands” where

“‘the entire case and all parties’” could be heard. Ibid.

(quoting Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco, 205 F.3d 208, 221

(5th Cir. 2000)); see also id. at 1116-17 (defendants conceding that besides the Central District of California, “there

might not be any single alternative forum that has subject

matter and personal jurisdiction over all parties and issues”).

2. The Second and now the Fourth Circuits have

taken a different view. Those Circuits, in sharp contrast,

do not require a single forum that can hear the entire case

against all defendants but instead allow a plaintiff ’s suit to

be split across multiple forums.

In this case, AdvanFort argued that forum non conveniens did not apply because, to proceed elsewhere, AdvanFort would have to bring its claims against Zamil and

the Ports Authority in two different courts in Saudi Arabia. See App., infra, 30a (Thacker, J., dissenting). But the

majority rejected AdvanFort’s assertion “that a defendant

must identify a single tribunal in a foreign jurisdiction

where all claims brought by a plaintiff may be heard and

resolved.” Id. at 17a (majority opinion). In the majority’s

view, it was enough that AdvanFort could bring its separate suits within the same country, rather than having “to

litigate in two different countries.” Id. at 18a (internal

quotation marks omitted). In other words, Saudi Arabia

as a country counted as the “available alternative forum.”

Id. at 17a. That reasoning, as Judge Thacker noted in her

dissent, is directly at odds with other circuits’ rule against

splitting cases. Id. at 31a (Thacker, J., dissenting) (citing

DIRTT, 65 F.4th at 555).

The Second Circuit likewise held that forum non conveniens allows the plaintiff ’s claims to be split between

two different courts in Aenergy, S.A. v. Rep. of Angola, 31

F.4th 119, 131 (2d Cir. 2022). There, as here, the plaintiff

objected to dismissing the case for forum non conveniens

because its claims against one defendant would have to be

brought in the Supreme Court of Angola, while its claims

against another defendant would have to proceed in one of

Angola’s provincial courts. Ibid. The Second Circuit rejected this argument and allowed the defendants to split

the single case into two, reasoning that forum non conveniens “does not require a single foreign court.” Ibid.

If Respondent Zamil had moved to dismiss for forum

non conveniens in any circuit other than the Second or

Fourth, its motion would have been denied because Zamil

failed to identify a single court in Saudi Arabia that could

hear “the entire case” against “all parties.” DIRTT, 65

F.4th at 554 (emphasis omitted). But because this case

arose in the Fourth Circuit, Zamil was allowed to split the

case, denying AdvanFort the right “to proceed on its

claims in its home forum.” App., infra, 32a (Thacker, J.,

dissenting). The Court should resolve this split.

B. The Decision Below Is Wrong on the Merits.

This Court’s review is also warranted because the

court of appeals’ decision below is incorrect. The majority

misconstrued this Court’s decision in Piper Aircraft as

making a defendant’s amenability to process the final

word on whether an alternative forum is available. And it

distinguished on-point precedent from other circuits on

superficial grounds.

1. For forum non conveniens, there must be a single

court in the foreign country in which the entire case may

be brought against all defendants. As this Court has explained, the movant must point to “an alternative forum.”

Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22; Sinochem Int’l Co. v.

Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007).

A “forum” is “[a] court or other judicial body; a place of

jurisdiction.” Forum (def. 2), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(12th ed. 2024); see also Forum Conveniens, in id. (“The

court in which an action is most appropriately brought

. . . .” (emphasis added)). And so an alternative forum is

not simply an alternative country, but a particular court in

that country. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 425 (Under “the

doctrine of forum non conveniens, . . . a federal district

court may dismiss an action on the ground that a court

abroad is the more appropriate and convenient forum for

adjudicating the controversy” (emphasis added)); 14D

Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3828 (4th ed.)

(“[F]orum non conveniens . . . applies only when the superior forum is in a foreign country or perhaps, under rare

circumstances, a state court or a territorial court.” (emphasis added)).

“Logically, this makes good sense.” DIRTT, 65 F.4th

at 554. “Forum non conveniens is a doctrine that is fundamentally concerned with convenience.” Ibid. This

means convenience as “to the entire case” and “to all parties.” Id. at 555. “When a plaintiff brings suit against multiple defendants in a forum where they are all subject to

jurisdiction and the proposed alternative forum could only

exercise jurisdiction over some of those defendants,” that

alternative forum is “inherently” less convenient than the

original. Instead of one suit, the plaintiff must now proceed in two or more suits—with double the pleadings, double the discovery, double the trials, and the possibility of

inconsistent judgments from the different courts. “Splitting cases” like that “fundamentally contradicts the central purpose of forum non conveniens.” Ibid. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

After all, forum non conveniens is nothing more than

a judicially crafted rule of venue. In the domestic context,

a district court in one State cannot simply transfer the

case to another, more convenient State. If a federal district court has jurisdiction and venue is proper, the court

may only transfer a case before it in its entirety if “another

proper federal district court would be a more convenient

forum” for the entire case. Fed. Prac. & Proc. § 3828 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). In other words, “[t]he idea behind [Section] 1404(a) is that where a civil action to vindicate a wrong—however brought in court—presents issues

and requires witnesses that make one District Court more

convenient than another, the trial judge can . . . transfer

the whole action to the more convenient court.” Van

Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964) (emphasis

added) (quoting Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364

U.S. 19, 26 (1960)). So too must it be with forum non conveniens. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430 (recognizing that

modern venue statutes have largely replaced forum non

conveniens within the federal court system); see Fed.

Prac. & Proc. § 3828. “Venue” is the “process” of “determining which among various competent courts will decide

the case,” not which sovereign. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).

2. The Fourth Circuit erred in concluding otherwise.

The court started from the right premise—that “[a]t the

outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must

determine whether there exists an alternat[ive] forum.”

App., infra, 16a (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254

n.22). And it even paid lip service to the requirement that

“the alternate forum must be available as to all defendants—that is, all parties must come under the jurisdiction

of the foreign forum.” Ibid. But the court of appeals then

concluded that it sufficed for a defendant to identify a single available foreign country, not a single tribunal within

that country.

As the majority reasoned, a party seeking dismissal

for forum non conveniens need only “provide more than

generalized evidence to demonstrate that the alternative

forum is better, i.e., available.” App., infra, 17a (internal

quotation marks omitted). And to meet that burden, according to the court of appeals, nothing is required “beyond a showing that all parties are amenable to process in

the other jurisdiction”—that is, the foreign country at

large. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). AdvanFort may not be able to bring its claims in the same suit in

Saudia Arabia, but at least it would not have to litigate its

claims “in two different countries.” Id. at 19a (internal

quotation marks omitted).

That reasoning confuses different inquiries. To be

sure, there must be “an alternative forum” where the defendant is “amenable to process.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S.

at 254 n.22 (internal quotation marks omitted). But that

requirement says nothing about whether “forum” refers

to a single tribunal—as the plain meaning of that word dictates—or to a foreign country with multiple forums. And

Piper Aircraft certainly did not purport to hold that amenability to process is the be-all and end-all of “whether

there exists an alternative forum.” Ibid. To the contrary,

Piper Aircraft recognized that other reasons might render an alternative forum unavailable, such as “where the

alternative forum does not permit litigation of the subject

matter of the dispute.” Ibid.

The Fourth Circuit’s exclusive focus on service of process makes little sense. Under the court of appeals’ reading, as long as service may be made on a defendant, a forum would be “available,” even if the foreign court were

still unable to hear the plaintiff ’s claims for other reasons.

That cannot be right, as this case illustrates. If AdvanFort

served the Ports Authority in the Commercial Court, the

Ports Authority could accept service but immediately

move to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the Board

of Grievances has exclusive jurisdiction over suits against

government entities. See CA4 App. 242 (¶ 39); App., infra,

29a-30a (Thacker, J., dissenting). Similarly, serving Zamil

with process in the Board of Grievances does not render

that tribunal meaningfully available as to Zamil because

joining Zamil as a party—if even possible at all, see CA4

App. 242 (¶ 39) (Dr. Alaoudh explaining that it isn’t)—

would be, as Zamil’s own expert concedes, subject to that

court’s discretion, and even then only if certain conditions

are met, see id. at 323-34; see also Associação, 891 F.3d at

620 (“[A] foreign forum is not truly ‘available’—and a defendant is not meaningfully ‘amenable to process’ there—

if the foreign court cannot exercise jurisdiction over both

parties.”).

None of this Court’s precedents supports that result.

In Piper Aircraft, there was no suggestion that all the

parties and claims at issue in the California suit could not

be brought in a singular Scottish court. 454 U.S. 235. Indeed, the defendants “had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts,” had “waive[d] any statutory of limitations defense that might be available,” and,

as this Court emphasized, the parties could “resolve all

claims in one trial.” Id. at 259. In Sinochem, suit had already been brought in the Guangzhou Admiralty Court in

China. Sinochem 549 U.S. at 426-27, 435. Likewise in

Canada Malting Co., suit had already been brought “in

the admiralty court of Canada.” Canada Malting Co. v.

Patterson Steamships, 285 U.S. 413, 417 (1932). In Koster,

all the defendants were Illinois citizens, and nothing suggested the claims against them would be split into separate suits in Illinois. See Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens

Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 519 (1947). And in Gilbert

there was never any threat of having the case split up, as

there was only one defendant. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).

The majority justified the case splitting here because

AdvanFort’s claims would not “be[] ‘splintered’ across different countries.” App., infra, 19a & n.6. But the majority

provided no reason why that should make a difference.

Requiring a plaintiff to forgo a single suit in the United

States and to instead litigate its claims across multiple foreign courts is the opposite of convenient, no matter

whether those multiple courts are in the same or different

countries. Splitting a case across multiple courts within

the same country, no less than splitting a case across different countries, will still result in “piecemeal litigation

that is inherently inconvenient for both the parties and the

courts.” DIRTT, 65 F.4th at 555; see App., infra, 31a

(Thacker, J., dissenting).

Indeed, had the district court not erroneously dismissed the Ports Authority along with Zamil—even

though the Ports Authority defaulted and so never moved

to dismiss on any ground—this case would be split across

multiple countries. See App., infra, 13a-15a (majority

opinion). AdvanFort would be proceeding on the default

against the Ports Authority in Virginia, and against Zamil

in Saudi Arabi. The Fourth Circuit brushed this aside,

reasoning that the district court could exercise its inherent authority to dismiss a defaulted defendant based on

forum non conveniens. Id. at 13a. But “procedural defenses, such as a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,” are “lost” to a defaulted defendant. Tyco Fire, 218

Fed. App’x at 863-64; see Moreno v. LG Elecs., USA Inc.,

800 F.3d 692, 698 (5th Cir. 2015) (assuming “defaulting defendants cannot raise a forum non conveniens defense”

unless the default is set aside). Only by ignoring this distinction could the court of appeals claim that this suit

would not be split across multiple countries.

This Court should grant review and reverse the court

of appeals’ erroneous conception and application of forum

non conveniens.

C. The Question Presented Is Important and Recurring.

The question presented is plainly important. It concerns what circumstances justify stripping an American

plaintiff of its home forum to be forced to litigate in foreign

tribunals. Just as it is up to a plaintiff who to sue, and for

what claims, so too it is the plaintiff ’s choice on where to

sue. “[P]laintiffs are ordinarily allowed to select whatever

forum they consider most advantageous,” Atl. Marine

Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. Texas, 571 U.S. 49,

63 (2013)—something that this Court has called the plaintiff ’s “venue privilege,” Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 635. That

“choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241. Hence why “[a] defendant invoking forum non conveniens ordinarily bears a heavy

burden in opposing the plaintiff ’s chosen forum.” Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430.

Here, AdvanFort has not only been deprived of its chosen forum, but it must now proceed, if at all, in two different foreign courts with no assurance of receiving a fair

trial in either one. AdvanFort did not receive a fair shake

the last time it litigated in Saudi Arabia. It sued in the

Eastern District of Virginia to ensure that its case would

be heard before an independent judge, where its witnesses

will not be threatened or intimidated, and where it could

join its claims against the two defendants. Whether a federal court can deny AdvanFort that opportunity based on

the convenience of others is worthy of this Court’s review.

That question is particularly important in light of federal courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear cases

over which they have jurisdiction. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.

v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013); see Colo. River, 424 U.S.

at 817 (same). Forum non conveniens is an exception to

this duty—a judge-made doctrine that has been grounded

in a court’s inherent authority. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991); see Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45

(2016) (noting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “make

no provision . . . for forum non conveniens”). But it rests

on uneasy grounds.

In other contexts, this Court has explained that a

court’s “exercise of an inherent power cannot be contrary

to any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s

power contained in a rule or statute.” Dietz, 579 U.S. at

45. And yet “forum non conveniens might be said to exist

not only in the absence of enacted law on point but in spite

of it.” Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94

VA. L. REV. 813, 826 (2008). “[F]orum non conveniens exists in spite of jurisdiction and venue statutes that arguably instruct a district court to adjudicate.” Ibid. The

Court has thus rightly explained that it should be used

only rarely “with restraint and discretion.” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); see Gulf Oil,

330 U.S. at 509 (explaining forum non conveniens only applies in “rather rare cases”). Decisions expanding the doctrine, like the decision below, constitute an important exercise of judicial power that merit this Court’s review.

The question presented is also increasingly recurring.

In the decade after this Court’s 1947 decision in Gulf Oil,

“federal courts delivered [only] approximately twentynine forum non conveniens opinions.” Elizabeth T. Lear,

Congress, The Federal Courts, & Forum Non Conveniens:

Friction on the Frontier of Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L.

REV. 1147, 1151 (2006). “[A]lmost twice that many decisions were reported in 2003 alone.” Ibid. By 2017, district

judges were writing “dozens” of decisions “analyzing forum non conveniens each year”—to say nothing of oral orders—and granting dismissal in “roughly half.” Maggie

Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y. UNIV.

L. REV. 390, 396 & n.33 (2017).

Despite this Court’s admonitions, dismissal for forum

non conveniens is thus no longer a “rare” case, but a frequent occurrence. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 722; Gulf

Oil, 330 U.S. at 509. The Fourth Circuit’s decision promises to only make such dismissals more frequent still. The

courts of appeals have issued three published decisions in

cases presenting the case-splitting issue in just the last

four years. See App., infra, 1a-32a; DIRTT, supra;

Aenergy, supra. The Fourth Circuit’s express and published approval of case splitting will only encourage more

litigants to demand it.

The Court should grant review to ensure that the

lower courts continue to faithfully apply this Court’s forum non conveniens precedents without unduly expand-

ing the doctrine’s reach in unrestrained exercise of inherent power.

D. This Case Is an Ideal Vehicle for Addressing the

Question Presented.

Finally, this case offers an ideal vehicle for this Court

to address whether forum non conveniens allows case

splitting. AdvanFort has raised and preserved this question at every step of the way, and the court of appeals

squarely decided the issue below in a published opinion.

The proper understanding of the “alternative forum” requirement is “dispositive” of the forum non conveniens

analysis. App., infra, 29a (Thacker, J., dissenting); accord

Associação, 891 F.3d at 619-20 (“[I]dentifying an alternate

forum is a prerequisite for dismissal . . . . If there is no

suitable alternate forum where the case can proceed, the

entire inquiry ends.”). And forum non conveniens is the

key procedural issue in this case. The district court dismissed only on forum non conveniens grounds, App., infra, 52a, and the court of appeals focused only on this

threshold issue, App., infra, 28a. See Sinochem, 549 U.S.

at 425 (explaining that district courts may address forum

non conveniens before “any other threshold objection,”

even subject-matter jurisdiction). Reversal would allow

further proceedings in the Eastern District of Virginia,

while affirmance would end the U.S. litigation altogether—and any meaningful chance for AdvanFort to recover on its claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

H. Brent McKnight, Jr.

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

501 Fayetteville St.

Suite 500

Raleigh, NC 27601

(919) 755-6600

Jonathan Y. Ellis

Counsel of Record

Grace Greene Simmons

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

888 16th Street N.W.

Suite 500

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 828-2887

jellis@mcguirewoods.com

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: September 29, 2025

APPENDIX

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 22,

2025 ............................................................................ 1a

APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA,

FILED DECEMBER 1, 2023 .............................. 33a

APPENDIX C — DENIAL OF REHEARING

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT,

DATED MAY 30, 2025 .......................................... 53a

Appendix A

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 22, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1007

ADVANFORT COMPANY,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

ZAMIL OFFSHORE SERVICES COMPANY; SAUDI

PORTS AUTHORITY, a foreign sovereign State,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M.

Brinkema, District Judge. (1:23-cv-00906-LMB-IDD)

January 29, 2025, Argued

April 22, 2025, Opinion Filed

Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and

FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the

Appendix A

majority opinion, in which Senior Judge Floyd joined.

Judge Thacker wrote a dissenting opinion.

KING, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal from the Eastern District of

Virginia,

plaintiff

AdvanFort

Company

(“AdvanFort”) challenges the district court’s

December 1, 2023 dismissal of its complaint against

defendants Zamil Offshore Services Company

(“Zamil”) and the Saudi Ports Authority (the “Ports

Authority”) on the basis of forum non conveniens. See

AdvanFort Co. v. Zamil Offshore Servs. Co., 704 F.

Supp. 3d 669 (E.D. Va. 2023). On appeal, AdvanFort

primarily contends that the district court abused its

discretion in determining that the Saudi Arabian

judicial system is a more convenient forum to litigate

its tort claims than AdvanFort’s choice of forum, the

Eastern District of Virginia. AdvanFort also argues

that the court was procedurally barred from

dismissing its complaint after the court had entered

default against the Ports Authority for its failure to

appear.

Having carefully assessed the record and the

parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument,

we are satisfied that the district court did not err in its

dismissal of AdvanFort’s complaint on the basis of

forum non conveniens. We therefore affirm the

district court.

Appendix A

AdvanFort is a maritime security company

headquartered in Fairfax County, Virginia, that

deploys vessels to protect oil tankers and other

vulnerable ships from the threats posed by piracy in

international waters. In May 2012, AdvanFort

deployed a former British Naval vessel, the Seaman

Guard Virginia (the “Virginia”), to perform

contracted anti-piracy services for commercial fleets

in the Red Sea. While the Virginia was sailing the Red

Sea, AdvanFort determined that the vessel required

routine maintenance and minor repairs.

AdvanFort sought repair services from defendant

Zamil, a company that provided maritime

construction and maintenance services from a leased

shipyard (the “Jeddah Shipyard”) at the Jeddah

Islamic Port in Saudi Arabia. Zamil operated the

Jeddah Shipyard pursuant to a lease from the Ports

Authority, a Saudi government entity. On October 19,

2013, AdvanFort docked the Virginia at the Jeddah

Shipyard in what it describes as “in good condition.”

At some point in October 2013, Zamil proposed that it

would undertake electrical maintenance work on the

Virginia, and AdvanFort agreed. On October 27,

2013— while the Virginia was undergoing those

electrical repairs — a fire broke out below the vessel’s

deck.

AdvanFort believed that the fire aboard the Virginia

was caused by Zamil’s repair personnel, and thus, in 2014,

Appendix A

filed suit against Zamil and the Ports Authority in a Saudi

Arabian court. Zamil filed a countersuit against

AdvanFort shortly thereafter. Three years later — in

April 2017 — the Saudi court issued a judgment

dismissing AdvanFort’s claims and awarding Zamil

partial damages on its counterclaims. All the while, the

Virginia remained docked at the Jeddah Shipyard.

In early 2022, Zamil transferred the Virginia to a

storage yard located within the Jeddah Shipyard,

claiming that the vessel was at risk of sinking, thereby

creating an environmental or safety hazard. In June 2022,

Zamil informed AdvanFort that its lease agreement with

the Ports Authority was ending and that it would dispose

of the Virginia if AdvanFort did not retrieve the vessel.

AdvanFort then dispatched a marine expert from the

United States to inspect the Virginia. The inspection

revealed that the Virginia had been stripped bare — a

measure which Zamil claimed was necessary to facilitate

the transfer of the Virginia to its storage yard. In addition

to the removal of the ship’s engines, steering equipment,

and anchors, the inspection observed that the Jeddah

Shipyard had left the Virginia’s windows and hatches

open, causing the ship to rust.

On July 12, 2023, AdvanFort filed a five-count

complaint in the district court for the Eastern District of

Virginia against Zamil and the Ports Authority for

Appendix A

conversion, breach of bailment, negligence, and gross

negligence. It sought damages for the loss of the Virginia,

plus damages for the loss of profits resulting from

AdvanFort’s inability to deploy the vessel due to its

unserviceable condition.

AdvanFort properly served process on the Ports

Authority, a subdivision of the Saudi Arabian

government, pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608. 1 To effectuate

service of process, AdvanFort requested that the Clerk of

Court mail a service package containing the summons,

complaint, and notice of suit to the head of Saudi Arabia’s

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on

September 11, 2023. The service package was delivered to

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 25, 2023,

where it was accepted and signed for by an authorized

representative of the Ministry. 2

Section 1608 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act requires

“[s]ervice in the courts of the United States . . . upon a foreign state

or political subdivision of a foreign state” be made by “sending a copy

of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a

translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by

any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and

dispatched by the clerk of court to the head of the ministry of foreign

affairs of the foreign state concerned.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a),

(a)(3).

Service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) is deemed made “as

of the date of receipt indicated in the certification, signed and

returned postal receipt, or other proof of service applicable to the

method of service employed.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(c)(2). Pursuant to

§ 1608, service on the Ports Authority occurred on September 25,

2023, when the service package was signed for at the Ministry of

Appendix A

Zamil waived service on September 29, 2023. It then

moved to dismiss AdvanFort’s complaint in the Eastern

District of Virginia on the grounds of forum non

conveniens and for lack of personal jurisdiction,

contending that the Saudi courts are a more convenient

forum to litigate AdvanFort’s claims. On October 30, 2023,

AdvanFort opposed Zamil’s motion and moved for limited

discovery relating to forum non conveniens and personal

jurisdiction.

In opposition to Zamil’s motion to dismiss, AdvanFort

primarily argued that the Saudi courts are unavailable

and inadequate. In doing so, it contended that the Saudi

courts are neither independent nor impartial, and that no

Saudi tribunal was available for it to litigate its claims

against the Ports Authority and Zamil in a single action.

To support its claims of inadequacy, AdvanFort cited

various publicly sourced documents and tendered the

opinion of an expert witness to argue that the Saudi courts

would subject AdvanFort to unfair treatment and deprive

it of all remedies. Those arguments included, inter alia,

that lawyers and witnesses face retribution for supporting

lawsuits opposing the Saudi government or its allied

families; that judges, lawyers, and critics of the Saudi

justice system have been detained or tortured; that the

Saudi government is currently prosecuting multiple

judges for “high treason,” on the basis that those judges

have issued judgments perceived as adverse to the

Foreign Affairs. See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048,

1059 (2019) (explaining that “service is deemed to have occurred on

the date shown on a document signed by the person who received it

from the carrier”).

Appendix A

government; and that witnesses are treated unfairly or

discredited based on their gender or religion.

Although Zamil moved to dismiss AdvanFort’s

complaint, the Ports Authority failed to appear in the

Eastern District of Virginia within the 60-day time limit

mandated by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See

28 U.S.C. § 1608(d). 3 On November 30, 2023, AdvanFort

requested entry of default against the Ports Authority for

its failure to respond to the complaint or otherwise

appear.

On December 1, 2023, the district court conducted a

hearing on Zamil’s motion to dismiss. Before turning to

the merits of Zamil’s motion, the court acknowledged that

the Ports Authority had failed to file a responsive pleading

or otherwise appear in the proceedings, and was therefore

in default. Later that day, the court directed the Clerk to

file an entry of default against the Ports Authority,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) (“When

a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is

sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that

failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must

enter the party's default.”).

Section 1608(d) of Title 28 requires that “[i]n any action brought in

a court of the United States or of a State, a foreign state, a political

subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state

shall serve an answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint

within sixty days after service has been made under this section.”

Appendix A

The district court then informed the parties that it

intended to dismiss AdvanFort’s complaint on the basis of

forum non conveniens. The court thereafter denied

AdvanFort’s motion for limited discovery and dismissed

its claims against Zamil and the defaulted Ports

Authority. Later that day, the court filed its

Memorandum Opinion dismissing AdvanFort’s complaint,

concluding that the Saudi courts were available, adequate,

and more convenient in light of public and private

interests involved, explaining that all the relevant events

had occurred in Saudi Arabia and all relevant evidence

was located there.

In rendering its forum non conveniens decision, the

district court first rejected AdvanFort’s availability

contentions, determining that “[n]either of AdvanFort’s

arguments preclude the [c]ourt from finding that Saudi

courts are available to hear” the action “[m]erely because

the Ports Authority has not yet appeared” before the

Eastern Virginia court. See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d

at 675-76. It also rejected AdvanFort’s argument that the

Saudi courts were unavailable because AdvanFort may be

required to pursue its claims against the Ports Authority

and Zamil before separate tribunals — that is, the Saudi

Board of Grievances and the Saudi Commercial Court,

respectively. Because dismissal “would not force

AdvanFort to litigate in two different countries” — and

because together those separate tribunals possess

jurisdiction to hear and resolve AdvanFort’s claims — the

court found that “the Saudi courts provide[d] an available

forum to resolve AdvanFort’s claims against both

defendants.” Id. at 676.

Appendix A

The district court then turned to and assessed the

adequacy of the Saudi courts. After considering

AdvanFort’s arguments regarding corrupt practices in

the Saudi courts, the court determined that those

assertions were generalized allegations that were

insufficient to support the proposition that the Saudi

courts were inadequate. To illustrate that the Saudi courts

were capable of fairly adjudicating AdvanFort’s claims,

the court pointed to and emphasized the parties’ prior

litigation in Saudi Arabia, observing that “although the

[Saudi] court dismissed AdvanFort’s claims, it awarded

Zamil . . . less than one-third” of the repair fees Zamil had

sought in its countersuit. See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d

at 676- 77.

The district court then turned to the public and

private interests at stake in the litigation, ultimately

concluding that both weighed in favor of dismissing on the

basis of forum non conveniens. The court explained that

the private interest factors favored litigating the dispute

in the Saudi courts. Although the court recognized that

AdvanFort had brought suit in its home forum of Virginia,

it nevertheless “partially discounted” AdvanFort’s

citizenship in the United States and the presumptive

effect of its choice of forum because AdvanFort had

elected to do business abroad in Saudi Arabia. See

AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 678. And “[b]ecause the

relevant conduct occurred in Saudi Arabia” — not the

United States — and because AdvanFort was not in Saudi

Arabia when the alleged damage to the vessel occurred,”

the court recognized that “the parties will need to rely on

physical and testimonial evidence” located in Saudi

10a

Appendix A

Arabia. Id. at 678. The court also explained that, given the

claims at issue, it was likely that the litigation would

involve third-party witnesses who would not be under the

control of either party and over whom a Virginia court

would lack authority to compel testimony.

The district court similarly found that the public

interest factors weighed in favor of litigating AdvanFort’s

claims in Saudi Arabia. The court explained that, at

bottom, AdvanFort’s “action is about a vessel in Saudi

Arabia that was allegedly damaged by a Saudi company,

with Saudi employees, in a Saudi shipyard in Saudi

Arabia.” See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 679. The

Commonwealth of Virginia, therefore, had “little local

interest in a case involving an alleged tort arising from

performance of a contract overseas.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). And, in any event, the court

would need to apply Saudi law to AdvanFort’s claims

under Virginia’s choice of law statute. Id. (explaining that

Virginia’s choice of law statute mandates that a “court

must apply the law of the place where the last event

necessary to make an action liable for an alleged tort takes

place”).

In sum, after assessing the threshold questions of

availability and adequacy, and then weighing the public

and private interests at stake in the matter, the district

court determined that Saudi Arabia was a more

convenient forum for AdvanFort’s litigation. It therefore

dismissed AdvanFort’s complaint on the basis of forum

non conveniens.

11a

Appendix A

AdvanFort has timely appealed the district court’s

dismissal of its complaint, and we possess jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review a district court’s dismissal based on the

doctrine of forum non conveniens for abuse of discretion,

“disturbing its decision only when it failed to consider a

material factor or clearly erred in evaluating the factors

before it, or did not hold the defendants to their burden of

persuasion on all elements of the forum non conveniens

analysis.” See Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 731 (4th

Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations

omitted). “[A]bsent a ‘clear abuse of discretion,’ the

district court’s ‘decision deserves substantial deference.’”

See dmarcian, Inc. v. dmarcian Europe BV, 60 F.4th 119,

136 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,

454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981)).

III.

On appeal, AdvanFort maintains that the district

court abused its discretion in dismissing the AdvanFort

complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens, and thus

argues that these proceedings should be litigated in the

Eastern District of Virginia.

A federal court has the discretion to dismiss a case on

the ground of forum non conveniens where another forum

is more appropriate for adjudicating a dispute,

considering “the factual and legal issues of the underlying

12a

Appendix A

dispute.” See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l

Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423 (2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The forum non conveniens

doctrine requires a court to consider whether an

alternative forum is “available” or “adequate” and, if so,

whether the alternative forum is “more convenient in light

of the public and private interests involved.” See Jiali

Tang v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 656 F.3d 242, 248 (4th Cir.

2011). The moving party bears the burden of showing that

an adequate alternative forum exists. See Galustian v.

Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 731 (4th Cir. 2010).

And as we have recited previously, a forum non

conveniens determination is “committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court,” and we therefore afford its

decision substantial deference. See Piper Aircraft Co. v.

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). We discern no abuse of

discretion in the district court’s ruling that its forum non

conveniens inquiry in this matter favors a Saudi Arabian

forum, and we therefore affirm the dismissal of

AdvanFort’s claims against Zamil and the Ports Authority

on that basis, without addressing the parties’ contentions

regarding personal jurisdiction.4

The district court declined to reach and resolve Zamil’s arguments

regarding a lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants after

rendering its decision to dismiss AdvanFort’s complaint on the basis

of forum non conveniens. As the Supreme Court has held, “[a] district

court . . . may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens

dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal

jurisdiction, when considerations of convenience, fairness, and

judicial economy so warrant.” See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 422. In light

of the district court’s decision to dismiss AdvanFort’s complaint on

13a

Appendix A

Before assessing the district court’s dismissal on the

merits, we must address AdvanFort’s claim that the court

was precluded from dismissing its complaint because the

Ports Authority was in default. As AdvanFort asserts, an

entry of default limits the defenses available to the

defaulting defendant and, thus, the Ports Authority was

not entitled to raise or benefit from its codefendant

Zamil’s assertion of the procedural defense of forum non

conveniens. We are constrained to disagree.

As we have explained, “federal courts possess certain

implied or inherent powers that ‘are necessary to the

exercise of all others.’” See United States v. Moussaoui,

483 F.3d 220, 236 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v.

Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)). More

specifically, we have recognized that a district court has

“the inherent authority to control various aspects of the

cases before that court,” including the ability to “dismiss a

lawsuit sua sponte . . . on [the] grounds of forum non

conveniens.” Id. at 236- 37; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v.

Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947). With those principles in

mind, we discern no reasonable basis for us to limit the

district court’s inherent authority to dismiss this action on

the basis of forum non conveniens, simply because the

Ports Authority failed to move for dismissal.

Moreover, our Court has adhered to the longstanding

the basis of forum non conveniens, we decline to reach the issues

regarding personal jurisdiction raised on appeal.

14a

Appendix A

principle that “if the suit should be decided against the

complainant on the merits, the bill will be dismissed as to

all the defendants alike — the defaulter as well as the

others.” See Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552, 554 (1872).

We have thus recognized that where “a defending party

establishes that [a] plaintiff has no cause of action or

present right of recovery, this defense generally inures

also to the benefit of a defaulting defendant.” See U.S. ex

rel. Hudson v. Peerless Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 942, 945 (4th Cir.

1967) (internal citations omitted); see also, e.g., Equip.

Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Traverse Comput. Brokers, 973 F.2d 345,

348 (4th Cir. 1992) (explaining that when action against

defaulting codefendant “was ultimately dismissed, it is not

vulnerable to judgment”). And although our Court has not

applied this principle in the circumstances presented

here, we see no reason to ignore our precedent merely

because the contested decision to dispose of AdvanFort’s

action was based on “a non-merits ground for dismissal.”

See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 432 (explaining that a dismissal

on the basis of forum non conveniens “is a determination

that the merits should be adjudicated elsewhere”).

Indeed, it would be “absurd” and “unreasonable to

hold” that a district court is precluded from dismissing an

action against a defaulting codefendant “where the court

is satisfied from the proofs offered by the other” that a

more convenient forum exists. See Frow, 82 U.S. at 554.

As made clear by its decision, the district court was

satisfied that Zamil had satisfied its burden of

establishing an available and adequate alternative forum

as to both defendants. At the outset of its decision — and

after recognizing that the Ports Authority was in default

15a

Appendix A

— the court concluded that its forum non conveniens

analysis would equally apply to both Zamil and the Ports

Authority. See AdvanFort Co. v. Zamil Offshore Servs.

Co., 704 F. Supp. 3d 669, 675 (E.D. Va. 2023). The court

then carefully analyzed the threshold factors of

availability and adequacy with respect to Zamil and the

Ports Authority, ultimately concluding that those factors

weighed in favor of AdvanFort litigating its claims against

both defendants in the Saudi courts. E.g., id. at 675-77. We

therefore cannot say that the court erred in applying its

analysis equally to each defendant, or in ruling that Zamil

had satisfied its burden of establishing that the Saudi

courts are the more convenient forum.

Accordingly, we decline to adopt AdvanFort’s view

that the district court erred in dismissing the claims

against the defaulted Ports Authority.

Having determined that the district court did not err

in dismissing AdvanFort’s complaint when the Ports

Authority was in default, we will turn to and assess the

district court’s forum non conveniens ruling. AdvanFort

contends that the district court committed reversible

error in ruling that the Saudi courts are an available and

adequate forum. It also contends that the district court

erred in the final step of its forum non conveniens inquiry

by improperly balancing the public and private interest

factors at stake in this litigation. These errors, AdvanFort

maintains, amount to an abuse of the court’s discretion.

16a

Appendix A

“At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry,

the court must determine whether there exists an

alternate forum.” See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254

n.22 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ordinarily, this

requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is

‘amenable to process’ in the other jurisdiction.” Id. (citing

Gulf Oil Corp., 330 at 506-07). And, importantly, “the

alternate forum must be available as to all defendants” —

that is, all parties must come under the jurisdiction of the

foreign forum. See Galustian, 591 F.3d at 731 (citing

Alpine View Co. v. Atlas Copco AB, 205 F.3d 208, 221 (5th

Cir. 2000)).

As the district court explained, AdvanFort “does not

contest that Saudi courts would have jurisdiction over

both defendants.” See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 675.

Rather, AdvanFort claims that the Saudi courts are

rendered unavailable because it may be forced to bring its

claims against Zamil and the Ports Authority in two

different tribunals, both located in the city of Jeddah: The

Commercial Court and the Board of Grievances,

respectively. 5 The Board of Grievances, as AdvanFort

argues,

exercises

“exclusive

jurisdiction

over

administrative cases and lawsuits filed against

government bodies” like the Ports Authority. See

AdvanFort’s expert witness observed that “[i]t appears” from

filings in the parties’ prior Saudi litigation that “the Commercial

Court in these cases was located within the Board of Grievances, as

the Board of Grievances address is listed. Though in the same

location, the two venues are legally distinct.” See J.A. 239 n.34.

17a

Appendix A

Appellant’s Br. 27. And AdvanFort maintains that “the

Ports Authority cannot be brought before the Commercial

Court,” where its claims against Zamil would be litigated.

Id. at 28.

AdvanFort thus urges us to hold that a defendant

moving for dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens

bears the burden of identifying a single available

alternative forum. Our precedent, however, does not go so

far as to demand that a defendant must identify a single

tribunal in a foreign jurisdiction where all claims brought

by a plaintiff may be heard and resolved. Rather, we

require only that a defendant provide more than

generalized evidence to demonstrate that “the alternative

forum is better,” i.e., available. See Kontoulas v. A.H.

Robins Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1984)

(explaining that letter suggesting Maryland physician

“will consent to personal jurisdiction in Australia” was

insufficient to establish available alternative forum); see

also Galustian, 591 F.3d at 730-31 (vacating forum non

conveniens dismissal as premature where “no evidence

was proffered regarding the availability of the forum” as

to codefendant). And although we have recognized that a

defendant can meet its availability burden by “indicat[ing]

which court provides the alternative forum,” instead of

merely “suggest[ing] the country,” we have not required

anything beyond a showing that all parties are “amenable

to process in the other jurisdiction.” See Kontoulas, 745

F.2d at 316; Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.

In light of our precedent, we cannot say that the

district court’s availability analysis was improper —

18a

Appendix A

particularly where, as the court recognized, “the parties’

Saudi Arabian attorneys dispute whether AdvanFort

would have to sue each defendant in a different Saudi

tribunal.” See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 676. Despite

this disagreement, this was not a case where “the record

before the court was so fragmentary that it [was]

impossible to make a sound determination.” See El-Fadl

v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 677 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (explaining that defendants “must provide enough

information to enable the District Court to evaluate

alternative forum”) (internal citations omitted). Indeed,

our review of the record demonstrates that Zamil

provided detailed information in its expert’s affidavit

regarding the availability of the Saudi courts. See, e.g.,

J.A. 323-24 (explaining that a claimant is allowed “to

request that the [Board of Grievances] involve another

party in the case”). Only after reviewing the evidence did

the court decide to credit the opinion of Zamil’s Saudi legal

expert, who had explained that the Board of Grievances

has the discretion to hear claims against both the Ports

Authority and Zamil. We discern no instance in the court’s

analysis demonstrating that it “did not hold the

defendants to their burden of persuasion” on this issue.

See Galustian, 591 F.3d at 731.

Moreover, the district court correctly recognized that,

in circumstances where “courts have denied motions to

dismiss for forum non conveniens,” those courts did so

only “when dismissing the actions would split claims

against domestic defendants from foreign defendants,

thereby forcing plaintiffs to litigate in two different

countries.” See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 676

19a

Appendix A

(explaining that AdvanFort “cite[d] inapposite cases”). 6

The court then reasoned that — unlike in the decisions it

reviewed — “dismissing this action would not force

AdvanFort to litigate in two different countries.” Id.

“[A]nd because together the Board of Grievances and the

Commercial Court have jurisdiction to hear AdvanFort’s

claims against defendants,” the Saudi courts are available

“to resolve AdvanFort’s claims against both defendants.”

Id. We cannot say, therefore, that the court’s ruling

constituted an abuse of its discretion. We thus agree that

the Saudi courts provide an available alternative forum to

litigate AdvanFort’s claims.

AdvanFort next argues that the district court erred in

evaluating the Saudi courts’ adequacy as an alternative

forum. Specifically, AdvanFort contends that the court

misconstrued its claims of judicial corruption and

unfairness as “generalized” or “anecdotal,” thereby

disregarding the detailed evidence from its expert witness

Our sister circuits appear to have routinely declined to find that an

available forum exists in instances where a dismissal for forum non

conveniens would result in the parties being “splintered” across

different countries. See DIRTT Env’t Sols., Inc. v. Falkbuilt Ltd., 65

F.4th 547, 554 (10th Cir. 2023); see also Associacao Brasileira de

Medicina de Grupo v. Stryker Corp., 891 F.3d 615, 621 (6th Cir.

2018); Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 867 (7th

Cir. 2015).

20a

Appendix A

supporting those claims. See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d

at 676-78. We find no merit to AdvanFort’s contentions.

As with the other forum non conveniens factors, the

burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that a foreign

forum is adequate — or, in other words, that “all parties

can come within that forum’s jurisdiction, and the parties

will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly.”

See Tang, 656 F.3d at 249. We recognize, however, that

“rare circumstances” exist “where the remedy offered by

the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory.” See Piper

Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254 n.22. In those circumstances,

“the other forum may not be an adequate alternative, and

the initial requirement may not be satisfied.” Id.

Initially, we observe that AdvanFort does not contest

that the Saudi courts permit the litigation of this dispute.

AdvanFort instead argues that the Saudi legal system is

corrupt and thus incapable of adjudicating its dispute

fairly. Although allegations such as those AdvanFort

advances are not to be taken lightly, we must emphasize

that an adequate forum need not be a perfect forum. See,

e.g., Compania Naviera Joanna SA v. Koninklijke

Boskalis Westminster NV, 569 F.3d 189, 205 (finding

adequate foreign forum despite differences in limitationof-liability process).

Indeed, courts have recognized that a forum is not

rendered inadequate merely because it applies less

favorable substantive law, utilizes different adjudicatory

procedures, or because of general allegations of

corruption in the forum’s judicial system. See Compania

21a

Appendix A

Naviera, 569 F.3d at 202 (“[A] difference in the law in the

two forums . . . is not sufficient to bar application of the

forum non conveniens doctrine.”); see also Lockman

Found. v. Evangelical All. Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 768 (9th

Cir. 1991); Blanco v. Blanco Indus. de Venezuela, 997

F.2d 974, 981-82 (2d Cir. 1993). And courts should be

hesitant“to pass value judgments on the adequacy of

justice and the integrity” of a foreign forum’s judicial

system based only on “conclusory” allegations or

“sweeping generalizations.” See In re Arbitration

Between Monegasque De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak

Naftogaz of Ukraine., 311 F.3d 488, 499 (2d Cir. 2002). As

such, “anecdotal evidence of corruption and delay

provides [an] insufficient basis” for concluding that a

foreign forum is inadequate. See Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs

must instead demonstrate that they would face serious

obstacles to conducting litigation, such as “extreme

amounts of partiality or inefficiency,” or “a complete

absence of due process or an inability of the forum to

provide substantial justice to the parties.” See Leon v.

Million Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001);

Monegasque, 311 F.3d at 499.

Our review of the record in this matter shows that the

district court did not err in determining that AdvanFort’s

allegations were generalized or anecdotal, and therefore

insufficient to sustain its claims that the Saudi courts are

incapable of adjudicating its dispute. In assessing those

allegations, the court reviewed numerous cases from

other jurisdictions where plaintiffs advanced similar

claims. Although AdvanFort argues that the court’s

22a

Appendix A

reliance on these cases — which it asserts are inapposite

— is erroneous, we are satisfied that the court’s thorough

review of AdvanFort’s allegations was both consistent and

reasonable, considering the rulings of other courts and the

nature of AdvanFort’s claims.

We also identify no error in the district court’s

weighing of AdvanFort’s prior Saudi litigation. See

AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 676-77. The court was

correct to point out that the reduction of damages totalling

nearly one-third of those sought by Zamil in its

countersuit “misaligns” with AdvanFort’s claims that “the

Saudi judicial system, as a whole, is corrupt and thus

incapable of adjudicating disputes.” Id. at 676. We

therefore agree with the court that AdvanFort’s

allegations are not sufficient to sustain a determination

that the Saudi judicial system is so corrupt or biased as to

be an inadequate forum for litigating AdvanFort’s

complaint.

“If the alternative forum is both available and

adequate, the district court must weigh the public and

private interest factors.” See Tang, 656 F.3d at 249. That

is, it must evaluate “the balance of conveniences” to

determine if a “trial in the chosen forum would be

unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the

court.” See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 256 n.23. Before

engaging with its analysis of the public and private

interest factors, however, a court “must establish the

appropriate level of deference owing to the [plaintiff’s]

23a

Appendix A

choice of forum.” See DiFederico v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,

714 F.3d 796, 802 (4th Cir. 2013). It is with this threshold

inquiry that AdvanFort contends the district court

initially erred by failing to determine the proper level of

deference given to AdvanFort’s choice of forum, the

Eastern District of Virginia. It argues that, as a Virginia

corporation bringing its claims in a Virginia court, it is

entitled to increased deference.

AdvanFort is correct that ordinarily, “a citizen

plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to even greater

deference when the plaintiff chooses her ‘home forum.’”

See DiFederico, 714 F.3d at 802-03 (quoting Piper

Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255-56). But we have recognized

that in circumstances where “the plaintiff is a corporation

doing business abroad,” it “should expect to litigate in

foreign courts.” Id. at 807. Indeed, where an American

corporation engaged in “extensive foreign business . . .

brings an action for injury occurring in a foreign country,

many courts have partially discounted the plaintiff’s

United States citizenship.” Id. (first quoting Reid-Walen

v. Hansen, 933 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1991); and then

citing Mizokami Bros. of Ariz., Inc. v. Baychem Corp.,

556 F.2d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1977)). In determining the

deference applied to a plaintiff’s choice of forum, we have

recognized that a court should demonstrate through

“affirmative evidence that [it] did in fact consider this

heightened standard when it conducted its analysis.” Id.

at 803.

And that is precisely what the district court did here:

Rather than merely implying that it gave less deference

24a

Appendix A

to AdvanFort’s choice of forum, the district court

explicitly set forth its reasoning to “partially discount” the

deference afforded to AdvanFort. See AdvanFort, 704 F.

Supp. 3d at 678; cf. DiFederico, 714 F.3d at 803 (explaining

that court’s failure to provide “affirmative evidence” was

abuse of discretion). The district court first explained that,

although AdvanFort sued in its home forum, it had

“elected to do business with Zamil in Saudi Arabia” and

therefore “should expect to litigate in foreign courts.” See

AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 678. And so the court

“partially discount[ed] AdvanFort’s United States

Citizenship.” Id. We cannot say, therefore, that the court

erred in applying our precedent in DiFederico, or by

partially discounting the deference owed to AdvanFort’s

choice of forum.

After establishing the proper level of deference, the

district court turned to evaluating the private interest

factors at stake in this dispute. As we have acknowledged,

“the forum non conveniens doctrine is ultimately

concerned with convenience, not simply the locus of

alleged wrongful conduct.” See Tang, 656 F.3d at 252. To

guide this inquiry, the Supreme Court has explained that

a court should consider private interest factors such as the

“relative ease of access to sources of proof,” the

“availability of compulsory process” and the “cost of

obtaining the attendance” of witnesses, the possibility of

viewing the premises, plus “all other practical problems

that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and

inexpensive.” See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6;

see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).

25a

Appendix A

AdvanFort, however, contends that the court failed in its

consideration of those factors. We disagree.

We are satisfied that the district court properly

exercised its discretion in weighing the relevant factors,

most notably by recognizing that “the relevant conduct

occurred in Saudi Arabia,” and thus “the parties will need

to rely on physical and testimonial evidence located in

Saudi Arabia, including Jeddah Shipyard employees,

AdvanFort’s marine expert, and physical evidence such as

the vessel which remains in Saudi Arabia.” See

AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 678. The court also

observed that it lacks the authority to compel the

attendance of Saudi witnesses, which would “greatly

undermin[e] a fact-finding effort” in Virginia. See Tang,

656 F.3d at 252. Moreover, because AdvanFort’s claims

“involves events spread over ten years at a Saudi Arabian

shipyard — including allegations that Zamil allowed the

vessel to be looted by third parties,” the court found it

“reasonable to expect that litigation of the case will involve

third-party witnesses who are not under either party’s

control.” See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 678 (internal

citations and alterations omitted). We discern no error

with the court’s findings. In sum, the court was well within

its discretion in concluding that the private interest

factors favored dismissal.

The same is true of the district court’s assessment of

the public interest factors in this case. We have explained

that “pertinent public interest factors are the local

interest in having localized controversies decided at home;

the avoidance of complex comparative law issues; and the

26a

Appendix A

unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum

with jury duty.” See Tang, 656 F.3d at 252 (citing Piper

Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6). Because “this is a case

about a ship in Saudi Arabia that was allegedly damaged

by a Saudi company, in a shipyard in Saudi Arabia,

pursuant to a contract to perform services in Saudi

Arabia,” the court correctly reasoned that the Saudi

courts “seemingly would have a significant interest in

hearing a dispute about a contract performed in Saudi

Arabia.” See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 679. And it is

true that, as the court recognized, the Commonwealth of

Virginia’s interests in this case “are minimal.” Id.

We thus agree that, in the circumstances presented

by this dispute — specifically, “where the controversy’s

contacts with the United States pale in comparison” to its

foreign contacts — “jury duty ought not to be imposed

upon the people of the United States nor should United

States courts be clogged.” See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp.

3d at 679 (internal quotation marks omitted). Virginia

residents “should therefore not be saddled with resolving”

AdvanFort’s dispute. See Tang, 656 F.3d at 252.

Moreover, there is little doubt that the court would

likely “encounter complex issues” of Saudi Arabian law

given the circumstances presented by AdvanFort’s

claims. See AdvanFort, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 679. Because

“[t]he forum non conveniens doctrine exists largely to

avoid such comparative law problems,” we agree that

dismissal is appropriate for that reason as well. See Tang,

656 F.3d at 252; see also Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at

251 (“The doctrine of forum non conveniens . . . is designed

27a

Appendix A

in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises

in comparative law.”). Put simply, the district court did

not abuse its discretion by concluding that the public

interest factors favor Saudi Arabia as the most

appropriate forum.

AdvanFort’s final contention challenges the district

court’s denial of limited discovery regarding what it

characterizes as “critical factual disputes relevant to

forum non conveniens.” See Appellant’s Br. 62. More

specifically, it sought discovery on the adequacy or

fairness of the Saudi courts, as well as the location and

language of witnesses and evidence.

Notably, the parties each presented detailed expert

affidavits supporting their positions regarding the

availability and adequacy of the Saudi courts. Those

affidavits were a proper basis for resolution by the district

court of Zamil’s motion to dismiss because, as the

Supreme Court has made clear, a forum non conveniens

inquiry “does not necessarily require extensive

investigation, and may be resolved on affidavits presented

by the parties.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517,

529 (1988).

Moreover, Zamil — which had the burden of showing

that the Saudi courts were a more convenient forum —

presented evidence regarding its witnesses and otherwise

adequately demonstrated that the interests of

convenience weighed in its favor. The district court,

28a

Appendix A

therefore, had “enough information to enable [it] to

balance the parties’ interests” on those issues without

ordering further discovery. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454

U.S. at 258. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that

there was no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to

deny additional discovery, particularly where “[r]equiring

extensive investigation would defeat the purpose of [the]

motion.” Id.

IV.

Pursuant to the foregoing, the district court’s

dismissal of AdvanFort’s complaint on the basis of the

doctrine of forum non conveniens is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

29a

Appendix A

THACKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

As an initial matter, I agree with the majority that the

district court was not precluded from granting a forum

non conveniens dismissal by virtue of the Ports

Authority’s default. But, as to the forum non conveniens

analysis, I depart from the majority on a single -- but

dispositive -- issue. Dismissal for forum non conveniens

requires the existence of one alternate, adequate, and

available forum. Because Saudi Arabia would require the

case be split between two courts, I would vacate the forum

non conveniens dismissal. Therefore, I respectfully

dissent.

As the majority explains, “[a]t the outset of any forum

non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine

whether there exists an alternate forum.” Piper Aircraft

Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (emphases

supplied). “[T]he alternate forum must be available as to

all defendants.” Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 731 (4th

Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (emphases supplied). We have

explained that a party seeking to demonstrate the

availability of an alternative forum must “indicate what

court provides the alternative forum” rather than “only

suggest[ing] the country.” Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins Co.,

Inc., 745 F.2d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphases in

original).

Here, Zamil argues that Saudi Arabia is an adequate

and available alternative forum because “Saudi courts

would have jurisdiction over both defendants.” Ante at 15

(citation omitted). But, as we have indicated, simply

30a

Appendix A

naming the country is inadequate. As AdvanFort’s Saudi

legal expert explained, the Saudi Board of Grievances is

the court with “exclusive jurisdictions over administrative

cases and lawsuits filed against government bodies” like

the Ports Authority. J.A. 242. The Board of Grievances

does not have authority over commercial entities like

Zamil. AdvanFort’s Saudi legal expert explained:

Thus, if litigated in Saudi Arabia,

AdvanFort’s claims against the Saudi Ports

Authority would have to be litigated before

the Board of Grievances. However, the Board

of Grievances’ jurisdiction does not extend to

commercial cases brought against nongovernment parties. Consequently, since

AdvanFort’s claims concern conversion,

breach of bailment, negligence, and gross

negligence, those claims against Zamil would

have to be litigated before a different court:

the Commercial Court. There is no forum in

Saudi Arabia where AdvanFort could bring

its claims against both Defendants.

J.A. 242. *

Zamil’s legal expert did not meaningfully refute this

claim. Instead, he offered only that the Board of

Grievances “allows a claimant that has submitted a

lawsuit” before it “to request that [it] involve another

party in the case provided that the conditions required by

Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties

to this appeal.

31a

Appendix A

the relevant law are met.” J.A. 323. Thus, Zamil’s expert

claimed that AdvanFort’s evaluation was “not entirely

accurate” because the Board of Grievances could decide to

allow the claims against Zamil to be heard there too. J.A.

324. Notably, however, Zamil’s expert did not explain

what the “conditions required by the relevant law” are,

nor did he provide an analysis or opinion as to whether

those requirements could be satisfied here.

The majority posits that “[o]ur precedent . . . does not

go so far as to demand that a defendant must identify a

single tribunal in a foreign jurisdiction where all claims

brought by a plaintiff may be heard and resolved.” Ante

at 16. I disagree. We have explicitly recognized that it is

insufficient for a party seeking forum non conveniens to

identify only the country, rather than the specific court

that would serve as the forum. See Kontoulas, 745 F.2d at

316. And as one of our sister circuits has explained, forum

non conveniens “is not available as a tool to split or

bifurcate cases” as that “fundamentally contradicts the

‘central purpose’ of forum non conveniens because it only

increases the possibility of overlapping, piecemeal

litigation that is inherently inconvenient for both the

parties and the courts.” DIRTT Env’t Solutions, Inc. v.

Falkbuilt Ltd., 65 F.4th 547, 555 (10th Cir. 2023) (citations

omitted).

Here, requiring AdvanFort to litigate its claims

against Zamil and the Ports Authority in separate Saudi

courts creates piecemeal litigation and increases the

possibility of overlapping and inconsistent judgments.

And it forces AdvanFort to incur the costs and

32a

Appendix A

inconvenience associated with litigating not one, but two,

cases in separate tribunals.

Given all of this, I would conclude that forum non

conveniens is unavailable in this case because there is not

a single alternative forum available to all defendants. I

would vacate the district court’s dismissal and allow

AdvanFort to proceed on its claims in its home forum, the

Eastern District of Virginia.

33a

Appendix B

APPENDIX B — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA,

FILED DECEMBER 1, 2023

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

No. 1:23-cv-906 (LMB/IDD)

ADVANFORT COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

ZAMIL OFFSHORE SERVICES COMPANY; SAUDI

PORTS AUTHORITY, a foreign sovereign State,

Defendants.

December 1, 2023, Decided;

December 1, 2023, Filed

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Brinkema, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant Zamil Offshore

Services Company's ("Zamil") Motion to Dismiss plaintiff

AdvanFort's ("AdvanFort") Complaint based on forum

non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction under

34a

Appendix B

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) ("Motion to Dismiss"). [Dkt. No.

23]. 1 More specifically, Zamil, a Saudi company that

operates a local shipyard in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, argues

that the Court should dismiss the Complaint based on

forum non conveniens because the Saudi courts, which

are already familiar with the facts that underlie this

dispute, are available, adequate, and more convenient in

light of the public and private interests involved, including

that all the relevant events occurred in Saudi Arabia and

all the relevant evidence and witnesses (other than

AdvanFort) are in Saudi Arabia. [Dkt. No. 24] at 2. Zamil

also argues that the Court should dismiss the Complaint

for lack of personal jurisdiction because Zamil, who has no

United States offices or employees and has never repaired

a ship in the United States, did not purposefully avail itself

of the privilege of doing business in the Commonwealth of

Virginia. Id.

AdvanFort opposes Zamil's Motion to Dismiss,

arguing that the choice of its home forum is entitled to

heightened deference, and Saudi Arabia is an inadequate

and inappropriate forum. [Dkt. No. 34] at 9-10. AdvanFort

also argues that the Court has personal jurisdiction over

Zamil because it is "a global company that appears to

employ individuals in the United States, and in Virginia

Defendant Saudi Ports Authority was properly served pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3) by mailing documents to the Minister of

Foreign Affairs at the address of the Saudi Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. See [Dkt. No. 33]. It has not yet filed

a responsive pleading. Pursuant to§ 1608(d), because it was served on

September 25, 2023, defendant Saudi Arabia Ports Authority should

have filed a responsive pleading by Monday, November 27, 2023.

35a

Appendix B

specifically" and because Zamil has purposefully availed

itself of the privilege of conducting business in Virginia.

Id. at 34-35. For the reasons that follow, Zamil's Motion to

Dismiss will be GRANTED. 2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

According to the Complaint, in May 2012, AdvanFort,

a Virginia-based company that deploys armed security

vessels to protect oil tankers and other vulnerable ships

against piracy, chartered a former British Navy vessel,

the Seaman Guard Virginia, for a period of 36 months.

[Dkt. No. I] at ¶ 23. In that same year, AdvanFort directed

the Seaman Guard Virginia to depart the Port of

Baltimore for the Red Sea. Id. at ¶ 28. Upon arrival in the

Red Sea, the vessel perfonned anti-piracy services

To the extent the Court "has any doubt as to whether [Zamil's]

Motion should be denied," AdvanFort has filed a Motion for Limited

Discovery on Personal Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens and

to Stay Motion to Dismiss of Zamil ("Motion for Limited Discovery")

[Dkt. No. 38], requesting "that the Court stay its consideration to

allow limited discovery targeted to the factual issues raised therein."

[Dkt. No. 39] at 5. Zamil opposes the Motion, arguing that "the Court

[] has the factual information it needs to resolve the legal questions

in the motion to dismiss, based on controlling Fourth Circuit law, and

allowing discovery would only further waste the parties' time and

resources." [Dkt. No. 42]. Because the Court finds that this

Complaint must be dismissed for forum non conveniens,

AdvanFort's Motion for Limited Discovery will be denied.

36a

Appendix B

pursuant to contracts that AdvanFort entered into with

commercial fleets. Id.

In 2013, defendant the Saudi Ports Authority, which

owns the Jeddah Islamic Port, entered into an agreement

to partner with defendant Zamil to jointly and

commercially operate a shipyard at the Jeddah Islamic

Port for a period of ten years (hereinafter, "Jeddah

Shipyard"). Id. at ¶¶ 30-31. That same year, the Seaman

Guard Virginia needed routine maintenance and minor

repairs. After seeing Zamil's advertisement in a magazine

called The Baltic Exchange and reading about the

company in The Maritime Executive Magazine,

AdvanFort sought the services of Jeddah Shipyard. Id. at

¶¶ 39, 58.

On September 23, 2013, Jeddah Shipyard provided

AdvanFort a quote, which included the corporate logos of

both defendants, offering to perfonn basic maintenance

services, including: hull cleaning; hull inspection; anchor

and chain inspection and cleaning; seawater valves

overhauling; and pipes and steel renewal for $46,550.00

and stated that the "[t]ime frame for [the] above defined

works [would be] 12 days in nonnal stable conditions." Id.

at ¶ 70. AdvanFort accepted the quote and wired

$20,000.00 to Zamil from its Virginia bank account. Id. at

¶ 72.

On October 19, 2013, AdvanFort delivered the vessel

to Jeddah Shipyard's dry dock in good condition. At the

time of delivery, the vessel required only routine

maintenance and minor repairs, id. at ¶ 74; however, at

37a

Appendix B

some point in October 2013, Jeddah Shipyard proposed

that electrical work be perfonned on the vessel. On

October 21, 2013, AdvanFort approved the proposal. Id.

at ¶ 77.

On October 27, 2013, a fire broke out on the vessel

below deck. 3 Id. at ¶ 79. Hours after the fire, the Saudi

government issued a report concluding that the fire was

caused by an electrical short circuit in the living room. 4 Id.

at ¶ 87. On December 15, 2013, the Director of Saudi

Arabia's Maritime Administration released a report that

attributed the cause of the fire to AdvanFort and the

vessel's electrical system. 5 Id. at ¶ 89.

AdvanFort spends much of its Complaint explaining how it believes

that Zamil was negligent in its handling of electrical work and

"because of the failures by Jeddah Shipyard to check for and remove

combustible material prior to performing hot work, the work taking

place on the deck ignited combustible materials underneath the

deck." Id. at ¶ 84. Because AdvanFort already litigated and lost this

issue in a Saudi court, this portion of the Complaint is not directly at

issue in this action.

AdvanFort disagrees with the Saudi government's report because

it "did not consider the root cause of the supposed electrical short

circuit, nor did it consider that the supposed short circuit could have

been caused by the hot work that Jeddah Shipyard had been

conducting on the vessel that day." Id. at ¶ 88.

AdvanFort also challenges the Maritime Administration's report

because it "contained supposed findings that were demonstrably

false," including that "the hot work on the port side (the same side as

the fire) had been completed before the fire occurred on October 27,

2013, and that the hot work on the day of the fire was on the opposite

side of the fire (the starboard side), even though governmental

investigators possessed the hot work permit, which expressly stated

38a

Appendix B

According to the Complaint, on October 28, 2013, the

day after the fire, AdvanFort received notice that Jeddah

Shipyard intended to undock the vessel mid-repair, which

would leave it vulnerable to water damage. Id. at ¶ 99.

When AdvanFort wrote to Jeddah Shipyard demanding

that it not undock the vessel, Jeddah Shipyard responded

by requesting that AdvanFort sign a statement of

responsibility for the fire, which AdvanFort refused to do.

Id. Jeddah Shipyard then ceased performing any work on

the vessel. Id. at ¶ 100.

On December 26, 2013, AdvanFort wrote to Zamil

seeking prompt repair of the vessel's fire-related damage.

Id. at ¶ 103. On January 25, 2014, Zamil wrote to

AdvanFort "denying responsibility for the fire; accusing

AdvanFort of causing the delay in the regular

maintenance and scheduled repair by falsely claiming

that AdvanFort had neglected to furnish spare parts;

and, most egregiously, demanding payment from

AdvanFort for purported damage suffered by Jeddah

Shipyard as a result of the fire that Jeddah Shipyard had

itself caused." Id. at ¶ 104. As a result, on April 14, 2014,

AdvanFort commenced a civil action against Zamil in

Saudi Arabia in the Third Commercial Circuit of the

Jeddah Board of Grievances seeking $825,986.00 per

month for damages caused by the fire. [Dkt. No. 1] at ¶

105. Zamil filed a countersuit, which according to

AdvanFort, "falsely claimed that the fire was somehow

that the hot work occurred on the forward port side of the vessel." Id.

at ¶ 89. This, according to the Complaint, evinces that Jeddah

Shipyard "influenced both reports by improper means." Id. at ¶ 90.

39a

Appendix B

AdvanFort's fault and falsely asserted that any delay in

repairing the vessel was attributable to AdvanFort's own

supposed delay in furnishing spare parts." Id. at ¶ 106.

Zamil sought $147,523.00 in berthing fees and $717,800.00

in repair costs. 6 Id. The Complaint alleges that,

throughout the Saudi litigation, Zamil "sought to taint the

legal process," by among other things, pressuring the

captain of the Seaman Guard Virginia, Yurii Fedorenko,

to change his testimony and making one of AdvanFort's

witnesses fearful to testify "against the interests of the

powerful Zamil family." Id. at ¶¶ 112, 119. At a hearing

that took place on June 16, 2014, the Saudi court stated

that it would appoint a marine expert in light of technical

issues raised by the action; however, the Saudi court

subsequently reversed course. Id. at ¶ 121. Instead, in

April 2017, the Saudi court, without appointing a marine

expert, issued a judgment dismissing AdvanFort's claims

and awarding Zamil $40,000.00 in damages and

unspecified berthing fees. Id.

According to the Complaint, on December 8, 2014, Zamil Offshore,

through its legal representative, offered to settle the dispute by

wiring 10 million Saudi Royals (approximately US $2.7 million) to

AdvanFort. Under the terms of the offer, however, AdvanFort had

to: (a) agree that the fire was an "Act of God" and (b) "pay the guys"

to have the Saudi Government's report revised to change the cause of

the fire, on the basis of which Zamil Offshore would make a claim to

its insurer. Id. at ¶ 108. AdvanFort understood the putative

settlement offer to mean that Zamil would arrange a bribe to the

relevant Saudi authorities, who, in exchange for payment, would

amend their report regarding the cause of the fire. Id. at ¶ 109.

AdvanFort refused the offer. Id. at ¶ 110.

40a

Appendix B

On June 29, 2022, Zamil, through counsel, informed

AdvanFort that "unless AdvanFort contacted Mr.

Allastair Bisset," Zamil's General Manager, "regarding its

plans to remove the Seaman Guard Virginia within 90

days of that letter, Zamil Offshore itself would take

'appropriate steps' to remove the Seaman Guard Virginia

including disposing of the vessel. Id. at ¶ 124.

On September 4, 2022, AdvanFort's marine expert

inspected the vessel and discovered that it "had been

stripped bare and rendered inoperable." Id. at ¶ 127.

According to the Complaint, the inspection revealed that

Jeddah Shipyard had undertaken no meaningful efforts to

preserve or protect the vessel or associated equipment.

Id. at ¶ 132. Jeddah Shipyard employees informed the

marine expert that the vessel had been removed from the

water due to fears that it would sink and become a hazard

to local navigation. Id. The inspection also revealed that

the vessel "was stripped of all items of value," including

among other things, engines, a speed boat, TVs, air

conditioners, a washing machine, steering equipment, and

anchors. Id. at ¶ 133. The Complaint concludes that

Jeddah Shipyard wrongly, and without right, assumed

ownership of the engines, along with all the other stripped

parts, materials, and instruments. Id. at ¶ 139.

B. Procedural History

Recognizing that res judicata prohibits it from

relitigating the cause of the 2013 fire, AdvanFort filed a

41a

Appendix B

five-count civil action in this Court against both Zamil and

the Saudi Ports Authority, alleging that it has been

"denied use" of the vessel since the fire because of the

deterioration of the boat's condition. 7 More specifically,

the five-count Complaint alleges conversion (Count I),

because Jeddah Shipyard lacked any right to assume

authority over or to convert the Seaman Guard Virginia,

its materials, instruments, engines, and parts, id. at ¶ 145;

breach of a bailment - tort (Count II), because while under

Jeddah Shipyard's control, the vessel was destroyed and

rendered useless and valueless which was proximately

caused by the negligence of Jeddah Shipyard, id. at ¶ 153;

breach of a bailment - contract (Count III), because

Jeddah Shipyard failed to redeliver the vessel as required

by the parties' contract and, instead, only allowed

AdvanFort to access the vessel when it had been stripped

of all value, id. at ¶ 157; negligence (Count IV), because

Jeddah Shipyard breached its duty to maintain the vessel

in a workman-like manner consistent with industry

standards when it stored the vessel without protection

from the elements or security from theft, id. at ¶ 161; and

gross negligence (Count V), because Jeddah Shipyard

showed an utter disregard to caution amounting to a

complete neglect of the Seaman Guard Virginia's safety by

exposing it to the elements for extended periods of time

and leaving it unprotected from theft, id. at ¶ 167.

AdvanFort seeks an award of actual, compensatory, and

consequential damages, including lost profits, and

Notably, neither party explains why the vessel remained in the

Jeddah Shipyard until 2023, especially given that the Saudi civil

action terminated in 2017.

42a

Appendix B

punitive damages; an order that Zamil disgorge all money

and profits wrongfully obtained; and an award of

attorney's fees and costs. Id. at 34-35.

On July 21, 2023, Zamil waived service [Dkt. No. 13],

and on September 29, 2023, it filed the instant Motion to

Dismiss [Dkt. No. 23], pursuant to the doctrine of forum

non conveniens and under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, to

which AdvanFort has filed an opposition. [Dkt. No. 34].

Zamil has filed a reply to the opposition, [Dkt. No. 41], and

oral argument has been held.

II. DISCUSSION

District courts have discretion whether to first

address objections to personal and subject matter

jurisdiction, or to first consider dismissal for forum non

conveniens. Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l

Shipping Com., 549 U.S. 422,432 (2007). Because this

action will be dismissed based on forum non conveniens,

Zamil's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) argument need not and,

therefore, will not be addressed.

A. Standard of Review

A forum non conveniens dismissal "den[ies] audience

to a case on the merits," and "is a determination that the

merits should be adjudicated elsewhere." Sinochem, 549

U.S. at 432 (2007). A civil action should be dismissed on

the basis of forum non conveniens when an alternative

forum is (i) available; (ii) adequate; and (iii) more

43a

Appendix B

convenient in light of the public and private interests

involved. dmarcian, Inc. v. dmarcian Eur. BV, 60 F.4th

119, 136 (4th Cir. 2023). The forum non conveniens

doctrine is ultimately "concerned with convenience, not

simply the locus of alleged wrongful conduct." Jiali Tang

v. Synutra Int'L, Inc., 656 F.3d 242, 252 (4th Cir. 2011).

B. Analysis

1. Availability

For a case to be dismissed based on forum non

conveniens, an alternate forum must be available to all

defendants. Galustian v. Peter, 591 F.3d 724, 731 (4th Cir.

2010). Zamil argues that, as a Saudi company, it is subject

to suit in Saudi Arabia, and AdvanFort cannot claim

otherwise because previously "it initiated litigation

against Zamil Offshore in Saudi Arabia." [Dkt. No. 24].

Although it does not contest that Saudi courts would have

jurisdiction over both defendants, AdvanFort argues that

Saudi Arabia is nevertheless an unavailable forum

because defendant Saudi Ports Authority has not yet

appeared in this action and because AdvanFort's claims

against defendants would have to be brought separately

in Saudi Arabia-suit against Zamil would have to be

brought in the Saudi Commercial Court and suit against

the Saudi Ports Authority would have to be brought

before the Saudi Board of Grievances. [Dkt. No. 34] at 15.

Neither of AdvanFort's arguments preclude the

Court from finding that Saudi courts are available to hear

this civil action. Merely because the Saudi Ports Authority

44a

Appendix B

has not yet appeared in this action does not prevent the

Court from dismissing this action based on forum non

conveniens. Moreover, although the parties' Saudi

Arabian attorneys dispute whether AdvanFort would

have to sue each defendant in a different Saudi tribunal,

compare [Dkt. No. 41-2] at 13.1.1, with [Dkt. No. 37] at

139, AdvanFort does not cite any legal authority for the

proposition that a foreign country is not a convenient

forum if a party's claims must be heard by different

tribunals in that country. Instead, it cites inapposite cases

in which courts have denied motions to dismiss for forum

non conveniens when dismissing the actions would split

claims against domestic defendants from foreign

defendants, thereby forcing plaintiffs to litigate in two

different countries. See [Dkt. No. 34] at 15 (citing DIRTT

Environmental Solutions, Inc. v. Falkbuilt Ltd., 65 F.4th

547,551 (10th Cir. 2023)). Unlike in DIRTT, because

dismissing this action would not force AdvanFort to

litigate in two different counties and because together the

Board of Grievances and the Commercial Court have

jurisdiction to hear AdvanFort's claims against

defendants, the Saudi courts provide an available forum to

resolve AdvanFort's claims against both defendants.

2. Adequacy

A foreign forum "is adequate when (1) all parties can

come within that forum's jurisdiction, and (2) the parties

will not be deprived of all remedies or treated unfairly,

even though they may not enjoy the same benefits as they

might receive in an American court." Tang, 656 F.3d at 249

(citation omitted). Zamil argues that the Saudi courts are

45a

Appendix B

adequate because all parties can come within the Saudi

courts' jurisdiction, as evinced by AdvanFort's past civil

action against Zamil in Saudi Arabia, and AdvanFort will

not be deprived of remedies in Saudi Arabia because it will

be able to pursue claims that Zamil "breached a duty of

care owed under the terms of a contract, or in the absence

of a specific contract, under Islamic tort law." [Dkt. No.

24] at 13. Zamil also claims that AdvanFort has not

established that it will be treated unfairly by the Saudi

courts because it merely provides "anecdotal evidence of

corruption and delay" which this district has found to be

"an insufficient basis for concluding that a foreign court is

an inadequate forum." Conflict Kinetics, Inc. v. Goldfus,

577 F. Supp. 3d 459, 464-65 (E.D. Va. 2021). AdvanFort

does not challenge Zamil's claim that all parties can come

within the Saudi courts' jurisdiction 8 and that AdvanFort

would have a legal avenue to pursue its claims against

defendants; rather, it claims that because "[t]he Saudi

judiciary is controlled by the Saudi government, a

defendant in this suit. and is marked by capriciousness,

opacity. and discrimination," and because the United

States Department of Treasury "regularly reports on [the

Saudijudiciary's] abuses, observing that the judiciary 'has

serious problems with ... independence,"' it is "extremely

unlikely that the courts of Saudi Arabia would adjudicate

Although the Saudi Ports Authority has not yet appeared in this

matter. it also is a Saudi Arabian entity within the jurisdiction of the

Saudi courts, and it is not entitled to sovereign immunity. See [Dkt.

No. 24-1] at ¶ 4.1.4 ("Under Saudi law, there is no sovereign immunity

granted to ministers, government employees, commercial public or

private entities, or citizens.").

46a

Appendix B

AdvanFort's claims in a fair and impartial manner." [Dkt.

No. 34] at 8.

AdvanFort's argument that the Saudi judicial system,

as a whole, is corrupt and thus incapable of adjudicating

disputes fairly misaligns with the results of the parties'

past litigation. In the parties' 2013 litigation in Saudi

Arabia, although the court dismissed AdvanFort's claims,

it awarded Zamil only $40,000.00 in repair fees-less than

one-third of the $147,523.00 Zamil sought. Also, a court's

administrative decision to change course and not "appoint

a marine expert in light of the technical issues raised by

th[is] case," [Dkt. No. l] at 1121, alone does not indicate

that a court would "deprive[] [AdvanFort] of all remedies

or treat [] [it] unfairly." Tang, 656 F.3d at 249.

Moreover, American courts have routinely found that

Saudi courts are adequate fora and have dismissed cases

on the basis of forum non conveniens. See, e.g. Kamel v.

Hill-Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799,803 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming

trial court's dismissal on the basis of forum non

conveniens, including its finding that Saudi Arabia was an

adequate forum); Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines

Corp., 885 F.2d 285, 290-91 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Ahmed

v. Boeing Co., 720 F.2d 224,226 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.)

(same).

Courts have also "uniformly held that anecdotal

evidence of corruption and delay provides an insufficient

basis for concluding that a foreign court is an inadequate

47a

Appendix B

forum." Conflict Kinetics, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 464-65. 9 For

example, in Alayan v. Permanent Mission of Saudi

Arabia to the United Nations, 2021 WL 1964078

(S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021), the plaintiffs argued that the

Saudi legal system was inadequate and "cite[d] allegations

of human rights scandals, the detention of women's rights

activists, and the murder of a Saudi Journalist[,]" as well

as allegations that its process server "was turned away

under the threat of arrest" and "was in fear of his life." Id.

at *2. The court found the plaintiffs "arguments

unavailing," explaining that they "rest mostly on general

biases and danger within Saudi Arabia[,]" and cited other

cases in which United States courts had found Saudi

Arabia to be an adequate forum. Id. at *2-3.

Even more recently, in CDM Smith Inc. v. Atasi, the

plaintiffs cited the same State Department "Human

Rights Practices" reports that AdvanFort cites in its

opposition to argue that the Saudi Labor Court was not an

adequate forum, but the court in CDM Smith was

unpersuaded. See 594 F. Supp. 3d 246, 256-57 (D. Mass.

2022) (finding Saudi Labor Court to be impartial and

explaining that State Department Human Rights Reports

are inapposite because they are focused on the Saudi

criminal justice system, not the civil courts). Ultimately,

"[c]ourts must be cautious before finding incompetence or

This calculus does not change when the claim being brought is

against a government-controlled entity, such as the Saudi Ports

Authority. See, e.g., Forsythe, 885 F.2d at 290-91 (affirming finding

that Saudi Arabia was an adequate forum even though defendant was

a corporation wholly owned by the Saudi government).

48a

Appendix B

corruption by other nation's judicial systems," Alayan,

2021 WL 1964078, at *2, and the type of generalized claims

of corruption pressed by AdvanFort have been repeatedly

held to be insufficient to establish inadequacy of a foreign

sovereign's courts. For these reasons, AdvanFort fails to

support its argument that the Saudi Board of Grievances

and the Commercial Court are inadequate fora.

3. Public and Private Interests

i. Private Interest Factors

The factors pertaining to the private interests of

litigants include (i) the relative ease of access to sources of

proof, (ii) the availability of compulsory process to obtain

the testimony of unwilling witnesses, (iii) the cost of

obtaining testimony from willing witnesses, (iv) the

possibility of viewing the premises, and (v) "all other

practical problems that make trial of a case easy,

expeditious and inexpensive." Tang, 656 F.3d at 249.

Generally, if there is a "real showing of convenience by a

plaintiff who has sued in his home forum [it will] normally

outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have

shown;" however, this principle is inapplicable where "the

plaintiff is a corporation doing business abroad."

DiFederico v. Marriott Int'l Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 804, 807

(4th Cir. 2013).

AdvanFort elected to do business with Zamil in Saudi

Arabia, and therefore, it "should expect to litigate in

foreign courts." As a result, the Court will "partially

discount[] [AdvanFort's] United States Citizenship." Id.

49a

Appendix B

Moreover, the private interest factors "plainly favor [the]

foreign forum" and "favor dismissal on forum non

conveniens grounds." In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport,

Saudi Arabia, on Aug. 19, 1980, 540 F. Supp. 1141, 1147

(D.D.C. 1982); Conflict Kinetics, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 465.

First, "the majority of the actionable conduct alleged in

the complaint occurred in [Saudi Arabia], not the United

States." Conflict Kinetics, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 465. Because

the relevant conduct occurred in Saudi Arabia and

because AdvanFort was not in Saudi Arabia when the

alleged damage to the vessel took place, the parties will

need to rely on physical and testimonial evidence located

in Saudi Arabia, including Jeddah Shipyard employees,

AdvanFort's marine expert, and physical evidence such as

the vessel which remains in Saudi Arabia. 10 [Dkt. No. 1] at

¶ 137; see In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp.

at 1147 (finding that evidence in Saudi Arabia regarding

alleged negligent maintenance of aircraft at Riyadh

airport was "more important to the proceedings").

Finally, regarding the availability of both willing and

unwilling witnesses, "[s]ignificant costs would be involved

in transporting and accommodating [the] willing

AdvanFort's claim that its "witnesses are located in the United

States and this forum," [Dkt. No. 34] at 17, is lacking in support.

AdvanFort states that unspecified "potential witnesses in this case

are located in the United States, and specifically Virginia," [Dkt. No.

36] at 1 6, but it does not identify a single witness. It also claims that

"employees who interacted with Zamil reside in the United States or

in countries other than Saudi Arabia," id. at 14, but offers no further

explanation of who those witnesses would be and what testimony they

would offer.

50a

Appendix B

witnesses ... from Saudi Arabia" because "more witnesses

will have to travel farther distances if trial is held in the

United States." In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540 F.

Supp. at 1148-49. Notably, given that this dispute involves

events spread over ten years at a Saudi Arabian shipyardincluding allegations that Zamil "allow[ed] the vessel to be

looted" by third parties, [Dkt. No. 1] at ¶ 153—it is

reasonable to expect that litigation of the case will involve

third-party witnesses who are not under either party's

control. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, at

258-59 (1981) (noting a lack of need to identify particular

witnesses who are not available, especially if they are

difficult to identify without "extensive investigation"). This

Court would lack authority to compel the attendance at

trial of any unwilling Saudi witnesses-a factor that favors

the Saudi forum. See Tang, 656 F.3d at 252; In re Disaster

at Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp. at 1148 ("[A] United

States forum would likely be unable to require the

attendance of those foreign witnesses having knowledge

of either plaintiffs' damages.").

ii. Public Interest Factors

Public interest factors in a forum non conveniens

inquiry include: "(l) the administrative difficulties flowing

from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having

localized controversies decided at home; (3) the interest in

having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at

home with the law that must govern the action; (4) the

avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or

in the application of foreign law; and (5) the unfairness of

burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty."

51a

Appendix B

Tang, 656 F.3d at 249. All of these factors weigh in favor

of litigation in Saudi Arabia, and not in Virginia.

First, the Commonwealth of Virginia's interests in

this case are minimal. Because this action is about a vessel

in Saudi Arabia that was allegedly damaged by a Saudi

company, with Saudi employees, in a Saudi shipyard in

Saudi Arabia, both the Board of Grievances and

Commercial Court "seemingly would have a significant

interest in hearing a dispute about a contract performed

in Saudi Arabia." D & S Consulting. Inc. v. Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia, 961 F.3d 1209, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2020). On the

other hand, there is "little local interest" in a case involving

an alleged tort arising from performance of a contract

overseas. Conflict Kinetics, 577 F. Supp. 3d at 465. In

situations where the "controversy's contacts with the

United States pale in comparison to the controversy's

foreign contacts," 'Jury duty ought not to be imposed upon

the people of the United States nor should United States

courts be clogged." In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540

F. Supp. at 1152.

Moreover, forum non conveniens is appropriate in

this action given that this Court would be tasked with

applying Saudi law. A federal court sitting in Virginia and

exercising diversity jurisdiction applies Virginia's choiceof-law rules, and under Virginia's lex loci delicti rule for

tort claims, the federal court must apply the law of the

place where "the last event necessary to make an actor

liable for an alleged tort takes place." DiFederico, 714

F.3d at 807. For contract claims, questions arising from

the performance of a contract are governed by the law of

52a

Appendix B

the place of performance. Equitable Tr. Co. v.

Bratwursthaus Mgmt. Corp., 514 F.2d 565,547 (4th Cir.

1975). Under both rules, the place of performance and the

place where the last alleged tortuous act took place is

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and as such, this Court would be

forced to apply Saudi law. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at

260 (explaining that "the need to apply foreign law point[s]

towards dismissal").

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss

the Complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens by an

Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.

Entered this 1st day of December, 2023.

53a

Appendix C

APPENDIX C — DENIAL OF REHEARING OF

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURT CIRCUIT, DATED MAY 30, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1007

(D.C. No. 1:23-cv-00906-LMB-IDD)

ADVANFORT COMPANY,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

ZAMIL OFFSHORE SERVICES COMPANY; SAUDI

PORTS AUTHORITY, a foreign sovereign State,

Defendants – Appellees.

ORDER

The court denies the petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc. No judge requested a poll under Fed.

R. App. P. 40 on the petition for rehearing en banc.

Entered at the direction of the panel: Judge King,

Judge Thacker, and Senior Judge Floyd.

For the Court

/s/ Nwamaka Anowi, Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.