Amicus Curiae Brief — Public Interest Legal Foundation, Petitioner v. Al Schmidt, Secretary of Pennsylvania, et al.

No. 25-379

In the Supreme Court of the United States

PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Petitioner,

v.

AL SCHMIDT, in his official capacity as Secretary

of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and

JONATHAN M. MARKS, in his official capacity as

Deputy Secretary for Elections and Commissions,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

_________

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE JUDICIAL WATCH,

INC. AND ALLIED EDUCATIONAL

FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

_________

ERIC W. LEE

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.

425 Third Street, SW

Suite 800

Washington, DC 20024

(202) 646-5172

T. RUSSELL NOBILE

Counsel of Record

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.

P.O. Box 6592

Gulfport, MS 39506

(202) 527-9866

Rnobile@judicialwatch.org

Counsel for Amici Curiae

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... ii

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ..............................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.....................................4

ARGUMENT ...............................................................6

I.

American Courts Have Long Regarded Informational Injuries As A Basis For Enforcing

Public-Disclosure Laws ..................................... 6

II.

The Decision Below Conflicts With Decisions

From Other Circuits Regarding An Important

Question .......................................................... 12

III. The Decision Below Is Incorrect And Conflicts

With Applicable Decisions By This Court ...... 14

A. TransUnion Explicitly Disclaimed Consideration of Injuries from Violations of PublicDisclosure Laws.......................................... 15

B. The Decision Conflicts With Applicable Rulings from This Court ....................................19

CONCLUSION ..........................................................23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted,

No. 16-3746 (6th Cir. 2016) (Dkt. No. 37) ...........3

Bellitto v. Snipes, No. 16-cv-61474,

2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103617

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2018) ....................................10

Bost v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,

No. 24-568 (U.S. 2025) ..........................................3

Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363 (1889) .........................7

Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott,

49 F.4th 931 (5th Cir. 2022) .............. 5, 13, 14, 19

Clay v. Ballard, 87 Va. 787 (1891) ........................... 7

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,

553 U.S. 181 (2008)...............................................9

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp.,

438 U.S. 59 (1978) ..........................................2, 21

FEC v. Akins,

524 U.S. 11 (1998) ...............4, 6, 14, 15, 18, 20-22

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) ....................20, 21

iii

Harkless v. Brunner,

545 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2008) ................................3

Higgins v. Lockwood,

74 N.J.L. 158 (N.J. 1906)..................................4, 8

Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst.,

No. 16-980 (U.S. 2017) .........................................3

Ill. Conservative Union v. Illinois,

No. 20 C 5542, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 102543 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2021) .........2, 13

Judicial Watch v. Grimes,

No. 17-94 (E.D. Ky. 2017) (ECF No. 39) .............2

Judicial Watch v. Griswold, No. 20-cv-2992

(D. Colo. 2020) ......................................................2

Judicial Watch v. Griswold, No. 20-cv-2992,

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153290

(D. Colo. Aug. 25, 2022) .....................................13

Judicial Watch v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections,

No. 24 C 1867, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 186730 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2025) ........... 13

Judicial Watch v. Lamone,

399 F. Supp. 3d 425 (D. Md. 2019) ......... 2, 10, 11

Judicial Watch v. Logan,

No. 17-8948 (C.D. Cal. 2017) ...............................2

iv

Judicial Watch v. Pennsylvania Sec. of State,

No. 20-708 (M.D. Pa. 2020) ................................ 2

Judicial Watch v. Weber, No. 2:24-cv-03750

(C.D. Cal. July 29, 2025) .................................. 13

Kelly v. Realpage Inc.,

47 F.4th 202 (3d Cir. 2022) ................................19

McDonnell v. United States,

4 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1993) ..................................11

NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson,

357 U.S. 449 (1958) ............................................. 5

Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,

435 U.S. 589 (1978)...............................................8

Nowack v. Auditor General,

243 Mich. 200 (1928) .......................................7, 8

Prisology, Inc. v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

852 F.3d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ..........................12

Project Vote v. Long,

682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2012) .................. 5, 10, 13

Project Vote, Inc. v. Kemp,

208 F. Supp. 3d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2016) ..............11

Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Just.,

491 U.S. 440 (1989)................... 4, 6, 15, 18, 20-22

v

Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Benson,

136 F.4th 613 (6th Cir. 2025) ........................5, 14

Pub. Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Bellows,

92 F.4th 36 (1st Cir. 2024) ................................13

Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Schmidt,

No. 23-1590 (3d Cir. 2023) (Dk.48) ......................3

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,

578 U.S. 330 (2016) ..............................................6

State v. King, 154 Ind. 621 (1900) ..............................7

State v. Williams,

41 N.J.L. 332 (N.J. 1879) .....................................7

Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A.,

590 U.S. 538 (2020).............................................11

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413 (2021)........................... 4, 6, 9, 12-21

Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,

964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020) ......................18, 19

U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) ......7, 9

Washington Legal Found. v. U.S. Sent’g,

Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ................8

vi

Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y of State,

444 F.3d 614 (D.C. Cir. 2006) .......................11, 12

Constitutional Provisions

U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ..........................................3

Statutes

5 U.S.C. § 552 ..............................................................1

15 U.S.C. § 1681 ........................................................15

52 U.S.C. § 20501 ......................................................10

52 U.S.C. § 20507 .............. 1-6, 8-13, 15, 17, 19, 21-22

Other

H.R. Rep. No. 103-9 (1993),

reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105 ..................10

Judicial Watch, Judicial Watch Update: New

Numbers Show Over Five Million Names Cleaned

from Voter Rolls Nationwide (Apr. 3, 2025) ........2

1

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Judicial Watch, Inc. (“Judicial Watch”) is a notfor-profit educational foundation dedicated to fostering accountability, transparency, integrity in government, and fidelity to the rule of law. In pursuit of its

public interest objectives, Judicial Watch routinely

requests access to public records from federal, state,

and local agencies, which it subsequently disseminates to its members and the public at large.

Since its founding in 1994, Judicial Watch has

submitted thousands of public records requests under

the nation’s public-disclosure laws. When such requests are denied—a frequent occurrence—Judicial

Watch has initiated litigation. In addition to individual state public-disclosure laws, the principal statutes relied on by Judicial Watch are the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq., and

the National Voter Registration Act of 1993

(“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) – the statute at issue

here. The records obtained through Judicial Watch’s

efforts are vital to enhancing public understanding of

government operations.

In 2012, Judicial Watch created an election-law

practice group to promote election integrity, focusing

especially on enforcing the NVRA’s list-maintenance

and public-disclosure provisions contained in § 8 of

Amici state that no counsel for a party to this case authored this brief in whole or in part; and no person or entity,

other than Amici and their counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation and submission of this

brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.2(a), counsel of record for each party

received timely notice of Amici’s intent to file this amicus brief.

1

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that act. 52 U.S.C. § 20507. In recent years, Judicial

Watch’s efforts have led to the removal of five million

names from voter rolls across nearly a dozen states,

primarily through settlement agreements and consent decrees with various jurisdictions. 2 See, e.g., Judicial Watch v. Grimes, No. 17-94 (E.D. Ky. 2017)

(ECF No. 39) (consent decree entered with the Commonwealth of Kentucky to settle NVRA claims); Judicial Watch v. Logan, No. 17-8948 (C.D. Cal. 2017)

(NVRA settlement agreement with Los Angeles

County and the State of California); Judicial Watch

v. Griswold, No. 20-2992 (NVRA settlement agreement with the State of Colorado); Judicial Watch v.

Pennsylvania Sec. of State, No. 20-708 (M.D. Pa.

2020) (NVRA settlement agreement the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania).

As part of its election-integrity program, Judicial

Watch frequently requests state records under

§ 20507(i) and has litigated both independently and

on behalf of others to ensure compliance with the

NVRA. Judicial Watch v. Lamone, 399 F. Supp. 3d

425 (D. Md. 2019); Illinois Conservative Union v. Illinois, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102543 (N.D. Ill. June 1,

2021). Judicial Watch’s public records requests under

Section 20507(i) are critical in evaluating NVRA compliance. See Lamone, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 445 (“Organizations such as Judicial Watch … have the resources

and expertise [concerning the NVRA] that few individuals can marshal.”).

Judicial Watch, Judicial Watch Update: New Numbers

Show Over Five Million Names Cleaned from Voter Rolls Nationwide, (Apr. 3, 2025), https://bit.ly/4hoFNjP.

2

3

The Allied Educational Foundation (“AEF”) is a

nonprofit charitable and educational foundation

based in Englewood, New Jersey. Founded in 1964,

AEF is dedicated to promoting education in diverse

areas of study. AEF regularly files amicus curiae

briefs to advance its purpose.

Judicial Watch and AEF have filed numerous

amicus curiae briefs addressing the proper interpretation of the NVRA. See, e.g., Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., No. 16-980 (Brief of Amici Judicial Watch

and AEF); A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Husted, No. 163746 (6th Cir. 2016) (Dkt. No. 37) (Brief of Amicus

Curiae Judicial Watch); Public Interest Legal Found.

v. Schmidt, No. 23-1590 (3d Cir. 2023) (Dkt. No. 48).

Amici—particularly Judicial Watch’s electionlaw team—have a strong interest in how courts define cognizable injuries from violations of federal law

enacted pursuant to Congress’s Elections Clause

powers. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Judicial Watch

most recently appeared before the Court as counsel

for petitioners in Bost, et al., v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, et al., No. 24-568, addressing candidate standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations. The Court heard arguments in Bost on October 8, 2025.

Congress enacted the NVRA pursuant its Elections Clause authority. Harkless v. Brunner, 545

F.3d 445, 455 (6th Cir. 2008). Section 8(i) of the

NVRA, codified as 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i), is an important public-disclosure law that allows the public

to evaluate the accuracy and currency of a state’s

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voter list maintenance and registration practices. Judicial Watch and AEF respectfully submit this brief

in support of Petitioner PILF. The Court should

grant certiorari—particularly on whether TransUnion v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), affects informational-injury standing following a denial of records

requested under public-records laws. As shown below, denial of access to public records is a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts, and is distinct from the injuries resulting from the denial of private records at

issue in TransUnion. Id. at 417 and 441.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The denial of access to public records requested

under the NVRA’s public-disclosure provision, 52

U.S.C. § 20507(i), inflicts a concrete informational injury deeply rooted in centuries of common-law tradition. The right of access to public records predates

the development of the states. American courts have

long recognized that a general right to inspect public

documents is essential to democratic governance the

denial of which is redressable at law. Indeed, that

right is of the “highest public interest” in the context

of inspecting voter registration materials. Higgins v.

Lockwood, 74 N.J.L. 158, 160 (N.J. 1906). More recently, this Court has affirmed that denials of that

right is a concrete harm. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S.

11 (1998); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,

491 U.S. 440 (1989); see also TransUnion, 594 U.S. at

441.

5

The Third Circuit’s decision below departs from

this precedent by imposing a novel “nexus” requirement, demanding plaintiffs prove downstream

harms beyond the denial itself. This ruling exacerbates a sharp and growing circuit split. Circuits like

the Fourth adhere to this Court’s framework, finding

standing upon denial alone. See Project Vote v. Long,

682 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir. 2012). In contrast, the

Third, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits now require additional showings—whether “downstream consequences” or a multi-part nexus—misapplying

TransUnion to public records cases it explicitly distinguished. See Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott, 49

F.4th 931, 938 (5th Cir. 2022); Pub. Int. Legal Found.

v. Benson, 136 F.4th 613, 629 (6th Cir. 2025).

Practically, the Third Circuit’s ruling threatens

electoral transparency nationwide. By shielding

voter list maintenance records from scrutiny, it enables dormant errors, inefficiencies, or worse, undermining the NVRA’s core purposes of accuracy and

public confidence. The resulting confusion is radically reducing the public’s access to public records

and will have a profound impact on public debate,

chilling oversight by watchdogs like Amici and eroding trust in democratic processes. Americans have always sought public records from city, county, and

state governments to ensure that the people’s representatives are properly and positively maintaining

democracies and adhering to good government principles. See NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.

449, 460, (1958) (“It is beyond debate that freedom to

engage in association for the advancement of beliefs

6

and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”).

Denying requested public records inhibits this type

of protected expressive activity.

This Court should grant certiorari to reaffirm that

the denial of public records inflicts a traditional, cognizable injury; resolve the entrenched split; and prevent the Third Circuit’s error from further obstructing the transparency Congress mandated under the

NVRA.

ARGUMENT

I.

AMERICAN COURTS HAVE LONG REGARDED INFORMATIONAL INJURIES

AS A BASIS FOR ENFORCING PUBLICDISCLOSURE LAWS

1. Central to determining whether an alleged injury is sufficiently concrete to trigger Article III

standing is “whether the asserted harm has a ‘close

relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as

providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—

such as physical harm, monetary harm, or various intangible harms[.]” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417 (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340-341

(2016)). The denial of records under public records

laws such as 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) is an intangible

harm long recognized as providing a basis for lawsuit

in American courts. See id.; Akins, 524 U.S. at 13;

Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 443.

7

The right of access to public records is grounded

in the public’s right to know “what the government is

up to.” U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773

(1989); see also State v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 625 (1900)

(holding that a person’s interest “to discover the condition of the public . . . to ascertain if the affairs of his

county have been honestly and faithfully administered by the public officials charged with that duty” is

completely appropriate).

Over a century ago, state courts recognized that

this right is inherent in democratic government. That

the common law rule is that “every person is entitled

to the inspection of” public documents. State v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334 (N.J. 1879); see also Burton

v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 374 (1889) (“I do not think that

any common law ever obtained in this free government that would deny the people thereof the right of

free access to, and public inspection of, public records.”). Significantly, in 1891, the Virginia Supreme

Court held, “[a]t common law, the right to inspect

public documents is well defined and understood.”

Clay v. Ballard, 87 Va. 787, 791 (1891).

Later courts reaffirmed that right. For example,

the Michigan Supreme Court again examined the

common law right of access to public records and the

origin of that right. “If there be any rule of the English

common law that denies the public the right of access

to public records, it is repugnant to the spirit of our

democratic institutions. Ours is a government of the

people.” Nowack v. Auditor General, 243 Mich. 200,

203 (1928). The court further stated, “[t]here is no

8

question as to the common-law right of the people at

large to inspect public documents and records.” Id. at

204. It reinforced the notion that the common law

right “to inspect public records” includes those circumstances when a person’s interest is solely that “as

a member of the general public.” Id. When the right

to inspect election administration records are at issue,

the public’s interest is even greater. See Higgins, 74

N.J.L. at 160 (The right to inspect the “registration of

voters” is of the “highest public interest” for its purpose “to prevent fraudulent voting” and preserve “representative government” on behalf of all citizens).

Federal courts share this view. See Nixon v.

Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597

(1978) (“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents.”); Washington Legal Foundation

v. U.S. Sentencing Commission, 89 F.3d 897, 904

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting “the right of access” exists “in

the common law of the states.”). This right of access

to public records applies not only to public records of

the federal government but also public records of

state governments.

Recognizing informational injuries from denial of

records under 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i) aligns with this

well-established legal tradition. Denying access to

voter-registration records impedes expressive and educational activity protected by the First Amendment.

Such denials harm groups like Amici and Petitioner

PILF (as well as their ideological counterparts) by re-

9

stricting their ability to inform the public, hold officials accountable, and evaluate election integrity. 3 It

denies the public the right to know “what their government is up to.” Reporters Committee for Freedom

of the Press, 489 U.S. at 773.

Withholding NVRA-related records like those

“concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters”

erodes public confidence in the administration of elections. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i). Public confidence, in turn,

“has independent significance, because it encourages

citizen participation in the democratic process.”

Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,

197 (2008). In the absence of the underlying records,

the public must rely on conflicting accounts, without

direct evidence, making it difficult to accurately assess the competency of election administration. In

short, denying access to records erodes public confidence in elections—precisely what Congress sought to

prevent in enacting § 20507(i).

2. Section 20507(i) is indisputably a public-disclosure statute, and injuries from record denials under

that provision are closely related to harms historically recognized as actionable. See TransUnion, 594

U.S. at 417. The NVRA “embodies Congress’s conviction that Americans who are eligible under law to vote

For example, PILF identified three “downstream consequences” in addition to the traditional informational injury.

Pet.App.22a. These additional downstream harms illustrate how

the denial inhibits expressive activity protected by the First

Amendment.

3

10

have every right to exercise their franchise, a right

that must not be sacrificed to administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies.” Project Vote, 682

F.3d at 334-35. Transparency in voter-list maintenance is essential to democratic confidence. See id. at

339 (“Without such transparency, public confidence

in the essential workings of democracy will suffer.”);

see H.R. REP. NO. 103-9, at 14, reprinted in 1993

U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 118 (“accurate and current voter

registration lists are essential to the integrity of the

election process and for the protection of the individual”).

Courts have long construed § 20507(i) broadly to

serve that purpose. See also Bellitto v. Snipes, No. 16cv-61474- BLOOM/Valle, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

103617, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2018) (NVRA public-disclosure provisions “convey Congress’s intention

that the public should be monitoring the state of the

voter rolls and the adequacy of election officials’ list

maintenance programs”). Increased voter participation of eligible citizenry and protecting the integrity

of electoral administration are central purposes of the

NVRA. 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b). Denying access to records frustrates that goal. See Lamone, 399 F. Supp.

3d at 445 (“Organizations such as Judicial Watch and

Project Vote have the resources and expertise that

few individuals can marshal. By excluding these organizations from access to [voter registration records], the State law undermines Section 8(i)’s efficacy”).

Courts have consistently rejected cramped readings of “records” under § 20507(i). For example, in

11

Project Vote, Inc. v. Kemp, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1320, 1336

(N.D. Ga. 2016), the court rejected the argument that

electronic records were not covered, noting that this

would allow easy circumvention and “effectively render Section 8(i) a nullity.” Such a “narrow interpretation of ‘records’—which would reduce the scope of information available to the public” is “inconsistent

with the statutory purposes of the NVRA.” Id.; see Lamone, 399 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (“common sense” cannot

abide “a purposeless obstruction” of Section 8(i)

“based on semantics”).

3. As discussed, infra, Part III.B.3, the Third Circuit should have followed this Court’s precedent and

applied its FOIA standing analysis to injuries arising

from violation of § 20507(i). But courts sometimes

make the standing inquiry “more complicated than it

needs to be.” Thole v. U.S Bank N.A., 590 U.S. 538,

547 (2020). Had it followed that precedent, its analysis would have been straightforward.

In that scenario, a requester suffers a particularized injury because he or she has requested and been

denied public records Congress gave him a right to receive. See Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State, 444 F.3d 614,

617-19 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (analogizing FOIA standing

requirements in non-FOIA case stating that “[a] requester is injured-in-fact for standing purposes because he did not get what the statute entitled him to

receive”); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227,

1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The filing of a request, and its

denial, is the factor that distinguishes the harm suffered by the plaintiff in an FOIA case from the harm

12

incurred by the general public arising from deprivation of the potential benefits accruing from the information sought.”). “[T]he requester’s circumstances—

why he wants the information, what he plans to do

with it, what harm he suffered from the failure to disclose—are irrelevant to his standing.” Prisology, Inc.

v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 852 F.3d 1114, 1117 (D.C.

Cir. 2017) (quoting Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 617); see

also Pet.7-8.

II.

THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS

WITH DECISIONS FROM OTHER CIRCUITS REGARDING AN IMPORTANT

QUESTION.

The Court should grant certiorari because there

is a clear and recurring circuit split on what constitutes a concrete injury under the public-disclosure

provision 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i). Some circuits recognize the traditionally accepted injury that a requester suffers a concrete injury merely by being denied access to requested public records, while others

require an additional showing of “downstream consequences.” The split largely stems from lower courts

misapplication of TransUnion. See, infra, Part III.A.

That case involved harms from violations of privatedisclosure statutes, not public-disclosure laws. This

additional showing requirement constitutes a live

split that involves an important matter of electoral

law, which warrant review. It is certain to recur

given the frequency of federal elections.

Amici will not repeat the detailed analysis of

lower court rulings provided by Petitioner. Pet.14-17.

13

Instead, Amici emphasize their agreement and their

first-hand experience with inconsistent rulings just

over the last few months on whether Amici Judicial

Watch has standing to enforce § 20507(i). Compare

Judicial Watch v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 24 C

1867, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186730, at *35 (N.D. Ill.

Sep. 23, 2025) (finding concrete injury) with Judicial

Watch v. Weber, No. 2:24-cv-03750-MCS-PVC, a *5

(C.D. Cal. July 29, 2025) (finding no concrete injury).

Prior to 2022, federal courts rejected restrictive

readings of concrete injury under § 20507(i). See Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 340 (affirming lower court’s

standing finding); Ill. Conservative Union, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 102543, at *1 (finding advocacy group

alleged concrete injury); and Judicial Watch v. Griswold, Civil Action No. 20-cv-02992-PAB-KMT, 2022

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153290, at *11 (D. Colo. Aug. 25,

2022) (finding plaintiffs alleged a traditional concrete

injury under TransUnion sufficient to enforce 52

U.S.C. § 20507). That uniformity changed with Scott,

49 F.4th at 938, which relied on TransUnion to deny

standing.

Today, the First and Fourth Circuits recognize

that a concrete injury exists when a requester is denied (or provided limited access to) records under

§ 20507(i). See Project Vote, 682 F.3d at 340 and Pub.

Int. Legal Found., Inc. v. Bellows, 92 F.4th 36, 50 (1st

Cir. 2024) (finding requester had standing to bring

preemption challenge to state restrictions on records

requested under 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i)). But the Third,

Fifth, and Sixth Circuits do not. See Pet.App.1a-27a;

14

Scott, 49 F.4th at 938; and Benson, 136 F.4th at 629

(finding requester lacked concrete injury).

Amici agrees with Petitioner that a further, secondary split exists over what heightened or additional concrete showing—if any—is required Pet.1721; compare Scott, 49 F.4th at 938 (requiring “downstream consequences”) with Pet.App.16a (articulating three-part “nexus requirement”).

This entrenched and widening conflict among the

circuits, on a question that frequently recurs, calls for

this Court’s intervention.

III.

THE DECISION BELOW IS INCORRECT

AND CONFLICTS WITH APPLICABLE

DECISIONS BY THIS COURT.

The Third Circuit’s decision contains serious legal

errors and directly conflicts with longstanding Supreme Court precedent. This Court has held that a

person who is denied requested public records suffers

a concrete injury. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 13-14. The

panel below misapplied TransUnion. In doing so it

adopted a heightened “nexus requirement” for determining concreteness in public-record cases. This new

requirement conflicts with previous rulings by this

Court on this issue.

15

A. TransUnion Explicitly Disclaimed Consideration of Injuries from Violations of

Public-Disclosure Laws.

1. The Third Circuit misapplied TransUnion.

That decision concerned injuries from procedural violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (“FCRA”),

15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., as amended, private-disclosure provisions. The harms at issue there differ fundamentally from those historically recognized under

public-disclosure laws such as 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i).

Indeed, the Court considered—and rejected—the Solicitor General’s argument that the injuries there

were analogous to informational injuries recognized

under Akins and Public Citizen. See TransUnion, 594

U.S. at 441 (“We disagree.”). The Court emphasized

that the case did not involve a public-disclosure law.

Id. (“This case does not involve such public-disclosure

law.”). By contrast, informational injuries from denial of public records have long been treated as concrete harms. See, supra, Part I.

TransUnion arose from a class action alleging

that the defendant credit-reporting agency misidentified consumers as potential terrorists, violating the

FCRA. 594 U.S. at 418. Mr. Ramirez, serving as the

lead plaintiff, brought forth three claims on behalf of

himself and a class of individuals. Id. at 418-22. The

Court noted that plaintiffs are required to establish

standing for each claim, subsequently analyzing

whether class members experienced a concrete harm.

Id. at 430-41. Regarding the first claim—TransUnion’s alleged failure to employ reasonable procedures

16

to prevent misclassifications—the Court differentiated the class into two groups, holding class members

whose erroneous reports were shared with third parties suffered a concrete reputational injury, while

those whose reports were never disclosed did not. Id.

432-34. The Court determined that the former group

had adequately alleged a concrete intangible injury

(defamation) that was a tort long recognized by American courts. Id. at 432 (citations omitted). Conversely,

the Court denied standing for the much larger latter

group who, although misclassified, failed to demonstrate any concrete harm—including reputational

damage—as their information was confined to

TransUnion’s internal records and not disclosed. Id.

at 433-34. The Court emphasized that “Article III requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. at 426. Lawsuits predicated

solely on statutory violations, such as those brought

by the larger group, cannot proceed when the plaintiff

had not alleged any physical, monetary, or cognizable

intangible harm traditionally recognized as grounds

for litigation in American jurisprudence. Id. at 42728.

The plaintiffs’ remaining two claims concerned

the format of disclosures and alleged omissions of a

summary-of-rights disclosure. Id. at 439-41. The

Court found no standing because plaintiffs had not alleged any injury—they received all required information. Id. at 441. Moreover, plaintiffs could not establish that the format of TransUnion’s mailings

caused an injury closely related “to harm traditionally

recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American Courts.” Id. at 440. Thus, the Court’s analysis

17

turned on the absence of any denial of information. A

distinction that is decisive here. The denial of access

to voter-registration records under § 20507(i) is the

exact opposite scenario: an outright refusal to provide

information Congress made public.

Claims arising under the FCRA were categorically different from those arising under public-disclosure laws. Id. at 441. “This case does not involve such

public-disclosure law.” Id. (citations omitted).

TransUnion made clear that both the nature of the

injuries before it, and its analysis, were distinct from

precedent recognizing harms from denials of public

records.

2. The Third Circuit’s contrary reading—that

TransUnion rejected the very argument advanced by

Petitioner PILF below—reverses the actual logic of

that decision. Pet. App. 14a. The Supreme Court in

TransUnion rejected the Solicitor General’s analogy

between the FCRA and public-disclosure statutes, not

the argument advanced by the petitioner here. See

TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 441–43. In this way, the

Third Circuit clearly misread TransUnion. The confusion on this point is radically reducing the public’s

access to public records and will have profound impact on public debate far larger than the Court could

have reasonably expected when it issued TransUnion.

This Court’s rejection of the Solicitor General’s argument that injuries arising from violation of the

FCRA’s private-disclosure laws are analogous to

18

those harms arising from violations of public-disclosure laws is intuitive. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 44143. Injuries resulting from violations of public-disclosure laws are categorically distinct from those arising

from violations of private-disclosure laws. Injuries associated with the former have long been recognized as

concrete injuries. See, supra, Part I; and see also

Akins, 524 U.S. at 13 and Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at

449-50. In contrast, the FCRA represents a more recent statutory innovation. While the FCRA safeguards important consumer rights, harm that may

arise from violations of this new statutory right does

have a “close relationship” to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American

courts. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 417.

TransUnion confirmed that Congress cannot

manufacture standing by labeling a procedural violation as an injury. Id. at 426. But Congress may authorize suit to remedy denials of information that the

public has a traditional, preexisting right to receive—

a principle reaffirmed in Akins and Public Citizen.

The denial of requested public records constitutes a

well-established concrete injury. Private actors failure to satisfy the FCRA private disclosure laws do

not.

Other courts have acknowledged the need to first

assess whether the statute at issue is a public or private disclosure before applying TransUnion’s concrete injury analysis. See Trichell v. Midland Credit

Mgmt., 964 F.3d 990, 1004 (11th Cir. 2020) (noting

that the statutes at issue in Public Citizen and Akins

19

made certain information subject to public disclosure.) “The provisions at issue here create no substantive entitlement to receive information from [private parties].” Id.; but see Scott, 49 F.4th at 938-39.

Under TransUnion, a plaintiff bringing an FCRA

enforcement action must allege both a statutory violation and a concrete injury—criteria satisfied only by

Mr. Ramirez with respect to all three claims in

TransUnion. Unlike injuries from the government’s

denial of requested public records, violation of private-disclosure laws do not inhibit expressive activity

protected by the First Amendment. The failure of a

credit reporting agency to provide information does

not constitute an informational injury that has been

traditionally recognized as actionable in American

courts. Violations of § 20507(i) do.

B. The Decision Conflicts With Applicable

Rulings from This Court.

1. The Third Circuit introduced a novel “nexus”

requirement that diverges from the Supreme Court

precedents. The panel concluded that a plaintiff asserting informational injuries following a denial of

public records must demonstrate “a nexus among the

omitted information to which she has entitlement, the

purported harm actually caused by the specific violation, and the ‘concrete interest’ that Congress identified as ‘deserving of protection’ when it created the

disclosure requirement.” Pet.App.16a. (citing Kelly v.

Realpage Inc., 47 F.4th 202, 213 (3d Cir. 2022)).

20

This requirement has no basis in Article III jurisprudence. Apart from narrow taxpayer-standing

cases, this Court has rejected calls to add a special

nexus requirement to its Article III analysis. See

Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438

U.S. 59 (1978) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102

(1968) (establishing Flast nexus for taxpayer standing injuries). Likewise, neither Akins nor Public Citizen imposed any nexus test, and both recognized

standing upon the simple denial of information Congress required to be disclosed.

2. Duke Power is instructive. There, the Court explicitly declined to extend Flast’s nexus concept beyond taxpayer suits. “The major difficulty with the argument is that it implicitly assumes that the nexus

requirement formulated in the context of taxpayer

suits has general applicability in suits of all other

types brought in the federal courts.” 438 U.S. at 78.

“No cases have been cited outside the context of taxpayer suits where we have demanded this type of subject-matter nexus between the right asserted and the

injury alleged, and we are aware of none.” Id. at 7879. “[W]e explicitly rejected such a broad compass for

the Flast nexus requirement.” Id. at 79; see also

Akins, 524 U.S. at 22 (rejecting application of Flast

nexus requirement to public-disclosure injuries).

Yet the Third Circuit adopted exactly that forbidden expansion. Under TransUnion, assessing concreteness depends on whether the asserted harm has

a ‘close relationship’ to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American

courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or

21

various intangible harms[.]” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at

417. In the Third Circuit, assessing concreteness requires courts to apply the TransUnion standard and

a separate “nexus” assessment. This additional requirement conflicts with applicable rulings from this

Court.

To be precise, Amici note the Third Circuit’s nexus

requirement is not identical to the Flast nexus requirement rejected in Duke Power. However, both impose a supplemental “nexus” showing not required

under Article III or this Court’s precedent in non- taxpayer suits. Id. and Akins, 524 U.S. at 22. In this way,

the Third Circuit has decided an important federal

question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.

3. For decades, this Court has analyzed standing under public-disclosure laws by analogy to FOIA.

In Public Citizen, the Court held that plaintiffs denied access to records under the Federal Advisory

Committee Act (“FACA”) suffered the same injury as

FOIA plaintiffs—being denied information the law

entitled them to receive. 491 U.S. at 449. FACA, like

to the NVRA, includes a public-disclosure provision

like 52 U.S.C. § 20507(i). See id. at 446–47. The Court

noted “[t]here is no reason for a different rule here.”

Id. at 449. Further, it determined that, as with agency

denials of information requests under FOIA, denying

requesters the opportunity to review the ABA Committee’s actions to the extent permitted by FACA constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to establish

standing to bring suit. Id. “[O]ur decisions interpret-

22

ing the Freedom of Information Act have never suggested that those requesting information under it

need show more than that they sought and were denied specific agency records.” Id.

Similarly, the Court applied in Akins the same

FOIA-based framework to the public-disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(“FECA”). 524 U.S. at 21–22. There, as here, plaintiffs

alleged informational injury from being denied access

to statutorily required records. The Court held that

such denial constituted an “injury in fact.” Id. at 21.

FECA, like the NVRA, includes several provisions one

of which mandates public-disclosure. See id. at 14-16.

Citing to Public Citizen, the Court clarified that it had

previously held a plaintiff incurs an ‘injury in fact’

when he is unable to obtain information required to

be publicly disclosed by statute. Id. at 21 (citing Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449). Applying this principle,

the Court stated the ‘injury in fact’ respondents experienced arose from their inability to access information that the public-disclosure provisions obligate

to be made public. 524 U.S. at 21.

The Third Circuit departed from that consistent

approach for public-disclosure laws by layering on its

own unique “nexus” test and by looking beyond

§ 20507(i)’s text to other NVRA provisions irrelevant

to disclosure. The Third Circuit erred by not applying

the well-established informational injury framework

applicable to FOIA and other public-disclosure laws.

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ERIC W. LEE

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.

425 Third Street, SW

Suite 800

Washington, DC 20024

(202) 646-5172

T. RUSSELL NOBILE

Counsel of Record

JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.

P.O. Box 6592

Gulfport, MS 39506

(202) 527-9866

Rnobile@judicialwatch.org

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

October 30, 2025