Reply Brief — Steven P. Mancuso, Petitioner v. New York
Supreme Court briefFeb 2, 2026
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No. 25-356
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
STEVEN P. MANCUSO,
Petitioner,
v.
NEW YORK,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to
the A ppellate Division, Supreme Court of
New York, Fourth Judicial Department
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
Robert A. George
Mashpee Commons
22 Steeple Street,
Suite 203
Mashpee, MA 02649
Gary G. Pelletier
Counsel of Record
Pelletier, Clarke &
Caley, LLC
35 Touro Street
Newport, RI 02840
(401) 849-4400
gpelletier@pcclaw.net
Counsel for Petitioner
February 2, 2026
389854
A
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
A. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s Facial
Challenge Barring A Person Convicted of
Any Crime From Possessing A Firearm
Even Within His or Her Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
B. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s As
Applied Challenge to New York’s Laws
P rohibiting Non-Violent Felons From
Possessing a Firearm Within the Home . . . . . . . . . 2
C. The Court Should Reject the State’s Attempt
to Malign Mr. Mancuso’s Character . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES:
Kanter v. Barr,
919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,
597 U.S. 1 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4
People v. Hughes,
921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2d Dept. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Range v. Attorney General of the United States,
124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4, 6
United States v. Duarte,
137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
United States v. Rahimi,
602 U.S. 680 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
United States v. Williams,
F.Supp.3d 2025 (WL 2969670)
(S.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
iii
Cited Authorities
Page
New York Penal Law § 265.02(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
New York Penal Law § 265.03(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
U.S. Constitution Amendment I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2
U.S. Constitution Amendment II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 6
1
The Court should grant a writ of certiorari in this
instance to hold invalid statutes that run afoul of the
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Steven Mancuso’s initial certiorari petition contains
a complete recitation of the Statement of the Case as
well as the Facts and Procedural history. Mr. Mancuso
respectfully incorporates his petition herein. Mr. Mancuso
utilizes this filing to reply to the points raised in the State
of New York’s Opposition to his certiorari petition.
A. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s Facial
Challenge Barring A Person Convicted of Any
Crime From Possessing A Firearm Even Within
His or Her Home
New York Penal Law § 265.03(3) (criminal possession
of a weapon in the second degree) in conjunction with
New York Penal Law § 265.02 (1) (criminal possession
of a weapon in the third degree) prohibits a person from
possessing a firearm even in the home if that person has
a prior conviction for any crime. The term “any crime”
encompasses both felonies and misdemeanors. People v.
Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (2d Dept. 2011).
The “any crime” prohibition is unconstitutionally
overbroad. This Court has previously held that succeeding
in a “typical facial attack” requires a petitioner to
demonstrate “that no set of circumstances exists under
which [the statue] would be valid or that the statute
lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)(internal quotations and
citations omitted). This Court, however, has recognized
another type of facial challenge in the context of the
First Amendment “whereby a law may be invalidated as
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overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep.” Id. at 473 (emphasis added)(internal
quotations omitted).
In its analysis in New York State Rif le & Pistol
Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 30-31 (2022), this Court
recognized the First Amendment facial challenge in the
context of the Second Amendment when it held that New
York’s statute requiring people seeking to carry a firearm
outside the home for self-defense purposes to demonstrate
“proper cause” was unconstitutionally overbroad.
Here, like Bruen, the “any crime” law is impermissibly
overbroad because a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional. The law encompasses a conviction
for any crime from the most petty form of misdemeanor
to a non-violent misdemeanor to a non-violent felony
to a serious violent felony. The latter category, which
is presumably constitutional, is merely a subset of the
statute. A substantial number of “any crimes” contained
within the reach of the statute would be unconstitutional
in this context. The statute prohibiting a person convicted
of “any crime” from possessing a firearm even in the home
is unconstitutionally overbroad, and this Court should
find it invalid.
B. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s As Applied
Challenge to New York’s Laws Prohibiting NonViolent Felons From Possessing a Firearm Within
the Home
A circuit split exists over the question of the
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting non-violent
felonies from possessing firearms. See United States v.
3
Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9 th Cir. 2025) (en banc); Range v.
Attorney General of the United States, 124 F.4th 218 (3rd
Cir. 2024); United States v. Williams, - F.Supp.3d-, 2025
WL 2969670, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025)(finding the
statute prohibiting firearm possession unconstitutional
both as applied and facially). The State of New York,
in its opposition to Mr. Mancuso’s certiorari petition,
recognizes the circuit split but still argues that in 1791
all felonies were punishable by death and, according to
the State, forfeiture is permissible because it is a lesser
form of punishment than death. The State’s assertion is
palpably false.
In Range, the Third Circuit recognized that the
Framers of the United States Constitution did not
confiscate guns unless the person or the crime of conviction
represented a potential danger to the community, and its
historical analysis elucidates the fact that society in the
Framers’ time restored the right to possess a firearm
upon a person’s reintegration into society. Range, 124
F.4th at 231. Moreover, the Third Circuit recognized that
felonies like fraud were punishable by lesser sentences
such as jail, fines, or whipping not death. Id. n. 10. The
Third Circuit noted that the felony at issue in Range –
making false statements to obtain food stamps – was a
fraud offense analogous to the types of felonies subject to
lesser punishments. Id. at 230-231.
Apart from the Third Circuit, one former judge in
the Seventh Circuit, now a Justice of this Court, has
noted that in 1791, the Framers barred individuals from
possessing firearms only when those individuals posed
a danger to society. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451
(7th Cir. 2019)(Barett, Circuit J., Dissenting), (majority
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opinion abrogated by Bruen). In Kanter, then Judge
Barrett noted that “[h]istory is consistent with common
sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power
to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns. But
that power extends only to people who are dangerous.
Founding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right
to bear arms simply because of their status as felons. Nor
have the parties introduced any evidence that foundingera legislatures imposed virtue-based restrictions on the
right; such restrictions applied to civic rights like voting
and jury service, not to individual rights like the right to
possess a gun. In 1791—and for well more than a century
afterward—legislatures disqualified categories of people
from the right to bear arms only when they judged that
doing so was necessary to protect the public safety.”
Kanter, 919 F.3d at 451 (dissent).
Here, no connection exists between the felony at
issue committed by Mr. Mancuso and a need to protect
public safety. The crime is a violation of the Clean Air
Act. While the courts have noted that the Clean Air Act
crime involves conduct harmful to the public, no analysis
converts the actions taken by Mr. Mancuso to a crime
of violence. Moreover, Mr. Mancuso’s role in the offense
involved fraudulent paperwork and falsifying documents.
In essence, a jury found Mr. Mancuso guilty of a crime
of fraud similar to the crime of fraud at issue in Range.
Fraud crimes were not punishable by death in 1791 and
Mr. Mancuso’s conduct is not the type of offense requiring
the protection of public safety by confiscating his right to
a firearm in his home.
In this case, the State of New York impliedly concedes
that the non-violent felony issue may warrant a writ of
5
certiorari; it just urges the Court not to grant certiorari
in this case. Instead, the State maintains that if this
Court grants a petition for writ of certiorari, it should
grant the petition in Vincent v. Bondi, No. 24-1156. While
Mr. Mancuso certainly does not oppose the certiorari
request in Vincent, his case and Vincent are not mutually
exclusive. No reason exists why the Court should not
grant certiorari in both matters. Vincent addresses
the constitutional application of federal law while Mr.
Mancuso’s matter addresses the application of state law
and involves the additional question of the constitutionality
of an overly broad state law. Both have similar issues, and
a decision in one matter may have reciprocal results in the
other matter. Even if one case serves as the lead matter
before this Court, the Court should resolve the circuit split
and grant the application for certiorari in both Vincent
and this matter.
C. The Court Should Reject the State’s Attempt to
Malign Mr. Mancuso’s Character
In a less than transparent effort to steer this Court
away from the merits of Mr. Mancuso’s certiorari petition,
the State resorts to character assassination in effort to
persuade this Court to deny his petition. The Court should
reject the State’s tactics. The State attempts to tie Mr.
Mancuso to cocaine use and mental health hospitalizations
as a means to paint his as a person who should not have a
gun. Both assertions are misleading and contravene prior
decisions of this Court.
In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690, 698
(2024), this Court held that when a court finds a person
poses a credible threat of violence to another person,
6
the court may confiscate that person’s firearms without
violating the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See also, Range, 124 F.4th at 230 (“Rahimi
did bless disarming (at least temporarily) physically
dangerous people. The law that it upheld required a
finding that the defendant represents a credible threat to
someone else’s physical safety”)(internal quotations and
brackets omitted).
Here, no court has found that Mr. Mancuso poses
a credible threat to someone else’s safety. No court
has found that he is a drug abuser or addict consistent
with the federal prohibition on firearm possession
under 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). No court has ever deemed
Mr. Mancuso a mental health risk that would prevent
him from possessing a firearm. In fact, Mr. Mancuso’s
overnight hospitalizations occurred immediately after
his girlfriend’s suicide that prompted the gun charge in
this case and after a DUI charge where Mr. Mancuso still
suffered from the aftermath of his girlfriend’s suicide. No
court has ever deemed Mr. Mancuso to possess a firearm
unfit because of mental health issues.
Finally, the State raises the issue that Mr. Mancuso
possessed and manufactured a ghost gun even if he had
a constitutional right to possess a firearm. The State’s
ghost gun argument is a red herring. The State did not
charge Mr. Mancuso with possession of a ghost gun. The
State did not charge Mr. Mancuso with manufacturing a
ghost gun. The State’s assertion that it proved beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial that Mr. Mancuso manufactured
a ghost gun is patently false. Although the State presented
testimony regarding the manufacture of a ghost gun,
the jury considered only whether Mr. Mancuso was
prohibited person under New York law who could not
7
possess a firearm in his home. The question in this case
simply concerns the constitutionality of whether a person
convicted of a non-violent felony can possess a firearm in
his home. Contrary to the State’s contention, Mr. Mancuso
argued the constitutionality of the New York “any crime”
statutes and its application to a person convicted of a nonviolent felony extensively at the trial level and raised the
question again on appeal before the Fourth Department
and in a review petition before the New York Court of
Appeals. This Court should address the constitutionality
of statutes that prohibit a person previously convicted
of any crime and a person previously convicted of a nonviolent felony from possessing a firearm outside or within
their home. The Court should correct the existence and
application of these unconstitutional statutes.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant
Mr. Mancuso’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the New
York Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert A. George
Mashpee Commons
22 Steeple Street,
Suite 203
Mashpee, MA 02649
Gary G. Pelletier
Counsel of Record
Pelletier, Clarke &
Caley, LLC
35 Touro Street
Newport, RI 02840
(401) 849-4400
gpelletier@pcclaw.net
Counsel for Petitioner
February 2, 2026
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