Reply Brief — Steven P. Mancuso, Petitioner v. New York

Supreme Court briefFeb 2, 2026

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No. 25-356

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

STEVEN P. MANCUSO,

Petitioner,

v.

NEW YORK,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to

the A ppellate Division, Supreme Court of

New York, Fourth Judicial Department

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Robert A. George

Mashpee Commons

22 Steeple Street,

Suite 203

Mashpee, MA 02649

Gary G. Pelletier

Counsel of Record

Pelletier, Clarke &

Caley, LLC

35 Touro Street

Newport, RI 02840

(401) 849-4400

gpelletier@pcclaw.net

Counsel for Petitioner

February 2, 2026

389854

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

A. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s Facial

Challenge Barring A Person Convicted of

Any Crime From Possessing A Firearm

Even Within His or Her Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

B. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s As

Applied Challenge to New York’s Laws

P rohibiting Non-Violent Felons From

Possessing a Firearm Within the Home . . . . . . . . . 2

C. The Court Should Reject the State’s Attempt

to Malign Mr. Mancuso’s Character . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Kanter v. Barr,

919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen,

597 U.S. 1 (2022) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 4

People v. Hughes,

921 N.Y.S.2d 300 (2d Dept. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Range v. Attorney General of the United States,

124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 4, 6

United States v. Duarte,

137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

United States v. Rahimi,

602 U.S. 680 (2024) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6

United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2

United States v. Williams,

F.Supp.3d 2025 (WL 2969670)

(S.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

iii

Cited Authorities

Page

New York Penal Law § 265.02(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

New York Penal Law § 265.03(3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

U.S. Constitution Amendment I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2

U.S. Constitution Amendment II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 6

1

The Court should grant a writ of certiorari in this

instance to hold invalid statutes that run afoul of the

Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Steven Mancuso’s initial certiorari petition contains

a complete recitation of the Statement of the Case as

well as the Facts and Procedural history. Mr. Mancuso

respectfully incorporates his petition herein. Mr. Mancuso

utilizes this filing to reply to the points raised in the State

of New York’s Opposition to his certiorari petition.

A. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s Facial

Challenge Barring A Person Convicted of Any

Crime From Possessing A Firearm Even Within

His or Her Home

New York Penal Law § 265.03(3) (criminal possession

of a weapon in the second degree) in conjunction with

New York Penal Law § 265.02 (1) (criminal possession

of a weapon in the third degree) prohibits a person from

possessing a firearm even in the home if that person has

a prior conviction for any crime. The term “any crime”

encompasses both felonies and misdemeanors. People v.

Hughes, 921 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (2d Dept. 2011).

The “any crime” prohibition is unconstitutionally

overbroad. This Court has previously held that succeeding

in a “typical facial attack” requires a petitioner to

demonstrate “that no set of circumstances exists under

which [the statue] would be valid or that the statute

lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v.

Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)(internal quotations and

citations omitted). This Court, however, has recognized

another type of facial challenge in the context of the

First Amendment “whereby a law may be invalidated as

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overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are

unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly

legitimate sweep.” Id. at 473 (emphasis added)(internal

quotations omitted).

In its analysis in New York State Rif le & Pistol

Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 30-31 (2022), this Court

recognized the First Amendment facial challenge in the

context of the Second Amendment when it held that New

York’s statute requiring people seeking to carry a firearm

outside the home for self-defense purposes to demonstrate

“proper cause” was unconstitutionally overbroad.

Here, like Bruen, the “any crime” law is impermissibly

overbroad because a substantial number of its applications

are unconstitutional. The law encompasses a conviction

for any crime from the most petty form of misdemeanor

to a non-violent misdemeanor to a non-violent felony

to a serious violent felony. The latter category, which

is presumably constitutional, is merely a subset of the

statute. A substantial number of “any crimes” contained

within the reach of the statute would be unconstitutional

in this context. The statute prohibiting a person convicted

of “any crime” from possessing a firearm even in the home

is unconstitutionally overbroad, and this Court should

find it invalid.

B. The Court Should Consider Mancuso’s As Applied

Challenge to New York’s Laws Prohibiting NonViolent Felons From Possessing a Firearm Within

the Home

A circuit split exists over the question of the

constitutionality of statutes prohibiting non-violent

felonies from possessing firearms. See United States v.

3

Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9 th Cir. 2025) (en banc); Range v.

Attorney General of the United States, 124 F.4th 218 (3rd

Cir. 2024); United States v. Williams, - F.Supp.3d-, 2025

WL 2969670, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2025)(finding the

statute prohibiting firearm possession unconstitutional

both as applied and facially). The State of New York,

in its opposition to Mr. Mancuso’s certiorari petition,

recognizes the circuit split but still argues that in 1791

all felonies were punishable by death and, according to

the State, forfeiture is permissible because it is a lesser

form of punishment than death. The State’s assertion is

palpably false.

In Range, the Third Circuit recognized that the

Framers of the United States Constitution did not

confiscate guns unless the person or the crime of conviction

represented a potential danger to the community, and its

historical analysis elucidates the fact that society in the

Framers’ time restored the right to possess a firearm

upon a person’s reintegration into society. Range, 124

F.4th at 231. Moreover, the Third Circuit recognized that

felonies like fraud were punishable by lesser sentences

such as jail, fines, or whipping not death. Id. n. 10. The

Third Circuit noted that the felony at issue in Range –

making false statements to obtain food stamps – was a

fraud offense analogous to the types of felonies subject to

lesser punishments. Id. at 230-231.

Apart from the Third Circuit, one former judge in

the Seventh Circuit, now a Justice of this Court, has

noted that in 1791, the Framers barred individuals from

possessing firearms only when those individuals posed

a danger to society. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 451

(7th Cir. 2019)(Barett, Circuit J., Dissenting), (majority

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opinion abrogated by Bruen). In Kanter, then Judge

Barrett noted that “[h]istory is consistent with common

sense: it demonstrates that legislatures have the power

to prohibit dangerous people from possessing guns. But

that power extends only to people who are dangerous.

Founding-era legislatures did not strip felons of the right

to bear arms simply because of their status as felons. Nor

have the parties introduced any evidence that foundingera legislatures imposed virtue-based restrictions on the

right; such restrictions applied to civic rights like voting

and jury service, not to individual rights like the right to

possess a gun. In 1791—and for well more than a century

afterward—legislatures disqualified categories of people

from the right to bear arms only when they judged that

doing so was necessary to protect the public safety.”

Kanter, 919 F.3d at 451 (dissent).

Here, no connection exists between the felony at

issue committed by Mr. Mancuso and a need to protect

public safety. The crime is a violation of the Clean Air

Act. While the courts have noted that the Clean Air Act

crime involves conduct harmful to the public, no analysis

converts the actions taken by Mr. Mancuso to a crime

of violence. Moreover, Mr. Mancuso’s role in the offense

involved fraudulent paperwork and falsifying documents.

In essence, a jury found Mr. Mancuso guilty of a crime

of fraud similar to the crime of fraud at issue in Range.

Fraud crimes were not punishable by death in 1791 and

Mr. Mancuso’s conduct is not the type of offense requiring

the protection of public safety by confiscating his right to

a firearm in his home.

In this case, the State of New York impliedly concedes

that the non-violent felony issue may warrant a writ of

5

certiorari; it just urges the Court not to grant certiorari

in this case. Instead, the State maintains that if this

Court grants a petition for writ of certiorari, it should

grant the petition in Vincent v. Bondi, No. 24-1156. While

Mr. Mancuso certainly does not oppose the certiorari

request in Vincent, his case and Vincent are not mutually

exclusive. No reason exists why the Court should not

grant certiorari in both matters. Vincent addresses

the constitutional application of federal law while Mr.

Mancuso’s matter addresses the application of state law

and involves the additional question of the constitutionality

of an overly broad state law. Both have similar issues, and

a decision in one matter may have reciprocal results in the

other matter. Even if one case serves as the lead matter

before this Court, the Court should resolve the circuit split

and grant the application for certiorari in both Vincent

and this matter.

C. The Court Should Reject the State’s Attempt to

Malign Mr. Mancuso’s Character

In a less than transparent effort to steer this Court

away from the merits of Mr. Mancuso’s certiorari petition,

the State resorts to character assassination in effort to

persuade this Court to deny his petition. The Court should

reject the State’s tactics. The State attempts to tie Mr.

Mancuso to cocaine use and mental health hospitalizations

as a means to paint his as a person who should not have a

gun. Both assertions are misleading and contravene prior

decisions of this Court.

In United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 690, 698

(2024), this Court held that when a court finds a person

poses a credible threat of violence to another person,

6

the court may confiscate that person’s firearms without

violating the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution. See also, Range, 124 F.4th at 230 (“Rahimi

did bless disarming (at least temporarily) physically

dangerous people. The law that it upheld required a

finding that the defendant represents a credible threat to

someone else’s physical safety”)(internal quotations and

brackets omitted).

Here, no court has found that Mr. Mancuso poses

a credible threat to someone else’s safety. No court

has found that he is a drug abuser or addict consistent

with the federal prohibition on firearm possession

under 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). No court has ever deemed

Mr. Mancuso a mental health risk that would prevent

him from possessing a firearm. In fact, Mr. Mancuso’s

overnight hospitalizations occurred immediately after

his girlfriend’s suicide that prompted the gun charge in

this case and after a DUI charge where Mr. Mancuso still

suffered from the aftermath of his girlfriend’s suicide. No

court has ever deemed Mr. Mancuso to possess a firearm

unfit because of mental health issues.

Finally, the State raises the issue that Mr. Mancuso

possessed and manufactured a ghost gun even if he had

a constitutional right to possess a firearm. The State’s

ghost gun argument is a red herring. The State did not

charge Mr. Mancuso with possession of a ghost gun. The

State did not charge Mr. Mancuso with manufacturing a

ghost gun. The State’s assertion that it proved beyond a

reasonable doubt at trial that Mr. Mancuso manufactured

a ghost gun is patently false. Although the State presented

testimony regarding the manufacture of a ghost gun,

the jury considered only whether Mr. Mancuso was

prohibited person under New York law who could not

7

possess a firearm in his home. The question in this case

simply concerns the constitutionality of whether a person

convicted of a non-violent felony can possess a firearm in

his home. Contrary to the State’s contention, Mr. Mancuso

argued the constitutionality of the New York “any crime”

statutes and its application to a person convicted of a nonviolent felony extensively at the trial level and raised the

question again on appeal before the Fourth Department

and in a review petition before the New York Court of

Appeals. This Court should address the constitutionality

of statutes that prohibit a person previously convicted

of any crime and a person previously convicted of a nonviolent felony from possessing a firearm outside or within

their home. The Court should correct the existence and

application of these unconstitutional statutes.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

Mr. Mancuso’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the New

York Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert A. George

Mashpee Commons

22 Steeple Street,

Suite 203

Mashpee, MA 02649

Gary G. Pelletier

Counsel of Record

Pelletier, Clarke &

Caley, LLC

35 Touro Street

Newport, RI 02840

(401) 849-4400

gpelletier@pcclaw.net

Counsel for Petitioner

February 2, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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