Amicus Curiae Brief — James Dondero, et al., Petitioners v. Stacey G. Jernigan, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 24, 2025

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 25-355

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

JAMES DONDERO, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

STACEY G. JERNIGAN, ET AL.,

Respondents.

____________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR INVESTMENT

PROFESSIONALS CONCERNED WITH

JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AS AMICUS

CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

__________

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .....................................................ii

Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................................... 1

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 2

Reasons for Granting the Writ.................................... 3

I. Public confidence in the judiciary depends on

the appearance of impartiality .......................... 3

A. The rule of law requires impartiality........... 3

B. The appearance of partiality reduces

confidence and predictability ....................... 7

II. The Fifth Circuit and most others are wrong

to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard .......... 8

A. This Court’s precedents and § 455’s

language call for de novo review .................. 9

B. Similar constitutional disqualification

decisions use a de novo standard ............... 15

C. Disqualification questions are especially

suited for de novo review ............................ 17

D. An overly deferential standard reduces

public confidence in the judiciary .............. 19

Conclusion.................................................................. 22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,

475 U.S. 813 (1986) ...................................... 5, 15, 17

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore &

Assocs., Inc.,

682 F.3d 1003 (CA Fed. 2012) ............................... 13

Berger v. United States,

255 U.S. 22 (1921) ............................................ 11, 17

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia,

590 U.S. 644 (2020) ................................................ 14

Bracy v. Gramley,

520 U.S. 899 (1997) .................................................. 5

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,

556 U.S. 868 (2009) .................................................. 6

Echavarria v. Filson,

896 F.3d 1118 (CA9 2018) ..................................... 16

Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc.,

593 U.S. 1 (2021) .................................................... 15

Hassan v. Holder,

604 F.3d 915 (CA6 2010) ....................................... 16

Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.,

572 U.S. 559 (2014) ................................................ 12

In re Billedeaux,

972 F.2d 104 (CA5 1992) ....................................... 20

In re Hatcher,

150 F.3d 631 (CA7 1998) ....................................... 18

iii

In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.,

98 F.4th 170 (CA5 2024) .......................................... 1

In re Kensington Int’l Ltd.,

368 F.3d 289 (CA3 2004) ....................................... 13

In re Mason,

916 F.2d 384 (CA7 1990) ....................................... 17

In re Murchison,

349 U.S. 133 (1955) ............................................ 5, 15

In re United States,

158 F.3d 26 (CA1 1998) ................................... 12, 18

In re United States,

441 F.3d 44 (CA1 2006) ......................................... 17

Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123 (1951) .................................................. 5

Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. 162 (2016) ................................................ 12

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.,

486 U.S. 847 (1988) ................................ 6, 10, 13, 21

Liteky v. United States,

510 U.S. 540 (1994) ........................ 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13

Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions,

875 F.3d 573 (CA10 2017) ..................................... 16

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,

446 U.S. 238 (1980) .................................................. 5

McGirt v. Oklahoma,

591 U.S. 894 (2020) ................................................ 14

McLane Co. v. EEOC,

581 U.S. 72 (2017) ............................................ 15, 17

iv

Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,

398 U.S. 375 (1970) .................................................. 7

Offutt v. United States,

348 U.S. 11 (1954) .................................................... 4

Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690 (1996) .................................... 11, 13, 15

Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin,

864 F.3d 591 (CADC 2017) ...................................... 7

Pullman-Standard v. Swint,

456 U.S. 273 (1982) .................................................. 9

Rippo v. Baker,

580 U.S. 285 (2017) ................................................ 17

Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell,

499 U.S. 225 (1991) ................................................ 20

Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v.

Am. Tobacco Co.,

535 U.S. 229 (2002) ................................................ 10

Tumey v. Ohio,

273 U.S. 510 (1927) ................................................ 16

U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt.

LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,

583 U.S. 387 (2018) .......................................... 12, 14

United States v. Balistrieri,

779 F.2d 1191 (CA7 1985) ..................................... 18

United States v. Brocato,

4 F.4th 296 (CA5 2021) .......................................... 16

United States v. Jones,

678 F.3d 293 (CA4 2012) ....................................... 13

v

United States v. Wessels,

539 F.3d 913 (CA8 2008) ....................................... 16

United States v. Will,

449 U.S. 200 (1980) ................................................ 10

Williams v. Pennsylvania,

579 U.S. 1 (2016) .......................... 3, 4, 13, 16, 17, 19

Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar,

575 U.S. 433 (2015) .................................. 3, 4, 13, 19

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Mass. Const. part 1, art. XXX ..................................... 3

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 453 ............................................................ 3

28 U.S.C. § 455

.... 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21

OTHER AUTHORITIES

13D Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice & Procedure

(Wright & Miller) (3d ed.) .......................... 11, 12, 19

Address of John Marshall, in Proceedings and

Debates of the Virginia State Convention of

1829–1830 (1830) ..................................................... 4

Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules,

56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989)................................. 7

Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Disqualification: An

Analysis of Federal Law, Fed. Jud. Ctr.

(3d ed. 2020) ........................................................... 20

Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial

Disqualification Matters. Again.,

30 Rev. Litig. 671 (2011) ........................................ 19

vi

Cl. 40 (1215), in W. McKechnie, Magna Carta, A

Commentary on the Great Charter of King John

(2d ed. 1914) ............................................................. 3

Dan Roe, Federal Bankruptcy Judge’s ‘Vilifying’

Novels Raise Questions Over Impartiality, Am.

Lawyer (July 23, 2024),

https://bit.ly/4o13H7n ...................................... 20, 21

Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a

Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in

Handbook of Economic Growth,

Vol. 1A (2005) ....................................................... 7, 8

H.R. Rep. No. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351 ................................ 6, 14

Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform,

53 Brook. L. Rev. 589 (1987) ................................. 13

Judicial Disqualification: Hearing before the

Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery

of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1064,

93d Cong. 14 (1973) ............................................... 21

Richard K. Neumann Jr., Conflicts of Interest in

Bush v. Gore,

16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 375 (2003) ............ 10, 11, 16

Samuel Bufford, International Rule of Law and the

Market Economy—An Outline,

12 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 303 (2006) ....................... 8

The Federalist No. 78 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)

(A. Hamilton) ........................................................... 4

TikTok (May 13, 2024), http://bit.ly/3WcRMHt ....... 21

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Investment Professionals Concerned with

Judicial Impartiality is composed of investment management industry professionals who worked with

Petitioner James Dondero at Highland Capital Management, the debtor in the underlying bankruptcy

proceeding. These professionals thus had a front-row

seat to what the Fifth Circuit called “a nasty breakup.”

In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 98 F.4th 170, 172

(CA5 2024). They are concerned that the bankruptcy

judge’s apparent disdain of the investment

management industry affected these proceedings—

and will have a chilling effect on future proceedings in

the Northern District of Texas. Even as the judge was

adjudicating this matter, she was writing books in

which an investment professional was the antagonist.

That apparent predisposition against the industry

seemed to be reflected in the case, as the rough

treatment of the industry in the judge’s books echoed

the judge’s approach. Yet the fund industry is a

responsible and trusted fiduciary for investors, creates

wealth for billions of people around the world, and is

a growing employer of tens of thousands of

Americans in the Northern District. In the experience

of these professionals, Mr. Dondero prioritized his

employees, while the bankruptcy estate often treated

those professionals as expendable. Thus, amicus has a

significant interest in protecting judicial impartiality

in this case. *

* Amicus provided timely notice of its intention to file this brief.

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and

no person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel

made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Public perception of judicial impartiality is a

foundation of the rule of law. The rule of law depends

on its application by judges, and any bias in that

application contradicts the promise of law applied

equally. Even the appearance of impartiality

threatens the rule of law. Not only does a perception

of partiality reduce the public’s view of the judiciary’s

legitimacy—the source of its authority—but it

undermines the ability of citizens to structure their

interactions with each other and with the government.

Because an impartial law provides the bedrock for

these interactions, any perception that the law may

not be applied equally introduces unpredictability.

This uncertainty discourages the exchanges that form

the basis of our market economy, among many other

negative consequences.

This case implicates these exceptionally important

principles. By deferring to a trial court’s assessment of

its own potential bias for recusal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 455, the decision below undervalues impartiality

and its appearance. This Court has repeatedly

considered recusal questions under both § 455 and

constitutional principles without deference to the

lower courts. Such de novo review makes sense, given

that § 455 requires recusal—it is not a matter of

discretion—and uses an objective standard. There is

no reason to think that trial judges are uniquely adept

at assessing their own potential biases. Misplaced

deference on recusal undermines public confidence in

an impartial judiciary, threatening rule-of-law values.

The Court should grant certiorari.

3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. Public confidence in the judiciary depends

on the appearance of impartiality

The questions presented are exceptionally

important, for they implicate “a state interest of the

highest order”: “public perception of judicial integrity.”

Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015).

Inherent in the rule of law is a promise that it be

applied equally. And because judicial authority stems

in large part from public confidence, both the

appearance and the actuality of judicial impartiality

are critical. Public perceptions that judges will

neutrally apply the law promote predictability in the

law, providing a stable background against which

private parties can structure their affairs and their

interactions with the government. Letting any

appearance of impartiality fester in the judiciary

undermines those important rule-of-law goals.

A. The rule of law requires impartiality

A cornerstone of American government is the

promise that ours is “a government of laws and not of

men.” Mass. Const. part 1, art. XXX. Yet judges

interpret the law. To fulfill this promise, then, judges

must “administer justice without respect to persons,

and do equal right to” all. 28 U.S.C. § 453. “This

principle dates back at least eight centuries to Magna

Carta, which proclaimed, ‘To no one will we sell, to no

one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.’” WilliamsYulee, 575 U.S. at 445 (quoting Cl. 40 (1215), in W.

McKechnie, Magna Carta, A Commentary on the Great

Charter of King John 395 (2d ed. 1914)). A judge must

“‘observe the utmost fairness,’ striving to be ‘perfectly

4

and completely independent, with nothing to influence

or controul him but God and his conscience.’” Id. at 447

(quoting Address of John Marshall, in Proceedings

and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–

1830, p. 616 (1830)).

Not only must judges apply the law impartially,

they also be must seen by the public as applying the

law impartially. “[J]ustice must satisfy the

appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348

U.S. 11, 14 (1954). “The importance of public

confidence in the integrity of judges stems from the

place of the judiciary in the government.” WilliamsYulee, 575 U.S. at 445. “Unlike the executive or the

legislature, the judiciary ‘has no influence over either

the sword or the purse; neither force nor will but

merely judgment.’” Ibid. (cleaned up) (quoting The

Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A.

Hamilton)). “The judiciary’s authority therefore

depends in large measure on the public’s willingness

to respect and follow its decisions.” Id. at 445–46.

As this Court has explained, “[a]n insistence on the

appearance of neutrality is not some artificial attempt

to mask imperfection in the judicial process.” Williams

v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 15 (2016). Rather, it is “an

essential means of ensuring the reality of a fair

adjudication.” Id. at 15–16. “Both the appearance and

reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public

legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to the

rule of law itself.” Id. at 16. “[T]hey concern the

ingredients of what constitutes justice.” Offutt, 348

U.S. at 14. “In matters of ethics, appearance and

reality often converge as one.” Liteky v. United States,

5

510 U.S. 540, 565 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in

judgment).

This Court has held that “[a] fair trial in a fair

tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re

Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Though

“[f]airness of course requires an absence of actual bias

in the trial of cases,” “our system of law has always

endeavored to prevent even the probability of

unfairness.” Ibid. This prevention “may sometimes

bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who

would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice

equally between contending parties.” Ibid. But that

result is necessary for justice “to perform its high

function in the best way.” Ibid. “[I]t preserves both the

appearance and reality of fairness, ‘generating the

feeling, so important to a popular government, that

justice has been done,’ by ensuring that no person will

be deprived of his interests in the absence of a

proceeding in which he may present his case with

assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find

against him.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,

242 (1980) (citation omitted) (quoting Joint AntiFascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)

(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).

Due process “demarks only the outer boundaries of

judicial disqualifications.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986). Judicial

disqualification has been refined and regulated by

“common law, statute, [and] the professional

standards of the bench and bar”—including the

federal statute at issue, 28 U.S.C. § 455. Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). But regulations

such as § 455 serve the same due-process goal: “to

6

promote public confidence in the integrity of the

judicial process.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition

Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859–60 (1988). “The guiding

consideration is that the administration of justice

should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well

as be so in fact.” Id. at 869–70 (cleaned up).

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) specifically requires recusal

whenever the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably

be questioned.” “The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid

even the appearance of partiality.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S.

at 860. “[W]hat matters is not the reality of bias or

prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548.

Section 455(a) “is triggered by an attitude or state of

mind so resistant to fair and dispassionate inquiry as

to cause a party, the public, or a reviewing court to

have reasonable grounds to question the neutral and

objective character of a judge’s rulings or findings.” Id.

at 557–58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).

“[T]here are a number of factors that could give rise to

a ‘probability’ or ‘appearance’ of bias: friendship with

a party or lawyer, prior employment experience,

membership in clubs or associations, prior speeches

and writings, religious affiliation, and countless other

considerations.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556

U.S. 868, 892 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)

(emphasis added).

In short, “[l]itigants ought not have to face a judge

where there is a reasonable question of impartiality.”

H.R. Rep. No. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in

1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355. Not only does this goal

“ha[ve] constitutional dimensions,” Liljeberg, 486 U.S.

at 865 n.12, but as discussed next, it also has

7

important policy benefits that flow from public

confidence in judicial pronouncements.

B. The appearance of partiality reduces

confidence and predictability

One of the functions of the rule of law is to “furnish

a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable

them to plan their affairs with assurance against

untoward surprise.” Moragne v. States Marine Lines,

Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). “The confidence of

people in their ability to predict the legal

consequences of their actions is vitally necessary to

facilitate the planning of primary activity and to

encourage the settlement of disputes without resort to

the courts.” Ibid. As Justice Scalia put it, “uncertainty

has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of

Law.” Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of

Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989).

“[T]he existence of a predictable rule of law has

made America’s enviable economic progress possible.”

Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591, 647 (CADC

2017) (Brown, J., dissenting in part). Dependable,

stable, and impartial institutions are prerequisites for

healthy markets. For instance, “[a]n owner and

manager can write a contract because they believe

that the state, and its agents the courts, would be

impartial enforcers of the contract.” 1 By contrast, if

either party believes that the enforcers may “be

aligned with” the other, “the contract would have little

1 Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of

Long-Run Growth 429, in Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A

(2005).

8

value.” 2 “Therefore, the presence of an impartial

enforcer is important for contracting.” 3

As above, what matters is not just impartiality but

also the appearance of impartiality. Parties must

believe that any disputes will be impartially “resolved

by courts on the merits, based on legal rules duly

adopted and evidence properly presented to the

court.” 4 Otherwise, they will hesitate to engage, for

the risk of uncertainty via potential bias will weigh as

a cost against the transaction. Indeed, in other

countries, “the lack of legal institutions that are

perceived as efficient, transparent, and impartial for

the purposes of dispute resolution has hindered [the]

capacity for sustainable development and international competitiveness.” 5 As one judge put it, “[t]he

most important Rule of Law requirement for a judicial

system . . . is that judges must be honest”—i.e.,

without bias. 6 Impartiality and its appearance are

thus necessary for both the rule of law and the benefits

that flow from the rule of law, including a stable

framework under which parties can engage in

commercial activity and interact with the government.

II. The Fifth Circuit and most others are wrong

to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard

The questions presented are especially important

because the decision below—like decisions from most

Courts of Appeals—wrongly defers to a trial judge’s

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

Samuel Bufford, International Rule of Law and the Market

Economy—An Outline, 12 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 303, 310 (2006).

5 Id. at 310 n.20.

6 Id. at 311.

4

9

own assessment of her impartiality, thereby undermining the rule-of-law values discussed above. The

abuse-of-discretion standard applied below and by

most circuits is not the right standard for § 455

recusal, which is mandatory rather than discretionary. The legal question involves the application of a

statutory standard to generally settled facts. This

Court has always applied § 455 without deference to

the lower courts on the ultimate recusal question. And

similar claims—including constitutional claims for

disqualification—have been reviewed de novo by both

this Court and the Courts of Appeals. There are

uniquely good reasons to apply the same de novo

standard here—most obviously that a judge’s ability

to self-diagnose partiality or its appearance is likely to

be limited.

A. This Court’s precedents and

language call for de novo review

§ 455’s

To begin, this Court has repeatedly adjudicated the

merits of § 455 recusal claims without suggesting any

deference. In Liteky v. United States, the Court

“[a]ppl[ied] the principles we have discussed to the

facts of the present case” to decide that “[n]one of the

grounds petitioners assert required disqualification.”

510 U.S. at 556. It did not defer to the lower courts’

application of law to fact. Nor did it remand for the

lower courts to conduct the inquiry in the first

instance, as it would typically do for questions of fact

(to which deferential review would then apply). See,

e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–

92 (1982). Rather, the Court considered the facts itself

in light of § 455’s standard and decided that

disqualification was not required.

10

This approach is consistent with this Court’s other

decisions involving § 455. “[O]f the four Supreme

Court cases that have interpreted § 455, none held

that a recusal decision is within the challenged judge’s

discretion.” Richard K. Neumann Jr., Conflicts of

Interest in Bush v. Gore, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 375,

394 (2003). Rather, all of them “interpret[ed] the

statute as Congress drafted it, with mandatory duties

not amenable to discretion.” Ibid.; see id. at 394–97.

Besides Liteky, another decision viewed the facts

independently and found it “self-evident that a

reasonable person would not believe [the judge] had

any interest or bias.” Sao Paulo State of Federative

Republic of Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 229,

233 (2002). Still another agreed with the lower courts

“that an objective observer would have questioned [the

judge’s] impartiality,” without suggesting deference to

that determination. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 861. As to

the proper remedy, the Court acknowledged that “the

Court of Appeals is in a better position to evaluate the

significance of a violation than is this Court,” but it

still declined to suggest any more deference than that

the remedy decided below be “afforded [the Supreme

Court’s] due consideration.” Id. at 862.

Last, this Court in United States v. Will held that

§ 455 did not negate the common-law Rule of

Necessity, under which a judge otherwise disqualified

was required to nonetheless adjudicate a case if no

other judge could. 449 U.S. 200, 213–17 (1980). Once

again, nothing suggests that either § 455 or the Rule

of Necessity would be a matter of discretion

warranting a deferential standard, as the Court

emphasized the tension between “requiring disqual-

11

ification” and “the mandate of the Rule of Necessity.”

Id. at 217.

The Court has used the same approach under 28

U.S.C. § 144, which applies only to district-court

judges but otherwise overlaps with § 455. See Liteky,

510 U.S. at 548 (noting that § 144 “seems to be

properly invocable only when § 455(a) can be invoked

anyway”); see also 13D Richard D. Freer, Federal

Practice & Procedure (Wright & Miller) § 3542 (3d ed.)

(“[T]he substantive standard for disqualification

based upon actual bias or prejudice is identical under

§ 144 and § 455(b)(1).”). In Berger v. United States, the

Court held that a judge who allegedly said that

German-Americans’ “hearts are reeking with

disloyalty” was required to recuse—notwithstanding a

factual dispute about the statement. 255 U.S. 22, 28,

33 (1921); see id. at 39–40 (Day, J., dissenting). The

Court again suggested no deference to the lower-court

decisions. See Neumann, supra, at 396–97.

This Court’s consistent de novo review makes

sense. The § 455 recusal determination is a classic

“mixed question of law and fact: [t]he historical facts

are admitted or established, the rule of law is

undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy

the relevant statutory standard.” Ornelas v. United

States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (cleaned up); see

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556 (“[a]pplying the principles we

have discussed to the facts of the present case”). “[T]he

standard of review for a mixed question” “depends[] on

whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual

work.” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset

Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387,

12

396 (2018). Here, § 455’s recusal determination turns

on primarily legal questions.

First, recusal under § 455 is mandatory. This Court

has said that the statute “defines the circumstances

that mandate disqualification of federal judges.”

Liljberg, 486 U.S. at 862 (emphasis added). That

follows from the statutory text, which provides

circumstances in which a judge “shall” “disqualify

himself.” 28 U.S.C. § 455. The term “shall” generally

“imposes a mandatory duty”—especially where, as

here, the “statute distinguishes between ‘may’ and

‘shall.’” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,

579 U.S. 162, 172 (2016); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(e)

(noting when judges “may” accept a waiver of a

“ground for disqualification”). Thus, there is “nothing

discretionary or equivocal in” § 455’s recusal

requirement. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 36 (CA1

1998) (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). “To the contrary,

this is a directive that allows for no deviation. The

judge must recuse him or herself if his or her

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Ibid. In

fact, the judge must recuse even absent any “action to

invoke the statute” by a party. 13D Federal Practice &

Procedure, supra, § 3550.

Thus, while “decisions on ‘matters of discretion’ are

reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion.’” Highmark Inc. v.

Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563

(2014) (cleaned up), § 455 recusal is not a matter of

discretion. Commentators and jurists have recognized

that “[b]ecause the disqualification statutes are

mandatory,” “there is a strong argument that

appellate courts should apply a de novo standard in

reviewing recusal decisions.” 13D Federal Practice &

13

Procedure, supra, § 3553. Even the Third Circuit,

which applies an abuse-of-discretion standard,

acknowledged that “[i]t is somewhat strange to speak

in terms of an abuse of discretion where the

underlying statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, states that a

judge ‘shall’ disqualify himself or herself if certain

grounds are present.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368

F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (CA3 2004). The Third Circuit

explained that “[t]he abuse of discretion standard may

be an anachronistic vestige of an earlier version of

§ 455,” which gave judges “broad discretion to deny a

recusal request even if the grounds for recusal were

present.” Ibid. But “under the post-1974 version of

§ 455,” “disqualification must follow” if the statutory

standards are met. Ibid.

Further, the statutory disqualification standard of

§ 455 is an “objective” one that applies a reasonableperson test. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548; see Liljeberg, 486

U.S. at 861 (“an objective observer”). Such objective

tests are generally reviewed de novo, for there is no

particular reason that a trial court would have better

insight into a “reasonable person” than an appellate

court. See, e.g., Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696–97; Bard

Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.,

682 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (CA Fed. 2012); United States

v. Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 299 (CA4 2012). And to the

extent the recusal decision is based on facts, “[t]hey

are ‘facts’ flowing from the [judge’s] perceptual cortex,

not facts unearthed through discovery, hearing, or

trial, weighed by a neutral factfinder, and made of

public record for all to inspect.” Jeffrey W. Stempel,

Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 Brook. L. Rev.

589, 662–63 (1987); cf. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 447

14

(“The concept of public confidence in judicial integrity

does not easily reduce to precise definition, nor does it

lend itself to proof by documentary record.”). Thus,

“applying the law” in the context of § 455 “involves

developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other

cases” involving recusal, confirming that de novo

review is proper. U.S. Bank, 583 U.S. at 396.

Against all this support for a de novo standard is

one remark in the legislative history of § 455. The

congressional conference report said that “while the

proposed legislation would adopt an objective test, it

is not designed to alter the standard of appellate

review on disqualification issues.” H.R. Rep. No. 931453, supra, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355. It goes on to

say that “[t]he issue of disqualification is a sensitive

question of assessing all the facts and circumstances

in order to determine whether the failure to disqualify

was an abuse of sound judicial discretion.” Ibid.

But this justification for an abuse-of-discretion

standard fails for several reasons. First, legislative

history (or congressional wishes) cannot overcome

statutory text. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,

Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020); McGirt v.

Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894, 907 (2020) (“wishes are not

laws”). And § 455’s text makes disqualification

mandatory based on an objective test. Second, why the

conference report believed that the existing

disqualification test was abuse-of-discretion is

unclear; as discussed next, constitutional disqualification cases widely use de novo review. Third, though

the report is right that disqualification involves

considering all the facts, it foremost involves applying

the disqualification standard to settled facts. As

15

discussed, such mixed questions that lean toward the

legal side are reviewed de novo. Of course, resolution

of a factual dispute that is a precursor to the

disqualification determination might warrant some

deference, but the disqualification determination

itself should not. See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc.,

593 U.S. 1, 24 (2021) (“[A] reviewing court should try

to break [a mixed] question into its separate factual

and legal parts, reviewing each according to the

appropriate legal standard.”); see also Ornelas, 517

U.S. at 697–99.

In sum, this Court’s § 455 precedents and the

statutory language strongly support a de novo

standard.

B. Similar constitutional disqualification

decisions use a de novo standard

More support for a de novo standard comes from

the related constitutional due process disqualification

cases. “When considering whether a district court’s

decision should be subject to searching or deferential

appellate review—at least absent ‘explicit statutory

command’—[this Court] traditionally look[s]” first to

“whether the history of appellate practice yields an

answer.” McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. 72, 79 (2017)

(cleaned up). Here, that history suggests de novo

review. In constitutional disqualification cases, both

this Court and the Courts of Appeals have repeatedly

adjudicated claims without suggesting deference—

often expressly rejecting a deferential standard.

“In all the Supreme Court due process cases—

Tumey v. Ohio, In re Murchison, Ward v. Village of

Monroeville, Gibson v. Berryhill, and Aetna Life

16

Insurance Co. v. Lavoie—the Court reviewed the

decisions below de novo, and not a word in any of those

decisions even implies that discretion is possible in

these circumstances.” Neumann, supra, at 397. For

instance, in Tumey v. Ohio, the Court held that a judge

who received money “only when he convicts the

defendant”—in

that

case,

$12—could

not

constitutionally adjudicate the case. 273 U.S. 510, 531

(1927). The Court said that it could not “regard the

prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in

each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant

interest.” Id. at 532. No deference was suggested to the

contrary decision below.

Other opinions by this Court about constitutional

disqualification are to the same effect. In Williams v.

Pennsylvania, this Court considered the facts

underlying the controversy itself before holding that

the judge’s “failure to recuse” “presented an

unconstitutional risk of bias.” 579 U.S. 1, 11 (2016).

The Court again did not suggest deference to the lower

courts’ determinations.

Even Courts of Appeals that apply an abuse-ofdiscretion standard under § 455 apply a de novo

standard to constitutional disqualification questions.

See, e.g., United States v. Brocato, 4 F.4th 296, 301

(CA5 2021); Echavarria v. Filson, 896 F.3d 1118, 1131

(CA9 2018); Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 576

(CA10 2017); Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 921

(CA6 2010); United States v. Wessels, 539 F.3d 913,

914 (CA8 2008).

There is no apparent reason to apply a different

standard to § 455 and constitutional disqualification

decisions. Both involve mandatory disqualification.

17

See supra pp. 12–13; Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828

(explaining the issue as “under what circumstances

the Constitution requires disqualification” (emphasis

added)). Both use an objective test. See supra pp. 13–

14; Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287 (2017). Both

focus on questions of potential bias. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(a), (b)(1); Rippo, 580 U.S. at 287. Thus, the

widespread use of a de novo standard for review of

constitutional disqualification questions supports the

same standard under § 455.

C. Disqualification questions are especially

suited for de novo review

Questions about disqualification under § 455 do

not lend themselves to deferential review because bias

is “difficult to discern in oneself.” Williams, 579 U.S.

at 8. That others could see bias in oneself is perhaps

even more difficult to discern. Thus, “basic principles

of institutional capacity counsel in favor” of de novo

review. McLane, 581 U.S. at 81.

“[T]he reason” that de novo review seems apt for

recusal questions “is easy to divine”: “To commit to the

judge a decision upon the truth of the facts gives

chance for the evil against which [recusal] is directed.”

Berger, 255 U.S. at 36. “[N]othing can be more elusive

of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind in

which there is a personal ingredient.” Ibid. “Judges

asked to recuse themselves” may “hesitate to impugn

their own standards.” In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386

(CA7 1990). “That is difficult for even a saint to do.” In

re United States, 441 F.3d 44, 67 (CA1 2006). And “a

judge may be especially reluctant to recuse himself

when to do so requires him to admit that his actual

bias or prejudice has been proved.” United States v.

18

Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (CA7 1985). “A recusal

motion usually attacks the judge’s own conduct—

something the judge said but perhaps should not have

even contemplated saying, a failure to keep track of

and disclose to the parties the nature of investments

or the employment of relatives, and so on—and the

judge is usually the person least able to evaluate the

propriety of that conduct.” Neumann, supra, at 392.

Further, § 455(a) recusal extends to even the

appearance of impropriety, and recognizing that

others might perceive bias in oneself seems

particularly unlikely. “[O]utside observers are less

inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental

discipline than the [judge herself] will be.” In re

Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (CA7 1998). Drawing

inferences “favorable to the honesty and care of the

judge whose conduct has been questioned could

collapse the appearance of impropriety standard

under § 455(a) into a demand for proof of actual

impropriety.” Ibid. As Chief Judge Torruella put it,

“favor[ing] the discretion of the challenged judge over

the appearance that his or her actions might

reasonably convey to the citizenry[] is particularly

egregious considering that it directly conflicts with

Congress’s purpose in enacting § 455(a)”—to provide

an objective standard for recusals. In re United States,

158 F.3d at 36 (dissenting opinion).

In some ways, deferring to a judge’s recusal

decision may contribute to an appearance of bias by

the judiciary. “Having a judge rule on the propriety of

his own conduct, without the benefit of adversarial

argument, without the need to explain his decision,

and subject to a deferential standard of review or no

19

review at all” hardly inspires public confidence in

judicial impartiality. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why

Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 Rev.

Litig. 671, 719 (2011). Deference on a denial of recusal

suggests some protection by the reviewing court in the

judge’s favor, which may exacerbate any appearance

of partiality.

In short, de novo review of recusal questions under

§ 455 best “reflect[s] [the] societal interest in an

impartial judiciary.” 13D Federal Practice &

Procedure, supra, § 3553.

D. An overly deferential standard reduces

public confidence in the judiciary

The widespread use of an abuse-of-discretion

standard when reviewing recusal decisions is an

important problem warranting this Court’s review.

First, the error undermines the fundamental public

interest in promoting “confidence in a judge’s ability

to administer justice without fear or favor.” WilliamsYulee, 575 U.S. at 445. As explained, stacking a

deferential standard on top of a personal determination by a judge about her own bias tends to undermine

the public appearance of impartiality and rule of law

values.

Second, this error is widespread. As the petition

shows, all the Courts of Appeals but the Seventh

Circuit use this incorrect standard. Thus, in the vast

majority of cases, recusal appeals are being decided in

the context of problematic deference to the initial

judge’s denial of recusal.

Third, this error changes outcomes. Even the court

below has acknowledged that § 455 recusal appeals

20

may turn on whether review is de novo or for an abuse

of discretion. See In re Billedeaux, 972 F.2d 104, 106

& n.4 (CA5 1992); see also Charles Gardner Geyh,

Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law

102–03, Fed. Jud. Ctr. (3d ed. 2020) (similar). As this

Court has said, “the difference between a rule of

deference and the duty to exercise independent review

is much more than a mere matter of degree”; “[w]hen

de novo review is compelled, no form of appellate

deference is acceptable.” Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell,

499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (cleaned up).

This case proves the point. The Fifth Circuit

acknowledged that “[d]ue to the similarities between

the characters in Chief Judge Jernigan’s novel and the

litigants currently before her court, a strong argument

could be made that she had a duty to recuse.” Pet. 17a.

In addition to those similarities, see Pet. 7–11,

substantial evidence suggests that reasonable

observers would not consider the judge to be impartial.

One observer quoted in an American Lawyer article on

this issue said: “Dondero’s definitely a character

worthy of novelization, but a judge shouldn’t write

thinly fictionalized versions of individuals in pending

cases, if only because of the possible appearance of

bias.” 7 Another said that “Judge Jernigan’s vilifying of

hedge-fund company managers in her self-published

‘legal thriller’ novels may very well appear to a

reasonable person to undermine her independence,

integrity, and impartiality.” 8 Even on TikTok, a recent

7 Dan Roe, Federal Bankruptcy Judge’s ‘Vilifying’ Novels Raise

Questions Over Impartiality, Am. Lawyer (July 23, 2024),

https://bit.ly/4o13H7n (quoting Prof. Adam Levitin).

8 Ibid. (quoting Prof. Anthony Alfieri).

21

video from LawyerLori—a South Carolina lawyer with

over 600,000 followers—wondered “how can a judge be

impartial . . . when she’s written a book where you

resemble the villain and she basically lets you know

that she thinks you’re a piece of dirt?” 9 These facts

suggest “precisely the kind of appearance of

impropriety that § 455(a) was intended to prevent.”

Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 867.

Fourth and finally, the standard-of-review error

only further discourages recusal motions. Such

motions are already (and unsurprisingly) rare:

“empirical data confirms the common sense lawyer

intuition that a failed recusal strategy will stoke

judicial animosity and risk reprisal in ways large and

small.” 10 As a former judge put it, “you get one shot,”

and “[i]f you miss, then you’ve got that judge, and

they’re not happy with you.” 11 That concern is only

exacerbated if appellate review defers to the judge’s

denial of a recusal motion, as the “one shot” becomes

that much riskier.

In sum, the questions presented here have

extraordinarily important implications for judicial

impartiality and its appearance—both of which are

critical in a country that depends on the rule of law.

9 TikTok (May 13, 2024), http://bit.ly/3WcRMHt.

10 Roe, supra note 7.

11 Ibid.; see also Judicial Disqualification: Hearing before the

Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm.

on the Judiciary on S. 1064, 93d Cong. 14 (1973) (statement of

Sen. Birch Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“There is

a great reluctance on the part of counsel to suggest to the judge

that he is prejudiced, because they are going to have to go ahead

and practice before that judge later.”).

22

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should grant the

petition.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

OCTOBER 24, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.

Amicus Curiae Brief — James Dondero, et al., Petitioners v. Stacey G. Jernigan, et al. | Frix