Amicus Curiae Brief — James Dondero, et al., Petitioners v. Stacey G. Jernigan, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 24, 2025
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No. 25-355
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________
JAMES DONDERO, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
STACEY G. JERNIGAN, ET AL.,
Respondents.
____________________
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR INVESTMENT
PROFESSIONALS CONCERNED WITH
JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AS AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
__________
CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS
Counsel of Record
Spero Law LLC
557 East Bay Street
#22251
Charleston, SC 29413
(843) 606-0640
cmills@spero.law
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities .....................................................ii
Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................................... 1
Summary of the Argument ......................................... 2
Reasons for Granting the Writ.................................... 3
I. Public confidence in the judiciary depends on
the appearance of impartiality .......................... 3
A. The rule of law requires impartiality........... 3
B. The appearance of partiality reduces
confidence and predictability ....................... 7
II. The Fifth Circuit and most others are wrong
to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard .......... 8
A. This Court’s precedents and § 455’s
language call for de novo review .................. 9
B. Similar constitutional disqualification
decisions use a de novo standard ............... 15
C. Disqualification questions are especially
suited for de novo review ............................ 17
D. An overly deferential standard reduces
public confidence in the judiciary .............. 19
Conclusion.................................................................. 22
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813 (1986) ...................................... 5, 15, 17
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc.,
682 F.3d 1003 (CA Fed. 2012) ............................... 13
Berger v. United States,
255 U.S. 22 (1921) ............................................ 11, 17
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia,
590 U.S. 644 (2020) ................................................ 14
Bracy v. Gramley,
520 U.S. 899 (1997) .................................................. 5
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 (2009) .................................................. 6
Echavarria v. Filson,
896 F.3d 1118 (CA9 2018) ..................................... 16
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc.,
593 U.S. 1 (2021) .................................................... 15
Hassan v. Holder,
604 F.3d 915 (CA6 2010) ....................................... 16
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.,
572 U.S. 559 (2014) ................................................ 12
In re Billedeaux,
972 F.2d 104 (CA5 1992) ....................................... 20
In re Hatcher,
150 F.3d 631 (CA7 1998) ....................................... 18
iii
In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P.,
98 F.4th 170 (CA5 2024) .......................................... 1
In re Kensington Int’l Ltd.,
368 F.3d 289 (CA3 2004) ....................................... 13
In re Mason,
916 F.2d 384 (CA7 1990) ....................................... 17
In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133 (1955) ............................................ 5, 15
In re United States,
158 F.3d 26 (CA1 1998) ................................... 12, 18
In re United States,
441 F.3d 44 (CA1 2006) ......................................... 17
Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951) .................................................. 5
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,
579 U.S. 162 (2016) ................................................ 12
Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.,
486 U.S. 847 (1988) ................................ 6, 10, 13, 21
Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540 (1994) ........................ 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13
Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions,
875 F.3d 573 (CA10 2017) ..................................... 16
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238 (1980) .................................................. 5
McGirt v. Oklahoma,
591 U.S. 894 (2020) ................................................ 14
McLane Co. v. EEOC,
581 U.S. 72 (2017) ............................................ 15, 17
iv
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970) .................................................. 7
Offutt v. United States,
348 U.S. 11 (1954) .................................................... 4
Ornelas v. United States,
517 U.S. 690 (1996) .................................... 11, 13, 15
Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin,
864 F.3d 591 (CADC 2017) ...................................... 7
Pullman-Standard v. Swint,
456 U.S. 273 (1982) .................................................. 9
Rippo v. Baker,
580 U.S. 285 (2017) ................................................ 17
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell,
499 U.S. 225 (1991) ................................................ 20
Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazil v.
Am. Tobacco Co.,
535 U.S. 229 (2002) ................................................ 10
Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1927) ................................................ 16
U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt.
LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC,
583 U.S. 387 (2018) .......................................... 12, 14
United States v. Balistrieri,
779 F.2d 1191 (CA7 1985) ..................................... 18
United States v. Brocato,
4 F.4th 296 (CA5 2021) .......................................... 16
United States v. Jones,
678 F.3d 293 (CA4 2012) ....................................... 13
v
United States v. Wessels,
539 F.3d 913 (CA8 2008) ....................................... 16
United States v. Will,
449 U.S. 200 (1980) ................................................ 10
Williams v. Pennsylvania,
579 U.S. 1 (2016) .......................... 3, 4, 13, 16, 17, 19
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar,
575 U.S. 433 (2015) .................................. 3, 4, 13, 19
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Mass. Const. part 1, art. XXX ..................................... 3
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 453 ............................................................ 3
28 U.S.C. § 455
.... 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21
OTHER AUTHORITIES
13D Richard D. Freer, Federal Practice & Procedure
(Wright & Miller) (3d ed.) .......................... 11, 12, 19
Address of John Marshall, in Proceedings and
Debates of the Virginia State Convention of
1829–1830 (1830) ..................................................... 4
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of Rules,
56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989)................................. 7
Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Disqualification: An
Analysis of Federal Law, Fed. Jud. Ctr.
(3d ed. 2020) ........................................................... 20
Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial
Disqualification Matters. Again.,
30 Rev. Litig. 671 (2011) ........................................ 19
vi
Cl. 40 (1215), in W. McKechnie, Magna Carta, A
Commentary on the Great Charter of King John
(2d ed. 1914) ............................................................. 3
Dan Roe, Federal Bankruptcy Judge’s ‘Vilifying’
Novels Raise Questions Over Impartiality, Am.
Lawyer (July 23, 2024),
https://bit.ly/4o13H7n ...................................... 20, 21
Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in
Handbook of Economic Growth,
Vol. 1A (2005) ....................................................... 7, 8
H.R. Rep. No. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351 ................................ 6, 14
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform,
53 Brook. L. Rev. 589 (1987) ................................. 13
Judicial Disqualification: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 1064,
93d Cong. 14 (1973) ............................................... 21
Richard K. Neumann Jr., Conflicts of Interest in
Bush v. Gore,
16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 375 (2003) ............ 10, 11, 16
Samuel Bufford, International Rule of Law and the
Market Economy—An Outline,
12 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 303 (2006) ....................... 8
The Federalist No. 78 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)
(A. Hamilton) ........................................................... 4
TikTok (May 13, 2024), http://bit.ly/3WcRMHt ....... 21
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus Investment Professionals Concerned with
Judicial Impartiality is composed of investment management industry professionals who worked with
Petitioner James Dondero at Highland Capital Management, the debtor in the underlying bankruptcy
proceeding. These professionals thus had a front-row
seat to what the Fifth Circuit called “a nasty breakup.”
In re Highland Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 98 F.4th 170, 172
(CA5 2024). They are concerned that the bankruptcy
judge’s apparent disdain of the investment
management industry affected these proceedings—
and will have a chilling effect on future proceedings in
the Northern District of Texas. Even as the judge was
adjudicating this matter, she was writing books in
which an investment professional was the antagonist.
That apparent predisposition against the industry
seemed to be reflected in the case, as the rough
treatment of the industry in the judge’s books echoed
the judge’s approach. Yet the fund industry is a
responsible and trusted fiduciary for investors, creates
wealth for billions of people around the world, and is
a growing employer of tens of thousands of
Americans in the Northern District. In the experience
of these professionals, Mr. Dondero prioritized his
employees, while the bankruptcy estate often treated
those professionals as expendable. Thus, amicus has a
significant interest in protecting judicial impartiality
in this case. *
* Amicus provided timely notice of its intention to file this brief.
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel
made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Public perception of judicial impartiality is a
foundation of the rule of law. The rule of law depends
on its application by judges, and any bias in that
application contradicts the promise of law applied
equally. Even the appearance of impartiality
threatens the rule of law. Not only does a perception
of partiality reduce the public’s view of the judiciary’s
legitimacy—the source of its authority—but it
undermines the ability of citizens to structure their
interactions with each other and with the government.
Because an impartial law provides the bedrock for
these interactions, any perception that the law may
not be applied equally introduces unpredictability.
This uncertainty discourages the exchanges that form
the basis of our market economy, among many other
negative consequences.
This case implicates these exceptionally important
principles. By deferring to a trial court’s assessment of
its own potential bias for recusal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455, the decision below undervalues impartiality
and its appearance. This Court has repeatedly
considered recusal questions under both § 455 and
constitutional principles without deference to the
lower courts. Such de novo review makes sense, given
that § 455 requires recusal—it is not a matter of
discretion—and uses an objective standard. There is
no reason to think that trial judges are uniquely adept
at assessing their own potential biases. Misplaced
deference on recusal undermines public confidence in
an impartial judiciary, threatening rule-of-law values.
The Court should grant certiorari.
3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. Public confidence in the judiciary depends
on the appearance of impartiality
The questions presented are exceptionally
important, for they implicate “a state interest of the
highest order”: “public perception of judicial integrity.”
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 446 (2015).
Inherent in the rule of law is a promise that it be
applied equally. And because judicial authority stems
in large part from public confidence, both the
appearance and the actuality of judicial impartiality
are critical. Public perceptions that judges will
neutrally apply the law promote predictability in the
law, providing a stable background against which
private parties can structure their affairs and their
interactions with the government. Letting any
appearance of impartiality fester in the judiciary
undermines those important rule-of-law goals.
A. The rule of law requires impartiality
A cornerstone of American government is the
promise that ours is “a government of laws and not of
men.” Mass. Const. part 1, art. XXX. Yet judges
interpret the law. To fulfill this promise, then, judges
must “administer justice without respect to persons,
and do equal right to” all. 28 U.S.C. § 453. “This
principle dates back at least eight centuries to Magna
Carta, which proclaimed, ‘To no one will we sell, to no
one will we refuse or delay, right or justice.’” WilliamsYulee, 575 U.S. at 445 (quoting Cl. 40 (1215), in W.
McKechnie, Magna Carta, A Commentary on the Great
Charter of King John 395 (2d ed. 1914)). A judge must
“‘observe the utmost fairness,’ striving to be ‘perfectly
4
and completely independent, with nothing to influence
or controul him but God and his conscience.’” Id. at 447
(quoting Address of John Marshall, in Proceedings
and Debates of the Virginia State Convention of 1829–
1830, p. 616 (1830)).
Not only must judges apply the law impartially,
they also be must seen by the public as applying the
law impartially. “[J]ustice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14 (1954). “The importance of public
confidence in the integrity of judges stems from the
place of the judiciary in the government.” WilliamsYulee, 575 U.S. at 445. “Unlike the executive or the
legislature, the judiciary ‘has no influence over either
the sword or the purse; neither force nor will but
merely judgment.’” Ibid. (cleaned up) (quoting The
Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton)). “The judiciary’s authority therefore
depends in large measure on the public’s willingness
to respect and follow its decisions.” Id. at 445–46.
As this Court has explained, “[a]n insistence on the
appearance of neutrality is not some artificial attempt
to mask imperfection in the judicial process.” Williams
v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 15 (2016). Rather, it is “an
essential means of ensuring the reality of a fair
adjudication.” Id. at 15–16. “Both the appearance and
reality of impartial justice are necessary to the public
legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to the
rule of law itself.” Id. at 16. “[T]hey concern the
ingredients of what constitutes justice.” Offutt, 348
U.S. at 14. “In matters of ethics, appearance and
reality often converge as one.” Liteky v. United States,
5
510 U.S. 540, 565 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment).
This Court has held that “[a] fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Though
“[f]airness of course requires an absence of actual bias
in the trial of cases,” “our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness.” Ibid. This prevention “may sometimes
bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who
would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice
equally between contending parties.” Ibid. But that
result is necessary for justice “to perform its high
function in the best way.” Ibid. “[I]t preserves both the
appearance and reality of fairness, ‘generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done,’ by ensuring that no person will
be deprived of his interests in the absence of a
proceeding in which he may present his case with
assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find
against him.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
242 (1980) (citation omitted) (quoting Joint AntiFascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
Due process “demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986). Judicial
disqualification has been refined and regulated by
“common law, statute, [and] the professional
standards of the bench and bar”—including the
federal statute at issue, 28 U.S.C. § 455. Bracy v.
Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). But regulations
such as § 455 serve the same due-process goal: “to
6
promote public confidence in the integrity of the
judicial process.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859–60 (1988). “The guiding
consideration is that the administration of justice
should reasonably appear to be disinterested as well
as be so in fact.” Id. at 869–70 (cleaned up).
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) specifically requires recusal
whenever the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” “The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid
even the appearance of partiality.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S.
at 860. “[W]hat matters is not the reality of bias or
prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548.
Section 455(a) “is triggered by an attitude or state of
mind so resistant to fair and dispassionate inquiry as
to cause a party, the public, or a reviewing court to
have reasonable grounds to question the neutral and
objective character of a judge’s rulings or findings.” Id.
at 557–58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
“[T]here are a number of factors that could give rise to
a ‘probability’ or ‘appearance’ of bias: friendship with
a party or lawyer, prior employment experience,
membership in clubs or associations, prior speeches
and writings, religious affiliation, and countless other
considerations.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556
U.S. 868, 892 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
In short, “[l]itigants ought not have to face a judge
where there is a reasonable question of impartiality.”
H.R. Rep. No. 1453, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355. Not only does this goal
“ha[ve] constitutional dimensions,” Liljeberg, 486 U.S.
at 865 n.12, but as discussed next, it also has
7
important policy benefits that flow from public
confidence in judicial pronouncements.
B. The appearance of partiality reduces
confidence and predictability
One of the functions of the rule of law is to “furnish
a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to enable
them to plan their affairs with assurance against
untoward surprise.” Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). “The confidence of
people in their ability to predict the legal
consequences of their actions is vitally necessary to
facilitate the planning of primary activity and to
encourage the settlement of disputes without resort to
the courts.” Ibid. As Justice Scalia put it, “uncertainty
has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of
Law.” Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As A Law of
Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1179 (1989).
“[T]he existence of a predictable rule of law has
made America’s enviable economic progress possible.”
Perry Cap. LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591, 647 (CADC
2017) (Brown, J., dissenting in part). Dependable,
stable, and impartial institutions are prerequisites for
healthy markets. For instance, “[a]n owner and
manager can write a contract because they believe
that the state, and its agents the courts, would be
impartial enforcers of the contract.” 1 By contrast, if
either party believes that the enforcers may “be
aligned with” the other, “the contract would have little
1 Daron Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of
Long-Run Growth 429, in Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A
(2005).
8
value.” 2 “Therefore, the presence of an impartial
enforcer is important for contracting.” 3
As above, what matters is not just impartiality but
also the appearance of impartiality. Parties must
believe that any disputes will be impartially “resolved
by courts on the merits, based on legal rules duly
adopted and evidence properly presented to the
court.” 4 Otherwise, they will hesitate to engage, for
the risk of uncertainty via potential bias will weigh as
a cost against the transaction. Indeed, in other
countries, “the lack of legal institutions that are
perceived as efficient, transparent, and impartial for
the purposes of dispute resolution has hindered [the]
capacity for sustainable development and international competitiveness.” 5 As one judge put it, “[t]he
most important Rule of Law requirement for a judicial
system . . . is that judges must be honest”—i.e.,
without bias. 6 Impartiality and its appearance are
thus necessary for both the rule of law and the benefits
that flow from the rule of law, including a stable
framework under which parties can engage in
commercial activity and interact with the government.
II. The Fifth Circuit and most others are wrong
to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard
The questions presented are especially important
because the decision below—like decisions from most
Courts of Appeals—wrongly defers to a trial judge’s
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
Samuel Bufford, International Rule of Law and the Market
Economy—An Outline, 12 Sw. J.L. & Trade Am. 303, 310 (2006).
5 Id. at 310 n.20.
6 Id. at 311.
4
9
own assessment of her impartiality, thereby undermining the rule-of-law values discussed above. The
abuse-of-discretion standard applied below and by
most circuits is not the right standard for § 455
recusal, which is mandatory rather than discretionary. The legal question involves the application of a
statutory standard to generally settled facts. This
Court has always applied § 455 without deference to
the lower courts on the ultimate recusal question. And
similar claims—including constitutional claims for
disqualification—have been reviewed de novo by both
this Court and the Courts of Appeals. There are
uniquely good reasons to apply the same de novo
standard here—most obviously that a judge’s ability
to self-diagnose partiality or its appearance is likely to
be limited.
A. This Court’s precedents and
language call for de novo review
§ 455’s
To begin, this Court has repeatedly adjudicated the
merits of § 455 recusal claims without suggesting any
deference. In Liteky v. United States, the Court
“[a]ppl[ied] the principles we have discussed to the
facts of the present case” to decide that “[n]one of the
grounds petitioners assert required disqualification.”
510 U.S. at 556. It did not defer to the lower courts’
application of law to fact. Nor did it remand for the
lower courts to conduct the inquiry in the first
instance, as it would typically do for questions of fact
(to which deferential review would then apply). See,
e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291–
92 (1982). Rather, the Court considered the facts itself
in light of § 455’s standard and decided that
disqualification was not required.
10
This approach is consistent with this Court’s other
decisions involving § 455. “[O]f the four Supreme
Court cases that have interpreted § 455, none held
that a recusal decision is within the challenged judge’s
discretion.” Richard K. Neumann Jr., Conflicts of
Interest in Bush v. Gore, 16 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 375,
394 (2003). Rather, all of them “interpret[ed] the
statute as Congress drafted it, with mandatory duties
not amenable to discretion.” Ibid.; see id. at 394–97.
Besides Liteky, another decision viewed the facts
independently and found it “self-evident that a
reasonable person would not believe [the judge] had
any interest or bias.” Sao Paulo State of Federative
Republic of Brazil v. Am. Tobacco Co., 535 U.S. 229,
233 (2002). Still another agreed with the lower courts
“that an objective observer would have questioned [the
judge’s] impartiality,” without suggesting deference to
that determination. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 861. As to
the proper remedy, the Court acknowledged that “the
Court of Appeals is in a better position to evaluate the
significance of a violation than is this Court,” but it
still declined to suggest any more deference than that
the remedy decided below be “afforded [the Supreme
Court’s] due consideration.” Id. at 862.
Last, this Court in United States v. Will held that
§ 455 did not negate the common-law Rule of
Necessity, under which a judge otherwise disqualified
was required to nonetheless adjudicate a case if no
other judge could. 449 U.S. 200, 213–17 (1980). Once
again, nothing suggests that either § 455 or the Rule
of Necessity would be a matter of discretion
warranting a deferential standard, as the Court
emphasized the tension between “requiring disqual-
11
ification” and “the mandate of the Rule of Necessity.”
Id. at 217.
The Court has used the same approach under 28
U.S.C. § 144, which applies only to district-court
judges but otherwise overlaps with § 455. See Liteky,
510 U.S. at 548 (noting that § 144 “seems to be
properly invocable only when § 455(a) can be invoked
anyway”); see also 13D Richard D. Freer, Federal
Practice & Procedure (Wright & Miller) § 3542 (3d ed.)
(“[T]he substantive standard for disqualification
based upon actual bias or prejudice is identical under
§ 144 and § 455(b)(1).”). In Berger v. United States, the
Court held that a judge who allegedly said that
German-Americans’ “hearts are reeking with
disloyalty” was required to recuse—notwithstanding a
factual dispute about the statement. 255 U.S. 22, 28,
33 (1921); see id. at 39–40 (Day, J., dissenting). The
Court again suggested no deference to the lower-court
decisions. See Neumann, supra, at 396–97.
This Court’s consistent de novo review makes
sense. The § 455 recusal determination is a classic
“mixed question of law and fact: [t]he historical facts
are admitted or established, the rule of law is
undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy
the relevant statutory standard.” Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (cleaned up); see
Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556 (“[a]pplying the principles we
have discussed to the facts of the present case”). “[T]he
standard of review for a mixed question” “depends[] on
whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual
work.” U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset
Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387,
12
396 (2018). Here, § 455’s recusal determination turns
on primarily legal questions.
First, recusal under § 455 is mandatory. This Court
has said that the statute “defines the circumstances
that mandate disqualification of federal judges.”
Liljberg, 486 U.S. at 862 (emphasis added). That
follows from the statutory text, which provides
circumstances in which a judge “shall” “disqualify
himself.” 28 U.S.C. § 455. The term “shall” generally
“imposes a mandatory duty”—especially where, as
here, the “statute distinguishes between ‘may’ and
‘shall.’” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,
579 U.S. 162, 172 (2016); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(e)
(noting when judges “may” accept a waiver of a
“ground for disqualification”). Thus, there is “nothing
discretionary or equivocal in” § 455’s recusal
requirement. In re United States, 158 F.3d 26, 36 (CA1
1998) (Torruella, C.J., dissenting). “To the contrary,
this is a directive that allows for no deviation. The
judge must recuse him or herself if his or her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Ibid. In
fact, the judge must recuse even absent any “action to
invoke the statute” by a party. 13D Federal Practice &
Procedure, supra, § 3550.
Thus, while “decisions on ‘matters of discretion’ are
reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion.’” Highmark Inc. v.
Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563
(2014) (cleaned up), § 455 recusal is not a matter of
discretion. Commentators and jurists have recognized
that “[b]ecause the disqualification statutes are
mandatory,” “there is a strong argument that
appellate courts should apply a de novo standard in
reviewing recusal decisions.” 13D Federal Practice &
13
Procedure, supra, § 3553. Even the Third Circuit,
which applies an abuse-of-discretion standard,
acknowledged that “[i]t is somewhat strange to speak
in terms of an abuse of discretion where the
underlying statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, states that a
judge ‘shall’ disqualify himself or herself if certain
grounds are present.” In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368
F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (CA3 2004). The Third Circuit
explained that “[t]he abuse of discretion standard may
be an anachronistic vestige of an earlier version of
§ 455,” which gave judges “broad discretion to deny a
recusal request even if the grounds for recusal were
present.” Ibid. But “under the post-1974 version of
§ 455,” “disqualification must follow” if the statutory
standards are met. Ibid.
Further, the statutory disqualification standard of
§ 455 is an “objective” one that applies a reasonableperson test. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548; see Liljeberg, 486
U.S. at 861 (“an objective observer”). Such objective
tests are generally reviewed de novo, for there is no
particular reason that a trial court would have better
insight into a “reasonable person” than an appellate
court. See, e.g., Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696–97; Bard
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc.,
682 F.3d 1003, 1006–07 (CA Fed. 2012); United States
v. Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 299 (CA4 2012). And to the
extent the recusal decision is based on facts, “[t]hey
are ‘facts’ flowing from the [judge’s] perceptual cortex,
not facts unearthed through discovery, hearing, or
trial, weighed by a neutral factfinder, and made of
public record for all to inspect.” Jeffrey W. Stempel,
Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 Brook. L. Rev.
589, 662–63 (1987); cf. Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 447
14
(“The concept of public confidence in judicial integrity
does not easily reduce to precise definition, nor does it
lend itself to proof by documentary record.”). Thus,
“applying the law” in the context of § 455 “involves
developing auxiliary legal principles of use in other
cases” involving recusal, confirming that de novo
review is proper. U.S. Bank, 583 U.S. at 396.
Against all this support for a de novo standard is
one remark in the legislative history of § 455. The
congressional conference report said that “while the
proposed legislation would adopt an objective test, it
is not designed to alter the standard of appellate
review on disqualification issues.” H.R. Rep. No. 931453, supra, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6355. It goes on to
say that “[t]he issue of disqualification is a sensitive
question of assessing all the facts and circumstances
in order to determine whether the failure to disqualify
was an abuse of sound judicial discretion.” Ibid.
But this justification for an abuse-of-discretion
standard fails for several reasons. First, legislative
history (or congressional wishes) cannot overcome
statutory text. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,
Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 674 (2020); McGirt v.
Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894, 907 (2020) (“wishes are not
laws”). And § 455’s text makes disqualification
mandatory based on an objective test. Second, why the
conference report believed that the existing
disqualification test was abuse-of-discretion is
unclear; as discussed next, constitutional disqualification cases widely use de novo review. Third, though
the report is right that disqualification involves
considering all the facts, it foremost involves applying
the disqualification standard to settled facts. As
15
discussed, such mixed questions that lean toward the
legal side are reviewed de novo. Of course, resolution
of a factual dispute that is a precursor to the
disqualification determination might warrant some
deference, but the disqualification determination
itself should not. See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc.,
593 U.S. 1, 24 (2021) (“[A] reviewing court should try
to break [a mixed] question into its separate factual
and legal parts, reviewing each according to the
appropriate legal standard.”); see also Ornelas, 517
U.S. at 697–99.
In sum, this Court’s § 455 precedents and the
statutory language strongly support a de novo
standard.
B. Similar constitutional disqualification
decisions use a de novo standard
More support for a de novo standard comes from
the related constitutional due process disqualification
cases. “When considering whether a district court’s
decision should be subject to searching or deferential
appellate review—at least absent ‘explicit statutory
command’—[this Court] traditionally look[s]” first to
“whether the history of appellate practice yields an
answer.” McLane Co. v. EEOC, 581 U.S. 72, 79 (2017)
(cleaned up). Here, that history suggests de novo
review. In constitutional disqualification cases, both
this Court and the Courts of Appeals have repeatedly
adjudicated claims without suggesting deference—
often expressly rejecting a deferential standard.
“In all the Supreme Court due process cases—
Tumey v. Ohio, In re Murchison, Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, Gibson v. Berryhill, and Aetna Life
16
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie—the Court reviewed the
decisions below de novo, and not a word in any of those
decisions even implies that discretion is possible in
these circumstances.” Neumann, supra, at 397. For
instance, in Tumey v. Ohio, the Court held that a judge
who received money “only when he convicts the
defendant”—in
that
case,
$12—could
not
constitutionally adjudicate the case. 273 U.S. 510, 531
(1927). The Court said that it could not “regard the
prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in
each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant
interest.” Id. at 532. No deference was suggested to the
contrary decision below.
Other opinions by this Court about constitutional
disqualification are to the same effect. In Williams v.
Pennsylvania, this Court considered the facts
underlying the controversy itself before holding that
the judge’s “failure to recuse” “presented an
unconstitutional risk of bias.” 579 U.S. 1, 11 (2016).
The Court again did not suggest deference to the lower
courts’ determinations.
Even Courts of Appeals that apply an abuse-ofdiscretion standard under § 455 apply a de novo
standard to constitutional disqualification questions.
See, e.g., United States v. Brocato, 4 F.4th 296, 301
(CA5 2021); Echavarria v. Filson, 896 F.3d 1118, 1131
(CA9 2018); Lucio-Rayos v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 573, 576
(CA10 2017); Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 921
(CA6 2010); United States v. Wessels, 539 F.3d 913,
914 (CA8 2008).
There is no apparent reason to apply a different
standard to § 455 and constitutional disqualification
decisions. Both involve mandatory disqualification.
17
See supra pp. 12–13; Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 828
(explaining the issue as “under what circumstances
the Constitution requires disqualification” (emphasis
added)). Both use an objective test. See supra pp. 13–
14; Rippo v. Baker, 580 U.S. 285, 287 (2017). Both
focus on questions of potential bias. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(a), (b)(1); Rippo, 580 U.S. at 287. Thus, the
widespread use of a de novo standard for review of
constitutional disqualification questions supports the
same standard under § 455.
C. Disqualification questions are especially
suited for de novo review
Questions about disqualification under § 455 do
not lend themselves to deferential review because bias
is “difficult to discern in oneself.” Williams, 579 U.S.
at 8. That others could see bias in oneself is perhaps
even more difficult to discern. Thus, “basic principles
of institutional capacity counsel in favor” of de novo
review. McLane, 581 U.S. at 81.
“[T]he reason” that de novo review seems apt for
recusal questions “is easy to divine”: “To commit to the
judge a decision upon the truth of the facts gives
chance for the evil against which [recusal] is directed.”
Berger, 255 U.S. at 36. “[N]othing can be more elusive
of estimate or decision than a disposition of a mind in
which there is a personal ingredient.” Ibid. “Judges
asked to recuse themselves” may “hesitate to impugn
their own standards.” In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386
(CA7 1990). “That is difficult for even a saint to do.” In
re United States, 441 F.3d 44, 67 (CA1 2006). And “a
judge may be especially reluctant to recuse himself
when to do so requires him to admit that his actual
bias or prejudice has been proved.” United States v.
18
Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1203 (CA7 1985). “A recusal
motion usually attacks the judge’s own conduct—
something the judge said but perhaps should not have
even contemplated saying, a failure to keep track of
and disclose to the parties the nature of investments
or the employment of relatives, and so on—and the
judge is usually the person least able to evaluate the
propriety of that conduct.” Neumann, supra, at 392.
Further, § 455(a) recusal extends to even the
appearance of impropriety, and recognizing that
others might perceive bias in oneself seems
particularly unlikely. “[O]utside observers are less
inclined to credit judges’ impartiality and mental
discipline than the [judge herself] will be.” In re
Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (CA7 1998). Drawing
inferences “favorable to the honesty and care of the
judge whose conduct has been questioned could
collapse the appearance of impropriety standard
under § 455(a) into a demand for proof of actual
impropriety.” Ibid. As Chief Judge Torruella put it,
“favor[ing] the discretion of the challenged judge over
the appearance that his or her actions might
reasonably convey to the citizenry[] is particularly
egregious considering that it directly conflicts with
Congress’s purpose in enacting § 455(a)”—to provide
an objective standard for recusals. In re United States,
158 F.3d at 36 (dissenting opinion).
In some ways, deferring to a judge’s recusal
decision may contribute to an appearance of bias by
the judiciary. “Having a judge rule on the propriety of
his own conduct, without the benefit of adversarial
argument, without the need to explain his decision,
and subject to a deferential standard of review or no
19
review at all” hardly inspires public confidence in
judicial impartiality. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why
Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 Rev.
Litig. 671, 719 (2011). Deference on a denial of recusal
suggests some protection by the reviewing court in the
judge’s favor, which may exacerbate any appearance
of partiality.
In short, de novo review of recusal questions under
§ 455 best “reflect[s] [the] societal interest in an
impartial judiciary.” 13D Federal Practice &
Procedure, supra, § 3553.
D. An overly deferential standard reduces
public confidence in the judiciary
The widespread use of an abuse-of-discretion
standard when reviewing recusal decisions is an
important problem warranting this Court’s review.
First, the error undermines the fundamental public
interest in promoting “confidence in a judge’s ability
to administer justice without fear or favor.” WilliamsYulee, 575 U.S. at 445. As explained, stacking a
deferential standard on top of a personal determination by a judge about her own bias tends to undermine
the public appearance of impartiality and rule of law
values.
Second, this error is widespread. As the petition
shows, all the Courts of Appeals but the Seventh
Circuit use this incorrect standard. Thus, in the vast
majority of cases, recusal appeals are being decided in
the context of problematic deference to the initial
judge’s denial of recusal.
Third, this error changes outcomes. Even the court
below has acknowledged that § 455 recusal appeals
20
may turn on whether review is de novo or for an abuse
of discretion. See In re Billedeaux, 972 F.2d 104, 106
& n.4 (CA5 1992); see also Charles Gardner Geyh,
Judicial Disqualification: An Analysis of Federal Law
102–03, Fed. Jud. Ctr. (3d ed. 2020) (similar). As this
Court has said, “the difference between a rule of
deference and the duty to exercise independent review
is much more than a mere matter of degree”; “[w]hen
de novo review is compelled, no form of appellate
deference is acceptable.” Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell,
499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991) (cleaned up).
This case proves the point. The Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that “[d]ue to the similarities between
the characters in Chief Judge Jernigan’s novel and the
litigants currently before her court, a strong argument
could be made that she had a duty to recuse.” Pet. 17a.
In addition to those similarities, see Pet. 7–11,
substantial evidence suggests that reasonable
observers would not consider the judge to be impartial.
One observer quoted in an American Lawyer article on
this issue said: “Dondero’s definitely a character
worthy of novelization, but a judge shouldn’t write
thinly fictionalized versions of individuals in pending
cases, if only because of the possible appearance of
bias.” 7 Another said that “Judge Jernigan’s vilifying of
hedge-fund company managers in her self-published
‘legal thriller’ novels may very well appear to a
reasonable person to undermine her independence,
integrity, and impartiality.” 8 Even on TikTok, a recent
7 Dan Roe, Federal Bankruptcy Judge’s ‘Vilifying’ Novels Raise
Questions Over Impartiality, Am. Lawyer (July 23, 2024),
https://bit.ly/4o13H7n (quoting Prof. Adam Levitin).
8 Ibid. (quoting Prof. Anthony Alfieri).
21
video from LawyerLori—a South Carolina lawyer with
over 600,000 followers—wondered “how can a judge be
impartial . . . when she’s written a book where you
resemble the villain and she basically lets you know
that she thinks you’re a piece of dirt?” 9 These facts
suggest “precisely the kind of appearance of
impropriety that § 455(a) was intended to prevent.”
Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 867.
Fourth and finally, the standard-of-review error
only further discourages recusal motions. Such
motions are already (and unsurprisingly) rare:
“empirical data confirms the common sense lawyer
intuition that a failed recusal strategy will stoke
judicial animosity and risk reprisal in ways large and
small.” 10 As a former judge put it, “you get one shot,”
and “[i]f you miss, then you’ve got that judge, and
they’re not happy with you.” 11 That concern is only
exacerbated if appellate review defers to the judge’s
denial of a recusal motion, as the “one shot” becomes
that much riskier.
In sum, the questions presented here have
extraordinarily important implications for judicial
impartiality and its appearance—both of which are
critical in a country that depends on the rule of law.
9 TikTok (May 13, 2024), http://bit.ly/3WcRMHt.
10 Roe, supra note 7.
11 Ibid.; see also Judicial Disqualification: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm.
on the Judiciary on S. 1064, 93d Cong. 14 (1973) (statement of
Sen. Birch Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“There is
a great reluctance on the part of counsel to suggest to the judge
that he is prejudiced, because they are going to have to go ahead
and practice before that judge later.”).
22
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should grant the
petition.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS
Counsel of Record
Spero Law LLC
557 East Bay Street
#22251
Charleston, SC 29413
(843) 606-0640
cmills@spero.law
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
OCTOBER 24, 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.