Amicus Curiae Brief — Alaska, et al., Petitioners v. United States, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 17, 2025
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No. 25-320
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________
ALASKA, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
Respondents.
____________________
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_______________
BRIEF FOR ALASKA INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT AND EXPORT AUTHORITY
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
__________
CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS
Counsel of Record
Spero Law LLC
557 East Bay Street
#22251
Charleston, SC 29413
(843) 606-0640
cmills@spero.law
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities .....................................................ii
Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................................... 1
Summary of the Argument ......................................... 4
Reasons for Granting the Writ.................................... 6
I. The decision below ignores that Alaskan
sovereignty over resource management was a
core statehood issue. .......................................... 6
A. Federal mismanagement of Alaskan waters
motivated statehood. .................................... 6
B. Congress gave Alaska unique authority over
fish and waters regulation. .......................... 8
C. Alaska’s careful fishing regulations have
benefited all Alaskans. ............................... 14
II. The interpretation below is wrong. ................. 17
Conclusion.................................................................. 23
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska,
480 U.S. 531 (1987) ................................................ 20
Andrus v. Utah,
446 U.S. 500 (1980) ................................................ 21
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605 (1989) ................................................ 22
Cooper v. Roberts,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 173 (1855) ................................. 21
Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz,
601 U.S. 42 (2024) .................................................. 22
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean,
574 U.S. 383 (2015) ................................................ 20
Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
431 U.S. 265 (1977) ................................................ 12
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1 (1928) .................................................... 18
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) ................................................ 17
Hawaii v. Off. of Hawaiian Affs.,
556 U.S. 163 (2009) ................................................ 21
Idaho v. United States,
533 U.S. 262 (2001) ................................................ 21
John v. United States,
247 F.3d 1032 (CA9 2001) ............................... 19, 21
iii
Manchester v. Massachusetts,
139 U.S. 240 (1891) .......................................... 12, 13
McDowell v. State,
785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989) ................................. 13, 14
Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Rsrv. v.
Egan,
362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961) ............................. 6, 7, 9
Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981) ................................................ 18
Sackett v. EPA,
598 U.S. 651 (2023) ................................................ 19
Smith v. Maryland,
59 U.S. 71 (1855) .................................................... 12
State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe,
894 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1995) ................................... 15
Sturgeon v. Frost,
577 U.S. 424 (2016) .................................................. 8
Sturgeon v. Frost,
587 U.S. 28 (2019) ................ 4, 11, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23
Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,
482 U.S. 193 (1987) ................................................ 18
Wyoming v. United States,
279 F.3d 1214 (CA10 2002) ................................... 18
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 2....................................... 13
Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 3....................................... 13
Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 4....................................... 15
Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 15..................................... 14
iv
Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 17..................................... 14
STATUTES
1958 Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508,
73 Stat. 339 .... 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 21, 22
43 U.S.C. § 1301 ........................................................ 11
43 U.S.C. § 1311 .................................................... 9, 11
43 U.S.C. § 1314 ........................................................ 12
Alaska Stat. § 16.05.010 ............................................ 15
Alaska Stat. § 16.05.020 ............................................ 15
Alaska Stat. § 16.05.221 ............................................ 15
Alaska Stat. § 16.05.258 ............................................ 15
Alaska Stat. § 44.88.020 .............................................. 1
Alaska Stat. § 44.88.070 .............................................. 1
Alaska Stat. § 44.88.080 .............................................. 1
ANILCA § 102...................................................... 19, 20
ANILCA § 801.............................................................. 2
ANILCA § 802.............................................................. 2
ANILCA § 803............................................................ 20
ANILCA § 810.............................................................. 2
ANILCA § 811.............................................................. 2
ANILCA § 1314.......................................................... 20
Pub. L. No. 50-180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) ...................... 9
Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) ........................ 11
v
REGULATIONS
43 C.F.R. § 24.1.......................................................... 18
43 C.F.R. § 24.3.......................................................... 18
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Fisheries Research,
https://perma.cc/HKP8-BHLW .............................. 16
Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Salmon Ocean Ecology
Program (SOEP), https://perma.cc/CUA9-R83S ... 16
Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Subsistence in Alaska:
A Year 2017 Update,
https://perma.cc/N2XP-BQVX ............................... 14
Alaska Div. of Elections, Statehood Election Final
Results, https://perma.cc/86TW-CHAB ................... 9
Ambler Road Final Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement App’x M-8–9 (Apr. 2024),
https://perma.cc/RV2U-QTN2 ................................. 2
Decision of the President and Statement of Reasons,
90 Fed. Reg. 48167 (Oct. 6, 2025) ............................ 3
Exec. Order No. 10857, 25 Fed. Reg. 33
(Dec. 29, 1959) ........................................................ 11
NOAA Fisheries, Alaska,
https://perma.cc/2A9Q-UPJ9 ................................. 16
Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849,
H.R. 340, H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the
Subcomm. Territorial & Insular Affairs of the H.
Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs, 81st
Cong. 1st Sess. 306 (1957) (statement of Ernest
Gruening), https://tinyurl.com/mshdvz9r. .......... 7, 8
vi
Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849,
H.R. 340, H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the
Subcomm. Territorial & Insular Affairs of the H.
Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs, 81st
Cong. 1st Sess. 98 (1957) (report of Hatfield
Chilson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior),
https://tinyurl.com/4ftwrevt ............................ 10, 11
The Federalist No. 46 (Madison) .............................. 17
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Alaska Industrial Development and Export
Authority (AIDEA) is a public corporation of the State
of Alaska, constituting a political subdivision under its
laws “but with separate and independent legal
existence.” Alaska Stat. § 44.88.020. The Alaska
Legislature created AIDEA “to promote, develop, and
advance the general prosperity and economic welfare
of the people of the state, to relieve problems of
unemployment, and to create additional employment.”
Id. § 44.88.070. AIDEA encourages economic growth
and diversification in Alaska by providing means of
financing and assistance to Alaska businesses,
including through its Credit and Development
Finance Programs. Id. § 44.88.080. Revenue
generated by AIDEA investments is allocated towards
reinvestment in AIDEA programs, AIDEA projects,
and dividends to the State’s general fund. *
AIDEA has a significant interest in this case,
which implicates Alaska’s sovereignty and a proper
interpretation of the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA). Federal overreading of
ANILCA has consistently harmed AIDEA. For
instance, under the prior administration, the U.S.
Department of the Interior Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) issued a decision halting
development of the Ambler Road. The Ambler Road is
a proposed 211-mile, private, industrial-controlled
* Under Rule 37.2, amicus provided timely notice of its intention
to file this brief. Under Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored
this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amicus
curiae or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission.
2
access road to reach the Ambler Mining District in the
Northwest Arctic Borough, an area with extensive
mineral resources critical for national security and
economic development. Federal agencies initially
granted AIDEA’s application for a right-of-way to
develop this gravel road, but reversed course in the
prior administration. The BLM relied in part on
ANILCA § 810, which provides that “[i]n determining
whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise
permit the use, occupancy, or disposition of public
lands,” “the head of the Federal agency having
primary jurisdiction over such lands or his designee
shall evaluate the effect of such use, occupancy, or
disposition on subsistence uses and needs, the
availability of other lands for the purposes sought to
be achieved, and other alternatives which would
reduce or eliminate the use, occupancy, or disposition
of public lands needed for subsistence purposes.”
This section and other ANILCA provisions focus on
subsistence uses on public lands. See, e.g., ANILCA
§§ 801(1), 802(1), 811(a). Yet BLM applied § 810 to the
entire length of the Road—most of which would be
placed on non-public lands over which BLM has no
jurisdiction, including lands owned and managed by
the State of Alaska, Alaska Native Regional
Corporations, and private persons. See Ambler Road
Final
Supplemental
Environmental
Impact
Statement App’x M-8–9 (Apr. 2024), https://perma.cc/
RV2U-QTN2. BLM purported to use § 810 to reject the
Road’s application even though it failed to show that
any of the studied subsistence uses occur on BLMmanaged public lands. Not only did BLM consider
subsistence uses on non-public lands, but it also failed
to show whether any threatened effects on those
3
subsistence uses are likely from the Road’s use of
public lands. Together, these dubious moves
dramatically expanded the federal agency’s purported
jurisdiction over non-public lands.
President Trump has now reversed the BLM’s
decision on the Ambler Road after an appeal from
AIDEA under ANILCA § 1106. See Decision of the
President and Statement of Reasons, 90 Fed. Reg.
48167 (Oct. 6, 2025). But the point remains: AIDEA
has a particular interest in proper interpretations of
ANILCA that do not deviate from the limited
statutory definition of “public lands”—or enable
practically boundless federal regulatory authority.
4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court has already said what “public lands”
means in the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act (ANILCA). Sturgeon v. Frost, 587
U.S. 28, 42 (2019) (Sturgeon II). Congress
meticulously defined “public lands,” and even said
when the statute would deviate from that definition.
The standard definition textually applies in ANILCA
Title VIII, and it excludes Alaska’s navigable waters.
But the United States has asserted otherwise in an
effort to promulgate fragmented regulations on rivers
within Alaska, disrupting Alaska’s comprehensive
and coherent regulatory scheme. The Ninth Circuit
relied on its pre-Sturgeon decisions to stick to a
reading that is both atextual and undermines Alaska’s
sovereign interests. This Court’s review is needed.
Though state sovereignty over natural resources
like fish is a fundamental interest of every State, it is
especially important to Alaska. Alaska’s statehood
movement was motivated by the State’s need to own
and develop its extensive national resources—and the
federal government’s mismanagement of those
resources. The Statehood Act addressed those issues
by granting Alaska millions of acres of lands—
including the lands beneath its navigable waters—
and the right to manage and develop those resources,
including fish. Congress also accepted Alaska’s
Constitution, which guarantees the availability of
these resources to all citizens on an equal basis.
Alaska’s comprehensive regulation of fishing and
water resources has reversed the failures of federal
regulation and led to a sustainable regulatory scheme
that benefits all its citizens.
5
The interpretation adopted below significantly
undermines Alaskan regulatory authority provided by
the Statehood Act. This Court already interpreted
“public lands” in ANILCA to exclude navigable waters,
and neither the federal government nor the Ninth
Circuit identified any clear reason to depart from that
defined term in ANILCA Title VIII. But such a clear
statement is necessary to overcome both the express
statutory definition and the traditional right of States
to manage their own natural resources. The State’s
textual interpretation, by contrast, harmonizes
ANILCA and the Statehood Act guarantees by
preserving Alaska’s regulatory authority. To ensure
that Congress’s promises to Alaska are fulfilled, this
Court should grant certiorari and again hold that
Alaska may properly manage its own navigable
waters.
6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The decision below ignores that Alaskan
sovereignty over resource management was
a core statehood issue.
States generally retain their authority over
natural resource management, and this presumption
of state authority is especially strong in Alaska.
Authority over wildlife and autonomy to develop
natural resources were the two main drivers of the
Alaskan statehood movement. The deal struck
between Alaska and the United States that led to
statehood uniquely protected Alaska’s right to oversee
natural resource management. That right is protected
through many provisions of the Statehood Act and the
Alaska Constitution—all incorporated into federal law
during the statehood process. These guarantees were
and remain critically important to Alaska. But the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of ANILCA significantly undermines them in the areas of fishing and
water management.
A. Federal mismanagement of
waters motivated statehood.
Alaskan
“Since time immemorial Alaska has been blessed
with a natural food resource in the form of annual
migrations of salmon.” Metlakatla Indian Cmty.,
Annette Island Rsrv. v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 903
(Alaska 1961). “From late spring until fall most of its
fresh water rivers and streams are, at one time or
another, visited by hordes of salmon that have
migrated shoreward from the open sea.” Ibid. “As a life
sustaining food the salmon is hardly exceled and
because of its abundance in Alaskan waters it has
7
always been one of the basic food resources of the
people as well as the basis of their main industry.”
Ibid. “Harvesting some portion of this natural
resource for food has always been an annual necessity
for most of the native population and many of the
white settlers,” and “[c]ommercial salmon fishing is
the principal source of income for a large portion of
Alaska’s labor force.” Ibid.
Before Alaska became a State, the federal
government was responsible for “the regulation of fish
and game” in the territory. Id. at 904. And the federal
government permitted the use of fish traps, which
involved stretched webbing or wire to trap large
amounts of migrating salmon. Id. at 903. The
territorial legislature repeatedly asked Congress to
limit the use of these traps, which led to severe
overfishing. Id. at 905. “In 1948 a referendum by the
people of Alaska resulted in a vote of 19,712 to 2,624
in favor of abolition of fish traps.” Ibid. But for
decades, Congress allowed the continued use of these
traps, “exterminat[ing]” large populations of fish. Ibid.
The results were disastrous. Former territorial
governor Ernest Gruening explained during the
statehood hearings that under federal control Alaska’s
salmon pack “went down, down, down,” from more
than 8.4 million cases in 1936 to just 2.4 million in
1955—the lowest point in nearly fifty years. 1 “So
serious was the depletion,” he noted, “that for [three]
1 Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849, H.R. 340,
H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the Subcomm. on Territorial &
Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs,
81st Cong. 1st Sess. 306 (1957) (statement of Ernest Gruening),
https://tinyurl.com/mshdvz9r.
8
successive years, 1953, 1954, and 1955,” the federal
government declared “Alaska fishing communities to
be disaster areas.” 2 Gruening contrasted Alaska’s
decline with British Columbia and Washington, where
local control had conserved and even rebuilt salmon
stocks. 3 He blamed the deterioration on the continued
use of fish traps, largely owned by outside interests,
and condemned the regime of “distant bureaucratic
control.” 4
This federal mismanagement was especially severe
because before statehood, the Federal Government
owned 98 percent of the 365 million acres of land in
Alaska. Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424, 429 (2016)
(Sturgeon I). “As a result, absent a land grant from the
Federal Government to the State, there would be little
land available to drive private economic activity”—
and little ability for Alaska to correct federal
mismanagement of its natural resources. Ibid.
B. Congress gave Alaska unique authority
over fish and waters regulation.
The 1958 Alaska Statehood Act was the solution.
Pub. L. No. 85-508, 73 Stat. 339. In exchange for
valuable consideration—for instance, Alaska gave up
rights to much land—the agreement “permitted
Alaska to select 103 million acres of ‘vacant,
unappropriated, and unreserved’ federal land—just
over a quarter of all land in Alaska—for state
ownership.” Sturgeon I, 577 U.S. at 429. The State
“also gained ‘title to and ownership of the lands
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 307.
9
beneath navigable waters’ within the State,” and “‘the
natural resources within such lands and waters.’”
Ibid. In addition to ownership, though, the Act
critically gave the State “the right and power to
manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said
lands and natural resources.” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a); see
Statehood Act § 6(m).
Unlike in other western states, where admittance
to the Union depended on a later state constitutional
convention, 5 Congress gave Alaskans the ability to
accept (or reject) statehood by direct vote. That offer
incorporated Alaska’s preexisting Constitution.
Statehood Act § 1. In other words, Alaskans voting on
whether to accept the offer of statehood from Congress
knew that the offer gave Alaska the right to
administer and manage fish and wildlife on its
property, and that the agreement was irrevocable if
they
voted
for
statehood.
And
Alaskans
overwhelmingly accepted Congress’s offer through a
state ballot proposition on August 26, 1958. 6 Within a
month of the legislature’s first meeting, “a law became
effective making it unlawful to erect, moor or maintain
fish traps.” Metlakatla, 362 P.2d at 906.
Two provisions of the Statehood Act, § 6(e) and
§ 6(m), as well as provisions of the Alaska
Constitution incorporated into the Statehood Act,
generally provide Alaska authority over regulation of
fish and its waters.
E.g., Pub. L. No. 50-180, 25 Stat. 676, 676 (1889) (Dakotas,
Montana, and Washington).
6 Alaska Div. of Elections, Statehood Election Final Results,
https://perma.cc/86TW-CHAB.
5
10
1. Unlike other statehood compacts, Congress in
the Statehood Act promised Alaskans that if they
voted to accept statehood and the state legislature
passed laws “adequate[ly]” protecting fish and game,
Alaska would gain unprecedented authority.
Statehood Act § 6(e). The State would have the right
to “administ[er] and manage[] the fish and wildlife” on
“property of the United States situated in the
Territory of Alaska” that had formerly been “used for
the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the
fisheries and wildlife of Alaska,” except “lands
withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or
reservations for the protection of wildlife.” Ibid.
As contemporaneously explained, § 6(e) was meant
to “transfer to the State of Alaska all real and personal
property of the United States utilized in connection
with the conservation and protection of fisheries and
wildlife,” with only narrow exceptions for lands
reserved for federal research activities. 7 The
Department of the Interior assured Congress of this
point. For example, when Representative Wayne N.
Aspinall pressed the Department of the Interior’s
witness, Mr. Chilson, on whether “some of the fishing
activities” “might come under the jurisdiction of the
Federal Government and would not be in harmony”
“with the Alaskan Government,” Chilson responded
that, as a “practical matter,” Alaska’s fisheries would
“continue [their] operation under Alaskan State laws,”
7 Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849, H.R. 340,
H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the Subcomm. on Territorial &
Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs,
81st Cong. 1st Sess. 98 (1957) (report of Hatfield Chilson,
Assistant Secretary of the Interior), https://tinyurl.com/4ftwrevt.
11
with federal interference only in the rare case of “some
military necessity.” 8 Chilson further confirmed that
“in any event 87 percent of all the fishing industry of
the proposed State of Alaska would come under the
jurisdiction of the Alaskan law,” and that he saw “no
difficulty as far as State control of the fishing in
Alaska.” 9
After the Statehood Act, Alaska promptly enacted
laws regulating fish and game, and President
Eisenhower approved them under the Act’s standard
Act. Exec. Order No. 10857, 25 Fed. Reg. 33 (Dec. 29,
1959). The federal government then transferred to
Alaska “administration and management of the fish
and wildlife resources of Alaska.” Ibid.
2. Next, Statehood Act § 6(m) provides for Alaska’s
authority over navigable waters regulation by
applying the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 to the
State. Like other states, Alaska received “title to and
ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters,”
including “natural resources” like “fish” in those
waters. Pub. L. No. 83-31, § 3(a), 67 Stat. 29, 30 (1953)
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)); 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e);
see Statehood Act § 6(m). Accordingly, Alaska’s
ownership includes “regulatory authority over
‘navigation, fishing, and other public uses’ of those
waters.” Sturgeon II, 587 U.S. at 34–35 (quoting 43
U.S.C. § 1311). The federal government merely
retains “constitutional powers of regulation and
control over these lands and waters for purposes of
commerce, navigation, national defense, and
8 Id. at 109.
9 Id. at 109–10.
12
international affairs.” Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
431 U.S. 265, 283–84 (1977) (cleaned up). But those
powers expressly do not include “the rights of
management, administration, leasing, use, and
development of the lands and natural resources” given
to the State. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a).
This presumption of state control over submerged
lands traces back to at least Smith v. Maryland, which
recognized a State’s “‘exclusive propriety and
ownership’ over its ‘maritime border.’” 59 U.S. 71, 74
(1855). The Court there explained that a State “may
regulate the modes of [fishery] enjoyment so as to
prevent the destruction of the fishery.” Id. at 75. The
Court also explained that this authority “results from
the ownership of the soil, from the legislative
jurisdiction of the State over it, and from its duty to
preserve unimpaired those public uses for which the
soil is held.” Ibid. Applying that rule, the Court in
Smith upheld a Maryland law protecting oysters in
the Chesapeake Bay and authorizing seizure of an outof-state vessel. Ibid.
Likewise, in Manchester v. Massachusetts, this
Court affirmed that states may regulate fishing within
their own bays, even where federal commerce powers
are implicated. 139 U.S. 240, 265 (1891). The
Massachusetts statute at issue was “confined to
waters within the jurisdiction of [the] commonwealth”
and “was evidently passed for the preservation of the
fish,” making “no discrimination in favor of citizens of
Massachusetts and against citizens of other states.”
Ibid. The Court held that “if [Congress] does not assert
by affirmative legislation its right or will to assume
the control of” “fisheries in such bays, the right to
13
control such fisheries must remain with the state
which contains such bays.” Id. at 266 (emphasis
added).
In sum, Statehood Act § 6(m) gives Alaska at least
the same submerged lands authority as other states,
and § 6(e) provides Alaska with even more extensive
fish and game management authority. Alaska’s
comprehensive regulation of fish resources to preserve
fish populations, cultural practices, and state policies
falls squarely within this authority.
3. When Congress approved the Alaska Statehood
Act, it directly “accepted, ratified, and confirmed”
Alaska’s Constitution. Statehood Act § 1. The Alaska
Constitution contains several provisions that reserve
fish and wildlife in the State to all Alaskans—
explicitly prohibiting distinctions.
Under the Alaska Constitution, “[t]he [Alaska]
legislature shall provide for the utilization,
development, and conservation of all natural
resources belonging to the State, including land and
waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.” Art.
VIII, § 2. Rights under the Alaska Constitution
include equal rights to subsistence fishing. According
to the Alaska Supreme Court, giving a “rural
preference” to subsistence fishing “violates article
VIII, sections 3, 15 and 17 of the Alaska Constitution.”
McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 1 (Alaska 1989). Section
3 provides that “[w]herever occurring in their natural
state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the
people for common use.” Id. at 5 (quoting Alaska
Const. Art. VIII, § 3). Section 15 prevents the
government from creating an “exclusive right or
special privilege of fishery” “in the natural waters of
14
the State.” Ibid. (quoting Alaska Const. Art. VIII,
§ 15). And Section 17 requires the “disposal of natural
resources” to “apply equally to all persons similarly
situated.” Ibid. (quoting Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 17).
Overall, “the article VIII provisions were designed to
ensure to the public the broadest possible access to
wildlife.” Id. at 6.
This mandate extends to all Alaskans who depend
on subsistence resources—not just those living in
rural areas. Restricting subsistence fishing to “rural”
Alaskans excludes “substantial numbers” of non-rural
residents who “lived a subsistence lifestyle and desire
to continue to do so.” McDowell, 785 P.2d at 4–5. A
1983 study, for instance, found that households “in or
near populated areas” engaged in subsistence fishing
and had “longer histories of participation” “than the
majority of users.” Id. at 5. Yet “their residence in an
area” “defined by regulation as urban” would strip
them of federal subsistence protection. Ibid. As of
2017, roughly 83 percent of Alaskans live in urban
areas. 10
The above provisions—again, accepted by
Congress and added to the statehood compact—
underscore the importance of Alaska’s retention of its
authority over fish and natural resource management
on navigable waters within the State.
C. Alaska’s careful fishing regulations have
benefited all Alaskans.
Right after statehood in 1959, the first state
legislature created the Department of Fish and Game.
10 Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Subsistence in Alaska: A Year
2017 Update, https://perma.cc/N2XP-BQVX.
15
See Alaska Stat. § 16.05.010. The Department was
granted full authority to “manage, protect, maintain,
improve, and extend the fish, game and aquatic plant
resources of the state.” Id. § 16.05.020(2). In 1975, the
legislature created two boards within the Department:
the Board of Fisheries and the Board of Game. See
id. § 16.05.221(a)–(b). The Board of Fisheries was
granted “the authority to adopt regulations,” including
“establishing open and closed seasons and areas for
taking fish; setting quotas, bag limits, and harvest
levels and limitations for taking fish; and establishing
the methods and means for taking fish.” App. 81a. The
Department also works with “various ‘working groups’
that include federal, native, and local participants.”
Ibid. Assisted by these groups, the Department
“maintains active and comprehensive management
and research programs to ensure fish and wildlife
populations are ‘utilized, developed, and maintained
on the sustained yield principle,’ as required by
Alaska’s constitution.” App. 80a (quoting Alaska
Const. Art. VIII, § 4).
Generally, Alaska has given subsistence fishing a
priority over other uses, such as commercial, sport,
and personal-use fishing. State v. Kenaitze Indian
Tribe, 894 P.2d 632, 633 (Alaska 1995); see Alaska
Stat. § 16.05.258(b). When a fish population “is
insufficient to supply all consumptive uses consistent
with the sustained yield principle, nonsubsistence
uses must be restricted,” and “when a population is
sufficient only to supply subsistence uses,
nonsubsistence uses must be eliminated.” Kenaitze,
894 P.2d at 633.
16
Alaska continues to manage its fisheries to sustain
resources for future generations while preserving
subsistence traditions and supporting responsible
commercial use. App. 82a. “To ensure long-term
sustainable salmon populations,” Alaska’s regulatory
scheme relies on “the best available data, including
preseason and inseason run projections, test fishing
indices, age and sex composition, harvest reports,
passage escapement estimates, and recognized
uncertainty, to assess run abundance.” App. 87a, 89a.
State regulation has worked. Even the federal
government recognizes that, today, “Alaska’s fisheries
are among the best-managed, most sustainable in the
world.” 11 “Alaska resources provide jobs and a stable
food supply for the nation, while supporting a
traditional way of life for Alaska Native and local
fishing communities.” 12 Unlike piecemeal federal
regulation of river segments, see Pet. 22–23, Alaska
provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme based on
its review of statewide data. The State maintains
specialized laboratories that provide fisheries
managers with biological data to “manage, preserve,
protect, and perpetuate Alaska’s fishery resources,”
including statewide age reading services and tracking
systems for salmon populations across the state. 13
That state regulation has worked is unsurprising:
federalism in America has long reflected the fact that
11 NOAA Fisheries, Alaska, https://perma.cc/2A9Q-UPJ9.
12 Ibid.
13 Alaska
Dep’t of Fish & Game, Fisheries Research,
https://perma.cc/HKP8-BHLW (describing Alaska’s genetics,
pathology, and mark/tag/age laboratories); see also Alaska Dep’t
of Fish & Game, Salmon Ocean Ecology Program (SOEP),
https://perma.cc/CUA9-R83S.
17
governments closer to the people will be more
responsive to local concerns. See, e.g., Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); The Federalist No.
46 (Madison). Alaska’s regulatory scheme properly
exercises the authority guaranteed it by the Statehood
Act.
II. The interpretation below is wrong.
The interpretation of “public lands” in ANILCA
Title VIII adopted by the Ninth Circuit contradicts
these Statehood Act guarantees. Even standing alone,
“public lands” in Title VIII does not include navigable
waters, for all the reasons the Court already identified
in Sturgeon II and because that’s how ANILCA
expressly defines the term. At a minimum, Title VIII’s
reference to “public lands” is not as clearly opposite
ANILCA’s other references to “public lands” to provide
a clear statement displacing state regulatory
authority. And interpreting “public lands” the same
way this Court did in Sturgeon II has the added
benefit of harmonizing ANILCA with the Statehood
Act. The Ninth Circuit’s decision wrongly deprives
Alaska of significant fish and resource management
authority, threatening incoherent and contradictory
regulations.
1. Because this Court already interpreted “public
lands” in ANILCA generally to exclude navigable
waters, the federal government must show that
ANILCA Title VIII’s definition of “public lands” clearly
deviates from the other references in the statute and
thus displaces traditional state regulatory authority.
As Alaska explains, the United States failed to meet
that burden, and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is
wrong.
18
From English common law to the present, because
title to “all lands underlying navigable waters” has
been “important to the sovereign’s ability to control
navigation, fishing, and other commercial activity on
rivers and lakes, ownership of this land [has been]
considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.” Utah
Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195
(1987). “Title to such land was therefore vested in the
sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.” Id. at
196. “As a general principle, the Federal Government
holds such lands in trust for future States, to be
granted to such States when they enter the Union and
assume sovereignty on an ‘equal footing’ with the
established States.” Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 551 (1981). “After a State enters the Union,
title to the land is governed by state law.” Ibid.
Likewise, “wildlife management is a field which
the States have traditionally occupied.” Wyoming v.
United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1231 (CA10 2002). The
federal government has “reaffirmed the basic
responsibility and authority of the States to manage
fish and resident wildlife on Federal lands.” 43 C.F.R.
§ 24.3(b) (setting out general jurisdictional principles
regarding the relationship of federal and state entities
vis-à-vis the regulation of fish and wildlife). According
to the Secretary of the Interior, “Federal authority
exists for specified purposes while State authority
regarding fish and resident wildlife remains the
comprehensive backdrop applicable in the absence of
specific, overriding federal law.” Id. § 24.1(a). State
authority to regulate and control the common property
in fish and game is “well established.” Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11 (1928).
19
Under “background principles of construction that
apply to the interpretation” of provisions affecting
“[r]egulation of land and water use [that] lies at the
core of traditional state authority,” Congress must
“enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to
significantly alter the balance between federal and
state power.” Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651, 679 (2023)
(cleaned up).
Neither the United States nor the Ninth Circuit
identified anything like a clear statement supporting
their interpretation. This Court already held in
Sturgeon II that identical statutory language in the
rest of ANILCA did not encompass navigable waters
within conservation system units. 587 U.S. at 42–45.
Title VIII uses the same term, which is expressly
defined for purposes of most of the statute as “lands,
waters, and interests therein . . . the title to which is
in the United States.” ANILCA § 102. Exempted from
this definition are “lands which have been . . . granted
to the Territory of Alaska or the State under any other
provision of Federal law.” ANILCA § 102(3)(A). Under
Statehood Act § 6(m), the Submerged Lands Act
grants Alaska—not the United States—title to the
State’s navigable waters. Thus, those navigable
waters cannot be “public lands.” See Sturgeon II, 587
U.S. at 44–45. “ANILCA does not speak of navigable
waters at all,” John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032,
1046 (CA9 2001) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), so there is
no reason to think that the statute treats such waters
differently than other legal provisions, including the
Statehood Act.
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation would tie the
statute in knots. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that
20
“a defined term” can occasionally have “different
meanings in different sections of a statute.” App. 26a.
But Congress expressly said when it wanted to use a
different definition of public lands (in Titles IX and
XIV, ANILCA § 102), and that express direction
counsels against changing the definition in Title VIII.
See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383,
391–92 (2015) (expressio unius). A different definition
is “particularly implausible” because Congress
separately set forth definitions applicable only to Title
VIII (ANILCA § 803)—but it did not give “public
lands” a different definition there. Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 550 (1987).
Changing the definition in Title VIII would result
in nonsensical provisions. Take the saving clause in
ANILCA § 1314(a): “Nothing in this Act is intended to
enlarge or diminish the responsibility and authority of
the State of Alaska for management of fish and
wildlife on the public lands except as may be provided
in title VIII of this Act . . . .” Under Sturgeon II, this
saving clause’s reference to “public lands” does not
include navigable waters. But the Ninth Circuit would
read the saving clause’s potential exception to depend
on a different interpretation of “public lands” within
Title VIII that would include navigable waters. That
makes a hash of the provision. So even if a defined
term could theoretically take on “different meanings,”
App. 26a, there is no reason to think that Congress
wanted divergent definitions of the same term at work
in the same provision.
All this confirms that Sturgeon II’s definition of
“public lands” readily applies to Title VIII of ANILCA
too. But at a minimum, even if it is “ambiguous
21
whether navigable waters are lands, waters or
interests to which the United States holds title” under
Title VIII, “a political judgment as monumental as this
must be made by Congress itself, and expressed in no
uncertain terms.” John, 247 F.3d at 1050 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting) (cleaned up). And that ambiguity
precludes the Ninth Circuit’s reading of ANILCA to
override Alaska’s comprehensive oversight of its own
natural resources.
2. The natural interpretation of the statute aligns
with the unique premises of Alaskan statehood.
Alaska bargained for and received some of the most
extensive resource management rights granted by
Congress to any State. Denying Alaska the ability to
comprehensively oversee management of its rivers
threatens all the negative consequences of federal
mismanagement that led to that bargain in the first
place.
Congress’s statehood agreements are “solemn
agreement[s]” that “may be analogized to a contract
between private parties.” Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S.
500, 507 (1980). They are “unalterable except by
consent.” Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 173, 177
(1855). “Congress cannot, after statehood, reserve or
convey” “lands that have already been bestowed upon
a State.” Hawaii v. Off. of Hawaiian Affs., 556 U.S.
163, 176 (2009) (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533
U.S. 262, 280 n.9 (2001)).
The purported federal regulation of part of the
Kuskokwim River is inconsistent with Alaska’s
Statehood Act guarantees. Together, § 6(e) and § 6(m)
give Alaska the right to “administ[er] and manage[]
the fish and wildlife” on state lands, including
22
navigable waters. And restricting subsistence fishing
to “rural” Alaskans, as the federal government
purported to do here, is inconsistent with Alaska
constitutional provisions incorporated into the
Statehood Act compact.
What would be the point of the United States
giving Alaska lands under navigable waters, the right
to regulate the natural resources in those waters, and
the right to ensure equal availability of those
resources if the federal government could turn around
and impose its own contradictory regulations on those
resources? Congress’s intent in the Statehood Act was
to ensure that Alaska as a state was no longer
subservient to the federal government, but master of
its resources and thus self-supporting. Nothing in the
Statehood Act suggests that Alaska’s “settled
expectations” in this area could be undermined by
inconsistent federal regulations. ASARCO Inc. v.
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 632 (1989). Alaska’s
management of fish and natural resource
management remains strong. Alaska has honored its
side of the compact, enacting and enforcing robust
conservation laws consistent with the Statehood Act.
Those laws have worked, ensuring access to Alaska’s
natural resources to all its citizens. Interpreting
ANILCA Title VIII’s reference to “public lands” just as
the Court did in Sturgeon II would thus promote the
statehood agreement, which is itself a federal law. Cf.
Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz,
601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024) (explaining that courts
“approach federal statutes touching on the same topic
with a ‘strong presumption’ they can coexist
harmoniously”).
23
The Ninth Circuit’s disregard for the statutory text
and federalism principles undermines state
sovereignty. Left unchecked, this erosion of state
sovereignty threatens the constitutional balance that
protects all states from federal overreach, but
especially threatens the unique framework that led to
Alaska’s inclusion in the Union. See Sturgeon II, 587
U.S. at 57. This Court’s review is urgently needed.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should grant the
petition.
Respectfully submitted,
CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS
Counsel of Record
Spero Law LLC
557 East Bay Street
#22251
Charleston, SC 29413
(843) 606-0640
cmills@spero.law
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
OCTOBER 17, 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.