Amicus Curiae Brief — Alaska, et al., Petitioners v. United States, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 17, 2025

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No. 25-320

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

ALASKA, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES, ET AL.,

Respondents.

____________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

_______________

BRIEF FOR ALASKA INDUSTRIAL

DEVELOPMENT AND EXPORT AUTHORITY

AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

__________

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .....................................................ii

Interest of Amicus Curiae ........................................... 1

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 4

Reasons for Granting the Writ.................................... 6

I. The decision below ignores that Alaskan

sovereignty over resource management was a

core statehood issue. .......................................... 6

A. Federal mismanagement of Alaskan waters

motivated statehood. .................................... 6

B. Congress gave Alaska unique authority over

fish and waters regulation. .......................... 8

C. Alaska’s careful fishing regulations have

benefited all Alaskans. ............................... 14

II. The interpretation below is wrong. ................. 17

Conclusion.................................................................. 23

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, Alaska,

480 U.S. 531 (1987) ................................................ 20

Andrus v. Utah,

446 U.S. 500 (1980) ................................................ 21

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,

490 U.S. 605 (1989) ................................................ 22

Cooper v. Roberts,

59 U.S. (18 How.) 173 (1855) ................................. 21

Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz,

601 U.S. 42 (2024) .................................................. 22

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean,

574 U.S. 383 (2015) ................................................ 20

Douglas v. Seacoast Products,

431 U.S. 265 (1977) ................................................ 12

Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,

278 U.S. 1 (1928) .................................................... 18

Gregory v. Ashcroft,

501 U.S. 452 (1991) ................................................ 17

Hawaii v. Off. of Hawaiian Affs.,

556 U.S. 163 (2009) ................................................ 21

Idaho v. United States,

533 U.S. 262 (2001) ................................................ 21

John v. United States,

247 F.3d 1032 (CA9 2001) ............................... 19, 21

iii

Manchester v. Massachusetts,

139 U.S. 240 (1891) .......................................... 12, 13

McDowell v. State,

785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989) ................................. 13, 14

Metlakatla Indian Cmty., Annette Island Rsrv. v.

Egan,

362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961) ............................. 6, 7, 9

Montana v. United States,

450 U.S. 544 (1981) ................................................ 18

Sackett v. EPA,

598 U.S. 651 (2023) ................................................ 19

Smith v. Maryland,

59 U.S. 71 (1855) .................................................... 12

State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe,

894 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1995) ................................... 15

Sturgeon v. Frost,

577 U.S. 424 (2016) .................................................. 8

Sturgeon v. Frost,

587 U.S. 28 (2019) ................ 4, 11, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23

Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States,

482 U.S. 193 (1987) ................................................ 18

Wyoming v. United States,

279 F.3d 1214 (CA10 2002) ................................... 18

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 2....................................... 13

Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 3....................................... 13

Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 4....................................... 15

Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 15..................................... 14

iv

Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 17..................................... 14

STATUTES

1958 Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508,

73 Stat. 339 .... 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 17, 19, 21, 22

43 U.S.C. § 1301 ........................................................ 11

43 U.S.C. § 1311 .................................................... 9, 11

43 U.S.C. § 1314 ........................................................ 12

Alaska Stat. § 16.05.010 ............................................ 15

Alaska Stat. § 16.05.020 ............................................ 15

Alaska Stat. § 16.05.221 ............................................ 15

Alaska Stat. § 16.05.258 ............................................ 15

Alaska Stat. § 44.88.020 .............................................. 1

Alaska Stat. § 44.88.070 .............................................. 1

Alaska Stat. § 44.88.080 .............................................. 1

ANILCA § 102...................................................... 19, 20

ANILCA § 801.............................................................. 2

ANILCA § 802.............................................................. 2

ANILCA § 803............................................................ 20

ANILCA § 810.............................................................. 2

ANILCA § 811.............................................................. 2

ANILCA § 1314.......................................................... 20

Pub. L. No. 50-180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889) ...................... 9

Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) ........................ 11

v

REGULATIONS

43 C.F.R. § 24.1.......................................................... 18

43 C.F.R. § 24.3.......................................................... 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Fisheries Research,

https://perma.cc/HKP8-BHLW .............................. 16

Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Salmon Ocean Ecology

Program (SOEP), https://perma.cc/CUA9-R83S ... 16

Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Subsistence in Alaska:

A Year 2017 Update,

https://perma.cc/N2XP-BQVX ............................... 14

Alaska Div. of Elections, Statehood Election Final

Results, https://perma.cc/86TW-CHAB ................... 9

Ambler Road Final Supplemental Environmental

Impact Statement App’x M-8–9 (Apr. 2024),

https://perma.cc/RV2U-QTN2 ................................. 2

Decision of the President and Statement of Reasons,

90 Fed. Reg. 48167 (Oct. 6, 2025) ............................ 3

Exec. Order No. 10857, 25 Fed. Reg. 33

(Dec. 29, 1959) ........................................................ 11

NOAA Fisheries, Alaska,

https://perma.cc/2A9Q-UPJ9 ................................. 16

Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849,

H.R. 340, H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the

Subcomm. Territorial & Insular Affairs of the H.

Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs, 81st

Cong. 1st Sess. 306 (1957) (statement of Ernest

Gruening), https://tinyurl.com/mshdvz9r. .......... 7, 8

vi

Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849,

H.R. 340, H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the

Subcomm. Territorial & Insular Affairs of the H.

Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs, 81st

Cong. 1st Sess. 98 (1957) (report of Hatfield

Chilson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior),

https://tinyurl.com/4ftwrevt ............................ 10, 11

The Federalist No. 46 (Madison) .............................. 17

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Alaska Industrial Development and Export

Authority (AIDEA) is a public corporation of the State

of Alaska, constituting a political subdivision under its

laws “but with separate and independent legal

existence.” Alaska Stat. § 44.88.020. The Alaska

Legislature created AIDEA “to promote, develop, and

advance the general prosperity and economic welfare

of the people of the state, to relieve problems of

unemployment, and to create additional employment.”

Id. § 44.88.070. AIDEA encourages economic growth

and diversification in Alaska by providing means of

financing and assistance to Alaska businesses,

including through its Credit and Development

Finance Programs. Id. § 44.88.080. Revenue

generated by AIDEA investments is allocated towards

reinvestment in AIDEA programs, AIDEA projects,

and dividends to the State’s general fund. *

AIDEA has a significant interest in this case,

which implicates Alaska’s sovereignty and a proper

interpretation of the Alaska National Interest Lands

Conservation Act (ANILCA). Federal overreading of

ANILCA has consistently harmed AIDEA. For

instance, under the prior administration, the U.S.

Department of the Interior Bureau of Land

Management (BLM) issued a decision halting

development of the Ambler Road. The Ambler Road is

a proposed 211-mile, private, industrial-controlled

* Under Rule 37.2, amicus provided timely notice of its intention

to file this brief. Under Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored

this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amicus

curiae or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its

preparation or submission.

2

access road to reach the Ambler Mining District in the

Northwest Arctic Borough, an area with extensive

mineral resources critical for national security and

economic development. Federal agencies initially

granted AIDEA’s application for a right-of-way to

develop this gravel road, but reversed course in the

prior administration. The BLM relied in part on

ANILCA § 810, which provides that “[i]n determining

whether to withdraw, reserve, lease, or otherwise

permit the use, occupancy, or disposition of public

lands,” “the head of the Federal agency having

primary jurisdiction over such lands or his designee

shall evaluate the effect of such use, occupancy, or

disposition on subsistence uses and needs, the

availability of other lands for the purposes sought to

be achieved, and other alternatives which would

reduce or eliminate the use, occupancy, or disposition

of public lands needed for subsistence purposes.”

This section and other ANILCA provisions focus on

subsistence uses on public lands. See, e.g., ANILCA

§§ 801(1), 802(1), 811(a). Yet BLM applied § 810 to the

entire length of the Road—most of which would be

placed on non-public lands over which BLM has no

jurisdiction, including lands owned and managed by

the State of Alaska, Alaska Native Regional

Corporations, and private persons. See Ambler Road

Final

Supplemental

Environmental

Impact

Statement App’x M-8–9 (Apr. 2024), https://perma.cc/

RV2U-QTN2. BLM purported to use § 810 to reject the

Road’s application even though it failed to show that

any of the studied subsistence uses occur on BLMmanaged public lands. Not only did BLM consider

subsistence uses on non-public lands, but it also failed

to show whether any threatened effects on those

3

subsistence uses are likely from the Road’s use of

public lands. Together, these dubious moves

dramatically expanded the federal agency’s purported

jurisdiction over non-public lands.

President Trump has now reversed the BLM’s

decision on the Ambler Road after an appeal from

AIDEA under ANILCA § 1106. See Decision of the

President and Statement of Reasons, 90 Fed. Reg.

48167 (Oct. 6, 2025). But the point remains: AIDEA

has a particular interest in proper interpretations of

ANILCA that do not deviate from the limited

statutory definition of “public lands”—or enable

practically boundless federal regulatory authority.

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court has already said what “public lands”

means in the Alaska National Interest Lands

Conservation Act (ANILCA). Sturgeon v. Frost, 587

U.S. 28, 42 (2019) (Sturgeon II). Congress

meticulously defined “public lands,” and even said

when the statute would deviate from that definition.

The standard definition textually applies in ANILCA

Title VIII, and it excludes Alaska’s navigable waters.

But the United States has asserted otherwise in an

effort to promulgate fragmented regulations on rivers

within Alaska, disrupting Alaska’s comprehensive

and coherent regulatory scheme. The Ninth Circuit

relied on its pre-Sturgeon decisions to stick to a

reading that is both atextual and undermines Alaska’s

sovereign interests. This Court’s review is needed.

Though state sovereignty over natural resources

like fish is a fundamental interest of every State, it is

especially important to Alaska. Alaska’s statehood

movement was motivated by the State’s need to own

and develop its extensive national resources—and the

federal government’s mismanagement of those

resources. The Statehood Act addressed those issues

by granting Alaska millions of acres of lands—

including the lands beneath its navigable waters—

and the right to manage and develop those resources,

including fish. Congress also accepted Alaska’s

Constitution, which guarantees the availability of

these resources to all citizens on an equal basis.

Alaska’s comprehensive regulation of fishing and

water resources has reversed the failures of federal

regulation and led to a sustainable regulatory scheme

that benefits all its citizens.

5

The interpretation adopted below significantly

undermines Alaskan regulatory authority provided by

the Statehood Act. This Court already interpreted

“public lands” in ANILCA to exclude navigable waters,

and neither the federal government nor the Ninth

Circuit identified any clear reason to depart from that

defined term in ANILCA Title VIII. But such a clear

statement is necessary to overcome both the express

statutory definition and the traditional right of States

to manage their own natural resources. The State’s

textual interpretation, by contrast, harmonizes

ANILCA and the Statehood Act guarantees by

preserving Alaska’s regulatory authority. To ensure

that Congress’s promises to Alaska are fulfilled, this

Court should grant certiorari and again hold that

Alaska may properly manage its own navigable

waters.

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The decision below ignores that Alaskan

sovereignty over resource management was

a core statehood issue.

States generally retain their authority over

natural resource management, and this presumption

of state authority is especially strong in Alaska.

Authority over wildlife and autonomy to develop

natural resources were the two main drivers of the

Alaskan statehood movement. The deal struck

between Alaska and the United States that led to

statehood uniquely protected Alaska’s right to oversee

natural resource management. That right is protected

through many provisions of the Statehood Act and the

Alaska Constitution—all incorporated into federal law

during the statehood process. These guarantees were

and remain critically important to Alaska. But the

Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of ANILCA significantly undermines them in the areas of fishing and

water management.

A. Federal mismanagement of

waters motivated statehood.

Alaskan

“Since time immemorial Alaska has been blessed

with a natural food resource in the form of annual

migrations of salmon.” Metlakatla Indian Cmty.,

Annette Island Rsrv. v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 903

(Alaska 1961). “From late spring until fall most of its

fresh water rivers and streams are, at one time or

another, visited by hordes of salmon that have

migrated shoreward from the open sea.” Ibid. “As a life

sustaining food the salmon is hardly exceled and

because of its abundance in Alaskan waters it has

7

always been one of the basic food resources of the

people as well as the basis of their main industry.”

Ibid. “Harvesting some portion of this natural

resource for food has always been an annual necessity

for most of the native population and many of the

white settlers,” and “[c]ommercial salmon fishing is

the principal source of income for a large portion of

Alaska’s labor force.” Ibid.

Before Alaska became a State, the federal

government was responsible for “the regulation of fish

and game” in the territory. Id. at 904. And the federal

government permitted the use of fish traps, which

involved stretched webbing or wire to trap large

amounts of migrating salmon. Id. at 903. The

territorial legislature repeatedly asked Congress to

limit the use of these traps, which led to severe

overfishing. Id. at 905. “In 1948 a referendum by the

people of Alaska resulted in a vote of 19,712 to 2,624

in favor of abolition of fish traps.” Ibid. But for

decades, Congress allowed the continued use of these

traps, “exterminat[ing]” large populations of fish. Ibid.

The results were disastrous. Former territorial

governor Ernest Gruening explained during the

statehood hearings that under federal control Alaska’s

salmon pack “went down, down, down,” from more

than 8.4 million cases in 1936 to just 2.4 million in

1955—the lowest point in nearly fifty years. 1 “So

serious was the depletion,” he noted, “that for [three]

1 Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849, H.R. 340,

H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the Subcomm. on Territorial &

Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs,

81st Cong. 1st Sess. 306 (1957) (statement of Ernest Gruening),

https://tinyurl.com/mshdvz9r.

8

successive years, 1953, 1954, and 1955,” the federal

government declared “Alaska fishing communities to

be disaster areas.” 2 Gruening contrasted Alaska’s

decline with British Columbia and Washington, where

local control had conserved and even rebuilt salmon

stocks. 3 He blamed the deterioration on the continued

use of fish traps, largely owned by outside interests,

and condemned the regime of “distant bureaucratic

control.” 4

This federal mismanagement was especially severe

because before statehood, the Federal Government

owned 98 percent of the 365 million acres of land in

Alaska. Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U.S. 424, 429 (2016)

(Sturgeon I). “As a result, absent a land grant from the

Federal Government to the State, there would be little

land available to drive private economic activity”—

and little ability for Alaska to correct federal

mismanagement of its natural resources. Ibid.

B. Congress gave Alaska unique authority

over fish and waters regulation.

The 1958 Alaska Statehood Act was the solution.

Pub. L. No. 85-508, 73 Stat. 339. In exchange for

valuable consideration—for instance, Alaska gave up

rights to much land—the agreement “permitted

Alaska to select 103 million acres of ‘vacant,

unappropriated, and unreserved’ federal land—just

over a quarter of all land in Alaska—for state

ownership.” Sturgeon I, 577 U.S. at 429. The State

“also gained ‘title to and ownership of the lands

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Id. at 307.

9

beneath navigable waters’ within the State,” and “‘the

natural resources within such lands and waters.’”

Ibid. In addition to ownership, though, the Act

critically gave the State “the right and power to

manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said

lands and natural resources.” 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a); see

Statehood Act § 6(m).

Unlike in other western states, where admittance

to the Union depended on a later state constitutional

convention, 5 Congress gave Alaskans the ability to

accept (or reject) statehood by direct vote. That offer

incorporated Alaska’s preexisting Constitution.

Statehood Act § 1. In other words, Alaskans voting on

whether to accept the offer of statehood from Congress

knew that the offer gave Alaska the right to

administer and manage fish and wildlife on its

property, and that the agreement was irrevocable if

they

voted

for

statehood.

And

Alaskans

overwhelmingly accepted Congress’s offer through a

state ballot proposition on August 26, 1958. 6 Within a

month of the legislature’s first meeting, “a law became

effective making it unlawful to erect, moor or maintain

fish traps.” Metlakatla, 362 P.2d at 906.

Two provisions of the Statehood Act, § 6(e) and

§ 6(m), as well as provisions of the Alaska

Constitution incorporated into the Statehood Act,

generally provide Alaska authority over regulation of

fish and its waters.

E.g., Pub. L. No. 50-180, 25 Stat. 676, 676 (1889) (Dakotas,

Montana, and Washington).

6 Alaska Div. of Elections, Statehood Election Final Results,

https://perma.cc/86TW-CHAB.

5

10

1. Unlike other statehood compacts, Congress in

the Statehood Act promised Alaskans that if they

voted to accept statehood and the state legislature

passed laws “adequate[ly]” protecting fish and game,

Alaska would gain unprecedented authority.

Statehood Act § 6(e). The State would have the right

to “administ[er] and manage[] the fish and wildlife” on

“property of the United States situated in the

Territory of Alaska” that had formerly been “used for

the sole purpose of conservation and protection of the

fisheries and wildlife of Alaska,” except “lands

withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or

reservations for the protection of wildlife.” Ibid.

As contemporaneously explained, § 6(e) was meant

to “transfer to the State of Alaska all real and personal

property of the United States utilized in connection

with the conservation and protection of fisheries and

wildlife,” with only narrow exceptions for lands

reserved for federal research activities. 7 The

Department of the Interior assured Congress of this

point. For example, when Representative Wayne N.

Aspinall pressed the Department of the Interior’s

witness, Mr. Chilson, on whether “some of the fishing

activities” “might come under the jurisdiction of the

Federal Government and would not be in harmony”

“with the Alaskan Government,” Chilson responded

that, as a “practical matter,” Alaska’s fisheries would

“continue [their] operation under Alaskan State laws,”

7 Statehood for Alaska: Hearings on H.R. 50, H.R. 849, H.R. 340,

H.R. 1242, and H.R. 1243 Before the Subcomm. on Territorial &

Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on the Interior & Insular Affairs,

81st Cong. 1st Sess. 98 (1957) (report of Hatfield Chilson,

Assistant Secretary of the Interior), https://tinyurl.com/4ftwrevt.

11

with federal interference only in the rare case of “some

military necessity.” 8 Chilson further confirmed that

“in any event 87 percent of all the fishing industry of

the proposed State of Alaska would come under the

jurisdiction of the Alaskan law,” and that he saw “no

difficulty as far as State control of the fishing in

Alaska.” 9

After the Statehood Act, Alaska promptly enacted

laws regulating fish and game, and President

Eisenhower approved them under the Act’s standard

Act. Exec. Order No. 10857, 25 Fed. Reg. 33 (Dec. 29,

1959). The federal government then transferred to

Alaska “administration and management of the fish

and wildlife resources of Alaska.” Ibid.

2. Next, Statehood Act § 6(m) provides for Alaska’s

authority over navigable waters regulation by

applying the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 to the

State. Like other states, Alaska received “title to and

ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters,”

including “natural resources” like “fish” in those

waters. Pub. L. No. 83-31, § 3(a), 67 Stat. 29, 30 (1953)

(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)); 43 U.S.C. § 1301(e);

see Statehood Act § 6(m). Accordingly, Alaska’s

ownership includes “regulatory authority over

‘navigation, fishing, and other public uses’ of those

waters.” Sturgeon II, 587 U.S. at 34–35 (quoting 43

U.S.C. § 1311). The federal government merely

retains “constitutional powers of regulation and

control over these lands and waters for purposes of

commerce, navigation, national defense, and

8 Id. at 109.

9 Id. at 109–10.

12

international affairs.” Douglas v. Seacoast Products,

431 U.S. 265, 283–84 (1977) (cleaned up). But those

powers expressly do not include “the rights of

management, administration, leasing, use, and

development of the lands and natural resources” given

to the State. 43 U.S.C. § 1314(a).

This presumption of state control over submerged

lands traces back to at least Smith v. Maryland, which

recognized a State’s “‘exclusive propriety and

ownership’ over its ‘maritime border.’” 59 U.S. 71, 74

(1855). The Court there explained that a State “may

regulate the modes of [fishery] enjoyment so as to

prevent the destruction of the fishery.” Id. at 75. The

Court also explained that this authority “results from

the ownership of the soil, from the legislative

jurisdiction of the State over it, and from its duty to

preserve unimpaired those public uses for which the

soil is held.” Ibid. Applying that rule, the Court in

Smith upheld a Maryland law protecting oysters in

the Chesapeake Bay and authorizing seizure of an outof-state vessel. Ibid.

Likewise, in Manchester v. Massachusetts, this

Court affirmed that states may regulate fishing within

their own bays, even where federal commerce powers

are implicated. 139 U.S. 240, 265 (1891). The

Massachusetts statute at issue was “confined to

waters within the jurisdiction of [the] commonwealth”

and “was evidently passed for the preservation of the

fish,” making “no discrimination in favor of citizens of

Massachusetts and against citizens of other states.”

Ibid. The Court held that “if [Congress] does not assert

by affirmative legislation its right or will to assume

the control of” “fisheries in such bays, the right to

13

control such fisheries must remain with the state

which contains such bays.” Id. at 266 (emphasis

added).

In sum, Statehood Act § 6(m) gives Alaska at least

the same submerged lands authority as other states,

and § 6(e) provides Alaska with even more extensive

fish and game management authority. Alaska’s

comprehensive regulation of fish resources to preserve

fish populations, cultural practices, and state policies

falls squarely within this authority.

3. When Congress approved the Alaska Statehood

Act, it directly “accepted, ratified, and confirmed”

Alaska’s Constitution. Statehood Act § 1. The Alaska

Constitution contains several provisions that reserve

fish and wildlife in the State to all Alaskans—

explicitly prohibiting distinctions.

Under the Alaska Constitution, “[t]he [Alaska]

legislature shall provide for the utilization,

development, and conservation of all natural

resources belonging to the State, including land and

waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.” Art.

VIII, § 2. Rights under the Alaska Constitution

include equal rights to subsistence fishing. According

to the Alaska Supreme Court, giving a “rural

preference” to subsistence fishing “violates article

VIII, sections 3, 15 and 17 of the Alaska Constitution.”

McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 1 (Alaska 1989). Section

3 provides that “[w]herever occurring in their natural

state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the

people for common use.” Id. at 5 (quoting Alaska

Const. Art. VIII, § 3). Section 15 prevents the

government from creating an “exclusive right or

special privilege of fishery” “in the natural waters of

14

the State.” Ibid. (quoting Alaska Const. Art. VIII,

§ 15). And Section 17 requires the “disposal of natural

resources” to “apply equally to all persons similarly

situated.” Ibid. (quoting Alaska Const. Art. VIII, § 17).

Overall, “the article VIII provisions were designed to

ensure to the public the broadest possible access to

wildlife.” Id. at 6.

This mandate extends to all Alaskans who depend

on subsistence resources—not just those living in

rural areas. Restricting subsistence fishing to “rural”

Alaskans excludes “substantial numbers” of non-rural

residents who “lived a subsistence lifestyle and desire

to continue to do so.” McDowell, 785 P.2d at 4–5. A

1983 study, for instance, found that households “in or

near populated areas” engaged in subsistence fishing

and had “longer histories of participation” “than the

majority of users.” Id. at 5. Yet “their residence in an

area” “defined by regulation as urban” would strip

them of federal subsistence protection. Ibid. As of

2017, roughly 83 percent of Alaskans live in urban

areas. 10

The above provisions—again, accepted by

Congress and added to the statehood compact—

underscore the importance of Alaska’s retention of its

authority over fish and natural resource management

on navigable waters within the State.

C. Alaska’s careful fishing regulations have

benefited all Alaskans.

Right after statehood in 1959, the first state

legislature created the Department of Fish and Game.

10 Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, Subsistence in Alaska: A Year

2017 Update, https://perma.cc/N2XP-BQVX.

15

See Alaska Stat. § 16.05.010. The Department was

granted full authority to “manage, protect, maintain,

improve, and extend the fish, game and aquatic plant

resources of the state.” Id. § 16.05.020(2). In 1975, the

legislature created two boards within the Department:

the Board of Fisheries and the Board of Game. See

id. § 16.05.221(a)–(b). The Board of Fisheries was

granted “the authority to adopt regulations,” including

“establishing open and closed seasons and areas for

taking fish; setting quotas, bag limits, and harvest

levels and limitations for taking fish; and establishing

the methods and means for taking fish.” App. 81a. The

Department also works with “various ‘working groups’

that include federal, native, and local participants.”

Ibid. Assisted by these groups, the Department

“maintains active and comprehensive management

and research programs to ensure fish and wildlife

populations are ‘utilized, developed, and maintained

on the sustained yield principle,’ as required by

Alaska’s constitution.” App. 80a (quoting Alaska

Const. Art. VIII, § 4).

Generally, Alaska has given subsistence fishing a

priority over other uses, such as commercial, sport,

and personal-use fishing. State v. Kenaitze Indian

Tribe, 894 P.2d 632, 633 (Alaska 1995); see Alaska

Stat. § 16.05.258(b). When a fish population “is

insufficient to supply all consumptive uses consistent

with the sustained yield principle, nonsubsistence

uses must be restricted,” and “when a population is

sufficient only to supply subsistence uses,

nonsubsistence uses must be eliminated.” Kenaitze,

894 P.2d at 633.

16

Alaska continues to manage its fisheries to sustain

resources for future generations while preserving

subsistence traditions and supporting responsible

commercial use. App. 82a. “To ensure long-term

sustainable salmon populations,” Alaska’s regulatory

scheme relies on “the best available data, including

preseason and inseason run projections, test fishing

indices, age and sex composition, harvest reports,

passage escapement estimates, and recognized

uncertainty, to assess run abundance.” App. 87a, 89a.

State regulation has worked. Even the federal

government recognizes that, today, “Alaska’s fisheries

are among the best-managed, most sustainable in the

world.” 11 “Alaska resources provide jobs and a stable

food supply for the nation, while supporting a

traditional way of life for Alaska Native and local

fishing communities.” 12 Unlike piecemeal federal

regulation of river segments, see Pet. 22–23, Alaska

provides a comprehensive regulatory scheme based on

its review of statewide data. The State maintains

specialized laboratories that provide fisheries

managers with biological data to “manage, preserve,

protect, and perpetuate Alaska’s fishery resources,”

including statewide age reading services and tracking

systems for salmon populations across the state. 13

That state regulation has worked is unsurprising:

federalism in America has long reflected the fact that

11 NOAA Fisheries, Alaska, https://perma.cc/2A9Q-UPJ9.

12 Ibid.

13 Alaska

Dep’t of Fish & Game, Fisheries Research,

https://perma.cc/HKP8-BHLW (describing Alaska’s genetics,

pathology, and mark/tag/age laboratories); see also Alaska Dep’t

of Fish & Game, Salmon Ocean Ecology Program (SOEP),

https://perma.cc/CUA9-R83S.

17

governments closer to the people will be more

responsive to local concerns. See, e.g., Gregory v.

Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); The Federalist No.

46 (Madison). Alaska’s regulatory scheme properly

exercises the authority guaranteed it by the Statehood

Act.

II. The interpretation below is wrong.

The interpretation of “public lands” in ANILCA

Title VIII adopted by the Ninth Circuit contradicts

these Statehood Act guarantees. Even standing alone,

“public lands” in Title VIII does not include navigable

waters, for all the reasons the Court already identified

in Sturgeon II and because that’s how ANILCA

expressly defines the term. At a minimum, Title VIII’s

reference to “public lands” is not as clearly opposite

ANILCA’s other references to “public lands” to provide

a clear statement displacing state regulatory

authority. And interpreting “public lands” the same

way this Court did in Sturgeon II has the added

benefit of harmonizing ANILCA with the Statehood

Act. The Ninth Circuit’s decision wrongly deprives

Alaska of significant fish and resource management

authority, threatening incoherent and contradictory

regulations.

1. Because this Court already interpreted “public

lands” in ANILCA generally to exclude navigable

waters, the federal government must show that

ANILCA Title VIII’s definition of “public lands” clearly

deviates from the other references in the statute and

thus displaces traditional state regulatory authority.

As Alaska explains, the United States failed to meet

that burden, and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is

wrong.

18

From English common law to the present, because

title to “all lands underlying navigable waters” has

been “important to the sovereign’s ability to control

navigation, fishing, and other commercial activity on

rivers and lakes, ownership of this land [has been]

considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.” Utah

Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195

(1987). “Title to such land was therefore vested in the

sovereign for the benefit of the whole people.” Id. at

196. “As a general principle, the Federal Government

holds such lands in trust for future States, to be

granted to such States when they enter the Union and

assume sovereignty on an ‘equal footing’ with the

established States.” Montana v. United States, 450

U.S. 544, 551 (1981). “After a State enters the Union,

title to the land is governed by state law.” Ibid.

Likewise, “wildlife management is a field which

the States have traditionally occupied.” Wyoming v.

United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1231 (CA10 2002). The

federal government has “reaffirmed the basic

responsibility and authority of the States to manage

fish and resident wildlife on Federal lands.” 43 C.F.R.

§ 24.3(b) (setting out general jurisdictional principles

regarding the relationship of federal and state entities

vis-à-vis the regulation of fish and wildlife). According

to the Secretary of the Interior, “Federal authority

exists for specified purposes while State authority

regarding fish and resident wildlife remains the

comprehensive backdrop applicable in the absence of

specific, overriding federal law.” Id. § 24.1(a). State

authority to regulate and control the common property

in fish and game is “well established.” Foster-Fountain

Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 11 (1928).

19

Under “background principles of construction that

apply to the interpretation” of provisions affecting

“[r]egulation of land and water use [that] lies at the

core of traditional state authority,” Congress must

“enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to

significantly alter the balance between federal and

state power.” Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651, 679 (2023)

(cleaned up).

Neither the United States nor the Ninth Circuit

identified anything like a clear statement supporting

their interpretation. This Court already held in

Sturgeon II that identical statutory language in the

rest of ANILCA did not encompass navigable waters

within conservation system units. 587 U.S. at 42–45.

Title VIII uses the same term, which is expressly

defined for purposes of most of the statute as “lands,

waters, and interests therein . . . the title to which is

in the United States.” ANILCA § 102. Exempted from

this definition are “lands which have been . . . granted

to the Territory of Alaska or the State under any other

provision of Federal law.” ANILCA § 102(3)(A). Under

Statehood Act § 6(m), the Submerged Lands Act

grants Alaska—not the United States—title to the

State’s navigable waters. Thus, those navigable

waters cannot be “public lands.” See Sturgeon II, 587

U.S. at 44–45. “ANILCA does not speak of navigable

waters at all,” John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032,

1046 (CA9 2001) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), so there is

no reason to think that the statute treats such waters

differently than other legal provisions, including the

Statehood Act.

The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation would tie the

statute in knots. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that

20

“a defined term” can occasionally have “different

meanings in different sections of a statute.” App. 26a.

But Congress expressly said when it wanted to use a

different definition of public lands (in Titles IX and

XIV, ANILCA § 102), and that express direction

counsels against changing the definition in Title VIII.

See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383,

391–92 (2015) (expressio unius). A different definition

is “particularly implausible” because Congress

separately set forth definitions applicable only to Title

VIII (ANILCA § 803)—but it did not give “public

lands” a different definition there. Amoco Prod. Co. v.

Vill. of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 550 (1987).

Changing the definition in Title VIII would result

in nonsensical provisions. Take the saving clause in

ANILCA § 1314(a): “Nothing in this Act is intended to

enlarge or diminish the responsibility and authority of

the State of Alaska for management of fish and

wildlife on the public lands except as may be provided

in title VIII of this Act . . . .” Under Sturgeon II, this

saving clause’s reference to “public lands” does not

include navigable waters. But the Ninth Circuit would

read the saving clause’s potential exception to depend

on a different interpretation of “public lands” within

Title VIII that would include navigable waters. That

makes a hash of the provision. So even if a defined

term could theoretically take on “different meanings,”

App. 26a, there is no reason to think that Congress

wanted divergent definitions of the same term at work

in the same provision.

All this confirms that Sturgeon II’s definition of

“public lands” readily applies to Title VIII of ANILCA

too. But at a minimum, even if it is “ambiguous

21

whether navigable waters are lands, waters or

interests to which the United States holds title” under

Title VIII, “a political judgment as monumental as this

must be made by Congress itself, and expressed in no

uncertain terms.” John, 247 F.3d at 1050 (Kozinski,

J., dissenting) (cleaned up). And that ambiguity

precludes the Ninth Circuit’s reading of ANILCA to

override Alaska’s comprehensive oversight of its own

natural resources.

2. The natural interpretation of the statute aligns

with the unique premises of Alaskan statehood.

Alaska bargained for and received some of the most

extensive resource management rights granted by

Congress to any State. Denying Alaska the ability to

comprehensively oversee management of its rivers

threatens all the negative consequences of federal

mismanagement that led to that bargain in the first

place.

Congress’s statehood agreements are “solemn

agreement[s]” that “may be analogized to a contract

between private parties.” Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S.

500, 507 (1980). They are “unalterable except by

consent.” Cooper v. Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 173, 177

(1855). “Congress cannot, after statehood, reserve or

convey” “lands that have already been bestowed upon

a State.” Hawaii v. Off. of Hawaiian Affs., 556 U.S.

163, 176 (2009) (quoting Idaho v. United States, 533

U.S. 262, 280 n.9 (2001)).

The purported federal regulation of part of the

Kuskokwim River is inconsistent with Alaska’s

Statehood Act guarantees. Together, § 6(e) and § 6(m)

give Alaska the right to “administ[er] and manage[]

the fish and wildlife” on state lands, including

22

navigable waters. And restricting subsistence fishing

to “rural” Alaskans, as the federal government

purported to do here, is inconsistent with Alaska

constitutional provisions incorporated into the

Statehood Act compact.

What would be the point of the United States

giving Alaska lands under navigable waters, the right

to regulate the natural resources in those waters, and

the right to ensure equal availability of those

resources if the federal government could turn around

and impose its own contradictory regulations on those

resources? Congress’s intent in the Statehood Act was

to ensure that Alaska as a state was no longer

subservient to the federal government, but master of

its resources and thus self-supporting. Nothing in the

Statehood Act suggests that Alaska’s “settled

expectations” in this area could be undermined by

inconsistent federal regulations. ASARCO Inc. v.

Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 632 (1989). Alaska’s

management of fish and natural resource

management remains strong. Alaska has honored its

side of the compact, enacting and enforcing robust

conservation laws consistent with the Statehood Act.

Those laws have worked, ensuring access to Alaska’s

natural resources to all its citizens. Interpreting

ANILCA Title VIII’s reference to “public lands” just as

the Court did in Sturgeon II would thus promote the

statehood agreement, which is itself a federal law. Cf.

Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz,

601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024) (explaining that courts

“approach federal statutes touching on the same topic

with a ‘strong presumption’ they can coexist

harmoniously”).

23

The Ninth Circuit’s disregard for the statutory text

and federalism principles undermines state

sovereignty. Left unchecked, this erosion of state

sovereignty threatens the constitutional balance that

protects all states from federal overreach, but

especially threatens the unique framework that led to

Alaska’s inclusion in the Union. See Sturgeon II, 587

U.S. at 57. This Court’s review is urgently needed.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should grant the

petition.

Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

OCTOBER 17, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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