Amicus Curiae Brief — Priscilla Villarreal, Petitioner v. Isidro R. Alaniz, et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 4, 2025
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No. 25-29
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
PRISCILLA VILLARREAL,
Petitioner,
v.
ISIDRO R. ALANIZ, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
MUCKROCK FOUNDATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
AARON S. JACOBS
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY PYLE
Prince Lobel Tye LLP
One International
Place, Suite 3700
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 456-8000
ajacobs@princelobel.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE.............................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................2
ARGUMENT ...............................................................3
I.
Respondents did not reasonably believe
that Petitioner’s act of requesting
government information could be a crime..........3
A.
Texas law declares that people are
entitled to “complete information about
the affairs of government and the
official acts of public officials and
employees,” subject to exemptions..................4
B.
The Fifth Circuit unreasonably
construed the Texas Misuse of Official
Information statute so as to make it a
crime to request information that may
be released at the state’s discretion................7
II.
A person who requests information from
a state or local government usually has
no way of knowing whether the
information is non-public ender the
state’s public records law. ...................................9
ii
A.
Records in the possession of state
entities are presumptively public,
unless one of a great number of
exemptions applies. ....................................... 10
B.
Many exemptions require judgment
calls by the governmental entity
holding the records. ....................................... 14
III. The Texas criminal statute is not limited
to the use of “backchannel” sources. ................. 20
IV. Informal requests for information like
Petitioner’s must be protected, because
formal procedures under state public
records laws are neither a timely nor
adequate means to inform the public. .............. 22
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 25
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
ACLU Found. v. Sup. Ct.,
400 P.3d 432 (Cal. 2017) ...................................... 14
Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941) .............................................. 24
Carlson v. Pima Cty.,
687 P.2d 1242 (Ariz. 1984) .................................. 15
Cf. Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet,
947 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2020)................................ 25
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) ................................................ 24
Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v.
Everfresh Juice Co.,
24 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1994).................................. 24
Indus. Found. of the South v. Tex. Indus.
Accident Bd.,
540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976) ................................. 15
International News Service v. Associated
Press,
248 U.S. 215 (1918) .............................................. 24
Jackson v. State Off. of Admin. Hearings,
351 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. 2011) ............................... 7, 8
iv
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v.
Favish,
541 U.S. 157 (2004) .............................................. 17
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart,
423 U.S. 1327 (1975) ............................................ 24
Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co.,
443 U.S. 97 (1979) .............................................. 4, 9
State v. Ford,
179 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App. 2005) ..........................8
State v. Newton,
179 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. App. 2005) ...................... 8, 9
Thomas v. Cornyn,
71 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. App. 2002) ............................7
Tidwell v. State,
No. 08-11-00322-CR, 2013 WL 6405498
(Tex. App. Dec. 4, 2013) .........................................9
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, Texas,
134 F.4th 273
(5th Cir. 2025) (en banc) ........................................4
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, Texas,
94 F.4th 374
(5th Cir. 2024) (en banc) ............ 4, 9, 15, 16, 20, 22
West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
311 U.S. 223 (1940) ................................................9
v
Rules
Rule 37.2 ...................................................................1
Rule 37.6 ...................................................................1
Statutes
1 M.R.S.A. §§ 400 et seq.......................................... 11
Cal. Gov’t Code § 7922.000 ..................................... 13
Cal. Gov’t Code § 7930.000(a) ................................ 13
Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 7930.100 et seq. ........................ 13
Fla. Stat. §§ 119.01 et seq. ...................................... 11
Fla. Stat. §§ 286.011 et seq. .................................... 11
K.S.A. §§ 45-215 et seq............................................ 11
K.S.A. §§ 75-4317 et seq.......................................... 11
N.D.C.C. §§ 44-04-17 et seq. ................................... 12
Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43 ......................................... 12
ORS § 192.314......................................................... 12
T.C.A. §§ 10-7-501 et seq. ....................................... 13
T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101 et seq. ....................................... 13
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001 ........................................5
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a) .............................. 5, 10
vi
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.007(a) ....................................6
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.007(b) ....................................6
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.021 ........................................6
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101 .................................. 5, 15
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.108 ...................................... 16
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.108(a) .............................. 6, 14
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.108(c) .................................. 14
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.1085 ......................................6
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221(a) .............................. 5, 23
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(a) ................................ 7, 8
Tex. Transp. Code § 550.065 .................................. 16
Tex. Transp. Code § 550.065(a) .............................. 16
Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.2-3700 et seq. .......................... 13
Other
Amy M. Oster, Open Government Guide:
North Dakota (Jan. 2024),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/north-dakota/#2discussion-of-each-exemption .............................. 12
vii
Andrew Geronimo & David Marburger,
Open Government Guide: Ohio, RCFP
(last visited July 18, 2025),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/ohio/#1-characterof-exemptions ........................................................ 12
C.J. Ciaramella, “New Jersey Town That
Sued a Woman for Public Records
Requests Now Wants Lawyer
Prosecuted for Same Thing,”
reason.com (Jan. 6, 2023),
https://reason.com/2023/01/06/newjersey-town-that-sued-a-woman-forpublic-records-requests-now-wantslawyer-prosecuted-for-same-thing/ ..................... 21
Comptroller General’s Report to the
Subcommittee on Government
Information and Individual Rights,
House Committee on Government
Operations, at ii
July 25, 1978 ........................................................ 22
Craig T. Merritt & David B. Lacy, Open
Government Guide: Virginia, RCFP
(Sept. 2021),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/virginia/#2discussion-of-each-exemption .............................. 13
viii
Douglas R. Pierce, Open Government
Guide: Tennessee, RCFP (last visited
July 18, 2025),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/tennessee/#iiexemptions-and-other-legal-limitations .............. 13
Duane A. Bosworth & Derek G. Green,
Open Government Guide: Oregon,
RCFP (July 2019),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/oregon/#1character-of-exemptions ....................................... 12
How open is your government?,
MuckRock,
https://www.muckrock.com/place/
(last visited July 16, 2025) .................................. 23
Margaret B. Kwoka, Saving the Freedom
of Information Act
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2021) ........................... 22
Mark R. Cara et al., Open Government
Guide: Florida, RCFP (July 31, 2021),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/florida/#2discussion-of-each-exemption .............................. 11
Maxwell E. Kautsch, Open Government
Guide: Kansas, RCFP (Jan. 19, 2023),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/kansas-2/#iiexemptions-and-other-legal-limitations .............. 11
ix
N.D. Const., art. XI, § 6 .......................................... 12
New Illustrated Webster’s Dictionary of
the English Language, “News” (1992) ................. 24
Sigmund D. Schutz & Harper
Weissburg, Open Government Guide:
Maine, RCFP (Oct. 2021),
https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/maine/#iiexemptions-and-other-legal-limitations .............. 12
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2022-36798,
2022 WL 17552725 (2022) ............................. 17, 18
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-127 (1976)...................... 17
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-405 (1983)...................... 15
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-600 (1992)...................... 15
Tex. Att’y Gen., Public Information Act
Handbook 76 & n.363 (2022) ............................... 17
Texas Public Records Guide, MuckRock
(last visited July 18, 2025),
https://www.muckrock.com/place/uni
ted-states-of-america/texas/ ............................... 10
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus MuckRock Foundation is a journalism and
government transparency non-profit organization.1
Since its founding in 2010, MuckRock has helped
thousands of journalists, professionals, and ordinary
citizens request, share, and understand public
records.
MuckRock’s work involves extensive use of the
public records laws of the 50 states, including the
Texas Public Information Act. State public records
laws are essential tools of public accountability.
Requests under them have led to the exposure of
public corruption, misuse of government funds, and
police misconduct, among many other matters of
public concern.
MuckRock operates as a hybrid newsroom and
journalism support organization. In addition to
working with thousands of newsrooms around the
country to help file more effective requests, the
organization has collaborated on important public
interest reporting based on the collection and analysis
of government records. For example, in 2023,
MuckRock and the Missouri Independent published
an investigation about the involvement of the City of
St. Louis in the race to build an atomic bomb during
World War II, and the government’s failure to protect
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus states that no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person
other than amicus or its counsel contributed money intended to
fund preparing or submitting this brief. Pursuant to Rule 37.2,
amicus affirms that all parties received timely notice of the
intent to file this brief.
2
the public from the environmental contamination that
followed. In March 2024, MuckRock won the First
Amendment Coalition’s Free Speech and Open
Government Award for its data journalism
collaborations.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fifth Circuit erroneously held that the
Respondents, law enforcement officials of the City of
Laredo, Texas, were qualifiedly immune from suit
based on their acts of charging and arresting a
journalist for requesting information from a police
officer. The decision rested in part on the court’s
determination that the information the journalist
requested was not subject to disclosure under the
Texas Public Information Act (“TPIA”), the state’s
analogue to the federal Freedom of Information Act.
As such, the court held, the journalist’s inquiry met
the elements of a criminal statute proscribing the
solicitation of nonpublic information from a public
servant.
Every day, thousands of citizens and corporations
submit informal inquiries or formal public records
requests to state and local entities for information
that government officials ultimately conclude is
nonpublic. That is not because requesters are
unlawfully seeking confidential information. Rather,
it is because state public records laws contain
hundreds of exemptions, some of them vaguely
defined or subject to complex balancing tests.
In this legal context, the act of merely requesting
information that is ultimately deemed nonpublic
cannot reasonably be considered a crime. Rarely can
3
an individual know in advance whether information
she requests is subject to a public records exemption.
Further, requiring journalists or other citizens always
to submit official information requests to authorized
government representatives on pain of criminal
sanction would lead to the unacceptably delayed
disclosure of timely information, and a less-informed
public.
Unless corrected, the Fifth Circuit’s decision will
encourage other government officials, both high and
petty, to harass, threaten, and arrest people for
requesting information that the government would
prefer not to release – even if the government may
lawfully release the information under state law. The
decision not only chills journalists from speaking to
unauthorized
government
sources
of
information – what the Fifth Circuit scorned as
“backchannel” communications – it inhibits the use of
state public records acts themselves, which are
essential tools of public accountability. The Court
should grant certiorari and reverse.
ARGUMENT
I. Respondents did not reasonably believe that
Petitioner’s act of requesting government
information could be a crime.
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, it was not
reasonable for Respondents to believe that
Petitioner’s conduct – asking a police officer to
confirm the identities of two people in her community
who had recently died – was a violation of Texas law.2
2 The officers were also on notice that their conduct violated
the First Amendment, as Petitioner has argued. Smith v. Daily
4
Villarreal v. City of Laredo, Texas, 94 F.4th 374, 385
(5th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (“Villarreal en banc I”). In its
first en banc opinion – in a part of the opinion that the
second en banc court refused to address, see Villarreal
v. City of Laredo, Texas, 134 F.4th 273, 275 (5th Cir.
2025) (en banc) (“Villarreal en banc II”) – the Fifth
Circuit construed the Texas criminal statute, and the
TPIA exemptions that it incorporates by reference, in
such a way as to hold that the law prohibits a citizen
from requesting information that is subject even to a
discretionary exemption to the TPIA. This leads to the
absurd result of imposing liability not only on those
who seek definitively “confidential” information, but
on those who request information that the
government may, but need not, make public. This
bears repeating: As interpreted, the Texas law
criminalizes asking for information that the requester
could not know would be made confidential until the
request was made and discretionarily rejected.
A. Texas law declares that people are
entitled to “complete information
about the affairs of government
and the official acts of public
officials and employees,” subject to
exemptions.
The TPIA, like the public records laws of many
other states, provides that records in the hands of the
government are presumptively public, subject to
Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1979) (“[I]f a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order.”).
5
narrow exemptions. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001. The
“policy” section of the statute articulates the reason
for this presumption:
Under the fundamental philosophy of the
American constitutional form of representative
government that adheres to the principle that
government is the servant and not the master
of the people, it is the policy of this state that
each person is entitled, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, at all times to
complete information about the affairs of
government and the official acts of public
officials and employees. The people, in
delegating authority, do not give their public
servants the right to decide what is good for the
people to know and what is not good for them to
know. The people insist on remaining informed
so that they may retain control over the
instruments they have created.
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.001(a). Consistent with this
policy, the TPIA provides that government officers
“shall promptly produce public information for
inspection, duplication, or both on application by any
person to the officer.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221(a).
Subchapter C of the TPIA sets categories of records
exempt from “required disclosure.” Tex. Gov’t Code
§§ 552.101-552.163. For the most part, however, these
exempt categories are not “prohibited from
disclosure,” in the words of the criminal statute under
which Petitioner was charged. Tex. Penal Code
§ 39.06; see infra § I.B. Rather, they are merely
exempt from required disclosure in response to a TPIA
6
request.3 For example, section 552.108 provides that
“[i]nformation held by a law enforcement agency or
prosecutor that deals with the detection,
investigation, or prosecution of crime is excepted”
from mandatory disclosure, but only “if . . . release of
the information would interfere with the detection,
investigation, or prosecution of crime,” or other
conditions are met. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.108(a). In
other words, a governmental agency does not have to
disclose such information, but it still may do so.
In fact, the statute expressly permits public bodies
to provide exempt information to the public. Section
552.007 provides: “This chapter does not prohibit a
governmental body . . . from voluntarily making part
or all of its information available to the public, unless
the disclosure is expressly prohibited by law or the
information is confidential under law.” Tex. Gov’t
Code § 552.007(a). Thus, a great deal of statutorily
exempt
information,
including
investigatory
information, may be voluntarily provided to the public
at the discretion of a given governmental body.
To put a fine point on it, the TPIA provides: “This
chapter shall be liberally construed in favor of
granting a request for information.” Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 552.007(b) (emphasis supplied). The Texas
Legislature “has clearly expressed its intent that
3 The exemptions state that they exclude certain information
“from the requirements of Section 552.021,” which provides that
“[p]ublic information” be “available to the public . . . .” Tex. Gov’t
Code § 552.021. In a few cases, they additionally provide that
certain information “is confidential,” and that a government body
may not permit a person to view or copy it. See, e.g. Tex. Gov’t
Code § 552.1085 (sensitive crime scene images deemed
confidential).
7
exceptions to disclosure be construed narrowly.”
Jackson v. State Off. of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d
290, 299 (Tex. 2011). Like the laws of other states and
the federal FOIA, under the TPIA, it is the
government’s responsibility – not the requester’s – to
prove that an exemption to required disclosure
applies. See Thomas v. Cornyn, 71 S.W.3d 473, 480-81
(Tex. App. 2002). In fact, unlike the public records
laws of other states, the TPIA provides that if a Texas
government body wishes to withhold a record under
an exemption listed in Subchapter C, it must seek and
obtain “a decision from the attorney general about
whether the information is within that exception if
there has not been a previous determination” as to the
records requested. Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(a).
B. The Fifth Circuit unreasonably
construed the Texas Misuse of
Official Information statute so as
to make it a crime to request
information that may be released
at the state’s discretion.
The Texas “Misuse of Official Information” statute
under which Petitioner was arrested states in
relevant part:
A person commits an offense if, with intent to
obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or
defraud another, he solicits or receives from a
public servant information that:
(1) the public servant has access to by means
of his office or employment; and
(2) has not been made public.
8
Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(c). The statute defines the
term “information that has not been made public” to
mean “any information to which the public does not
generally have access, and that is prohibited from
disclosure under Chapter 552, Government Code,”
meaning the TPIA. Id. (emphasis supplied).
Against the backdrop of Texas’s strongly expressed
public policy in favor of disclosure of government
information, it was unreasonable for the Respondents
and the Fifth Circuit to believe the statute
criminalizes any request (with intent to benefit) for
governmental information that ultimately turns out
to be nonpublic. The TPIA enacts a presumption of
disclosure, expresses the “clear[] . . . intent that
exceptions to disclosure be construed narrowly,”
Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 299, and requires a
declaration from the Texas Attorney General to apply
an exemption, Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301(a). In this
legal context, the little-used Misuse of Official
Information statute cannot reasonably be construed
to make it a crime to request information, merely
because the information happens to fall into one of the
narrow TPIA exceptions.
It is true that, according to two Texas intermediate
appellate courts, the word “prohibited” in the Misuse
of Official Information statute includes all of the
discretionary exemptions listed in Subchapter C of the
statute. State v. Newton, 179 S.W.3d 104, 109 (Tex.
App. 2005); see also State v. Ford, 179 S.W.3d 117, 123
(Tex. App. 2005) (companion case to Newton) (“[I]n
order to give meaning to the penal statute, we will
construe the phrase ‘prohibited from disclosure’ in
§ 39.06(d) to mean the set of exceptions to disclosure
9
listed in Subchapter C of [the TPIA].”);4 Tidwell v.
State, No. 08-11-00322-CR, 2013 WL 6405498, at *12
(Tex. App. Dec. 4, 2013) (agreeing with Newton).
However, neither of the appellate court decisions
explained why it made sense to conflate exceptions
from mandatory disclosure with information
“prohibited from disclosure.” The Fifth Circuit was not
required to adopt this construction of the statute in
determining whether there was probable cause to
arrest the Petitioner here. Villarreal en banc I, 94
F.4th at 387, 386 n.12; see West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940).
In any event, as construed by the Fifth Circuit, the
“Misuse of Official Information” statute is obviously
unconstitutional as applied here. If the law prohibits
“soliciting” from a public servant information that the
government may disclose, at a government official’s
discretion, then not only are “routine newspaper
reporting techniques” unlawful, but so are ordinary
requests by citizens for information that may lawfully
be disclosed. Smith, 443 U.S. at 103.
II. A person who requests information from a
state or local government usually has no way
of knowing whether the information is nonpublic ender the state’s public records law.
In immunizing the Petitioner’s arrest, the Fifth
Circuit erroneously assumed that a person such as
4 The Texas appellate court need not have decided how to
construe this language because the records at issue in Newton
were grand jury materials, judicial records not subject to the
TPIA, and thus the court held that an indictment for seeking
them was properly dismissed. Newton, 179 S.W.3d at 111.
10
Petitioner who requests information from a state or
local government would know in advance whether the
information is exempt from disclosure under the
state’s public records law. That assumption was
incorrect. That is shown by the sheer number of
exemptions to such laws, and the way those
exemptions are drafted and interpreted.
A. Records in the possession of state
entities are presumptively public,
unless one of a great number of
exemptions applies.
As noted supra § I.A, the TPIA provides that “each
person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law, at all times to complete information
about the affairs of government and the official acts of
public officials and employees.” Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 552.001(a). However, there are so many exemptions
“otherwise expressly provided by law” as to render
almost ineffective any effort by a layperson to follow
them. For example, MuckRock tracks requests by
state, including Texas. Requesters in Texas have a
success rate of 37.72%. Texas Public Records Guide,
MuckRock
(last
visited
July
18,
2025),
https://www.muckrock.com/place/united-states-ofamerica/texas/. Are the unsuccessful 62.28% of
requesters in Texas potentially subject to criminal
liability?
Texas is not unusual in the confusion sown by the
exemptions to its public records law. The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press (“RCFP”)
surveyed the public records laws of all 50 states, and
it found thousands upon thousands of such
exemptions. For example:
11
•
Florida has at least 1,100 statutory
exemptions to its public records law.5 See
generally Fla. Stat. §§ 119.01 et seq. (Florida
Public Records Law); Fla. Stat. §§ 286.011 et
seq. (Florida Sunshine Law).
•
Kansas has “a laundry list” of exemptions in
its Open Records Act, as well as more than 350
others spread throughout its statutes.6 See
generally K.S.A. §§ 45-215 et seq. (Kansas Open
Records Act); K.S.A. §§ 75-4317 et seq. (Kansas
Open Meetings Act).
•
Maine’s exemptions are “[t]oo numerous to
list○.○.○.○.”7 See generally 1 M.R.S.A. §§ 400 et
seq. (Maine Freedom of Access Act).
Mark R. Cara et al., Open Government Guide: Florida,
RCFP (July 31, 2021), https://www.rcfp.org/open-governmentguide/florida/#2-discussion-of-each-exemption; see also id.
(“The difficulty in identifying exemptions is partially because the
enactment of exemptions has occurred over many years, often as
part of larger bills. Also, because the term ‘exemption’ had no
statutory definition, no uniform language was used when
exemptions were created.”).
5
Maxwell E. Kautsch, Open Government Guide: Kansas,
RCFP (Jan. 19, 2023), https://www.rcfp.org/open-governmentguide/kansas-2/#ii-exemptions-and-other-legal-limitations; see
also
id.
at
https://www.rcfp.org/open-governmentguide/kansas-2/#b-other-statutory-exclusions
(“Any
other
statute which specifically restricts disclosure takes precedence
over the KORA. K.S.A. 45-221(a)(1). The Revisor of Statutes has
identified over 350 such other statutes.”).
6
7 Sigmund D. Schutz & Harper Weissburg, Open Government
Guide: Maine, RCFP (Oct. 2021), https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/maine/#ii-exemptions-and-other-legal-
12
•
North
Dakota has 166
enumerated
8
exemptions. See generally N.D. Const., art. XI,
§ 6; N.D.C.C. §§ 44-04-17 et seq. (North Dakota
open records statutes).
•
Ohio has more than 400 statutory exemptions
spread throughout its code.9 See generally Ohio
Rev. Code § 149.43 (Availability of public
records for inspection and copying).
•
Oregon has more than 500 exemptions.10 See
generally ORS § 192.314 (Right to inspect
public records).
•
Tennessee’s Open Records Act lists 48
categories of confidential records, with more
than 300 other exemptions scattered
throughout other statutes and court rules.11 See
limitations. (“There are many exemptions scattered throughout
Maine statutes.”) See e.g., 36 M.R.S.A. § 706-A (1).
Amy M. Oster, Open Government Guide: North Dakota
(Jan.
2024),
https://www.rcfp.org/open-governmentguide/north-dakota/#2-discussion-of-each-exemption.
(“The
North Dakota Constitution and North Dakota statutes provide
that all records are open unless there is a specific exception in
the law.”) Id.
8
9 Andrew Geronimo & David Marburger, Open Government
Guide: Ohio, RCFP (last visited July 18, 2025),
https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/ohio/#1character-of-exemptions. (“Absent an express statutory
exemption, records are open to the public.”) Id.
10 Duane A. Bosworth & Derek G. Green, Open Government
Guide: Oregon, RCFP (July 2019), https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/oregon/#1-character-of-exemptions.
Douglas R. Pierce, Open Government Guide: Tennessee,
RCFP (last visited July 18, 2025), https://www.rcfp.org/open11
13
generally T.C.A. §§ 10-7-501 et seq. (Tennessee
Public Records Act); T.C.A. §§ 8-44-101 et seq.
(Tennessee Sunshine Act).
•
Virginia has “136 exclusions for public records
located in seven different statutes organized
loosely by subject matter[,]” while the “Virginia
Code contains dozens of specific statutory
provisions operating outside of the Act that
make information confidential.”12 See generally
Va. Code Ann. §§ 2.2-3700 et seq. (Virginia
Freedom of Information Act).
California presents an interesting (and not
uncommon) example. In an effort “to assist members
of the public and state and local agencies in
identifying exemptions to the California Public
Records Act,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 7930.000(a), the
Legislature helpfully collected an alphabetical list of
the approximately 570 statutory exemptions spread
throughout California’s Code. See generally Cal. Gov’t
Code §§ 7930.100 et seq. But, this does not tell the
whole story, because CPRA includes a “catchall”
exemption under which any agency may withhold
“any record by demonstrating . . . that on the facts of
the particular case the public interest served by not
disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public
interest served by disclosure of the record.” Cal. Gov’t
Code § 7922.000. This “public interest” exemption
involves a “case-by-case balancing process” and has
government-guide/tennessee/#ii-exemptions-and-other-legallimitations.
12 Craig T. Merritt & David B. Lacy, Open Government Guide:
Virginia, RCFP (Sept. 2021), https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide/virginia/#2-discussion-of-each-exemption.
14
been used to withhold a variety of public records not
otherwise expressly exempt under the CPRA. ACLU
Found. v. Sup. Ct., 400 P.3d 432, 439 (Cal. 2017)
(listing examples).
B. Many
exemptions
require
judgment
calls
by
the
governmental entity holding the
records.
Quite apart from the sheer number of exemptions,
whether information falls within a particular
exemption is often unknowable in advance by a
requester. For example, one exemption to the TPIA
states that information is exempt if “release of the
information would interfere with the detection,
investigation, or prosecution of crime.” Tex. Gov’t
Code § 552.108(a). But, an exemption to that
exemption – i.e., information that may not be
withheld – is “information that is basic information
about an arrested person, an arrest, or a crime.” Tex.
Gov’t Code § 552.108(c). How would anyone
know – before
asking – whether
release
of
information about a crime would interfere with an
investigation? Such a determination could vary
depending on the case, on the status of the
investigation, and even on the police departments or
individual police officers involved. And, if otherwise
exempted, how would anyone know – before
asking – whether an exemption to the exemption
might apply because the information is “basic”?
Further, many exemptions under state public
records laws call for a balancing of interests. For
example, Section 552.101 of the TPIA exempts
information “if it is . . . considered to be confidential
15
by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial
decision.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.101.13 So, the statute
invokes common-law privacy doctrine, under which
information is confidential if it “contain[s] highly
intimate or embarrassing facts about a person’s
private affairs, such that its publication would be
highly objectionable to a person of ordinary
sensibilities.” Indus. Found. of the South v. Tex.
Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683 (Tex. 1976);
see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. ORD-405 (1983) (stating
that “information may be withheld only if it is highly
intimate or embarrassing, its release would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and the public
interest in its disclosure is minimal.”); Tex. Att’y Gen.
Op. ORD-600 (1992). If an unknown government
official must balance the public’s interest in the
newsworthiness of information against the privacy
interests of unknown others, the Constitution cannot
possibly permit post hoc criminal liability simply
because a member of the public guesses the outcome
of that balancing test wrong.
Indeed, Villarreal’s case is a paradigmatic example
of this uncertainty. For, contrary to the intimations of
the court below, see Villarreal en banc I, 94 F.4th at
382, 387-88, there is no TPIA exemption clearly
providing that a suicide or crash victim’s identity is
confidential while the investigation is ongoing or
13 Examples from other states abound. To take just one, the
Arizona Supreme Court in Carlson v. Pima Cty., 687 P.2d 1242,
1244 (Ariz. 1984), explained that Arizona’s statutory scheme is
simple, providing “a broad right of inspection to the public.” But,
documents can be withheld on the bases of (1) confidentiality;
(2) privacy; or (3) where “disclosure would be detrimental to the
best interests of the state,” based upon a balancing of interests.
Id.
16
before the notification of the victim’s next of kin. This
bears repeating: There is no express exemption for the
information Villarreal sought to confirm.
The court below stated in its first en banc iteration:
Texas law prevents the disclosure of certain
personal identifying information of victims in
accident reports and exempts disclosure of
information related to ongoing criminal
investigations. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE
§ 550.065(f)(2)(A)
(requiring
the
Texas
Department of Transportation to withhold or
redact “the first, middle, and last name of any
person listed in a collision report”); TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 552.108(a)(1)-(2) (exempting
from disclosure information dealing with the
investigation of a crime).
Villarreal en banc I, 94 F.4th at 387. These statements
are incorrect. Texas Transportation Code § 550.065
only applies to “a written report of a collision” and
tabulated collision reports under Section 201.806.
Tex. Transp. Code § 550.065(a). It does not apply to
the identity of a suicide or crash victim outside of such
reports. Villarreal did not seek a written report of a
collision; she only asked for information. And, no case
or other authority had hitherto applied Texas
Government Code § 552.108 to such a request.
So too, the court below claimed that “[t]he state
has a longstanding policy to protect individual privacy
in law enforcement situations that appear to involve
suicide or vehicular accidents,” Villarreal en banc I,
94 F.4th at 387, but the authorities it cited are
inapplicable or support Villarreal’s position. The
17
Texas Attorney General’s opinion from 1976 spoke
only of protecting the privacy of voluntary witnesses,
not the feelings of grieving families. Tex. Att’y Gen.
Op. ORD-127 at 7 (1976). The Texas Public
Information handbook cited by the court below was
issued after Villarreal’s arrest, and it says nothing
about the timing of access to a crash or suicide report.
Tex. Att’y Gen., Public Information Act Handbook 76
& n.363 (2022), https://perma.cc/6NJB-X5NM.
Finally, the more recent Texas Attorney General
opinion cited by the court below was also issued after
Villarreal’s arrest and, significantly, ordered the
information produced. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR202236798, 2022 WL 17552725 (2022).
In fact, the 2022 Texas Attorney General’s opinion
suggests that the identities of the decedents may well
have been subject to mandatory disclosure under the
TPIA. As the Texas Attorney General explained in
2022:
[T]he right to privacy is a personal right that
lapses at death and therefore may not be
asserted solely on behalf of a deceased
individual. However, the United States
Supreme Court has determined that surviving
family members can have a privacy interest in
information relating to their deceased
relatives. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin.
v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
Because the submitted information relates
to deceased individuals, the information may
not be withheld from disclosure based on the
deceased individuals' privacy interests. The
[Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sciences]
18
contends members of the deceased individuals’
families may have privacy interest in the
information. As of this date, we have not
received correspondence from any member of
any deceased individual's family asserting a
privacy interest in the information. Thus, we
have no basis to conclude any family member
has a privacy interest in the information at
issue. Therefore, the institute may not withhold
any portion of the information at issue under
section 552.101 of the Government Code in
conjunction with constitutional privacy and the
holding in Favish.
* * *
Because the submitted information pertains
solely to deceased persons, we find the institute
may not withhold any portion of the
information under section 552.101 in
conjunction with common-law privacy. The
institute must release the submitted
information.
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. OR2022-36798, 2022 WL
17552725, at *2 (2022) (certain citations omitted).
In short, the decedent at issue in the 2022 Texas
Attorney General’s opinion had – and could have – no
privacy interest, as he/she was deceased. And, since
no member of the decedent’s family had come forward,
there were no privacy interests identified such that
the information could be withheld. But, of course,
there was no way the requester could have known that
no family had come forward until she asked for the
information. So too, there is no way that Petitioner
19
could have known that the information she sought
was exempt until she asked – especially where she
had already obtained the decedents’ names from nongovernmental sources.14
It is also noteworthy that, as discussed supra § I.A,
Texas law does not entrust the exemption
determination to just any government official. In
order to invoke one of the exemptions and thereby
withhold information, a governmental entity must
obtain express permission from the state Attorney
General, unless the specific records requested were
previously deemed exempt by the Attorney General.
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.301. In other words,
government officials are not supposed to invoke an
exemption on their own – the Texas Attorney General
must look over their shoulders and approve the
invocation of the exemption. That is because the
legislature did not believe that just any government
entity would – or even could – apply the exemptions
correctly. And yet, according to the court below, it was
reasonable to criminally charge a member of the
public for failing to correctly guess whether
information was subject to a TIPA exemption, and
Imagine two situations based upon the events of the 2022
Texas Attorney General’s opinion: In one – as actually happened
– no member of the decedent’s family comes forward to ask for
confidentiality. In the other, a member of the decedent’s family
has asked the state to keep the decedent’s name confidential.
There is no way for a member of the press to know about that
request. Is that member of the press subject to criminal liability
in the second situation?
14
The answer to the above question must be “no.” And yet, that
is the exact situation faced by Petitioner – she had no way of
knowing whether the information requested would be considered
confidential until that post hoc decision was made by the state.
20
whether the Texas Attorney General would so
determine.
III. The Texas criminal statute is not limited
to the use of “backchannel” sources.
The Fifth Circuit erroneously assumed that
Petitioner would not have run afoul of the Misuse of
Official Information statute (as it construed that
statute) but for the fact that she contacted “an illicit
backchannel” source – to wit, Officer Goodman – to
confirm the identities of the decedents. Villarreal en
banc I, 94 F.4th at 389. The court suggests that
Petitioner should have sought to confirm the
identities of the decedents through a formal TPIA
request, or by asking the City of Laredo’s “public
information officer,” who is “entrusted with reporting
to the press and public.” Id. at 387, 389.
However, under the statute as the Fifth Circuit
interpreted it, Petitioner could have been arrested for
doing just that. The statute does not limit liability to
those who use “backchannel” sources, nor does it
provide immunity for soliciting information from
authorized spokespeople. Rather, it prohibits any
person from “solicit[ing]” (i.e., asking for or trying to
obtain) information that is nonpublic under the TPIA
from any “public servant” with “intent to obtain a
benefit.” Tex. Penal Code § 39.06(c). Thus, at least
under the Fifth Circuit’s construction of the statute, if
Petitioner had asked the public information officer to
confirm the identities of the decedents on the days
they died, Petitioner would have been no less guilty of
“soliciting” nonpublic information from a “public
servant” under the terms of the statute. And, if
Petitioner had filed a TPIA request for public records
21
sufficient to show the decedents’ identities, that too
could have been an illegal request, if the information
were later deemed in retrospect to be exempt.
It cannot constitutionally be a crime to request
public information from the government, whether
through public records requests, questions directed to
government officials, or otherwise. If the Fifth
Circuit’s ruling to the contrary is allowed to stand,
states would be left free to pass similar statutes and
deploy them against those who request information
the government would rather not produce, inhibiting
public accountability.
This is not theoretical. One town in New Jersey
recently threatened to bring criminal charges against
a lawyer who complained that the town had ignored
his public records request.15 The same town had
previously sued an 82-year-old woman who sought
records, including items as basic as travel
expenditures and copies of township resolutions.16 If
allowed to stand, the Fifth Circuit’s ruling could
greenlight such intimidation at a much broader scale.
Such intimidation would not be directed just at
journalists. While data at the state level is difficult to
ascertain, a 1978 study from the Government
Accountability Office found 58% of analyzed FOIA
15 C.J. Ciaramella, “New Jersey Town That Sued a Woman
for Public Records Requests Now Wants Lawyer Prosecuted for
Same
Thing,”
reason.com
(Jan.
6,
2023),
https://reason.com/2023/01/06/new-jersey-town-that-sued-awoman-for-public-records-requests-now-wants-lawyerprosecuted-for-same-thing/.
16 Id.
22
requests were commercial in nature.17 A more recent
analysis by Professor Margaret Kwoka found that for
some agencies, as many of 95.6% of FOIA requests
were commercial.18 Requesting information via state
and federal laws is critical to businesses that, for
example, wish to understand why new medicines were
denied approval, or why they lost competitive bids for
government contracts. All requesters of government
information must be protected from retaliation and
harassment like that suffered by Petitioner if the
public records laws are to have their intended effect.
IV.Informal requests for information like
Petitioner’s must be protected, because
formal procedures under state public
records laws are neither a timely nor
adequate means to inform the public.
The court below suggested that Petitioner should
have “take[n] time to go through local or TPIA
channels” to confirm the identities of the decedents,
even if doing so “sacrifice[d] the status of getting a
scoop.” Villareal en banc I, 94 F.4th at 388. However,
even assuming that a formal TPIA request would not
have rendered Petitioner liable under the Misuse of
Official Information Statute, that vehicle is too slow
to satisfy the public’s interest in reporting on the news
when it is fresh.
Comptroller General’s Report to the Subcommittee on
Government Information and Individual Rights, House
Committee on Government Operations, July 25, 1978, at ii.
17
18 Margaret B. Kwoka, Saving the Freedom of Information
Act (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2021).
23
It is true that Texas law mandates that
information requested under the TPIA be provided
“promptly,” meaning “as soon as possible under the
circumstances,” and sets 10 business days as a
presumptive standard of reasonableness. Tex. Gov’t
Code § 552.221(a). In reality, though, the state’s
compliance with the timeliness requirements of the
TPIA does not come close to these standards.
MuckRock maintains a survey of compliance times
under all the state records laws, and has found that in
Texas, the average wait time is 73 days:
How open is your government?, MuckRock,
https://www.muckrock.com/place/ (last visited July
16, 2025). So, had Petitioner gone through official
channels, she could have expected to wait at least ten
weeks for the production of records confirming the
identities of the decedents – information she already
had – assuming the information was released at all.
24
The value of news is that it is new; indeed, that is
essential to its definition. New Illustrated Webster’s
Dictionary of the English Language, “News” (1992) (“1
Fresh information concerning something that has
recently taken place. 2 A newspaper. 3 Anything new
or strange. . . . [Trans. of OF noveles <LL nova new
(things)]”). Or, as this Court put it in International
News Service v. Associated Press:
The peculiar value of news is in the spreading
of it while it is fresh; and it is evident that a
valuable property interest in the news, as news,
cannot be maintained by keeping it secret.
248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918);19 see also, e.g., Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 269 (1941) (recognizing that
a ban on reporting news “just at the time [the]
audience would be most receptive” would be
effectively equivalent to “a deliberate statutory
scheme of censorship”); Nebraska Press Ass’n v.
Stuart, 423 U.S. 1327, 1329 (1975) (Blackmun, Circuit
Justice) (“[E]ach passing day may constitute a
separate and cognizable infringement of the First
Amendment. The suppressed information grows
older. Other events crowd upon it. To this extent, any
First Amendment infringement that occurs with each
passing day is irreparable.”); Grove Fresh
Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893,
897 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The newsworthiness of a
particular story is often fleeting. To delay or postpone
disclosure undermines the benefit of public scrutiny
19 INS was abrogated on other grounds by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25
and may have the
suppression.”).
same
result
as complete
Accordingly, informal queries to police officers,
politicians and other governmental officials are of
profound importance to reporting the news when it is
still relevant. Cf. Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet,
947 F.3d 581, 594 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[A] necessary
corollary of the right to access is a right to timely
access. CNS’s reporting on complaints must be timely
to be newsworthy and to allow for ample and
meaningful public discussion regarding the
functioning of our nation’s court systems.”). Neither
the citizenry, nor the news media that represents it,
should be expected to be mere passive conduits for
whatever information government publicity offices
choose to provide, whenever they choose to provide it.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision to the contrary should be
reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amicus respectfully
asks the Court to grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari.
26
August 4, 2025
Respectfully Submitted,
AARON S. JACOBS
Counsel of Record
JEFFREY PYLE
Prince Lobel Tye LLP
One International Place,
Suite 3700
Boston, MA 02110
(617) 456-8000
ajacobs@princelobel.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.