Amicus Curiae Brief — Wes Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al., Appellants v. Evan Milligan, et al.

Nos. 25-243, 25-273, 25-274

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

WES ALLEN, SEC’Y OF STATE, ET AL., Petitioners,

v.

MARCUS CASTER, ET AL., Respondents.

WES ALLEN, SEC’Y OF STATE, ET AL., Appellants,

v.

BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL., Appellees.

WES ALLEN, SEC’Y OF STATE, ET AL., Appellants,

v.

EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL., Appellees.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH

CIRCUIT AND ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

BRIEF FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

AND 15 OTHER STATES AS AMICI CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Attorney General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1885 N. Third St.

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 506-3746

AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov

J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ZACHARY FAIRCLOTH

Principal Deputy

Solicitor General

MORGAN BRUNGARD

Deputy Solicitor General

CAITLIN HUETTEMANN

ELIZABETH BROWN

Assistant Solicitors General

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of Louisiana

(additional counsel listed after signature page)

October 3, 2025

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE................................. 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

THE ARGUMENT ....................................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 4

I.

RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS ARE

ANTITHETICAL TO EQUAL JUSTICE

UNDER LAW. ....................................................... 4

II.

SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

PROVIDES NO SHIELD FOR RACE-BASED

REDISTRICTING.................................................... 7

III.

AN ENDURING REJECTION OF RACE-BASED

REDISTRICTING REQUIRES ZERO TOLERANCE

FOR ANY CONSIDERATION OF RACE. .................. 14

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 15

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page(s)

Abbott v. Perez,

585 U.S. 579 (2018) .................................. 1, 2, 6, 13

Alexander v. S.C. NAACP,

602 U.S. 1 (2024) .................................................... 2

Allen v. Milligan,

599 U.S. 1 (2023) .................................. 9, 10, 14, 15

Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of

Elections,

580 U.S. 178 (2017) .............................................. 13

Brown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483 (1954) ................................................ 4

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,

488 U.S. 469 (1989) ................................................ 5

Flowers v. Mississippi,

588 U.S. 284 (2019) ............................................... 5

In re Landry,

83 F.4th 300 (5th Cir. 2023) .................................. 6

Louisiana v. Callais,

No. 24-109 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2025)....................... 1, 11

LULAC v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399 (2006) ................................................ 3

iii

Merrill v. Milligan,

142 S. Ct. 879 (2022) ............................................ 13

Miller v. Johnson,

515 U.S. 900 (1995) .................................... 2, 12, 15

Nairne v. Ardoin,

715 F. Supp. 3d 808 (M.D. La. 2024) ............. 11, 14

Plessy v. Ferguson,

163 U.S. 537 (1896) ................................................ 7

Robinson v. Ardoin,

605 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. La. 2022) ......... 6, 11, 14

Rucho v. Common Cause,

588 U.S. 684 (2019) ........................................ 10, 13

Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II),

517 U.S. 899 (1996) .............................................. 13

Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I),

509 U.S. 630 (1993) ................................ 3, 4, 5, 6, 9

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013) ................................................ 1

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v.

President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.

(SFFA),

600 U.S. 181 (2023)

............................................... 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,

10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15

iv

Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v.

Thomas,

588 U.S. 504 (2019) .............................................. 12

Thornburg v. Gingles,

478 U.S. 30 (1986) ............................................ 9, 15

Other Authorities

Hannah Hartig et al., 2.

Voting patterns in the 2024 election,

Pew Res. Ctr. (June 26, 2025),

tinyurl.com/2umdx5wb .......................................... 9

Supp. Br. for Appellants on Reargument

in Nos. 1, 2, and 4, and for Respondents in No. 10, in Brown v. Bd. of

Educ., O.T. 1953 ..................................................... 7

Supp. Br. for Appellant in Louisiana v.

Callais, No. 24-109 (U.S. Aug. 27,

2025) ....................................................................... 1

Br. of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in

Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109

(U.S. Sept. 24, 2025)............................................... 1

Sup. Ct. R. 37.2 ............................................................ 1

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 .................................... 4, 7

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The States of Louisiana, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, South Carolina, Tennessee,

Texas, and West Virginia respectfully submit this

brief as amici curiae in support of Petitioners.1

Like the State of Alabama, the amici States

“want[ ] out of this abhorrent system of racial discrimination.” Supp. Br. for Appellant in Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109, at 47 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2025). “[R]acebased state action” should be forbidden “except in the

most extraordinary case.” Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.

(SFFA), 600 U.S. 181, 208 (2023). In 1965, the Nation

faced an “extraordinary problem.” Shelby County v.

Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534 (2013). But “[t]hanks in part

to” the Voting Rights Act, “2025 is not 1965.” Br. of

Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109 at 1 (U.S. Sept. 24, 2025) (citing Nw.

Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S.

193, 202 (2009)).

Today, however, Section 2’s race-based command

that States intentionally create majority-minority districts—often at the behest of a federal judge—violates

the Constitution. “Redistricting is never easy.” Abbott

v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 585 (2018). But Section 2’s mandate makes it virtually impossible for the States. Just

ask Washington, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.2, on September 23, 2025, counsel for

amicus State of Louisiana provided the parties’ counsel with notice of its intention to file this brief.

2

and Georgia, all of which have lost their maps to Section 2 in this redistricting cycle alone. And it has “no

end … in sight.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 213.

When a State is compelled to sort its people by race

under the thumb of a federal court, the State loses, its

citizens lose, the judiciary loses, and the Nation’s

founding principles lose force. It is time to end this

perpetual “lose-lose situation.” Alexander v. S.C.

NAACP, 602 U.S. 1, 65 (2024) (Thomas, J., concurring). For the sake of the States, our citizens, the

courts, and this Nation, this Court should bring it to

an end now.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This Court has dismantled government discrimination on the basis of race in every corner of American

life over the last 75 years. See SFFA, 600 U.S. at 204–

05. Yet in 2025, Section 2 of the VRA still “insists that

districts be created precisely because of race.” Abbott,

585 U.S. at 586. That government-mandated racial

discrimination cannot be squared with the core of the

Equal Protection Clause: that government “may never

use race as a stereotype or negative.” SFFA, 600 U.S.

at 213.

Race-based redistricting is antithetical to “the Constitution’s pledge of racial equality.” Id. at 205. It rests

on “the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, ‘think

alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.’ ” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995). It uses race as a nega-

3

tive in this zero-sum context by advantaging some people at the expense of others based on their skin color.

See SFFA, 600 U.S. at 212. And if that “were not

enough,” race-based redistricting under Section 2 also

“lack[s] a ‘logical end point.’ ” Id. at 221.

Respectfully, it is “remarkably wrong” for courts—

or States coerced by courts—to be “pick[ing] winners

and losers based on the color of their skin.” Id. at 229–

30. Racial classifications “are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded

upon the doctrine of equality.” Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I),

509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (quoting Hirabayashi v.

United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). And the use of

race in race-based admissions programs is odious

“[j]ust like” the “drawing [of] district lines” to create

majority-minority districts under Section 2. SFFA,

600 U.S at 361 n.34 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

“Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it.” Id. at 206 (maj. op.). Now is the time

to bring this “sordid business” to an end. LULAC v.

Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and

dissenting in part). The Court should grant certiorari

and make plain that the Constitution does not tolerate

government-mandated line drawing on the basis of

race. That is the only way to become “a society that is

no longer fixated on race.” Id. at 434 (maj. op.).

4

ARGUMENT

I. RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS ARE ANTITHETICAL TO

EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW.

The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o

State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1. “Its central purpose is to prevent

States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642.

“Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals

on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition” and are therefore “presumptively invalid[.]” Id.

at 642–43 (quoting Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v.

Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).

For nearly 75 years, this Court has expelled racebased government action from American life on that

presumption. After Brown v. Board of Education, 347

U.S. 483 (1954), the Court invalidated racial segregation in schools, juries, neighborhoods, parks, buses,

and beyond—holding fast to “the Constitution’s pledge

of racial equality.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 204–05. Most recently in SFFA, the Court applied the same rule to

elite

universities’

race-conscious

admissions:

“ ‘[O]utright racial balancing’ is ‘patently unconstitutional,’ ” id. at 223 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at

Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 311 (2013)), so admissions programs that “effectively assure[d] that race will always

be relevant” could not stand, id. at 224 (quoting City

of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495

(1989) (plurality op.)).

In our Nation, “the individual is important, not his

race, his creed, or his color.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 648

5

(quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964)

(Douglas, J., dissenting)). Government classifications

by race “demean[ ] the dignity and worth of a person to

be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own

merit and essential qualities.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 220

(quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)).

They also “reinforce the belief ... that individuals

should be judged by the color of their skin,” Shaw I,

509 U.S. at 657, and thus provoke “a politics of racial

hostility,” Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality op.). Such

stereotyping inflicts “continued hurt and injury” on individuals and society alike “contrary as it is to the ‘core

purpose’ of the Equal Protection Clause[.]” SFFA, 600

U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). Put otherwise, government-mandated racial classifications are irreconcilable with equal justice under law.

This Court has therefore rightly described racial

classifications as “odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”

Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 643 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320

U.S. at 100). Uniquely odious—even “danger[ous]”—

are “[r]acial classifications with respect to voting[.]”

Id. at 657. When governments draw districts by race,

it reinforces “impermissible racial stereotypes” by perpetuating “the assumption that members of the same

racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—

think alike[.]” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 220 (quoting Schuette

v. BAMN, 572 U.S. 291, 308 (2014) (plurality op.)).

Mandating such racial classifications, as the Court

has warned, “may balkanize us into competing racial

factions” and “threaten[s] to carry us further from the

goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth

6

Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 657.

The harms to States are equally grave. A legislature compelled to sort its citizens based on “the color

of their skin” “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to

political apartheid.” Id. at 647. But if the State refuses

to sort its citizens by race, it is accused of bigoted “racial voter suppression.” See, e.g., Fifth Circuit Sides

with Black Louisianans, Strikes Down Racially Discriminatory State Map, Legal Defense Fund (Aug. 14,

2025), tinyurl.com/4ja89emh. Either way, States face

endless litigation, astronomical expense, and erosion

of their sovereign responsibility to draw districts. See

Abbott, 585 U.S. at 608, 611.

Race-based redistricting also corrodes the federal

judiciary into “pick[ing] winners and losers based on

the color of their skin.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 229. Louisiana’s recent experience illustrates the problem: The

Middle District declared that the State must create an

additional majority-Black district. Robinson v. Ardoin,

605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 766 (M.D. La. 2022). Then, only

extraordinary mandamus relief from the Fifth Circuit

prevented the court from imposing its own map within

five legislative days when the legislature did not comply. In re Landry, 83 F.4th 300, 304 (5th Cir. 2023).

Through it all, the court’s message was clear: By not

creating a second majority-Black district, Louisiana

had failed to “pick[ ] the right race[ ] to benefit,” so the

Middle District would pick instead. Cf. SFFA, 600 U.S.

at 229. That “remarkably wrong” exercise of the judicial power, id. at 230, now repeats across the country

each redistricting cycle—ensuring that federal judges

7

are the arbiters of who wins and who loses based on

skin color.

Race-based redistricting also strikes at the heart of

the Nation’s founding commitments. Among the

truths we declared self-evident was that “all men are

created equal.” Declaration of Independence ¶ 2. The

Fourteenth Amendment ensured that “no State shall

… deny to any person … the equal protection of the

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. And etched in marble on the Supreme Court building: “Equal Justice Under Law.” Those promises are hollow so long as government compels racial discrimination by the States.

The invidious classifications underlying race-based

redistricting present the last significant battle in defense of our “color blind” Constitution. Supp. Br. for

Appellants on Reargument in Nos. 1, 2, and 4, and for

Respondents in No. 10, in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., O.T.

1953, p. 65; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559

(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see SFFA, 600 U.S. at

207 (identifying the only two narrow circumstances

“permit[ting] resort to race-based government action”). But this battle is easy. For “[e]liminating racial

discrimination means eliminating all of it”—that includes race-based redistricting. SFFA, 600 U.S. at

206.

II. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT PROVIDES

NO SHIELD FOR RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING.

Because racial classifications are presumptively

invalid, the only question is whether Section 2 of the

VRA displaces that presumption. It does not. This

Court has assumed—but never decided—that race-

8

based redistricting in the name of Section 2 is constitutional. It is not, for two independent reasons: (A) it

violates fundamental equal-protection principles, and

(B) it fails strict scrutiny.

A. Race-based redistricting is unconstitutional for

the same reasons that doomed the race-conscious admissions programs in SFFA. It rests on stereotypes, it

employs race as a negative, and it lacks any logical

endpoint. 600 U.S. at 231; see id. at 314 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring). That is unsurprising—because the use

of race in admissions was “[j]ust like drawing district

lines” to create majority-minority districts under Section 2. Id. at 361 n.34 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

Race-based redistricting rests on categorically unconstitutional stereotypes. The first of “the twin commands of the Equal Protection Clause” is that government “may never use race as a stereotype.” Id. at 213,

218 (maj. op.). “[T]his Court has rejected the assumption that members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the

community in which they live—think alike[.]” Id. at

220 (quoting Schuette, 572 U.S. at 308) (quotation

marks omitted). To that end, the Court has repudiated

“the notion that government actors may intentionally

allocate preference to those ‘who may have little in

common with one another but the color of their skin.’ ”

Id. (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647). Those stereotypes proved fatal in SFFA. E.g., id. at 220 (Harvard

9

“rest[ed] on the pernicious stereotype that ‘a black student can usually bring something that a white person

cannot offer.’ ” (citation omitted)). So too here.

Race-based redistricting’s stereotypes are more

pernicious. Baked into any analysis under Thornburg

v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), is the offensive (and

wrong) assumption “that members of the same racial

group—regardless of their age, education, economic

status, or the community in which they live—think

alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.” Shaw I, 509 U.S.

at 647; but see Hannah Hartig et al., 2. Voting patterns

in the 2024 election, Pew Res. Ctr. (June 26, 2025), tinyurl.com/2umdx5wb. More fundamentally, “[t]he

whole point” is to draw districts “with an express target in mind”: That minority voters must form a 50%+

majority and non-minority voters form a less-than50% minority. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. 1, 33 (2023).

It pays zero regard for which individuals meet that racial quota—just “race for race’s sake.” SFFA, 600 U.S.

at 220. That cannot be squared with “[t]he core guarantee of equal protection[.]” Flowers v. Mississippi,

588 U.S. 284, 299 (2019). Race-based redistricting is

directly contrary to the central “command[ ] of the

Equal Protection Clause”—that the government “may

never use race as a stereotype.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 213,

218.

Race-based redistricting also violates the second

twin command of equal protection: that “government

10

may never use race as a … negative.” Id. at 213. Universities in SFFA resisted that charge by claiming

they simply preferred some races, without punishment

to others. Id. at 218. But the Court found that “hard to

take seriously”: “How else but ‘negative’ can race be

described if, in its absence, members of some racial

groups would be admitted in greater numbers than

they otherwise would have been?” Id. at 218–19.

The same question lingers for race-based redistricting. Redistricting is “zero-sum,” id. at 219, for under one-person-one-vote, there are a finite number of

citizens who may be assigned to any given district, see

Allen, 599 U.S. at 99 (Alito, J., dissenting); Rucho v.

Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684, 706 (2019) (creating a

safe district for one party “comes at the expense ... of

individuals in [that district who are members of] the

opposing party”). In other words, “[a] benefit provided

to some [voters] but not to others necessarily advantages the former group at the expense of the latter.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at 218–19. Race-based redistricting is thus the very definition of race as a negative.

“If all this were not enough,” race-based redistricting is unlawful because it “lack[s] a ‘logical end point.’ ”

Id. at 221 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,

342 (2003)). “[A] ‘deviation from the norm of equal

treatment of all racial and ethnic groups’ must be ‘a

temporary matter’—or stated otherwise, must be ‘limited in time.’ ” Id. at 311 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)

11

(quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510 (plurality op.)). Under no circumstance may “racial classifications … continue indefinitely.” Id. at 314.

There can be no dispute that Section 2’s race-based

redistricting mandate is neither “ ‘a temporary matter’ ” nor “ ‘limited in time.’ ” Id. at 311 (quoting Croson,

488 U.S. at 510). That mandate has existed for more

than four decades—and there is no end in sight. In the

current cycle alone, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,

Georgia, and Washington have lost cases requiring

new majority-minority districts. See Supp. Br. for Appellant in Louisiana v. Callais, No. 24-109, at 26–27

(U.S. Aug. 27, 2025) (collecting citations). And the

length courts have taken to strike down those maps

are as strained as the “subliminal message” of a registrar’s office sharing a floor with a sheriff ’s office,

Nairne v. Ardoin, 715 F. Supp. 3d 808, 874 n.461 (M.D.

La. 2024)—or worse, the abject falsehood that “David

Duke … won three statewide elections” in Louisiana.

Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 849. It seems the States

can never shed “the burdens of history,” SFFA, 600

U.S. at 404 (Jackson, J., dissenting), as plaintiffs continue a boundless crusade to find racism in the name

of race-based redistricting, “ ‘effectively assur[ing] that

race will always be relevant ... and that the ultimate

goal of eliminating’ race as a criterion ‘will never be

achieved.’ ” Id. at 224 (maj. op.) (quoting Croson, 488

U.S. at 495). What may have begun as a temporary

race-based remediation has become immortal. That,

our Constitution does not permit.

12

B. Race-based redistricting under Section 2 also

fails strict scrutiny. “ ‘[R]acial classifications are

simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact

connection between justification and classification.’ ”

SFFA, 600 U.S. at 217 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539

U.S. 244, 270 (2003)). To that end, the Court has required “an exceedingly persuasive justification that is

measurable and concrete enough to permit judicial review.” Id. Race-based redistricting fails that test for at

least four independent reasons.

First, Section 2 cannot shield otherwise unconstitutional state action. This Court has worried that

“command[ing] that States engage in presumptively

unconstitutional race-based districting” brings the

VRA “into tension with the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Miller, 515 U.S. at 927 (citation omitted). That worry

is well founded: Viewing Congress’ authority under

the subsequently enacted Fifteenth Amendment “as

one part of a unified constitutional scheme,” Tenn.

Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 588 U.S.

504, 519–20 (2019), it blinks reality to think that Congress could cite the Fifteenth Amendment in “demand[ing] the very racial stereotyping the Fourteenth

Amendment forbids,” Miller, 515 U.S. at 928.

Second, Section 2 compliance is unlike the two narrow compelling interests that permit race-based government action. This Court has allowed race-based action only in two contexts: (1) “remediating specific,

identified instances of past discrimination”; and

(2) “avoiding imminent and serious risks to human

13

safety in prisons, such as a race riot.” SFFA, 600 U.S.

at 207. Both turn on specific harm and permit only a

corresponding narrow, temporary remedy. But racebased redistricting pursuant to Section 2 does neither.

In its heartland vote-dilution application, it depends

only on “[a] generalized assertion of past discrimination,” Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 909

(1996), which cannot be “the basis for [the] rigid racial

preferences” inherent in race-based redistricting,

SFFA, 600 U.S. at 226.

Third, Section 2 is too amorphous to be judicially

reviewable. A classification “based on [ ] race ‘requires

more than ... an amorphous end to justify it.’ ” Id. at

214 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle

Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007)). This Court

has described the States’ predicament well: “Since the

Equal Protection Clause restricts consideration of race

and the VRA demands consideration of race, a legislature attempting to produce a lawful districting plan is

vulnerable to competing hazards of liability.” Abbott,

585 U.S. at 587 (quotation marks and citation omitted). All the while, the Court “has struggled without

success over the past several decades to discern judicially manageable standards for deciding [these]

claims.” Rucho, 588 U.S. at 691. States are left to litigate on standards “notoriously unclear and confusing,” Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 (2022)

(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in grant of applications for

stays), suffocating whatever “breathing room” state

legislatures once enjoyed, Bethune-Hill v. Va. State

14

Bd. of Elections, 580 U.S. 178, 196 (2017). Four decades of uncertainty is enough to know that neither

race-based redistricting under Section 2 nor any injury it purports to remedy “is measurable and concrete

enough to permit judicial review.” SFFA, 600 U.S. at

217.

Finally, race-based redistricting under Section 2

cannot be a compelling interest because it exceeds

Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment authority. Congress’s enforcement power is “remedial, rather than

substantive.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But race-based redistricting flunks any congruence-and-proportionality review because, as Justice Thomas has explained, Congress never bothered

to “ ‘identif[y] a history and pattern’ of actual constitutional violations that, for some reason, required extraordinary prophylactic remedies[.]” Id. at 82 (alteration added).

III. AN ENDURING REJECTION OF RACE-BASED REDISTRICTING REQUIRES ZERO TOLERANCE FOR

ANY CONSIDERATION OF RACE.

Race-based redistricting will not truly be at its end

unless this Court forecloses every avenue for race to

creep back in. Without such clarity, the next cycle will

look like the last four—experts insisting that race

“was a consideration” but “did not predominate,” Allen, 599 U.S. at 31; courts crediting that testimony as

“sincere,” Robinson, 605 F. Supp. 3d at 838, and “credible,” Nairne, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 858; and States once

again compelled to redistrict on the basis of race.

15

This Court’s precedent bar that result. If it was fatal that “race [was] determinative for at least some—

if not many—of the [admitted] students” at Harvard,

SFFA, 600 U.S. at 219, it is fatal where experts consider just a smidge of race, however sincerely. That accords with this Court’s command that government action “may never use race as a stereotype or negative.”

Id. at 213 (emphasis added). If the Court even need go

further, it should amend or overrule its racial-predominance precedents—Miller and its progeny—to make

clear that if “race in the creation of a new district … is

‘non-negotiable[,]’ … then race is given a predominant

role.” Allen, 599 U.S. at 102 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). And insofar as Gingles cannot be conducted constitutionally at all, but see id. at 64–65

(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 99–100 (Alito, J., dissenting), it too must be overruled.

The States desperately need clarity that has been

absent from this Court’s redistricting cases. Without

that clarity, nothing will change in the endless waste

of resources and millions of dollars that the States and

the courts face after every redistricting cycle.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for writ of certiorari should be

granted.

16

Respectfully submitted,

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Attorney General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

1885 N. Third St.

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 506-3746

AguinagaB@ag.louisiana.gov

J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

ZACHARY FAIRCLOTH

Principal Deputy

Solicitor General

MORGAN BRUNGARD

Deputy Solicitor General

CAITLIN HUETTEMANN

ELIZABETH BROWN

Assistant Solicitors General

Counsel for Amicus Curiae State of Louisiana

(additional counsel listed below)

October 3, 2025

17

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEPHEN J. COX

Attorney General

State of Alaska

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

CATHERINE HANAWAY

Attorney General

State of Missouri

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General

State of Florida

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

RAÚL R. LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

State of Tennessee

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

State of Indiana

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General

State of Texas

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

JOHN B. MCCUSKEY

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

KRIS W. KOBACH

Attorney General

State of Kansas