Petition for Writ of Certiorari — United States, ex rel. Mark J. O'Connor, et al., Petitioners v. USCC Wireless Investment, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 5, 2025

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No. 25-___

In the Supreme Court of the United States

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL.

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

Petitioners,

v.

USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC.; TELEPHONE AND

DATA SYSTEMS, INC.; KING STREET WIRELESS, LP;

ALLISON CRYOR DINARDO; UNITED STATES CELLULAR

CORPORATION; KING STREET WIRELESS, INC.; CARROLL

WIRELESS, LP; CARROLL PCS, INC.; BARAT WIRELESS,

LP; BARAT WIRELESS, INC.

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Sara M. Lord

Daniel Woofter

Counsel of Record

ARNALL GOLDEN

R

USSELL

& WOOFTER LLC

GREGORY, LLP

1701 Pennsylvania

2100 Pennsylvania

Avenue NW, Suite 350S Avenue NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20006

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 240-8433

(202) 677-4054

dw@russellwoofter.com

sara.lord@agg.com

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the D.C. Circuit erred by requiring

plaintiffs to anticipate and negate in their complaint

a False Claims Act affirmative defense, in direct

conflict with Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145

S. Ct. 1020 (2025), and basic principles of civil

procedure.

2.

Whether a False Claims Act plaintiff’s

independent knowledge that prompts a multi-year

fraud investigation “materially adds” to what is

publicly disclosed under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B), or

whether it must be so substantial it is likely to prompt

the government to intervene and prosecute the fraud,

as the D.C. Circuit held, deepening a conflict among

the federal courts of appeals.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding are as follows:

1. Petitioners Mark J. O’Connor and Sara F.

Leibman, who were the plaintiffs in the District Court

and appellants in the Court of Appeals.

2. Respondents are USCC Wireless Investment,

Inc.; Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.; King Street

Wireless, LP; Allison Cryor DiNardo, United States

Cellular Corporation; King Street Wireless, Inc.;

Carroll Wireless, LP; Carroll PCS, Inc.; Barat

Wireless, LP; and Barat Wireless, Inc., who were the

defendants in the District Court and appellees in the

Court of Appeals.

iii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

This case was designated as a related proceeding

in the Court of Appeals to the following case:

United States ex rel. O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular

Corp., No. 20-cv-2070 (D.D.C.), judgment entered

March 9, 2023; No. 23-7041 (D.C. Cir.), pending (oral

argument held April 1, 2024).

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS ..................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vii

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 1

OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1

JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1

RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY

PROVISIONS ......................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 4

I.

Legal Background ............................................... 4

A. The False Claims Act ..................................... 4

B. FCC Wireless Spectrum Licensing ................ 8

II. Factual Background ............................................ 9

A. The Fraudulent Scheme ................................. 9

B. Petitioner O’Connor’s 2007 Lawsuit ............ 11

C. The Current Lawsuit.................................... 12

III. Procedural History ............................................ 16

A. District Court................................................ 16

B. Court of Appeals ........................................... 17

v

REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION ................. 19

I.

The Court of Appeals’ answer to the first

Question Presented directly conflicts with this

Court’s recent decision in Cunningham. .......... 19

II. The Court of Appeals’ answer to the second

Question Presented deepens an intractable

circuit conflict over the original-source

“materially adds” standard in the FCA. ........... 25

A. The First, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits

interpret the original-source “materially

adds” exception in the public-disclosure

defense such that whistleblowers can proceed

with declined qui tam cases even when the

affirmative defense is triggered. .................. 27

B. In contrast, the Seventh and now D.C.

Circuits hold that the “materially adds”

original-source standard cannot be met in the

only cases it applies. ..................................... 29

C. The multi-split circuit conflict produces

divergent outcomes in practice. ................... 31

III. The Questions Presented are important and

squarely presented. ........................................... 33

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 37

Appendix A, Court of Appeals Decision.................... 1a

Appendix B, District Court Decision ...................... 23a

Appendix C, District Court Order .......................... 41a

Appendix D, Panel Rehearing Order ...................... 43a

Appendix E, En Banc Rehearing Order ................. 45a

vi

Appendix F, Mandate .............................................. 47a

Appendix G, Relevant Statutory And Regulatory

Provisions ........................................................... 49a

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of

Hartgrove, Inc.,

867 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2017) ...................... 29, 30, 33

Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth.,

815 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2016) ..................................29

Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler,

538 U.S. 119 (2003) ..................................................4

Cunningham v. Cornell University,

145 S. Ct. 1020 (2025) .. i, 1, 3, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 36,

37

Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist.

v. United States ex rel. Wilson,

559 U.S. 280 (2010) ..................................................6

Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y,

554 U.S. 84 (2008) ...................................... 21, 22, 23

Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

582 U.S. 420 (2017) ................................................ 22

Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex

rel. Kirk,

563 U.S. 401 (2011) ..................................................5

Smith v. United States,

568 U.S. 106 (2013) .......................................... 18, 24

United States ex rel. Banigan v. PharMerica,

Inc.,

950 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2020) ............................ 31, 33

United States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban,

981 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2020) ...................... 27, 28, 32

viii

United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. Majestic

Blue Fisheries, LLC,

812 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2016) ............... 7, 8, 27, 31, 33

United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t

Sols.,

923 F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 2019) ........ 26, 28, 30, 32, 33

United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark

Corp.,

875 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2017) .....................................5

United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS

Caremark Corp.,

827 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2016) ................ 18, 26, 28, 30

United States v. Neifert–White Co.,

390 U.S. 228 (1968) ..................................................4

Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States

ex rel. Escobar,

579 U.S. 176 (2016) ................................................ 28

Statutes

Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 .................5

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ......................................................1

29 U.S.C. § 1106 ........................................................21

29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) .......................................... 20

29 U.S.C. § 1108 .................................................. 21, 24

29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) ....................................................24

29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(A) .......................................... 20

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) ............................................ 4, 7, 21

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) ............................................4

ix

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) ............................................4

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) ............................................4

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) .................................................4

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) .................................................4

31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) ......................................................4

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) (2006) ......................................5

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) ..................... 7, 21, 23, 29, 30

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) .................................5

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) ..........................i, 5, 7, 21, 29

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2006) .................................5

31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) ....................................................35

47 U.S.C. § 308(j)(3)(C) ...............................................8

47 U.S.C. § 308(j)(4)(E) ...............................................8

47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1) ....................................................8

47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) ...............................................8

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1).................................................22

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .......................................... 9, 32

Regulations

47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(1) (2014) ...................................8

47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A) (2014) ................... 9, 16

47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(2) (2014) ....................................8

47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(n) (2014)........................................9

47 C.F.R. § 1.2111(b) (2014) ........................................9

x

47 C.F.R. § 1.2114(a) (2014) ........................................9

Other Authorities

145 Cong. Rec. E1546 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) .........6

145 Cong. Rec. E1547 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) .........7

U.S. DOJ, False Claims Act Settlements and

Judgments Exceed $2.9B in Fiscal Year 2024

(Jan. 15, 2025) ........................................................34

Complaint, Lampert & O’Connor, P.C. v.

Carroll Wireless, LP, No. 1:07-cv-00800-JDB

(D.D.C.) (May 2, 2007) ..................................... 11, 17

Resp. Br., Cunningham v. Cornell Univ.,

No. 23-1007 (U.S. Dec. 27, 2024) ...........................23

S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 3 (2008)..............................5, 6

S. Rep. No. 99-345 .......................................................6

S. Rep. No. 99-345 (1986) ...................................... 4, 33

Universal Serv. Admin. Co., Mobility Funds,

https://www.usac.org/highcost/funds/mobility-funds/ (last visited Sept.

3, 2025) ...................................................................13

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners respectfully petition this Court for a

writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In the

alternative, petitioners respectfully request that the

Court grant the petition, vacate the judgment, and

remand for further consideration of the first Question

Presented in light of Cunningham v. Cornell

University, 145 S. Ct. 1020 (2025).

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. App. A)

is reported at 128 F.4th 276 (D.C. Cir. 2025). The

District Court’s opinion (Pet. App. B) is unpublished

but available at 2023 WL 2598678.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on

February 11, 2025. Pet. App. A. The court denied

timely petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en

banc on April 8, 2025. Pet. App. D & E. The Chief

Justice granted a timely application extending the

time to file this petition to and including September 5,

2025. See No. 25A9. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTORY AND

REGULATORY PROVISIONS

Relevant statutory provisions and regulations are

reproduced in Appendix G to this Petition.

2

INTRODUCTION

The False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions

harness private enforcement to protect the public fisc.

Recognizing that the government cannot detect every

fraud, Congress empowers whistleblowers to sue on

the government’s behalf, sharing recoveries with

those who expose schemes to steal taxpayer dollars.

This case involves a brazen fraud that cost taxpayers

more than $163 million through sham small

businesses

created

to

exploit

Federal

Communications Commission programs designed to

promote

legitimate

competition

in

wireless

communications.

The D.C. Circuit’s decision eviscerates the

statutory scheme Congress carefully calibrated in

2010 to encourage more whistleblowers to come

forward. In amendments designed to lower barriers

for relators, Congress transformed the “publicdisclosure bar” from a jurisdictional requirement that

plaintiffs had to overcome into an affirmative defense

that defendants must plead and prove. Congress

simultaneously expanded the exception included in

the newly affirmative defense for “an original source”

to whom the defense cannot apply, ensuring that

relators with valuable information could proceed even

when substantially similar frauds had been disclosed.

The panel acknowledged these amendments but

then imposed requirements that nullify them. First,

despite recognizing that what was once a

jurisdictional bar is now an affirmative defense, the

panel held that False Claims Act (FCA) plaintiffs

must negate this affirmative defense in their

complaint. When the panel invented this novel

3

burden-shifting framework respondents didn’t even

ask for, it did not have the benefit of this Court’s

decision in Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145 S.

Ct. 1020 (2025), which directly contradicts the panel’s

reasoning and conclusions and was decided one day

after the mandate issued. For reasons that equally

apply to the structure and text of the FCA, this Court

held that ERISA plaintiffs need not anticipate and

negate affirmative defenses at the pleading stage.

Second, the panel adopted an impossibly restrictive

interpretation of the “materially adds” standard,

requiring that a relator’s information be so significant

it would prompt government prosecution. This

standard ensures no relator will ever qualify in a

declined case, rendering the “materially adds”

original-source exception meaningless.

These errors warrant immediate review. The

Court of Appeals’ answers to the Questions Presented

conflict with this Court’s decisions and those of

several other circuits, creating inconsistent

enforcement of a critical anti-fraud statute. The D.C.

Circuit hears a disproportionate share of FCA cases—

indeed, respondents elected to transfer this District of

Oklahoma case to the District of Columbia—making

its atextual holdings particularly harmful. And the

decision’s

timing—with

Cunningham

decided

immediately after the mandate issued and after

petitions for panel and en banc rehearing had already

been denied—calls for intervention. At minimum, the

Court should grant, vacate, and remand for further

consideration in light of Cunningham. It is nigh

indisputable that a GVR is warranted given the

peculiar timing, before the panel’s published and

fundamentally flawed authority metastasizes.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Legal Background

A. The False Claims Act

The False Claims Act creates civil liability for

“any person” who, e.g., “knowingly presents, or causes

to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for

payment or approval,” “knowingly makes, uses, or

causes to be made or used, a false record or statement

material to a false or fraudulent claim,” or “knowingly

makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false

record or statement material to an obligation to pay or

transmit money or property to the Government.” 31

U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (G). Congress “wrote

expansively, meaning ‘to reach all types of fraud,

without qualification, that might result in financial

loss to the Government.’” Cook County v. United

States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003)

(quoting United States v. Neifert–White Co., 390 U.S.

228, 232 (1968)); see also S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2

(1986) (financial recovery provisions introduced by the

False Claims Reform Act designed to “encourage any

individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that

information forward”).

The statute’s most distinctive feature authorizes

private persons known as qui tam relators to sue on

the government’s behalf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). After

a relator files suit under seal, the government

investigates and decides whether to intervene. Id.

§ 3730(b)(4). Successful relators can receive up to 30%

of the recovery in declined suits, and up to 25% if the

government intervenes and secures a recovery itself.

Id. § 3730(d).

5

From 1986 until 2010, the FCA included a “public

disclosure bar” that operated as a jurisdictional

limitation on qui tam suits. The statute provided that

“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction” over a qui tam

action based on publicly disclosed allegations unless

the relator was an “original source” of the information.

31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(e)(1), (e)(4)(A) (2006). To qualify as

an original source, a relator had to possess “direct and

independent knowledge of the information on which

the allegations are based” and voluntarily provide

that information to the government before filing suit.

Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2006).

Previously, the statute included a “government

knowledge bar,” which precluded qui tam suits

“whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit

was based upon evidence or information in the

possession of the United States, or any agency, officer

or employee thereof, at the time such suit was

brought.” Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608,

609 (repealed 1968). Congress replaced the

government knowledge bar with the “public disclosure

bar” in 1986 because the government knowledge bar

“so ‘significantly limited the number of FCA cases that

were filed’ that ‘by the 1980s, the FCA was no longer

a viable tool for combating fraud against the

Government.’” United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS

Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 2017)

(cleaned up) (quoting S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 3 (2008)).

The public disclosure bar sought “to strike a

balance between encouraging private persons to root

out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.” Schindler

Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S.

401, 413 (2011) (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559

6

U.S. 280, 294-95 (2010)). But that balance favors

enforcement. “In creating both the public disclosure

bar and the original source exception,” Congress

sought “to only bar truly ‘parasitic’ lawsuits, such as

those brought by individuals who did nothing more

than copy a criminal indictment filed by the

Government.” S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 22 (2008);

(quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 5275-78 (1986)). On the

other hand, Congress sought “to ensure that any

individual qui tam relator who came forward with

legitimate information that started the Government

looking into an area it would otherwise not have

looked, could proceed with an FCA case.” Id. at 5.

Unfortunately, courts still misapplied the public

disclosure bar to dismiss meritorious cases. This

prompted the sponsors of the 1986 Amendments to

explain that the public disclosure bar, “which was

drafted to deter so-called ‘parasitic’ cases, has been

converted by several circuit courts into a powerful

sword by which defendants are able to defeat worthy

relators and their claims,” in a manner that

threatened to undermine “the very purpose” of the

1986 Amendments. 145 Cong. Rec. E1546 (daily ed.

July 14, 1999) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman

and Sen. Charles E. Grassley). In particular, the

legislators “disagree[d] with cases holding that qui

tam suits are barred if the relator obtains some, or

even all, of the information necessary to prove fraud

from publicly available documents.” Id. E1547. In

their view, a relator “who uses their education,

training, experience, or talent to uncover a fraudulent

scheme from publicly available documents, should be

allowed to file a qui tam action.” Ibid. “This is

especially true where a relator must piece together

7

facts exposing a fraud from separate documents.”

Ibid.

Congress thus substantially revised these

provisions in 2010 to encourage more private

enforcement suits. See United States ex rel. Moore &

Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 29899 (3d Cir. 2016) (Congress “overhauled” and

“radically changed” the statute to “lower the bar for

relators”). The 2010 amendments made two relevant

critical changes. First, Congress eliminated the

jurisdictional language, transforming the publicdisclosure bar into an affirmative defense. Separately

from the FCA’s prohibitions in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a),

the current statute provides that a court “shall

dismiss” an action “if substantially the same

allegations or transactions” were publicly disclosed

through specific public channels, “unless” the relator

is “an original source,” id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). As the

panel acknowledged, the “public disclosure bar now

operates as an affirmative defense.” Pet. App. 9a

(footnote omitted). Second, Congress expanded the

definition of the original source exception in the

affirmative defense to create two independent paths.

The defense does not apply if: (i) “prior to a public

disclosure,” the relator “has voluntarily disclosed to

the Government the information on which allegations

or transactions in a claim are based,” or (ii) the relator

“has knowledge that is independent of and materially

adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or

transactions” and voluntarily provided that

information to the government before filing suit. 31

U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).

The change to the first path removed the

requirement that the relator’s knowledge be “direct

8

and independent” (i.e., entirely firsthand). And

Congress added the new “materially adds” second

pathway to the original-source exception to ensure

that relators who have independent, materially

valuable knowledge may proceed if they provide their

information to the government before suing—even

though the material elements of the fraud were

already publicly disclosed. See, e.g., Moore, 812 F.3d

at 299. This provision recognizes that even when some

aspects of a fraud are known, insiders and specialists

may possess critical information that exposes the full

scope of the scheme or reveals continuing violations.

B. FCC Wireless Spectrum Licensing

Wireless spectrum is a finite public resource with

extraordinary commercial value. To allocate spectrum

licenses fairly while promoting competition, Congress

authorized the FCC to conduct auctions. 47 U.S.C.

§ 309(j)(1). Recognizing that auctions would favor

large incumbents with deep pockets, Congress

directed the FCC to “ensure that small businesses . . .

are given the opportunity to participate in the

provision

of

spectrum-based

services.”

Id.

§ 309(j)(4)(D). But to ensure the legitimacy of the

small business program and the recovery of funds for

the taxpayers, Congress directed the FCC to design

auction rules that prevent “unjust enrichment.” Id.

§ 308(j)(3)(C) & (4)(E).

The FCC implements this mandate through its

“Designated entities” program, which provides

substantial bidding credits—25% discounts in this

case—to qualifying “very small” businesses. See 47

C.F.R. §§ 1.2110(b)(1)(i), (f)(2) (2014). To prevent large

companies from gaming the system through sham

9

small businesses, the FCC imposes strict eligibility

requirements. Designated entities must have average

gross revenues, including the revenues of all affiliates

and controlling interests, under specified thresholds.

Id. §§ 1.2110(b)(1), (f)(2). And designated entities

must maintain actual control over their licenses

during a five-year “[u]njust enrichment” period. Id.

§§ 1.2111(b), (b)(1). Under the regulations relevant

here, if a designated entity were to transfer more than

25% of its spectrum capacity in any single license area

to a non-qualifying entity during this period through

leasing or resale arrangements, it would create an

“attributable material relationship” disqualifying it

from retaining any bid credits for all licenses acquired

by the designated entity with the valuable

discounts—not just the bid credits for the affected

licenses. Id. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A).

Throughout the unjust enrichment period,

designated entities must file annual reports certifying

continued

compliance

with

all

eligibility

requirements. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(n) (2014). They must

also report within 30 days any event affecting their

eligibility, including spectrum leases creating

attributable material relationships. Id. § 1.2114(a).

II. Factual Background1

A. The Fraudulent Scheme

Respondent U.S. Cellular Corporation is one of

the nation’s largest wireless providers, with billions in

1

The case was dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The facts are thus derived

from the operative Second Amended Complaint, located in the

Court of Appeals’ Joint Appendix (“JA”) at JA23-114.

10

annual revenues—far exceeding the thresholds to be

a “very small” designated entity. See Pet. App. 4a.

Between 2005 and 2008, U.S. Cellular orchestrated an

elaborate scheme to circumvent the FCC’s smallbusiness preferences through sham entities that

appeared independent but were secretly controlled by

U.S. Cellular from inception. See id. 4a-5a.

The scheme followed a consistent pattern across

three FCC spectrum auctions. See JA23-114. U.S.

Cellular identified spectrum adjacent to or

overlapping with its existing service areas. It then

recruited respondent Allison Cryor DiNardo, who had

no experience operating wireless services, to serve as

the nominal head of purportedly independent small

businesses. U.S. Cellular provided all financing for

these entities’ auction bids, directed their bidding

strategy, and planned from the start to incorporate

the spectrum into its own network. In Auction 58

(2005), the sham entity Carroll Wireless obtained 16

licenses with $22.1 million in bid credits. See JA80-85.

In Auction 66 (2006), respondent Barat Wireless

obtained 17 licenses with $42.4 million in bid credits.

See JA95. In Auction 73 (2008), respondent King

Street Wireless obtained 152 licenses with $100.2

million in bid credits. See JA54.

In their FCC applications, these entities certified

that DiNardo held both de jure and de facto control,

that they had no additional affiliates, and that their

revenues fell within designated entity thresholds. See

JA78; JA86; JA94. In reality, U.S. Cellular controlled

every aspect of their operations. The entities never

built networks, never had customers, never marketed

services, and never operated as legitimate wireless

providers. See JA68-72; JA90-92; JA100-01.

11

B. Petitioner O’Connor’s 2007 Lawsuit

Petitioner Mark O’Connor, an experienced

telecommunications attorney, suspected that Carroll

and Barat were fronts for U.S. Cellular. His

investigation revealed that these entities had

obtained licenses precisely matching U.S. Cellular’s

coverage gaps, using U.S. Cellular’s financing, and

with no apparent ability to operate independently. So

in 2007, O’Connor filed a qui tam complaint under

seal on behalf of his titular law firm, alleging that

defendants conspired to register sham designated

entities to obtain fraudulent bid credits. See Pet. App.

5a (discussing Lampert & O’Connor, P.C. v. Carroll

Wireless, LP, No. 1:07-cv-00800-JDB (D.D.C.) (suit

filed May 2, 2007)).2 The complaint detailed how U.S.

Cellular formed and controlled Carroll and Barat,

made material misstatements in FCC applications,

and concealed that U.S. Cellular was the real party in

interest. JA637-41. In April 2008, O’Connor amended

the complaint to add King Street as a defendant. See

JA636-70 (amended complaint).

The government conducted at most a cursory

investigation of O’Connor’s allegations, and the FCC

asked defendants to respond to O’Connor’s complaint

as part of the agency’s review of King Street’s license

application. Defendants argued that the King Street

licenses had not yet been granted, and therefore,

O’Connor had no evidence that U.S. Cellular would

take de facto control of King Street. The FCC, relying

on U.S. Cellular’s implicit pledge that King Street

would operate independently, awarded the licenses to

2

The Court of Appeals wrote that the suit was filed in 2008,

Pet. App. 5a, but it was in fact filed in 2007.

12

King Street at a $100.2 million “very small business”

discount. JA54. Faced with the theoretical possibility

that King Street might operate legitimately—which

would disprove the fraud allegations—O’Connor

voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice in

January 2010. See Pet. App. 5a.

C. The Current Lawsuit

After dismissing the original action, O’Connor

partnered with telecommunications attorney and

fellow petitioner Sara Leibman to investigate whether

the entities had fulfilled their promise to operate

independently. See Pet. App. 6a-7a. Their multi-year

investigation uncovered extensive evidence of a new

post-licensing fraud that went far beyond the original

allegations. In particular, the relators demonstrated

that King Street had never provided wireless

telecommunications services (to the public or anyone

else) and instead had relinquished its spectrum

licenses to U.S. Cellular, which used them to build a

broadband network and offer 4G LTE services to its

own customers without any involvement by King

Street. See id. 17a-18a. In April 2015, petitioners filed

this action under seal, realleging both the original

fraud to obtain license discounts and asserting for the

first time independent knowledge of a subsequent

fraud to retain the hundreds of millions of taxpayer

dollars in bid credits through false certifications. See

id. 6a-7a; JA8. Their complaint triggered what

became a nearly five-year DOJ reinvestigation.

Petitioners

commissioned

sophisticated

engineering analyses that revealed continuous radio

signals across both King Street’s and U.S. Cellular’s

adjacent spectrum bands, proving technical spectrum

13

integration invisible to casual observation. See

JA62-63. This integration meant U.S. Cellular had

incorporated King Street’s entire spectrum into its

own network, violating the 25% leasing limitation

many times over. This spectrum analysis led

petitioners to discover that respondents had

fabricated a network sharing agreement that U.S.

Cellular submitted to the FCC in 2012.

Petitioners’ discovery of the fabricated 2012 lease

came through methodical detective work. Their

engineering analyses had revealed that U.S. Cellular

was using far more of King Street’s spectrum than any

disclosed agreements would permit. Searching for an

explanation, they discovered that in 2012, U.S.

Cellular had participated in “Auction 901,” which

served as the FCC’s vehicle to distribute more than

$40 million in “Mobility Fund” subsidies3 to wireless

providers willing to deploy broadband networks in

underserved rural areas. See JA76-78; JA306. To

qualify, applicants had to prove they controlled

spectrum in the areas in which they bid. U.S. Cellular

faced a dilemma: It needed to show the FCC it had

access to King Street’s spectrum to win the subsidies,

but King Street was still in its unjust enrichment

period and could not transfer or lease substantial

spectrum

without

triggering

bidding

credit

repayment obligations. Petitioners found U.S.

Cellular’s solution buried in its Auction 901

application: A summary of a purported 2012 lease

3

The Mobility Fund was part of the FCC’s Universal Service

Fund program. See Universal Serv. Admin. Co., Mobility Funds,

https://www.usac.org/high-cost/funds/mobility-funds/

(last

visited Sept. 3, 2025).

14

showing King Street had transferred spectrum

covering only tiny census tracts—just 1.03% of one

license area. JA77-78; JA325-29.

This made no commercial sense given petitioners’

technical

evidence

of

widespread

spectrum

integration. As discussed below, their suspicions

proved correct when DOJ investigators, armed with

petitioners’ analysis, forced production of the real

agreement—the 2011 Network Sharing Agreement—

showing that respondents had violated the

attributable material relationships rule many times

over and intentionally concealed it from the

government. See JA77. Meanwhile, the fabricated

2012 lease submitted to the FCC had been carefully

crafted to give U.S. Cellular just enough documented

spectrum access to qualify for Mobility Fund subsidies

while concealing the massive regulatory violations

that would have required repaying over $100 million

in bid credits. See JA76-78; JA325-29.

Petitioners’ investigation further revealed that

King Street never operated as a legitimate wireless

company. See Pet. App. 17a. It had no retail stores, no

customers, never obtained telephone numbers

essential for providing service, never filed required

FCC service reports, and never marketed in its

licensed areas. See JA66-72. Some antenna structures

King Street claimed to operate were actually built by

and registered to U.S. Cellular—facts petitioners

verified by cross-referencing building permits with

FCC registration databases that no one had

previously connected. See JA67.

Petitioners also hired investigators to obtain

wireless service using King Street’s spectrum. They

15

discovered that U.S. Cellular, not King Street,

controlled all aspects of service provisioning, rates,

terms, and conditions. See JA63-65. Meanwhile, King

Street filed annual reports with the FCC falsely

certifying that it maintained “continuing oversight,

review, supervision and control” of its licenses. JA74.

Respondents never disputed that petitioners’

“voluntary disclosures” to the DOJ of their discoveries

“prior to filing the 2015 complaint, led to the

Government’s lengthy second investigation.” See Petr.

C.A. Reply Br. 16 (comparing Resp. C.A. Br. 12, 30,

with Petr. C.A. Br. 54-55). And although none of this

was relevant to sufficiently pleading their claims,

respondents have never disputed that petitioners

worked closely with DOJ attorneys and investigators

throughout this investigation. Petitioners provided

their engineering analyses, investigative reports, and

regulatory expertise. They helped investigators

understand the technical aspects of spectrum

integration and the significance of various FCC

filings. They identified discrepancies between what

defendants told the FCC and what the technical

evidence revealed.

This collaboration bore fruit. Armed with

petitioners’ evidence and analysis, DOJ investigators

ultimately forced defendants to produce documents

they had concealed from the FCC. Most significantly,

investigators obtained the actual spectrum sharing

agreement between King Street and U.S. Cellular—

not the fabricated 2012 version submitted to the FCC

in an unrelated proceeding to further defraud the

government, but the real agreement signed in 2011—

ceding control of virtually all of King Street’s licensed

spectrum to U.S. Cellular during the unjust

16

enrichment period. See Pet. App. 17a-18a. The 2011

Network Sharing Agreement revealed the fraud’s full

scope. King Street had leased to U.S. Cellular not 1%

of the spectrum capacity of a couple dozen licenses, as

U.S. Cellular publicly claimed, but 100% of the

spectrum capacity across 90 license areas. See JA77.

Under the governing FCC regulations, violating the

rule in any single license area disqualified King Street

from retaining the $100 million in bid credits for any

of the 152 license areas it had won in Auction 73. See

47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A) (2014). King Street had

violated the regulation 90 times over. The contrast

between the real 2011 agreement and the fake 2012

version submitted to the FCC demonstrated

deliberate deception. This was not mere nondisclosure

but affirmative fabrication of documents to conceal

regulatory violations.

While this case remained under seal, DOJ

investigators shared the 2011 agreement with

petitioners, recognizing their crucial role in exposing

the fraud. Using the additional evidence of fraud the

government shared while the case was under seal,

petitioners amended their complaint to allege the

concealed 2011 agreement and the false 2012

agreement submitted to the FCC. The government

ultimately declined to intervene in December 2019

and the complaint was unsealed. See Pet. App. 7a.

III. Procedural History

A. District Court

Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple

grounds, including failure to state a claim and the

public-disclosure defense. The District Court granted

the motion based solely on the public-disclosure

17

defense, finding that petitioners’ allegations were

“substantially the same” as those in O’Connor’s 2008

complaint and that petitioners failed to prove they are

original sources. See Pet. App. 32a-39a. The court held

that

petitioners’

extensive

post-dismissal

investigation did not “materially add” to the

allegations that were disclosed when the 2008

complaint in Lampert & O’Connor was unsealed to the

public, Pet. App. 36a, because the “core” fraud

remained the same, id. 33a.4

B. Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published

opinion addressing two questions of first impression

for the D.C. Circuit. Pet. App. A.5

First, the panel created a novel burden-shifting

framework for the public-disclosure defense. While

acknowledging that Congress had transformed the

bar from a jurisdictional limitation into “an

affirmative defense” on the merits, Pet. App. 9a, the

4

Adding insult to injury, the District Court dismissed with

prejudice, denying petitioners any opportunity to amend their

complaint to address the court’s concerns. See Pet. App. C. This

was defendants’ first motion to dismiss, and the court was

interpreting statutory provisions never previously addressed by

the D.C. Circuit. Even so, petitioners’ express request that “any

dismissal should be without prejudice” to allow them to “correct

any defects” was rejected. See JA900.

5

Adding further insult to injury, the panel held that the

District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the

complaint with prejudice despite petitioners’ express request

that, at a minimum, petitioners be allowed to replead to allege

O’Connor’s personal involvement in the 2007 case that

indisputably makes him an original source of the current suit.

Pet. App. 22a n.9.

18

panel held that relators must nonetheless

“demonstrat[e]” they qualify as an original source to

avoid pre-answer dismissal, id. 15a. The panel

reasoned that because original-source status “benefits

relators” and because relators are “best situated to

know the facts” of their status, they should bear the

burden at the pleading stage of establishing that the

affirmative public-disclosure defense does not apply.

Id. 15a (citing only Smith v. United States, 568 U.S.

106, 112 (2013), which addresses the ultimate burden

of proof in criminal conspiracy cases, and affirmed and

applied “the common-law rule” that “affirmative

defenses were matters for the defendant to prove”

(cleaned up)).

Second, the panel adopted an exceptionally

restrictive interpretation of the “materially adds”

original-source condition in the public-disclosure

defense. Acknowledging that the second Question

Presented was a matter of first impression for the

D.C. Circuit, Pet. App. 18a, the panel held that a

relator’s information materially adds to what the

government already knows from public disclosures

only if it is “‘sufficiently significant or essential’” to

influence the government “to prosecute fraud,” id.

19a-20a (quoting United States ex rel. Winkelman v.

CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir.

2016)). Applying this new “materially adds” standard,

the panel dismissed petitioners’ contributions to the

government’s investigation as immaterial despite

acknowledging that their information prompted DOJ

to conduct a comprehensive reinvestigation lasting

nearly five years. See id. 21a. The panel recognized

that “the government has broad discretion in deciding

how to respond to allegations in a qui tam suit” and

19

that “such decision may be based on a range of factors

independent of the relators’ specific disclosures.” Ibid.

Yet because the government ultimately declined to

intervene, it was not even plausible to the court that

petitioners’ information was material. See id. 21a-22a.

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ timely

rehearing petitions on April 8, 2025. Pet. App. D & E.

The mandate issued April 16, 2025. Pet. App. F. This

Court decided Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145

S. Ct. 1020 (2025), on April 17—the very next day.

REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION

I.

The Court of Appeals’ Answer to the

First Question Presented Directly

Conflicts With This Court’s Recent

Decision in Cunningham.

The timing alone compels intervention.

Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145 S. Ct. 1020

(2025), was decided April 17, 2025—after petitions for

rehearing had been denied, indeed just one day after

the mandate issued. The D.C. Circuit had no

opportunity to consider Cunningham’s holding that

plaintiffs need not anticipate and negate affirmative

defenses in their complaints. See id. at 1024. At

minimum, this Court should grant, vacate, and

remand for reconsideration in light of Cunningham.

But the conflict runs deeper than timing. The

D.C. Circuit correctly recognized that the publicdisclosure bar “now operates as an affirmative

defense” on the merits. Pet. App. 9a. And respondents

never disputed petitioners’ express and repeated

argument that plaintiffs need not anticipate and

negate an affirmative defense. Compare Petr. C.A.

20

Br. 32 (explaining standard of review for affirmative

defenses), Petr. C.A. Reply Br. 1 (“Defendants do not

dispute that the post-2010 public disclosure bar is an

affirmative defense on which they have the burden of

proof. Nor do they contest that plaintiffs are ‘not

required to negate an affirmative defense in their

complaint.’” (citation omitted)), and Petr. C.A. Reply

Br. 5-6, 9-10 (explaining same), with Resp. C.A. Br. 39

(arguing only that under the pre-amended

jurisdictional bar, a relator must “allege specific facts”

to “establish original source status” (citation

omitted)). Yet the panel departed from this black

letter law for two reasons: Relators benefit when the

affirmative defense does not apply and probably

possess the relevant original-source evidence. See Pet.

App. 15a. That analysis cannot be reconciled with

Cunningham’s reasoning or this Court’s consistent

approach to affirmative defenses.

Cunningham involved a foundational question of

civil procedure: When Congress creates statutory

exemptions or exceptions to liability, must plaintiffs

anticipate and negate those exceptions in their

complaints? The Court’s unanimous answer was no.

See Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at 1024-28; id. at 103234 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh, JJ.,

concurring). The case arose under ERISA, which

prohibits certain transactions between retirement

plans and parties in interest. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1106(a)(1)(C). The statute separately provides

twenty-one exemptions for transactions that would

otherwise be prohibited, such as those involving

“services necessary for the establishment or operation

of the plan” with “reasonable compensation.” Id.

§ 1108(b)(2)(A). Cornell University argued that

21

plaintiffs suing for prohibited transactions must plead

facts showing that none of these exemptions apply—

essentially requiring plaintiffs to prove a negative

before defendants even answer the complaint. This

Court rejected that approach, holding that the

exemptions constitute affirmative defenses that

defendants must plead and prove. Cunningham, 145

S. Ct. at 1028. The Court’s analysis turned on

statutory structure and the established principles

governing affirmative defenses that apply here.

First, Cunningham examined how Congress

organized the statute, an analysis that applies with

equal force to the FCA. When exemptions are “laid out

apart from the prohibitions” and “expressly refer to

the prohibited conduct as such,” they operate as

affirmative defenses rather than elements of a

plaintiff’s claim. 145 S. Ct. at 1027 (cleaned up)

(quoting Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y, 554

U.S. 84, 91 (2008)). In ERISA, the prohibitions

creating liability appear in one section (29 U.S.C.

§ 1106), while the exemptions appear separately (29

U.S.C. § 1108). Ibid. The FCA follows the identical

pattern: The provisions creating liability for false

claims appear in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), while the publicdisclosure defense and original-source condition

appear in § 3730(e)(4)(A). It then defines the originalsource condition in § 3730(e)(4)(B)—an original source

is either the source of the public disclosure or has

independent information that materially adds to it.

This structural separation matters. The Court in

Cunningham analogized to the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act at issue in Meacham, where

Congress similarly placed prohibitions in one

provision

and

exemptions

including

a

22

“reasonableness” defense in another. Cunningham,

145 S. Ct. at 1028. The Meacham Court held that this

structure created affirmative defenses that

defendants must both plead and prove. 554 U.S. at 95.

Cunningham applied the same principle to ERISA:

“Like the exemptions at issue in Meacham, the § 1108

exemptions are ‘written in the orthodox format of an

affirmative defense.’” 145 S. Ct. at 1028 (cleaned up)

(quoting Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102). The FCA’s

public-disclosure defense follows this same “orthodox

format.” See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102. Just as

ERISA’s prohibitions apply “[e]xcept as provided in

section 1108,” Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at 1029, the

FCA’s public-disclosure defense creates a conditional

exception to otherwise valid claims separate from the

FCA’s liability provisions.

Second, the Court emphasized a fundamental

principle of civil litigation: “an ‘affirmative defense’ is

‘not something the plaintiff must anticipate and

negate in her pleading.’” Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at

1028 (quoting Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

582 U.S. 420 (2017)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(c) codifies this principle, requiring defendants—not

plaintiffs—to “affirmatively state any . . . affirmative

defense” in their responsive pleadings. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(c)(1). This principle applies equally to FCA

plaintiffs, who should not be required to anticipate

and negate potential public disclosures before

defendants even identify what disclosures they claim

bar the action. Yet respondents never asserted the

defense in an answer; they raised it in their first and

only pre-answer motion to dismiss, which the courts

granted with prejudice.

23

Cunningham acknowledged practical concerns

about meritless litigation but found them insufficient

to override clear statutory text. See 145 S. Ct. at 1029

(“These are serious concerns but they cannot

overcome the statutory text and structure.”); id. at

1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh, JJ.,

concurring) (“[T]he Second Circuit tried to formulate

a rule that would weed out plainly unmeritorious

suits at the pleading stage. The court attempted to

achieve an admirable goal, but established pleading

rules do not allow that workaround.”). When Congress

writes exemptions “in the orthodox format of an

affirmative defense,” courts must “read [them] the

way Congress wrote [them],” regardless of perceived

practical benefits of a different approach. Id. at 1031

(quoting Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102).

Cunningham also rejected the notion that

practical considerations about who possesses relevant

information should determine burden allocation.

Cornell argued that because plaintiffs possess the

information necessary to plead that the exceptions to

ERISA’s liability provisions do not apply, they should

have to do so at the pleading stage. See Resp. Br.

39-44, Cunningham, No. 23-1007 (Dec. 27, 2024). The

D.C. Circuit raised similar policy concerns here,

arguing that relators “benefit” when they are an

original source to whom the affirmative defense

expressly does not apply and are “best situated to

know the facts” of their status. Pet. App. 15a. But that

is universally the case for a conditional affirmative

defense like this one, which applies “unless” the

plaintiff is an original source, 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(e)(4)(A), and nothing particular to ERISA or

the FCA warrants a different result. See

24

Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at 1030 (applying its holding

to all of ERISA’s affirmative defenses in 29 U.S.C.

§ 1108(a) whether “conditional or unconditional”).

Congress’s structural choices control, not practical

considerations. Compare Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at

1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh, JJ.,

concurring) (agreeing with majority that prudential

considerations could not shift pleading burden to

plaintiffs); ibid. (highlighting Solicitor General’s

“promising” proposed “alternative safeguards,” by

which “a district court may insist that a plaintiff file a

reply to an answer that raises one of the § 1108

exemptions as an affirmative defense” (citation

omitted)).

This Court’s earlier decision in Smith v. United

States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013)—the only case the Court

of Appeals relied on for its contrary conclusion, Pet.

App. 15a (citing Smith, 568 U.S. at 112)—only

reinforces that petitioners are right and the panel was

wrong. Smith addressed whether defendants bear the

ultimate burden of proving withdrawal from a

criminal conspiracy—a question about the burden of

proof at trial. 568 U.S. at 112-13. The Court

reaffirmed and applied “the common-law rule” that

“affirmative defenses were matters for the defendant

to prove.” Id. at 112 (cleaned up). Nothing in Smith

suggests plaintiffs must anticipate and negate

affirmative defenses in their complaints. To the

contrary, Smith reinforces the traditional allocation of

burdens: Defendants must prove their affirmative

defenses. The Court emphasized that when Congress

leaves “the traditional burden of proof undisturbed,”

courts must apply common-law principles. Ibid. It is

equally clear that nothing in Smith supports the

25

notion that at the pleading stage, it should matter

whether plaintiffs “benefit” from negating an

affirmative defense and are “best situated to know the

facts.” Contra Pet. App. 15a.

Petitioners do not dispute that they at least bear

the burden of production regarding their originalsource status. And although it is not conceded nor at

issue, they might even have the ultimate burden to

prove their original-source status at the appropriate

stage. They indisputably could, given petitioner

O’Connor’s personal involvement in drafting and

filing the 2007 suit that forms the entire basis of

respondents’ public-disclosure defense. Cf. Pet. App.

22a n.9 (affirming dismissal with prejudice over

petitioners’ express request for leave to replead,

holding that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion in denying leave to amend). But requiring

petitioners to establish this status in their complaint,

before any defendant pleads the defense and before

any factual development, contradicts this Court’s

teachings and basic principles of civil litigation.

II. The Court of Appeals’ Answer to the

Second Question Presented Deepens an

Intractable Circuit Conflict Over the

Original-Source

“Materially

Adds”

Standard in the FCA.

The circuits have adopted three divergent

interpretations of what it means for information to

“materially add” to public disclosures for purposes of

the original-source exception in the affirmative

public-disclosure defense. This division has persisted

for nearly a decade since the 2010 amendments, and

only this Court can resolve it.

26

As discussed below, the First, Third, Sixth, and

Tenth Circuits apply a text-based standard focused on

whether information “adds value” to the government’s

enforcement efforts. These courts recognize that the

“materially adds” original-source condition in the

public-disclosure defense must mean something

different than the “substantially the same” standard

that triggers the defense to begin with. In contrast,

the Seventh and now D.C. Circuits have effectively

erased the “materially adds” definition of an original

source from the provision. The Seventh Circuit has

expressly held that if information is “substantially the

same” as that which has been publicly disclosed, then

it cannot “materially add” to what was public,

rendering the exception a nullity. See, e.g., United

States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d

729, 757-58 (10th Cir. 2019) (criticizing Seventh

Circuit’s approach because it “has the effect of

collapsing the materially-adds inquiry into the

substantially-the-same inquiry,” which “renders

nugatory” Congress’s decision to create a separate

path for relators with valuable additional information

(citation omitted)); United States ex rel. Winkelman v.

CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211-12 (1st Cir.

2016) (same). In this case, the D.C. Circuit further

fractured and deepened the split; by holding that

information materially adds to what is publicly known

only if it would likely prompt the government to

intervene, a situation in which the original-source

exception would not apply, the panel similarly

“rendered nugatory” the materially adds exception to

the affirmative public-disclosure defense. See Reed,

923 F.3d at 757-58 (quoting Winkelman, 827 F.3d at

211-12).

27

A. The First, Third, Sixth, and Tenth

Circuits Interpret the OriginalSource “Materially Adds” Exception

in the Public-Disclosure Defense

Such That Whistleblowers Can

Proceed With Declined Qui Tam

Cases Even When the Affirmative

Defense Is Triggered.

In the Third Circuit, relators need only

“contribute significant additional information to that

which has been publicly disclosed so as to improve its

quality” to be an original source. United States ex rel.

Moore & Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d

294, 306 (3d Cir. 2016). As the Third Circuit

explained, Congress “expanded the definition of

‘original source’” to “lower the bar for relators.” Id.

at 299. Applying the materially adds standard, the

Third Circuit refused to dismiss a relator’s new details

as immaterial merely because the general fraud had

been publicly reported. Id. at 306-08. Holding

otherwise “cannot be” correct, the court reasoned, “for

that would read out of the statute the original source

exception,” which “comes into play only when some

facts regarding the allegation or transaction have

been publicly disclosed.” Id. at 306.

Like the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit asks

whether the relator’s information “might actually

affect the government’s decision-making,” defined as

anything that “would add value for the government.”

United States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban, 981 F.3d

516, 525, 527 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up; citations

omitted). This standard recognizes that even

“allegations that a substantially similar scheme has

28

continued or restarted could provide the government

with ‘knowledge that is independent of and materially

adds’ to the public disclosures.” Id. at 525 (citation

omitted). So too the Tenth Circuit’s standard, which

requires only that the allegations be “capable of

‘influencing the behavior of the recipient’—i.e., the

government.” Reed, 923 F.3d at 757 (cleaned up)

(quoting Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211); id. at 759-63

(concluding that plaintiff could proceed as an original

source in a declined case based on independent

information that materially added to publicly

disclosed frauds).

The First Circuit’s standard, while sometimes

quoted selectively, e.g., Pet. App. 19a (quoting

Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211), aligns with this

approach. Information must be “sufficiently

significant or essential so as” to “influence the

behavior of the recipient.” Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211

(citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States

ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 195-96 (2016)). The First

Circuit has never suggested the information must

prompt prosecution—only that it could influence

government behavior. See, e.g., Maur, 981 F.3d at 527

(agreeing with Winkelman and Reed that to be an

original source, relator’s independent information

need only “add value for the government”).

Under any of these standards, petitioners easily

qualify. Their engineering analyses revealed technical

spectrum integration invisible without sophisticated

testing. Their investigation proved King Street never

operated as a legitimate provider. Their persistence

led DOJ to uncover the concealed 2011 agreement

showing 100% spectrum transfer rather than the

1.03% falsely claimed to the FCC. This information

29

fundamentally

changed

the

government’s

understanding of the fraud’s scope and methods—or

the DOJ wouldn’t have reopened the fraud

investigation and wasted resources rigorously

pursuing a new inquiry for half a decade.

B. In Contrast, the Seventh and Now

D.C. Circuits Hold That the

“Materially Adds” Original-Source

Standard Cannot Be Met in the Only

Cases It Applies.

The Seventh Circuit takes a fundamentally

different approach that effectively eliminates the

“materially adds” provision altogether, as other

circuits have recognized.

In Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of

Hartgrove, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that if

allegations are “substantially similar to” public

disclosures such that the public-disclosure defense is

triggered, the allegations cannot materially add to

what the public knows. 867 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir.

2017) (citing Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth., 815

F.3d 267, 283 (7th Cir. 2016)). Under this

interpretation, the two statutory inquiries collapse

into one: If a court finds the allegations “substantially

the same” as public disclosures (triggering the

defense), it necessarily follows that the relator’s

information does not “materially add” (defeating the

exception). Ibid. The Seventh Circuit reached this

conclusion by focusing on the word “allegations” in

both statutory phrases, reasoning that because

§ 3730(e)(4)(A) bars suits based on “substantially the

same allegations or transactions” as publicly

disclosed, and § 3730(e)(4)(B) requires knowledge that

30

“materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations

or transactions,” the two standards must be

measuring the same thing. Id. at 717; see id. at

717-21.

This interpretation has been widely criticized by

other circuits. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Reed,

the Seventh Circuit’s approach “has the effect of

collapsing the materially-adds inquiry into the

substantially-the-same inquiry,” which “renders

nugatory” Congress’s decision to create a separate

path for relators with valuable additional

information. 923 F.3d at 757 (quoting Winkelman, 827

F.3d at 211-12). The First Circuit similarly rejected

the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, because it would

mean a relator could never qualify as an original

source in any case where the public-disclosure defense

applies. Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211-12.

The D.C. Circuit has now staked out the most

extreme position, requiring that information be so

“significant or essential” that it would push the

government “to prosecute” the fraud. Pet. App. 19a20a. This standard is impossible to meet in declined

cases—the only context where the “materially adds”

standard matters. The panel’s standard thus creates

a Catch-22. If the government intervenes, the publicdisclosure defense is inapplicable. 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(e)(4)(A) (defense does not apply if “the action is

brought by the Attorney General”). If the government

declines even after an extensive fraud investigation in

tandem with relators while the case is under seal, the

D.C. Circuit holds that it is not even plausible the

information was material to the government. Under

this logic, no relator in a declined case can ever

establish materiality.

31

Citing nothing, the panel attempted to justify its

restrictive interpretation by claiming it “comports

with Congress’s narrowing of the original source

exception in 2010.” Pet. App. 20a (emphasis added).

But as the Third Circuit has explained, Congress

“expanded the definition of ‘original source’” in 2010,

thus narrowing the applicability of the newly

affirmative defense to “lower the bar for relators.”

Moore, 812 F.3d at 297-99 (emphases added)).

C. The Multi-Split Circuit Conflict

Produces Divergent Outcomes in

Practice.

The competing standards are not merely

academic distinctions—they determine whether

meritorious cases proceed or are dismissed. Decisions

from the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits all would

have come out the other way under the standards

imposed in the Seventh and D.C. Circuits.

In United States ex rel. Banigan v. PharMerica,

Inc., 950 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2020), the First Circuit

found the public-disclosure defense triggered because

prior qui tam suits and government reports had

disclosed the same fraudulent scheme—indeed, the

court found the schemes “indistinguishable in all

material respects.” Id. at 144 (emphasis added). The

government declined to intervene. Id. at 141-42. Yet

the court held the relator could proceed because his

specific insider knowledge about how his company

executed the kickback scheme “materially added” to

what was publicly known. Id. at 147. In Moore, the

Third Circuit found the public-disclosure defense

triggered because news articles and FOIA documents

had revealed “substantially the same allegations or

32

transactions” regarding foreign entities using sham

U.S. companies to obtain fishing licenses. 812 F.3d at

301, 304. The government had declined to intervene.

Even so, the court held the relator could proceed

because his independent information revealing how

the defendants specifically structured and controlled

the sham companies “materially added” to the public

disclosures. Id. at 297, 308. And in Reed, the Tenth

Circuit found the public-disclosure defense triggered

because news reports and government audits had

revealed fraud allegations that were “substantially

the same” as those in Reed’s complaint regarding the

background-investigation industry. 923 F.3d at

747-53. The government declined to intervene. Id.

at 741. But the court held the relator could proceed

because her specific allegations about fraud in

KeyPoint’s Telephone Testimony Program, combined

with evidence of management cover-ups, “added

material information” to the public disclosures. Id. at

761-63.6

Under the D.C. Circuit’s standard, none of these

relators could have proceeded. As the Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal in this case makes evident, the court

6

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Maur reached a different

result, but not because it applied the wrong standard. See Maur,

981 F.3d at 527 (agreeing with Winkelman and Reed that to be

an original source, relator’s independent information need only

“add value for the government”). Maur found no material

addition when the same doctor’s fraud continued during active

government monitoring through an integrity agreement with

quarterly reporting. Id. at 528-29. Here, there was no

government monitoring—no one disputes that petitioners’

information prompted the government to open an entirely new

investigation after closing the previous one based on O’Connor’s

2007 lawsuit.

33

requires information so significant it would prompt

the government “to prosecute fraud”—petitioners’

prompting a five-year DOJ fraud reinvestigation could

not in the court’s view even plausibly show that their

independent information materially added to what

the government already knew. See Pet. App. 19a-20a.

Since the government declined to intervene in

Banigan, Moore, and Reed after considering the

relators’ independent information, those relators

would not meet the D.C. Circuit’s standard either.

Under the Seventh Circuit’s standard, Banigan,

Moore, and Reed would have come out the other way

as well. The Seventh Circuit holds that if allegations

are “substantially similar to” public disclosures—

which all three courts found—they cannot “materially

add” under the second original-source exception to the

defense. See Bellevue, 867 F.3d at 721. In other words,

once the public-disclosure defense is triggered under

the Seventh Circuit’s approach, only the first originalsource exception is available and the second is

surplusage.

The intolerable result is that relators like

petitioners in declined cases can proceed in the First,

Third, and Tenth Circuits (and probably the Sixth

Circuit too), even when the public-disclosure defense

is triggered, but are automatically barred in the D.C.

and Seventh Circuits.

III. The Questions Presented Are Important

and Squarely Presented.

The False Claims Act is the government’s

“primary litigative tool” for combating fraud. See S.

Rep. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986). Since 1986, FCA cases

have recovered “more than $78 billion” for taxpayers,

34

with the vast majority coming from qui tam actions.

See U.S. DOJ, False Claims Act Settlements and

Judgments Exceed $2.9B in Fiscal Year 2024 (Jan. 15,

2025).7 In fiscal year 2024 alone, qui tam cases

accounted for $2.4 billion of the $2.9 billion recovered

under the FCA—over 80% of the recuperated taxpayer

dollars. See ibid. These recoveries represent only a

fraction of the fraud prevented through the statute’s

deterrent effect. See ibid. Potential fraudsters know

that insiders might expose their schemes, making

fraud a riskier proposition. This deterrent effect

depends on maintaining viable paths for

whistleblowers to bring suit.

The D.C. Circuit’s restrictions undermine both

recovery and deterrence. By requiring relators to

negate affirmative defenses in their complaints and

setting an impossible standard for original-source

materiality, the court has created artificial barriers to

private enforcement. Fraudsters can operate with

greater confidence that even if insiders detect their

schemes, procedural hurdles will prevent successful

challenges.

And the D.C. Circuit’s decision deepens a circuit

conflict that has profound practical implications. The

same fraudulent scheme dismissed out of hand in this

case would be remediable in the Third, Sixth, or Tenth

Circuits, for example, but not in the D.C. Circuit or

Seventh Circuit. Potential whistleblowers must

therefore evaluate whether to risk their careers and

relationships to expose fraud depending on which

circuit they are in. In circuits applying the majority

“materially adds” standard, they know that valuable

7

Available at https://tinyurl.com/35yaudx9.

35

information—even if it doesn’t prompt immediate

prosecution—can support a viable claim. In the D.C.

Circuit, they know that unless their information

would cause the government to intervene, their efforts

are futile. And given that many government contracts

are performed in multiple jurisdictions, fraudsters

can exploit these inconsistencies by structuring

operations to take advantage of circuits with

restrictive standards—or, as here, simply by moving

to transfer the case to D.D.C. over plaintiffs’ objection.

See Pet. App. 23a; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a). So it is

particularly important to intervene and correct the

D.C. Circuit’s published, novel decision.

This case demonstrates why Congress relies on

private

parties

to

supplement

government

enforcement. Petitioners—each a telecommunications

attorney with special expertise—understood the

FCC’s complex regulatory scheme and recognized

irregularities

that

might

escape

generalist

investigators. They invested years and significant

resources investigating the fraud, hiring engineers

and investigators, and analyzing technical data. Their

efforts paid off. Working with petitioners, DOJ

investigators uncovered the concealed 2011 lease that

proved the fraud’s full scope. Without petitioners’

expertise and persistence, defendants would have

successfully concealed their scheme to steal over $163

million in taxpayer funds. Yet under the D.C. Circuit’s

standards, petitioners’ contributions mean nothing.

Despite prompting a five-year reinvestigation and

uncovering crucial evidence, they cannot proceed with

their case. This result sends a chilling message to

potential whistleblowers.

36

This case presents an ideal vehicle for resolving

both questions. The only disputes concern the legal

standards governing the public-disclosure defense.

Either question independently requires reversal.

First, if plaintiffs need not negate affirmative

defenses in their complaints—as Cunningham

holds—the dismissal cannot stand. Petitioners never

had the opportunity to develop evidence of their

original-source status through discovery or to respond

in the pleadings to defendants’ specific contentions

about public disclosures. See, e.g., Cunningham, 145

S. Ct. at 1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and

Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (suggesting that in

circumstances like these, “a district court may insist

that a plaintiff file a reply to an answer that raises . . .

an affirmative defense”). Second, if the majority

circuits’ interpretation of “materially adds” is correct,

petitioners qualify as original sources under the

second exception to the defense. The relevant facts are

undisputed: Petitioner “O’Connor was a partner at the

law firm and involved in filing” the original 2007

action on which respondents founded their publicdisclosure defense; petitioners conducted extensive

investigation yielding new evidence of fraud; the

government reopened a closed investigation and then

reinvestigated for nearly five years; and the

government ultimately declined intervention. See Pet.

App. 4a-7a, 15a-16a, 20a-21a. Under any standard

that gives meaning to the FCA’s text, this information

materially added to what was publicly known.

The case’s procedural posture underscores the

need for review. This was defendants’ first motion to

dismiss, addressing statutory provisions the D.C.

Circuit had never interpreted. Yet the District Court

37

dismissed with prejudice, denying petitioners any

opportunity to address its concerns, and the Court of

Appeals affirmed that choice—in a published decision

announcing novel legal standards that conflict with

this Court’s decisions and those of several other

circuits. The Court should intervene.

CONCLUSION

The petition should be granted. In the

alternative, the Court should grant the petition,

vacate the judgment, and remand for further

consideration of the first Question Presented in light

of Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145 S. Ct. 1020

(2025).

Respectfully submitted,

Sara M. Lord

ARNALL GOLDEN

GREGORY, LLP

2100 Pennsylvania

Avenue NW, Suite 350S

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 677-4054

sara.lord@agg.com

September 5, 2025

Daniel Woofter

Counsel of Record

RUSSELL & WOOFTER LLC

1701 Pennsylvania

Avenue NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 240-8433

dw@russellwoofter.com

APPENDIX

i

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,

FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a

APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM OPINION OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBI A ,

FILED MARCH 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23a

APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DI S T R IC T OF C OLU M BI A , F I L E D

MARCH 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41a

APPENDIX D — DENIAL OF REHEARING

OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

A PPE A L S F OR T H E DI S T R IC T OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 8, 2025 . . 43a

APPENDIX E — DENIAL OF REHEARING

EN BA NC OF THE UNITED STATES

COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR T H E

DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,

FILED APRIL 8, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45a

APPENDIX F — MANDATE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,

FILED APRIL 16, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47a

ii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

APPENDIX G — RELEVANT STATUTORY

AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . 49a

1a

Appendix

A

APPENDIX A — OPINION

OF THE

UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-7044

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. MARK

J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN, AND

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

APPELLANTS,

v.

USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:20-cv-02071)

Argued April 1, 2024

Decided February 11, 2025

Before: Wilkins, K atsas and Rao, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rao.

R ao , Circuit Judge: This False Claims Act suit

alleges that U.S. Cellular and other entities committed

fraud in Federal Communications Commission wireless

spectrum auctions. The alleged fraud involved using sham

2a

Appendix A

small businesses to obtain and retain bidding discounts

worth millions of dollars. The district court dismissed

the qui tam action because a previous lawsuit had raised

substantially the same allegations, triggering the Act’s

public disclosure bar, and the relators bringing the action

were not original sources of the information. Although

relators have provided some new details about the fraud,

they have not overcome the stringent requirements of the

public disclosure bar. We therefore affirm.

I.

The False Claims Act (“FCA”) imposes liability on

persons who defraud the federal government. Act of Mar.

2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (codified as amended at 31

U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.). While the government has primary

responsibility for enforcing the FCA, if the government

declines to proceed with a claim, individuals, referred to

as relators, may act as “ad hoc deputies” to pursue the

fraud on behalf of the government in exchange for a share

of any recovery. United States ex rel. Cimino v. IBM

Corp., 3 F.4th 412, 415, 453 U.S. App. D.C. 112 (D.C. Cir.

2021) (cleaned up); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (b)(4)(B).

The bounty for a prevailing relator, which can be up to

30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement,

provides an incentive for individuals to come forward

with allegations of fraud against the government. See 31

U.S.C. § 3730(d).

Congress, however, limited the circumstances in which

a relator may bring suit and share in the government’s

recovery. The FCA’s public disclosure bar provides that

3a

Appendix A

a relator whose allegations are “substantially the same”

as information that has already been publicly disclosed

cannot maintain a qui tam action unless he “is an original

source of the information.” Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The public

disclosure bar helps protect against the risk that qui

tam suits will lead to “parasitic exploitation of the public

coffers.” United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry.

Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649, 304 U.S. App. D.C. 347

(D.C. Cir. 1994). The bar helps achieve “the golden mean”

reflected in the FCA, which provides “adequate incentives

for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable

information” but blocks “opportunistic plaintiffs who have

no significant information to contribute of their own.” Id.

A.

This qui tam action involves alleged fraud in FCC

spectrum auctions. The FCC licenses and administers

the wireless spectrum for commercial use and distributes

spectrum licenses through public auctions. As relevant here,

Congress requires the FCC to promote “disseminati[on]

[of] licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including

small businesses.” 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B). To implement

this statutory goal, the FCC established a program that

provides qualifying small businesses, i.e., designated

entities, with bidding credits that effectively discount

the cost of their licenses. Implementation of Section

309(j) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding,

Second Report & Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348, 2388-91 (1994).

Eligibility for bidding credits turns on an entity’s revenue.

47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b), (c), (f).

4a

Appendix A

Given t he h igh ba r r ier s t o ent r y i n t he

telecommunications market, the FCC also encourages

larger companies to invest in and support designated

entities. Large firms may not bid on licenses for

designated entities, but they can “become partners

with or make investments in designated entities so as

to gain an interest in” designated entities’ licenses.

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications

Act - Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report & Order, 9 FCC

Rcd. 5532, 5547 (1994). Nevertheless, “bidding credits can

only be used by genuine small businesses—not by small

sham companies that are managed by or affiliated with

big businesses.” SNR Wireless Licenseco, LLC v. FCC,

868 F.3d 1021, 1026, 432 U.S. App. D.C. 353 (D.C. Cir.

2017). The FCC scrutinizes designated entities to ensure

that large companies are not improperly benefitting from

bidding credits by exercising de facto control over small

businesses. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(1), (c)(2)(i), (c)(5).

B.

In this qui tam action, the relators maintain the

government was defrauded because the FCC awarded

millions of dollars in bidding credits to designated entities

that in fact were controlled by U.S. Cellular, a large

mobile phone service provider with annual revenues in

the billions. Relators sued U.S. Cellular, several of its

related entities, three designated entities, and Allison

DiNardo, the owner of the designated entities.1 Between

1. The qui tam action was brought against United States

Cellular Corporation, USCC Wireless Investment, Inc., and

Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. (together, “U.S. Cellular”); King

5a

Appendix A

2006 and 2008, DiNardo registered three entities, Carroll,

Barat, and King Street, as “very small businesses”

in FCC auctions and applied for the corresponding 25

percent bidding credit. According to the complaint, these

designated entities obtained discounted licenses and

received nearly $165 million in bidding credits.

In 2008, the law firm Lampert, O’Connor & Johnston,

P.C., filed a qui tam action alleging that the same

defendants here conspired to register sham designated

entities to obtain and hold discounted spectrum licenses

for U.S. Cellular’s use—thereby allowing U.S. Cellular

to exploit bidding credits intended for small businesses.

According to the law firm, defendants represented that

Carroll and Barat were organized to develop and operate

spectrum licenses and provide telecommunications

services, yet the designated entities engaged in no

business activity, had no assets, and generated no revenue.

The law firm further alleged that U.S. Cellular controlled

the discounted licenses for Carroll and Barat from the

moment they were issued but failed to return the bidding

credits as required by federal law. At the time the suit was

filed, King Street had not obtained its spectrum licenses.

The government investigated the allegations against King

Street and declined to intervene in the suit. The FCC

eventually granted the King Street licenses. The law firm

then voluntarily dismissed the qui tam action.

Street Wireless, L.P., and King Street Wireless, Inc. (together, “King

Street”); Carroll Wireless, L.P., and Carroll PCS, Inc. (together,

“Carroll”); Barat Wireless, L.P., and Barat Wireless, Inc. (together,

“Barat”); and DiNardo. We refer to these entities collectively as

“Defendants.”

6a

Appendix A

This case originated in 2015, when Sara Leibman

and Mark O’Connor—the latter of whom was a named

partner at Lampert, O’Connor & Johnston, P.C., and

represented the firm in the 2008 qui tam action—filed a

complaint in federal court in Oklahoma, asserting FCA

claims against the same defendants as in the 2008 action.

In particular, relators alleged Defendants conspired

to use sham designated entities to obtain and retain

discounted spectrum licenses and made false statements

and representations to the government in this effort. The

relators further claimed that U.S. Cellular exercised de

facto control over these entities, disqualifying them from

receiving bidding credits, and that King Street unlawfully

transferred its licensed spectrum to U.S. Cellular while

concealing the transfer from the government.

Relators primarily focused on fraudulent activity

involving King Street. They discovered that King Street

never provided wireless services to the public. It did not

apply for or receive telephone numbers, had no retail

stores or customers, and lacked the network capabilities

necessary to offer telecommunications services. Instead,

according to relators, U.S. Cellular used King Street’s

licenses to provide U.S. Cellular branded service to

customers. King Street, meanwhile, filed false annual

reports and construction notices with the FCC to conceal

that it was holding its discounted licenses for U.S. Cellular.

Relators also conducted field tests that supposedly

revealed U.S. Cellular had incorporated King Street’s

spectrum into its network. They learned of a network

sharing agreement (the “2011 NSA”) that, relators say,

7a

Appendix A

effectively transferred King Street’s spectrum rights for

many of its licenses to U.S. Cellular. Relators alleged

the agreement established an “attributable material

relationship” between King Street and U.S. Cellular,

violating FCC rules and disqualifying King Street as a

designated entity. The government declined to intervene

in relators’ suit.

The case was transferred to the District of Columbia, 2

and the district court found relators’ complaint asserted

“substantially the same” allegations as the 2008 qui tam

action. This triggered the FCA’s public disclosure bar, and

because relators did not meet the criteria for the original

source exception, the district court dismissed the action.

United States ex rel. O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp.,

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48810, 2023 WL 2598678, at *4-7

(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2023).

Relators timely appealed, and this court has

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district

court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). United States ex rel. Williams

v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1259, 363

U.S. App. D.C. 419 (D.C. Cir. 2004). When determining

whether a complaint fails to state a claim, “we accept the

operative complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as

2. Relators filed a second, related action in the Western District

of Oklahoma, which was similarly transferred to the District of

Columbia. United States ex rel. O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp.,

No. 20-cv-2070, Dkt. No. 128 (D.D.C. July 30, 2020). We heard

oral argument in both cases on the same day. United States ex rel.

O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 23-7041 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2024).

8a

Appendix A

true and draw all reasonable inferences in the [relators’]

favor.” 3 North American Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d

1244, 1249, 450 U.S. App. D.C. 20 (D.C. Cir. 2020).

II.

Relators attempt to save their qui tam action by

arguing that the public disclosure bar does not apply,

either because their allegations were not “substantially

the same” as those in the 2008 qui tam action or because

they qualify for the original source exception. We reject

both arguments.

A.

We begin by considering whether relators’ allegations

are “substantially the same” as those disclosed in the 2008

qui tam action and thus trigger the public disclosure bar.

The claims here turn on alleged transactions that postdate

2010, and so are governed by the public disclosure bar as

amended in 2010, which provides:

The court shall dismiss an action or claim ... unless

opposed by the Government, if substantially the

same allegations or transactions as alleged in

the action or claim were publicly disclosed ... [in

3. Although the FCA is an anti-fraud statute and requires

relators to meet the heightened “particularity” pleading standard

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), United States ex rel. Totten

v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551-52, 351 U.S. App. D.C. 30

(D.C. Cir. 2002), that standard is not at issue in this case because

Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of relators’ substantive

allegations on appeal.

9a

Appendix A

the enumerated channels], unless ... the person

bringing the action is an original source of the

information.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).

The 2010 amendments included two changes relevant

to this case. First, the public disclosure bar was previously

a jurisdictional limit but is now an affirmative defense.

When the bar applies, a court must “dismiss [the] action.”

Id.; compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1986) (providing

that “[n]o court [would] have jurisdiction over an action”

for which there had already been a public disclosure).

Unless Congress “clearly states” that a statutory

limitation is jurisdictional, “courts should treat the

restriction as nonjurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,

546 U.S. 500, 515-16, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097

(2006). In the 2010 amendments, Congress removed

the jurisdictional language in the public disclosure bar.

United States ex rel. Shea v. Cellco Partnership, 863

F.3d 923, 933, 430 U.S. App. D.C. 353 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

Moreover, the government may oppose a court’s dismissal,

which reinforces that the bar is no longer jurisdictional.

Otherwise, “the government [could] cure a jurisdictional

defect simply by opposing a motion to dismiss.” United

States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811

(11th Cir. 2015). The public disclosure bar now operates

as an affirmative defense.4

4. We note this is the unanimous view of our sister circuits that

have considered the issue. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reed v.

KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 737 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019) (collecting

cases).

10a

Appendix A

Second, Congress clarified the standard for applying

the public disclosure bar. Prior to the amendment, the

public disclosure bar deprived courts of jurisdiction over

actions “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or

transactions.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1986) (emphasis

added). Interpreting the pre-2010 language, this circuit

held that a suit was “based upon publicly disclosed

allegations or transactions when the allegations in the

complaint [were] substantially similar to those in the

public domain.” United States ex rel. Oliver v. Philip

Morris USA Inc., 826 F.3d 466, 472, 423 U.S. App. D.C.

302 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Other

circuits used terms such as “substantially similar,”

“substantially the same,” and “substantial identity”

when applying the public disclosure bar. See United

States ex rel. Holloway v. Heartland Hospice, Inc., 960

F.3d 836, 849-50 & nn.8-9 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting and

discussing cases). In the 2010 amendments, Congress

mirrored these judicial formulations, requiring dismissal

of a qui tam action “if substantially the same allegations

or transactions ... were publicly disclosed.” 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis added).

Congress’s amendment of the public disclosure bar

is best understood as codifying the interpretation of this

circuit and others that focused on whether the allegations

of fraud in a qui tam action were “substantially similar”

to or “substantially the same” as publicly disclosed

allegations and transactions. See United States ex rel.

May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 917 (4th Cir.

2013) (“[T]he amended version [of the public disclosure

bar] ... focuses on the similarity of the allegations of

11a

Appendix A

fraud.”); see also United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint

Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 743 (10th Cir. 2019) (“That the

substantially-the-same standard adopted in the 2010

amendment resembles the standard we already used is

no accident; the amendment expressly incorporates the

‘substantially similar’ standard in accordance with the

interpretation of this circuit and most other circuits.”)

(cleaned up). Because the FCA amendments incorporate

judicial interpretations, we can reasonably continue to rely

on our pre-2010 cases applying the public disclosure bar.5

B.

Under the “substantially the same” standard, the

critical inquiry is whether “the government ... ha[d] enough

information to investigate the case ... or [whether] the

information could at least have alerted law-enforcement

authorities to the likelihood of wrongdoing.” United States

ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 679 F.3d 832, 836,

5. Other circuits have also concluded that “pre-2010-amendment

cases guide [the] substantially-the-same inquiry.” Reed, 923 F.3d at

744; see also Silbersher v. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, Inc., 89 F.4th 1154,

1167 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Congress re-enacted its prior law in clearer

terms by replacing ‘based upon’ with ‘substantially the same as,’

leaving our precedent interpreting that phrase undisturbed.”);

United States ex rel. Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., 903 F.3d 78, 83-84

n.6 (3d Cir. 2018); Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of Hartgrove,

Inc., 867 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2017). By contrast, the Sixth Circuit

has held that “substantially the same” requires a higher degree of

similarity than “based upon.” Holloway, 960 F.3d at 850-51. We need

not resolve whether or how the two standards differ because relators

conceded in the proceedings below that our cases interpreting the

public disclosure bar before the 2010 amendments remain instructive.

12a

Appendix A

400 U.S. App. D.C. 351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). “[T]he

government has enough information to investigate

the case” when either “the allegation of fraud” or “its

underlying factual elements” have been publicly disclosed.

United States ex rel. Doe v. Staples, Inc., 773 F.3d 83, 86,

413 U.S. App. D.C. 208 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). The

public disclosure bar applies if the fraud was publicly

disclosed, or if both the misrepresentation and the truth

were in the public domain. Id.

Because the public disclosure bar is an affirmative

defense and Defendants have raised it in a pre-answer

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b),

Defendants must show that “the facts that give rise to the

defense are clear from the face of the complaint.” See de

Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 608, 404 U.S.

App. D.C. 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). Defendants

argue the public disclosure bar applies to this case because

the 2008 qui tam action publicly disclosed “substantially

the same” allegations, namely the same fraudulent scheme

(obtaining discounted bidding credits) at the same FCC

auctions, perpetrated by the same defendants.

In response, relators claim that their current

allegations are not “substantially the same” as the

disclosures from 2008, because this suit alleges postlicensing fraud focused on the retention of bidding credits

and the incorporation of the designated entities’ spectrum

into the U.S. Cellular network. Relators also insist they

have marshalled new evidence, including an engineering

study, employee interviews, and the 2011 NSA, that

exposes this fraudulent scheme. Furthermore, relators

13a

Appendix A

argue that they have advanced a new allegation that U.S.

Cellular’s control over King Street’s spectrum violates

the FCC’s attributable material relationship rule, an

allegation that is not substantially the same as the prelicensing fraud involving U.S. Cellular’s control over the

designated entities during the spectrum auctions.

Relators’ complaint includes some additional facts, but

ultimately describes a fraud that is merely a continuation

of, and therefore substantially the same as, the scheme

disclosed in the 2008 qui tam action. In the 2008 action,

relators alleged that Carroll, Barat, and King Street

served as fronts for U.S. Cellular to obtain spectrum

licenses at a discount and that the designated entities were

under the de facto control of U.S. Cellular. In their present

complaint, relators reiterate these same allegations,

adding only some details about how Defendants have

continued the fraud since the spectrum auctions. But the

pertinent elements of the fraud were all alleged in the

2008 qui tam action: the misrepresentation that Carroll,

Barat, and King Street were genuine designated entities;

the truth that they were fronts for U.S. Cellular; and the

allegation that Defendants committed fraud in the FCC

auctions to benefit from valuable bidding credits. The 2008

qui tam action alerted the government to the same fraud

alleged in this action.

This qui tam action simply elaborates on how

Defendants attempted to conceal the fraud and maintain

its benefits. But “a qui tam action cannot be sustained

where both elements of the fraudulent transaction ... are

already public, even if the relator comes forward with

14a

Appendix A

additional evidence incriminating the defendant.” Doe,

773 F.3d at 86 (cleaned up). Filling in details about an

already disclosed fraud is not enough to overcome the

public disclosure bar. United States ex rel. Settlemire v.

District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 919, 339 U.S. App.

D.C. 166 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We agree with the district court

that the 2008 qui tam action publicly disclosed that the

“same defendants intended to acquire the same discounts

at the same auctions via the same scheme of using front

companies to fraudulently pose as small businesses.”

O’Connor, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48810, 2023 WL

2598678, at *5 (cleaned up).

Although relators offer some additional details about

actions Defendants took to preserve their bidding credits

and spectrum, the underlying fraud is “substantially

the same” as that alleged in the 2008 qui tam action.

Therefore, the public disclosure bar applies.

III.

Relators also argue they qualify as “original sources”

and therefore fit within the exception to the public

disclosure bar. Even if relators’ claims were previously

publicly disclosed, they may bring a qui tam action if they

were “original source[s]” identifying the alleged fraud.

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). In the 2010 amendments to the

FCA, Congress narrowed the definition of original source.

Before the amendments, a relator qualified as an original

source by simply possessing “direct and independent

knowledge of the information on which the allegations

are based.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1986). The timing of

the relator’s claim was immaterial. Now, a relator can be

15a

Appendix A

an original source only if: (1) “prior to a public disclosure

... [he] has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the

information on which allegations or transactions in a claim

are based”; or (2) he “has knowledge that is independent

of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations

or transactions, and ... has voluntarily provided the

information to the Government before filing an action.”

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Relators here are not original

sources under either definition.

Because qualifying as an original source is an

exception to the public disclosure bar, relators will

generally bear the burden of demonstrating it applies. The

original source exception benefits relators by permitting

their claims to go forward even if the public disclosure

bar is triggered. Relators are also best situated to know

the facts relevant to whether they qualify as original

sources. See Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 112,

133 S. Ct. 714, 184 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2013) (“Where the facts

with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of

a party, that party is best situated to bear the burden of

proof.”) (cleaned up).

A.

Relators maintain that O’Connor is an original source

under the first definition because his law firm shared the

2008 qui tam action with the government before its public

disclosure.

O’Connor cannot be an original source for the 2008

qui tam action, however, because that action was filed

by his law firm. The 2008 pleadings stated: “Lampert,

16a

Appendix A

O’Connor & Johnston, P.C. brings this action ... on behalf

of itself and the Government.” It is a fundamental principle

of corporate law that a professional corporation is a

legal entity distinct from its shareholders. See O’Neal,

Thompson & Wells, 1 Close Corporations and LLCs: Law

and Practice § 2.9 (3d ed. 2024). Although O’Connor was a

partner at the law firm and involved in filing the complaint,

he cannot attribute the firm’s suit to himself. Cf. United

States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d

548, 554 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding a corporation cannot

serve as the original source of information gathered by

its shareholders before its formation). The 2008 qui tam

action was brought by the law firm, and O’Connor cannot

step into the firm’s shoes to qualify as an original source.

For the first time in their reply brief, relators also

claim that O’Connor personally communicated with the

government about the allegations of fraud in the 2008 qui

tam action before its unsealing. This argument, however,

has been forfeited because it was not presented in the

opening brief. In their opening brief, relators suggested

O’Connor was an original source of the 2008 qui tam action

because he “served” and later “dismissed” the complaint.

Defendants naturally responded by focusing on whether

the 2008 qui tam action, which was filed by O’Connor’s

law firm and did not mention O’Connor personally,

could be attributed to him. Only in their reply brief did

relators specifically assert that O’Connor independently

communicated with the government about the allegations

as early as 2007. This argument comes too late. Relators

cannot preserve their claim that O’Connor is an original

source by providing a “skeletal” argument in their opening

17a

Appendix A

brief and waiting to develop their full argument in reply.

Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6, 439 U.S. App. D.C.

357 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

O’Connor cannot claim to be an original source based

on the disclosures of his law firm, and any argument that

he individually provided information to the government

has been forfeited. Relators therefore do not qualify as

original sources under the first definition of section 3730(e)

(4)(B) by voluntarily disclosing allegations of fraud prior

to the unsealing of the 2008 qui tam action.

B.

Relators also argue that they qualify as original

sources under the second definition by having “knowledge

that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly

disclosed allegations or transactions” and by voluntarily

providing that information to the government. 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(e)(4)(B). Relators maintain that their independent

investigations materially added to the disclosures in the

2008 qui tam action by providing information about postlicensing fraud. For example, relators proved through

spectrum analyses that after King Street obtained the

licenses referenced in the 2008 qui tam action, U.S.

Cellular secretly incorporated King Street’s licensed

spectrum, which contradicted King Street’s FCC

certifications and exposed unlawful activity. Relators also

discovered that King Street never operated as a legitimate

telecommunications provider. According to relators,

their efforts instigated a government investigation

that uncovered the 2011 NSA, further demonstrating

18a

Appendix A

Defendants’ post-licensing fraud. Relators argue they

influenced the government’s decisionmaking and filled

gaps in the government’s understanding of the fraud.

Even assuming relators provided some new information

that is “independent of” the 2008 qui tam action, we must

consider whether this information “materially adds” to

what was publicly disclosed.6 Id.

This circuit has not previously considered what counts

as a material addition for the purpose of the original

source exception. We begin with the text and structure of

the statute. As the Supreme Court has recognized when

interpreting other sections of the FCA, the term “material”

has a well-established common law meaning: Something

is material if it is likely to influence a reasonable person’s

behavior. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States

ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 193, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 195 L.

Ed. 2d 348 (2016) (discussing common law definitions of

“material” in tort and contract). Information is material

if “knowledge of [it] would affect a person’s decisionmaking” or if it is “significant” or “essential.” Material

6. Whether the original source exception applies because

information “materially adds” to public disclosures must be a

separate inquiry from whether relators have brought forward

allegations that are “substantially the same,” which triggers

application of the public disclosure bar. While the precise line

between these concepts may be difficult to draw, they “must remain

conceptually distinct; otherwise, the original source exception would

be rendered nugatory.” United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS

Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211-12 (1st Cir. 2016); see also United

States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban, 981 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2020)

(endorsing Winkelman’s reasoning because the alternative “would

leave an exception that excepts nothing”).

19a

Appendix A

(adj.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This

definition comports with the liability section of the FCA,

which defines “material” as “having a natural tendency

to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or

receipt of money or property.” 7 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). As

the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[t]he materiality

standard [in section 3729(b)(4)] is demanding” and is not

met “where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.”

Escobar, 579 U.S. at 194. Interpreting the term “material”

consistently across the FCA, we conclude that minor or

insubstantial additions to publicly disclosed information

will not qualify a relator as an “original source.”

A relator therefore “materially adds” to public

disclosures by contributing information that “is sufficiently

significant or essential” to influence the government’s

decision to prosecute fraud. 8 United States ex rel.

Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211

7. The Supreme Court has interpreted “material” in other

federal statutes in a similar way. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States,

485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 99 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1988) (construing

“material” in an immigration statute to mean information that “has

a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the

decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)

(cleaned up); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20-25, 119 S. Ct.

1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999) (same for federal mail fraud, bank fraud,

and wire fraud statutes); see also id. at 22 (explaining “the common

law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality”).

8. In addition to the cases already cited, this interpretation

is consistent with the interpretation of “materially adds” in other

circuits. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Advocates for Basic Legal

Equality., Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 816 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2016);

United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries,

LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2016).

20a

Appendix A

(1st Cir. 2016); see also Reed, 923 F.3d at 757 (holding

that “materially adds” requires relators to “disclose[]

new information that is sufficiently significant or

important that it would be capable of influencing the

behavior of the recipient—i.e., the government”) (cleaned

up). This interpretation is consistent with the careful

balance Congress struck in the FCA to ensure that the

government remains “in the driver’s seat to pursue and

punish false claims according to its priorities.” United

States v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 47 F.4th 805, 818, 459

U.S. App. D.C. 85 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Reading “material”

to require significant or essential additional information

also comports with Congress’s narrowing of the original

source exception in 2010.

Determining whether a relator’s contribution

materially adds to a public disclosure is a case-dependent

inquiry. “[A] relator who merely adds detail or color to

previously disclosed elements of an alleged scheme is not

materially adding to the public disclosures.” Reed, 923

F.3d at 757 (cleaned up). Simply elaborating on public

disclosures is insufficient to meet the “materially adds”

standard because marginal details are not likely to

influence the government’s decision to prosecute.

Relators do not qualify for the original source

exception to the public disclosure bar because their

information—which we take as true—does not materially

add to the disclosures made in the 2008 qui tam action.

The 2008 action provided substantial information about

U.S. Cellular’s alleged control over Carroll, Barat, and

King Street. That complaint alleged the designated

entities were sham companies under the de facto control

21a

Appendix A

of U.S. Cellular and existed solely to obtain the 25 percent

bidding credit on FCC licenses that were ultimately for

U.S. Cellular’s use. Relators’ allegations in this case

merely confirm U.S. Cellular’s continued control over the

designated entities and its use of their licenses. While

some information may be new, it is not so significant

or essential that it would influence the government’s

decision to prosecute, because the 2008 action already

disclosed the allegations of Defendants’ fraud. Rather than

“blaz[ing] a new trail,” relators merely “add[ed] a few more

breadcrumbs on an existing trail.” Id. at 763. Providing

some additional color about the fraudulent scheme does

not make relators an original source.

Relators’ contention that they affected the government’s

decisionmaking by prompting an investigation does not

alter our conclusion. Relators say they provided evidence

of post-licensing fraud that led the government to conduct

a second investigation. This investigation uncovered the

2011 NSA, which relators claim established an attributable

material relationship between King Street and U.S.

Cellular that violated FCC rules and disqualified King

Street from bidding credits. On relators’ account, the

fact of the government’s investigation proves their new

information materially added to what the government

knew. We disagree.

The government has broad discretion in deciding

how to respond to allegations in a qui tam suit, and such

decisions may be based on a range of factors independent

of the relators’ specific disclosures. See Swift v. United

States, 318 F.3d 250, 253, 355 U.S. App. D.C. 59 (D.C. Cir.

2003). The FCA requires relators to serve the government

22a

Appendix A

a copy of the complaint and all material evidence, which

remains sealed for 60 days. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).

During this seal period, the government may investigate,

or take whatever action it sees fit, to determine whether

it wants to proceed with an enforcement action or

intervene in the qui tam suit. See id. The fact that the

government undertook some due diligence in response to

new information does not necessarily show that relators’

information was material. The government has significant

latitude in how it exercises its enforcement authority under

the FCA, and the mere fact of a government investigation

cannot support the conclusion that relators’ information

was essential or influenced the government.

Because relators’ allegations failed to materially add

to the public disclosures, relators do not qualify for the

original source exception to the public disclosure bar.9

***

This qui tam action must be dismissed because

the frauds Leibman and O’Connor allege were publicly

disclosed in an earlier lawsuit, and they are not original

sources of the information. We therefore affirm the

judgment of the district court.

So ordered.

9. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

with prejudice. Relators did not make a formal motion to amend, and

in these circumstances it is not an abuse of discretion for a district

court not to grant “such leave sua sponte.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns

Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1280, 305 U.S. App. D.C. 60 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

23a

Appendix B

APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM

OPINION OF

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

FILED MARCH 22, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 20-cv-2071 (TSC)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

Plaintiffs-Relators,

v.

UNITED STATES CELLULAR CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiffs-Relators Mark J. O’Connor and Sara F.

Leibman filed this False Claims Act (FCA) action in the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Oklahoma. ECF No. 118. After the United States declined

to intervene, ECF No. 47, the case was transferred upon

Defendants’ motion to this court on July 30, 2020, ECF

No. 126. Defendants have filed two motions to dismiss

Plaintiffs-Relators’ Second Amended Complaint, ECF

Nos. 148, 149. For the reasons set forth below, the court

will GRANT both motions and dismiss this case.

24a

Appendix B

I. BACKGROUND

A. Designated Entities and Spectrum Auctions

Electromagnetic waves of varying frequencies carry

the information necessary for people to enjoy technologies

ranging from the radio to Wi-Fi. Second Amended

Complaint ¶ 5, ECF No. 118 (“SAC”). Particular sources

broadcast on specific electromagnetic frequencies; for

example, National Public Radio in Washington, D.C.

appears at 88.5 MHz, while C-SPAN is at 90.1 MHz.

Those stations do not “own” their frequencies. Instead, the

Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) regulates

the electromagnetic spectrum, licensing control over

certain bands to private parties. 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.

In doing so, the FCC seeks to ensure the distribution

of licenses and frequencies provides a “fair, efficient,

and equitable distribution” of services. Id. § 307(a), (b).

Accordingly, it distributes licenses through a competitive

auction system. See id. § 309(j).

Unsurprisingly, spectrum auction bids are expensive.

See, e.g., Press Release, FCC, FCC Concludes Largest

Ever Spectrum Auction (Mar. 12, 2020), fcc.gov/document/

fcc-concludes-largest-ever-spectrum-auction (detailing an

auction with over $7 billion in bids). To ensure fairness and

access, Congress and the FCC created the Designated

Entity (“DE”) program, under which women and minorityowned businesses, as well as small businesses below a

certain gross revenue threshold, are offered “bidding

credits” for license auctions. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(1), (2); see

47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D); In the Matter of Implementation

of Section 309(j) of the Commc’ns Act — Competitive

25a

Appendix B

Bidding, 9 FCC Rcd. 5532 ¶ 15 (1994). Credits are

percentage-based—the FCC pledges to credit a certain

percentage of a DE’s winning bid. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)

(2)(i). For small businesses, the size of a credit varies

depending on business revenue (e.g., businesses with less

than $4 million in revenue are eligible for bidding credits

of 35%). Id.

To determine whether a business qualifies as a DE,

the FCC calculates the business’s gross revenue by

aggregating the business’s gross revenue, its affiliates,

its controlling interests and their affiliates, and the

entities with which the business has an attributable

material relationship. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(1). Affiliates

are individuals or entities that directly or indirectly

control or are otherwise controlled by the prospective

DE business. Id. § 1.2110(c)(5). A controlling interest

includes any entities that had de facto or de jure control

of the applicant. Id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(i). While de jure control

is defined by the regulations, de facto control is assessed

on a “case-by-case basis.” Id.

The FCC reviews a business’s DE status twice. First,

the business must complete a pre-auction short-form

application certifying that it is eligible for DE status. See

FCC Form 175, available at transition.fcc.gov/Forms/

Form175/175.pdf. If the business wins a bid for a spectrum

license, it then completes a long-form application, which

is a significantly longer questionnaire asking for the

business’s affiliates and controlling interests, as well as

their respective assets and gross revenues. See FCC Form

601, available at transition.fcc.gov/Forms/Form601/601.

pdf.

26a

Appendix B

Once a DE is awarded a license, it may not transfer it

to a business that would have otherwise been ineligible for

a bidding credit for at least five years, or risk having to pay

back some or all of its discount. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2111(b)

(2)(i). A DE must also submit an annual report certifying

its continued eligibility for DE status. Id. § 1.2110(n)(1), (2).

Despite these requirements, non-qualifying businesses

are not barred from interacting with DE entities; in

fact, the FCC seeks to promote economic opportunity

for DE owners—especially those owned by minorities or

women—by encouraging large companies to invest in DEs

and avail themselves of the DE-licensed spectrum. See,

e.g., In the Matter of Implementation of Section 309(j) of

the Commc’ns Act — Competitive Bidding, 9 FCC Rcd.

5532 ¶ 15 (1994).

B. Parties

Plaintiffs-Relators Mark J. O’Connor and Sara F.

Leibman are attorneys specializing in communications

law. SAC ¶¶ 21-22. Their Second Amended Complaint

names ten defendants connected by a complex web of

ownership and partnership, described below. Figure 1,

attached to this opinion, maps out those relationships in

a chart.

Defendant (1) Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.

(“ TDS”) is a publicly held corporation that owns

approximately 80% of Defendant (2) United States

Cellular Corporation (“U.S. Cellular”). Id. ¶¶ 23-24. U.S.

Cellular wholly owns and controls Defendant (3) USCC

Wireless Investment, Inc (“USCC”). Id. ¶ 25.

27a

Appendix B

Defendant (4) Carroll Wireless, L.P. was a limited

partnership between USCC and Defendant (5) Carroll

PCS, Inc. (“Carroll Wireless”), which is wholly owned

by Defendant (6) Allison Cryor DiNardo. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

Following the December 2012 transfer of control of Carroll

Wireless, L.P. to U.S. Cellular, Carroll Wireless, L.P,

merged with and was dissolved into USCC in December

2018. Id.

Defendant (7) Barat Wireless, L.P. was a similar

limited partnership between USCC and Defendant (8)

Barat Wireless, Inc. (“Barat Wireless”), which is likewise

wholly owned by DiNardo. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Following the

September 2012 transfer of control of Barat Wireless, L.P.

to U.S. Cellular, Barat Wireless, L.P, merged with USCOS

of Rochester, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of USCC,

in December 2018. Id. ¶ 30. In January 2019, USCOC of

Rochester, Inc. merged into and with USSC. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.

Lastly, Defendant (9) King Street Wireless, L.P. was

a limited partnership between USCC and Defendant (10)

King Street Wireless, Inc. (“King Street”), which is also

wholly owned by DiNardo. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.

C. Factual Background

This case involves three FCC spectrum auctions:

Auction 58, held on June 18, 2004; Auction 66, held on

January 31, 2006; and Auction 73, held on August 17, 2007.

In each of those auctions, DiNardo registered Defendant

entities—the Carroll, Barat, and King Street entities,

respectively—as “very small business[es]” with gross

revenues under $15 million, and applied for a 25% bidding

28a

Appendix B

credit. Id. ¶¶ 154-55, 183-84; 76-77. Each application stated

that DiNardo had both de facto and de jure control of the

businesses, and that none had any additional affiliates.

Id. ¶¶ 78, 155, 184.

The DiNardo-registered businesses won discounted

spectrum licenses in all three auctions. Carroll Wireless

secured 17 licenses in Auction 58, applying its 25%

discount to pay $129.7 million of the $151.8 million that it

bid. Id. ¶ 158. Barat Wireless also secured 17 licenses in

Auction 66, paying $127.1 million for its $169 million bid.

Id. ¶ 185. And King Street Wireless secured 152 licenses

in Auction 73, paying $300.4 million for its $400.6 million

bid. Id. ¶ 80. In their post-auction long-form applications,

all three businesses reaffirmed their eligibility for DE

status. Id. ¶¶ 84, 159, 187.

In 2007, the law firm of Lampert & O’Connor, P.C.,

represented by Plaintiff-Relator Mark J. O’Connor,

brought an FCA suit in this district. As amended in

2008, the Complaint named as defendants the same ten

entities as the ones in this suit. See Am. Compl., Case No.

1:07-cv-00800-JDB (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2008), ECF No. 11

(“2008 Complaint”).1 It also involved the same three FCC

spectrum auctions: 58, 66, and 73. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.

The 2008 Complaint alleged that the U.S. Cellular

entities had “formed sham ‘very small business’ bidding

1. ”A court may take judicial notice of facts contained in public

records of other proceedings,” Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of

Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 84 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Abhe & Svoboda,

Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059, 378 U.S. App. D.C. 355 (D.C. Cir.

2007)), along with other “government documents available from

reliable sources,” id. at 85 (citations omitted).

29a

Appendix B

entities”—the Barat, Carroll, and King Street entities—

”for purposes of obtaining 25 percent credits against

their gross winning bids” in the respective auctions.

Id. ¶ 3. “In furtherance of their fraudulent scheme, the

Defendants made material misstatements and omissions

in their submissions to the FCC for each of the spectrum

auctions”—specifically, concealing that the U.S. Cellular

entities were in control of the DEs all along. Id. ¶ 4.

The fraudulent records “wrongly represented that the

sham “very small businesses” were organized to design,

construct, develop, operate, manage and maintain

spectrum licenses, and otherwise to engage in the business

of providing telecommunications services,” but in fact they

“acted as fronts for the [U.S. Cellular entities] to acquire

licenses to complement [their] existing wireless operating

footprint and to block new entrants from competing with

[them].” Id. ¶¶ 7-8.

Because the FCC had not yet finally approved King

Street’s application for discount, the 2008 Complaint

prompted the FCC to investigate the allegations before

granting that approval. The government requested that

the 2008 Complaint be partially unsealed, then provided

a copy to King Street along with an opportunity to

respond to the allegations therein. See Letter from R.

Noel to T. Gutierrez Re: Auction 73 Application of King

Street Wireless, L.P., 24 FCC Rcd. 4526, 4527 (Apr. 14,

2009). King Street responded, denying the allegations and

asking the FCC to grant its application. Resp. to Bureau

Inquiry (Redacted), FCC ULS File No. 0003379814 (May

8, 2009). 2 After completing its review, the FCC granted

2. See Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. et al. Motion to

Dismiss, Decl. of Frank Volpe, Ex. B, ECF No. 149-4.

30a

Appendix B

King Street’s application for discounted licenses in Auction

73. SAC ¶ 89; see FCC Public Notice, DA-09-2643, 24 FCC

Rcd 14754 (Dec. 30, 2009).3 The Department of Justice also

declined to intervene in the 2008 FCA suit or otherwise

take action against the Defendants. See Gov’t’s Notice of

Election to Decline Intervention, Case No. 1:07-cv-00800JDB (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2009), ECF No. 25. Shortly thereafter,

Lampert & O’Connor moved to voluntarily dismiss the

action without prejudice. Id., ECF No. 28. The motion was

granted. Id., ECF No. 29.

D. Procedural History

Over five years later, in 2015, Plaintiffs-Relators

brought this action in Oklahoma, and the matter was

subsequently transferred here. In their Second Amended

Complaint, Plaintiffs-Relators claim that Barat, Carroll,

and King Street were not genuine DEs and in fact were

controlled by U.S. Cellular and its affiliates. SAC ¶¶ 84,

105, 147, 157, 162-65, 171, 178, 190, 200. The Complaint

alleges five FCA violations: (1) conspiracy to violate

the FCA under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C); (2) falsely and

fraudulently presenting claims for payment from the

FCC, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A); (3) making

or using a false record to receive payments from the

FCC, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B); (4) unlawful

possession of FCC licenses, in violation of 31 U.S.C.

§ 3729(a)(1)(D); and (5) making or using a false record

to avoid making payments to the federal government, in

violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).

3. Available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-092643A1.pdf.

31a

Appendix B

Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that PlaintiffsRelators’ claims are barred by the FCA’s public disclosure

bar, lacking essential pleading elements, and timebarred under the FCA’s statute of limitations. Because

both motions to dismiss make overlapping substantive

arguments, the court will address them jointly.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of a complaint. See Browning v. Clinton,

292 F.3d 235, 242, 352 U.S. App. D.C. 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

To survive such a motion, the “complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127

S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is plausible

when the facts alleged allow the court to reasonably infer

the defendant’s culpability for the misconduct alleged. Id.

In drawing such reasonable inferences, the court must

grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can

be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 268

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d

605, 608, 199 U.S. App. D.C. 23 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss present two Rule

12(b)(6) defenses. First, they argue that dismissal is

warranted because of the FCA’s public disclosure bar,

32a

Appendix B

which requires a court to dismiss an action where a

relator’s claim is based on allegations and transactions

made public by sources other than the relator before the

complaint was filed. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).

The public disclosure bar applies if “substantially the

same allegations or transactions” were publicly disclosed

in a hearing in which the Government or its agent was

a party, in certain federal reports, hearings, audits, or

investigations, or in the news media. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).

However, if the relator was the “original source” of the

information on which their allegations are based, and that

information “materially adds to the publicly disclosed

allegations or transactions,” the public disclosure bar

does not apply. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v.

United States, 549 U.S. 457, 467, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 167 L.

Ed. 2d 190 (2007) (defining “original source”).

Second, Defendants argue that regardless of the

public disclosure bar, Plaintiffs-Relators have failed to

plausibly allege an FCA violation, and that the allegations

against Carroll and Barat exceed the statute of limitations.

The court need not reach those defenses, however, because

it finds that the public disclosure bar is an insurmountable

defense to Plaintiffs-Relators’ claims.

A. The 2008 FCA suit bars this action

Claims involving “allegations or transactions

substantially similar to those in the public domain”

cannot survive the public disclosure bar. United States

ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emps.’ Club, 105 F.3d

33a

Appendix B

675, 682, 323 U.S. App. D.C. 61 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The

court must determine if “the government already ha[d]

enough information to investigate the case and to make

a decision whether to prosecute’ or [if] the information

‘could at least have alerted law-enforcement authorities

to the likelihood of wrongdoing.’” United States ex rel.

Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 679 F.3d 832, 836, 400 U.S.

App. D.C. 351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting United States ex

rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,

654, 304 U.S. App. D.C. 347 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal

quotations omitted)). Because the public domain includes

information “disclosed . . . in a Federal criminal, civil, or

administrative hearing in which the Government or its

agent is a party,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i), allegations

or transactions involved in prior litigation can trigger the

public disclosure bar, see, e.g., In re Nat. Gas Royalties,

562 F.3d 1032, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the

preclusive effect of “court documents from . . . a qui tam

action Relator had filed” years earlier).

The 2008 FCA suit triggers the public disclosure bar.

That suit alleged that Carroll, Barat, and King Street

were fronts for U.S. Cellular to fraudulently obtain the

small business discount for the spectrum in Auctions 58,

66, and 73, respectively. 2008 Complaint ¶¶ 2-3, 6; see

supra Section I.C. Those are the same core allegations—

against the same defendants—that Plaintiffs-Relators’

Complaint makes here. See SAC ¶ 1. As a result, the 2008

FCA suit “could at least have alerted law-enforcement

authorities to the likelihood of wrongdoing” that PlaintiffsRelators allege here—indeed, that was the suit’s express

purpose. Davis, 679 F.3d at 836. The 2008 Complaint not

34a

Appendix B

only could have, but actually did, “enable the government

to adequately investigate the case and to make a decision

whether to prosecute.” Findley, 105 F.3d at 688. But the

government declined to prosecute, and the FCC ultimately

decided to grant the licenses. The public disclosure bar

precludes Plaintiffs-Relators from raising the same

allegations here.4

B. The allegations of continued fraud are substantially

similar

Plaintiffs-Relators do not meaningfully dispute the

preclusive effect of the 2008 FCA suit with respect to

the allegations it raised. Instead, they argue that their

Complaint here is sufficiently different from the 2008

Complaint to avoid the bar. Principally, they assert that

their Complaint “alleges additional fraudulent conduct,

as well as additional violations of the FCA, that differ

significantly from the fraudulent conduct alleged in

the 2008 Complaint.” Plaintiffs/Relators’ Consolidated

Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

at 16, ECF No. 152 (“Opposition”). What that additional

fraud amounts to is Defendants’ alleged conduct in

maintaining the sham front companies of Carroll, Barat,

and King Street—which in fact continued to be under the

de facto control of U.S. Cellular—while still certifying

their DE status so that they could retain their discount

on the licenses they had obtained. Id. at 16-17 (citing SAC

4. Defendants also argue other public filings in FCC proceedings

independently impose the public disclosure bar. Because the 2008

FCA suit is alone sufficient to preclude this action, the court does

not reach those arguments.

35a

Appendix B

¶¶ 92-105, 107-14, 118-130, 138-46, 162, 166-70, 173-79,

190-93, 196-97, 199-201).

D.C. Circuit precedent forecloses Plaintiffs-Relators’

attempt to distinguish their Complaint from the 2008

FCA suit. A “relator’s ability to reveal specific instances

of fraud where the general practice has already been

publicly disclosed is insufficient” to prevent dismissal

under the public disclosure bar. United States ex rel.

Settlemire v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 919, 339 U.S.

App. D.C. 166 (D.C. Cir. 1999). That Defendants allegedly

continued to perpetuate the fraud to retain their discounts

simply provides more specific instances of the general

fraudulent practice that they allegedly initiated to obtain

those discounts in the first place. “Cases may arise where

disclosures of a practice are insufficient to be considered

public disclosures of later instances of fraud,” but “where

we have before us publicly disclosed information showing

how th[ese] same defendant[s] intended to” acquire

the same discounts at the same auctions via the same

scheme of using front companies to fraudulently pose as

small businesses, “it is clear that public disclosure under

§ 3730(e)(4)(A) has occurred.” Id. The Complaint therefore

cannot get around the public disclosure bar by alleging

that Defendants continued the same fraud that has already

been disclosed.

C. Plaintiffs-Relators are not an original source

Because the Amended Complaint is premised on

“substantially the same allegations or transactions”

that have already been publicly disclosed, PlaintiffsRelators’ suit must be dismissed unless they qualify as

36a

Appendix B

an “original source” by obtaining and sharing “knowledge

that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly

disclosed allegations or transactions,” in which case the

public disclosure bar would not apply. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)

(4)(A)-(B); see Rockwell Int’l Corp., 549 U.S. at 467

(defining “original source”). “Congress did not prescribe

by mathematical formulae the quantum or centrality of

nonpublic information that must be in the hands of the

qui tam relator in order for suits to proceed.” Quinn, 14

F.3d at 653. But Plaintiffs-Relators’ allegations do not

render them an original source here. What little nonpublic

information they allege does not materially add to the

publicly disclosed information.

Plaintiffs-Relators rely chiefly on one nonpublic

document, but it cannot bear the weight they place on it.

They repeatedly cite the U.S. Cellular-King Street 2011

Network Sharing Agreement (“2011 NSA”) in which King

Street allegedly agreed to share its spectrum with U.S.

Cellular for a fee, split profits, and allow U.S. Cellular to

do most of the network construction and management. See

SAC ¶¶ 92-97, 100-06; Opposition at 8, 10, 15, 20-21. Again,

however, that alleged relationship between the entities

at most supports the claim that Defendants continued

the substantially similar, and already disclosed, original

fraud. It therefore cannot be a material addition to the

publicly disclosed information. See, e.g., United States ex

rel. Paulos v. Stryker Corp., 762 F. 3d 688, 694-95 (8th

Cir. 2014) (equating the substantial similarity and material

addition standards); Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit

Auth., 815 F.3d 267, 283 (7th Cir. 2016) (same).

37a

Appendix B

What is more, the 2011 NSA does not even contain

significant nonpublic information. While the 2011 NSA was

never disclosed, U.S. Cellular did provide a 2012 NSA to

the FCC in connection with a later auction. SAC ¶ 142. The

2012 NSA also established that U.S. Cellular would share

in King Street’s spectrum and manage services provided

over that spectrum—the key evidence that PlaintiffsRelators proffer in the 2011 NSA. See id. ¶ 143; U.S.

Cellular FCC Form 680 Long-Form Application for FCC

Auction 901, Amended Ex. 2 - REDACTED, at 1, FCC

Applic. File No. 0005476908 (June 23, 2013) (“Pursuant to

[the 2012] Network Sharing Agreement . . . [,] King Street

agreed to provide 4G services, to be managed by [U.S.

Cellular] . . . via King Street’s Spectrum.”).5 And the FCC

expressly acknowledged that relationship. See Promoting

Interoperability in the 700 MHz Com. Spectrum, 27 FCC

Rcd. 3521, 3536 (Mar. 21, 2012). The main difference

between the 2011 and 2012 NSAs appears to be their

geographic scope; the 2012 NSA allegedly covered much

less territory. SAC ¶¶ 143-45. But the spectrum-sharing

and management relationship between U.S. Cellular and

King Street is the same in both, and that is the operative

fact here for purposes of whether U.S. Cellular was

exercising secret, de facto control over King Street. As a

result, the 2011 NSA does not “add[] in a significant way to

the essential factual background” surrounding this case,

5. Available at https://auctionfiling.fcc.gov/form175/search175/

index.htm (select “Auction 901,” search in search bar for file

number 0005476908, select “Winning Bids” tab, select “Show”

in “Attachments” column for any entry, then scroll to and click

“Amended Exhibit 2 - REDACTED”).

38a

Appendix B

United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue

Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2016).

Plaintiffs-Relators also claim that they conducted

independent “investigation and research” that have

revealed Defendants’ fraud. Opposition at 11. But “relators

[are] not an original source [when] they at best verif[y]

. . . information contained in” the public record, United

States ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 826 F.3d

466, 479, 423 U.S. App. D.C. 302 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotation

omitted), and that is all that Plaintiffs-Relators have

done here. First, they claim that they “commission[ed]

spectrum analysis studies showing U.S. Cellular’s use

and control of the King Street spectrum.” Opposition at 8;

SAC ¶ 98-99. But as already discussed, the fact that U.S.

Cellular and King Street shared spectrum was already

public and even expressly recognized by the FCC. Second,

Plaintiffs-Relators “contact[ed] King Street’s alleged

sales team to determine whether King Street offered

wireless services to customers (it did not)” and “obtain[ed]

customer service contracts that identified U.S. Cellular

as the sole provider in King Street markets.” Opposition

at 8; SAC ¶ 101. But King Street’s annual, public DE

compliance reports repeatedly stated that King Street had

no customers. SAC Ex. 4 at 12, 23, 34, 45, ECF No. 118-4.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs-Relators’ investigations provide

no more than “background information or collateral

research”—insufficient to make them an original source.

Oliver, 826 F.3d at 479 (quotation omitted).

Finally, Plaintiffs-Relators point to their “locating

permits and other documents naming U.S. Cellular (or its

39a

Appendix B

affiliates) in connection with the build out of the purported

King Street networks” and their finding that “King Street

never applied for telephone numbers to be able to offer

services to customers, never filed a Form 499A identifying

the jurisdictions where it offered services, and never even

filed for a Form 499 number.” Opposition at 8-9; SAC

¶¶ 111, 112-13. But those permits, documents, and forms

are all public, and “[a]ny member of the public could have”

looked them up. Oliver, 826 F.3d at 480 (quoting U.S. ex

rel. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 523

(3d Cir. 2007)). As a result, they cannot qualify PlaintiffsRelators for original-source status. Id.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court will GRANT Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 148, 149. A corresponding

order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: March 22, 2023

/s/ Tanya S. Chutkan

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge

40a

Appendix B

Figure 1 - Alleged Relationship Between Defendants

Source: Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 23-32, ECF No.

118. “G.P.” stands for general partner. “L.P.” stands for

limited partner.

41a

Appendix

C UNITED STATES

APPENDIX C — ORDER

OF THE

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA, FILED MARCH 22, 2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 20-cv-2071 (TSC)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

Plaintiffs-Relators,

v.

UNITED STATES CELLULAR CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

For the reasons set forth in the accompanying

Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 165, the Motion to

Dismiss of Defendants King Street Wireless, [*20] L.P.,

King Street Wireless, Inc., and Allison Cryor Dinardo,

ECF No. 148, is hereby GRANTED; and Defendants

United States Cellular Corporation, USCC Wireless

Investment, Inc., and Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.’s

Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 149, is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED. This is a

final appealable order.

42a

Appendix C

Date: March 22, 2023

/s/ Tanya S. Chutkan

TANYA S. CHUTKAN

United States District Judge

43a

AppendixOF

D REHEARING OF

APPENDIX D — DENIAL

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,

FILED APRIL 8, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-7044

September Term, 2024

1:20-cv-02071-TSC

Filed On: April 8, 2025

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

and

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

Appellants,

v.

USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., et al.,

Appellees.

BEFORE: Wilkins, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for panel

rehearing filed on March 27, 2025, it is

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

44a

Appendix D

Per Curiam

BY:

FOR THE COURT:

Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

/s/

Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Clerk

45a

APPENDIX E —Appendix

DENIALDOF REHEARING

EN BANC OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 8, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-7044

September Term, 2024

1:20-cv-02071-TSC

Filed On: April 8, 2025

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

and

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

Appellants,

v.

USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., et al.,

Appellees.

BEFORE:

Srinivasan, Chief Judge, and Henderson,

Millett, Pillard, Wilkins, Katsas, Rao,

Walker, Childs, Pan, and Garcia, Circuit

Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for

rehearing en banc, and the absence of a request by any

member of the court for a vote, it is

46a

Appendix E

ORDERED that the petition be denied.

Per Curiam

BY:

FOR THE COURT:

Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

/s/

Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Clerk

47a

Appendix F OF THE UNITED

APPENDIX F — MANDATE

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, FILED

APRIL 16, 2025

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23-7044

September Term, 2024

1:20-cv-02071-TSC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. MARK

J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

and

MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,

Appellants

v.

USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., ET AL.,

Appellees

48a

Appendix F

MANDATE

In accordance with the judgment of February 11, 2025,

and pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41,

this constitutes the formal mandate of this court.

FOR THE COURT:

Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk

49a

G STATUTORY

APPENDIX G —Appendix

RELEVANT

AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

31 U.S.C. § 3729, False Claims

(a) Liability for certain acts.

(1) In general. Subject to paragraph (2), any person who

(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a

false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;

(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or

used, a false record or statement material to a false

or fraudulent claim;

(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph

(A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G);

(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or

money used, or to be used, by the Government and

knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than

all of that money or property;

(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document

certifying receipt of property used, or to be used,

by the Government and, intending to defraud the

Government, makes or delivers the receipt without

completely knowing that the information on the receipt

is true;

(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an

obligation or debt, public property from an officer

or employee of the Government, or a member of the

50a

Appendix G

Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge

property; or

(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made

or used, a false record or statement material to an

obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the

Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and

improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or

transmit money or property to the Government,

is liable to the United States Government for a civil

penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000,

as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation

Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note; Public Law

104-4101), plus 3 times the amount of damages which the

Government sustains because of the act of that person.

(2) Reduced damages. If the court finds that

(A) the person committing the violation of this

subsection furnished officials of the United States

responsible for investigating false claims violations

with all information known to such person about the

violation within 30 days after the date on which the

defendant first obtained the information;

(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government

investigation of such violation; and

(C) at the time such person furnished the United States

with the information about the violation, no criminal

prosecution, civil action, or administrative action

51a

Appendix G

had commenced under this title with respect to such

violation, and the person did not have actual knowledge

of the existence of an investigation into such violation,

the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of

damages which the Government sustains because of the

act of that person.

(3) Costs of civil actions.

A person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the

United States Government for the costs of a civil action

brought to recover any such penalty or damages.

(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section

(1) the terms “knowing” and “knowingly”

(A) mean that a person, with respect to information

(i) has actual knowledge of the information;

(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or

falsity of the information; or

(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity

of the information; and

(B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud;

(2) the term “claim”

52a

Appendix G

(A) means any request or demand, whether under

a contract or otherwise, for money or property and

whether or not the United States has title to the money

or property, that

(i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of

the United States; or

(ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other

recipient, if the money or property is to be spent

or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a

Government program or interest, and if the United

States Government

(I) provides or has provided any portion of the

money or property requested or demanded; or

(II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or

other recipient for any portion of the money or

property which is requested or demanded; and

(B) does not include requests or demands for money or

property that the Government has paid to an individual

as compensation for Federal employment or as an

income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual’s

use of the money or property;

(3) the term “obligation” means an established duty,

whether or not fixed, arising from an express or implied

contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee

relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship,

from statute or regulation, or from the retention of any

overpayment; and

53a

Appendix G

(4) the term “material” means having a natural tendency

to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or

receipt of money or property.

(c) Exemption from disclosure.

Any information furnished pursuant to subsection (a)(2)

shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5.

(d) Exclusion.

This section does not apply to claims, records, or

statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of

1986.

54a

Appendix G

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)

(b) Actions by private persons.

(1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of

section 3729 for the person and for the United States

Government. The action shall be brought in the name

of the Government. The action may be dismissed

only if the court and the Attorney General give

written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for

consenting.

(2) A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of

substantially all material evidence and information the

person possesses shall be served on the Government

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.1 The complaint shall be filed in camera,

shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and

shall not be served on the defendant until the court

so orders. The Government may elect to intervene

and proceed with the action within 60 days after it

receives both the complaint and the material evidence

and information.

(3) The Government may, for good cause shown, move

the court for extensions of the time during which the

complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2).

Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or

other submissions in camera. The defendant shall

not be required to respond to any complaint filed

under this section until 20 days after the complaint is

unsealed and served upon the defendant pursuant to

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

55a

Appendix G

(4) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or

any extensions obtained under paragraph (3), the

Government shall—

(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action

shall be conducted by the Government; or

(B) notify the court that it declines to take over the

action, in which case the person bringing the action

shall have the right to conduct the action.

(5) When a person brings an action under this

subsection, no person other than the Government may

intervene or bring a related action based on the facts

underlying the pending action.

56a

Appendix G

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)

(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under

this section, unless opposed by the Government, if

substantially the same allegations or transactions as

alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed—

(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative

hearing in which the Government or its agent is a

party;

(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability

Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit, or

investigation; or

(iii) from the news media,

unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or

the person bringing the action is an original source of the

information.

(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source”

means an individual who either (i) prior to a public

disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily

disclosed to the Government the information on which

allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2)

who has knowledge that is independent of and materially

adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,

and who has voluntarily provided the information to the

Government before filing an action under this section.

57a

Appendix G

The version of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), as amended in

1986, read:

(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under

this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations

or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative

hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government

Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation,

or from the news media, unless the action is brought by

the Attorney General or the person bringing the action

is an original source of the information.

(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source”

means an individual who has direct and independent

knowledge of the information on which the allegations

are based and has voluntarily provided the information to

the Government before filing an action under this section

which is based on the information.

58a

Appendix G

47 C.F.R. § 1.2110 (2014), Designated entities

(a) Designated entities are small businesses, businesses

owned by members of minority groups and/or women, and

rural telephone companies.

(b) Eligibility for small business and entrepreneur

provisions—

(1) Size attribution.

(i) The gross revenues of the applicant (or licensee),

its affiliates, its controlling interests, the affiliates

of its controlling interests, and the entities with

which it has an attributable material relationship

shall be attributed to the applicant (or licensee) and

considered on a cumulative basis and aggregated

for purposes of determining whether the applicant

(or licensee) is eligible for status as a small business,

very small business, or entrepreneur, as those

terms are defined in the service-specific rules. An

applicant seeking status as a small business, very

small business, or entrepreneur, as those terms are

defined in the service-specific rules, must disclose

on its short- and long-form applications, separately

and in the aggregate, the gross revenues for each

of the previous three years of the applicant (or

licensee), its affiliates, its controlling interests,

the affiliates of its controlling interests, and the

entities with which it has an attributable material

relationship.

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Appendix G

(ii) If applicable, pursuant to § 24.709 of this

chapter, the total assets of the applicant (or

licensee), its affiliates, its controlling interests,

the affiliates of its controlling interests, and the

entities with which it has an attributable material

relationship shall be attributed to the applicant (or

licensee) and considered on a cumulative basis and

aggregated for purposes of determining whether

the applicant (or licensee) is eligible for status as

an entrepreneur. An applicant seeking status as an

entrepreneur must disclose on its short- and longform applications, separately and in the aggregate,

the gross revenues for each of the previous two

years of the applicant (or licensee), its affiliates, its

controlling interests, the affiliates of its controlling

interests, and the entities with which it has an

attributable material relationship.

(2) Aggregation of affiliate interests. Persons or

entities that hold interests in an applicant (or licensee)

that are affiliates of each other or have an identity

of interests identified in § 1.2110(c)(5)(iii) will be

treated as though they were one person or entity and

their ownership interests aggregated for purposes of

determining an applicant’s (or licensee’s) compliance

with the requirements of this section.

Example 1 to paragraph (b)(2): ABC Corp. is owned by

individuals, A, B and C, each having an equal one-third

voting interest in ABC Corp. A and B together, with

two-thirds of the stock have the power to control ABC

Corp. and have an identity of interest. If A & B invest in

60a

Appendix G

DE Corp., a broadband PCS applicant for block C, A and

B’s separate interests in DE Corp. must be aggregated

because A and B are to be treated as one person or entity.

Example 2 to paragraph (b)(2): ABC Corp. has subsidiary

BC Corp., of which it holds a controlling 51 percent of

the stock. If ABC Corp. and BC Corp., both invest in

DE Corp., their separate interests in DE Corp. must

be aggregated because ABC Corp. and BC Corp. are

affiliates of each other.

(3) Exceptions—

***

(iv) Applicants or licensees w ith mater ia l

relationships—

***

(A) Attributable material relationships. An

applicant or licensee must attribute the gross

revenues (and, if applicable, the total assets) of

any entity, (including the controlling interests,

affiliates, and affiliates of the controlling

interests of that entity) with which the applicant

or licensee has an attributable material

relationship. An applicant or licensee has an

attributable material relationship when it has

one or more arrangements with any individual

entity for the lease or resale (including under a

wholesale agreement) of, on a cumulative basis,

61a

Appendix G

more than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity

of any one of the applicant’s or licensee’s

licenses.

***

(c) Definitions—

(1) Small businesses. The Commission will establish

the definition of a small business on a service-specific

basis, taking into consideration the characteristics and

capital requirements of the particular service.

(2) Controlling interests.

(i) For purposes of this section, controlling interest

includes individuals or entities with either de jure

or de facto control of the applicant. De jure control

is evidenced by holdings of greater than 50 percent

of the voting stock of a corporation, or in the case

of a partnership, general partnership interests.

De facto control is determined on a case-by-case

basis. An entity must disclose its equity interest

and demonstrate at least the following indicia of

control to establish that it retains de facto control

of the applicant:

(A) The entity constitutes or appoints more

than 50 percent of the board of directors or

management committee;

62a

Appendix G

(B) The entity has authority to appoint, promote,

demote, and fire senior executives that control

the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and

(C) The entity plays an integ ral role in

management decisions.

(ii) Calculation of certain interests.

(A)* Fully diluted requirement.

(1) Except as set forth in paragraph (c)(2)

(ii)(A)(2) of this section, ownership interests

shall be calculated on a fully diluted basis; all

agreements such as warrants, stock options

and convertible debentures will generally be

treated as if the rights thereunder already

have been fully exercised.

(2) Rights of first refusal and put options

shall not be calculated on a fully diluted

basis for purposes of determining de jure

control; however, rights of first refusal and

* Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(A): Mutually exclusive

contingent ownership interests, i.e., one or more ownership

interests that, by their terms, are mutually exclusive of one or

more other ownership interests, shall be calculated as having been

fully exercised only in the possible combinations in which they can

be exercised by their holder(s). A contingent ownership interest

is mutually exclusive of another only if contractual language

specifies that both interests cannot be held simultaneously as

present ownership interests.

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Appendix G

put options shall be calculated on a fully

diluted basis if such ownership interests,

in combination with other terms to an

agreement, deprive an otherwise qualified

applicant or licensee of de facto control.

(B) Partnership and other ownership interests

and any stock interest equity, or outstanding

stock, or outstanding voting stock shall be

attributed as specified.

(C) Stock interests held in trust shall be

attributed to any person who holds or shares

the power to vote such stock, to any person

who has the sole power to sell such stock, and

to any person who has the right to revoke the

trust at will or to replace the trustee at will. If

the trustee has a familial, personal, or extratrust business relationship to the grantor or

the beneficiary, the grantor or beneficiary, as

appropriate, will be attributed with the stock

interests held in trust.

(D) Non-voting stock shall be attributed as an

interest in the issuing entity.

(E) Limited partnership interests shall be

attributed to limited partners and shall be

calculated according to both the percentage of

equity paid in and the percentage of distribution

of profits and losses.

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Appendix G

(F) Officers and directors of the applicant shall

be considered to have a controlling interest in

the applicant. The officers and directors of an

entity that controls a licensee or applicant shall

be considered to have a controlling interest in

the licensee or applicant. The personal net worth,

including personal income of the officers and

directors of an applicant, is not attributed to

the applicant. To the extent that the officers and

directors of an applicant are affiliates of other

entities, the gross revenues of the other entities

are attributed to the applicant.

(G) Ownership interests that are held indirectly

by any party through one or more intervening

corporations will be determined by successive

multiplication of the ownership percentages for

each link in the vertical ownership chain and

application of the relevant attribution benchmark to

the resulting product, except that if the ownership

percentage for an interest in any link in the chain

exceeds 50 percent or represents actual control, it

shall be treated as if it were a 100 percent interest.

(H) Any person who manages the operations of an

applicant or licensee pursuant to a management

agreement shall be considered to have a controlling

interest in such applicant or licensee if such person,

or its affiliate, has authority to make decisions or

otherwise engage in practices or activities that

determine, or significantly influence:

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Appendix G

(1) The nature or types of services offered by

such an applicant or licensee;

(2) The terms upon which such services are

offered; or

(3) The prices charged for such services.

(I) Any licensee or its affiliate who enters into a

joint marketing arrangement with an applicant or

licensee, or its affiliate, shall be considered to have

a controlling interest, if such applicant or licensee,

or its affiliate, has authority to make decisions or

otherwise engage in practices or activities that

determine, or significantly influence:

(1) The nature or types of services offered by

such an applicant or licensee;

(2) The terms upon which such services are

offered; or

(3) The prices charged for such services.

***

(5) Affiliate.

(i) An individual or entity is an affiliate of an applicant

or of a person holding an attributable interest in an

applicant if such individual or entity—

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Appendix G

(A) Directly or indirectly controls or has the power

to control the applicant, or

(B) Is directly or indirectly controlled by the

applicant, or

(C) Is directly or indirectly controlled by a third

party or parties that also controls or has the power

to control the applicant, or

(D) Has an “identity of interest” with the applicant.

(ii) Nature of control in determining affiliation.

(A) Every business concern is considered to have

one or more parties who directly or indirectly

control or have the power to control it. Control

may be affirmative or negative and it is immaterial

whether it is exercised so long as the power to

control exists.

Example. An applicant owning 50 percent of the

voting stock of another concern would have negative

power to control such concern since such party can

block any action of the other stockholders. Also, the

bylaws of a corporation may permit a stockholder

with less than 50 percent of the voting stock to

block any actions taken by the other stockholders

in the other entity. Affiliation exists when the

applicant has the power to control a concern while

at the same time another person, or persons, are

in control of the concern at the will of the party or

67a

Appendix G

parties with the power to control.

(B) Control can arise through stock ownership;

occupancy of director, officer or key employee

positions; contractual or other business relations;

or combinations of these and other factors. A key

employee is an employee who, because of his/her

position in the concern, has a critical influence

in or substantive control over the operations or

management of the concern.

(C) Control can arise through management

positions where a concern’s voting stock is so

widely distributed that no effective control can be

established.

Example. In a corporation where the officers and

directors own various size blocks of stock totaling

40 percent of the corporation’s voting stock, but

no officer or director has a block sufficient to give

him or her control or the power to control and the

remaining 60 percent is widely distributed with

no individual stockholder having a stock interest

greater than 10 percent, management has the

power to control. If persons with such management

control of the other entity are persons with

attributable interests in the applicant, the other

entity will be deemed an affiliate of the applicant.

(iii) Identity of interest between and among persons.

A ffiliation can arise between or among two or

more persons with an identity of interest, such as

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Appendix G

members of the same family or persons with common

investments. In determining if the applicant controls

or has the power to control a concern, persons with

an identity of interest will be treated as though they

were one person.

Example. T wo shareholders in Corporation Y

each have attributable interests in the same PCS

application. While neither shareholder has enough

shares to individually control Corporation Y, together

they have the power to control Corporation Y. The

two shareholders with these common investments (or

identity in interest) are treated as though they are

one person and Corporation Y would be deemed an

affiliate of the applicant.

(A) Spousal affiliation. Both spouses are deemed

to own or control or have the power to control

interests owned or controlled by either of them,

unless they are subject to a legal separation

recognized by a court of competent jurisdiction in

the United States. In calculating their net worth,

investors who are legally separated must include

their share of interests in property held jointly

with a spouse.

(B) Kinship affiliation. Immediate fa

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