Petition for Writ of Certiorari — United States, ex rel. Mark J. O'Connor, et al., Petitioners v. USCC Wireless Investment, Inc., et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 5, 2025
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No. 25-___
In the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA EX REL.
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
Petitioners,
v.
USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC.; TELEPHONE AND
DATA SYSTEMS, INC.; KING STREET WIRELESS, LP;
ALLISON CRYOR DINARDO; UNITED STATES CELLULAR
CORPORATION; KING STREET WIRELESS, INC.; CARROLL
WIRELESS, LP; CARROLL PCS, INC.; BARAT WIRELESS,
LP; BARAT WIRELESS, INC.
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Sara M. Lord
Daniel Woofter
Counsel of Record
ARNALL GOLDEN
R
USSELL
& WOOFTER LLC
GREGORY, LLP
1701 Pennsylvania
2100 Pennsylvania
Avenue NW, Suite 350S Avenue NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 240-8433
(202) 677-4054
dw@russellwoofter.com
sara.lord@agg.com
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the D.C. Circuit erred by requiring
plaintiffs to anticipate and negate in their complaint
a False Claims Act affirmative defense, in direct
conflict with Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145
S. Ct. 1020 (2025), and basic principles of civil
procedure.
2.
Whether a False Claims Act plaintiff’s
independent knowledge that prompts a multi-year
fraud investigation “materially adds” to what is
publicly disclosed under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B), or
whether it must be so substantial it is likely to prompt
the government to intervene and prosecute the fraud,
as the D.C. Circuit held, deepening a conflict among
the federal courts of appeals.
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to the proceeding are as follows:
1. Petitioners Mark J. O’Connor and Sara F.
Leibman, who were the plaintiffs in the District Court
and appellants in the Court of Appeals.
2. Respondents are USCC Wireless Investment,
Inc.; Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.; King Street
Wireless, LP; Allison Cryor DiNardo, United States
Cellular Corporation; King Street Wireless, Inc.;
Carroll Wireless, LP; Carroll PCS, Inc.; Barat
Wireless, LP; and Barat Wireless, Inc., who were the
defendants in the District Court and appellees in the
Court of Appeals.
iii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
This case was designated as a related proceeding
in the Court of Appeals to the following case:
United States ex rel. O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular
Corp., No. 20-cv-2070 (D.D.C.), judgment entered
March 9, 2023; No. 23-7041 (D.C. Cir.), pending (oral
argument held April 1, 2024).
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................ii
RELATED PROCEEDINGS ..................................... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... vii
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 1
OPINIONS BELOW .................................................... 1
JURISDICTION .......................................................... 1
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS ......................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................ 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 4
I.
Legal Background ............................................... 4
A. The False Claims Act ..................................... 4
B. FCC Wireless Spectrum Licensing ................ 8
II. Factual Background ............................................ 9
A. The Fraudulent Scheme ................................. 9
B. Petitioner O’Connor’s 2007 Lawsuit ............ 11
C. The Current Lawsuit.................................... 12
III. Procedural History ............................................ 16
A. District Court................................................ 16
B. Court of Appeals ........................................... 17
v
REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION ................. 19
I.
The Court of Appeals’ answer to the first
Question Presented directly conflicts with this
Court’s recent decision in Cunningham. .......... 19
II. The Court of Appeals’ answer to the second
Question Presented deepens an intractable
circuit conflict over the original-source
“materially adds” standard in the FCA. ........... 25
A. The First, Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
interpret the original-source “materially
adds” exception in the public-disclosure
defense such that whistleblowers can proceed
with declined qui tam cases even when the
affirmative defense is triggered. .................. 27
B. In contrast, the Seventh and now D.C.
Circuits hold that the “materially adds”
original-source standard cannot be met in the
only cases it applies. ..................................... 29
C. The multi-split circuit conflict produces
divergent outcomes in practice. ................... 31
III. The Questions Presented are important and
squarely presented. ........................................... 33
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 37
Appendix A, Court of Appeals Decision.................... 1a
Appendix B, District Court Decision ...................... 23a
Appendix C, District Court Order .......................... 41a
Appendix D, Panel Rehearing Order ...................... 43a
Appendix E, En Banc Rehearing Order ................. 45a
vi
Appendix F, Mandate .............................................. 47a
Appendix G, Relevant Statutory And Regulatory
Provisions ........................................................... 49a
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of
Hartgrove, Inc.,
867 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2017) ...................... 29, 30, 33
Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
815 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2016) ..................................29
Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler,
538 U.S. 119 (2003) ..................................................4
Cunningham v. Cornell University,
145 S. Ct. 1020 (2025) .. i, 1, 3, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 36,
37
Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States ex rel. Wilson,
559 U.S. 280 (2010) ..................................................6
Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y,
554 U.S. 84 (2008) ...................................... 21, 22, 23
Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
582 U.S. 420 (2017) ................................................ 22
Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex
rel. Kirk,
563 U.S. 401 (2011) ..................................................5
Smith v. United States,
568 U.S. 106 (2013) .......................................... 18, 24
United States ex rel. Banigan v. PharMerica,
Inc.,
950 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2020) ............................ 31, 33
United States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban,
981 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2020) ...................... 27, 28, 32
viii
United States ex rel. Moore & Co. v. Majestic
Blue Fisheries, LLC,
812 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2016) ............... 7, 8, 27, 31, 33
United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t
Sols.,
923 F.3d 729 (10th Cir. 2019) ........ 26, 28, 30, 32, 33
United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark
Corp.,
875 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2017) .....................................5
United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS
Caremark Corp.,
827 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2016) ................ 18, 26, 28, 30
United States v. Neifert–White Co.,
390 U.S. 228 (1968) ..................................................4
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States
ex rel. Escobar,
579 U.S. 176 (2016) ................................................ 28
Statutes
Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 .................5
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ......................................................1
29 U.S.C. § 1106 ........................................................21
29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) .......................................... 20
29 U.S.C. § 1108 .................................................. 21, 24
29 U.S.C. § 1108(a) ....................................................24
29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(2)(A) .......................................... 20
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) ............................................ 4, 7, 21
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) ............................................4
ix
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) ............................................4
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) ............................................4
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) .................................................4
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) .................................................4
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) ......................................................4
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(1) (2006) ......................................5
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) ..................... 7, 21, 23, 29, 30
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2006) .................................5
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) ..........................i, 5, 7, 21, 29
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2006) .................................5
31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) ....................................................35
47 U.S.C. § 308(j)(3)(C) ...............................................8
47 U.S.C. § 308(j)(4)(E) ...............................................8
47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1) ....................................................8
47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) ...............................................8
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1).................................................22
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) .......................................... 9, 32
Regulations
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(1) (2014) ...................................8
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A) (2014) ................... 9, 16
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(2) (2014) ....................................8
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(n) (2014)........................................9
47 C.F.R. § 1.2111(b) (2014) ........................................9
x
47 C.F.R. § 1.2114(a) (2014) ........................................9
Other Authorities
145 Cong. Rec. E1546 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) .........6
145 Cong. Rec. E1547 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) .........7
U.S. DOJ, False Claims Act Settlements and
Judgments Exceed $2.9B in Fiscal Year 2024
(Jan. 15, 2025) ........................................................34
Complaint, Lampert & O’Connor, P.C. v.
Carroll Wireless, LP, No. 1:07-cv-00800-JDB
(D.D.C.) (May 2, 2007) ..................................... 11, 17
Resp. Br., Cunningham v. Cornell Univ.,
No. 23-1007 (U.S. Dec. 27, 2024) ...........................23
S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 3 (2008)..............................5, 6
S. Rep. No. 99-345 .......................................................6
S. Rep. No. 99-345 (1986) ...................................... 4, 33
Universal Serv. Admin. Co., Mobility Funds,
https://www.usac.org/highcost/funds/mobility-funds/ (last visited Sept.
3, 2025) ...................................................................13
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners respectfully petition this Court for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. In the
alternative, petitioners respectfully request that the
Court grant the petition, vacate the judgment, and
remand for further consideration of the first Question
Presented in light of Cunningham v. Cornell
University, 145 S. Ct. 1020 (2025).
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals (Pet. App. A)
is reported at 128 F.4th 276 (D.C. Cir. 2025). The
District Court’s opinion (Pet. App. B) is unpublished
but available at 2023 WL 2598678.
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on
February 11, 2025. Pet. App. A. The court denied
timely petitions for panel rehearing and rehearing en
banc on April 8, 2025. Pet. App. D & E. The Chief
Justice granted a timely application extending the
time to file this petition to and including September 5,
2025. See No. 25A9. This Court has jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
RELEVANT STATUTORY AND
REGULATORY PROVISIONS
Relevant statutory provisions and regulations are
reproduced in Appendix G to this Petition.
2
INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act’s qui tam provisions
harness private enforcement to protect the public fisc.
Recognizing that the government cannot detect every
fraud, Congress empowers whistleblowers to sue on
the government’s behalf, sharing recoveries with
those who expose schemes to steal taxpayer dollars.
This case involves a brazen fraud that cost taxpayers
more than $163 million through sham small
businesses
created
to
exploit
Federal
Communications Commission programs designed to
promote
legitimate
competition
in
wireless
communications.
The D.C. Circuit’s decision eviscerates the
statutory scheme Congress carefully calibrated in
2010 to encourage more whistleblowers to come
forward. In amendments designed to lower barriers
for relators, Congress transformed the “publicdisclosure bar” from a jurisdictional requirement that
plaintiffs had to overcome into an affirmative defense
that defendants must plead and prove. Congress
simultaneously expanded the exception included in
the newly affirmative defense for “an original source”
to whom the defense cannot apply, ensuring that
relators with valuable information could proceed even
when substantially similar frauds had been disclosed.
The panel acknowledged these amendments but
then imposed requirements that nullify them. First,
despite recognizing that what was once a
jurisdictional bar is now an affirmative defense, the
panel held that False Claims Act (FCA) plaintiffs
must negate this affirmative defense in their
complaint. When the panel invented this novel
3
burden-shifting framework respondents didn’t even
ask for, it did not have the benefit of this Court’s
decision in Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145 S.
Ct. 1020 (2025), which directly contradicts the panel’s
reasoning and conclusions and was decided one day
after the mandate issued. For reasons that equally
apply to the structure and text of the FCA, this Court
held that ERISA plaintiffs need not anticipate and
negate affirmative defenses at the pleading stage.
Second, the panel adopted an impossibly restrictive
interpretation of the “materially adds” standard,
requiring that a relator’s information be so significant
it would prompt government prosecution. This
standard ensures no relator will ever qualify in a
declined case, rendering the “materially adds”
original-source exception meaningless.
These errors warrant immediate review. The
Court of Appeals’ answers to the Questions Presented
conflict with this Court’s decisions and those of
several other circuits, creating inconsistent
enforcement of a critical anti-fraud statute. The D.C.
Circuit hears a disproportionate share of FCA cases—
indeed, respondents elected to transfer this District of
Oklahoma case to the District of Columbia—making
its atextual holdings particularly harmful. And the
decision’s
timing—with
Cunningham
decided
immediately after the mandate issued and after
petitions for panel and en banc rehearing had already
been denied—calls for intervention. At minimum, the
Court should grant, vacate, and remand for further
consideration in light of Cunningham. It is nigh
indisputable that a GVR is warranted given the
peculiar timing, before the panel’s published and
fundamentally flawed authority metastasizes.
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
Legal Background
A. The False Claims Act
The False Claims Act creates civil liability for
“any person” who, e.g., “knowingly presents, or causes
to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval,” “knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
material to a false or fraudulent claim,” or “knowingly
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government.” 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (G). Congress “wrote
expansively, meaning ‘to reach all types of fraud,
without qualification, that might result in financial
loss to the Government.’” Cook County v. United
States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003)
(quoting United States v. Neifert–White Co., 390 U.S.
228, 232 (1968)); see also S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2
(1986) (financial recovery provisions introduced by the
False Claims Reform Act designed to “encourage any
individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that
information forward”).
The statute’s most distinctive feature authorizes
private persons known as qui tam relators to sue on
the government’s behalf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). After
a relator files suit under seal, the government
investigates and decides whether to intervene. Id.
§ 3730(b)(4). Successful relators can receive up to 30%
of the recovery in declined suits, and up to 25% if the
government intervenes and secures a recovery itself.
Id. § 3730(d).
5
From 1986 until 2010, the FCA included a “public
disclosure bar” that operated as a jurisdictional
limitation on qui tam suits. The statute provided that
“[n]o court shall have jurisdiction” over a qui tam
action based on publicly disclosed allegations unless
the relator was an “original source” of the information.
31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(e)(1), (e)(4)(A) (2006). To qualify as
an original source, a relator had to possess “direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which
the allegations are based” and voluntarily provide
that information to the government before filing suit.
Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2006).
Previously, the statute included a “government
knowledge bar,” which precluded qui tam suits
“whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit
was based upon evidence or information in the
possession of the United States, or any agency, officer
or employee thereof, at the time such suit was
brought.” Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608,
609 (repealed 1968). Congress replaced the
government knowledge bar with the “public disclosure
bar” in 1986 because the government knowledge bar
“so ‘significantly limited the number of FCA cases that
were filed’ that ‘by the 1980s, the FCA was no longer
a viable tool for combating fraud against the
Government.’” United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 2017)
(cleaned up) (quoting S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 3 (2008)).
The public disclosure bar sought “to strike a
balance between encouraging private persons to root
out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.” Schindler
Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S.
401, 413 (2011) (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559
6
U.S. 280, 294-95 (2010)). But that balance favors
enforcement. “In creating both the public disclosure
bar and the original source exception,” Congress
sought “to only bar truly ‘parasitic’ lawsuits, such as
those brought by individuals who did nothing more
than copy a criminal indictment filed by the
Government.” S. Rep. No. 110-507, at 22 (2008);
(quoting S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 5275-78 (1986)). On the
other hand, Congress sought “to ensure that any
individual qui tam relator who came forward with
legitimate information that started the Government
looking into an area it would otherwise not have
looked, could proceed with an FCA case.” Id. at 5.
Unfortunately, courts still misapplied the public
disclosure bar to dismiss meritorious cases. This
prompted the sponsors of the 1986 Amendments to
explain that the public disclosure bar, “which was
drafted to deter so-called ‘parasitic’ cases, has been
converted by several circuit courts into a powerful
sword by which defendants are able to defeat worthy
relators and their claims,” in a manner that
threatened to undermine “the very purpose” of the
1986 Amendments. 145 Cong. Rec. E1546 (daily ed.
July 14, 1999) (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman
and Sen. Charles E. Grassley). In particular, the
legislators “disagree[d] with cases holding that qui
tam suits are barred if the relator obtains some, or
even all, of the information necessary to prove fraud
from publicly available documents.” Id. E1547. In
their view, a relator “who uses their education,
training, experience, or talent to uncover a fraudulent
scheme from publicly available documents, should be
allowed to file a qui tam action.” Ibid. “This is
especially true where a relator must piece together
7
facts exposing a fraud from separate documents.”
Ibid.
Congress thus substantially revised these
provisions in 2010 to encourage more private
enforcement suits. See United States ex rel. Moore &
Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 29899 (3d Cir. 2016) (Congress “overhauled” and
“radically changed” the statute to “lower the bar for
relators”). The 2010 amendments made two relevant
critical changes. First, Congress eliminated the
jurisdictional language, transforming the publicdisclosure bar into an affirmative defense. Separately
from the FCA’s prohibitions in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a),
the current statute provides that a court “shall
dismiss” an action “if substantially the same
allegations or transactions” were publicly disclosed
through specific public channels, “unless” the relator
is “an original source,” id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). As the
panel acknowledged, the “public disclosure bar now
operates as an affirmative defense.” Pet. App. 9a
(footnote omitted). Second, Congress expanded the
definition of the original source exception in the
affirmative defense to create two independent paths.
The defense does not apply if: (i) “prior to a public
disclosure,” the relator “has voluntarily disclosed to
the Government the information on which allegations
or transactions in a claim are based,” or (ii) the relator
“has knowledge that is independent of and materially
adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or
transactions” and voluntarily provided that
information to the government before filing suit. 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
The change to the first path removed the
requirement that the relator’s knowledge be “direct
8
and independent” (i.e., entirely firsthand). And
Congress added the new “materially adds” second
pathway to the original-source exception to ensure
that relators who have independent, materially
valuable knowledge may proceed if they provide their
information to the government before suing—even
though the material elements of the fraud were
already publicly disclosed. See, e.g., Moore, 812 F.3d
at 299. This provision recognizes that even when some
aspects of a fraud are known, insiders and specialists
may possess critical information that exposes the full
scope of the scheme or reveals continuing violations.
B. FCC Wireless Spectrum Licensing
Wireless spectrum is a finite public resource with
extraordinary commercial value. To allocate spectrum
licenses fairly while promoting competition, Congress
authorized the FCC to conduct auctions. 47 U.S.C.
§ 309(j)(1). Recognizing that auctions would favor
large incumbents with deep pockets, Congress
directed the FCC to “ensure that small businesses . . .
are given the opportunity to participate in the
provision
of
spectrum-based
services.”
Id.
§ 309(j)(4)(D). But to ensure the legitimacy of the
small business program and the recovery of funds for
the taxpayers, Congress directed the FCC to design
auction rules that prevent “unjust enrichment.” Id.
§ 308(j)(3)(C) & (4)(E).
The FCC implements this mandate through its
“Designated entities” program, which provides
substantial bidding credits—25% discounts in this
case—to qualifying “very small” businesses. See 47
C.F.R. §§ 1.2110(b)(1)(i), (f)(2) (2014). To prevent large
companies from gaming the system through sham
9
small businesses, the FCC imposes strict eligibility
requirements. Designated entities must have average
gross revenues, including the revenues of all affiliates
and controlling interests, under specified thresholds.
Id. §§ 1.2110(b)(1), (f)(2). And designated entities
must maintain actual control over their licenses
during a five-year “[u]njust enrichment” period. Id.
§§ 1.2111(b), (b)(1). Under the regulations relevant
here, if a designated entity were to transfer more than
25% of its spectrum capacity in any single license area
to a non-qualifying entity during this period through
leasing or resale arrangements, it would create an
“attributable material relationship” disqualifying it
from retaining any bid credits for all licenses acquired
by the designated entity with the valuable
discounts—not just the bid credits for the affected
licenses. Id. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A).
Throughout the unjust enrichment period,
designated entities must file annual reports certifying
continued
compliance
with
all
eligibility
requirements. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(n) (2014). They must
also report within 30 days any event affecting their
eligibility, including spectrum leases creating
attributable material relationships. Id. § 1.2114(a).
II. Factual Background1
A. The Fraudulent Scheme
Respondent U.S. Cellular Corporation is one of
the nation’s largest wireless providers, with billions in
1
The case was dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The facts are thus derived
from the operative Second Amended Complaint, located in the
Court of Appeals’ Joint Appendix (“JA”) at JA23-114.
10
annual revenues—far exceeding the thresholds to be
a “very small” designated entity. See Pet. App. 4a.
Between 2005 and 2008, U.S. Cellular orchestrated an
elaborate scheme to circumvent the FCC’s smallbusiness preferences through sham entities that
appeared independent but were secretly controlled by
U.S. Cellular from inception. See id. 4a-5a.
The scheme followed a consistent pattern across
three FCC spectrum auctions. See JA23-114. U.S.
Cellular identified spectrum adjacent to or
overlapping with its existing service areas. It then
recruited respondent Allison Cryor DiNardo, who had
no experience operating wireless services, to serve as
the nominal head of purportedly independent small
businesses. U.S. Cellular provided all financing for
these entities’ auction bids, directed their bidding
strategy, and planned from the start to incorporate
the spectrum into its own network. In Auction 58
(2005), the sham entity Carroll Wireless obtained 16
licenses with $22.1 million in bid credits. See JA80-85.
In Auction 66 (2006), respondent Barat Wireless
obtained 17 licenses with $42.4 million in bid credits.
See JA95. In Auction 73 (2008), respondent King
Street Wireless obtained 152 licenses with $100.2
million in bid credits. See JA54.
In their FCC applications, these entities certified
that DiNardo held both de jure and de facto control,
that they had no additional affiliates, and that their
revenues fell within designated entity thresholds. See
JA78; JA86; JA94. In reality, U.S. Cellular controlled
every aspect of their operations. The entities never
built networks, never had customers, never marketed
services, and never operated as legitimate wireless
providers. See JA68-72; JA90-92; JA100-01.
11
B. Petitioner O’Connor’s 2007 Lawsuit
Petitioner Mark O’Connor, an experienced
telecommunications attorney, suspected that Carroll
and Barat were fronts for U.S. Cellular. His
investigation revealed that these entities had
obtained licenses precisely matching U.S. Cellular’s
coverage gaps, using U.S. Cellular’s financing, and
with no apparent ability to operate independently. So
in 2007, O’Connor filed a qui tam complaint under
seal on behalf of his titular law firm, alleging that
defendants conspired to register sham designated
entities to obtain fraudulent bid credits. See Pet. App.
5a (discussing Lampert & O’Connor, P.C. v. Carroll
Wireless, LP, No. 1:07-cv-00800-JDB (D.D.C.) (suit
filed May 2, 2007)).2 The complaint detailed how U.S.
Cellular formed and controlled Carroll and Barat,
made material misstatements in FCC applications,
and concealed that U.S. Cellular was the real party in
interest. JA637-41. In April 2008, O’Connor amended
the complaint to add King Street as a defendant. See
JA636-70 (amended complaint).
The government conducted at most a cursory
investigation of O’Connor’s allegations, and the FCC
asked defendants to respond to O’Connor’s complaint
as part of the agency’s review of King Street’s license
application. Defendants argued that the King Street
licenses had not yet been granted, and therefore,
O’Connor had no evidence that U.S. Cellular would
take de facto control of King Street. The FCC, relying
on U.S. Cellular’s implicit pledge that King Street
would operate independently, awarded the licenses to
2
The Court of Appeals wrote that the suit was filed in 2008,
Pet. App. 5a, but it was in fact filed in 2007.
12
King Street at a $100.2 million “very small business”
discount. JA54. Faced with the theoretical possibility
that King Street might operate legitimately—which
would disprove the fraud allegations—O’Connor
voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice in
January 2010. See Pet. App. 5a.
C. The Current Lawsuit
After dismissing the original action, O’Connor
partnered with telecommunications attorney and
fellow petitioner Sara Leibman to investigate whether
the entities had fulfilled their promise to operate
independently. See Pet. App. 6a-7a. Their multi-year
investigation uncovered extensive evidence of a new
post-licensing fraud that went far beyond the original
allegations. In particular, the relators demonstrated
that King Street had never provided wireless
telecommunications services (to the public or anyone
else) and instead had relinquished its spectrum
licenses to U.S. Cellular, which used them to build a
broadband network and offer 4G LTE services to its
own customers without any involvement by King
Street. See id. 17a-18a. In April 2015, petitioners filed
this action under seal, realleging both the original
fraud to obtain license discounts and asserting for the
first time independent knowledge of a subsequent
fraud to retain the hundreds of millions of taxpayer
dollars in bid credits through false certifications. See
id. 6a-7a; JA8. Their complaint triggered what
became a nearly five-year DOJ reinvestigation.
Petitioners
commissioned
sophisticated
engineering analyses that revealed continuous radio
signals across both King Street’s and U.S. Cellular’s
adjacent spectrum bands, proving technical spectrum
13
integration invisible to casual observation. See
JA62-63. This integration meant U.S. Cellular had
incorporated King Street’s entire spectrum into its
own network, violating the 25% leasing limitation
many times over. This spectrum analysis led
petitioners to discover that respondents had
fabricated a network sharing agreement that U.S.
Cellular submitted to the FCC in 2012.
Petitioners’ discovery of the fabricated 2012 lease
came through methodical detective work. Their
engineering analyses had revealed that U.S. Cellular
was using far more of King Street’s spectrum than any
disclosed agreements would permit. Searching for an
explanation, they discovered that in 2012, U.S.
Cellular had participated in “Auction 901,” which
served as the FCC’s vehicle to distribute more than
$40 million in “Mobility Fund” subsidies3 to wireless
providers willing to deploy broadband networks in
underserved rural areas. See JA76-78; JA306. To
qualify, applicants had to prove they controlled
spectrum in the areas in which they bid. U.S. Cellular
faced a dilemma: It needed to show the FCC it had
access to King Street’s spectrum to win the subsidies,
but King Street was still in its unjust enrichment
period and could not transfer or lease substantial
spectrum
without
triggering
bidding
credit
repayment obligations. Petitioners found U.S.
Cellular’s solution buried in its Auction 901
application: A summary of a purported 2012 lease
3
The Mobility Fund was part of the FCC’s Universal Service
Fund program. See Universal Serv. Admin. Co., Mobility Funds,
https://www.usac.org/high-cost/funds/mobility-funds/
(last
visited Sept. 3, 2025).
14
showing King Street had transferred spectrum
covering only tiny census tracts—just 1.03% of one
license area. JA77-78; JA325-29.
This made no commercial sense given petitioners’
technical
evidence
of
widespread
spectrum
integration. As discussed below, their suspicions
proved correct when DOJ investigators, armed with
petitioners’ analysis, forced production of the real
agreement—the 2011 Network Sharing Agreement—
showing that respondents had violated the
attributable material relationships rule many times
over and intentionally concealed it from the
government. See JA77. Meanwhile, the fabricated
2012 lease submitted to the FCC had been carefully
crafted to give U.S. Cellular just enough documented
spectrum access to qualify for Mobility Fund subsidies
while concealing the massive regulatory violations
that would have required repaying over $100 million
in bid credits. See JA76-78; JA325-29.
Petitioners’ investigation further revealed that
King Street never operated as a legitimate wireless
company. See Pet. App. 17a. It had no retail stores, no
customers, never obtained telephone numbers
essential for providing service, never filed required
FCC service reports, and never marketed in its
licensed areas. See JA66-72. Some antenna structures
King Street claimed to operate were actually built by
and registered to U.S. Cellular—facts petitioners
verified by cross-referencing building permits with
FCC registration databases that no one had
previously connected. See JA67.
Petitioners also hired investigators to obtain
wireless service using King Street’s spectrum. They
15
discovered that U.S. Cellular, not King Street,
controlled all aspects of service provisioning, rates,
terms, and conditions. See JA63-65. Meanwhile, King
Street filed annual reports with the FCC falsely
certifying that it maintained “continuing oversight,
review, supervision and control” of its licenses. JA74.
Respondents never disputed that petitioners’
“voluntary disclosures” to the DOJ of their discoveries
“prior to filing the 2015 complaint, led to the
Government’s lengthy second investigation.” See Petr.
C.A. Reply Br. 16 (comparing Resp. C.A. Br. 12, 30,
with Petr. C.A. Br. 54-55). And although none of this
was relevant to sufficiently pleading their claims,
respondents have never disputed that petitioners
worked closely with DOJ attorneys and investigators
throughout this investigation. Petitioners provided
their engineering analyses, investigative reports, and
regulatory expertise. They helped investigators
understand the technical aspects of spectrum
integration and the significance of various FCC
filings. They identified discrepancies between what
defendants told the FCC and what the technical
evidence revealed.
This collaboration bore fruit. Armed with
petitioners’ evidence and analysis, DOJ investigators
ultimately forced defendants to produce documents
they had concealed from the FCC. Most significantly,
investigators obtained the actual spectrum sharing
agreement between King Street and U.S. Cellular—
not the fabricated 2012 version submitted to the FCC
in an unrelated proceeding to further defraud the
government, but the real agreement signed in 2011—
ceding control of virtually all of King Street’s licensed
spectrum to U.S. Cellular during the unjust
16
enrichment period. See Pet. App. 17a-18a. The 2011
Network Sharing Agreement revealed the fraud’s full
scope. King Street had leased to U.S. Cellular not 1%
of the spectrum capacity of a couple dozen licenses, as
U.S. Cellular publicly claimed, but 100% of the
spectrum capacity across 90 license areas. See JA77.
Under the governing FCC regulations, violating the
rule in any single license area disqualified King Street
from retaining the $100 million in bid credits for any
of the 152 license areas it had won in Auction 73. See
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(A) (2014). King Street had
violated the regulation 90 times over. The contrast
between the real 2011 agreement and the fake 2012
version submitted to the FCC demonstrated
deliberate deception. This was not mere nondisclosure
but affirmative fabrication of documents to conceal
regulatory violations.
While this case remained under seal, DOJ
investigators shared the 2011 agreement with
petitioners, recognizing their crucial role in exposing
the fraud. Using the additional evidence of fraud the
government shared while the case was under seal,
petitioners amended their complaint to allege the
concealed 2011 agreement and the false 2012
agreement submitted to the FCC. The government
ultimately declined to intervene in December 2019
and the complaint was unsealed. See Pet. App. 7a.
III. Procedural History
A. District Court
Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple
grounds, including failure to state a claim and the
public-disclosure defense. The District Court granted
the motion based solely on the public-disclosure
17
defense, finding that petitioners’ allegations were
“substantially the same” as those in O’Connor’s 2008
complaint and that petitioners failed to prove they are
original sources. See Pet. App. 32a-39a. The court held
that
petitioners’
extensive
post-dismissal
investigation did not “materially add” to the
allegations that were disclosed when the 2008
complaint in Lampert & O’Connor was unsealed to the
public, Pet. App. 36a, because the “core” fraud
remained the same, id. 33a.4
B. Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a published
opinion addressing two questions of first impression
for the D.C. Circuit. Pet. App. A.5
First, the panel created a novel burden-shifting
framework for the public-disclosure defense. While
acknowledging that Congress had transformed the
bar from a jurisdictional limitation into “an
affirmative defense” on the merits, Pet. App. 9a, the
4
Adding insult to injury, the District Court dismissed with
prejudice, denying petitioners any opportunity to amend their
complaint to address the court’s concerns. See Pet. App. C. This
was defendants’ first motion to dismiss, and the court was
interpreting statutory provisions never previously addressed by
the D.C. Circuit. Even so, petitioners’ express request that “any
dismissal should be without prejudice” to allow them to “correct
any defects” was rejected. See JA900.
5
Adding further insult to injury, the panel held that the
District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the
complaint with prejudice despite petitioners’ express request
that, at a minimum, petitioners be allowed to replead to allege
O’Connor’s personal involvement in the 2007 case that
indisputably makes him an original source of the current suit.
Pet. App. 22a n.9.
18
panel held that relators must nonetheless
“demonstrat[e]” they qualify as an original source to
avoid pre-answer dismissal, id. 15a. The panel
reasoned that because original-source status “benefits
relators” and because relators are “best situated to
know the facts” of their status, they should bear the
burden at the pleading stage of establishing that the
affirmative public-disclosure defense does not apply.
Id. 15a (citing only Smith v. United States, 568 U.S.
106, 112 (2013), which addresses the ultimate burden
of proof in criminal conspiracy cases, and affirmed and
applied “the common-law rule” that “affirmative
defenses were matters for the defendant to prove”
(cleaned up)).
Second, the panel adopted an exceptionally
restrictive interpretation of the “materially adds”
original-source condition in the public-disclosure
defense. Acknowledging that the second Question
Presented was a matter of first impression for the
D.C. Circuit, Pet. App. 18a, the panel held that a
relator’s information materially adds to what the
government already knows from public disclosures
only if it is “‘sufficiently significant or essential’” to
influence the government “to prosecute fraud,” id.
19a-20a (quoting United States ex rel. Winkelman v.
CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir.
2016)). Applying this new “materially adds” standard,
the panel dismissed petitioners’ contributions to the
government’s investigation as immaterial despite
acknowledging that their information prompted DOJ
to conduct a comprehensive reinvestigation lasting
nearly five years. See id. 21a. The panel recognized
that “the government has broad discretion in deciding
how to respond to allegations in a qui tam suit” and
19
that “such decision may be based on a range of factors
independent of the relators’ specific disclosures.” Ibid.
Yet because the government ultimately declined to
intervene, it was not even plausible to the court that
petitioners’ information was material. See id. 21a-22a.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ timely
rehearing petitions on April 8, 2025. Pet. App. D & E.
The mandate issued April 16, 2025. Pet. App. F. This
Court decided Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145
S. Ct. 1020 (2025), on April 17—the very next day.
REASONS TO GRANT THE PETITION
I.
The Court of Appeals’ Answer to the
First Question Presented Directly
Conflicts With This Court’s Recent
Decision in Cunningham.
The timing alone compels intervention.
Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145 S. Ct. 1020
(2025), was decided April 17, 2025—after petitions for
rehearing had been denied, indeed just one day after
the mandate issued. The D.C. Circuit had no
opportunity to consider Cunningham’s holding that
plaintiffs need not anticipate and negate affirmative
defenses in their complaints. See id. at 1024. At
minimum, this Court should grant, vacate, and
remand for reconsideration in light of Cunningham.
But the conflict runs deeper than timing. The
D.C. Circuit correctly recognized that the publicdisclosure bar “now operates as an affirmative
defense” on the merits. Pet. App. 9a. And respondents
never disputed petitioners’ express and repeated
argument that plaintiffs need not anticipate and
negate an affirmative defense. Compare Petr. C.A.
20
Br. 32 (explaining standard of review for affirmative
defenses), Petr. C.A. Reply Br. 1 (“Defendants do not
dispute that the post-2010 public disclosure bar is an
affirmative defense on which they have the burden of
proof. Nor do they contest that plaintiffs are ‘not
required to negate an affirmative defense in their
complaint.’” (citation omitted)), and Petr. C.A. Reply
Br. 5-6, 9-10 (explaining same), with Resp. C.A. Br. 39
(arguing only that under the pre-amended
jurisdictional bar, a relator must “allege specific facts”
to “establish original source status” (citation
omitted)). Yet the panel departed from this black
letter law for two reasons: Relators benefit when the
affirmative defense does not apply and probably
possess the relevant original-source evidence. See Pet.
App. 15a. That analysis cannot be reconciled with
Cunningham’s reasoning or this Court’s consistent
approach to affirmative defenses.
Cunningham involved a foundational question of
civil procedure: When Congress creates statutory
exemptions or exceptions to liability, must plaintiffs
anticipate and negate those exceptions in their
complaints? The Court’s unanimous answer was no.
See Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at 1024-28; id. at 103234 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
concurring). The case arose under ERISA, which
prohibits certain transactions between retirement
plans and parties in interest. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1106(a)(1)(C). The statute separately provides
twenty-one exemptions for transactions that would
otherwise be prohibited, such as those involving
“services necessary for the establishment or operation
of the plan” with “reasonable compensation.” Id.
§ 1108(b)(2)(A). Cornell University argued that
21
plaintiffs suing for prohibited transactions must plead
facts showing that none of these exemptions apply—
essentially requiring plaintiffs to prove a negative
before defendants even answer the complaint. This
Court rejected that approach, holding that the
exemptions constitute affirmative defenses that
defendants must plead and prove. Cunningham, 145
S. Ct. at 1028. The Court’s analysis turned on
statutory structure and the established principles
governing affirmative defenses that apply here.
First, Cunningham examined how Congress
organized the statute, an analysis that applies with
equal force to the FCA. When exemptions are “laid out
apart from the prohibitions” and “expressly refer to
the prohibited conduct as such,” they operate as
affirmative defenses rather than elements of a
plaintiff’s claim. 145 S. Ct. at 1027 (cleaned up)
(quoting Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab’y, 554
U.S. 84, 91 (2008)). In ERISA, the prohibitions
creating liability appear in one section (29 U.S.C.
§ 1106), while the exemptions appear separately (29
U.S.C. § 1108). Ibid. The FCA follows the identical
pattern: The provisions creating liability for false
claims appear in 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a), while the publicdisclosure defense and original-source condition
appear in § 3730(e)(4)(A). It then defines the originalsource condition in § 3730(e)(4)(B)—an original source
is either the source of the public disclosure or has
independent information that materially adds to it.
This structural separation matters. The Court in
Cunningham analogized to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act at issue in Meacham, where
Congress similarly placed prohibitions in one
provision
and
exemptions
including
a
22
“reasonableness” defense in another. Cunningham,
145 S. Ct. at 1028. The Meacham Court held that this
structure created affirmative defenses that
defendants must both plead and prove. 554 U.S. at 95.
Cunningham applied the same principle to ERISA:
“Like the exemptions at issue in Meacham, the § 1108
exemptions are ‘written in the orthodox format of an
affirmative defense.’” 145 S. Ct. at 1028 (cleaned up)
(quoting Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102). The FCA’s
public-disclosure defense follows this same “orthodox
format.” See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102. Just as
ERISA’s prohibitions apply “[e]xcept as provided in
section 1108,” Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at 1029, the
FCA’s public-disclosure defense creates a conditional
exception to otherwise valid claims separate from the
FCA’s liability provisions.
Second, the Court emphasized a fundamental
principle of civil litigation: “an ‘affirmative defense’ is
‘not something the plaintiff must anticipate and
negate in her pleading.’” Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at
1028 (quoting Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
582 U.S. 420 (2017)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(c) codifies this principle, requiring defendants—not
plaintiffs—to “affirmatively state any . . . affirmative
defense” in their responsive pleadings. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(c)(1). This principle applies equally to FCA
plaintiffs, who should not be required to anticipate
and negate potential public disclosures before
defendants even identify what disclosures they claim
bar the action. Yet respondents never asserted the
defense in an answer; they raised it in their first and
only pre-answer motion to dismiss, which the courts
granted with prejudice.
23
Cunningham acknowledged practical concerns
about meritless litigation but found them insufficient
to override clear statutory text. See 145 S. Ct. at 1029
(“These are serious concerns but they cannot
overcome the statutory text and structure.”); id. at
1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
concurring) (“[T]he Second Circuit tried to formulate
a rule that would weed out plainly unmeritorious
suits at the pleading stage. The court attempted to
achieve an admirable goal, but established pleading
rules do not allow that workaround.”). When Congress
writes exemptions “in the orthodox format of an
affirmative defense,” courts must “read [them] the
way Congress wrote [them],” regardless of perceived
practical benefits of a different approach. Id. at 1031
(quoting Meacham, 554 U.S. at 102).
Cunningham also rejected the notion that
practical considerations about who possesses relevant
information should determine burden allocation.
Cornell argued that because plaintiffs possess the
information necessary to plead that the exceptions to
ERISA’s liability provisions do not apply, they should
have to do so at the pleading stage. See Resp. Br.
39-44, Cunningham, No. 23-1007 (Dec. 27, 2024). The
D.C. Circuit raised similar policy concerns here,
arguing that relators “benefit” when they are an
original source to whom the affirmative defense
expressly does not apply and are “best situated to
know the facts” of their status. Pet. App. 15a. But that
is universally the case for a conditional affirmative
defense like this one, which applies “unless” the
plaintiff is an original source, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), and nothing particular to ERISA or
the FCA warrants a different result. See
24
Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at 1030 (applying its holding
to all of ERISA’s affirmative defenses in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1108(a) whether “conditional or unconditional”).
Congress’s structural choices control, not practical
considerations. Compare Cunningham, 145 S. Ct. at
1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and Kavanaugh, JJ.,
concurring) (agreeing with majority that prudential
considerations could not shift pleading burden to
plaintiffs); ibid. (highlighting Solicitor General’s
“promising” proposed “alternative safeguards,” by
which “a district court may insist that a plaintiff file a
reply to an answer that raises one of the § 1108
exemptions as an affirmative defense” (citation
omitted)).
This Court’s earlier decision in Smith v. United
States, 568 U.S. 106 (2013)—the only case the Court
of Appeals relied on for its contrary conclusion, Pet.
App. 15a (citing Smith, 568 U.S. at 112)—only
reinforces that petitioners are right and the panel was
wrong. Smith addressed whether defendants bear the
ultimate burden of proving withdrawal from a
criminal conspiracy—a question about the burden of
proof at trial. 568 U.S. at 112-13. The Court
reaffirmed and applied “the common-law rule” that
“affirmative defenses were matters for the defendant
to prove.” Id. at 112 (cleaned up). Nothing in Smith
suggests plaintiffs must anticipate and negate
affirmative defenses in their complaints. To the
contrary, Smith reinforces the traditional allocation of
burdens: Defendants must prove their affirmative
defenses. The Court emphasized that when Congress
leaves “the traditional burden of proof undisturbed,”
courts must apply common-law principles. Ibid. It is
equally clear that nothing in Smith supports the
25
notion that at the pleading stage, it should matter
whether plaintiffs “benefit” from negating an
affirmative defense and are “best situated to know the
facts.” Contra Pet. App. 15a.
Petitioners do not dispute that they at least bear
the burden of production regarding their originalsource status. And although it is not conceded nor at
issue, they might even have the ultimate burden to
prove their original-source status at the appropriate
stage. They indisputably could, given petitioner
O’Connor’s personal involvement in drafting and
filing the 2007 suit that forms the entire basis of
respondents’ public-disclosure defense. Cf. Pet. App.
22a n.9 (affirming dismissal with prejudice over
petitioners’ express request for leave to replead,
holding that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying leave to amend). But requiring
petitioners to establish this status in their complaint,
before any defendant pleads the defense and before
any factual development, contradicts this Court’s
teachings and basic principles of civil litigation.
II. The Court of Appeals’ Answer to the
Second Question Presented Deepens an
Intractable Circuit Conflict Over the
Original-Source
“Materially
Adds”
Standard in the FCA.
The circuits have adopted three divergent
interpretations of what it means for information to
“materially add” to public disclosures for purposes of
the original-source exception in the affirmative
public-disclosure defense. This division has persisted
for nearly a decade since the 2010 amendments, and
only this Court can resolve it.
26
As discussed below, the First, Third, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits apply a text-based standard focused on
whether information “adds value” to the government’s
enforcement efforts. These courts recognize that the
“materially adds” original-source condition in the
public-disclosure defense must mean something
different than the “substantially the same” standard
that triggers the defense to begin with. In contrast,
the Seventh and now D.C. Circuits have effectively
erased the “materially adds” definition of an original
source from the provision. The Seventh Circuit has
expressly held that if information is “substantially the
same” as that which has been publicly disclosed, then
it cannot “materially add” to what was public,
rendering the exception a nullity. See, e.g., United
States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d
729, 757-58 (10th Cir. 2019) (criticizing Seventh
Circuit’s approach because it “has the effect of
collapsing the materially-adds inquiry into the
substantially-the-same inquiry,” which “renders
nugatory” Congress’s decision to create a separate
path for relators with valuable additional information
(citation omitted)); United States ex rel. Winkelman v.
CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211-12 (1st Cir.
2016) (same). In this case, the D.C. Circuit further
fractured and deepened the split; by holding that
information materially adds to what is publicly known
only if it would likely prompt the government to
intervene, a situation in which the original-source
exception would not apply, the panel similarly
“rendered nugatory” the materially adds exception to
the affirmative public-disclosure defense. See Reed,
923 F.3d at 757-58 (quoting Winkelman, 827 F.3d at
211-12).
27
A. The First, Third, Sixth, and Tenth
Circuits Interpret the OriginalSource “Materially Adds” Exception
in the Public-Disclosure Defense
Such That Whistleblowers Can
Proceed With Declined Qui Tam
Cases Even When the Affirmative
Defense Is Triggered.
In the Third Circuit, relators need only
“contribute significant additional information to that
which has been publicly disclosed so as to improve its
quality” to be an original source. United States ex rel.
Moore & Co. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d
294, 306 (3d Cir. 2016). As the Third Circuit
explained, Congress “expanded the definition of
‘original source’” to “lower the bar for relators.” Id.
at 299. Applying the materially adds standard, the
Third Circuit refused to dismiss a relator’s new details
as immaterial merely because the general fraud had
been publicly reported. Id. at 306-08. Holding
otherwise “cannot be” correct, the court reasoned, “for
that would read out of the statute the original source
exception,” which “comes into play only when some
facts regarding the allegation or transaction have
been publicly disclosed.” Id. at 306.
Like the Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit asks
whether the relator’s information “might actually
affect the government’s decision-making,” defined as
anything that “would add value for the government.”
United States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban, 981 F.3d
516, 525, 527 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up; citations
omitted). This standard recognizes that even
“allegations that a substantially similar scheme has
28
continued or restarted could provide the government
with ‘knowledge that is independent of and materially
adds’ to the public disclosures.” Id. at 525 (citation
omitted). So too the Tenth Circuit’s standard, which
requires only that the allegations be “capable of
‘influencing the behavior of the recipient’—i.e., the
government.” Reed, 923 F.3d at 757 (cleaned up)
(quoting Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211); id. at 759-63
(concluding that plaintiff could proceed as an original
source in a declined case based on independent
information that materially added to publicly
disclosed frauds).
The First Circuit’s standard, while sometimes
quoted selectively, e.g., Pet. App. 19a (quoting
Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211), aligns with this
approach. Information must be “sufficiently
significant or essential so as” to “influence the
behavior of the recipient.” Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211
(citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States
ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 195-96 (2016)). The First
Circuit has never suggested the information must
prompt prosecution—only that it could influence
government behavior. See, e.g., Maur, 981 F.3d at 527
(agreeing with Winkelman and Reed that to be an
original source, relator’s independent information
need only “add value for the government”).
Under any of these standards, petitioners easily
qualify. Their engineering analyses revealed technical
spectrum integration invisible without sophisticated
testing. Their investigation proved King Street never
operated as a legitimate provider. Their persistence
led DOJ to uncover the concealed 2011 agreement
showing 100% spectrum transfer rather than the
1.03% falsely claimed to the FCC. This information
29
fundamentally
changed
the
government’s
understanding of the fraud’s scope and methods—or
the DOJ wouldn’t have reopened the fraud
investigation and wasted resources rigorously
pursuing a new inquiry for half a decade.
B. In Contrast, the Seventh and Now
D.C. Circuits Hold That the
“Materially Adds” Original-Source
Standard Cannot Be Met in the Only
Cases It Applies.
The Seventh Circuit takes a fundamentally
different approach that effectively eliminates the
“materially adds” provision altogether, as other
circuits have recognized.
In Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of
Hartgrove, Inc., the Seventh Circuit held that if
allegations are “substantially similar to” public
disclosures such that the public-disclosure defense is
triggered, the allegations cannot materially add to
what the public knows. 867 F.3d 712, 721 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing Cause of Action v. Chi. Transit Auth., 815
F.3d 267, 283 (7th Cir. 2016)). Under this
interpretation, the two statutory inquiries collapse
into one: If a court finds the allegations “substantially
the same” as public disclosures (triggering the
defense), it necessarily follows that the relator’s
information does not “materially add” (defeating the
exception). Ibid. The Seventh Circuit reached this
conclusion by focusing on the word “allegations” in
both statutory phrases, reasoning that because
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) bars suits based on “substantially the
same allegations or transactions” as publicly
disclosed, and § 3730(e)(4)(B) requires knowledge that
30
“materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations
or transactions,” the two standards must be
measuring the same thing. Id. at 717; see id. at
717-21.
This interpretation has been widely criticized by
other circuits. As the Tenth Circuit explained in Reed,
the Seventh Circuit’s approach “has the effect of
collapsing the materially-adds inquiry into the
substantially-the-same inquiry,” which “renders
nugatory” Congress’s decision to create a separate
path for relators with valuable additional
information. 923 F.3d at 757 (quoting Winkelman, 827
F.3d at 211-12). The First Circuit similarly rejected
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, because it would
mean a relator could never qualify as an original
source in any case where the public-disclosure defense
applies. Winkelman, 827 F.3d at 211-12.
The D.C. Circuit has now staked out the most
extreme position, requiring that information be so
“significant or essential” that it would push the
government “to prosecute” the fraud. Pet. App. 19a20a. This standard is impossible to meet in declined
cases—the only context where the “materially adds”
standard matters. The panel’s standard thus creates
a Catch-22. If the government intervenes, the publicdisclosure defense is inapplicable. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) (defense does not apply if “the action is
brought by the Attorney General”). If the government
declines even after an extensive fraud investigation in
tandem with relators while the case is under seal, the
D.C. Circuit holds that it is not even plausible the
information was material to the government. Under
this logic, no relator in a declined case can ever
establish materiality.
31
Citing nothing, the panel attempted to justify its
restrictive interpretation by claiming it “comports
with Congress’s narrowing of the original source
exception in 2010.” Pet. App. 20a (emphasis added).
But as the Third Circuit has explained, Congress
“expanded the definition of ‘original source’” in 2010,
thus narrowing the applicability of the newly
affirmative defense to “lower the bar for relators.”
Moore, 812 F.3d at 297-99 (emphases added)).
C. The Multi-Split Circuit Conflict
Produces Divergent Outcomes in
Practice.
The competing standards are not merely
academic distinctions—they determine whether
meritorious cases proceed or are dismissed. Decisions
from the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits all would
have come out the other way under the standards
imposed in the Seventh and D.C. Circuits.
In United States ex rel. Banigan v. PharMerica,
Inc., 950 F.3d 134 (1st Cir. 2020), the First Circuit
found the public-disclosure defense triggered because
prior qui tam suits and government reports had
disclosed the same fraudulent scheme—indeed, the
court found the schemes “indistinguishable in all
material respects.” Id. at 144 (emphasis added). The
government declined to intervene. Id. at 141-42. Yet
the court held the relator could proceed because his
specific insider knowledge about how his company
executed the kickback scheme “materially added” to
what was publicly known. Id. at 147. In Moore, the
Third Circuit found the public-disclosure defense
triggered because news articles and FOIA documents
had revealed “substantially the same allegations or
32
transactions” regarding foreign entities using sham
U.S. companies to obtain fishing licenses. 812 F.3d at
301, 304. The government had declined to intervene.
Even so, the court held the relator could proceed
because his independent information revealing how
the defendants specifically structured and controlled
the sham companies “materially added” to the public
disclosures. Id. at 297, 308. And in Reed, the Tenth
Circuit found the public-disclosure defense triggered
because news reports and government audits had
revealed fraud allegations that were “substantially
the same” as those in Reed’s complaint regarding the
background-investigation industry. 923 F.3d at
747-53. The government declined to intervene. Id.
at 741. But the court held the relator could proceed
because her specific allegations about fraud in
KeyPoint’s Telephone Testimony Program, combined
with evidence of management cover-ups, “added
material information” to the public disclosures. Id. at
761-63.6
Under the D.C. Circuit’s standard, none of these
relators could have proceeded. As the Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal in this case makes evident, the court
6
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Maur reached a different
result, but not because it applied the wrong standard. See Maur,
981 F.3d at 527 (agreeing with Winkelman and Reed that to be
an original source, relator’s independent information need only
“add value for the government”). Maur found no material
addition when the same doctor’s fraud continued during active
government monitoring through an integrity agreement with
quarterly reporting. Id. at 528-29. Here, there was no
government monitoring—no one disputes that petitioners’
information prompted the government to open an entirely new
investigation after closing the previous one based on O’Connor’s
2007 lawsuit.
33
requires information so significant it would prompt
the government “to prosecute fraud”—petitioners’
prompting a five-year DOJ fraud reinvestigation could
not in the court’s view even plausibly show that their
independent information materially added to what
the government already knew. See Pet. App. 19a-20a.
Since the government declined to intervene in
Banigan, Moore, and Reed after considering the
relators’ independent information, those relators
would not meet the D.C. Circuit’s standard either.
Under the Seventh Circuit’s standard, Banigan,
Moore, and Reed would have come out the other way
as well. The Seventh Circuit holds that if allegations
are “substantially similar to” public disclosures—
which all three courts found—they cannot “materially
add” under the second original-source exception to the
defense. See Bellevue, 867 F.3d at 721. In other words,
once the public-disclosure defense is triggered under
the Seventh Circuit’s approach, only the first originalsource exception is available and the second is
surplusage.
The intolerable result is that relators like
petitioners in declined cases can proceed in the First,
Third, and Tenth Circuits (and probably the Sixth
Circuit too), even when the public-disclosure defense
is triggered, but are automatically barred in the D.C.
and Seventh Circuits.
III. The Questions Presented Are Important
and Squarely Presented.
The False Claims Act is the government’s
“primary litigative tool” for combating fraud. See S.
Rep. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986). Since 1986, FCA cases
have recovered “more than $78 billion” for taxpayers,
34
with the vast majority coming from qui tam actions.
See U.S. DOJ, False Claims Act Settlements and
Judgments Exceed $2.9B in Fiscal Year 2024 (Jan. 15,
2025).7 In fiscal year 2024 alone, qui tam cases
accounted for $2.4 billion of the $2.9 billion recovered
under the FCA—over 80% of the recuperated taxpayer
dollars. See ibid. These recoveries represent only a
fraction of the fraud prevented through the statute’s
deterrent effect. See ibid. Potential fraudsters know
that insiders might expose their schemes, making
fraud a riskier proposition. This deterrent effect
depends on maintaining viable paths for
whistleblowers to bring suit.
The D.C. Circuit’s restrictions undermine both
recovery and deterrence. By requiring relators to
negate affirmative defenses in their complaints and
setting an impossible standard for original-source
materiality, the court has created artificial barriers to
private enforcement. Fraudsters can operate with
greater confidence that even if insiders detect their
schemes, procedural hurdles will prevent successful
challenges.
And the D.C. Circuit’s decision deepens a circuit
conflict that has profound practical implications. The
same fraudulent scheme dismissed out of hand in this
case would be remediable in the Third, Sixth, or Tenth
Circuits, for example, but not in the D.C. Circuit or
Seventh Circuit. Potential whistleblowers must
therefore evaluate whether to risk their careers and
relationships to expose fraud depending on which
circuit they are in. In circuits applying the majority
“materially adds” standard, they know that valuable
7
Available at https://tinyurl.com/35yaudx9.
35
information—even if it doesn’t prompt immediate
prosecution—can support a viable claim. In the D.C.
Circuit, they know that unless their information
would cause the government to intervene, their efforts
are futile. And given that many government contracts
are performed in multiple jurisdictions, fraudsters
can exploit these inconsistencies by structuring
operations to take advantage of circuits with
restrictive standards—or, as here, simply by moving
to transfer the case to D.D.C. over plaintiffs’ objection.
See Pet. App. 23a; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a). So it is
particularly important to intervene and correct the
D.C. Circuit’s published, novel decision.
This case demonstrates why Congress relies on
private
parties
to
supplement
government
enforcement. Petitioners—each a telecommunications
attorney with special expertise—understood the
FCC’s complex regulatory scheme and recognized
irregularities
that
might
escape
generalist
investigators. They invested years and significant
resources investigating the fraud, hiring engineers
and investigators, and analyzing technical data. Their
efforts paid off. Working with petitioners, DOJ
investigators uncovered the concealed 2011 lease that
proved the fraud’s full scope. Without petitioners’
expertise and persistence, defendants would have
successfully concealed their scheme to steal over $163
million in taxpayer funds. Yet under the D.C. Circuit’s
standards, petitioners’ contributions mean nothing.
Despite prompting a five-year reinvestigation and
uncovering crucial evidence, they cannot proceed with
their case. This result sends a chilling message to
potential whistleblowers.
36
This case presents an ideal vehicle for resolving
both questions. The only disputes concern the legal
standards governing the public-disclosure defense.
Either question independently requires reversal.
First, if plaintiffs need not negate affirmative
defenses in their complaints—as Cunningham
holds—the dismissal cannot stand. Petitioners never
had the opportunity to develop evidence of their
original-source status through discovery or to respond
in the pleadings to defendants’ specific contentions
about public disclosures. See, e.g., Cunningham, 145
S. Ct. at 1033 (Alito, J., joined by Thomas and
Kavanaugh, JJ., concurring) (suggesting that in
circumstances like these, “a district court may insist
that a plaintiff file a reply to an answer that raises . . .
an affirmative defense”). Second, if the majority
circuits’ interpretation of “materially adds” is correct,
petitioners qualify as original sources under the
second exception to the defense. The relevant facts are
undisputed: Petitioner “O’Connor was a partner at the
law firm and involved in filing” the original 2007
action on which respondents founded their publicdisclosure defense; petitioners conducted extensive
investigation yielding new evidence of fraud; the
government reopened a closed investigation and then
reinvestigated for nearly five years; and the
government ultimately declined intervention. See Pet.
App. 4a-7a, 15a-16a, 20a-21a. Under any standard
that gives meaning to the FCA’s text, this information
materially added to what was publicly known.
The case’s procedural posture underscores the
need for review. This was defendants’ first motion to
dismiss, addressing statutory provisions the D.C.
Circuit had never interpreted. Yet the District Court
37
dismissed with prejudice, denying petitioners any
opportunity to address its concerns, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed that choice—in a published decision
announcing novel legal standards that conflict with
this Court’s decisions and those of several other
circuits. The Court should intervene.
CONCLUSION
The petition should be granted. In the
alternative, the Court should grant the petition,
vacate the judgment, and remand for further
consideration of the first Question Presented in light
of Cunningham v. Cornell University, 145 S. Ct. 1020
(2025).
Respectfully submitted,
Sara M. Lord
ARNALL GOLDEN
GREGORY, LLP
2100 Pennsylvania
Avenue NW, Suite 350S
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 677-4054
sara.lord@agg.com
September 5, 2025
Daniel Woofter
Counsel of Record
RUSSELL & WOOFTER LLC
1701 Pennsylvania
Avenue NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 240-8433
dw@russellwoofter.com
APPENDIX
i
TABLE OF APPENDICES
Page
APPENDIX A — OPINION OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,
FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1a
APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM OPINION OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBI A ,
FILED MARCH 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23a
APPENDIX C — ORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DI S T R IC T OF C OLU M BI A , F I L E D
MARCH 22, 2023 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41a
APPENDIX D — DENIAL OF REHEARING
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
A PPE A L S F OR T H E DI S T R IC T OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 8, 2025 . . 43a
APPENDIX E — DENIAL OF REHEARING
EN BA NC OF THE UNITED STATES
COU RT OF A PPEA LS FOR T H E
DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,
FILED APRIL 8, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45a
APPENDIX F — MANDATE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLU M BI A CIRCUIT,
FILED APRIL 16, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47a
ii
TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES
Page
APPENDIX G — RELEVANT STATUTORY
AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . 49a
1a
Appendix
A
APPENDIX A — OPINION
OF THE
UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23-7044
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. MARK
J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN, AND
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
APPELLANTS,
v.
USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., ET AL.,
APPELLEES.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:20-cv-02071)
Argued April 1, 2024
Decided February 11, 2025
Before: Wilkins, K atsas and Rao, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rao.
R ao , Circuit Judge: This False Claims Act suit
alleges that U.S. Cellular and other entities committed
fraud in Federal Communications Commission wireless
spectrum auctions. The alleged fraud involved using sham
2a
Appendix A
small businesses to obtain and retain bidding discounts
worth millions of dollars. The district court dismissed
the qui tam action because a previous lawsuit had raised
substantially the same allegations, triggering the Act’s
public disclosure bar, and the relators bringing the action
were not original sources of the information. Although
relators have provided some new details about the fraud,
they have not overcome the stringent requirements of the
public disclosure bar. We therefore affirm.
I.
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) imposes liability on
persons who defraud the federal government. Act of Mar.
2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.). While the government has primary
responsibility for enforcing the FCA, if the government
declines to proceed with a claim, individuals, referred to
as relators, may act as “ad hoc deputies” to pursue the
fraud on behalf of the government in exchange for a share
of any recovery. United States ex rel. Cimino v. IBM
Corp., 3 F.4th 412, 415, 453 U.S. App. D.C. 112 (D.C. Cir.
2021) (cleaned up); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2), (b)(4)(B).
The bounty for a prevailing relator, which can be up to
30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement,
provides an incentive for individuals to come forward
with allegations of fraud against the government. See 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d).
Congress, however, limited the circumstances in which
a relator may bring suit and share in the government’s
recovery. The FCA’s public disclosure bar provides that
3a
Appendix A
a relator whose allegations are “substantially the same”
as information that has already been publicly disclosed
cannot maintain a qui tam action unless he “is an original
source of the information.” Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The public
disclosure bar helps protect against the risk that qui
tam suits will lead to “parasitic exploitation of the public
coffers.” United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry.
Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649, 304 U.S. App. D.C. 347
(D.C. Cir. 1994). The bar helps achieve “the golden mean”
reflected in the FCA, which provides “adequate incentives
for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable
information” but blocks “opportunistic plaintiffs who have
no significant information to contribute of their own.” Id.
A.
This qui tam action involves alleged fraud in FCC
spectrum auctions. The FCC licenses and administers
the wireless spectrum for commercial use and distributes
spectrum licenses through public auctions. As relevant here,
Congress requires the FCC to promote “disseminati[on]
[of] licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including
small businesses.” 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B). To implement
this statutory goal, the FCC established a program that
provides qualifying small businesses, i.e., designated
entities, with bidding credits that effectively discount
the cost of their licenses. Implementation of Section
309(j) of the Communications Act - Competitive Bidding,
Second Report & Order, 9 FCC Rcd. 2348, 2388-91 (1994).
Eligibility for bidding credits turns on an entity’s revenue.
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b), (c), (f).
4a
Appendix A
Given t he h igh ba r r ier s t o ent r y i n t he
telecommunications market, the FCC also encourages
larger companies to invest in and support designated
entities. Large firms may not bid on licenses for
designated entities, but they can “become partners
with or make investments in designated entities so as
to gain an interest in” designated entities’ licenses.
Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications
Act - Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report & Order, 9 FCC
Rcd. 5532, 5547 (1994). Nevertheless, “bidding credits can
only be used by genuine small businesses—not by small
sham companies that are managed by or affiliated with
big businesses.” SNR Wireless Licenseco, LLC v. FCC,
868 F.3d 1021, 1026, 432 U.S. App. D.C. 353 (D.C. Cir.
2017). The FCC scrutinizes designated entities to ensure
that large companies are not improperly benefitting from
bidding credits by exercising de facto control over small
businesses. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(1), (c)(2)(i), (c)(5).
B.
In this qui tam action, the relators maintain the
government was defrauded because the FCC awarded
millions of dollars in bidding credits to designated entities
that in fact were controlled by U.S. Cellular, a large
mobile phone service provider with annual revenues in
the billions. Relators sued U.S. Cellular, several of its
related entities, three designated entities, and Allison
DiNardo, the owner of the designated entities.1 Between
1. The qui tam action was brought against United States
Cellular Corporation, USCC Wireless Investment, Inc., and
Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. (together, “U.S. Cellular”); King
5a
Appendix A
2006 and 2008, DiNardo registered three entities, Carroll,
Barat, and King Street, as “very small businesses”
in FCC auctions and applied for the corresponding 25
percent bidding credit. According to the complaint, these
designated entities obtained discounted licenses and
received nearly $165 million in bidding credits.
In 2008, the law firm Lampert, O’Connor & Johnston,
P.C., filed a qui tam action alleging that the same
defendants here conspired to register sham designated
entities to obtain and hold discounted spectrum licenses
for U.S. Cellular’s use—thereby allowing U.S. Cellular
to exploit bidding credits intended for small businesses.
According to the law firm, defendants represented that
Carroll and Barat were organized to develop and operate
spectrum licenses and provide telecommunications
services, yet the designated entities engaged in no
business activity, had no assets, and generated no revenue.
The law firm further alleged that U.S. Cellular controlled
the discounted licenses for Carroll and Barat from the
moment they were issued but failed to return the bidding
credits as required by federal law. At the time the suit was
filed, King Street had not obtained its spectrum licenses.
The government investigated the allegations against King
Street and declined to intervene in the suit. The FCC
eventually granted the King Street licenses. The law firm
then voluntarily dismissed the qui tam action.
Street Wireless, L.P., and King Street Wireless, Inc. (together, “King
Street”); Carroll Wireless, L.P., and Carroll PCS, Inc. (together,
“Carroll”); Barat Wireless, L.P., and Barat Wireless, Inc. (together,
“Barat”); and DiNardo. We refer to these entities collectively as
“Defendants.”
6a
Appendix A
This case originated in 2015, when Sara Leibman
and Mark O’Connor—the latter of whom was a named
partner at Lampert, O’Connor & Johnston, P.C., and
represented the firm in the 2008 qui tam action—filed a
complaint in federal court in Oklahoma, asserting FCA
claims against the same defendants as in the 2008 action.
In particular, relators alleged Defendants conspired
to use sham designated entities to obtain and retain
discounted spectrum licenses and made false statements
and representations to the government in this effort. The
relators further claimed that U.S. Cellular exercised de
facto control over these entities, disqualifying them from
receiving bidding credits, and that King Street unlawfully
transferred its licensed spectrum to U.S. Cellular while
concealing the transfer from the government.
Relators primarily focused on fraudulent activity
involving King Street. They discovered that King Street
never provided wireless services to the public. It did not
apply for or receive telephone numbers, had no retail
stores or customers, and lacked the network capabilities
necessary to offer telecommunications services. Instead,
according to relators, U.S. Cellular used King Street’s
licenses to provide U.S. Cellular branded service to
customers. King Street, meanwhile, filed false annual
reports and construction notices with the FCC to conceal
that it was holding its discounted licenses for U.S. Cellular.
Relators also conducted field tests that supposedly
revealed U.S. Cellular had incorporated King Street’s
spectrum into its network. They learned of a network
sharing agreement (the “2011 NSA”) that, relators say,
7a
Appendix A
effectively transferred King Street’s spectrum rights for
many of its licenses to U.S. Cellular. Relators alleged
the agreement established an “attributable material
relationship” between King Street and U.S. Cellular,
violating FCC rules and disqualifying King Street as a
designated entity. The government declined to intervene
in relators’ suit.
The case was transferred to the District of Columbia, 2
and the district court found relators’ complaint asserted
“substantially the same” allegations as the 2008 qui tam
action. This triggered the FCA’s public disclosure bar, and
because relators did not meet the criteria for the original
source exception, the district court dismissed the action.
United States ex rel. O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp.,
2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48810, 2023 WL 2598678, at *4-7
(D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2023).
Relators timely appealed, and this court has
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district
court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). United States ex rel. Williams
v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1259, 363
U.S. App. D.C. 419 (D.C. Cir. 2004). When determining
whether a complaint fails to state a claim, “we accept the
operative complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as
2. Relators filed a second, related action in the Western District
of Oklahoma, which was similarly transferred to the District of
Columbia. United States ex rel. O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp.,
No. 20-cv-2070, Dkt. No. 128 (D.D.C. July 30, 2020). We heard
oral argument in both cases on the same day. United States ex rel.
O’Connor v. U.S. Cellular Corp., No. 23-7041 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 1, 2024).
8a
Appendix A
true and draw all reasonable inferences in the [relators’]
favor.” 3 North American Butterfly Ass’n v. Wolf, 977 F.3d
1244, 1249, 450 U.S. App. D.C. 20 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
II.
Relators attempt to save their qui tam action by
arguing that the public disclosure bar does not apply,
either because their allegations were not “substantially
the same” as those in the 2008 qui tam action or because
they qualify for the original source exception. We reject
both arguments.
A.
We begin by considering whether relators’ allegations
are “substantially the same” as those disclosed in the 2008
qui tam action and thus trigger the public disclosure bar.
The claims here turn on alleged transactions that postdate
2010, and so are governed by the public disclosure bar as
amended in 2010, which provides:
The court shall dismiss an action or claim ... unless
opposed by the Government, if substantially the
same allegations or transactions as alleged in
the action or claim were publicly disclosed ... [in
3. Although the FCA is an anti-fraud statute and requires
relators to meet the heightened “particularity” pleading standard
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), United States ex rel. Totten
v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551-52, 351 U.S. App. D.C. 30
(D.C. Cir. 2002), that standard is not at issue in this case because
Defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of relators’ substantive
allegations on appeal.
9a
Appendix A
the enumerated channels], unless ... the person
bringing the action is an original source of the
information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
The 2010 amendments included two changes relevant
to this case. First, the public disclosure bar was previously
a jurisdictional limit but is now an affirmative defense.
When the bar applies, a court must “dismiss [the] action.”
Id.; compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1986) (providing
that “[n]o court [would] have jurisdiction over an action”
for which there had already been a public disclosure).
Unless Congress “clearly states” that a statutory
limitation is jurisdictional, “courts should treat the
restriction as nonjurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 515-16, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097
(2006). In the 2010 amendments, Congress removed
the jurisdictional language in the public disclosure bar.
United States ex rel. Shea v. Cellco Partnership, 863
F.3d 923, 933, 430 U.S. App. D.C. 353 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Moreover, the government may oppose a court’s dismissal,
which reinforces that the bar is no longer jurisdictional.
Otherwise, “the government [could] cure a jurisdictional
defect simply by opposing a motion to dismiss.” United
States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811
(11th Cir. 2015). The public disclosure bar now operates
as an affirmative defense.4
4. We note this is the unanimous view of our sister circuits that
have considered the issue. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Reed v.
KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 737 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019) (collecting
cases).
10a
Appendix A
Second, Congress clarified the standard for applying
the public disclosure bar. Prior to the amendment, the
public disclosure bar deprived courts of jurisdiction over
actions “based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1986) (emphasis
added). Interpreting the pre-2010 language, this circuit
held that a suit was “based upon publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions when the allegations in the
complaint [were] substantially similar to those in the
public domain.” United States ex rel. Oliver v. Philip
Morris USA Inc., 826 F.3d 466, 472, 423 U.S. App. D.C.
302 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). Other
circuits used terms such as “substantially similar,”
“substantially the same,” and “substantial identity”
when applying the public disclosure bar. See United
States ex rel. Holloway v. Heartland Hospice, Inc., 960
F.3d 836, 849-50 & nn.8-9 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting and
discussing cases). In the 2010 amendments, Congress
mirrored these judicial formulations, requiring dismissal
of a qui tam action “if substantially the same allegations
or transactions ... were publicly disclosed.” 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis added).
Congress’s amendment of the public disclosure bar
is best understood as codifying the interpretation of this
circuit and others that focused on whether the allegations
of fraud in a qui tam action were “substantially similar”
to or “substantially the same” as publicly disclosed
allegations and transactions. See United States ex rel.
May v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 737 F.3d 908, 917 (4th Cir.
2013) (“[T]he amended version [of the public disclosure
bar] ... focuses on the similarity of the allegations of
11a
Appendix A
fraud.”); see also United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint
Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 743 (10th Cir. 2019) (“That the
substantially-the-same standard adopted in the 2010
amendment resembles the standard we already used is
no accident; the amendment expressly incorporates the
‘substantially similar’ standard in accordance with the
interpretation of this circuit and most other circuits.”)
(cleaned up). Because the FCA amendments incorporate
judicial interpretations, we can reasonably continue to rely
on our pre-2010 cases applying the public disclosure bar.5
B.
Under the “substantially the same” standard, the
critical inquiry is whether “the government ... ha[d] enough
information to investigate the case ... or [whether] the
information could at least have alerted law-enforcement
authorities to the likelihood of wrongdoing.” United States
ex rel. Davis v. District of Columbia, 679 F.3d 832, 836,
5. Other circuits have also concluded that “pre-2010-amendment
cases guide [the] substantially-the-same inquiry.” Reed, 923 F.3d at
744; see also Silbersher v. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, Inc., 89 F.4th 1154,
1167 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Congress re-enacted its prior law in clearer
terms by replacing ‘based upon’ with ‘substantially the same as,’
leaving our precedent interpreting that phrase undisturbed.”);
United States ex rel. Silver v. Omnicare, Inc., 903 F.3d 78, 83-84
n.6 (3d Cir. 2018); Bellevue v. Universal Health Servs. of Hartgrove,
Inc., 867 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2017). By contrast, the Sixth Circuit
has held that “substantially the same” requires a higher degree of
similarity than “based upon.” Holloway, 960 F.3d at 850-51. We need
not resolve whether or how the two standards differ because relators
conceded in the proceedings below that our cases interpreting the
public disclosure bar before the 2010 amendments remain instructive.
12a
Appendix A
400 U.S. App. D.C. 351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). “[T]he
government has enough information to investigate
the case” when either “the allegation of fraud” or “its
underlying factual elements” have been publicly disclosed.
United States ex rel. Doe v. Staples, Inc., 773 F.3d 83, 86,
413 U.S. App. D.C. 208 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). The
public disclosure bar applies if the fraud was publicly
disclosed, or if both the misrepresentation and the truth
were in the public domain. Id.
Because the public disclosure bar is an affirmative
defense and Defendants have raised it in a pre-answer
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b),
Defendants must show that “the facts that give rise to the
defense are clear from the face of the complaint.” See de
Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 714 F.3d 591, 608, 404 U.S.
App. D.C. 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). Defendants
argue the public disclosure bar applies to this case because
the 2008 qui tam action publicly disclosed “substantially
the same” allegations, namely the same fraudulent scheme
(obtaining discounted bidding credits) at the same FCC
auctions, perpetrated by the same defendants.
In response, relators claim that their current
allegations are not “substantially the same” as the
disclosures from 2008, because this suit alleges postlicensing fraud focused on the retention of bidding credits
and the incorporation of the designated entities’ spectrum
into the U.S. Cellular network. Relators also insist they
have marshalled new evidence, including an engineering
study, employee interviews, and the 2011 NSA, that
exposes this fraudulent scheme. Furthermore, relators
13a
Appendix A
argue that they have advanced a new allegation that U.S.
Cellular’s control over King Street’s spectrum violates
the FCC’s attributable material relationship rule, an
allegation that is not substantially the same as the prelicensing fraud involving U.S. Cellular’s control over the
designated entities during the spectrum auctions.
Relators’ complaint includes some additional facts, but
ultimately describes a fraud that is merely a continuation
of, and therefore substantially the same as, the scheme
disclosed in the 2008 qui tam action. In the 2008 action,
relators alleged that Carroll, Barat, and King Street
served as fronts for U.S. Cellular to obtain spectrum
licenses at a discount and that the designated entities were
under the de facto control of U.S. Cellular. In their present
complaint, relators reiterate these same allegations,
adding only some details about how Defendants have
continued the fraud since the spectrum auctions. But the
pertinent elements of the fraud were all alleged in the
2008 qui tam action: the misrepresentation that Carroll,
Barat, and King Street were genuine designated entities;
the truth that they were fronts for U.S. Cellular; and the
allegation that Defendants committed fraud in the FCC
auctions to benefit from valuable bidding credits. The 2008
qui tam action alerted the government to the same fraud
alleged in this action.
This qui tam action simply elaborates on how
Defendants attempted to conceal the fraud and maintain
its benefits. But “a qui tam action cannot be sustained
where both elements of the fraudulent transaction ... are
already public, even if the relator comes forward with
14a
Appendix A
additional evidence incriminating the defendant.” Doe,
773 F.3d at 86 (cleaned up). Filling in details about an
already disclosed fraud is not enough to overcome the
public disclosure bar. United States ex rel. Settlemire v.
District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 919, 339 U.S. App.
D.C. 166 (D.C. Cir. 1999). We agree with the district court
that the 2008 qui tam action publicly disclosed that the
“same defendants intended to acquire the same discounts
at the same auctions via the same scheme of using front
companies to fraudulently pose as small businesses.”
O’Connor, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48810, 2023 WL
2598678, at *5 (cleaned up).
Although relators offer some additional details about
actions Defendants took to preserve their bidding credits
and spectrum, the underlying fraud is “substantially
the same” as that alleged in the 2008 qui tam action.
Therefore, the public disclosure bar applies.
III.
Relators also argue they qualify as “original sources”
and therefore fit within the exception to the public
disclosure bar. Even if relators’ claims were previously
publicly disclosed, they may bring a qui tam action if they
were “original source[s]” identifying the alleged fraud.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). In the 2010 amendments to the
FCA, Congress narrowed the definition of original source.
Before the amendments, a relator qualified as an original
source by simply possessing “direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1986). The timing of
the relator’s claim was immaterial. Now, a relator can be
15a
Appendix A
an original source only if: (1) “prior to a public disclosure
... [he] has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the
information on which allegations or transactions in a claim
are based”; or (2) he “has knowledge that is independent
of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations
or transactions, and ... has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action.”
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Relators here are not original
sources under either definition.
Because qualifying as an original source is an
exception to the public disclosure bar, relators will
generally bear the burden of demonstrating it applies. The
original source exception benefits relators by permitting
their claims to go forward even if the public disclosure
bar is triggered. Relators are also best situated to know
the facts relevant to whether they qualify as original
sources. See Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 112,
133 S. Ct. 714, 184 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2013) (“Where the facts
with regard to an issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of
a party, that party is best situated to bear the burden of
proof.”) (cleaned up).
A.
Relators maintain that O’Connor is an original source
under the first definition because his law firm shared the
2008 qui tam action with the government before its public
disclosure.
O’Connor cannot be an original source for the 2008
qui tam action, however, because that action was filed
by his law firm. The 2008 pleadings stated: “Lampert,
16a
Appendix A
O’Connor & Johnston, P.C. brings this action ... on behalf
of itself and the Government.” It is a fundamental principle
of corporate law that a professional corporation is a
legal entity distinct from its shareholders. See O’Neal,
Thompson & Wells, 1 Close Corporations and LLCs: Law
and Practice § 2.9 (3d ed. 2024). Although O’Connor was a
partner at the law firm and involved in filing the complaint,
he cannot attribute the firm’s suit to himself. Cf. United
States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d
548, 554 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding a corporation cannot
serve as the original source of information gathered by
its shareholders before its formation). The 2008 qui tam
action was brought by the law firm, and O’Connor cannot
step into the firm’s shoes to qualify as an original source.
For the first time in their reply brief, relators also
claim that O’Connor personally communicated with the
government about the allegations of fraud in the 2008 qui
tam action before its unsealing. This argument, however,
has been forfeited because it was not presented in the
opening brief. In their opening brief, relators suggested
O’Connor was an original source of the 2008 qui tam action
because he “served” and later “dismissed” the complaint.
Defendants naturally responded by focusing on whether
the 2008 qui tam action, which was filed by O’Connor’s
law firm and did not mention O’Connor personally,
could be attributed to him. Only in their reply brief did
relators specifically assert that O’Connor independently
communicated with the government about the allegations
as early as 2007. This argument comes too late. Relators
cannot preserve their claim that O’Connor is an original
source by providing a “skeletal” argument in their opening
17a
Appendix A
brief and waiting to develop their full argument in reply.
Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6, 439 U.S. App. D.C.
357 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
O’Connor cannot claim to be an original source based
on the disclosures of his law firm, and any argument that
he individually provided information to the government
has been forfeited. Relators therefore do not qualify as
original sources under the first definition of section 3730(e)
(4)(B) by voluntarily disclosing allegations of fraud prior
to the unsealing of the 2008 qui tam action.
B.
Relators also argue that they qualify as original
sources under the second definition by having “knowledge
that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions” and by voluntarily
providing that information to the government. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(B). Relators maintain that their independent
investigations materially added to the disclosures in the
2008 qui tam action by providing information about postlicensing fraud. For example, relators proved through
spectrum analyses that after King Street obtained the
licenses referenced in the 2008 qui tam action, U.S.
Cellular secretly incorporated King Street’s licensed
spectrum, which contradicted King Street’s FCC
certifications and exposed unlawful activity. Relators also
discovered that King Street never operated as a legitimate
telecommunications provider. According to relators,
their efforts instigated a government investigation
that uncovered the 2011 NSA, further demonstrating
18a
Appendix A
Defendants’ post-licensing fraud. Relators argue they
influenced the government’s decisionmaking and filled
gaps in the government’s understanding of the fraud.
Even assuming relators provided some new information
that is “independent of” the 2008 qui tam action, we must
consider whether this information “materially adds” to
what was publicly disclosed.6 Id.
This circuit has not previously considered what counts
as a material addition for the purpose of the original
source exception. We begin with the text and structure of
the statute. As the Supreme Court has recognized when
interpreting other sections of the FCA, the term “material”
has a well-established common law meaning: Something
is material if it is likely to influence a reasonable person’s
behavior. See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States
ex rel. Escobar, 579 U.S. 176, 193, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 195 L.
Ed. 2d 348 (2016) (discussing common law definitions of
“material” in tort and contract). Information is material
if “knowledge of [it] would affect a person’s decisionmaking” or if it is “significant” or “essential.” Material
6. Whether the original source exception applies because
information “materially adds” to public disclosures must be a
separate inquiry from whether relators have brought forward
allegations that are “substantially the same,” which triggers
application of the public disclosure bar. While the precise line
between these concepts may be difficult to draw, they “must remain
conceptually distinct; otherwise, the original source exception would
be rendered nugatory.” United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211-12 (1st Cir. 2016); see also United
States ex rel. Maur v. Hage-Korban, 981 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2020)
(endorsing Winkelman’s reasoning because the alternative “would
leave an exception that excepts nothing”).
19a
Appendix A
(adj.), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This
definition comports with the liability section of the FCA,
which defines “material” as “having a natural tendency
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or
receipt of money or property.” 7 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). As
the Supreme Court has emphasized, “[t]he materiality
standard [in section 3729(b)(4)] is demanding” and is not
met “where noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.”
Escobar, 579 U.S. at 194. Interpreting the term “material”
consistently across the FCA, we conclude that minor or
insubstantial additions to publicly disclosed information
will not qualify a relator as an “original source.”
A relator therefore “materially adds” to public
disclosures by contributing information that “is sufficiently
significant or essential” to influence the government’s
decision to prosecute fraud. 8 United States ex rel.
Winkelman v. CVS Caremark Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211
7. The Supreme Court has interpreted “material” in other
federal statutes in a similar way. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 99 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1988) (construing
“material” in an immigration statute to mean information that “has
a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the
decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”)
(cleaned up); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20-25, 119 S. Ct.
1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999) (same for federal mail fraud, bank fraud,
and wire fraud statutes); see also id. at 22 (explaining “the common
law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality”).
8. In addition to the cases already cited, this interpretation
is consistent with the interpretation of “materially adds” in other
circuits. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Advocates for Basic Legal
Equality., Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 816 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2016);
United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue Fisheries,
LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2016).
20a
Appendix A
(1st Cir. 2016); see also Reed, 923 F.3d at 757 (holding
that “materially adds” requires relators to “disclose[]
new information that is sufficiently significant or
important that it would be capable of influencing the
behavior of the recipient—i.e., the government”) (cleaned
up). This interpretation is consistent with the careful
balance Congress struck in the FCA to ensure that the
government remains “in the driver’s seat to pursue and
punish false claims according to its priorities.” United
States v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 47 F.4th 805, 818, 459
U.S. App. D.C. 85 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Reading “material”
to require significant or essential additional information
also comports with Congress’s narrowing of the original
source exception in 2010.
Determining whether a relator’s contribution
materially adds to a public disclosure is a case-dependent
inquiry. “[A] relator who merely adds detail or color to
previously disclosed elements of an alleged scheme is not
materially adding to the public disclosures.” Reed, 923
F.3d at 757 (cleaned up). Simply elaborating on public
disclosures is insufficient to meet the “materially adds”
standard because marginal details are not likely to
influence the government’s decision to prosecute.
Relators do not qualify for the original source
exception to the public disclosure bar because their
information—which we take as true—does not materially
add to the disclosures made in the 2008 qui tam action.
The 2008 action provided substantial information about
U.S. Cellular’s alleged control over Carroll, Barat, and
King Street. That complaint alleged the designated
entities were sham companies under the de facto control
21a
Appendix A
of U.S. Cellular and existed solely to obtain the 25 percent
bidding credit on FCC licenses that were ultimately for
U.S. Cellular’s use. Relators’ allegations in this case
merely confirm U.S. Cellular’s continued control over the
designated entities and its use of their licenses. While
some information may be new, it is not so significant
or essential that it would influence the government’s
decision to prosecute, because the 2008 action already
disclosed the allegations of Defendants’ fraud. Rather than
“blaz[ing] a new trail,” relators merely “add[ed] a few more
breadcrumbs on an existing trail.” Id. at 763. Providing
some additional color about the fraudulent scheme does
not make relators an original source.
Relators’ contention that they affected the government’s
decisionmaking by prompting an investigation does not
alter our conclusion. Relators say they provided evidence
of post-licensing fraud that led the government to conduct
a second investigation. This investigation uncovered the
2011 NSA, which relators claim established an attributable
material relationship between King Street and U.S.
Cellular that violated FCC rules and disqualified King
Street from bidding credits. On relators’ account, the
fact of the government’s investigation proves their new
information materially added to what the government
knew. We disagree.
The government has broad discretion in deciding
how to respond to allegations in a qui tam suit, and such
decisions may be based on a range of factors independent
of the relators’ specific disclosures. See Swift v. United
States, 318 F.3d 250, 253, 355 U.S. App. D.C. 59 (D.C. Cir.
2003). The FCA requires relators to serve the government
22a
Appendix A
a copy of the complaint and all material evidence, which
remains sealed for 60 days. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
During this seal period, the government may investigate,
or take whatever action it sees fit, to determine whether
it wants to proceed with an enforcement action or
intervene in the qui tam suit. See id. The fact that the
government undertook some due diligence in response to
new information does not necessarily show that relators’
information was material. The government has significant
latitude in how it exercises its enforcement authority under
the FCA, and the mere fact of a government investigation
cannot support the conclusion that relators’ information
was essential or influenced the government.
Because relators’ allegations failed to materially add
to the public disclosures, relators do not qualify for the
original source exception to the public disclosure bar.9
***
This qui tam action must be dismissed because
the frauds Leibman and O’Connor allege were publicly
disclosed in an earlier lawsuit, and they are not original
sources of the information. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the district court.
So ordered.
9. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
with prejudice. Relators did not make a formal motion to amend, and
in these circumstances it is not an abuse of discretion for a district
court not to grant “such leave sua sponte.” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns
Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1280, 305 U.S. App. D.C. 60 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
23a
Appendix B
APPENDIX B — MEMORANDUM
OPINION OF
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
FILED MARCH 22, 2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 20-cv-2071 (TSC)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
Plaintiffs-Relators,
v.
UNITED STATES CELLULAR CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs-Relators Mark J. O’Connor and Sara F.
Leibman filed this False Claims Act (FCA) action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma. ECF No. 118. After the United States declined
to intervene, ECF No. 47, the case was transferred upon
Defendants’ motion to this court on July 30, 2020, ECF
No. 126. Defendants have filed two motions to dismiss
Plaintiffs-Relators’ Second Amended Complaint, ECF
Nos. 148, 149. For the reasons set forth below, the court
will GRANT both motions and dismiss this case.
24a
Appendix B
I. BACKGROUND
A. Designated Entities and Spectrum Auctions
Electromagnetic waves of varying frequencies carry
the information necessary for people to enjoy technologies
ranging from the radio to Wi-Fi. Second Amended
Complaint ¶ 5, ECF No. 118 (“SAC”). Particular sources
broadcast on specific electromagnetic frequencies; for
example, National Public Radio in Washington, D.C.
appears at 88.5 MHz, while C-SPAN is at 90.1 MHz.
Those stations do not “own” their frequencies. Instead, the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) regulates
the electromagnetic spectrum, licensing control over
certain bands to private parties. 47 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.
In doing so, the FCC seeks to ensure the distribution
of licenses and frequencies provides a “fair, efficient,
and equitable distribution” of services. Id. § 307(a), (b).
Accordingly, it distributes licenses through a competitive
auction system. See id. § 309(j).
Unsurprisingly, spectrum auction bids are expensive.
See, e.g., Press Release, FCC, FCC Concludes Largest
Ever Spectrum Auction (Mar. 12, 2020), fcc.gov/document/
fcc-concludes-largest-ever-spectrum-auction (detailing an
auction with over $7 billion in bids). To ensure fairness and
access, Congress and the FCC created the Designated
Entity (“DE”) program, under which women and minorityowned businesses, as well as small businesses below a
certain gross revenue threshold, are offered “bidding
credits” for license auctions. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(1), (2); see
47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D); In the Matter of Implementation
of Section 309(j) of the Commc’ns Act — Competitive
25a
Appendix B
Bidding, 9 FCC Rcd. 5532 ¶ 15 (1994). Credits are
percentage-based—the FCC pledges to credit a certain
percentage of a DE’s winning bid. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)
(2)(i). For small businesses, the size of a credit varies
depending on business revenue (e.g., businesses with less
than $4 million in revenue are eligible for bidding credits
of 35%). Id.
To determine whether a business qualifies as a DE,
the FCC calculates the business’s gross revenue by
aggregating the business’s gross revenue, its affiliates,
its controlling interests and their affiliates, and the
entities with which the business has an attributable
material relationship. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(1). Affiliates
are individuals or entities that directly or indirectly
control or are otherwise controlled by the prospective
DE business. Id. § 1.2110(c)(5). A controlling interest
includes any entities that had de facto or de jure control
of the applicant. Id. § 1.2110(c)(2)(i). While de jure control
is defined by the regulations, de facto control is assessed
on a “case-by-case basis.” Id.
The FCC reviews a business’s DE status twice. First,
the business must complete a pre-auction short-form
application certifying that it is eligible for DE status. See
FCC Form 175, available at transition.fcc.gov/Forms/
Form175/175.pdf. If the business wins a bid for a spectrum
license, it then completes a long-form application, which
is a significantly longer questionnaire asking for the
business’s affiliates and controlling interests, as well as
their respective assets and gross revenues. See FCC Form
601, available at transition.fcc.gov/Forms/Form601/601.
pdf.
26a
Appendix B
Once a DE is awarded a license, it may not transfer it
to a business that would have otherwise been ineligible for
a bidding credit for at least five years, or risk having to pay
back some or all of its discount. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2111(b)
(2)(i). A DE must also submit an annual report certifying
its continued eligibility for DE status. Id. § 1.2110(n)(1), (2).
Despite these requirements, non-qualifying businesses
are not barred from interacting with DE entities; in
fact, the FCC seeks to promote economic opportunity
for DE owners—especially those owned by minorities or
women—by encouraging large companies to invest in DEs
and avail themselves of the DE-licensed spectrum. See,
e.g., In the Matter of Implementation of Section 309(j) of
the Commc’ns Act — Competitive Bidding, 9 FCC Rcd.
5532 ¶ 15 (1994).
B. Parties
Plaintiffs-Relators Mark J. O’Connor and Sara F.
Leibman are attorneys specializing in communications
law. SAC ¶¶ 21-22. Their Second Amended Complaint
names ten defendants connected by a complex web of
ownership and partnership, described below. Figure 1,
attached to this opinion, maps out those relationships in
a chart.
Defendant (1) Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.
(“ TDS”) is a publicly held corporation that owns
approximately 80% of Defendant (2) United States
Cellular Corporation (“U.S. Cellular”). Id. ¶¶ 23-24. U.S.
Cellular wholly owns and controls Defendant (3) USCC
Wireless Investment, Inc (“USCC”). Id. ¶ 25.
27a
Appendix B
Defendant (4) Carroll Wireless, L.P. was a limited
partnership between USCC and Defendant (5) Carroll
PCS, Inc. (“Carroll Wireless”), which is wholly owned
by Defendant (6) Allison Cryor DiNardo. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.
Following the December 2012 transfer of control of Carroll
Wireless, L.P. to U.S. Cellular, Carroll Wireless, L.P,
merged with and was dissolved into USCC in December
2018. Id.
Defendant (7) Barat Wireless, L.P. was a similar
limited partnership between USCC and Defendant (8)
Barat Wireless, Inc. (“Barat Wireless”), which is likewise
wholly owned by DiNardo. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Following the
September 2012 transfer of control of Barat Wireless, L.P.
to U.S. Cellular, Barat Wireless, L.P, merged with USCOS
of Rochester, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of USCC,
in December 2018. Id. ¶ 30. In January 2019, USCOC of
Rochester, Inc. merged into and with USSC. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.
Lastly, Defendant (9) King Street Wireless, L.P. was
a limited partnership between USCC and Defendant (10)
King Street Wireless, Inc. (“King Street”), which is also
wholly owned by DiNardo. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
C. Factual Background
This case involves three FCC spectrum auctions:
Auction 58, held on June 18, 2004; Auction 66, held on
January 31, 2006; and Auction 73, held on August 17, 2007.
In each of those auctions, DiNardo registered Defendant
entities—the Carroll, Barat, and King Street entities,
respectively—as “very small business[es]” with gross
revenues under $15 million, and applied for a 25% bidding
28a
Appendix B
credit. Id. ¶¶ 154-55, 183-84; 76-77. Each application stated
that DiNardo had both de facto and de jure control of the
businesses, and that none had any additional affiliates.
Id. ¶¶ 78, 155, 184.
The DiNardo-registered businesses won discounted
spectrum licenses in all three auctions. Carroll Wireless
secured 17 licenses in Auction 58, applying its 25%
discount to pay $129.7 million of the $151.8 million that it
bid. Id. ¶ 158. Barat Wireless also secured 17 licenses in
Auction 66, paying $127.1 million for its $169 million bid.
Id. ¶ 185. And King Street Wireless secured 152 licenses
in Auction 73, paying $300.4 million for its $400.6 million
bid. Id. ¶ 80. In their post-auction long-form applications,
all three businesses reaffirmed their eligibility for DE
status. Id. ¶¶ 84, 159, 187.
In 2007, the law firm of Lampert & O’Connor, P.C.,
represented by Plaintiff-Relator Mark J. O’Connor,
brought an FCA suit in this district. As amended in
2008, the Complaint named as defendants the same ten
entities as the ones in this suit. See Am. Compl., Case No.
1:07-cv-00800-JDB (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2008), ECF No. 11
(“2008 Complaint”).1 It also involved the same three FCC
spectrum auctions: 58, 66, and 73. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
The 2008 Complaint alleged that the U.S. Cellular
entities had “formed sham ‘very small business’ bidding
1. ”A court may take judicial notice of facts contained in public
records of other proceedings,” Detroit Int’l Bridge Co. v. Gov’t of
Canada, 133 F. Supp. 3d 70, 84 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Abhe & Svoboda,
Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059, 378 U.S. App. D.C. 355 (D.C. Cir.
2007)), along with other “government documents available from
reliable sources,” id. at 85 (citations omitted).
29a
Appendix B
entities”—the Barat, Carroll, and King Street entities—
”for purposes of obtaining 25 percent credits against
their gross winning bids” in the respective auctions.
Id. ¶ 3. “In furtherance of their fraudulent scheme, the
Defendants made material misstatements and omissions
in their submissions to the FCC for each of the spectrum
auctions”—specifically, concealing that the U.S. Cellular
entities were in control of the DEs all along. Id. ¶ 4.
The fraudulent records “wrongly represented that the
sham “very small businesses” were organized to design,
construct, develop, operate, manage and maintain
spectrum licenses, and otherwise to engage in the business
of providing telecommunications services,” but in fact they
“acted as fronts for the [U.S. Cellular entities] to acquire
licenses to complement [their] existing wireless operating
footprint and to block new entrants from competing with
[them].” Id. ¶¶ 7-8.
Because the FCC had not yet finally approved King
Street’s application for discount, the 2008 Complaint
prompted the FCC to investigate the allegations before
granting that approval. The government requested that
the 2008 Complaint be partially unsealed, then provided
a copy to King Street along with an opportunity to
respond to the allegations therein. See Letter from R.
Noel to T. Gutierrez Re: Auction 73 Application of King
Street Wireless, L.P., 24 FCC Rcd. 4526, 4527 (Apr. 14,
2009). King Street responded, denying the allegations and
asking the FCC to grant its application. Resp. to Bureau
Inquiry (Redacted), FCC ULS File No. 0003379814 (May
8, 2009). 2 After completing its review, the FCC granted
2. See Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. et al. Motion to
Dismiss, Decl. of Frank Volpe, Ex. B, ECF No. 149-4.
30a
Appendix B
King Street’s application for discounted licenses in Auction
73. SAC ¶ 89; see FCC Public Notice, DA-09-2643, 24 FCC
Rcd 14754 (Dec. 30, 2009).3 The Department of Justice also
declined to intervene in the 2008 FCA suit or otherwise
take action against the Defendants. See Gov’t’s Notice of
Election to Decline Intervention, Case No. 1:07-cv-00800JDB (D.D.C. Oct. 9, 2009), ECF No. 25. Shortly thereafter,
Lampert & O’Connor moved to voluntarily dismiss the
action without prejudice. Id., ECF No. 28. The motion was
granted. Id., ECF No. 29.
D. Procedural History
Over five years later, in 2015, Plaintiffs-Relators
brought this action in Oklahoma, and the matter was
subsequently transferred here. In their Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs-Relators claim that Barat, Carroll,
and King Street were not genuine DEs and in fact were
controlled by U.S. Cellular and its affiliates. SAC ¶¶ 84,
105, 147, 157, 162-65, 171, 178, 190, 200. The Complaint
alleges five FCA violations: (1) conspiracy to violate
the FCA under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C); (2) falsely and
fraudulently presenting claims for payment from the
FCC, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A); (3) making
or using a false record to receive payments from the
FCC, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B); (4) unlawful
possession of FCC licenses, in violation of 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1)(D); and (5) making or using a false record
to avoid making payments to the federal government, in
violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
3. Available at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-092643A1.pdf.
31a
Appendix B
Defendants move to dismiss, arguing that PlaintiffsRelators’ claims are barred by the FCA’s public disclosure
bar, lacking essential pleading elements, and timebarred under the FCA’s statute of limitations. Because
both motions to dismiss make overlapping substantive
arguments, the court will address them jointly.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. See Browning v. Clinton,
292 F.3d 235, 242, 352 U.S. App. D.C. 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
To survive such a motion, the “complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127
S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is plausible
when the facts alleged allow the court to reasonably infer
the defendant’s culpability for the misconduct alleged. Id.
In drawing such reasonable inferences, the court must
grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can
be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 268
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d
605, 608, 199 U.S. App. D.C. 23 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss present two Rule
12(b)(6) defenses. First, they argue that dismissal is
warranted because of the FCA’s public disclosure bar,
32a
Appendix B
which requires a court to dismiss an action where a
relator’s claim is based on allegations and transactions
made public by sources other than the relator before the
complaint was filed. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4).
The public disclosure bar applies if “substantially the
same allegations or transactions” were publicly disclosed
in a hearing in which the Government or its agent was
a party, in certain federal reports, hearings, audits, or
investigations, or in the news media. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
However, if the relator was the “original source” of the
information on which their allegations are based, and that
information “materially adds to the publicly disclosed
allegations or transactions,” the public disclosure bar
does not apply. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B); Rockwell Int’l Corp. v.
United States, 549 U.S. 457, 467, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 167 L.
Ed. 2d 190 (2007) (defining “original source”).
Second, Defendants argue that regardless of the
public disclosure bar, Plaintiffs-Relators have failed to
plausibly allege an FCA violation, and that the allegations
against Carroll and Barat exceed the statute of limitations.
The court need not reach those defenses, however, because
it finds that the public disclosure bar is an insurmountable
defense to Plaintiffs-Relators’ claims.
A. The 2008 FCA suit bars this action
Claims involving “allegations or transactions
substantially similar to those in the public domain”
cannot survive the public disclosure bar. United States
ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Emps.’ Club, 105 F.3d
33a
Appendix B
675, 682, 323 U.S. App. D.C. 61 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The
court must determine if “the government already ha[d]
enough information to investigate the case and to make
a decision whether to prosecute’ or [if] the information
‘could at least have alerted law-enforcement authorities
to the likelihood of wrongdoing.’” United States ex rel.
Davis v. Dist. of Columbia, 679 F.3d 832, 836, 400 U.S.
App. D.C. 351 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting United States ex
rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,
654, 304 U.S. App. D.C. 347 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal
quotations omitted)). Because the public domain includes
information “disclosed . . . in a Federal criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing in which the Government or its
agent is a party,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i), allegations
or transactions involved in prior litigation can trigger the
public disclosure bar, see, e.g., In re Nat. Gas Royalties,
562 F.3d 1032, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the
preclusive effect of “court documents from . . . a qui tam
action Relator had filed” years earlier).
The 2008 FCA suit triggers the public disclosure bar.
That suit alleged that Carroll, Barat, and King Street
were fronts for U.S. Cellular to fraudulently obtain the
small business discount for the spectrum in Auctions 58,
66, and 73, respectively. 2008 Complaint ¶¶ 2-3, 6; see
supra Section I.C. Those are the same core allegations—
against the same defendants—that Plaintiffs-Relators’
Complaint makes here. See SAC ¶ 1. As a result, the 2008
FCA suit “could at least have alerted law-enforcement
authorities to the likelihood of wrongdoing” that PlaintiffsRelators allege here—indeed, that was the suit’s express
purpose. Davis, 679 F.3d at 836. The 2008 Complaint not
34a
Appendix B
only could have, but actually did, “enable the government
to adequately investigate the case and to make a decision
whether to prosecute.” Findley, 105 F.3d at 688. But the
government declined to prosecute, and the FCC ultimately
decided to grant the licenses. The public disclosure bar
precludes Plaintiffs-Relators from raising the same
allegations here.4
B. The allegations of continued fraud are substantially
similar
Plaintiffs-Relators do not meaningfully dispute the
preclusive effect of the 2008 FCA suit with respect to
the allegations it raised. Instead, they argue that their
Complaint here is sufficiently different from the 2008
Complaint to avoid the bar. Principally, they assert that
their Complaint “alleges additional fraudulent conduct,
as well as additional violations of the FCA, that differ
significantly from the fraudulent conduct alleged in
the 2008 Complaint.” Plaintiffs/Relators’ Consolidated
Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
at 16, ECF No. 152 (“Opposition”). What that additional
fraud amounts to is Defendants’ alleged conduct in
maintaining the sham front companies of Carroll, Barat,
and King Street—which in fact continued to be under the
de facto control of U.S. Cellular—while still certifying
their DE status so that they could retain their discount
on the licenses they had obtained. Id. at 16-17 (citing SAC
4. Defendants also argue other public filings in FCC proceedings
independently impose the public disclosure bar. Because the 2008
FCA suit is alone sufficient to preclude this action, the court does
not reach those arguments.
35a
Appendix B
¶¶ 92-105, 107-14, 118-130, 138-46, 162, 166-70, 173-79,
190-93, 196-97, 199-201).
D.C. Circuit precedent forecloses Plaintiffs-Relators’
attempt to distinguish their Complaint from the 2008
FCA suit. A “relator’s ability to reveal specific instances
of fraud where the general practice has already been
publicly disclosed is insufficient” to prevent dismissal
under the public disclosure bar. United States ex rel.
Settlemire v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 913, 919, 339 U.S.
App. D.C. 166 (D.C. Cir. 1999). That Defendants allegedly
continued to perpetuate the fraud to retain their discounts
simply provides more specific instances of the general
fraudulent practice that they allegedly initiated to obtain
those discounts in the first place. “Cases may arise where
disclosures of a practice are insufficient to be considered
public disclosures of later instances of fraud,” but “where
we have before us publicly disclosed information showing
how th[ese] same defendant[s] intended to” acquire
the same discounts at the same auctions via the same
scheme of using front companies to fraudulently pose as
small businesses, “it is clear that public disclosure under
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) has occurred.” Id. The Complaint therefore
cannot get around the public disclosure bar by alleging
that Defendants continued the same fraud that has already
been disclosed.
C. Plaintiffs-Relators are not an original source
Because the Amended Complaint is premised on
“substantially the same allegations or transactions”
that have already been publicly disclosed, PlaintiffsRelators’ suit must be dismissed unless they qualify as
36a
Appendix B
an “original source” by obtaining and sharing “knowledge
that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly
disclosed allegations or transactions,” in which case the
public disclosure bar would not apply. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)
(4)(A)-(B); see Rockwell Int’l Corp., 549 U.S. at 467
(defining “original source”). “Congress did not prescribe
by mathematical formulae the quantum or centrality of
nonpublic information that must be in the hands of the
qui tam relator in order for suits to proceed.” Quinn, 14
F.3d at 653. But Plaintiffs-Relators’ allegations do not
render them an original source here. What little nonpublic
information they allege does not materially add to the
publicly disclosed information.
Plaintiffs-Relators rely chiefly on one nonpublic
document, but it cannot bear the weight they place on it.
They repeatedly cite the U.S. Cellular-King Street 2011
Network Sharing Agreement (“2011 NSA”) in which King
Street allegedly agreed to share its spectrum with U.S.
Cellular for a fee, split profits, and allow U.S. Cellular to
do most of the network construction and management. See
SAC ¶¶ 92-97, 100-06; Opposition at 8, 10, 15, 20-21. Again,
however, that alleged relationship between the entities
at most supports the claim that Defendants continued
the substantially similar, and already disclosed, original
fraud. It therefore cannot be a material addition to the
publicly disclosed information. See, e.g., United States ex
rel. Paulos v. Stryker Corp., 762 F. 3d 688, 694-95 (8th
Cir. 2014) (equating the substantial similarity and material
addition standards); Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 815 F.3d 267, 283 (7th Cir. 2016) (same).
37a
Appendix B
What is more, the 2011 NSA does not even contain
significant nonpublic information. While the 2011 NSA was
never disclosed, U.S. Cellular did provide a 2012 NSA to
the FCC in connection with a later auction. SAC ¶ 142. The
2012 NSA also established that U.S. Cellular would share
in King Street’s spectrum and manage services provided
over that spectrum—the key evidence that PlaintiffsRelators proffer in the 2011 NSA. See id. ¶ 143; U.S.
Cellular FCC Form 680 Long-Form Application for FCC
Auction 901, Amended Ex. 2 - REDACTED, at 1, FCC
Applic. File No. 0005476908 (June 23, 2013) (“Pursuant to
[the 2012] Network Sharing Agreement . . . [,] King Street
agreed to provide 4G services, to be managed by [U.S.
Cellular] . . . via King Street’s Spectrum.”).5 And the FCC
expressly acknowledged that relationship. See Promoting
Interoperability in the 700 MHz Com. Spectrum, 27 FCC
Rcd. 3521, 3536 (Mar. 21, 2012). The main difference
between the 2011 and 2012 NSAs appears to be their
geographic scope; the 2012 NSA allegedly covered much
less territory. SAC ¶¶ 143-45. But the spectrum-sharing
and management relationship between U.S. Cellular and
King Street is the same in both, and that is the operative
fact here for purposes of whether U.S. Cellular was
exercising secret, de facto control over King Street. As a
result, the 2011 NSA does not “add[] in a significant way to
the essential factual background” surrounding this case,
5. Available at https://auctionfiling.fcc.gov/form175/search175/
index.htm (select “Auction 901,” search in search bar for file
number 0005476908, select “Winning Bids” tab, select “Show”
in “Attachments” column for any entry, then scroll to and click
“Amended Exhibit 2 - REDACTED”).
38a
Appendix B
United States ex rel. Moore & Co., P.A. v. Majestic Blue
Fisheries, LLC, 812 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2016).
Plaintiffs-Relators also claim that they conducted
independent “investigation and research” that have
revealed Defendants’ fraud. Opposition at 11. But “relators
[are] not an original source [when] they at best verif[y]
. . . information contained in” the public record, United
States ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 826 F.3d
466, 479, 423 U.S. App. D.C. 302 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quotation
omitted), and that is all that Plaintiffs-Relators have
done here. First, they claim that they “commission[ed]
spectrum analysis studies showing U.S. Cellular’s use
and control of the King Street spectrum.” Opposition at 8;
SAC ¶ 98-99. But as already discussed, the fact that U.S.
Cellular and King Street shared spectrum was already
public and even expressly recognized by the FCC. Second,
Plaintiffs-Relators “contact[ed] King Street’s alleged
sales team to determine whether King Street offered
wireless services to customers (it did not)” and “obtain[ed]
customer service contracts that identified U.S. Cellular
as the sole provider in King Street markets.” Opposition
at 8; SAC ¶ 101. But King Street’s annual, public DE
compliance reports repeatedly stated that King Street had
no customers. SAC Ex. 4 at 12, 23, 34, 45, ECF No. 118-4.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs-Relators’ investigations provide
no more than “background information or collateral
research”—insufficient to make them an original source.
Oliver, 826 F.3d at 479 (quotation omitted).
Finally, Plaintiffs-Relators point to their “locating
permits and other documents naming U.S. Cellular (or its
39a
Appendix B
affiliates) in connection with the build out of the purported
King Street networks” and their finding that “King Street
never applied for telephone numbers to be able to offer
services to customers, never filed a Form 499A identifying
the jurisdictions where it offered services, and never even
filed for a Form 499 number.” Opposition at 8-9; SAC
¶¶ 111, 112-13. But those permits, documents, and forms
are all public, and “[a]ny member of the public could have”
looked them up. Oliver, 826 F.3d at 480 (quoting U.S. ex
rel. Atkinson v. PA. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 523
(3d Cir. 2007)). As a result, they cannot qualify PlaintiffsRelators for original-source status. Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court will GRANT Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 148, 149. A corresponding
order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: March 22, 2023
/s/ Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
40a
Appendix B
Figure 1 - Alleged Relationship Between Defendants
Source: Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 23-32, ECF No.
118. “G.P.” stands for general partner. “L.P.” stands for
limited partner.
41a
Appendix
C UNITED STATES
APPENDIX C — ORDER
OF THE
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, FILED MARCH 22, 2023
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 20-cv-2071 (TSC)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
Plaintiffs-Relators,
v.
UNITED STATES CELLULAR CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying
Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 165, the Motion to
Dismiss of Defendants King Street Wireless, [*20] L.P.,
King Street Wireless, Inc., and Allison Cryor Dinardo,
ECF No. 148, is hereby GRANTED; and Defendants
United States Cellular Corporation, USCC Wireless
Investment, Inc., and Telephone and Data Systems, Inc.’s
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 149, is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED. This is a
final appealable order.
42a
Appendix C
Date: March 22, 2023
/s/ Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
43a
AppendixOF
D REHEARING OF
APPENDIX D — DENIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,
FILED APRIL 8, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23-7044
September Term, 2024
1:20-cv-02071-TSC
Filed On: April 8, 2025
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
and
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
Appellants,
v.
USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., et al.,
Appellees.
BEFORE: Wilkins, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for panel
rehearing filed on March 27, 2025, it is
ORDERED that the petition be denied.
44a
Appendix D
Per Curiam
BY:
FOR THE COURT:
Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk
/s/
Michael C. McGrail
Deputy Clerk
45a
APPENDIX E —Appendix
DENIALDOF REHEARING
EN BANC OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT, FILED APRIL 8, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23-7044
September Term, 2024
1:20-cv-02071-TSC
Filed On: April 8, 2025
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL.
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
and
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
Appellants,
v.
USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., et al.,
Appellees.
BEFORE:
Srinivasan, Chief Judge, and Henderson,
Millett, Pillard, Wilkins, Katsas, Rao,
Walker, Childs, Pan, and Garcia, Circuit
Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellants’ petition for
rehearing en banc, and the absence of a request by any
member of the court for a vote, it is
46a
Appendix E
ORDERED that the petition be denied.
Per Curiam
BY:
FOR THE COURT:
Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk
/s/
Michael C. McGrail
Deputy Clerk
47a
Appendix F OF THE UNITED
APPENDIX F — MANDATE
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, FILED
APRIL 16, 2025
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 23-7044
September Term, 2024
1:20-cv-02071-TSC
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, EX REL. MARK
J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
and
MARK J. O’CONNOR AND SARA F. LEIBMAN,
Appellants
v.
USCC WIRELESS INVESTMENT, INC., ET AL.,
Appellees
48a
Appendix F
MANDATE
In accordance with the judgment of February 11, 2025,
and pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41,
this constitutes the formal mandate of this court.
FOR THE COURT:
Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk
BY: /s/
Daniel J. Reidy
Deputy Clerk
49a
G STATUTORY
APPENDIX G —Appendix
RELEVANT
AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS
31 U.S.C. § 3729, False Claims
(a) Liability for certain acts.
(1) In general. Subject to paragraph (2), any person who
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or
used, a false record or statement material to a false
or fraudulent claim;
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph
(A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G);
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or
money used, or to be used, by the Government and
knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than
all of that money or property;
(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document
certifying receipt of property used, or to be used,
by the Government and, intending to defraud the
Government, makes or delivers the receipt without
completely knowing that the information on the receipt
is true;
(F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an
obligation or debt, public property from an officer
or employee of the Government, or a member of the
50a
Appendix G
Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge
property; or
(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement material to an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or
transmit money or property to the Government,
is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000,
as adjusted by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note; Public Law
104-4101), plus 3 times the amount of damages which the
Government sustains because of the act of that person.
(2) Reduced damages. If the court finds that
(A) the person committing the violation of this
subsection furnished officials of the United States
responsible for investigating false claims violations
with all information known to such person about the
violation within 30 days after the date on which the
defendant first obtained the information;
(B) such person fully cooperated with any Government
investigation of such violation; and
(C) at the time such person furnished the United States
with the information about the violation, no criminal
prosecution, civil action, or administrative action
51a
Appendix G
had commenced under this title with respect to such
violation, and the person did not have actual knowledge
of the existence of an investigation into such violation,
the court may assess not less than 2 times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains because of the
act of that person.
(3) Costs of civil actions.
A person violating this subsection shall also be liable to the
United States Government for the costs of a civil action
brought to recover any such penalty or damages.
(b) Definitions. For purposes of this section
(1) the terms “knowing” and “knowingly”
(A) mean that a person, with respect to information
(i) has actual knowledge of the information;
(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or
falsity of the information; or
(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
of the information; and
(B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud;
(2) the term “claim”
52a
Appendix G
(A) means any request or demand, whether under
a contract or otherwise, for money or property and
whether or not the United States has title to the money
or property, that
(i) is presented to an officer, employee, or agent of
the United States; or
(ii) is made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient, if the money or property is to be spent
or used on the Government’s behalf or to advance a
Government program or interest, and if the United
States Government
(I) provides or has provided any portion of the
money or property requested or demanded; or
(II) will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or
other recipient for any portion of the money or
property which is requested or demanded; and
(B) does not include requests or demands for money or
property that the Government has paid to an individual
as compensation for Federal employment or as an
income subsidy with no restrictions on that individual’s
use of the money or property;
(3) the term “obligation” means an established duty,
whether or not fixed, arising from an express or implied
contractual, grantor-grantee, or licensor-licensee
relationship, from a fee-based or similar relationship,
from statute or regulation, or from the retention of any
overpayment; and
53a
Appendix G
(4) the term “material” means having a natural tendency
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or
receipt of money or property.
(c) Exemption from disclosure.
Any information furnished pursuant to subsection (a)(2)
shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5.
(d) Exclusion.
This section does not apply to claims, records, or
statements made under the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.
54a
Appendix G
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)
(b) Actions by private persons.
(1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of
section 3729 for the person and for the United States
Government. The action shall be brought in the name
of the Government. The action may be dismissed
only if the court and the Attorney General give
written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for
consenting.
(2) A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of
substantially all material evidence and information the
person possesses shall be served on the Government
pursuant to Rule 4(d)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.1 The complaint shall be filed in camera,
shall remain under seal for at least 60 days, and
shall not be served on the defendant until the court
so orders. The Government may elect to intervene
and proceed with the action within 60 days after it
receives both the complaint and the material evidence
and information.
(3) The Government may, for good cause shown, move
the court for extensions of the time during which the
complaint remains under seal under paragraph (2).
Any such motions may be supported by affidavits or
other submissions in camera. The defendant shall
not be required to respond to any complaint filed
under this section until 20 days after the complaint is
unsealed and served upon the defendant pursuant to
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
55a
Appendix G
(4) Before the expiration of the 60-day period or
any extensions obtained under paragraph (3), the
Government shall—
(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action
shall be conducted by the Government; or
(B) notify the court that it declines to take over the
action, in which case the person bringing the action
shall have the right to conduct the action.
(5) When a person brings an action under this
subsection, no person other than the Government may
intervene or bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action.
56a
Appendix G
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)
(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under
this section, unless opposed by the Government, if
substantially the same allegations or transactions as
alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed—
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing in which the Government or its agent is a
party;
(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability
Office, or other Federal report, hearing, audit, or
investigation; or
(iii) from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or
the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source”
means an individual who either (i) prior to a public
disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily
disclosed to the Government the information on which
allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2)
who has knowledge that is independent of and materially
adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,
and who has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing an action under this section.
57a
Appendix G
The version of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4), as amended in
1986, read:
(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under
this section based upon the public disclosure of allegations
or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation,
or from the news media, unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General or the person bringing the action
is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source”
means an individual who has direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations
are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action under this section
which is based on the information.
58a
Appendix G
47 C.F.R. § 1.2110 (2014), Designated entities
(a) Designated entities are small businesses, businesses
owned by members of minority groups and/or women, and
rural telephone companies.
(b) Eligibility for small business and entrepreneur
provisions—
(1) Size attribution.
(i) The gross revenues of the applicant (or licensee),
its affiliates, its controlling interests, the affiliates
of its controlling interests, and the entities with
which it has an attributable material relationship
shall be attributed to the applicant (or licensee) and
considered on a cumulative basis and aggregated
for purposes of determining whether the applicant
(or licensee) is eligible for status as a small business,
very small business, or entrepreneur, as those
terms are defined in the service-specific rules. An
applicant seeking status as a small business, very
small business, or entrepreneur, as those terms are
defined in the service-specific rules, must disclose
on its short- and long-form applications, separately
and in the aggregate, the gross revenues for each
of the previous three years of the applicant (or
licensee), its affiliates, its controlling interests,
the affiliates of its controlling interests, and the
entities with which it has an attributable material
relationship.
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(ii) If applicable, pursuant to § 24.709 of this
chapter, the total assets of the applicant (or
licensee), its affiliates, its controlling interests,
the affiliates of its controlling interests, and the
entities with which it has an attributable material
relationship shall be attributed to the applicant (or
licensee) and considered on a cumulative basis and
aggregated for purposes of determining whether
the applicant (or licensee) is eligible for status as
an entrepreneur. An applicant seeking status as an
entrepreneur must disclose on its short- and longform applications, separately and in the aggregate,
the gross revenues for each of the previous two
years of the applicant (or licensee), its affiliates, its
controlling interests, the affiliates of its controlling
interests, and the entities with which it has an
attributable material relationship.
(2) Aggregation of affiliate interests. Persons or
entities that hold interests in an applicant (or licensee)
that are affiliates of each other or have an identity
of interests identified in § 1.2110(c)(5)(iii) will be
treated as though they were one person or entity and
their ownership interests aggregated for purposes of
determining an applicant’s (or licensee’s) compliance
with the requirements of this section.
Example 1 to paragraph (b)(2): ABC Corp. is owned by
individuals, A, B and C, each having an equal one-third
voting interest in ABC Corp. A and B together, with
two-thirds of the stock have the power to control ABC
Corp. and have an identity of interest. If A & B invest in
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Appendix G
DE Corp., a broadband PCS applicant for block C, A and
B’s separate interests in DE Corp. must be aggregated
because A and B are to be treated as one person or entity.
Example 2 to paragraph (b)(2): ABC Corp. has subsidiary
BC Corp., of which it holds a controlling 51 percent of
the stock. If ABC Corp. and BC Corp., both invest in
DE Corp., their separate interests in DE Corp. must
be aggregated because ABC Corp. and BC Corp. are
affiliates of each other.
(3) Exceptions—
***
(iv) Applicants or licensees w ith mater ia l
relationships—
***
(A) Attributable material relationships. An
applicant or licensee must attribute the gross
revenues (and, if applicable, the total assets) of
any entity, (including the controlling interests,
affiliates, and affiliates of the controlling
interests of that entity) with which the applicant
or licensee has an attributable material
relationship. An applicant or licensee has an
attributable material relationship when it has
one or more arrangements with any individual
entity for the lease or resale (including under a
wholesale agreement) of, on a cumulative basis,
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more than 25 percent of the spectrum capacity
of any one of the applicant’s or licensee’s
licenses.
***
(c) Definitions—
(1) Small businesses. The Commission will establish
the definition of a small business on a service-specific
basis, taking into consideration the characteristics and
capital requirements of the particular service.
(2) Controlling interests.
(i) For purposes of this section, controlling interest
includes individuals or entities with either de jure
or de facto control of the applicant. De jure control
is evidenced by holdings of greater than 50 percent
of the voting stock of a corporation, or in the case
of a partnership, general partnership interests.
De facto control is determined on a case-by-case
basis. An entity must disclose its equity interest
and demonstrate at least the following indicia of
control to establish that it retains de facto control
of the applicant:
(A) The entity constitutes or appoints more
than 50 percent of the board of directors or
management committee;
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Appendix G
(B) The entity has authority to appoint, promote,
demote, and fire senior executives that control
the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and
(C) The entity plays an integ ral role in
management decisions.
(ii) Calculation of certain interests.
(A)* Fully diluted requirement.
(1) Except as set forth in paragraph (c)(2)
(ii)(A)(2) of this section, ownership interests
shall be calculated on a fully diluted basis; all
agreements such as warrants, stock options
and convertible debentures will generally be
treated as if the rights thereunder already
have been fully exercised.
(2) Rights of first refusal and put options
shall not be calculated on a fully diluted
basis for purposes of determining de jure
control; however, rights of first refusal and
* Note to paragraph (c)(2)(ii)(A): Mutually exclusive
contingent ownership interests, i.e., one or more ownership
interests that, by their terms, are mutually exclusive of one or
more other ownership interests, shall be calculated as having been
fully exercised only in the possible combinations in which they can
be exercised by their holder(s). A contingent ownership interest
is mutually exclusive of another only if contractual language
specifies that both interests cannot be held simultaneously as
present ownership interests.
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Appendix G
put options shall be calculated on a fully
diluted basis if such ownership interests,
in combination with other terms to an
agreement, deprive an otherwise qualified
applicant or licensee of de facto control.
(B) Partnership and other ownership interests
and any stock interest equity, or outstanding
stock, or outstanding voting stock shall be
attributed as specified.
(C) Stock interests held in trust shall be
attributed to any person who holds or shares
the power to vote such stock, to any person
who has the sole power to sell such stock, and
to any person who has the right to revoke the
trust at will or to replace the trustee at will. If
the trustee has a familial, personal, or extratrust business relationship to the grantor or
the beneficiary, the grantor or beneficiary, as
appropriate, will be attributed with the stock
interests held in trust.
(D) Non-voting stock shall be attributed as an
interest in the issuing entity.
(E) Limited partnership interests shall be
attributed to limited partners and shall be
calculated according to both the percentage of
equity paid in and the percentage of distribution
of profits and losses.
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Appendix G
(F) Officers and directors of the applicant shall
be considered to have a controlling interest in
the applicant. The officers and directors of an
entity that controls a licensee or applicant shall
be considered to have a controlling interest in
the licensee or applicant. The personal net worth,
including personal income of the officers and
directors of an applicant, is not attributed to
the applicant. To the extent that the officers and
directors of an applicant are affiliates of other
entities, the gross revenues of the other entities
are attributed to the applicant.
(G) Ownership interests that are held indirectly
by any party through one or more intervening
corporations will be determined by successive
multiplication of the ownership percentages for
each link in the vertical ownership chain and
application of the relevant attribution benchmark to
the resulting product, except that if the ownership
percentage for an interest in any link in the chain
exceeds 50 percent or represents actual control, it
shall be treated as if it were a 100 percent interest.
(H) Any person who manages the operations of an
applicant or licensee pursuant to a management
agreement shall be considered to have a controlling
interest in such applicant or licensee if such person,
or its affiliate, has authority to make decisions or
otherwise engage in practices or activities that
determine, or significantly influence:
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Appendix G
(1) The nature or types of services offered by
such an applicant or licensee;
(2) The terms upon which such services are
offered; or
(3) The prices charged for such services.
(I) Any licensee or its affiliate who enters into a
joint marketing arrangement with an applicant or
licensee, or its affiliate, shall be considered to have
a controlling interest, if such applicant or licensee,
or its affiliate, has authority to make decisions or
otherwise engage in practices or activities that
determine, or significantly influence:
(1) The nature or types of services offered by
such an applicant or licensee;
(2) The terms upon which such services are
offered; or
(3) The prices charged for such services.
***
(5) Affiliate.
(i) An individual or entity is an affiliate of an applicant
or of a person holding an attributable interest in an
applicant if such individual or entity—
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Appendix G
(A) Directly or indirectly controls or has the power
to control the applicant, or
(B) Is directly or indirectly controlled by the
applicant, or
(C) Is directly or indirectly controlled by a third
party or parties that also controls or has the power
to control the applicant, or
(D) Has an “identity of interest” with the applicant.
(ii) Nature of control in determining affiliation.
(A) Every business concern is considered to have
one or more parties who directly or indirectly
control or have the power to control it. Control
may be affirmative or negative and it is immaterial
whether it is exercised so long as the power to
control exists.
Example. An applicant owning 50 percent of the
voting stock of another concern would have negative
power to control such concern since such party can
block any action of the other stockholders. Also, the
bylaws of a corporation may permit a stockholder
with less than 50 percent of the voting stock to
block any actions taken by the other stockholders
in the other entity. Affiliation exists when the
applicant has the power to control a concern while
at the same time another person, or persons, are
in control of the concern at the will of the party or
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parties with the power to control.
(B) Control can arise through stock ownership;
occupancy of director, officer or key employee
positions; contractual or other business relations;
or combinations of these and other factors. A key
employee is an employee who, because of his/her
position in the concern, has a critical influence
in or substantive control over the operations or
management of the concern.
(C) Control can arise through management
positions where a concern’s voting stock is so
widely distributed that no effective control can be
established.
Example. In a corporation where the officers and
directors own various size blocks of stock totaling
40 percent of the corporation’s voting stock, but
no officer or director has a block sufficient to give
him or her control or the power to control and the
remaining 60 percent is widely distributed with
no individual stockholder having a stock interest
greater than 10 percent, management has the
power to control. If persons with such management
control of the other entity are persons with
attributable interests in the applicant, the other
entity will be deemed an affiliate of the applicant.
(iii) Identity of interest between and among persons.
A ffiliation can arise between or among two or
more persons with an identity of interest, such as
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Appendix G
members of the same family or persons with common
investments. In determining if the applicant controls
or has the power to control a concern, persons with
an identity of interest will be treated as though they
were one person.
Example. T wo shareholders in Corporation Y
each have attributable interests in the same PCS
application. While neither shareholder has enough
shares to individually control Corporation Y, together
they have the power to control Corporation Y. The
two shareholders with these common investments (or
identity in interest) are treated as though they are
one person and Corporation Y would be deemed an
affiliate of the applicant.
(A) Spousal affiliation. Both spouses are deemed
to own or control or have the power to control
interests owned or controlled by either of them,
unless they are subject to a legal separation
recognized by a court of competent jurisdiction in
the United States. In calculating their net worth,
investors who are legally separated must include
their share of interests in property held jointly
with a spouse.
(B) Kinship affiliation. Immediate fa
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