Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al., Petitioners v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 3, 2025

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No. XX-XX

In the Supreme Court of the United States

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

SARAH M. HARRIS

Deputy Solicitor General

SOPAN JOSHI

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MARK R. FREEMAN

MICHAEL S. RAAB

BRAD HINSHELWOOD

DANIEL WINIK

SOPHIA SHAMS

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat.

1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump

pursuant to the national emergencies declared or continued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders

14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.

2. If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to

the President.

(I)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners (defendants-appellants below) are Donald J. Trump, President of the United States; the

United States of America; the Executive Office of the

President; the Department of Homeland Security;

Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP); Rodney S.

Scott, Commissioner for CBP; the Office of the United

States Trade Representative; Jamieson Greer, United

States Trade Representative; and Howard Lutnick,

Secretary of Commerce.*

Respondents are V.O.S. Selections, Inc.; Plastic Services and Products, LLC d/b/a Genova Pipe; MicroKits,

LLC; FishUSA Inc.; and Terry Precision Cycling LLC

(plaintiffs-appellees in Nos. 25-cv-66 and 25-1812). Respondents also include the States of Oregon; Arizona;

Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Illinois; Maine; Minnesota; Nevada; New Mexico; New York; and Vermont

(plaintiffs-appellees in Nos. 25-cv-77 and 25-1813).

* All individual petitioners were sued in their official capacities

and their successors, if any, have automatically been substituted in

their respective places. See Sup. Ct. R. 35.3; Fed. R. App. P.

43(c)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). The Court of International Trade

dismissed the President as a defendant, and respondents did not

cross-appeal that ruling. See App., infra, 22a n.10, 161a. Nevertheless, the court of appeals retained the President in the case caption

and we accordingly do the same here.

(II)

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of International Trade:

V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States, No. 25-cv-66

(May 28, 2025)

Oregon v. United States Department of Homeland

Security, No. 25-cv-77 (May 28, 2025)

United States Court of Appeals (Fed. Cir.):

V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1812 (Aug.

29, 2025)

Oregon v. Trump, No. 25-1813 (Aug. 29, 2025)

(III)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1

Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1

Statutory provisions involved ...................................................... 1

Introduction................................................................................... 2

Statement:

A. Statutory background ....................................................... 6

B. The challenged actions.................................................... 10

1. Contraband drug tariffs ........................................... 11

2. Reciprocal tariffs ...................................................... 12

C. Proceedings below ........................................................... 15

Reasons for granting the petition ............................................. 18

A. IEEPA authorizes the challenged tariffs ..................... 19

B. IEEPA does not violate the nondelegation doctrine ... 29

C. The decision below warrants further review ................ 31

Conclusion ................................................................................... 34

Appendix A — Federal Circuit opinion (Aug. 29, 2025, as

amended on Sept. 2, 2025) ........................ 1a

Appendix B — Federal Circuit judgment

(Aug. 29, 2025) ....................................... 137a

Appendix C — Court of International Trade opinion

(May 28, 2025) ........................................ 139a

Appendix D — Court of International Trade judgment

(May 28, 2025) ........................................ 198a

Appendix E — Statutory provisions................................... 201a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023) ........................ 25, 33

Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States,

7 Cranch 382 (1813) ........................................................ 7, 30

Dames & Moore v. Regan,

453 U.S. 654 (1981).............................................. 9, 23, 28, 31

(V)

Cases—Continued:

Page

Department of Agriculture Rural Development

Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz,

601 U.S. 42 (2024) ......................................................... 22, 27

Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) ...... 26

FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284 (2012) ..................................... 20

FCC v. Consumers’ Research,

145 S. Ct. 2482 (2025) ....................................... 25, 26, 29, 30

FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,

426 U.S. 548 (1976).........................................5, 20, 21, 29, 30

Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 590 U.S. 255 (2020) ........ 23

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824) ......................... 5, 20, 22

Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128 (2019)...................... 29

Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) .................................. 24, 28

J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,

276 U. S. 394 (1928)................................................... 7, 29, 31

Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark,

143 U.S. 649 (1892).................................................... 7, 30, 31

PrimeSource Building Products, Inc. v. United

States, 59 F.4th 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2023), cert. denied,

144 S. Ct. 345 (2023), and 144 S. Ct. 561 (2024) ............... 31

Public Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209

(D.C. Cir. 2004) ................................................................... 28

Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) ..................... 9, 23, 24, 28

Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197 (2020) .................... 25

Soto v. United States, 605 U.S. 360 (2025) .......................... 20

Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025) ..................... 18

Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667 (2018) ................................ 29

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,

299 U.S. 304 (1936).............................................................. 29

United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) ................... 29

United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077 (9th Cir. 2023),

cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 820 (2024) ..................................... 31

VII

Cases—Continued:

Page

United States v. Yoshida International, Inc.,

526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ................................... 8, 23, 31

Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,

573 U.S. 302 (2014).............................................................. 26

Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825) .......................... 30

Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) ..................................... 28

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022) ........................ 25

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579 (1952)........................................................ 26, 31

Constitution and statutes:

U.S. Const.:

Art. I, § 8 .......................................................................... 22

Art. II ................................................................................. 6

First War Powers Act,

ch. 593, 55 Stat. 838 .............................................................. 8

55 Stat. 839 ......................................................................... 8

International Emergency Economic Powers Act,

Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626

(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) .......... 2-6, 9-11, 15, 17, 19-28, 31, 32

50 U.S.C. 1701(a) ............................................... 3, 5, 10, 30

50 U.S.C. 1701(b) ....................................................... 16, 30

50 U.S.C. 1702 .................................................................. 24

50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(A) ................................................... 10

50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(B) ............................10, 15, 19, 20, 30

50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(C) ................................................... 10

50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(2)(B) ..................................................... 3

50 U.S.C. 1702(b) ............................................................. 30

50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1) ........................................................ 10

50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2) ........................................................ 10

50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3) ........................................................ 10

50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(4) ........................................................ 10

VIII

Statutes—Continued:

Page

50 U.S.C. 1703 ............................................................ 24, 30

50 U.S.C. 1703(a) ............................................................. 10

50 U.S.C. 1703(b) ............................................................. 10

50 U.S.C. 1703(c) ............................................................. 10

50 U.S.C. 1703(d) ............................................................. 10

National Emergencies Act of 1976,

Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 ........................................ 8

50 U.S.C. 1621(a) ............................................................... 9

50 U.S.C. 1622(a)(1)........................................................... 9

50 U.S.C. 1622(b) ............................................................... 9

50 U.S.C. 1622(d) ............................................................... 9

50 U.S.C. 1641(a) ............................................................... 9

50 U.S.C. 1641(b) ............................................................... 9

50 U.S.C. 1641(c) ............................................................... 9

Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809, ch. 24,

2 Stat. 528 .............................................................................. 7

Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 ............................... 7

Tarriff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858................................ 7

Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 338, 46 Stat. 704

(19 U.S.C. 1338)..................................................................... 7

Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978:

§ 122, 88 Stat. 1987 (19 U.S.C. 2132) ............. 8, 15, 25, 26

Tit., II, 88 Stat. 2011 (19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.) ................. 8

Tit. III, 88 Stat. 2041 (19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq.) ................ 8

19 U.S.C. 2132(a) ....................................................... 16, 27

19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq. ........................................................ 8

19 U.S.C. 2411 et seq. ........................................................ 8

19 U.S.C. 3004(c)(1) ......................................................... 17

Trade Expansion Act of 1962,

Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 877 (19 U.S.C. 1862).............. 7

Statutes—Continued:

Page

Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917,

ch. 106, § 11, 40 Stat. 422-423 .......................................... 8, 9

15 U.S.C. 78i(h)(1).................................................................. 23

15 U.S.C. 78i(h)(2).................................................................. 23

28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(1)(B) .......................................................... 16

50 U.S.C. 4302 .......................................................................... 9

Miscellaneous:

The American Heritage Dictionary of the English

Language (1969) ................................................................. 28

Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) ............................... 19

Exec. Order No. 14,157,

90 Fed. Reg. 8439 (Jan. 29, 2025) ...................................... 11

Exec. Order No. 14,193,

90 Fed. Reg. 9113 (Feb. 7, 2025) ....................................... 11

Exec. Order No. 14,194,

90 Fed. Reg. 9117 (Feb. 7, 2025) ....................................... 11

Exec. Order No. 14,195,

90 Fed. Reg. 9121 (Feb. 7, 2025) ................................. 11, 12

Exec. Order No. 14,197,

90 Fed. Reg. 9183 (Feb. 10, 2025) ..................................... 11

Exec. Order No. 14,198,

90 Fed. Reg. 9185 (Feb. 10, 2025) ..................................... 11

Exec. Order No. 14,228,

90 Fed. Reg. 11,463 (Mar. 7, 2025) .................................... 12

Exec. Order No. 14,231,

90 Fed. Reg. 11,785 (Mar. 11, 2025) .................................. 11

Exec. Order No. 14,232,

90 Fed. Reg. 11,787 (Mar. 11, 2025) .................................. 11

Exec. Order No. 14,257,

90 Fed. Reg. 15,041 (Apr. 7, 2025) .............................. 12, 13

Exec. Order No. 14,266,

90 Fed. Reg. 15,625 (Apr. 15, 2025)................................... 13

Miscellaneous—Continued:

Page

Exec. Order No. 14,316,

90 Fed. Reg. 30,823 (July 7, 2025) ..................................... 14

Exec. Order No. 14,326,

90 Fed. Reg. 37,963 (Aug. 6, 2025) .................................... 14

H.R. Rep. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ....... 8, 10, 23

Proclamation No. 4074,

36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (Aug. 17, 1971) .................................... 8

Proclamation No. 10,886,

90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (Jan. 29, 2025) ...................................... 11

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. XX-XX

DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

ET AL., PETITIONERS

V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General respectfully petitions for a writ

of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., infra, 1a136a) is available at 2025 WL 2490634. The opinion of

the Court of International Trade (App., infra, 139a-197a)

is reported at 772 F. Supp. 3d 1350.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

August 29, 2025. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Pertinent statutory provisions are reproduced in the

appendix to this brief (App., infra, 201a-206a).

(1)

INTRODUCTION

This case addresses the validity of the Administration’s most significant economic and foreign-policy

initiative—the imposition of tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub.

L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626 (50 U.S.C. 1701

et seq.), which President Trump has determined are necessary to rectify America’s country-killing trade deficits and to stem the flood of fentanyl across our borders.

In January 2025, the United States faced “enormous,

persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits”—$1.2 trillion per year—that, the President perceived, “have hollowed out our domestic manufacturing and defenseindustrial base and have resulted in a lack of advanced

domestic manufacturing capacity, a defense-industrial

base dependent on inputs from foreign adversaries,

[and] vulnerable domestic supply chains.” C.A. Doc.

158, at 6-7 (Aug. 29, 2025) (Lutnick).1 Those “catastrophic” deficits, id. at 5, arose from asymmetric tariffs and trade barriers that virtually all our major trading partners had imposed on the United States for decades. Gov’t Mot. to Expedite 2a (Bessent).2

The President and his most senior advisors recognized that those trade deficits had created “an ongoing

economic emergency of historic proportions,” C.A. Doc.

158, at 6 (Lutnick), and brought America to a “tipping

point,” i.e., “the brink of a major economic and nationalsecurity catastrophe.” Gov’t Mot. to Expedite 2a (Bessent). Exercising the President’s broad discretion un1

All record citations are to Federal Circuit case 25-1812 and

Court of International Trade case 25-cv-66.

The government is simultaneously filing a motion to expedite

consideration of the petition for a writ of certiorari and, if certiorari

is granted, to expedite merits briefing and argument.

der IEEPA to “regulate * * * importation” of foreign

goods to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat”

to “national security, foreign policy, or [the U.S.] economy,” 50 U.S.C. 1701(a), 1702(a)(2)(B), President Trump

declared a national emergency and imposed tariffs. The

President has determined that those tariffs and the ensuing trade negotiations with all our major trading partners are pulling America back from the precipice of disaster, restoring its respect and standing in the world,

eliminating decades of unfair and asymmetric trade policies that have gutted our manufacturing capacity and

military readiness, and inducing our trading partners to

invest trillions of dollars in the American economy. The

tariffs also address the separate national emergency

arising from mass importation of fentanyl and other illegal drugs that have taken hundreds of thousands of

American lives and helped fuel the rise of foreign cartels and traffickers. C.A. Doc. 158, at 25 (Rubio), 35-36

(Greer).

Due to IEEPA tariffs, six major trading partners

and the 27-nation European Union have already entered into framework deals with the United States, accepting tariff arrangements heavily recalibrated in

America’s favor and agreeing to make approximately

$2 trillion of purchases and investment in the United

States’ economy, see C.A. Doc. 158, at 13-14 (Lutnick),

36 (Greer)—with trillions more under negotiation with

countries across the world.

In addition, the President recently authorized

IEEPA tariffs against India for purchasing Russian energy products, to deal with a preexisting national emergency regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine, as a crucial

aspect of his push for peace in that war-torn country.

C.A. Doc. 158, at 26 (Rubio). And the Congressional

Budget Office projected that tariffs will reduce federal

deficits by $4 trillion in the coming years. Id. at 19.

The stakes in this case could not be higher. The

President and his Cabinet officials have determined

that the tariffs are promoting peace and unprecedented

economic prosperity, and that the denial of tariff authority would expose our nation to trade retaliation

without effective defenses and thrust America back to

the brink of economic catastrophe. C.A. Doc. 158, at

8-9 (Lutnick).

To the President and his most senior advisors, these

tariffs thus present a stark choice: With tariffs, we are

a rich nation; without tariffs, we are a poor nation. According to the President, “[o]ne year ago, the United

States was a dead country, and now, because of the trillions of dollars being paid by countries that have so

badly abused us, America is a strong, financially viable,

and respected country again.” C.A. Doc. 154, at 1 (Aug.

11, 2025). The President predicts that “[i]f the United

States were forced to pay back the trillions of dollars

committed to us, America could go from strength to failure the moment such an incorrect decision took effect,”

and “the economic consequences would be ruinous, instead of unprecedented success.” Id. at 1-2.

Nonetheless, in a fractured, 7-4 decision, the en banc

Federal Circuit declared that the President’s use of

IEEPA tariffs was unlawful. That decision casts a

pall of uncertainty upon ongoing foreign negotiations

that the President has been pursuing through tariffs

over the past five months, jeopardizing both alreadynegotiated framework deals and ongoing negotiations.

C.A. Doc. 158, at 8-9 (Lutnick), 39 (Greer). Few cases

have so clearly called out for this Court’s swift resolution.

The Federal Circuit did not question that those crises constitute “unusual and extraordinary threat[s]” to

“national security, foreign policy, or [the U.S.] economy” sufficient to trigger the President’s emergency

powers under IEEPA. 50 U.S.C. 1701(a). And the Federal Circuit did not rule out that the President’s authority under IEEPA to “regulate * * * importation” of foreign goods to “deal with” such threats might authorize

some tariffs. See App., infra 25a. That court simply

held that these particular tariffs are too significant and

enduring to fall within IEEPA’s bounds, reasoning that

Congress needed to authorize them more expressly.

See id. at 38a-39a.

As Judge Taranto’s dissent recognized, that reasoning is profoundly wrong. It contradicts IEEPA’s plain

text, the Court’s cases, statutory history, and longstanding practice. App., infra, 64a-136a. Without further qualification, IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate”

—i.e., to govern or control—foreign imports to address

national emergencies. Id. at 94a-103a. Imposing tariffs

is a quintessential method of governing or controlling

imports. The Court has long interpreted “regulation of

commerce” in this area to encompass tariffs or duties.

E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 202 (1824) (Marshall,

C.J.). And the Court has interpreted the phrase “adjust

imports” to encompass tariffs. FEA v. Algonquin SNG,

Inc., 426 U.S. 548 (1976).

By contrast, the Federal Circuit majority’s atextual,

some-but-not-others theory of IEEPA tariffs would

leave courts with no metrics for judging when tariffs

last too long, realize too much revenue, cover too many

countries, or become too effective for the court’s liking.

IEEPA does not empower federal judges to perversely

declare tariffs unlawful at some judicially discerned

point when they achieve too much.

There is nothing new or suspect about IEEPA’s

broad delegation of tariff authority to address national

emergencies. Congress has long supplemented the

President’s Article II foreign-affairs powers by delegating capacious authority to impose tariffs that, in the

President’s judgment, will advance national security,

foster economic prosperity, or facilitate negotiations with

foreign counterparts. Likewise, the major-questions

doctrine on which the Federal Circuit relied is inapplicable. IEEPA quite naturally addresses the most

major of questions—the powers available to Presidents

to address extraordinary national emergencies in the

foreign-affairs context—by conferring major powers.

The decision below eviscerates a critical tool for addressing emergencies through fuzzy reasoning that improperly transforms judges into foreign-policy referees. Though the Federal Circuit has stayed its mandate

pending this Court’s review, its decision has jeopardized ongoing foreign negotiations and threatens framework deals. Gov’t Mot. to Expedite 1a-2a (Bessent).

Left undisturbed, the decision below would, in the President’s view, unilaterally disarm the United States and

allow other nations to hold America’s economy hostage

to their retaliatory trade policies. This Court should

grant certiorari, expedite consideration of the merits,

and reverse.

STATEMENT

A. Statutory Background

1. For over a century, Congress has supplemented

the President’s constitutional power over foreign affairs

and national security by delegating to him the authority

to manage tariffs or duties on foreign imports in re-

sponse to international conditions. See Marshall Field

& Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892).

This Court has repeatedly upheld presidential exercises of such authority. In 1813, this Court upheld an

1810 statute that authorized the President to reinstate

the terms of the Non-Intercourse Act of March 1, 1809,

ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528, and prohibit imports from either

Great Britain or France if either nation “violate[d] the

neutral commerce of the United States.” Cargo of Brig

Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382, 384 (citation

omitted); see id. at 388. In 1892, this Court upheld the

constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, 26

Stat. 567, which authorized the President to suspend an

exemption for certain products from import duties “for

such time as he shall deem just” “whenever, and so often as [he] shall be satisfied,” that the exporting country “imposes duties or other exactions” on American

products that “he may deem to be reciprocally unequal

and unreasonable.” Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 680 (citation omitted). And in 1928, the Court upheld the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, which empowered

the President to raise import duties “whenever the

President * * * shall find” that existing tariffs do not

equalize the differences between foreign and domestic

production costs, and to modify the tariffs “when he determines” that “the differences in costs of production

have changed.” J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United

States, 276 U.S. 394, 401-402 (citation omitted).

Congress has since enacted many other statutes authorizing the Executive to impose or modify tariffs or

duties on imports, including Section 338 of the Tariff

Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 704 (19 U.S.C. 1338); Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No.

87-794, 76 Stat. 877 (19 U.S.C. 1862); and Titles II and

III of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat.

2011, 2041 (19 U.S.C. 2251 et seq., 2411 et seq.).

Most relevant here, the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), ch. 106, § 11, 40 Stat. 422-423, authorized the President to specify foreign goods that may not

be imported during wartime “except at such time or

times, and under such regulations or orders * * * as

the President shall prescribe.” In 1941, Congress expanded that authority to apply during times of peace.

See First War Powers Act, ch. 593, 55 Stat. 838, 839 (authorizing the President to “regulate * * * importation”).

In 1971, President Nixon imposed peacetime tariffs

that were upheld under those authorities. See Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 (Aug. 17, 1971).

Because a “prolonged decline in the international monetary reserves” of the United States over a number

of years had seriously threatened its “international

competitive position” and potentially impaired its ability to assure national security, ibid., President Nixon

“declared a national emergency with respect to the

balance-of-payments crisis and under that emergency

imposed a surcharge on imports,” H.R. Rep. No. 459,

95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977) (IEEPA House Report);

see Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724 15,724

(Aug. 17, 1971). In United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975), the Federal

Circuit’s predecessor upheld those tariffs under

TWEA, rejecting an argument that TWEA—which authorized the President to “regulate * * * importation”

of foreign goods—did not authorize the President to impose tariffs. Id. at 575-576.

2. In 1976 and 1977, Congress modified TWEA

through the National Emergencies Act of 1976, Pub. L.

No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, and IEEPA, respectively.

The National Emergencies Act “authorized” “the President” “to declare [a] national emergency” “[w]ith respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or

extraordinary power.” 50 U.S.C. 1621(a). Congress

placed no substantive conditions on the President’s ability to declare a national emergency.

Congress gave itself oversight authority over

national-emergency declarations. National-emergency

declarations must be “immediately * * * transmitted

to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.”

50 U.S.C. 1621(a); see 50 U.S.C. 1641(a)-(c). Congress

may terminate a national emergency. 50 U.S.C.

1622(a)(1). And Congress must meet within six months

of the national-emergency declaration to consider terminating it. 50 U.S.C. 1622(b). In addition, nationalemergency declarations automatically terminate after

one year unless the President notifies Congress that the

emergency “continue[s].” 50 U.S.C. 1622(d).

IEEPA, in turn, separated the President’s authority

to act in wartime and peacetime. Congress limited

TWEA to periods of declared wars. 50 U.S.C. 4302.

IEEPA then extended the President’s authority to periods of declared national emergencies during peacetime. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 227-228 (1984).

The broad powers that IEEPA grants to the President

are “essentially the same as” those under its predecessor TWEA. Id. at 228. Indeed, IEEPA’s operative language was “directly drawn” from TWEA. Dames &

Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981). IEEPA authorizes the President to exercise those powers during

peacetime “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary

threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part

outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.

1701(a).

Once the President declares a national emergency

relating to such a threat, IEEPA grants the President

deliberately broad powers, including to “regulate[] or

prohibit” certain foreign monetary transactions, 50

U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(A), and to “confiscate” certain property during “armed hostilities,” 50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(C).

As relevant here, IEEPA also empowers the President

to “regulate * * * importation” of “any property in

which any foreign country or a national thereof has any

interest by any person, or with respect to any property,

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50

U.S.C. 1702(a)(1)(B). Unlike TWEA, IEEPA contains

an enumerated list of exceptions to those broad grants

of authority. See 50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(1)-(4). None is at

issue here.

Congress also gave itself oversight authority over

exercises of IEEPA powers beyond that afforded by the

National Emergencies Act. 50 U.S.C. 1703(d). The

President “shall consult regularly with the Congress so

long as [IEEPA] authorities are exercised.” 50 U.S.C.

1703(a). The President also is directed to “immediately

transmit to the Congress a report” on the emergency,

with updates every six months. 50 U.S.C. 1703(b)-(c).

Nonetheless, Congress recognized that those “new authorities should be sufficiently broad and flexible to enable the President to respond as appropriate and necessary to unforeseen contingencies.” IEEPA House Report 10.

B. The Challenged Actions

In early 2025, President Trump declared national

emergencies arising from the influx of contraband

drugs into the United States from Mexico, Canada, and

the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and from the

United States’ exploding goods trade deficit.

1. Contraband drug tariffs

a. Mexico and Canada. In January 2025, the President declared the flow of contraband drugs like fentanyl

through illicit distribution networks, and the resulting

public-health crisis, to be a national emergency. Proclamation No. 10,886, 90 Fed. Reg. 8327 (Jan. 29, 2025);

Executive Order No. 14,157, 90 Fed. Reg. 8439 (Jan. 29,

2025). On February 1, 2025, the President found that

the actions of Canada and Mexico contributed to that

crisis. Executive Order No. 14,193, § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. 9113,

9114 (Feb. 7, 2025); Executive Order No. 14,194, § 1, 90

Fed. Reg. 9117, 9118 (Feb. 7, 2025).

Invoking his powers under IEEPA, the President

addressed that unusual and extraordinary threat to the

United States’ national security, foreign policy, and

economy, by ordering a 25 percent duty on most Canadian and Mexican imports. 90 Fed. Reg. at 9114; 90

Fed. Reg. at 9118.

Since that time, the President has variously paused

and adjusted those duties following negotiations and in

response to international events. See, e.g., Executive

Order No. 14,197, 90 Fed. Reg. 9183 (Feb. 10, 2025); Executive Order No. 14,198, 90 Fed. Reg. 9185 (Feb. 10,

2025); Executive Order No. 14,231, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,785

(Mar. 11, 2025); Executive Order No. 14,232, 90 Fed.

Reg. 11,787 (Mar. 11, 2025).

b. PRC. On February 1, 2025, the President took action under IEEPA to address the contraband-drug

threat from the PRC. Executive Order No. 14,195, 90

Fed. Reg. 9121 (Feb. 7, 2025). To address the national

emergency, the President imposed a 10 percent duty on

most goods imported from the PRC. Id. at 9122-9123.

On March 3, 2025, the President increased the rate to

20 percent. Executive Order No. 14,228, 90 Fed. Reg.

11,463 (Mar. 7, 2025).

2. Reciprocal tariffs

On April 2, 2025, the President declared a separate

national emergency, finding that the United States’s exploding goods trade deficit—caused by foreign trading

partners’ asymmetrical “tariff ” and “non-tariff barriers” that prevent fair and reciprocal trade—and the

consequences of that trade deficit “constitute an unusual and extraordinary [foreign] threat to the national

security and economy of the United States.” Executive

Order No. 14,257, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,041 (Apr. 7, 2025).

In particular, the President found, “large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits” have “atrophied”

our nation’s “domestic production capacity,” and

“[i]ncreased reliance on foreign producers for goods

* * * has compromised U.S. economic security by rendering U.S. supply chains vulnerable to geopolitical disruption and supply shocks.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,043.

Those deficits “and the concomitant loss of industrial

capacity, have compromised military readiness,” and

“this vulnerability can only be redressed through swift

corrective action to rebalance the flow of imports into

the United States.” Ibid. The President determined

that “[t]he future of American competitiveness depends

on reversing” the hemorrhage of manufacturing capabilities to create “the industrial base” that the nation

“needs for national security.” Id. at 15,044. Using his

broad IEEPA powers, the President addressed that unusual and extraordinary threat by imposing an additional 10 percent duty on most imported goods. Id. at

15,045. Those duties took effect on April 5, 2025, with

additional duties imposed on select countries on April 9.

Ibid.

Since then, the President has taken additional actions that he deemed necessary to address that national

emergency, both by using the tariffs to reduce the trade

deficit and to increase leverage on other countries to

eliminate barriers to fair, reciprocal trade. The President signaled that if “trading partner[s] take significant

steps to remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and

align sufficiently with the United States on economic

and national security matters,” that may prompt him to

“decrease or limit in scope the duties” imposed, while

the countries negotiated trade and security agreements

to deal with the emergency. 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,047. Alternatively, if a “trading partner retaliate[d] against the

United States,” the President indicated that he would

“ensure the efficacy” of his action by “increas[ing] or

expand[ing] in scope the duties” he imposed. Ibid.

Soon after the President’s imposition of tariffs,

“more than 75 * * * trading partners * * * approached

the United States to address the lack of trade reciprocity in our economic relationships and our resulting national and economic security concerns.” Executive Order No. 14,266, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,625, 15,626 (Apr. 15,

2025). Given those “significant steps” by trading partners to address the emergency, the President paused

the increased tariffs for 90 days for the cooperating

countries, facilitating the negotiation of trade deals. Id.

at 15,625. At the same time, the President maintained

a 10 percent tariff to encourage those countries to

swiftly negotiate agreements. The President also made

clear that if trading partners were not “sincere” in their

“intentions * * * to facilitate a resolution to the national emergency,” then he would increase tariffs. Id.

at 15,626. As Secretary Bessent explained, “[t]he success of the negotiations depends on the credible threat

of prompt imposition of tariffs.” C.A. Doc. 158, at 31.

Those negotiations have produced historic reciprocal

trade deals with the United Kingdom, the European

Union, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines,

Indonesia, and Vietnam, among others. C.A. Doc. 158,

at 9-10.3 For example, the framework deal with the European Union will cause the EU to “buy $750 billion in

U.S. energy exports,” “invest $600 billion in the United

States by 2028,” and “eliminate certain non-tariff barriers” on “industrial goods, digital, and agricultural products.” Id. at 37.

In contrast, after extensions of the 90-day pause to

give more time for negotiation, see Executive Order No.

14,316, 90 Fed. Reg. 30,823 (July 7, 2025); Executive Order No. 14,326, 90 Fed. Reg. 37,963 (Aug. 6, 2025), the

President found that some trading partners “offered

terms” that “do not sufficiently address imbalances in

our trading relationship.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 37,963. The

President accordingly did not renew the pause for those

countries and instead increased tariffs on them. Id. at

37,963-37,964.

The President has now “set the tariff rates for all

foreign-trading partners” without triggering “retaliation for this restructured and rebalanced tariff regime,”

save for one short-lived exception. C.A. Doc. 158, at 9.

Still, the United States remains in “delicate” highstakes negotiations with “dozens of countries.” Id. at

39-40. No agreements “would be possible without the

Those countries are still negotiating final trade and security

agreements based on the terms of framework deals. C.A. Doc. 15,

at 38 (Greer).

imposition of tariffs to regulate imports,” and the tariffs

“br[ought] other countries to the table.” Id. at 38.

C. Proceedings Below

1. Respondents are plaintiffs in two consolidated

cases filed in the Court of International Trade (CIT).

Respondents in V.O.S. (No. 25-cv-66) are a group of importers challenging the reciprocal tariffs. Respondents

in Oregon (No. 25-cv-77) are a group of States challenging both the reciprocal and contraband-drug tariffs.

The CIT denied a temporary restraining order in

V.O.S., and consolidated briefing on a preliminary injunction and for summary judgment in each of the

cases. See App., infra, 156a-158a (recounting the procedural history).

2. The CIT granted summary judgment to respondents, vacated the tariff orders, and entered a universal

permanent injunction against the tariffs’ imposition, ordering the government to restore the pre-emergency

rates within 10 days. App., infra, 139a-197a.

The CIT held that IEEPA does not authorize the reciprocal tariffs. App., infra, 169a-181a. The CIT acknowledged (App., infra, 174a-175a) that IEEPA’s authorization to “regulate * * * importation,” 50 U.S.C.

1702(a)(1)(B), authorizes the President to impose some

tariffs, but held that Section 122 of the Trade Act of

1974, 88 Stat. 1987, “removes the President’s power to

impose remedies in response to balance-of-payments

deficits, and specifically trade deficits, from the broader

powers granted to a president during a national emergency under IEEPA,” App., infra, 178a. Section 122,

codified at 19 U.S.C. 2132, authorizes the President to,

among other things, impose “a temporary import surcharge, not to exceed 15 percent,” “for a period not exceeding 150 days,” whenever “fundamental interna-

tional payments problems require special import measures to restrict imports * * * to deal with large and

serious United States balance-of-payments deficits.” 19

U.S.C. 2132(a). In the CIT’s view, any tariff that “responds to an imbalance in trade * * * must conform

with the limits of Section 122,” even if the tariff otherwise complies with IEEPA. App., infra, 179a-180a.

The CIT further held that IEEPA does not authorize

the contraband-drug tariffs. App., infra, 181a-196a.

The CIT observed that IEEPA provides that the President may exercise his authorities only to “deal with” a

threat underlying a declared emergency. 50 U.S.C.

1701(b). In the CIT’s view, however, the contrabanddrug tariffs were “ ‘pressure’ or ‘leverage’ tactics,” and

thus insufficiently “direct” to satisfy IEEPA’s “ ‘deal

with’ ” requirement. App., infra, 193a.

The CIT declared the tariffs unlawful, issued a universal permanent injunction against the tariffs, and ordered the government to revert to prior tariff rates

within 10 days. App., infra, 199a-200a. The Federal

Circuit stayed the CIT’s order pending appeal. 2025

WL 1649290.

3. Sitting initially en banc, the Federal Circuit in a

7-4 decision affirmed the declaratory relief but vacated

the injunction in its entirety and remanded to the CIT

to reconsider the scope of injunctive relief, if any. App.,

infra, 1a-136a.

a. In a per curiam opinion, the en banc court of appeals held that IEEPA did not authorize the challenged

tariffs. But that court relied on different grounds from

the CIT.4

Like the CIT, the court of appeals confirmed that the CIT had

subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1581(i)(1)(B), which

grants the CIT “exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced

The court of appeals purported not to address

“whether IEEPA authorizes any tariffs at all,” and (unlike the CIT) the court did not categorically rule out

IEEPA tariffs to address balance-of-payments deficits.

App., infra, at 25a. Instead, the court held, IEEPA

does not authorize “tariffs of the magnitude of the” challenged tariffs here. Id. at 38a; see id. at 25a-42a. The

court stated that “whenever Congress intends to delegate to the President the authority to impose tariffs, it

does so explicitly.” Id. at 30a. The court found it significant that unlike various tariff-specific statutes, IEEPA

uses the phrase “regulate * * * importation,” but does

“not use the term ‘tariff ’ or any of its synonyms, like

‘duty’ or ‘tax.’ ” Id. at 27a.

The court of appeals contemplated that IEEPA

might authorize some tariffs, but held that to interpret

IEEPA as authorizing “unlimited tariffs” would “run[]

afoul of the major questions doctrine.” Id. at 34a. The

court explained that although past Presidents had invoked IEEPA, they mostly did so “to freeze assets,

block financial transfers, place embargoes, or impose

targeted sanctions,” not to impose tariffs. Id. at 36a.

The court distinguished the tariffs imposed by President Nixon under IEEPA’s predecessor statute

(TWEA) as “ ‘limited’ ” in “time, scope, and amount.” Id.

at 40a (brackets and citation omitted). The court thus

affirmed the CIT’s holding that IEEPA does not authorize the challenged tariffs.

against” the government “that arises out of any law of the United

States providing for * * * tariffs.” The court of appeals explained

that respondents’ suits arose out of modifications to the Harmonized

Tariff Schedule of the United States, which Congress has directed

“shall be considered to be statutory provisions of law for all purposes,” 19 U.S.C. 3004(c)(1). App., infra, 22a-25a.

As to remedies, the court of appeals affirmed declaratory relief, but vacated the CIT’s universal injunction

in its entirety in light of Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct.

2540 (2025), and remanded to the CIT for further consideration of the scope of injunctive relief, if any. See

App., infra, 43a-45a.

b. Judge Cunningham, joined by Judges Lourie,

Reyna, and Stark, filed an opinion expressing additional

views. App., infra, 47a-62a. In her view, IEEPA does

not authorize any tariffs at all, and a contrary interpretation would violate the nondelegation doctrine. Ibid.

c. Judge Taranto, joined by Chief Judge Moore and

Judges Prost and Chen, dissented. App., infra, 63a136a. He explained that the plain meaning of “regulate

importation” includes the authority to impose tariffs,

and that the omission of “additional limits” simply reflects that “IEEPA embodies an eyes-open congressional grant of broad emergency authority in this

foreign-affairs realm, which unsurprisingly extends beyond authorities available under non-emergency laws.”

App., infra, 66a; see id. at 93a-113a, 121a-123a. Judge

Taranto also rebutted the CIT’s different rationales.

See 113a-121a, 124a-136a.

4. The Federal Circuit stayed its mandate pending

the completion of any further proceedings in this Court.

C.A. Doc. 161 (Aug. 29, 2025). Accordingly, its previously entered stay pending appeal remains in effect and

the challenged tariffs remain in force.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The decision below jeopardizes tariffs that the President has determined are essential to the country’s future. Whether the President has authority to impose

those tariffs under IEEPA is a question of surpassing

importance—and a question that the court of appeals

erroneously answered in the negative. IEEPA authorizes the President to “regulate * * * importation” of

foreign goods—clearly encompassing the authority to

impose tariffs. IEEPA need not use the word “tariff ”

to delegate tariff authority; nor does IEEPA atextually

limit the President to not-too-big, not-too-enduring tariffs. Given the obvious importance of the scope of the

President’s authority under IEEPA, and the legality of

the challenged tariffs in particular, this Court should

grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the

judgment below.5

A. IEEPA Authorizes The Challenged Tariffs

1. a. IEEPA’s plain text authorizes the President to

impose the challenged tariffs. Under IEEPA, “[a]t the

times and to the extent specified in section 1701,” the

President may “regulate * * * importation” of “any

property in which any foreign country or a national

thereof has any interest” or “any property, subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.

1702(a)(1)(B).

The power to “regulate importation” encompasses

the power to impose tariffs or duties on imports. The

ordinary meaning of “regulate” is to “fix, establish or

control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode;

to direct by rule or restriction; to subject to governing

principles or laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1156 (5th

ed. 1979). That self-evidently covers the imposition of

tariffs or duties. As Chief Justice Marshall observed,

The pending petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment in

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24-1287 (filed June 17,

2025), also involves a challenge to the tariffs. As the government

has explained in its brief in opposition, that case is not an appropriate vehicle for review because the district court there lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction.

the “right to regulate commerce, even by the imposition

of duties, was not controverted” by the Framers.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 202 (1824). Indeed, tariffs and duties historically have been one of the most

common ways to “regulate” importation. See pp. 7-8,

supra. Given that IEEPA separately authorizes the

President to entirely “prohibit” importation, 50 U.S.C.

1702(a)(1)(B), it would be particularly anomalous to

read “regulate importation” as excluding the “less extreme, more flexible tool for pursuing the same objective.” App., infra, 97a (Taranto, J., dissenting).

b. The court of appeals erroneously rejected that

plain meaning even as it disclaimed deciding whether

IEEPA “authorizes any tariffs at all.” App., infra, 25a.

The court emphasized that IEEPA “d[oes] not use the

term ‘tariff ’ or any of its synonyms, like ‘duty’ or ‘tax,’ ”

as evidence that IEEPA does not authorize the challenged tariffs. Id. at 27a. But this Court has repeatedly

rejected such “magic words” requirements in a variety

of statutory contexts. E.g., Soto v. United States, 605

U.S. 360, 371 (2025); FAA v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 291

(2012). The court of appeals also asserted that “whenever Congress intends to delegate to the President the

authority to impose tariffs, it does so explicitly.” App.,

infra, 30a. But “even if Congress ‘typically’ confers the

authority to” take certain actions using a particular

term, “that standard practice does not bind legislators

to specific words or formulations.” Soto, 605 U.S. at 371

(citation omitted).

In any event, the court of appeals mischaracterized

Congress’s practice. In FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,

426 U.S. 548 (1976), this Court addressed a statutory

provision authorizing the President “to adjust the imports” of a product—without mentioning “tariffs” or

“duties” in that provision. Id. at 555 (citation omitted).

Nonetheless, this Court held, that phrase encompassed

not just “quantitative methods—i.e., quotas” to prescribe import quantities, but also “monetary methods—

i.e., license fees” for “effecting such adjustments.” Id.

at 561. Like the license fees in Algonquin (imposed per

barrel of oil there), a tariff also is a “monetary method”

(imposed ad valorem). Cf. id. at 553. And because “regulate importation” is broader than “adjust imports,” the

authority to impose tariffs under IEEPA follows a fortiori from this Court’s decision in Algonquin.

The court of appeals attempted to distinguish Algonquin by noting that a neighboring provision in the statute at issue used the term “duty.” App., infra, 29a-30a.

But Algonquin did not rely on that neighboring provision; it simply analyzed the text, context, and history of

the “adjust the imports” provision. See 426 U.S. at 561562. Further, Algonquin rejected the argument that

“reading the statute to authorize the action taken by the

President ‘would be an anomalous departure’ from ‘the

consistently explicit, well-defined manner in which Congress has delegated control over foreign trade and tariffs.’ ” Id. at 557 (citation omitted). This Court thus has

already rejected the very reasoning that the court of appeals embraced here.

The court of appeals also thought it significant that

the tariff statute in Algonquin “is within title 19 of the

U.S. Code, which is entitled ‘Customs Duties,’ ” whereas

IEEPA is “within title 50, which is entitled ‘War and

National Defense.’ ” App., infra, 29a. But Congress has

not enacted either Title 19 or Title 50 into positive law.

And that placement (presumably by a codifier in the

House Law Revision Counsel) signifies especially little

because it is natural for a tariff-specific statute to be

placed in Title 19. But it would make little sense and

risk confusion to shoehorn IEEPA in that title when it

authorizes far more than just tariffs.

The court of appeals’ other rationales lack merit.

The court observed (App., infra, 31a) that the Constitution vests in Congress the power to “regulate” interstate and foreign commerce and the power to impose

“Taxes” and “Duties” in separate clauses of Article I,

Section 8. That is a non sequitur. The point is that the

plain meaning of “regulation” includes the imposition of

taxes or duties, as Gibbons recognized. 9 Wheat. at 202.

That the Constitution grants the federal government

an additional, broader power to tax domestic and noncommercial activity does not constrict the power to regulate. Courts must “approach federal statutes touching

on the same topic with a ‘strong presumption’ they can

coexist harmoniously” by “giving effect to both,” Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural

Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42, 63 (2024) (citations omitted); the same goes for constitutional provisions.

The court of appeals also thought that interpreting

“regulate importation” to include tariffs “would mean,

for example, that Congress delegated to the SEC power

to tax substantial swaths of the American economy by

granting the SEC the authority to regulate various activities.” App., infra, 32a. That misconstrues the government’s argument: when the broad term “regulate”

is paired with “importation,” the term is best read to

include the power to impose duties because that is a traditional way to regulate importation. The grant of authority to an agency to “regulate the trading” of certain

securities consistent with its mission to protect investors and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,

15 U.S.C. 78i(h)(1) and (2), does not naturally carry the

same inference.

The court of appeals further stated that “the history

of the enactment of IEEPA lacks any * * * legislative

lodestar” indicating Congress’s recognition that the

statute would encompass tariffs. App., infra, 29a. The

opposite is true. Shortly before IEEPA’s enactment,

President Nixon imposed tariffs that the Federal Circuit’s predecessor upheld under TWEA. United States

v. Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A.

1975). This Court has recognized that IEEPA’s language was “directly drawn” from TWEA, Dames &

Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 671 (1981), and that the

“authorities granted to the President” under IEEPA

“are essentially the same as those” under TWEA, Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 228 (1984); see id. at 228 n.8

(listing differences, all immaterial here). “[W]hen Congress ‘adopts the language used in an earlier act,’

[courts] presume that Congress ‘adopted also the construction given’ ” to that language. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 590 U.S. 255, 270 (2020) (brackets and citation omitted). Congress indisputably was aware of

the “construction given” to TWEA by Yoshida. See

IEEPA House Report 5 (approvingly citing Yoshida’s

interpretation of TWEA as authorizing the “imposition

of duties”).

The court of appeals attempted to distinguish TWEA

and Yoshida on the ground that the Nixon tariffs were

supposedly more “ ‘limited’ ” in “time, scope, and amount.”

App., infra, 40a (citation omitted). But as Judge Taranto explained, those supposed limits either did not actually exist (such as a rate cap for “almost all countries”

or a “temporal constraint”) or were imposed pursuant

to separate statutory constraints that do not apply here.

Id. at 104a n.9, 105a. IEEPA contains its own limits—

such as the default one-year time limit on emergencies,

congressional reporting requirements, and an enumerated list of exceptions, see 50 U.S.C. 1702, 1703—that

differ from those under TWEA. The court of appeals

did not claim that the tariffs here violate any of IEEPA’s

unique constraints. And in any event, “[i]t is the obvious

role of emergency laws to confer authority that Congress has not conferred in non-emergency laws.” App.,

infra, 109a (Taranto, J., dissenting).

2. Despite expressing skepticism that IEEPA authorizes any tariffs, the court of appeals ultimately declined to hold so broadly. Instead, the court contemplated that IEEPA might authorize some tariffs—just

not ones of the duration, scope, or amount of the tariffs

challenged here. But the court identified no such limitations in IEEPA’s text, even as it held that IEEPA

does not authorize “tariffs of the magnitude of the” challenged tariffs here. App., infra, 38a.

That textually incoherent holding invites judges to

gauge the legality of tariffs based on their own policy

views of how much is too much, how long is too long, or

how many countries are too many. Such judicial secondguessing of the President’s determinations would be improper. See Wald, 468 U.S. at 242 (“Matters relating

‘to the conduct of foreign relations * * * are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government

as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.’ ”) (citation omitted); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.

280, 292 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign

policy and national security are rarely proper subjects

for judicial intervention.”).

The court of appeals grounded its holding that these

tariffs go too far (App., infra, 34a-39a) on the major-

questions doctrine. But that doctrine has no purchase

here for several reasons.

First, the statute unambiguously authorizes tariffs,

leaving no basis to apply the major-questions doctrine

to atextually limit the types of authorized tariffs.

Second, the major-questions doctrine addresses the

“particular and recurring problem” of “agencies asserting highly consequential power beyond what Congress

could reasonably be understood to have granted.” West

Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 724 (2022) (emphasis

added). Those concerns dissipate when, as here, Congress delegates authority directly to the President—

“the most democratic and politically accountable official

in Government,” Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 591 U.S. 197,

224 (2020).

Third, the major-questions doctrine applies where

there is an apparent “ ‘mismatch[]’ ” between the breadth

of the asserted power and the “narrow[ness]” of the

statute in which the agency claims to have discovered it.

Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 511, 517 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring) (citation omitted). No such mismatch exists here. IEEPA addresses national emergencies (the most important of circumstances) and authorizes the President (the most important person in

government—and uniquely situated to react quickly) to

respond to those emergencies. In short, IEEPA is all

about major questions, and the more natural presumption is that Congress intends broad language conferring

emergency powers to be construed broadly, not narrowly.

Fourth, “the major questions canon has not been applied by this Court in the national security or foreign

policy contexts, because the canon does not reflect ordinary congressional intent in those areas.” FCC v. Con-

sumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2516 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In those areas, Congress and

the President enjoy concurrent constitutional authority, so the presumption flips: “Congress specifies limits

on the President when it wants to restrict Presidential

power.” Ibid. When Congress authorizes the President

to impose tariffs (as multiple overlapping statutes, including IEEPA, do), that should eliminate, not create,

doubts about the President’s authority. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-637

(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

Fifth, the major-questions doctrine counsels “skepticism” where “an agency claims to discover in a longextant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy.’ ” Utility Air

Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (citation omitted). But Congress has long granted Presidents capacious authority over tariffs, and IEEPA is a

particularly broad delegation in the domains of foreign

policy and national security—areas that implicate the

President’s expertise and independent constitutional

authority, see, e.g., Department of the Navy v. Egan,

484 U.S. 518, 529-530 (1988); cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S.

at 635-637 (Jackson, J., concurring).

3. Nor can the judgment below be justified by the

CIT’s rationales, which the court of appeals tellingly did

not adopt.

a. Section 122. As to the reciprocal tariffs, the CIT

held that Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.

2132, “removes the President’s power to impose remedies” that the plain text of IEEPA otherwise authorizes

as to balance-of-payments imbalances, App., infra,

178a. Section 122 provides that whenever “fundamental

international payments problems require special im-

port measures to restrict imports,” including “to deal

with large and serious United States balance-of-payments

deficits,” “the President shall proclaim, for a period not

exceeding 150 days,” “a temporary import surcharge,

not to exceed 15 percent ad valorem, in the form of duties (in addition to those already imposed, if any) on articles imported into the United States.” 19 U.S.C.

2132(a). The CIT held that even if IEEPA’s text authorizes tariffs to address balance-of-payments problems, that tariff must nevertheless satisfy the 150-day

and 15-percent limitations in Section 122. App., infra,

177a-181a.

That holding is incorrect. Section 122 and IEEPA

each provides an independent source of authority; the

President’s choice to exercise his authority under one

does not compel him to comply with the terms of the

other. Although both Section 122 and IEEPA address

tariffs, courts “approach federal statutes touching on

the same topic with a ‘strong presumption’ they can coexist harmoniously. Only by carrying a ‘heavy burden’

can a party convince us that one statute ‘displaces’ a

second.” Kirtz, 601 U.S. at 63 (citations omitted). And

here, the two statutes are “merely complementary.”

Ibid. Section 122 is available to address balance-ofpayments deficits whether or not they rise to the level

of a declared emergency. IEEPA is available to address

emergencies whether or not there exist balance-ofpayments deficits. That Section 122 contains scope and

duration limits that IEEPA omits is hardly surprising

given that Congress naturally gave the President

broader leeway in the narrower circumstance of an

emergency covered by IEEPA. See App., infra, 113a121a (Taranto, J., dissenting).

b. “Deal with.” The CIT held that IEEPA does not

authorize the contraband-drug tariffs because the

phrase “deal with” in IEEPA requires “a direct link between an act and the problem it purports to address,”

and precludes actions that merely “aim to create leverage to ‘deal with’ th[e stated] objectives.” App., infra,

191a-192a; see id. at 190a-196a. But the intransitive

verb “deal,” when paired with “with,” is a broad term

that simply means “[t]o be occupied or concerned,” “[t]o

behave in a specified way toward another,” or “[t]o take

action.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 339 (1969); cf. Public Citizen v. FMCSA,

374 F.3d 1209, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“ ‘Deal with,’ in the

sense meant here, means ‘to take action with regard to

someone or something.’ ”) (brackets and citation omitted). Nothing in that broad definition supports the

CIT’s proposition that one can “deal with” a problem

only directly, not indirectly through leverage. See App.,

infra, 134a-136a (Taranto, J., dissenting). History is littered with counterexamples, including this Court’s

recognition that IEEPA permits using property to

“serve as a ‘bargaining chip’ to be used by the President

when dealing with a hostile country.” Dames & Moore,

453 U.S. at 673.

Besides, whether a given action in fact “deal[s] with”

an identified threat or emergency in the areas of foreign

affairs and national security is a question on which

courts should give substantial deference to the President. See Wald, 468 U.S. at 242; Agee, 453 U.S. at 292.

Such determinations resist meaningful judicial review

because of their discretion-laden nature and the lack of

judicially manageable standards. See Webster v. Doe,

486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988). In another national-security

and foreign-relations context, this Court stated that

courts should not scrutinize “ ‘[w]hether the President’s

chosen method’ of addressing perceived risks is justified from a policy perspective.” Trump v. Hawaii, 585

U.S. 667, 686 (2018) (citation omitted). Such scrutiny is

“inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference traditionally accorded the President in this

sphere.” Ibid. So too here.

B. IEEPA Does Not Violate The Nondelegation Doctrine

The CIT and Judge Cunningham reasoned that interpreting IEEPA to authorize tariffs would amount to

“a functionally limitless delegation of Congressional

taxation authority.” App., infra, 58a; see id. at 169a172a. But “in the national security and foreign policy

realms, the nondelegation doctrine (whatever its scope

with respect to domestic legislation) appropriately has

played an even more limited role in light of the President’s constitutional responsibilities and independent

Article II authority.” Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct.

at 2516 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see United States

v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314-329

(1936). “Congress may assign the President broad authority regarding the conduct of foreign affairs or other

matters where he enjoys his own inherent Article II

powers.” Gundy v. United States, 588 U.S. 128, 170-171

(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). “[L]imitations” on

Congress’s authority to delegate are “less stringent in

cases where the entity exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter.” United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544,

556-557 (1975).

This Court has long approved broad congressional

delegations to the President to regulate international

trade, including through tariffs. E.g., Algonquin, 426

U.S. at 558-560; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United

States, 276 U. S. 394, 406, 409 (1928); Marshall Field &

Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892); Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382, 384-388 (1813).

Even if the nondelegation doctrine were applicable,

IEEPA would easily pass muster. Congress at most

“commit[ted] something to the discretion” of the Executive, Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46 (1825),

which is permissible so long as Congress sets forth “an

intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform,” Hampton, 276

U.S. at 409. Congress must delineate both “ ‘the general

policy’ ” and “ ‘the boundaries of [the] delegated authority,’ ” so that “both ‘the courts and the public’ ” can “ ‘ascertain whether the agency’ has followed the law.” Consumers’ Research, 145 S. Ct. at 2497 (citations omitted).

IEEPA satisfies those standards. It prescribes a

general policy for Presidents to pursue: “to deal with

any unusual and extraordinary [foreign] threat * * * to

the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the

United States” during a “national emergency” by “regulat[ing] * * * importation” of property, among other

options. 50 U.S.C. 1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B).

IEEPA’s boundaries are likewise plain: the President may exercise his authorities only “to deal with an

unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which

a national emergency has been declared,” and may not

exercise those authorities to “regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly,” an enumerated list of items. 50

U.S.C. 1701(b), 1702(b). Congress itself oversees the

President’s exercise of authority in this area. See 50

U.S.C. 1703 (describing reports to and consultation with

Congress). This Court has repeatedly upheld multiple

statutes granting the President broad authority to set

or change tariffs. See Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 558-560;

Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409; Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at

683-689. Lower courts have uniformly rejected nondelegation challenges to similar delegations of tariff authority, e.g., Yoshida, 526 F.2d at 580-581; PrimeSource

Building Products, Inc. v. United States, 59 F.4th 1255,

1263 (Fed. Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 345 (2023),

and 144 S. Ct. 561 (2024); and to IEEPA more generally,

see United States v. Shih, 73 F.4th 1077, 1092 (9th Cir.

2023) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 820

(2024).

C. The Decision Below Warrants Further Review

This case easily satisfies this Court’s criteria for review. The Federal Circuit’s decision casts doubt upon

the President’s most significant economic and foreignaffairs policy—a policy that implicates sensitive, ongoing foreign negotiations and urgent national-security

concerns. This Court often grants review when lower

courts prevent the President’s exercise of asserted

foreign-affairs and economic powers, especially in times

of emergency. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, supra. If allowed to take effect, the decision below would reflect an

intolerable judicial intrusion into the President’s responsibility to manage foreign relations and trade,

where he exercises both inherent and delegated authority. Cf. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-637 (Jackson, J.,

concurring). And the Court’s ordinary preference to

grant review to resolve circuit conflicts is inapposite

given that the CIT and Federal Circuit have exclusive

jurisdiction to review tariff challenges.

Whether IEEPA authorizes the challenged tariffs

here also is of unquestionable importance, as the court

of appeals itself recognized (App., infra, 34a) and as evidenced by its sua sponte decision to consider the case

initially en banc on an expedited basis. The scope of the

President’s authority under IEEPA—a statute that

provides vital tools to protect the American economy

and national security—is itself important enough to

warrant review. And Cabinet members have submitted

declarations attesting to the surpassing importance of

tariffs in particular. To give just a few examples:

• The Treasury Secretary states that the tariffs

“have been one of the country’s top foreign policy

priorities for the last several months” and that allowing the decision below to take effect “would

lead to dangerous diplomatic embarrassment,”

“expose the United States to the risk of retaliation,” and “interrupt ongoing negotiations midstream, undermining our ability to protect the national security and economic welfare of the American people.” C.A. Doc. 158, at 32.

• The Secretary of Commerce states that the decision below “would cause massive and irreparable

harm to the United States and its foreign policy

and national security both now and in the future”;

“would threaten broader U.S. strategic interests

at home and abroad”; would “likely lead to retaliation and the unwinding of agreed-upon deals by

foreign-trading partners”; and would “derail critical ongoing negotiations with foreign-trading

partners.” Id. at 8-9.

• The Secretary of State explains that if the decision below were to take effect, the President’s recent exercise of his IEEPA authority “in connection with highly sensitive negotiations he is conducting to end the conflict between the Russian

Federation and Ukraine” could be jeopardized,

with “severe consequences for ongoing peace negotiations and human rights abuses.” Id. at 26.

• The U.S. Trade Representative describes framework deals with the European Union and other

trading partners that “will reverse the crippling

effects of our exploding trade deficit,” among

other economic and national-security benefits,

and observes that “[n]one of these agreements

would be possible without the imposition of tariffs

to regulate imports and bring other countries to

the table.” Id. at 36, 38.

The Congressional Budget Office projection indicates

that tariffs will reduce federal deficits by $4 trillion in

the coming years. Id. at 19. In short, the tariffs rank

among the most consequential programs whose legality

the Court has been asked to review in recent years. Cf.

Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 502 (describing a $0.5 trillion program as one of “staggering” significance).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

D. JOHN SAUER

Solicitor General

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

SARAH M. HARRIS

Deputy Solicitor General

SOPAN JOSHI

Assistant to the

Solicitor General

MARK R. FREEMAN

MICHAEL S. RAAB

BRAD HINSHELWOOD

DANIEL WINIK

SOPHIA SHAMS

Attorneys

SEPTEMBER 2025

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A — Federal Circuit opinion (Aug. 29,

2025, as amended on Sept. 2, 2025) .... 1a

Appendix B — Federal Circuit judgment

(Aug. 29, 2025) ................................. 137a

Appendix C — Court of International Trade

opinion (May 28, 2025) .................... 139a

Appendix D — Court of International Trade

judgment (May 28, 2025) ................ 198a

Appendix E — Statutory provisions:

50 U.S.C. 1701 ................................. 201a

50 U.S.C. 1702 ................................. 201a

50 U.S.C. 1703 ................................. 205a

(I)

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2025-1812, 2025-1813

V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND

PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS, LLC,

FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, RODNEY

S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, JAMIESON

GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF

COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER

PROTECTION, DEFENDANTS -APPELLANTS

STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF

COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF

DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE,

STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF

NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF

VERMONT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM,

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL

(1a)

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS

AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY S. SCOTT,

COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND

BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER

PROTECTION, UNITED STATES,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Decided:

Aug. 29, 2025

Appeals from the United States Court of

International Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSKTMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior

Judge Jane A. Restani, Judge Gary S. Katzmann,

Judge Timothy M. Reif.

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, LOURIE, DYK, PROST,

REYNA, TARANTO, CHEN, HUGHES , STOLL, CUNNING1

HAM, and STARK , Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE,

DYK, REYNA, HUGHES, STOLL, CUNNINGHAM, and

STARK.

Additional views filed by Circuit Judge CUNNINGHAM,

joined by Circuit Judges LOURIE, REYNA, and STARK.

Dissenting Opinion filed by Circuit Judge TARANTO, in

which Chief Judge MOORE, and Circuit Judges PROST

and CHEN, join.

PER CURIAM.

Circuit Judge Newman did not participate.

The Government appeals a decision of the Court of

International Trade setting aside five Executive Orders

that imposed tariffs of unlimited duration on nearly all

goods from nearly every country in the world, holding

that the tariffs were not authorized by the International

Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C.

§ 1701 et seq. Because we agree that IEEPA’s grant of

presidential authority to “regulate” imports does not authorize the tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders, we

affirm.

This case involves the extent of the President’s authority under IEEPA to “regulate” importation in response to a national emergency declared by the President. For many years, Congress has carefully constructed tariff schedules which provide for, in great detail, the tariffs to be imposed on particular goods.

Since taking office, President Donald J. Trump has declared several national emergencies. In response to

these declared emergencies, the President has departed

from the established tariff schedules and imposed varying tariffs of unlimited duration on imports of nearly all

goods from nearly every country with which the United

States conducts trade. This appeal concerns Five Executive Orders imposing duties on foreign trading partners to address these emergencies: Executive Orders

Nos. 14193, 14194, 14195, 14257, and 14266 (hereinafter

collectively referred to as the Challenged Executive Orders). We summarize the history of the Challenged

Executive Orders by first discussing the national emergencies in response to which they were issued and then

addressing the nature of the measures directed by the

Challenged Executive Orders. 2

On January 20, 2025, the President declared the existence of a national emergency at the United States’

southern border with Mexico under sections 201 and 301

of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), Pub. L. No. 94412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.

§§ 1601-1651). See Proclamation No. 10886, Declaring

a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the

United States, 90 Fed. Reg. 8,327, 8,327 (Jan. 20, 2025).

In the Proclamation, he identified the presence of “cartels, criminal gangs, known terrorists, human traffickers,

smugglers, unvetted military-age males from foreign

adversaries, and illicit narcotics that harm Americans”

at and around the southern border as threats to the country’s territorial sovereignty. Id. Shortly thereafter,

the President faulted Mexico for “afford[ing] safe havens for the cartels to engage in the manufacturing and

transportation of illicit drugs” to the United States.

Executive Order No. 14194, Imposing Duties to Address

the Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg.

9,117, 9,117 (Feb. 1. 2025).

The President also expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Proclamation 10886 to include threats originating from Canada and the People’s

Republic of China. On February 1, 2025, he declared

that “the sustained influx of illicit opioids and other

drugs has profound consequences on our Nation” and

The President has continued to impose various tariffs targeting

imports from dozens of U.S. trading partners during the pendency

of this appeal. Because this appeal pertains only to the Challenged Executive Orders, we do not delve into the details of these

later Executive Orders here.

stated that “Canada has played a central role in these

challenges, including by failing to devote sufficient attention and resources . . . to effectively stem the

tide of illicit drugs.” Executive Order No. 14193, Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs

Across Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,113, 9,113

(Feb. 1, 2025). He similarly stated that this emergency

had been exacerbated by China’s failure “to arrest,

seize, detain, or otherwise intercept chemical precursor

suppliers, money launderers, other [transnational criminal organizations], criminals at large, and drugs.” Executive Order No. 14195, Imposing Duties to Address

the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,121, 9,122 (Feb. 1, 2025).

In response to the declared national emergency of

the trafficking of opioids into the country and the ostensible failure of Mexico, Canada, and China to meaningfully address this threat, the President imposed what

this opinion refers to as the “Trafficking Tariffs”: 25

percent ad valorem duties on “[a]ll articles that are

products of Canada,” Executive Order No. 14193, 90

Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 3 25 percent ad valorem duties on

“[a]ll articles that are products of Mexico,” Executive

Order No. 14194, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,118 (Feb. 1, 2025), 4

Canadian energy and energy resources were subjected to a

lower ad valorem rate of 10 percent. 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114. Enforcement of the tariffs on Canadian products was subsequently

delayed from the planned start date of February 4, 2025, to March

4, 2025. Executive Order No. 14197, Progress on the Situation at

Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,183, 9,183 (Feb. 3, 2025).

Enforcement of the tariffs on Mexican products was subsequently delayed from the planned start date of February 4, 2025,

to March 4, 2025. Executive Order No. 14198, Progress on the

and 10 percent ad valorem duties on “[a]ll articles that

are products of China,” Executive Order No. 14195, 90

Fed. Reg. at 9,122. In each of these Executive Orders,

the President stated that the circumstances “constitute[d] an unusual and extraordinary threat, which ha[d]

its source in substantial part outside the United States,

to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of

the United States.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 9,118, 9,122.

In imposing these tariffs, he claimed to be acting under

the authority of section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA and

“specifically [found] that action under other authority to

impose tariffs [was] inadequate to address this unusual

and extraordinary threat.” 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,114, 9,118,

9,122. Each of the Executive Orders providing for the

Trafficking Tariffs directed the Secretary of Homeland

Security to alter the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the

United States (HTSUS) to effectuate the new, higher

Trafficking Tariffs. 90 Fed. Reg. at 9,115, 9,118, 9,123.

The President subsequently modified the Trafficking

Tariffs. First, after determining that China “ha[d] not

taken adequate steps to alleviate the illicit drug crisis

through cooperative enforcement actions, and that the

crisis described in Executive Order 14195 ha[d] not

abated,” he increased ad valorem duties on Chinese

products from 10 percent to 20 percent. Executive Order No. 14228, Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of

China, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,463, 11,463 (Mar. 3, 2025). The

President further implemented duty-free de minimis

Situation at Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 9,185, 9,185 (Feb.

3, 2025).

treatment5 for otherwise covered articles from Canada

and Mexico. See Executive Order No. 14231, Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs

Across Our Northern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,785, 11,785

(Mar. 6, 2025); Executive Order No. 14232, Amendment

to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across

Our Southern Border, 90 Fed. Reg. 11,787, 11,787 (Mar.

6, 2025).6

On April 2, 2025, the President imposed what this

opinion refers to as the “Reciprocal Tariffs”: baseline

10 percent ad valorem duties on imports from nearly

every country with which the United States has any significant trade relationship with additional ad valorem

duties ranging from 11 percent to as high as 50 percent

to be imposed “shortly thereafter” on a per-country basis. Executive Order No. 14257, Regulating Imports

With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices

That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United

States Goods Trade Deficits, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,041, 15,045,

15,049-50 (Apr. 2, 2025). Like the Trafficking Tariffs,

these Reciprocal Tariffs were to be implemented by modifying the HTSUS. Id. at 15,047.

Under Section 321(a)(2)(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, duty-free

de minimis treatment allows goods valued at $800 or less to enter

the country without customs duties. 19 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2)(C).

The President also originally implemented such duty-free de

minimis treatment for otherwise eligible articles from China, Executive Order No. 14200, Amendment to Duties Addressing the

Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China,

90 Fed. Reg. 9,277, 9,277 (Feb. 5, 2025), but he later rescinded this

de minimis treatment for Chinese products, Executive Order No.

14256, Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic

Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China as Applied

to Low-Value Imports, 90 Fed. Reg. 14,899, 14,899 (Apr. 2, 2025).

In imposing the Reciprocal Tariffs, the President

again invoked his claimed authority under IEEPA; the

NEA; section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified as

amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2483); and 3 U.S.C. § 301. 7 Id.

at 15,041. He explained that the Reciprocal Tariffs addressed “an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and economy of the United States” posed

by “underlying conditions, including a lack of reciprocity

in our bilateral trade relationships, disparate tariff rates

and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading partners’ economic policies that suppress domestic wages and consumption.” Id. On April 9, 2025, the President suspended the imposition of the additional country-specific

ad valorem duties for all countries except China until

July 9, 2025. Executive Order No. 14266, Modifying

Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation and Alignment, 90 Fed. Reg 15,625, 15,626

(Apr. 9, 2025).

The President repeatedly amended the Chinaspecific Reciprocal Tariff rate in response to China’s adjustments of its own tariff rates on U.S. goods: he first

increased the China-specific rate from 34 to 84 percent

effective April 8, 2025, Executive Order No. 14259,

Amendment to Reciprocal Tariffs and Updated Duties

as Applied to Low-Value Imports From the People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 15,509, 15,509 (Apr. 8,

The Government does not contend that any of the statutes besides IEEPA grant the President the substantive authority to impose these tariffs. The NEA governs procedures for declaring

and ending national emergencies; section 604 of the Trade Act of

1974 requires the President to update the HTSUS to reflect import

duties but does not provide the substantive authority to impose

such duties; and 3 U.S.C. § 301 simply allows the President to delegate powers within the Executive Branch.

2025), and then from 84 to 125 percent effective April 10,

2025, Executive Order No. 14266, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,626.

These new rates were to be effectuated by modifying the

HTSUS to reflect the higher rates. Executive Order

No. 14259, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,509; Executive Order No.

14266, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,626. Following discussions

with Chinese officials, the President lowered the Chinaspecific Reciprocal Tariff rate to 10 percent, effective until August 12, 2025, observing that these discussions were

“a significant step by [China] toward remedying nonreciprocal trade arrangements and addressing the concerns of the United States relating to economic and national security matters.” Executive Order No. 14298,

Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Discussions With the People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg.

21,831, 21,831-32 (May 12, 2025).

On July 7, 2025, the President paused enforcement of

all Reciprocal Tariffs until August 1, 2025. Executive

Order No. 14316, Extending the Modification of the Reciprocal Tariff Rates, 90 Fed. Reg. 30,823, 30,823 (July

7, 2025). On July 31, 2025, the President again paused

enforcement of the Reciprocal Tariffs for seven days.

Executive Order No. 14326, Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates, 90 Fed. Reg. 37,963, 37,963-64

(July 31, 2025). The Reciprocal Tariffs (other than for

China8) took effect on August 7, 2025.

On August 11, 2025, the President issued a new Executive Order extending the suspension of the Reciprocal Tariffs against

China from the prior deadline of August 12, 2025 to November 10,

2025. Executive Order No. 14334, Further Modifying the Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Ongoing Discussions With the People’s Republic of China, 90 Fed. Reg. 39,305, 39,305-06 (Aug. 11,

2025).

10a

On April 14, 2025, five small businesses—V.O.S. Selections, Inc.; Plastic Services and Products, LLC, dba

Genova Pipe; MicroKits, LLC; FishUSA, Inc.; and

Terry Precision Cycling, LLC (collectively, the “Private

Plaintiffs”)—brought suit before the Court of International Trade (CIT) against the United States and various Government officials in their official capacities, challenging the President’s imposition of the Reciprocal

Tariffs. On April 23, 2025, Oregon and eleven other

states (collectively, the “State Plaintiffs”) brought suit

before the CIT against the United States and various

Government officials in their official capacities, challenging the President’s imposition of both the Reciprocal Tariffs and the Trafficking Tariffs.

On May 28, 2025, a three-judge panel of the CIT

granted summary judgment to the Private Plaintiffs and

State Plaintiffs in a consolidated order, holding that

both the Reciprocal Tariffs and the Trafficking Tariffs

exceeded the President’s authority under IEEPA and

permanently enjoining the Government from imposing

these tariffs. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. United States,

772 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1383 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2025). The

Government appealed both cases the same day and

moved to stay the injunction pending appeal. We consolidated the appeals, granted the Government’s motion to

stay pending their resolution, and expedited briefing

and oral argument. V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump,

No. 2025-1812, 2025 WL 1527040, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May

29, 2025). We also sua sponte decided to assign the case

to the court en banc. ECF No. 51 at 3 (“[T]he court also

concludes that these cases present issues of exceptional

11a

importance warranting expedited en banc consideration

of the merits in the first instance.”).

Before we reach the merits of this case, we briefly

discuss the history and legal authority concerning the

imposition of tariffs as relevant to this appeal.

The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay

and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and to

“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” U.S. Const.

art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3. Tariffs are a tax, and the Framers of

the Constitution expressly contemplated the exclusive

grant of taxing power to the legislative branch; when

Patrick Henry expressed concern that the President

“may easily become king,” 3 Debates in the Several State

Conventions 58 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836), James Madison replied that this would not occur because “[t]he

purse is in the hands of the representatives of the people,” id. at 393.

At the time of the Founding, and for most of the early

history of the United States, tariffs were the primary

source of revenue for the federal government. See

Goldwater Inst. Br. 12 n.5 (citing Federalist No. 12 at 75

(J. Cooke, ed., 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (“[W]e must

a long time depend for the means of revenue, chiefly on

such duties.”)). Setting tariff policy was thus considered a core Congressional function. See Michael W.

McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King:

Executive Power Under the Constitution 101 (2020); cf.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (limiting direct taxation by

tying it to a census for proper apportioning). In 1913,

the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, granting Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,

from whatever source derived.” U.S. Const. amend.

12a

XVI. This ability of Congress to impose a domestic income tax reduced the importance of tariffs as a source

of revenue for the federal government.

For much of this early history, Congress set tariffs

without authorizing the President to adjust tariff rates

by entering into international agreements. In the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Congress began to delegate to the Executive limited authority to

“activate or suspend” tariff rates through international

agreements. Cato Inst. Amicus Br. 6-7 (citing Tariff

Act of 1883, 22 Stat. 488; Tariff Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 567).

Nonetheless, Congress continued to enact legislation establishing the basic tariff schedules. For example, in the

Tariff Act of 1930, Congress set forth tariff rates in

“ninety-five pages of schedules.” ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1297

(Fed. Cir. 2015).

Through the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, Congress adopted the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

Pub. L. 87-456, 76 Stat. 72, 72-75 (1962). In 1988, the

HTSUS was enacted by Congress. Omnibus Trade and

Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat.

1107, 1148-50. The HTSUS sets the United States’ current tariff schedules. During this entire period, Congress authorized the President to enter into agreements

reducing tariff rates, or, in some cases, increasing tariff

rates. That presidential authority to increase rates

was cabined in various respects, including limitations on

the President’s authority to increase rates by more than

a certain percentage of the established statutory rate.

See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub.

L. No. 73-316, ch. 474, § 1, 48 Stat. 943, 943-45 (codified

as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351-54 (2018)); Trade Act

13a

of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 101-02, 151, 88 Stat. 1978,

1982-84 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2111-12). The

HTSUS rates reflect applicable governing tariffs that

have been set over time in part through international

negotiations and multilateral and bilateral trade agreements like the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.

Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States Revision 20 (Aug. 27, 2025), General Notes at 28; see generally 19 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(2) (directing the President to

“take such action as the President considers necessary

to bring trade agreements to which the United States is

a party into conformity with the Harmonized Tariff Schedule”).

In 1916, Congress passed legislation that created the

United States Tariff Commission, which was later renamed the United States International Trade Commission (ITC). Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271,

§§ 700-09, 39 Stat. 756, 795-98; 19 U.S.C. § 2231(a).

Later legislation provided that one of the ITC’s responsibilities is to provide recommendations to the President

in making adjustments to the tariff schedule. 19 U.S.C.

§ 3005. The framework for tariff schedules is set forth

in the HTSUS. “The [HTSUS] is the United States’

implementation of the 1983 International Convention on

the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding

(‘the Convention’), which created a single international

system of nomenclature to classify goods for customs

purposes.” Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United

States, 609 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). “As periodic changes are made to the international harmonized

tariff system, the HTSUS is correspondingly modified

pursuant to a statutory scheme established by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.” Id.

The HTSUS itself “is indeed a statute but is not pub-

14a

lished physically in the United States Code.” Libas,

Ltd. v. United States, 193 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Congress’s enactment of the HTSUS provided that its

terms, including “[e]ach modification or change made to

the [HTSUS] by the President under authority of law,”

“shall be considered to be statutory provisions of law for

all purposes.” 19 U.S.C. § 3004(c)(1).

In 1917, Congress enacted the Trading with the

Enemy Act (TWEA), Pub. L. No. 65-91, §§ 1-19, 40 Stat.

411, 411-26 (1917) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.

§ 95a; 50 U.S.C. §§ 4305-41), to address threats to

the U.S. economy resulting from our entry into World

War I. Section 5(b) of TWEA empowered the President to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit[] any transactions in foreign exchange” during wartime. 50 U.S.C.

§ 4305(b)(1)(A). In 1933, Congress expanded TWEA

by authorizing the President to deploy the power to “investigate, regulate, or prohibit” foreign transactions

during other national emergencies besides war. Emergency Banking Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, § 2, 48 Stat.

1, 1 (1933). In 1941, just one week after the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress further broadened presidential authority under TWEA by adding the phrase “importation

or exportation” to the list of transactions involving foreign property that the President may “investigate, regulate, or . . . prohibit.” First War Powers Act of

1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, § 301, 55 Stat. 838, 839.

After World War II, presidents used TWEA to impose economic sanctions on foreign adversaries, regulate foreign exchange, and control exports based on several declarations of national emergencies. See, e.g.,

Proclamation 2914, Proclaiming the Existence of a Na-

15a

tional Emergency, 15 Fed. Reg. 9,029, 9,029 (Dec. 16,

1950) (President Truman invoking TWEA to declare a

national emergency because of the outbreak of the Korean war and the threat of “communist imperialism”);

Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 500,

15 Fed. Reg. 9,040, reserved by Foreign Assets Control

Regulations; Transaction Control Regulations (Regulations Prohibiting Transactions Involving the Shipment

of Certain Merchandise Between Foreign Countries), 76

Fed. Reg. 35,739, 35,739 (Department of the Treasury

forbidding any financial transactions involving, or on behalf of, North Korea in response to Proclamation 2914);

Executive Order No. 11387, Governing Certain Capital

Transfers Abroad, 33 Fed. Reg. 47, 47 (Jan. 1, 1968)

(President Johnson placing controls on capital exports).

In 1971, to address a balance of payments deficit, 9 President Nixon asserted the authority to temporarily suspend existing tariff agreements that reduced the statutory rates so as to impose a temporary additional ten

percent ad valorem duty, which was not to exceed the

amounts set in the Congressionally-approved existing

Tariff Schedules of the United States, on all dutiable articles imported into the United States. Proclamation

4074, Imposition of Supplemental Duty for Balance of

Payments Purposes, 85 Stat. 926, 926 (Aug. 15, 1971).

This surcharge lasted less than five months. ProclaA country’s balance of payments is the difference between all

money flowing into the country and the amount of money flowing

out of the country to the rest of the world during a particular time

period. A severe and sudden disruption in a country’s ability to

finance its international transactions, often due to an inability to

cover essential imports or external debt repayments, is known as a

balance-of-payments crisis. See V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp.

3d at 1375.

16a

mation 4098, Termination of Additional Duty for Balance of Payments Purposes, 86 Stat. 1,591, 1,592 (Dec.

20, 1971). Yoshida International, a zipper importer

subject to the surcharge, filed a lawsuit challenging the

legality of the temporary tariff surcharge imposed by

President Nixon’s Proclamation and sought a refund of

taxes paid. The United States Customs Court ruled in

favor of Yoshida, holding that the President had exceeded his statutory authority as delegated by the Tariff

Act of 1930, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and section 5(b) of TWEA in assessing the surcharge; it accordingly concluded that President Nixon’s imposition of a

temporary surcharge was not authorized. Yoshida

Int’l v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 1155, 1175-76 (Cust.

Ct. 1974) (Yoshida I), rev’d, 526 F.2d 560 (CCPA 1975)

(Yoshida II).

While Yoshida I was pending appeal, Congress enacted the Trade Act of 1974 (codified as amended at 19

U.S.C. §§ 2101-2497b). Section 122 of the Trade Act gave

the President the authority to impose, for up to 150 days,

im-port quotas and/or a temporary import surcharge of

up to 15 percent “to deal with large and serious United

States balance-of-payments deficits,” “to prevent an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar in foreign exchange markets,” or “to cooperate with other countries in correcting an international balance-of-payments

disequilibrium.” 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a).

The next year, our predecessor court, the Court of

Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), reversed the Customs Court’s decision and upheld President Nixon’s ten

percent surcharge, determining that its imposition fell

within the authority delegated to the President by section 5(b) of TWEA. Yoshida II, at 566. The court also

17a

noted that a “surcharge imposed after Jan. 3, 1975[,] must,

of course, comply with [section 122 of the Trade Act].”

Id. at 582 n.33. As described in greater detail below,

the decision does not hold that TWEA created unlimited

authority in the President to revise the tariff schedule,

but only the limited temporary authority to impose tariffs that would not exceed the Congressionally-approved

tariff rates.

In 1976, Congress pared back the scope of TWEA

and enacted the National Emergencies Act (NEA). Pub.

L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended

at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1621-22, 1631, 1641, 1651). The

NEA limited presidential power and placed restrictions

on the use of authorities granted by TWEA. As relevant to this appeal, the NEA ended within two years

“[a]ll powers and authorities possessed by the President

. . . as a result of the existence of any declaration of

national emergency in effect on September 14, 1976,” 50

U.S.C. § 1601(a), and placed new restrictions on the declaration and termination of future national emergencies.

Id. §§ 1621-22.

The NEA did not explicitly address section 5(b) of

TWEA; however, the NEA’s legislative history indicates

Congress’s intent “to study section 5(b) [of TWEA] and

propose such revisions as might be found necessary” to

limit the President’s exercise of authority granted in

section 5(b) during peacetime. S. Rep. No. 95-466, at 2

(1977). IEEPA is the result of this legislative effort and

is consistent with Congress’s stated goal “to revise and delimit the President’s authority to regulate international

economic transactions during wars or national emergencies.” Id. In drafting IEEPA, Congress adopted the

same list of authorities as in TWEA—including the

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power to “regulate . . . importation”—but Congress

explicitly limited the President’s authority under IEEPA

by substituting authorities “which [we]re both more limited in scope than those of [TWEA] section 5(b) and subject to various procedural limitations.” H.R. Rep. No.

95-459, at 2, 19 (1977). The House Report also mentioned the Yoshida II decision in its background section,

stating:

[S]ection 5(b) came into play when, on August 15,

1971, President Nixon declared a national emergency

with respect to the balance-of-payments crisis and

under that emergency imposed a surcharge on imports. In that case, section 5(b) was not among the

statutes cited in the President’s proclamation as authority for the surcharge[] but was so cited later by

the Government in response to a suit brought in Customs Court by Yoshida International challenging the

surcharge. The court’s decision then rested on

whether section 5(b) authorized imposition of duties.

Although the lower court held that it did not, the Appeals Court reversed on the grounds that the existence of the national emergency made section 5(b)

available for purposes which would not be contemplated in normal times.

Id. at 5 (footnotes omitted).

IEEPA provides that, after declaring a national

emergency pursuant to the NEA, the President may “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation,

regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any . . . importation or exportation of . . .

any property in which any foreign country or a national

thereof has any interest.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B).

Notably, IEEPA does not use the words “tariffs” or “du-

19a

ties,” nor any similar terms like “customs,” “taxes,” or

“imposts.” IEEPA also does not have a residual clause

granting the President powers beyond those which are

explicitly listed.

In addition to the President’s authority to adjust tariffs by international agreement and the limited authority conferred by Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974

(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2132), Congress has passed numerous other statutes that authorize the President and

the executive branch to impose or modify tariffs on imports in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Tariff Act of

1930, Pub. L. No. 71- 361, § 338, 46 Stat. 590, 704 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1338); Trade Expansion Act of 1962,

Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (codified at 19 U.S.C.

§§ 1801-1991); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88

Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.

§§ 2101-2497b). Notably, every Congressional delegation to the President of the core legislative power to impose tariffs includes well-defined procedural and substantive limitations. For example, Section 232 of the

Trade Expansion Act of 1962 authorizes the President

to adjust the importation of certain articles if the Secretary of Commerce finds that they pose a threat to national security. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A). The statute provides the President must, within ninety days, determine whether he concurs with the Secretary’s report,

and if he does concur, “determine the nature and duration of the action that . . . must be taken . . . so

that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.” Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii). The President must take any such action within fifteen days of his

determination. Id. § 1862(c)(1)(B). In all instances,

20a

section 232 requires the President to “submit to the

Congress a written statement of the reasons why the

President has decided to take action, or refused to take

action.” Id. § 1862(c)(2).

Provisions of the Trade Act similarly authorize the

executive branch to impose tariffs on imports, but only

once certain conditions set forth by statute have been

met. Section 201 allows the President to “take all appropriate and feasible action within his power,” including imposing tariffs (often called “safeguard” tariffs) if

the ITC finds that imports are causing or threatening

“serious injury” to a domestic industry. 19 U.S.C.

§ 2251(a). Under Section 301 of the Trade Act, the

President may specifically direct the United States

Trade Representative (USTR) to respond to unfair

trade practices which violate trade agreements, or burden or restrict United States commerce, including by

“impos[ing] duties or other import restrictions” on foreign countries responsible for the harmful conduct. 19

U.S.C. § 2411(a), (c)(1)(B). While the USTR may take

any action “within the power of the President with respect to trade in any goods or services, or with respect

to any other area of pertinent relations with the foreign

country,” id. § 2411(a), the USTR must complete various

steps before taking such action. For example, before

imposing duties pursuant to section 301, the USTR must

initiate an investigation, id. § 2412; consult with the foreign country regarding the practices being investigated,

id. § 2413; determine whether the requisite conditions

for action are met, and if so, publish its proposed action

and the factual findings on which it is based, id. § 2414;

and allow for public comment regarding both the proposed investigation and the final action, id. § 2412(a)(4).

As interpreted by the Government, IEEPA, unlike

21a

these other statutes, would impose no such limitations

on the President’s authority.

“We review a grant of summary judgment by the

[CIT] de novo.” Aspects Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. United

States, 42 F.4th 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “We review the [CIT]’s grant of an injunction for abuse of discretion,” which “may be established by showing that the

[CIT] ‘made a clear error of judgment in weighing the

relevant factors or exercised its discretion based on an

error of law or clearly erroneous fact findings.’ ” Oman

Fasteners, LLC v. United States, 125 F.4th 1068, 1084

(Fed. Cir. 2025) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Wind

Tower Trade Coal. v. United States, 741 F.3d 89, 95

(Fed. Cir. 2014)) “To the extent the [CIT]’s decision to

grant or deny an injunction ‘hinges on questions of law,’

this court reviews those determinations without deference.” Id.

III

We first consider whether this case falls within our

court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

“The objection

that a federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction

may be raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation, even after trial and

the entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546

U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (internal citation omitted). “If the

court determines at any time that it lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Although no party here questions our jurisdiction, we are obligated to confirm

whether we have it.

22a

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1295(a)(5). We review de novo whether the CIT had

subject-matter jurisdiction. Int’l Custom Prods., Inc.

v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

If the CIT lacked jurisdiction, we similarly lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of this appeal. Glasstech, Inc.

v. AB Kyro OY, 769 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

(“[A]n appellate court has no jurisdiction to decide the

merits of the case if the court from which the appeal was

taken was without jurisdiction.”).

Article III of the Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested . . .

in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time

to time ordain and establish.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

Accordingly, the “[j]urisdiction of the lower federal

courts is . . . limited to those subjects encompassed

within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.” Ins. Corp. of

Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.

694, 701 (1982).

The statute conferring jurisdiction on the CIT provides, in relevant part, that “the [CIT] shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against

the United States, its agencies, or its officers, that arises

out of any law of the United States providing for . . .

tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of

merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue.” 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1)(B). 10 By granting excluWhile the President is a named party in this appeal, the CIT

noted that section 1581(i), which permits actions “against the

United States, its agencies, or its officers,” does not cover an action

naming the President. V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d at 136667. The CIT therefore held that while the President “must be dismissed from the two cases before the court,” it “retain[ed] ‘juris10

23a

sive jurisdiction to the CIT, “[s]ection 1581(i) removes

specific actions from the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331) and

places them in the jurisdiction of the [CIT].” Orleans

Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir.

2003). The question here is whether the action before

us arose from a law providing for tariffs such that the

CIT had exclusive jurisdiction in the first instance, and

we may properly maintain appellate jurisdiction.

A claim “arises out of ” a tariff law “for reasons other

than the raising of revenue,” 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(1)(B), if

the law in question is invoked as the authority to impose

a tariff for such a non-revenue raising purpose. To determine jurisdiction pursuant to an “arising out of” provision, we do not have to decide whether the statute does

in fact confer such authority. That question goes to the

merits of the claim. “Jurisdiction is [the court’s] authority to decide the case either way.” The Fair v.

Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). It

does not depend on the claim’s success. See id.; see

also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946).

The CIT found it had exclusive jurisdiction to hear

the present case in part because the Challenged Executive Orders purport to “effect changes to the [HTSUS]”

to reflect the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariff rates.

J.A. 64. The statute establishing the HTSUS specifies

that “[t]he provisions of the [HTSUS] . . . enacted

by” Congress, as well as “[e]ach modification or change

diction to consider challenges to the President’s actions in suits

against subordinate officials who are charged with implementing

the presidential directives.” Id. at 1367 (quoting USP Holdings,

Inc. v. United States, 36 F.4th 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2022)). The

parties before us have not challenged those rulings.

24a

made to the [HTSUS] by the President under authority

of law,” “shall be considered to be statutory provisions

of law for all purposes.” 19 U.S.C. § 3004(c)(1)(A), (C).

The Challenged Executive Orders purport to modify the

HTSUS—for example, by “inserting . . . new headings” providing for specific tariff rates applicable to

goods from each country, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15,088, 15,090,

by allegedly “modifying the HTSUS to temporarily suspend” certain tariffs, id. at 15,626, or by directing the

Secretary of Homeland Security to alter the HTSUS to

effectuate the orders, id. at 9,115, 9,118, 9,123. While

executive orders are not ordinarily “law within the

meaning of the Constitution,” Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t

of Energy, 134 F.4th 568, 573 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted), the Challenged

Executive Orders, if authorized, would modify the

HTSUS. These modifications to HTSUS are thus purported laws of the United States, and a lawsuit challenging tariffs effectuated by such a modification “arises out

of [a] law of the United States providing for . . . tariffs.” See California v. Trump, No. 25-cv-03372-JSC,

2025 WL 1569334, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2025) (quoting

28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)).

Finding that the CIT has exclusive jurisdiction over

the present cases is consistent with the reason why Congress established this exclusive jurisdiction in the first

place, as noted by three district court courts considering

challenges to the same tariffs now before us. K Mart

Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 188 (1988) (“Congress intended, first and foremost, to remedy the confusion over the division of jurisdiction between the Customs Court (now the Court of International Trade) and

the district courts and to ensure uniformity in the judicial decisionmaking process.” (internal citation and

25a

quotation marks omitted)); Webber v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CV-25-26-GF-DLC, 2025 WL 1207587, at

*7 (D. Mont. Apr. 25, 2025) (“Consolidating tariff matters with the [CIT] ensures a necessary ‘degree of uniformity and consistency’ throughout the United States.”

(quoting Conoco, Inc. v. U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones Bd.,

18 F.3d 1581, 1586 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); California v.

Trump, 2025 WL 1569334, at *5-6.11 The CIT had subject matter jurisdiction over this case in the first instance, and we accordingly have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.

We are not addressing whether the President’s actions should have been taken as a matter of policy. Nor

are we deciding whether IEEPA authorizes any tariffs

at all. Rather, the only issue we resolve on appeal is

One decision from the District Court for the District of the District of Columbia has held otherwise. See Learning Resources,

Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1248 (RC), 2025 WL 1525376 (D.D.C. May

29, 2025), appeal pending, No. 25-5202 (D.C. Cir.), cert. before

judgment denied, No. 24-1287, 2025 WL 1717468 (June 20, 2025).

The district court in that case held that its jurisdiction was not precluded by § 1581’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the CIT because IEEPA does not delegate to the President any authority to

impose tariffs. See id. at *8 (holding that IEEPA’s authorization

of the President to “regulate . . . importation or exportation”

does not encompass the power to tariff, because “[t]o regulate is to

establish rules governing conduct; to tariff is to raise revenue

through taxes on imports or exports.”). This decision appears to

erroneously conflate the merits question of whether IEEPA authorizes tariffs with the jurisdictional issue. Regardless, we do

not agree with the jurisdictional analysis in Learning Resources

because, whether or not IEEPA itself is a “law providing for tariffs,” the Challenged Executive Orders, which direct modifications

to the HTSUS, are such laws, for the reasons explained above.

26a

whether the Trafficking Tariffs and Reciprocal Tariffs

imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders are authorized by IEEPA. We conclude they are not.

We first consider the statutory text, including any

relevant canons of interpretation. See U.S. ex rel.

Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., 598 U.S. 739, 749 (2023) (“We

start, as always, with the text.”). IEEPA authorizes

the President to take certain actions in response to a declared national emergency arising from an “unusual and

extraordinary threat[] . . . to the national security,

foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” 50

U.S.C. § 1701(a). Upon the declaration of such an emergency, IEEPA authorizes the President to:

investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,

prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,

importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to,

or transactions involving, any property in which any

foreign country or a national thereof has any interest

by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.

50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphases added).

The statute bestows significant authority on the

President to undertake a number of actions in response

to a declared national emergency, but none of these actions explicitly include the power to impose tariffs, duties, or the like, or the power to tax. The Government

locates that authority within the term “regulate . . .

importation,” but it is far from plain that “regulate

27a

. . . importation,” in this context, includes the power

to impose the tariffs at issue in this case.

Notably, when drafting IEEPA, Congress did not

use the term “tariff” or any of its synonyms, like “duty”

or “tax.” There are numerous statutes that do delegate to the President the power to impose tariffs; in each

of these statutes that we have identified, Congress has

used clear and precise terms to delegate tariff power,

reciting the term “duties” or one of its synonyms. In

contrast, none of these statutes uses the broad term

“regulate” without also separately and explicitly granting the President the authority to impose tariffs. The

absence of any such tariff language in IEEPA contrasts

with statutes where Congress has affirmatively granted

such power and included clear limits on that power.

For example, section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930

permits the President to “specify and declare new or additional duties.” 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (emphasis added).

Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to proclaim “a temporary import surcharge . . .

in the form of duties.” 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)(A) (emphasis

added). Section 201 of the Trade Act authorizes the

President to “proclaim an increase in, or the imposition

of, any duty on the imported article” or to “proclaim a

tariff-rate quota.” 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3)(A)-(B) (emphases added). And section 301 of the Trade Act allows

the President to “impose duties or other import restrictions.” 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 12

See also 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (“[T]here shall be imposed upon

such merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other

duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.”); id. § 1673 (“[T]here shall be imposed upon such merchan12

28a

The only statute the Government identifies that

might reasonably be viewed as inconsistent with this

analysis is section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of

1962. Section 232 provides that:

[I]f the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an “article is being imported into the United States in such

quantities or under such circumstances as to

threaten to impair the national security,” the President is authorized to “take such action, and for such

time, as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of

(the) article and its derivatives so that . . . imports (of the article) will not threaten to impair the

national security.”

Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S.

548, 550 (1976) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1970 ed.,

Supp. IV) (emphasis added)).

In Algonquin, the Supreme Court interpreted the

phrase “adjust the imports” in section 232 to permit the

President to “control such imports of petroleum and petroleum products . . . by imposing on them a system

of monetary exactions in the form of license fees.” Id.

at 551-52, 571. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the authorization to “‘adjust’ imports should

be read to encompass only quantitative methods [i.e.],

quotas as opposed to monetary methods [i.e.]., license

dise an antidumping duty, in addition to any other duty imposed.”);

id. § 2465 (“No duty-free treatment provided under this subchapter

shall remain in effect after December 31, 2020.”); id. § 2252(d)(2)(D)

(“Such relief shall take the form of an increase in, or the imposition

of, a duty on imports.”); id. § 2411(c)(1)(B) (“[T]he Trade Representative is authorized to . . . impose duties or other import restrictions on the goods of . . . foreign countr[ies] for such time

as the Trade Representative determines appropriate.”).

29a

fees of effecting such adjustments,” based on the statute’s explicit statement that the circumstances that

threaten to impair national security are not related to

quantity of imports but rather “their use, their availability, [and] their character.” Id. at 561 (quoting 104

Cong. Rec. 10542-10543 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Mills)).

Even section 232 does not undermine our conclusion

regarding IEEPA’s use of “regulate . . . importation.” This is first because the use of the term “adjust,”

which the Government argues is synonymous with “regulate,” in section 232 is in the context of a provision dealing with the imports and duties, making it far more plausible that the adjustment referenced in subsection (b)

includes an adjustment to tariff rates. See 19 U.S.C.

§ 1862(a) (explicitly referring to “the duty . . . on

any article”). Also, in construing the meaning of “adjust” in Algonquin, the Supreme Court also relied heavily on the statutory history of the Trade Expansion Act.

Multiple members of the House and Senate had explicitly referenced the President’s authority to “increase

. . . duties” or “impose . . . fees” as contemplated

by proposed amendments that were “strikingly similar”

to the enacted law. Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 563-66. In

contrast, here, neither the term “duties” nor any of its

synonyms appear anywhere in the text of IEEPA, and

the history of the enactment of IEEPA lacks any similar

legislative lodestar. Moreover, section 232 is within title 19 of the U.S. Code, which is entitled “Customs Duties.” See INS v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rts., Inc.,

502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (“[W]e have stated that the title

of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity

in the legislation’s text.”). In contrast, IEEPA’s provisions are located within title 50, which is entitled “War

and National Defense.” And in enacting IEEPA, Con-

30a

gress explicitly set out to cabin the President’s authority, providing for authorities “which [we]re both more

limited in scope than those of [TWEA] and subject to

various procedural limitations.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-459,

at 2.13 Thus, even if Algonquin is viewed as supporting

the proposition that “adjust the imports” includes the

power to impose tariffs (as opposed to standing for

the narrower proposition that, in section 232, which appears in title 19, “adjust” simply is not limited to nonmonetary actions), it does not follow that IEEPA’s use

of “regulate . . . importation” also includes tariffs.

Further, as we previously discussed, see supra Section I.E., in each statute delegating tariff power to the

President, Congress has provided specific substantive

limitations and procedural guidelines to be followed in

imposing any such tariffs. It seems unlikely that Congress intended, in enacting IEEPA, to depart from its

past practice and grant the President unlimited authority to impose tariffs. The statute neither mentions tariffs (or any of its synonyms) nor has procedural safeguards that contain clear limits on the President’s power

to impose tariffs.

Taken together, these other statutes indicate that

whenever Congress intends to delegate to the President

the authority to impose tariffs, it does so explicitly, either by using unequivocal terms like tariff and duty, or

via an overall structure which makes clear that Congress is referring to tariffs. This is no surprise, as the

core Congressional power to impose taxes such as tariffs

To be clear, we cite legislative history as additional support for

the conclusion we reach based on the statutory text alone. Even

without this legislative history, we would reach the same conclusion.

31a

is vested exclusively in the legislative branch by the

Constitution; when Congress delegates this power in the

first instance, it does so clearly and unambiguously.

See Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, v. United States, 415

U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) (“Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress . . . is the sole organ for levying

taxes. . . . It would be . . . a sharp break with

our traditions to conclude that Congress had bestowed

on [the executive branch] the taxing power.”).

Contrary to the Government’s assertion, the mere

authorization to “regulate” does not in and of itself imply the authority to impose tariffs. The power to “regulate” has long been understood to be distinct from the

power to “tax.” In fact, the Constitution vests these

authorities in Congress separately. U.S. Const. art. I,

§ 8 cl. 1, 3; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 201

(1824) (“It is, that all duties, imposts, and excises, shall

be uniform. In a separate clause of the enumeration,

the power to regulate commerce is given, as being entirely distinct from the right to levy taxes and imposts,

and as being a new power, not before conferred. The

constitution, then, considers these powers as substantive, and distinct from each other.”); Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552, 567 (2012) (holding that the individual mandate provision of the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act was a permissible

exercise of Congress’s taxing power but exceeded Congress’s power to regulate commerce). While Congress

may use its taxing power in a manner that has a regulatory effect, see Nat’l Fed’n. of Indep. Bus., 567 U.S. at

537, the power to tax is not always incident to the power

to regulate.

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Indeed, there are important examples where Congress has granted the power to regulate to the executive

branch without delegating the power to impose tariffs.

See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Pub. L. No.

73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended by Pub. L. No.

97-303, 96 Stat. 1409, 1409 at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(h)(1)) (directing the Securities and Exchange Commission “to

regulate the trading of [tradeable assets]”); Communications Act of 1934, § 303, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat.

1082, 1082 (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 303(e)) (directing the

Federal Communications Commission to “[r]egulate the

kind of apparatus to be used with respect to its external

effects and the purity and sharpness of the emissions

from each [radio] station and from the apparatus

therein”). The Government’s suggestion would mean,

for example, that Congress delegated to the SEC power

to tax substantial swaths of the American economy by

granting the SEC the authority to regulate various activities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78i(h)(1) (“[T]he Commission

shall have the authority to regulate the trading of any

put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,

certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities.”);

id. § 78i(h)(2) (“[T]he Commission shall have the authority to regulate the trading of any security futures product to the extent provided in the securities laws.”).

Even in the context of international trade, apart from

the decision in Yoshida II, the Government has not

pointed to any statute or judicial decision that has construed the power to regulate as including the authority

to impose tariffs without the statute also including a specific provision in the statute authorizing tariffs. That

was notably the case in J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v.

United States, where the statute authorized the President to act “to regulate the foreign commerce of the

33a

United States” and then specifically authorized tariffs.

276 U.S. 394, 401 (1928) (quoting Tariff Act, ch. 356

§ 315, 42 Stat. 858, 941-42 (1922) (granting President authority to proclaim certain “increases or decreases in

any rate of duty provided in th[e] act.”)).

Upon declaring an emergency under IEEPA, a President may, in relevant part, “investigate, block during

the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and

compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” the “importation or exportation of . . . any property in which any

foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.”.

50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). “Regulate” must be read in

the context of these other verbs, 14 none of which involve

monetary actions or suggest the power to tax or impose

tariffs.15

Instead, the other verbs implicate the common law doctrine

that trade with enemy nations or hostile actors is illegal. See, e.g.,

The Julia, 12 U.S. 181, 193 (1814) (“[I]n war all intercourse between

the subjects and citizens of the belligerent countries is illegal, unless sanctioned by the authority of the government.”); Hanger v.

Abbott, 73 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1867) (“All foreign writers on international law concur in the opinion that the immediate and necessary

consequence of a declaration of war is to interdict all intercourse

or dealings between the subjects of the belligerent states.”); Coppell v. Hall, 74 U.S. 542, 554 (1868) (“When international wars exist

all commerce between the countries of the belligerents, unless permitted, is contrary to public policy, and all contracts growing out

of such commerce are illegal. Such wars are regarded not as wars

of the governments only, but of all the inhabitants of their respective countries.”). Congress has long enacted statutes on this

backdrop. See, e.g., Section 5 of the Act of July 13, 1861, 12 Stat.

255, 257.

An import of goods may trigger a host of other customs-related

procedures, such as acquisition of a Certificate of Origin under the

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules of origin,

34a

The Government’s interpretation of IEEPA as

providing the President power to impose unlimited tariffs also runs afoul of the major questions doctrine.

See, e.g., Oral Arg. 16 at 19:28-19:39 (the Government

stating “there is no limit on the cap of the tariff in

IEEPA itself ”). The Supreme Court has explained

that the doctrine applies in “cases in which the ‘history

and the breadth of the authority . . . asserted’ ” by

the Government entails vast “economic and political significance.” West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 721

(2022) (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S.

120, 159 (2000)). In such cases, there may be a “‘reason

to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant to

confer such authority.” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159-60). When the major questions

doctrine is implicated, the Government must point to

“clear congressional authorization” for that asserted

power. Id. at 732 (quoting Util. Air. Regul. Grp. v.

EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)).

The tariffs at issue in this case implicate the concerns

animating the major questions doctrine as they are both

“unheralded” and “transformative.” Id. at 722, 724;

see also id. at 725 (“[J]ust as established practice may

shed light on the extent of power conveyed by general

statutory language, so the want of assertion of power by

see Xerox Corp. v. United States, 423 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir.

2005), licenses, see Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 571 (1976), and creation

and management of foreign trade zones, see Nissan Motor Mfg.

Corp., U.S.A. v. United States, 884 F.2d 1375, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

These measures are more readily under-stood to fall under the authorization to “regulate . . . importation” granted to the President by IEEPA.

Available at https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.

aspx?fl=25-1812_07312025.mp3.

35a

those who presumably would be alert to exercise it, is

equally significant in determining whether such power

was actually conferred.” (quoting FTC v. Bunte Bros.,

Inc., 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941)). 17 The Supreme Court

has explained that where the Government has “never

previously claimed powers of this magnitude,” the major

questions doctrine may be implicated. Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 501-03 (2023).

Since IEEPA was promulgated almost fifty years

ago, past presidents have invoked IEEPA frequently.

But not once before has a President asserted his authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs on imports or adjust

the rates thereof. Rather, presidents have typically invoked IEEPA to restrict financial transactions with specific countries or entities that the President has determined pose an acute threat to the country’s interests.

The Government argues as a threshold matter that the major

questions doctrine does not apply to the President because of the

President’s democratic and political accountability. See Government’s Opening Br. 43-44. The Government fails to articulate

why it makes any difference whether the challenged action is the

result of presidential or agency action, since agency heads themselves are accountable to the President. See Trump v. Wilcox,

145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025). We accordingly join our sister circuits in concluding that delegations to the President are treated

the same as delegations to executive agencies under the major

questions doctrine. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F.4th 1017,

1031 n.40 (5th Cir. 2022); Georgia v. President of the U.S., 46 F.4th

1283, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2022); Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585,

606-08 (6th Cir. 2022). The only circuit court decision to hold otherwise was vacated as moot, see Mayes v. Biden, 67 F.4th 921, 933

(9th Cir. 2023), vacated as moot, 89 F.4th 1186 (9th Cir. 2023); see

also Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1, 9 n.2 (9th Cir. 2024) (acknowledging that “Mayes is no longer binding law”); id. at 20 (Nelson, J.,

concurring) (explaining why the major questions doctrine applies

to presidential actions).

36a

For example, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001

terror attacks, President George W. Bush invoked

IEEPA to establish a process for designating terrorist

organizations and affiliated individuals to prevent the deployment of American resources for their advantage.

Executive Order No. 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079,

49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). In almost all other instances

where IEEPA has been invoked, presidents did so to

freeze assets, block financial transfers, place embargoes, or impose targeted sanctions on hostile regimes

and individuals. Even under IEEPA’s predecessor,

TWEA, a President has invoked his authority to impose

tariffs on only one occasion, and on that occasion, the

tariffs were of limited scope and duration. See Yoshida

II, 526 F.2d at 572. The invocation of IEEPA to impose tariffs on nearly every country in the world is undoubtedly a significant departure from these previous

invocations. “ ‘This ‘lack of historical precedent,’ coupled with the breadth of authority that the [Government] now claims[] [may be] a ‘telling indication’ ” that

the Government’s reading of a statute is incorrect. See

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational

Safety & Health Admin., 595 U.S. 109, 119-20 (2022)

(per curiam) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.

Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 505 (2010)); Dames &

Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669-74 (1981) (interpreting IEEPA in light of past presidential action).

Additionally, as already discussed, tariffs are a core

Congressional power. The “basic and consequential

tradeoffs” that are inherent in the President’s decision

to impose the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs “are

ones that Congress would likely have intended for it-

37a

self.” Nebraska, 600 U.S. at 506 (quoting West Virginia,

597 U.S. at 730). Moreover, the United States imports

more than $4 trillion of goods annually; these imports

account for 14 percent of the nation’s economy. J.A. 215.

The Government itself has claimed that the Reciprocal

Tariffs will “generate between $2.3 trillion and $3.3 trillion over the budget window.” The White House, Statement from the Off. of Commc’ns, FACT: One, Big, Beautiful Bill Cuts Spending, Fuels Growth, https://www.

whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/05/fact-one-big-beautifulbill-cuts-spending-fuels-growth/ (May 28, 2025). 18 The

Executive’s use of tariffs qualifies as a decision of vast

economic and political significance, so the Government

must “point to clear congressional authorization” for its

interpretation of IEEPA. West Virginia, 597 U.S. at

723 (quoting Util. Air, 573 U.S. at 324).

Indeed, the economic impact of the tariffs is predicted to be

many magnitudes greater than the two programs that the Supreme

Court has previously held to implicate major questions. In Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of Health & Human

Services, the Court held that the power to impose “$50 billion in

. . . economic impact” was “exactly the kind of power” “of vast

economic and political significance” for which it “expect[s] Congress to speak clearly.” 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Nebraska, the Supreme Court

pointed to the “staggering” scope of impact of a program “between

$469 billion and $519 billion,” which was “ten times the ‘economic

impact’ ” in Alabama Association that it previously concluded “triggered analysis under the major questions doctrine.” 600 U.S. at

502-03. As noted, the Government’s estimates of the Reciprocal

and Trafficking Tariff ’s impact are at least five times larger. And

given the President’s continued invocation of IEEPA to impose additional expansive tariffs during the pendency of this appeal, the

overall economic impact of the tariffs imposed under the Government’s reading of IEEPA is even larger still.

38a

For the reasons discussed above, we discern no clear

congressional authorization by IEEPA for tariffs of the

magnitude of the Reciprocal Tariffs and Trafficking

Tariffs. Reading the phrase “regulate . . . importation” to include imposing these tariffs is “a wafer-thin

reed on which to rest such sweeping power.” Ala.

Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 594

U.S. 758, 765 (2021) (per curiam). In this respect, the

Government’s argument resembles the argument expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Nebraska,

where the Court concluded that Congress’s authorization to the Secretary of Education to “waive or modify”

laws and regulations governing student debt did not encompass student debt relief. 600 U.S. at 494-96. The

Court explained that “[h]owever broad the meaning of

‘waive or modify,’ that language cannot authorize the

kind of exhaustive rewriting of the statute that has

taken place here.” Id. at 500. The same is true of the

statutory language (“regulate . . . importation”) at

issue in this case.

We are unpersuaded by the Government’s argument

that it is “particularly inappropriate to construe narrowly a delegation of power in the arena of foreign affairs and national security.” Government’s Opening Br.

45. While the President of course has independent constitutional authority in these spheres, the power of the

purse (including the power to tax) belongs to Congress.

See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 21

(2015) (“[I]t is essential the congressional role in foreign

affairs be understood and respected. . . . The Executive is not free from the ordinary controls and checks

of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.”); Fuld v. Pal. Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 19 (2025)

(“The Federal Government’s inherent foreign affairs

39a

power, like every other governmental power, must be

exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions

of the Constitution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Absent a valid delegation by Congress, the President has no authority to impose taxes.

Given these considerations, we conclude Congress,

in enacting IEEPA, did not give the President wideranging authority to impose tariffs of the nature of the

Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs simply by the use of

the term “regulate . . . importation.”

In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, the Government relies heavily on Yoshida II, a decision of our

predecessor court, the CCPA. In the Government’s

view, we should discern that Congress intended to include in IEEPA the power to impose tariffs because it

enacted IEEPA with knowledge of existing judicial

precedent set by Yoshida II, which recognized the delegation of tariff authority to the President under TWEA,

IEEPA’s predecessor statute, and contained the identical “regulate . . . importation” language. Thus, we

consider whether, even if Congress ratified Yoshida II’s

understanding of the term “regulate,” to what extent

that ratification authorizes the Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders

under IEEPA.

Yoshida II concerned President Nixon’s issuance of

Proclamation 4074 to address a balance-of-payments

deficit. 526 F.2d at 567. The CCPA reversed the Customs Court’s determination that TWEA section 5(b) did

not authorize President Nixon’s 10 percent import surcharge. 526 F.2d at 566. Section 5(b) of TWEA also

authorized the President to “regulate . . . importa-

40a

tion.” Id. at 573; 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(1)(B). The

CCPA held that TWEA “does in fact delegate to the

President, for use during war or during national emergency only, the power to ‘regulate importation,’ ” and

that power also included the authority to “impos[e] an

import duty surcharge.” Yoshida II, 526 F.2d at 573,

577.19 Without foreclosing the possibility that TWEA

delegated authority to the President to impose some tariffs, the CCPA also “agree[d] with the Customs Court

that the delegation could not constitutionally have been

of the full and all-inclusive power to regulate foreign

commerce.” Id. at 574. Thus, it determined that “[a]

question remain[ed] . . . as to how the President

may regulate importation in a national emergency, i.e.,

what means of execution of the delegated powers are

permissible.” Id. at 574.

The CCPA ultimately concluded that President

Nixon’s tariff was authorized given its “[l]imited

[n]ature” in time, scope, and amount, since it was a temporary measure, “limited to articles which had been the

subject of prior tariff concessions, and, thus, to less than

all United States imports,” and subject to a maximum

rate that had been prescribed by Congress. Id. at 577We note that Yoshida II is not binding on the en banc court.

See Robert Bosch, LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 719 F.3d 1305, 1316

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Indeed, ‘[t]he province and obligation of the en

banc court is to review the current validity of challenged prior decisions.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Aguon,

851 F.2d 1158, 1167 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev’d on other

grounds, Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992))). But because Yoshida II approved narrowly circumscribed tariffs that did

not exceed Congressional caps, and the CCPA expressly declined

to approve unbounded tariffs, today’s case does not require us to

decide whether to overrule Yoshida II.

41a

78. Thus, the CCPA held that “[f]ar from attempting

. . . to tear down or supplant the entire tariff scheme

of Congress, the President imposed a limited surcharge,

as a temporary measure . . . calculated to help meet

a particular national emergency, which is quite different

from imposing whatever tariff rates he deems desirable.” Id. at 577-78 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Government argues that because Yoshida II was

existing precedent at the time IEEPA was enacted,

Congress intended to ratify Yoshida II’s understanding

of the term “regulate . . . importation” as used in

TWEA by using the same language in IEEPA. Even if

we assume, as the Government urges, that Congress intended to ratify Yoshida II when it enacted IEEPA, we

still must consider what it is that Congress ratified.

Yoshida II does not broadly conclude that “regulate

. . . importation” must be read to include any type of

tariff imposition. In fact, it held the opposite. The

CCPA’s reasoning in Yoshida II was expressly premised on the limits of President Nixon’s Proclamation.

The court noted that “[t]he Executive does not here

seek, nor would it receive, judicial approval of a wholesale delegation of legislative power.” Id. at 583. And

the CCPA agreed with the Customs Court that to sanction “the exercise of an unlimited power . . . would

be to strike a blow to our Constitution.” Id. Thus, the

CCPA explicitly contrasted presidential conduct it found

permissible within the power granted by TWEA—“ ‘a

temporary measure’ . . . calculated to help meet a

particular national emergency” that is limited in scope

and amount—with conduct it found impermissible under

TWEA—“imposing whatever tariff rates [the President] deems desirable.” Id. at 578.

42a

The Government would have us define “regulate

. . . importation” to include only the portion of Yoshida II authorizing tariffs and ignore the rest of its

holding. But if the ratification doctrine is to apply, and

we are to presume that Congress intended for the holding of Yoshida II to apply to the newly enacted IEEPA,

then we must presume that it intended for the court’s

entire holding to apply, not just the portion favorable to

the Government. And because Yoshida II was explicit

in its view that an unbounded tariff authority would not

be permitted, that understanding must be attributed to

Congress as well.

Accepting the Government’s argument as correct—

that Congress ratified Yoshida II’s conclusion that “regulate . . . importation” could include the power to

impose tariffs—we still must conclude that the Challenged Executive Orders in this case exceed the authority provided by that interpretation of IEEPA. Both

the Trafficking Tariffs and the Reciprocal Tariffs are

unbounded in scope, amount, and duration. These tariffs apply to nearly all articles imported into the United

States (and, in the case of the Reciprocal Tariffs, apply

to almost all countries), impose high rates which are

ever-changing and exceed those set out in the HTSUS,

and are not limited in duration. The Trafficking and

Reciprocal Tariffs assert an expansive authority that is

beyond the express limitations of Yoshida II’s holding

and, thus, beyond the authority delegated to the President by IEEPA.

* * *

The final issue raised by this appeal is whether the

CIT abused its discretion in vacating and permanently

43a

enjoining the operation of the Challenged Executive Orders. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the

CIT’s injunction and remand.

An injunction “does not follow from success on the

merits as a matter of course.” Winter v. NRDC, 555

U.S. 7, 32 (2008). Under “well-established principles of

equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must

satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such

relief.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.

388, 391 (2006). The four factors a plaintiff must establish to secure a permanent injunction are: “(1) that it

has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies

available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and

defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that

the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” Id. “The decision to grant or deny

permanent injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the [trial] court, reviewable on appeal for abuse

of discretion.” Id.

After invalidating both the Trafficking Tariffs and

the Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive Orders as contrary to law, the CIT ordered the

Government to issue the “necessary administrative orders to effectuate the permanent injunction” “within 10

calendar days.” V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d. at

1384. The CIT did not address the eBay factors in its

original opinion. The following week, in an order responding to the Government’s motions to stay the CIT’s

enforcement of its judgment pending the Government’s

appeal to this Court, the CIT explained that “[t]he injunction issued on account of Plaintiffs’ success on the

44a

merits and the unavailability under the Uniformity

Clause of a complete legal remedy in the form of piecemeal duty refunds to specific plaintiffs,” and that “[i]ntrinsic to this exercise of equitable discretion was the compelling public interest in ‘ensuring that governmental

bodies comply with the law’ . . . and the lack of any

cognizable hardship borne by the United States in the

form of its non-enforcement of orders issued ultra

vires.” J.A. 63 (quoting Am. Signature, Inc. v. United

States, 598 F.3d 816, 830 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).

We need not decide whether the CIT abused its discretion by only articulating its analysis of the eBay factors some days after it issued its original opinion on the

merits, nor whether the Government has shown any

prejudice from the delay. Nor need we evaluate the

sufficiency of the CIT’s explanation. This is because

vacatur of the universal injunction is warranted based

on the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Trump

v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025).

In CASA, the Supreme Court considered the Government’s challenge to three universal injunctions issued

by different district courts prohibiting enforcement of

the President’s policy with respect to birthright citizenship. Id. at 2549. While the Court held that the universal injunctions at issue “likely exceed the equitable

authority Congress has granted to federal courts,” id. at

2548, it “decline[d] to take up . . . in the first instance” arguments as to the permissible scope of injunctive relief, id. at 2558. Instead, it instructed “[t]he lower

courts [to] move expeditiously to ensure that, with respect to each plaintiff, the injunctions comport with this

rule and otherwise comply with principles of equity” as

outlined in the opinion. Id. at 2563; see also Doe v.

45a

Trump, 142 F.4th 109, 112 (1st Cir. 2025) (remanding

“for the limited purpose of enabling the District Court

to consider the bearing, if any, of that guidance in CASA

on the scope of the preliminary injunction . . . and

to act accordingly”); United States v. Texas, No. 2450149, 2025 WL 1836640, at *38 (5th Cir. July 3, 2025)

(“Like the Supreme Court in Trump v. CASA, we ‘decline to take up . . . in the first instance’ arguments

as to the permissible scope of injunctive relief in the present case. ‘[W]e therefore leave it’ to the district court

to consider any arguments the parties may present in

this regard.” (alterations in original)).

We will follow this same practice. 20 On remand, the

CIT should consider in the first instance whether its

grant of a universal injunction comports with the standards outlined by the Supreme Court in CASA.

We affirm the CIT’s holding that the Trafficking and

Reciprocal Tariffs imposed by the Challenged Executive

Orders exceed the authority delegated to the President

by IEEPA’s text. We also affirm the CIT’s grant of

declaratory relief that the orders are “invalid as contrary to law.” V.O.S. Selections, 772 F. Supp. 3d at

1383-84. We vacate the CIT’s grant of a permanent injunction universally enjoining the enforcement of the

Trafficking and Reciprocal Tariffs and remand for the

CIT to reevaluate the propriety of granting injunctive

relief and the proper scope of such relief, after considWe are neither affirming nor reversing the CIT’s holding that

any relief short of a universal injunction would be unconstitutional

as violative of the Uniformity Clause. On remand, the CIT will

need to reconsider this holding in light of the guidance provided by

the Supreme Court in CASA.

46a

ering all four eBay factors and the Supreme Court’s

holding in CASA.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED-IN-PART

COSTS

No costs.

47a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

2025-1812, 2025-1813

V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., PLASTIC SERVICES AND

PRODUCTS, LLC, DBA GENOVA PIPE, MICROKITS, LLC,

FISHUSA INC., TERRY PRECISION CYCLING LLC,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

DONALD J. TRUMP, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES, RODNEY

S. SCOTT, COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE UNITED STATES

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, JAMIESON

GREER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, HOWARD LUTNICK,

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF

COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND BORDER

PROTECTION, DEFENDANTS -APPELLANTS

STATE OF OREGON, STATE OF ARIZONA, STATE OF

COLORADO, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, STATE OF

DELAWARE, STATE OF ILLINOIS, STATE OF MAINE,

STATE OF MINNESOTA, STATE OF NEVADA, STATE OF

NEW MEXICO, STATE OF NEW YORK, STATE OF

VERMONT, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP, UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, KRISTI NOEM,

SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IN HER OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS

48a

AND BORDER PROTECTION, RODNEY S. SCOTT,

COMMISSIONER FOR UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND

BORDER PROTECTION, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER

PROTECTION, UNITED STATES,

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Filed:

Aug. 29, 2025

Appeals from the United States Court of

International Trade in Nos. 1:25-cv-00066-GSKTMR-JAR, 1:25-cv-00077-GSK-TMR-JAR, Senior

Judge Jane A. Restani, Judge Gary S. Katzmann,

Judge Timothy M. Reif.

CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge, joined by Circuit Judges

LOURIE, REYNA, and STARK, additional views.

We join the majority opinion in full. While we agree

with the majority that the International Emergency

Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. § 1701

et seq., does not grant the President authority to impose

the type of tariffs imposed by the Executive Orders,

Maj. Op. at 26-42, we write separately to state our view

that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose

any tariffs. In particular, we conclude that (1) the Government’s expansive interpretation of “regulate” is not

supported by the plain text of IEEPA; (2) the Government’s reliance on the ratification of our predecessor

court’s opinion in United States v. Yoshida Int’l, Inc.,

526 F.2d 560 (CCPA 1975) (“Yoshida II”) does not overcome this plain meaning; and (3) the Government’s un-

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derstanding of the scope of authority granted by IEEPA

would render it an unconstitutional delegation.

We start by addressing the statutory text of IEEPA.

IEEPA allows the President to declare a national emergency to deal with “any unusual and extraordinary

threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part

outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.

§ 1701(a). Once the President declares such an emergency, IEEPA grants the President the power to:

investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising

any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign

country or a national thereof has any interest by any

person, or with respect to any property, subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States[.]

50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). The Government locates the

President’s purported tariff authority in the statute’s

grant of power to “regulate . . . importation.” Appellants’ Br. 32.

The plain meaning of “regulate” does not support the

Government’s argument. “Regulate” means “[t]o fix,

establish or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; to subject

to governing principles or laws.” Regulate, Black’s

Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979). “Regulate” also means

“to govern or direct according to rule,” “to bring under

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the control of law or constituted authority,” or “make

regulations for or concerning.” Regulate, Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary (1961). As the

plain meaning of “regulate” does not include measures

for raising revenue, the Government is forced to rely on

a syllogism: it contends to “regulate” importation means

to “adjust” or “control” the quantity of imports, and tariffs are ways to “adjust” or “control” the quantity of imports. Appellants’ Br. 32-33; Am. First Leg. Found.

Br. 3-5; see Dissent at 29-33. The Government’s broad

interpretation of “regulate” as encompassing every possible method and mode of adjustment of the quantity of

importation, including taxation, faces three textual

problems in the specific context 1 of 50 U.S.C. § 1702:

(1) it is inconsistent with how “regulate” would be applied beyond its application to “importation;” (2) it renders the other listed powers in IEEPA surplusage; and

(3) it violates the proposition that Congress must speak

clearly when authorizing taxation.

First, the Government’s interpretation of “regulate”

would require “regulate” to have multiple meanings in

the very provision on which the Government relies.

The Supreme Court has “never engaged in such interpretive contortion” to conclude that Congress intended

As the dissent notes, taxes can sometimes be a form of regulation. Dissent at 29-33. However, “[s]tatutory language has meaning only in context.” Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist.

v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 415 (2005). The examples the

dissent marshals all contain explicit grants of taxation authority

and thus stand for the uncontroversial principle that taxation can

sometimes have a regulatory purpose; they do not support the

broader proposition that “regulate,” in all contexts and most especially in the context of IEEPA, is interpreted to include the taxation power.

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to “giv[e] the same word, in the same statutory provision, different meanings in different factual contexts.”

United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008) (emphasis omitted). IEEPA’s grant of the power to “regulate” applies not just to “importation,” but to

any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer,

withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power,

or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving,

any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.

50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (emphases added). If the

Government’s reading of “regulate” to include adjusting

quantity through taxation is adopted, then the President

would have the power to unilaterally tax bank withdrawals or to implement a wealth tax on any foreign property

holdings. Similarly, under the Government’s interpretation, the President could “regulate . . . transportation” by taxing transportation to reduce it. Further,

reading IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate . . .

exportation” to include the ability to reduce exportation

by taxing it would render the provision unconstitutional.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. The Government’s suggestion that “it is natural to read the President’s power to

‘regulate

. . .

importation’ as encompassing the

power to impose tariffs, while reading the power to ‘regulate . . . exportation’ as excluding that power,” Appellants’ Reply Br. 9, effectively concedes that its argument requires reading “regulate” to have different

meanings in different factual contexts of the same statutory provision. We reject the Government’s proposal

that we adopt such a fluctuating construction of “regulate.”

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Second, the Government’s interpretation of “regulate” would make the President’s other authorities in

IEEPA superfluous. It is a “‘cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the

whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no

clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or

insignificant.’ ” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31

(2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174

(2001)). If the Government’s expansive reading of

“regulate” were correct, there would have been little

need for Congress to separately list, for example, the

powers to “direct and compel,” or “prevent or prohibit”

in IEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). Notably,

the power to “prevent or prohibit” any particular act of

importation (or acquisition, holding, or withdrawal) is

subsumed in a definition of “regulate” that includes no

limits on the scope of authorized restrictions. Thus, we

also reject the Government’s interpretation for allowing

the term “regulate” to render many of the remaining

listed powers superfluous.

Third, even if the Government’s reading were plausible, any delegation is far from clear. “Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive

the discretionary authority to” impose “ ‘fees’ or ‘taxes.’ ”

Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224

(1989) (quoting Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG,

Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 n.10 (1976)); see National Cable

Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341

(1974) (“It would be such a sharp break with our traditions to conclude that Congress had bestowed on a federal agency the taxing power.”). We reject the dissent’s suggestion that because IEEPA involves foreign

affairs, it must be interpreted so broadly as to include

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tariff authority. Dissent at 36.2 We are aware of no

Supreme Court case applying that proposition to read a

broad delegation of taxing authority in

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