Amicus Curiae Brief — Catharine Miller, et al., Petitioners v. Civil Rights Department

Supreme Court briefSep 29, 2025

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No. 25-233

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

CATHARINE MILLER, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT,

Respondent.

____________________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

_______________

BRIEF FOR GENERAL CONFERENCE OF

SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS AND

THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMED FORCES

AND CHAPLAINCY AS AMICI CURIAE IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

__________

CHRISTOPHER E. MILLS

Counsel of Record

Spero Law LLC

557 East Bay Street

#22251

Charleston, SC 29413

(843) 606-0640

cmills@spero.law

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Table of Authorities .....................................................ii

Interest of Amici Curiae .............................................. 1

Introduction ................................................................. 2

Summary of the Argument ......................................... 6

Reasons for Granting the Writ.................................... 7

I. The Department targeted Cathy Miller because

of her religious beliefs. ....................................... 7

A. California law is not generally applicable. .. 7

B. The Department failed to protect Cathy and

her staff from repeated threats and

discrimination. ............................................ 12

C. The Department fueled the fire of

discrimination against Cathy’s bakery. ..... 18

II. Certiorari is needed to protect the rights of

religious Americans. ........................................ 20

Conclusion.................................................................. 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

303 Creative LLC v. Elenis,

600 U.S. 570 (2023) .......................................... 20, 22

Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,

225 F.3d 1042 (CA9 2000) ..................................... 11

Comm’r v. Bosch’s Est.,

387 U.S. 456 (1967) ................................................ 12

Employment Division v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990) ............................................ 8, 12

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,

593 U.S. 522 (2021) .................................... 7, 8, 9, 12

Hollingsworth v. Perry,

570 U.S. 693 (2013) .................................................. 4

Koire v. Metro Car Wash,

707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985) .................................... 9, 10

Mahmoud v. Taylor,

145 S. Ct. 235 (2025) .............................................. 20

Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson,

640 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1982) .............................. 9, 10, 11

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civ. Rts. Comm’n,

584 U.S. 617 (2018) ................................................ 22

McClung v. Emp. Dev. Dep’t,

99 P.3d 1015 (Cal. 2004) ........................................ 11

O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass’n,

662 P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) .......................................... 9

iii

Obergefell v. Hodges,

576 U.S. 644 (2015) .......................................... 19, 20

Pines v. Tomson,

160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1984) .. 10

Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell,

499 U.S. 225 (1991) ................................................ 12

Sherbert v. Verner,

374 U.S. 398 (1963) ............................................ 8, 12

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of

New Jersey,

27 F.4th 886 (CA3 2022) ........................................ 20

Tandon v. Newsom,

593 U.S. 61 (2021) .............................................. 8, 11

STATUTES

Cal. Civ. Code § 51............................................... 10, 17

Cal. Civ. Code § 51.2.................................................. 10

Cal. Civ. Code § 51.3.................................................. 10

Cal. Civ. Code § 51.4.................................................. 10

Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7.................................................. 17

Cal. Civ. Code § 51.10................................................ 10

Cal. Civ. Code § 51.12................................................ 10

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Civil Rights Department, CA vs. Hate Resource Line

and Network, https://perma.cc/3ZWQ-8KCQ (last

visited Sept. 22, 2025)............................................ 18

Civil Rights Department, Report a Hate Incident or

Hate Crime, https://perma.cc/CZ6C-H2GM (last

visited Sept. 22, 2025)...................................... 13, 18

Matthew 22:36–3 ......................................................... 3

Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Motion for

Preliminary Injunction, DFEH v. Cathy’s

Creations, Inc., No. BCV-17-102855 (Cal. Super.

Ct. Kern Cnty. Feb. 2, 2018).................................. 19

Press Release, Civil Rights Department Files

Appellate Brief in Defense of California’s Efforts to

Enforce LGBTQ+ Civil Rights Protections (Oct. 23,

2023), https://perma.cc/WK3H-JDLJ .................... 18

Respondents’ App’x, DFEH v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc.,

109 Cal. App. 5th 204,

No. BCV-18-102633 ............................. 14, 15, 16, 17

Transcript of Trial Proceedings, DFEH v. Cathy’s

Creations, Inc., No. BCV-18-102633 (Cal. Super.

Ct. Kern Cnty. July 28, 2022)............................ 2, 19

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

The General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists

is the worldwide administrative body for the Seventhday Adventist Church, a Protestant Christian

denomination with more than 22 million members and

a longstanding commitment to religious liberty. Since

its founding, through its own programs and the work

of the International Religious Liberty Association

founded in 1893, the Adventist Church has worked to

guarantee religious liberty for all.

The Jurisdiction of the Armed Forces and

Chaplaincy endorses over 250 military chaplains. Its

endorser, Bishop Derek Jones, is a retired U.S. Air

Force officer and decorated fighter pilot who served for

27 years and helped lead development of joint military

religious affairs doctrine.

Amici have a shared commitment to defending

religious freedom under the Constitution. They also

have a strong interest in protecting free speech for

themselves and their members. *

* Under Rule 37.2, the parties’ counsel of record received timely

notice of the intent to file this brief. Under Rule 37.6, no counsel

for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person

other than amici curiae, their members, or their counsel made a

monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

INTRODUCTION

Cathy Miller is a sincere and faithful Christian

who has devoted her life to honoring God in all she

does. In her thirty years as a teacher at Christian

schools, Cathy used her God-given creative skills to

help students and teachers. Pet. 114a. Among other

things, she led worship and musicals and developed a

support system for students with academic, emotional,

or behavioral needs. Transcript of Trial Proceedings

1590, DFEH v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., No. BCV-18102633 (Cal. Super. Ct. Kern Cnty. July 28, 2022). In

2013, after she retired from teaching, Cathy and her

husband opened Cathy’s Creations, Inc. (“Tastries”), a

small bakery in Bakersfield, California. Pet. 329a.

This bakery fulfilled her dream of crafting custom

cakes and baked goods. Pet. 329a–30a.

Cathy met her husband, Mike, at a church, where

he was the youth director. Pet. 114a. After forty years

of marriage, Cathy and Mike worked together to bring

Cathy’s baking dream to life. Ibid. The mission of

Tastries is to honor God. Pet. 385a. Cathy said that

“[f]rom day one, I told my employees [that] Mike and I

have agreed that this is God’s business. I manage it,

and we work for Him.” Ibid. The trial court found that

“[t]he uncontroverted evidence showed that [Cathy’s]

sincere faith permeates her life and work and is

‘founded on God’s word.’” Pet. 115a.

The environment inside Tastries reflects this

mission, in outward appearance and in culture.

Visitors will hear Christian music playing and see the

boutique section of the bakery, which includes a wall

of crosses for sale. Pet. 384a. Cathy sees her employees

as more than a “corporate unit” and instead runs

Tastries as a “family.” Pet. 385a. At Tastries, one can

find cases of premade baked goods available for

immediate purchase, including cookies, brownies,

cupcakes, cheesecakes, eclairs, and small single-tiered

cakes. Pet. 114a, 358a. Customers can also place

custom orders for any of these items, along with larger

cakes. Pet. 114a. Approximately 70 percent of custom

orders are wedding cakes, Pet. 115a, while the rest

include cakes celebrating birthdays, quinceañeras,

anniversaries, baby showers, bachelorette parties, and

other occasions. Pet. 6a, 114a, 334a.

From the bakery’s start, Cathy has been

occasionally asked to design cakes that, as a

Christian, she could not make. Pet. 386a–87a.

Requested designs have included cakes that celebrate

divorce, glorify drunkenness or drugs, contain explicit

sexual content, display violence, or present “gory,

demonic, or satanic symbols.” Pet. 333a. Cathy

“eagerly seek[s] to serve all people, but [she] cannot

design custom cakes that express ideas or celebrate

events that conflict with [her] core religious beliefs.”

Pet. 332a. She explained that it would “violate the first

and greatest commandment if [she] were to create

custom cakes that express messages or celebrate

events that conflict with [her] love for God.” Ibid.; see

Matthew 22:36–38.

To ensure that she could operate her business with

integrity to her faith and her perspective clients,

Cathy developed “Design Standards” that apply to all

pre-ordered and custom goods:

We do not accept requests that do not meet

Tastries’ Standards of Service, including but

not limited to designs or an intended purpose

based on the following:

•

Requests portraying explicit sexual content

•

Requests promoting marijuana or casual

drug use

•

Requests featuring alcohol products or

drunkenness

•

Requests presenting anything offensive,

demeaning, or violent

•

Requests depicting gore, witches, spirits,

and satanic or demonic content

•

Requests

that

violate

fundamental

Christian principals; wedding cakes must

not contradict God’s sacrament of marriage

between a man and a woman.

Pet. 276a–77a.

Because of Cathy’s religious convictions, she has

faced relentless prosecution from the California

Department of Civil Rights. In 2017, Cathy declined to

create a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple

because of her religious beliefs about marriage. Pet.

120a–21a. When Cathy opened her bakery, California

did not allow same-sex marriages, see Hollingsworth

v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 701 (2013), yet for eight years

now the Department has sought to compel Cathy to

expressively sanction such unions or cease making

wedding cakes.

Cathy routinely serves and employs people of all

orientations without discrimination. Pet. 332a–33a.

Her sole reason for declining to create a custom

wedding cake for the same-sex couple here was rooted

in her sincere beliefs. Pet. 331a. She applies this

standard consistently, turning down custom orders—

like those celebrating divorce or depicting explicit

imagery—that clash with her Christian faith. Pet.

333a.

In several other instances, Cathy has respectfully

declined to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples,

and each couple went to a nearby bakery that Cathy

recommended. Pet. 342a–43a. Yet the Department

cannot overlook such an offense to the ideologies it

seeks to propagate. At the same time as it has pursued

a civil action against Cathy, it has turned a blind eye

to harassment, threats, violence, and business

retaliation against Cathy based on her religious

viewpoint—discrimination that the Department is

supposed to care about under California law. But it

doesn’t. The Department has provided no protection

for Cathy, an actual victim of discriminatory actions

carrying actual consequences. The Department’s

double standard reinforces its disregard of Cathy’s

First Amendment rights of expression and religious

exercise. And it emboldens those who would

discriminate against people of faith. To protect

expression and religious exercise for all people of faith,

the Court should intervene and reverse.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Though this Court has repeatedly warned state

and local governments in recent years that they

cannot discriminate against religious expression, that

is what California has done here. California’s antidiscrimination law is riddled with exceptions, the

most expansive being that it does not apply if there is

a strong public policy to the contrary. Those exceptions

mean that the law is not generally applicable, so any

burden on religious exercise or expression presumptively violates the First Amendment. Reinforcing this

lack of general applicability is the Department’s

double standard. Even as the Department pursued

Cathy, it ignored the graphic threats, actual violence,

and business cancellations against Cathy and her

bakery based on her religious views. Rather than

protect Cathy’s religious expression—purportedly

protected by the same laws the Department invoked—

the Department fanned the flames of societal hate and

violence, comparing Cathy to segregationists and

proclaiming her beliefs to be outdated.

Intervention by this Court is necessary to protect

the rights of religious Americans, especially given the

repeated refusals by state bodies to follow this Court’s

precedents. The Department put Cathy to the choice

of abandoning her beliefs, using employees to violate

her beliefs, or stopping wedding cake sales. But this

Court has repeatedly vindicated the rights of people of

faith to live and work in American society, even when

their beliefs on issues like marriage depart from

government orthodoxy. This Court should again grant

certiorari to protect the rights of religious expression.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Department targeted Cathy

because of her religious beliefs.

Miller

California’s antidiscrimination law includes

significant exceptions that undercut any assertion

that the law is generally applicable. The law exempts

practically any discriminatory conduct that is

supported by a strong public policy. But the

Department and the court below refused to recognize

that Cathy Miller has the strongest of policy reasons

here: her rights to express her religious beliefs are

protected by not one but two parts of the First

Amendment. The Department has dragged Cathy

through eight years of investigation and litigation. At

the same time, it has refused to protect Cathy from the

deluge of government-encouraged harassment and

violence that Cathy and her staff have endured. Since

this case began, Cathy’s bakery and her employees

have been subject to recurring graphic threats of

violence, actual violence, and business cancellations

because of Cathy’s religious beliefs. And the

Department has done nothing to protect her. To the

contrary, it has repeatedly issued public statements

that foster this hate and violence. All this underscores

that California law cannot be considered neutral or

generally applicable.

A. California law is not generally applicable.

State action that burdens religious exercise is

presumptively unlawful and must satisfy strict

scrutiny if it is not neutral or generally applicable.

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 533, 541

(2021). State action is “not generally applicable” (1) “if

it invites the government to consider the particular

reasons for a person’s conduct by providing a

mechanism for individualized exemptions” or (2) “if it

prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular

conduct that undermines the government’s asserted

interests in a similar way.” Id. at 533–34 (cleaned up).

For both categories, “underinclusiveness” means that

the law is “not generally applicable.” Id. at 534.

An example of the first category is Sherbert v.

Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), which involved “a

Seventh-day Adventist [who] was fired because she

would not work on Saturdays.” Fulton, 593 U.S. at

533. “Unable to find a job that would allow her to keep

the Sabbath as her faith required, she applied for

unemployment benefits,” but “[t]he State denied her

application under a law prohibiting eligibility to

claimants who had ‘failed, without good cause . . . to

accept available suitable work.’” Ibid. In Employment

Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990), this Court

“explained that the unemployment benefits law in

Sherbert was not generally applicable because the

‘good cause’ standard permitted the government to

grant exemptions based on the circumstances

underlying each application.” Fulton, 593 U.S. at 534.

The second category of underinclusiveness

includes cases like Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61

(2021), which involved California imposing COVID

regulations that “treat[ed] some comparable secular

activities more favorably than” “religious exercise.” Id.

at 63. The State “permitt[ed] hair salons, retail stores,

personal care services, movie theaters, private suites

at sporting events and concerts, and indoor

restaurants to bring together more than three

households at a time”—but did not permit the same

for religious gatherings. Ibid. This Court held that

“whether two activities are comparable for purposes of

the Free Exercise Clause must be judged against the

asserted government interest that justifies the

regulation at issue.” Id. at 62.

California’s law here flunks under both categories.

First, it “invites the government to consider the

particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing

a mechanism for individualized exemptions.” Fulton,

593 U.S. at 533. In particular, “certain types of

discrimination have been denominated ‘reasonable’

and, therefore, not arbitrary”—and not within the

scope of California’s antidiscrimination law. Koire v.

Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195, 197 (Cal. 1985).

“[D]iscrimination is not arbitrary,” according to

California law, when “it is based on a ‘compelling

societal interest.’” Id. at 198.

So California requires a case-by-case determination, considering among other things “the nature of

the business enterprise and of the facilities provided.”

O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass’n, 662 P.2d 427,

429 (Cal. 1983). “[B]ars, adult book stores and senior

citizens homes” can discriminate based on age, ibid.,

because of generalized “public policy” notions. Marina

Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 640 P.2d 115, 128 (Cal. 1982).

Such public policy has been discovered in a

hodgepodge of semi-related statutes (including from

other States), task force reports, legislative hearings,

and social science research. See id. at 127–28 & n.10;

see also Pet. 44a. But when California takes a dimmer

view of the policy underscoring a business’s

classification—say, when the publisher of the

“Christian Yellow Pages” tries to exercise speech and

religion rights by limiting inclusion to Christian

businesses—the State will wave away the First

Amendment’s (actual) policy as a “constitutional

argument in disguise” and insist on prioritizing “the

government’s ‘compelling interest in eradicating

discrimination in all forms.’” Koire, 707 P.2d at 198 n.8

(cleaned up) (quoting Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App.

3d 370, 387, 391, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 876, 879 (1984)).

This underinclusiveness means California law is not

generally applicable.

Second, as just identified, California claims a

government interest in antidiscrimination. The above

exceptions undermine that interest by allowing

businesses to engage in otherwise-unlawful

discrimination for secular reasons. California finds

secular rationales as expressed by sources like a state

Committee on Aging’s Hearings on Condominium

Conversions to overcome its supposedly compelling

interest in antidiscrimination. See Marina Point, 640

P.2d at 128 n.10. Plus, California’s statute expressly

provides for other exemptions. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code

§ 51(c) (“This section shall not be construed to confer

any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned

or limited by law . . .”); id. §§ 51.2–51.4, 51.10–51.12

(allowing age discrimination in several contexts). But

it backhands the right of religious expression

guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution as a “disguise”

that cannot overcome a suddenly very compelling

interest in antidiscrimination. Koire, 707 P.2d at 198;

see Pet. 43a–46a. Put aside the State’s curious method

of ascertaining important interests, though the results

of that method suggest some hostility toward religion.

The point is that California gives secular exceptions

but refuses to allow people of faith, like Cathy, to make

business decisions for religious reasons. That squarely

violates Tandon.

The decision below suggested that California only

gives exceptions to classifications not listed in the

statute. Pet. 87a. Not so. First, California law does not

treat unenumerated classifications any differently

from enumerated ones: “The listing of possible bases

of discrimination has no legal effect, but is merely

illustrative.” Marina Point, 640 P.2d at 123; see id. at

116–17.

Second,

even

the

decision

below

acknowledged that there are cases sanctioning secular

exceptions involving an enumerated classification.

Pet. 45a (citing Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins.

Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1050 (CA9 2000), which involved

disability).

The decision below also suggested that California

law has no “formalized system of discretionary,

individualized exemptions,” seemingly because the

public policy exceptions discussed above are in

decisional law rather than the statute. Pet. 89a. But

States cannot evade the First Amendment’s

guarantees by passing broad statutes and secreting

exceptions away in either administrative regulations

or court decisions. California decisional law provides a

binding interpretation of the statute—binding on both

enforcement authorities like the Department and

businesses—so exceptions within that decisional law

are just as much part of state law as what’s written in

the statute. See McClung v. Emp. Dev. Dep’t, 99 P.3d

1015, 1019 (Cal. 2004) (“[I]t is the duty of this court,

when a question of law is properly presented, to state

the true meaning of the statute finally and

conclusively.” (cleaned up)); see also Salve Regina

Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 227 (1991) (“state law is

to be determined . . . in accordance with the applicable

principles for determining state law” (cleaned up));

Comm’r v. Bosch’s Est., 387 U.S. 456, 464 (1967)

(“judicial decisions are ‘laws of the state’” (cleaned

up)).

This point is confirmed by Sherbert. As discussed,

Fulton and Smith both looked to Sherbert on the issue

of secular exceptions, and Sherbert found such an

exception in a broad statutory phrase (“good cause”)

that had been liquidated by court decisions. See

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402 n.4 (considering “the

statute” and “decisions” that “construe[] the statute”);

see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (noting that Sherbert

“read[] state unemployment compensation law” to find

relevant exceptions).

Thus, the California law applied here to Cathy’s

bakery is not generally applicable because it treats at

least some secular actions more favorably than

religious exercise.

B. The Department failed to protect Cathy

and her staff from repeated threats and

discrimination.

Reinforcing that California law is not generally

applicable is the double standard that the Department

has used in enforcing the law. It has ceaselessly come

after Cathy and her bakery. But when Cathy and her

staff have been subjected to the very hate and

discrimination that the Department claims to oppose,

it has done nothing.

The Department defines a hate incident as “a

hostile expression or action motivated by bias against

a person’s actual or perceived identity,” including

based on religion, and it has a mandate to assist

victims of hate in filing complaints. 1 Beginning just

hours after Cathy declined to produce the custom cake

at issue, a deluge of hate incidents occurred against

Cathy and her staff—all ignored by the Department.

Take one early example. A young female employee

answered a bakery phone call, and the putative

customer sought to email photos of cake design ideas;

the employee expected a routine order. Pet. 346a.

Instead, the caller sent a photo of two naked men

engaged in a pornographic act, startling the employee.

Ibid. Apparently some form of malware, the photo took

over the computer screen and could not be removed

without printing it. Ibid.

“Violent threats, acts of violence and retaliation”

continued from there. Pet. 361a. An anonymous man

repeatedly called the bakery, threatening violence and

bringing young female employees to tears. Pet. 347a.

After Cathy contacted the police—who briefly

responded and then left the bakery—the caller

resumed, implying that he was watching the bakery.

Ibid. Many other emails and phone calls threatened

violence. Supposed customers “would come in and

make a scene” and have to be escorted out by the

police. Pet. 361a–62a. Fake reviews undermined the

bakery’s reputation. Pet. 381a–82a.

1 Civil Rights Department, Report a Hate Incident or Hate Crime,

https://perma.cc/CZ6C-H2GM (last visited Sept. 22, 2025).

The threats escalated on the night before the

preliminary injunction hearing in this case, when

someone broke into Cathy’s car and stole her laptop.

See Pet. 347a. That same night, a man assaulted one

of Cathy’s employees, even referencing the case during

the attack. Ibid. Though Cathy reported these crimes

to the police and notified the Department, no

prosecutions have apparently resulted.

The Department was also aware that numerous

corporate clients terminated contracts with Cathy due

to her religious beliefs, even though California law

explicitly prohibits businesses from refusing contracts

based on religious convictions. Pet. 14a, 403a. These

corporate clients held “huge” accounts at Tastries, and

the loss of their business was significant. Pet. 14a,

403.

Public comments and private messages on the

bakery’s and Cathy’s social media accounts reveal

more than mere disagreement with her beliefs. Cathy

faced extreme violence and profanity. One social

media user wrote:

Respondents’ App’x 0234, DFEH v. Cathy’s Creations,

Inc., 109 Cal. App. 5th 204, No. BCV-18-102633

(unredacted versions available in original).

Another posted:

Id. at 0228 (the last line is the abbreviation for the

Queer Insurrection and Liberation Army).

This user also threatened:

Id. at 0235.

Another user commented:

Id. at 0252. Yet another wrote:

Id. at 0223.

One person sent multiple violent threats, including

one (the last below) via private message:

Id. at 0237, 0240–41.

These represent just a small fraction of the threats

targeting Cathy, Tastries, and its staff. The

Department’s lawyers were informed about these

threats. See Pet. 346a–48a. Yet the Department never

offered resources or assistance to Cathy and

Tastries—resources that they would have offered

other Californians who were victims of violent threats

based on hate. And the Department never tried to

protect Cathy’s right to be free from discrimination

based on religious belief. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 51.7. 2

2 The

Department’s website offers “community-specific” hyperlinks for racial, gender, age, and disability groups, including a

C. The Department fueled the fire of

discrimination against Cathy’s bakery.

Far from protecting Cathy from discrimination,

hate, and violence, the Department has targeted her

with ongoing prosecution and public statements that

vilify her and Tastries—thereby amplifying public

threats. After a five-day trial on the merits, the

Superior Court found that the Department “failed to

prove that [Cathy] intentionally discriminated against

[the couple] because of their sexual orientation,” and

instead that “[t]he evidence affirmatively showed that

Miller’s only intent, her only motivation, was fidelity

to her sincere Christian beliefs.” Pet. 125a (emphasis

added). Yet the Department continued its pursuit of

Cathy through appeals and hostile public statements.

Repeatedly, the Department has characterized Cathy

as a bigoted person with discredited beliefs.

In a press release about the case against Cathy and

Tastries, the Department’s Acting Director Mary

Wheat characterized Cathy’s Christian beliefs as

outdated and sanctionable: “In California, we refuse to

stand down and let others roll back the clock on

fundamental

civil

rights

protections.” 3

The

Department called for citizens to “work with us in

page titled “Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, and Jewish communities,”

which leads to “Resource Links: Religion.” Report a Hate

Incident, supra note 1. The Department provides no similar

resources for Christians. Civil Rights Department, CA vs. Hate

Resource Line and Network, https://perma.cc/3ZWQ-8KCQ (last

visited Sept. 22, 2025).

3 Press Release, Civil Rights Department Files Appellate Brief in

Defense of California’s Efforts to Enforce LGBTQ+ Civil Rights

Protections (Oct. 23, 2023), https://perma.cc/WK3H-JDLJ.

fighting for your rights.” 4 The Department has also

compared Cathy’s refusal to make certain custom

cakes to the Heart of Atlanta Motel’s refusal to serve

black patrons. 5 The Department asserted that if the

court did not enjoin Cathy from continuing to operate

Tastries with her Christian convictions, “an entire

population [would be subjected] to the continuing

indignity of discrimination” “oppressive in its

consequences.” 6 The Department also claimed that

Cathy’s beliefs “harm[] the dignity of all Californians.”

Pet. 95a.

Before the Department sought a temporary

restraining order against Cathy and Tastries for these

beliefs, there was no investigation of Cathy or her

employees about their practices in the business or

beliefs, or even an interview. Transcript of Trial

Proceedings, supra, at 1649. The Department instead

relentlessly prosecuted Cathy, while leaving her

entirely unprotected from harassment and violence

directed at her based on her sincere religious beliefs—

fueled by the Department’s own statements. See

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 712 (2015)

(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “assaults on

the character of fair-minded people will have an effect,

in society and in court”). The Department’s actions

leveraged intense government and societal pressure

on Cathy to cave and abandon her religious

expression. “One might suspect that [wa]s the whole

4 Ibid.

5 See

Petitioner’s Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary

Injunction 10, DFEH v. Cathy’s Creations, Inc., No. BCV-17102855 (Cal. Super. Ct. Kern Cnty. Feb. 2, 2018).

6 Ibid.

point.” Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of

New Jersey, 27 F.4th 886, 897 (CA3 2022) (Matey, J.,

concurring).

Cathy’s beliefs are shared by millions of Americans

today, who “advocate with utmost, sincere conviction

that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should

not be condoned.” Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332,

2353 (2025) (quoting Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 679). This

Court has promised that they “may continue to”

express themselves “based on [these] decent and

honorable religious or philosophical premises.

Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672, 679. After all, the First

Amendment’s “protections belong to all, including to

speakers whose motives others may find misinformed

or offensive.” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 600 U.S. 570,

595 (2023). The Department’s double-standard here—

committing thousands of hours to prosecuting Cathy

for a cake easily obtained elsewhere while ignoring

harassment and violence against Cathy for her

religious beliefs—contradicts this guarantee.

II. Certiorari is needed to protect the rights of

religious Americans.

The danger of the decision below—like other

decisions that this Court has needed to address—is

that religious people like Cathy will be unable to run

a business or express themselves in accord with their

sincere beliefs when these beliefs conflict with a state

or local government’s ideology. Their faith must be, as

the trial court put it, “buried and paved over.” Pet.

134a. The Department acknowledged that Cathy has

sincere Christian beliefs but presented Cathy with

three untenable options: (1) sell all cakes for all events

to everyone, ignoring her faith; (2) stop selling

wedding cakes entirely; or (3) have employees create

cakes that violate her religious and design standards.

Pet. 133a. These options contradict the Department’s

claim of neutrality and effectively box Cathy into

abandoning either her beliefs or her livelihood. The

trial court, ruling in Cathy’s favor, found that these

options substantially burden her free exercise of

religion, showing “blunt force rigidity” and a lack of

sensitivity to her sincere Christian convictions. Ibid.

The Department’s first option, requiring Cathy to

sell all goods to all customers, disregards Cathy’s

objection to participating in same-sex marriage

celebrations, effectively burying her Christian faith by

mandate of the government. See Pet. 134a. The second

option, ceasing wedding cake sales, would devastate

Tastries, which relies on wedding cakes for 25–30% of

its revenue. Ibid. The third option, having Cathy “step

aside” to let employees handle orders that directly

oppose Cathy’s beliefs and design standards, is

impractical for a small business in which Cathy

personally oversees every wedding cake’s design and

ignores Cathy’s religious objections as the owner and

leader of her business. Pet. 134a–35a.

The appellate court’s decision below signals that

religious business owners must either conform to

state-imposed standards of morality and belief,

abandon much of their business, or delegate their craft

against their conscience, effectively stripping them of

their ability to maintain faithful convictions as

business leaders. Cathy serves and employs

individuals of all identities without issue. At the same

time, she will not compromise her deeply-held beliefs

about marriage—again, beliefs shared by many faiths.

These beliefs are sincere and respectable, and this

Court has affirmed that they are protected by the First

Amendment. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civ.

Rts. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 631–32 (2018).

But lower courts continue to resist this Court’s

repeated efforts to protect the right of religious

believers to live and work in modern society

consistently with their faith. The decision below is

another manifestation of that unrelenting hostility

toward religious exercise, a hostility that threatens all

believers—and anyone else who seeks to express

themselves in a way that may deviate from the

government’s orthodoxy. Allowing the Department to

penalize Cathy for her faith would embolden further

local and state government overreach, leaving

religious people vulnerable to coercion and unable to

live out their convictions through their work. The

government may not “coerce an individual to speak

contrary to her beliefs on a significant issue of

personal conviction . . . to eliminate ideas that differ

from its own.” 303 Creative, 600 U.S. at 598. Certiorari

is urgently needed.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court should grant the

petition.

Respectfully submitted,