Reply Brief — T. M., Petitioner v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, et al.

No. 25-197

In the Supreme Court of the United States

T.M., PETITIONER

v.

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

RAY M. SHEPARD

SHEPARD LAW FIRM

122 Riviera Drive

Pasadena, MD 21122

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM T. MARKS

ANNA J. LUCARDI

MATTHEW J. DISLER

MIKAELA MILLIGAN

KRISTA A. STAPLEFORD

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. The Court has applied the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine only to the final decisions of state

courts of last resort .................................................................. 3

B. Extending the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

to non-final state-court decisions is inconsistent

with the doctrine’s statutory basis......................................... 6

C. There are compelling practical reasons

not to expand the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to non-final state-court decisions ......................... 16

D. In the alternative, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

should be overruled................................................................ 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206 (11th Cir. 2021) .................. 8

Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U.S. 501 (1899) .............................. 12

Bowe v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 447 (2026) ...................... 14

Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc.,

538 U.S. 691 (2003) ............................................................ 14

Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118 (2022) ............................. 5

Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) .............................. 14

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) ............ 10

Colorado River Water Conservation District

v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) ............................. 14

Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl,

575 U.S. 1 (2015) ................................................................ 10

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ...................... 1-11, 15-22

Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503 (1876) .................................. 11

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) ...................... 1-8, 12, 13, 17, 20

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) .......................................... 13

Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) ........................... 13, 15

Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943)............ 14

(I)

II

Page

Cases—continued:

Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human

Services, 111 F.4th 754 (7th Cir. 2024),

cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1167 (2025) ................................... 9

Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)........................... 10

Holmes v. Trout, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 171 (1833) ...................... 10

HPIL Holding, Inc. v. Zhang, No. 25-1595,

2026 WL 636728 (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2026) ........................ 17

Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62 (2d Cir. 2023) ................. 9

Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U.S. 668 (1900) ................. 11, 12

Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,

513 U.S. 374 (1995) .............................................................. 9

Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions

Group, Inc., 590 U.S. 405 (2020) ..................................... 18

Ortiz v. United States, 585 U.S. 427 (2018) .................... 9, 10

Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,

474 U.S. 518 (1986) ............................................................ 10

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923) ............................................. 1-12, 15-22

Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger,

604 U.S. 22 (2025) .............................................................. 14

Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975) ............... 13

Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022) ............................... 15

Simon v. Southern Railway Co.,

236 U.S. 115 (1915) ...................................................... 11, 16

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) ................................ 6

Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274 (1924) .................................... 11

United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) ............................. 10

VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,

951 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2020) ............................................... 7

Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service

Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635 (2002) ... 7, 8, 12

Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175 (1920) ............. 11

Statutes and rule:

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82 ................ 14

25 U.S.C. § 1914 ...................................................................... 14

III

Page

Statutes and rule—continued:

28 U.S.C. ch. 85 ....................................................................... 13

28 U.S.C. § 1257 ..................................... 1-4, 6-9, 11, 15, 19, 20

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ............................................................... 6, 8

28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................ 6-8, 14, 16

28 U.S.C. § 1332 ................................................................ 14, 16

Fed. R. App. P. 10 .................................................................. 10

Miscellaneous:

Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982)................. 17, 18

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 25-197

T.M., PETITIONER

v.

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION, ET AL.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONER

This Court has dismissed claims under the RookerFeldman doctrine only twice: in Rooker and in Feldman.

See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462 (1983). In both cases, the plaintiffs had sought federal

relief from a judgment of a state court of last resort after

the state litigation had ended. When lower courts began

to expand Rooker-Feldman beyond those limited circumstances, this Court intervened. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the

Court attempted to return the doctrine to its original

scope and root it in a negative inference from the Court’s

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257.

(1)

2

So understood, Rooker-Feldman does not properly

apply to a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court. Because this Court would not

have jurisdiction over such a decision under Section 1257,

there is no basis for drawing a negative inference from

that statute to limit the jurisdiction a district court would

otherwise have to entertain an action challenging that decision. Expanding Rooker-Feldman to the circumstances

here would undermine this Court’s longstanding efforts to

make jurisdictional rules simple. And for no good reason.

Other legal doctrines already do the work that RookerFeldman does, without the complications that come with

a jurisdictional label.

Swimming against the tide of Exxon Mobil, respondents seek to expand Rooker-Feldman despite the confusion the doctrine has long caused in the lower courts. In

the process, respondents attempt to separate the doctrine

from its statutory basis in Section 1257 and instead

ground it entirely in an amorphous distinction between

“original” and “appellate” jurisdiction.

That effort is deeply flawed. The distinction between

original and appellate jurisdiction can neither explain

Rooker-Feldman nor sustain the doctrine going forward.

A plaintiff who files suit in federal district court asserting

a freestanding cause of action seeking relief from a statecourt judgment invokes the district court’s original jurisdiction, not forbidden appellate jurisdiction. Respondents

contend that Rooker-Feldman should nevertheless apply

because the action would seek the functional equivalent

of the relief available in an appeal. But that approach

would contravene this Court’s efforts to ensure that jurisdictional rules are clear and easy to administer. And it

would make the application of Rooker-Feldman turn on

an inquiry that respondents concede has confounded the

lower courts for decades.

3

Respondents contend that their rule remains necessary to avoid a system in which lower federal courts wield

their original jurisdiction effectively to exercise appellate

review of state-court decisions. But the simple answer to

that concern is preclusion. As courts and commentators

have recognized, preclusion prevents federal-court interference with state-court judgments wherever RookerFeldman does not apply. And far from infringing on the

States’ sovereignty, reliance on preclusion allows States

to decide for themselves the effect of their own judgments

through the development of state preclusion law. Respondents fail to explain why a federal jurisdictional doctrine is necessary where non-jurisdictional state-law doctrines such as preclusion already suffice.

In the end, petitioner’s position provides the Court

with a simple approach that has at least some footing in

the relevant statutory text. Because this Court would lack

jurisdiction under Section 1257 over a state-court decision

that remains subject to further review in state court,

Rooker-Feldman should not apply. And if the Court were

to conclude otherwise, it should consider eliminating the

doctrine altogether. Whichever path the Court takes, the

judgment below should be reversed.

A. The Court Has Applied The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Only To The Final Decisions Of State Courts Of Last

Resort

In the century since it decided Rooker, the Court has

treated Rooker’s jurisdictional holding as exceedingly

narrow. In Rooker’s first sixty years, the Court so much

as cited the decision only once. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S.

at 288 n.3. And when the Court revived Rooker in Feldman, the Court applied Rooker’s jurisdictional holding

only in the same narrow circumstances: to a party asking

a federal court for relief from an adverse judgment of a

4

state court of last resort that terminated the state litigation. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476. After Feldman, however, Rooker’s jurisdictional principle developed a name

and a life of its own, with lower courts extending the newly

minted Rooker-Feldman doctrine “far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases.” Exxon Mobil,

544 U.S. at 283; see Pet. Br. 7-8.

In Exxon Mobil, this Court—to borrow respondents’

words—“ordered a course correction.” Br. 16. It made

clear that Rooker-Feldman is “confined to cases of the

kind from which the doctrine acquired its name.” Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. It observed that, in both Rooker

and Feldman, “the losing party in state court filed suit in

federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and

seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Id. at

291. And it rooted the doctrine in Section 1257, explaining

that Rooker-Feldman arises from the “limited circumstances” in which Section 1257 deprives a district court of

jurisdiction over a case the court would “otherwise be empowered to adjudicate” under a statutory grant of original

jurisdiction. Ibid.

All of this is seemingly common ground. Respondents

do not contest the limited role that Rooker-Feldman has

played in this Court’s precedents. And respondents do

not dispute that the cases from which Rooker-Feldman

“acquired its name” involved federal claims filed in district court “after the state proceedings ended.” Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 291.

Instead, respondents boldly attempt to suggest that

Exxon Mobil resolved the question presented in their favor. They read one sentence from Exxon Mobil’s introduction as establishing “four enumerated elements” that,

if satisfied, trigger application of the doctrine. Br. 19.

Based on that sentence, respondents charge petitioner

5

with introducing a “stealth fifth element” beyond Exxon

Mobil’s four. Br. 20.

There are two problems with that argument. First, it

falls into the trap of reading an opinion like a statute. See,

e.g., Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 141 (2022). And

even in the spotlighted sentence, the Court did not purport to “enumerate[]” the specific elements that would

govern every Rooker-Feldman case in perpetuity; it is respondents who are attempting to impose that overlay on

the Court’s opinion. See Br. 17 (adding numbers to the

relevant sentence in an effort to create “elements”). Second, even if respondents were correct that Exxon Mobil

established specific elements governing the application of

Rooker-Feldman across all cases, petitioner’s position

would not require the creation of an additional element.

It would merely require the Court to read the reference

to “state-court judgments” in those purported elements to

refer to state-court judgments that do not remain subject

to further review in state court.

As respondents implicitly recognize (Br. 16-17, 21, 22),

Exxon Mobil simply did not resolve the question whether

Rooker-Feldman can be triggered by a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court.

Instead, the real question here is which party’s position is

more consistent with the Court’s reset of the RookerFeldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil.

The answer is clearly petitioner’s. Respondents’ position represents an extension of Rooker-Feldman far beyond the narrow fact pattern of Rooker and Feldman.

And contrary to respondents’ suggestion, the Court’s discussion of finality in Exxon Mobil was not drawn merely

from the opinion’s introduction or its “recitation” of

“Rooker’s and Feldman’s procedural histories,” Br. 19-20,

but from the portion of the opinion where the Court

turned to analyze the question presented in earnest. See

6

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291; see also Skinner v. Switzer,

562 U.S. 521, 531 (2011) (reiterating that Rooker and Feldman involved federal actions filed “after the state proceedings ended”).

In any event, the most important aspect of Exxon Mobil is that it rooted Rooker-Feldman in a negative inference from this Court’s jurisdiction under Section 1257,

which operates as a limitation on a district court’s original

jurisdiction under statutes such as 28 U.S.C. 1331. See

Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. Petitioner’s position flows

directly from that understanding of Rooker-Feldman.

Respondents’ contravenes it.

B. Extending The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine To Non-Final State-Court Decisions Is Inconsistent With The

Doctrine’s Statutory Basis

Section 1257 grants this Court jurisdiction over

“[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had.” 28

U.S.C. 1257(a). As petitioner has explained (Br. 28-32),

the most natural negative inference that can be drawn

from that statute (if any) is that a federal district court

cannot exercise jurisdiction over a final judgment of a

state court of last resort. Respondents’ position would require a much broader inference: namely, that Congress

intended to deprive district courts of jurisdiction even

where Section 1257 does not grant jurisdiction to this

Court. That sweeping limitation cannot be inferred from

Section 1257.

Perhaps recognizing as much, respondents attempt to

downplay the role of Section 1257 and instead ground

Rooker-Feldman in the fact that, in statutes such as Section 1331, Congress conferred only “original jurisdiction,”

and not appellate jurisdiction, on the district courts. See

Br. 13-17, 24-25. In respondents’ view, even where a

7

state-court decision remains subject to further review in

state court, a federal action seeking to prevent the enforcement of the state judgment requires the exercise of

appellate jurisdiction and thus triggers Rooker-Feldman.

That argument does not withstand scrutiny.

1. To begin with, respondents’ reconceptualization of

Rooker-Feldman renders Section 1257 irrelevant to the

doctrine. To be sure, respondents suggest that Section

1257 “buttresses th[e] conclusion” that an action that triggers Rooker-Feldman falls outside a district court’s original jurisdiction. Br. 21. But if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine rests on the proposition that actions that trigger the

doctrine are inherently outside a district court’s original

jurisdiction, Section 1257 would be superfluous; the text

of statutes such as Section 1331 would do all the work necessary to justify the doctrine.

That position is difficult to square with Exxon Mobil.

As already noted, the Court there made clear that

Rooker-Feldman applies in the “limited circumstances”

where this Court’s “appellate jurisdiction over state-court

judgments” under Section 1257 precludes a district court

from “exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action

it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate.” Exxon

Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. In light of Exxon Mobil, one prominent judge has even suggested that Rooker-Feldman be

renamed “the 1257 Rule” or “the Supreme Court review

rule,” because “[e]ach step away from the statute that justifies the rule creates exponential risks of expansion and

confusion.” VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,

951 F.3d 397, 409 (6th Cir. 2020) (Sutton, J., concurring).

Yet respondents would make Section 1257 wholly unnecessary to the doctrine.

Respondents emphasize (Br. 21) that, in Exxon Mobil,

the Court quoted a footnote from Verizon Maryland, Inc.

v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635,

8

644 n.3 (2002), stating that “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of

original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts

to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court, see

§ 1257(a).” The quoted language appears only in a parenthetical. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. And if anything, it confirms that Section 1257 is the foundation for

Rooker-Feldman: Section 1257 “reserve[s]” to this Court

the authority to review final state-court judgments,

thereby depriving a district court of the ability to do so

under the original jurisdiction it might otherwise have.

See CAC Br. 19-23.

Respondents separately contend (Br. 25) that a footnote in Feldman “directly foreclose[d]” the argument that

the scope of Rooker-Feldman is tied to the scope of this

Court’s jurisdiction under Section 1257. Br. 25. That is

wrong. In the footnote, the Court expressed disapproval

of a lower-court decision that had held that a district court

could exercise jurisdiction over a claim seeking review of

a state-court judgment on constitutional grounds the

plaintiff had failed to raise in state court. See Feldman,

460 U.S. at 482 n.16. The Court proceeded to suggest that

a district court would lack jurisdiction over any claim that

was “inextricably intertwined” with a state-court judgment. Ibid.

That footnote is dictum at best, and in any event is far

too feeble to provide the theoretical footing respondents

seek for their argument. Its reference to an “inextricably

intertwined” standard “spawned endless confusion” before Exxon Mobil, resulting in “many mistaken RookerFeldman dismissals.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206,

1211 (11th Cir. 2021). Notably, the Court in Exxon Mobil

did not rely on the “inextricably intertwined” standard;

taking this Court’s signal, lower courts proceeded to

9

retreat from it. See Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 72

& n.13 (2d Cir. 2023); Gilbank v. Wood County Department of Human Services, 111 F.4th 754, 767 n.5 (7th Cir.

2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1167 (2025). And on top of

all of that, the footnote’s reasoning turned in part on “policy grounds” concerning why a plaintiff who failed to preserve his claims in state court should be treated as having

“forfeit[ed] his right to obtain review of the state-court decision in any federal court.” Feldman, 460 U.S. at 484

n.16. The footnote thus cannot support decoupling

Rooker-Feldman from Section 1257 entirely.

2. Aside from rendering Section 1257 irrelevant to

Rooker-Feldman, respondents’ argument that RookerFeldman arises from the distinction between original and

appellate jurisdiction (Br. 32-35) fails on its own terms.*

a. As respondents recognize (Br. 14, 28), the “essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction” is that it “revises

and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted.” Ortiz v. United States, 585 U.S. 427, 436 (2018)

(citation omitted). But a complaint asserting a freestanding cause of action, asking a federal district court to prevent the enforcement of a state-court judgment, does not

satisfy that definition. A federal complaint bringing a new

cause of action commences a “cause,” instead of continuRespondents assert (Br. 27-28) that the question presented does

not encompass the argument that a district court’s original jurisdiction extends to a case in which the plaintiff is asserting a freestanding

cause of action seeking to prevent the enforcement of a state-court

judgment. But as this Court has long explained, “[o]nce a federal

claim is properly presented, a party can make any argument in support of that claim.” Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,

513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995) (citation omitted; alteration in original). In

any event, it was respondents that first drew the distinction between

original and appellate jurisdiction in defense of the judgment below.

See Br. in Opp. 26-28. Now that respondents have raised the argument, surely petitioner is entitled to respond.

*

10

ing “proceedings” that were “already instituted.” Ibid.

And such a complaint does not ask the district court to

“revise” or “correct” the state-court decision; it leaves the

judgment in place but simply prevents the judgment

holder from enforcing it.

Such a federal case lacks other hallmarks of appellate

jurisdiction, too. For example, the federal suit does not

“remove[] the record into the supervising tribunal.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 410 (1821). The

district court entertaining the cause of action can receive

new evidence, whereas a court exercising appellate jurisdiction ordinarily cannot. See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 10;

United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76, 83-84 (1894); Holmes v.

Trout, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 171, 210 (1833). And most notably,

preclusion would apply in a new action challenging an earlier judgment, see, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 523 (1986), whereas it obviously

would not apply in an appeal of the judgment.

Respondents seemingly concede (Br. 28-29) that suits

such as petitioner’s are not truly requests for appellate

review of a state-court judgment. Instead, respondents

contend that, because a party should not be permitted to

do “indirectly” what it cannot do “directly,” a losing party

in state court should not be allowed to seek “what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment

under the guise of an original action in federal district

court.” Br. 28 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

That concession gives away the game. For decades,

the Court has made significant efforts to ensure that jurisdictional rules are “clear” and “straightforward” to administer. See Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl, 575

U.S. 1, 14 (2015); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94

(2010); Pet. Br. 38-39. But respondents are asking the

Court to ground Rooker-Feldman entirely in the distinc-

11

tion between original and appellate jurisdiction, while acknowledging that the typical action understood to trigger

Rooker-Feldman is not really an appeal at all, but rather

an original action seeking relief that is functionally similar to the relief available on appeal.

Worse still, respondents recognize (Br. 36) that the aspect of Rooker-Feldman that has most confounded the

lower courts is the question whether a particular form of

requested relief constitutes “review and rejection” of a

state-court judgment. Respondents are thus asking the

Court to decouple Rooker-Feldman from Section 1257

and hitch it entirely to a distinction that has sowed confusion in the lower courts since Feldman resurrected

Rooker. See, e.g., IJ Br. 5-6. Far from bringing clarity to

the doctrine, respondents’ proposed expansion will perpetuate the problems that have plagued it.

b. As petitioner has explained (Br. 32-35), the better

way to understand a federal claim that seeks to prevent

the enforcement of a state-court judgment is not as an invocation of appellate jurisdiction, but rather as a collateral

attack that invokes a district court’s original jurisdiction.

Respondents’ contrary arguments are unpersuasive.

Respondents first argue (Br. 32) that district courts

lack original jurisdiction over collateral attacks on statecourt judgments. But that contradicts the long tradition

of lower federal courts sitting in equity entertaining bills

to enjoin the enforcement of state-court judgments. See,

e.g., Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 275, 278 (1924); Wells

Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 183-186 (1920); Simon v. Southern Railway Co., 236 U.S. 115, 124-125, 128

(1915); Huntington v. Laidley, 176 U.S. 668, 678-679

(1900); compare Resp. Br. 32-33 (contending that Earle v.

McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503 (1876), did not involve a federal suit

“directly challenging a state-court judgment”), with

Earle, 91 U.S. at 507 (entertaining a bill of complaint re-

12

moved to federal court that was seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a state-court judgment).

Respondents also assert that petitioner’s suit does not

constitute a collateral attack because it seeks to “void” the

state-court judgment—something respondents say involves “appellate review.” Br. 33. But petitioner requested declaratory relief and an injunction preventing

respondents, the state-court judgment holders, from enforcing the consent decree, on the ground that it was void.

See J.A. 46. As just explained, federal courts have long

entertained such collateral attacks. While respondents

contend that the Court “has repeatedly described requests for federal courts to declare state-court judgments

‘void’ as requiring the exercise of appellate jurisdiction,”

none of the decisions they cite stands for that absolute

proposition. See Br. 27 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at

292; Verizon, 535 U.S. at 644 n.3; and Rooker, 263 U.S. at

416).

Indeed, even in Rooker, the Court acknowledged that

the plaintiffs could have brought a collateral attack requesting that the state-court judgment be “declared null

and void” on the ground that it was “given without jurisdiction.” 263 U.S. at 414, 416. To be sure, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ voidness arguments as a “mistaken

characterization,” because their bill was “merely an attempt to get rid of the judgment for alleged errors of law

committed in the exercise of that jurisdiction.” Id. at 416.

But the Court failed to explain why that difference in substantive grounds for a collateral attack implicated federal

jurisdiction rather than the merits. Cf. Huntington, 176

U.S. at 679 (explaining that whether proceedings in state

court provided a res judicata defense did not “affect[] the

jurisdiction” of the lower federal court but instead “affect[ed] the merits of the cause”); Blythe v. Hinckley, 173

U.S. 501, 507 (1899) (similar).

13

Respondents effectively acknowledge (Br. 34) that

federal habeas—perhaps the most well-known form of

collateral attack in federal courts, see Pet. Br. 33—invokes a district court’s original jurisdiction. Respondents

instead attempt (Br. 34-35) to distinguish habeas from the

type of action at issue here. But neither the Court’s treatment of habeas in Exxon Mobil nor the features of habeas

practice highlighted by respondents undermine the crucial point that the use of federal habeas to review a state

criminal judgment has “generally been deemed original,”

not appellate. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 407, 423-424 &

n.34 (1963).

Nor are respondents correct that habeas petitions

merely “target the state-executive-branch’s detention,”

Br. 35, rather than seeking judicial reexamination of “a

final judgment of conviction in a state court,” Felker v.

Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663 (1996). To give a habeas petitioner relief from unauthorized detention, the district

court must necessarily declare the judgment authorizing

that detention void. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Councilman,

420 U.S. 738, 746-747 (1975); Noia, 372 U.S. at 423-424.

And even if federal habeas was traditionally limited to

cases where the “confining court lacked jurisdiction,”

Resp. Br. 34, that demonstrates that at least some review

by lower federal courts of state-court judgments has long

been allowed.

c. Respondents separately attempt to craft a clearstatement rule in support of their position (Br. 29-31),

suggesting that a federal jurisdictional statute should not

be interpreted to encompass review of a state-court judgment unless Congress has clearly authorized such review

and provided “guardrails” around it. That turns the law

on its head. Congress has given the district courts jurisdiction over broad categories of cases, including those

arising under federal law. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. ch. 85.

14

District courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to

exercise that jurisdiction, Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976),

and “Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to impose exceptions” on a “broad grant of jurisdiction,” Bowe v.

United States, 146 S. Ct. 447, 456 (2026); see generally

CAC Br. 11-17 (explaining Congress’s expansion of federal jurisdiction during Reconstruction).

In any event, respondents’ examples do not prove

their rule. For instance, respondents cite removal (Br.

30), but removal is not a mechanism for seeking review of

a state-court decision. Instead, it is a procedural tool for

transferring a case from state to federal court. See

Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691,

698 (2003). And to the extent that respondents are suggesting that some review may be involved in the process

of removal, that would only undermine their position, because the “jurisdiction exercised on removal is original not

appellate.” Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448,

452 (1943); see, e.g., Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 27 (2025).

Section 1914 of Title 25 is no more availing. See Resp.

Br. 31. It authorizes an Indian tribe to “petition any court

of competent jurisdiction” to invalidate certain state-court

child-custody proceedings involving an Indian child. 25

U.S.C. 1914. That language indicates that Section 1914 is

not a jurisdictional statute but instead creates a right of

action that a district court can adjudicate under an independent source of jurisdiction such as Section 1331 or

1332. Cf. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 n.6 (1977).

That leaves habeas. See Resp. Br. 30. To be sure,

there has been independent statutory authorization for

federal courts to entertain habeas petitions since the

Founding. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat.

81-82. But that does not show that the Founders believed

15

that especially clear statutory language was required to

authorize federal habeas review. Rather, it shows only

their view that the “power to award the writ” needed to

be “given by written law”—that is, by some statutory language—and could not be exercised as a matter of common

law. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). And although federal habeas review is

“carefully limited,” Resp. Br. 31, that is likely because, by

“overrid[ing] the States’ core power to enforce criminal

law,” habeas acutely intrudes on state sovereignty. Shinn

v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 376 (2022) (citation omitted; emphasis added). The same cannot be said of ordinary collateral attacks on state civil judgments—particularly

given that state preclusion law will impose limits of its own

on such actions.

3. Respondents raise two supposed practical problems with petitioner’s approach based on Section 1257.

Neither is significant.

First, respondents argue (Br. 23-24, 38) that petitioner’s approach is logically inconsistent because it would

allow Rooker-Feldman to apply to a state-court decision

that became final after the losing party failed to appeal (or

dismissed its appeal), even though this Court would lack

jurisdiction over such a decision under Section 1257. But

petitioner has never taken that position. To begin with,

this case does not present the question of how RookerFeldman applies where a state-court decision becomes final after the losing party forfeits or waives the right to

state appellate review. See Pet. i.

That said, there would be nothing anomalous about the

view that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to a state-court

decision that has become unreviewable in state court without a decision from the state court of last resort. Such an

approach would best comport with Rooker-Feldman’s

foundation in Section 1257. And the risks of gamesman-

16

ship are meager, because it would be foolhardy for a litigant to forgo state appellate review in order to move directly to a collateral attack in federal district court. Such

a decision would preclude any ability to obtain appellate

relief in state court (and ultimately to seek direct review

in this Court), and it would likely run squarely into state

preclusion law in federal court. See Pet. Br. 40-43; pp. 1718, infra. Even if some litigants were unwise enough to

take that step, there is no need for a jurisdictional bar to

deal with it.

Second, respondents argue (Br. 29) that, if petitioner’s

action did properly invoke the district court’s original federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, a litigant

could similarly invoke a district court’s original diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332 to bring a collateral attack against a state-court decision. That is true, but again

there is nothing anomalous about that result. It simply

interprets Section 1332 as congruent with Section 1331,

with any limitations implied by Rooker-Feldman applying

equally to both statutes. See Simon, 236 U.S. at 120-122.

To the extent that respondents are invoking diversity jurisdiction to hint at a floodgates problem, the answer is

simple: preclusion and abstention doctrines exist to deal

with those cases, just like ones based on federal-question

jurisdiction. See Pet. Br. 40-43; pp. 17-18, infra.

C. There Are Compelling Practical Reasons Not To Expand The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine To Non-Final

State-Court Decisions

As petitioner has explained (Br. 35-43), there are no

valid reasons to expand Rooker-Feldman to state-court

decisions that remain subject to further review in state

court, and every reason not to. The doctrine has been notoriously difficult for lower courts to apply, and other,

non-jurisdictional doctrines already take care of the

17

problems that Rooker-Feldman purports to address. Respondents’ contrary arguments lack merit.

1. Respondents do not dispute that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has confounded the lower courts for decades. But despite the Court’s “aggressive intervention”

in Exxon Mobil, lower courts dismissed cases based on

Rooker-Feldman at an even higher rate—indeed, a “significantly higher” rate—in the eight years after Exxon

Mobil than in the eight years before it. HPIL Holding,

Inc. v. Zhang, No. 25-1595, 2026 WL 636728, at *3 (6th

Cir. Mar. 6, 2026). Indeed, “in the last five years, approximately 7,800 federal cases cited Rooker and Feldman

while fewer than half as many cited [Exxon Mobil].”

Ibid.; see IJ Br. 9-11. If Exxon Mobil did not deter the

lower federal courts from applying Rooker-Feldman, one

can only imagine what effect a decision from this Court

expanding the doctrine would have.

Most importantly, there is “no good reason” to extend

Rooker-Feldman, because “anything Rooker and Feldman can do, preclusion can do better”—without the baggage that comes with a jurisdictional rule. HPIL Holding, 2026 WL 636728, at *3; see Pet. Br. 40-43; Scholars

Br. 14-15; IJ Br. 18. In fact, preclusion and abstention

doctrines are the simple answer to nearly all of the concerns that respondents have raised about petitioner’s position.

Respondents argue (Br. 41-42) that preclusion doctrines are only minimally helpful, but they misunderstand

the scope of those doctrines. Under the doctrine of claim

preclusion, if the plaintiff prevailed in state court, the losing defendant cannot later raise defenses “he might have

interposed, or did interpose,” in state court. Restatement

(Second) of Judgments § 18(2) (1982) (Restatement). By

contrast, if the defendant prevailed, preclusion extinguishes the plaintiff ’s rights against the defendant con-

18

cerning “all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Id.

§ 24(1). Claim preclusion thus extends beyond the precise

claims and defenses that were actually litigated in state

court. See Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Group, Inc., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). As to the doctrine of issue preclusion, while it generally applies only to

issues that are actually litigated and decided in state

court, see Resp. Br. 42, it plays an additional and meaningful role in preventing the relitigation of such issues.

Related doctrines also set strict limitations on the ability of litigants to bring collateral attacks on judgments.

See, e.g., Restatement §§ 69-72. Respondents do not dispute that proposition. Instead, they suggest that “the

plaintiffs in most of the cases on [petitioner’s] side of the

circuit split invoked federal law arguments beyond those

that petitioner identifies in the Restatement.” Br. 42. But

respondents do not contend that the claims in those cases

would have prevailed over a preclusion defense.

Respondents separately dismiss the relevance of abstention doctrines. See Br. 41. But regardless of whether

those doctrines would be applicable in this particular case,

it is beyond dispute that those doctrines address many

scenarios that overlap substantially with Rooker-Feldman. See Pet. Br. 42; Scholars Br. 8-9, 11-12. Accordingly, while respondents may be able to conjure up situations where a given preclusion or abstention doctrine does

not apply, those doctrines collectively do nearly all of the

work that Rooker-Feldman does. See Scholars Br. 14-15.

2. Respondents do not dispute that this Court has

made significant efforts to clarify federal jurisdictional

rules or that such rules should be simple and easy to administer. See Pet. Br. 38-40. Instead, respondents argue

that adopting the “practical finality” approach applied by

19

some courts of appeals would “generate confusion, not alleviate it.” Br. 36-37.

But the Court need not adopt a “practical finality” approach to decide the case in petitioner’s favor. The question presented concerns only how Rooker-Feldman applies where a state-court decision remains subject to further review in state court. The Court can decide that issue

by holding that Rooker-Feldman does not apply where

there has been no decision from the state court of last resort, as required to give rise to this Court’s jurisdiction

under Section 1257. To the extent that respondents are

worried about complexities that may arise in other factual

contexts, it will ordinarily be more straightforward to ask

whether this Court would have jurisdiction under Section

1257 over the relevant state-court decision, rather than

whether a particular action seeks relief that is sufficiently

similar to appellate review to resort to Rooker-Feldman.

3. Respondents next argue that petitioner’s position

“produces nothing less than a profound affront to federalism.” Br. 39. In respondents’ view, petitioner seeks to

have “federal courts supervise state-court judgments”

whenever original federal jurisdiction is present. Br. 40.

That is a strawman. Petitioner’s position is not that

state courts should be under “constant supervision” by

lower federal courts. Resp. Br. 40. Instead, it is simply

that, where a state-court decision remains subject to further review in state court, a jurisdictional bar should not

apply, and non-jurisdictional doctrines should govern the

scope of the federal action. The great virtue of that approach is that it allows States to determine the preclusive

effect of proceedings in their courts, because state law

governs the preclusive effect of a state-court judgment.

See Pet. Br. 41-42. If a particular State’s preclusion laws

were to permit an action that Rooker-Feldman might otherwise foreclose, that would be a pro-federalism feature,

20

not an anti-federalism bug, of petitioner’s position. See

Scholars Br. 13-15; IJ Br. 21-22.

Respondents also argue that, if this Court can intervene in state litigation only after a decision of the state

court of last resort, “it makes little sense” that a district

court could “intervene midstream” while a state-court decision remains subject to further review in state court. Br.

26. That proves too much. The same could be said for

parallel federal and state proceedings, and this Court has

rejected the argument that parallel suits implicate the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, even though the prospect of

federal-court intervention in state-court proceedings is at

least as salient in those circumstances. See Exxon Mobil,

544 U.S. at 292-294 & n.9. Respondents offer no basis to

conclude that the same concerns justify a different result

here.

D. In The Alternative, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Should Be Overruled

If the Court were to determine that Rooker-Feldman

otherwise applies to a federal action challenging a statecourt decision that remains subject to further review in

state court, the Court should consider overruling the doctrine entirely. As petitioner has explained (Br. 44-45),

Rooker-Feldman does not comport with the plain text of

Section 1257; the longstanding acceptance of concurrent

jurisdiction; or the distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and preclusion. Given all of the problems the

doctrine has caused since the Court revived Rooker in

Feldman (Pet. Br. 35-38, 45-46), the time for jettisoning it

may be now.

Respondents do not meaningfully engage with petitioner’s arguments on this score. Instead, respondents

protest (Br. 43-45) that the validity of Rooker-Feldman is

beyond the scope of the question presented. Respondents

21

express concern that the court of appeals below did not

consider Rooker-Feldman’s validity and that this Court’s

consideration of it now would “encourage petitioners” to

“fram[e] the question presented narrowly” and then later

“to focus their fire on this Court’s precedents.” Br. 44.

Respondents further suggest that interested parties

lacked an “opportunity to weigh in” on Rooker-Feldman’s

validity in amicus briefs. Br. 45.

Respondents’ concerns are overstated. Respondents’

principal argument on the question presented (Br. 12-17,

24-26, 28-35) is that it is irrelevant to Rooker-Feldman

whether a state-court decision remains subject to further

review in state court, because the entire basis for the doctrine is that any federal action seeking relief from a statecourt judgment requires the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. By contrast, petitioner has argued (Br. 32-35) that a

federal action seeking to prevent the enforcement of a

state-court judgment does not require the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Respondents have thus had a full and

fair opportunity to defend Rooker-Feldman on their own

terms.

Respondents’ other objections are insubstantial. Petitioner did not ask the court of appeals to address RookerFeldman’s validity for the simple reason that the court of

appeals had no power to overrule this Court’s precedents.

Petitioner also hardly “focus[ed] [her] fire” on having

Rooker-Feldman overruled; petitioner made an alternative argument only after comprehensively addressing the

question presented. Compare Pet. Br. 18-43 with id. at

44-47. And although respondents suggest that interested

amici lacked the ability to weigh in on whether RookerFeldman should be overruled, one amicus brief on petitioner’s side did, see IJ Br. 13-22, and respondents’ lone

amicus brief did not respond.

22

Petitioner’s principal position remains that RookerFeldman does not apply to a state-court decision that remains subject to further review in state court. But if the

Court concludes otherwise, it should consider overruling

the doctrine and ending the confusion that has plagued

lower courts for the last four decades.

*

*

*

*

*

The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

RAY M. SHEPARD

SHEPARD LAW FIRM

122 Riviera Drive

Pasadena, MD 21122

MARCH 2026

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

WILLIAM T. MARKS

ANNA J. LUCARDI

MATTHEW J. DISLER

MIKAELA MILLIGAN

KRISTA A. STAPLEFORD

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com