Amicus Curiae Brief — T. M., Petitioner v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, et al.
Supreme Court briefJan 21, 2026
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No. 25-197
In the Supreme Court of the United States
T.M.,
Petitioner,
v.
UNIVERSITY OF M ARYLAND
MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
BENJAMIN A. FIELD
Counsel of Record
TATE H. COOPER
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
901 North Glebe Rd.,
Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22203
(703) 682-9320
bfield@ ij.org
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........................................2
ARGUMENT .......................................................................4
I. This Court Tried To Inter The Rooker-Feldman
Doctrine, But It Hasn’t Worked ............................4
A. IJ’s Experience Shows Rooker-Feldman
Continues To Impose Costly Delays................4
B. Empirical Evidence Indicates Lower Courts
Are (Ab)using Rooker-Feldman More Than
Ever .....................................................................9
C. This Evidence Reflects Real Costs From
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine ......................12
II. The Court Should Abrogate Rooker-Feldman ...13
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Is Wrong.....14
B. Rooker-Feldman Is Unworkable ...................18
C. No Reliance Interests Support
Rooker-Feldman ..............................................21
III. In The Alternative, And At Minimum, The Court
Should Go Further Than Exxon-Mobil To
Abrogate Feldman .................................................22
A. If The Court Will Not Jettison RookerFeldman Altogether, It Should Scrap
Feldman .................................................... 22
ii
B. The Court Should Also Articulate Important
Effects Of Abrogating Feldman.....................27
CONCLUSION..................................................................29
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500 (2006) .......................................................18
Birchansky v. Clabaugh,
421 F. Supp. 3d 658 (S.D. Iowa 2018)...........................8
Brody v. Village of Port Chester,
No. 00-cv-7481, 2007 WL 704002
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) ..................................................9
Brucker v. City of Doraville,
No. 1:18-cv-02375, 2019 WL 3557893
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2019) ...................................................8
aff ’d, 38 F.4th 876 (11th Cir. 2022) ................................8
Chris H. v. New York,
764 F. App’x 53 (2d Cir. 2019) .....................................26
Collins v. Battle,
No. 1:14-cv-03824, 2015 WL 10550927
(N.D. Ga. July 28, 2015) .................................................8
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976) .......................................................17
Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.,
603 U.S. 799 (2024) .......................................................17
D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983) ............................................. 2, 23, 24
iv
Eck v. Battle,
No. 1:14-cv-962, 2014 WL 11199420
(N.D. Ga. July 28, 2014) .................................................8
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,
544 U.S. 280 (2005) ............. 3, 4, 7, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 25
Fambrough v. City of East Cleveland,
No. 1:22-cv-992, ECF No. 35
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2023)...............................................8
Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
111 F.4th 754 (7th Cir. 2024) ..................................19, 20
Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc.,
65 F.4th 500 (10th Cir. 2023) ........................................19
Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson,
62 F.4th 394 (7th Cir. 2023) ..........................................20
Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections,
422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) .............................................26
Hohenberg v. Shelby County,
68 F.4th 336 (6th Cir. 2023) ...................... 5, 6, 17, 18, 20
Hohenberg v. Shelby County,
No. 2:20-cv-02432, 2022 WL 3088100
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2022) ..........................................5, 8
In re Adams,
151 F.4th 144 (3d Cir. 2025) ........................................26
In re Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., LLC,
690 F. App’x 283 (5th Cir. 2017) ..................................20
v
Johnson v. De Grandy,
512 U.S. 997 (1994) .................................................26, 28
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
597 U.S. 507 (2022) .......................................................19
Knick v. Twp. of Scott,
588 U.S. 180 (2019) .......................................................17
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384 (1993) .........................................................4
Lance v. Dennis,
546 U.S. 459 (2006) ........................... 4, 13, 14, 26, 27, 28
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
603 U.S. 369 (2024) ..................................... 14, 18, 19, 21
Marshall v. Marshall,
547 U.S. 293 (2006) .......................................................13
McClellan v. Carland,
217 U.S. 268 (1910) .......................................................25
Miroth v. County of Trinity,
136 F.4th 1141 (9th Cir. 2025) ................................20, 26
Reed v. Goertz,
598 U.S. 230 (2023) .......................................................26
Richwine v. Matuszak,
707 F. Supp. 3d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2023) ............................8
aff ’d, 148 F.4th 942 (7th Cir. 2025) ................................8
Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923) ................................. 2, 15, 16, 23, 28
vi
Skinner v. Switzer,
562 U.S. 521 (2011) .......................................................26
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83 (1998) .........................................................16
Sung Cho v. City of New York,
910 F.3d 639 (2d Cir. 2018) ................................... 6, 7, 20
Sung Cho v. City of New York,
No. 1:16-cv-07961, 2018 WL 401512
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018).............................................7, 8
VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,
951 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2020)
...................................... 1, 9, 13, 17–19, 22–24, 26, 28, 29
Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
535 U.S. 635 (2002) .................................................16, 26
STATUTES AND RULES
28 U.S.C. § 1257............................................................25, 27
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ............................................. 6, 15, 17, 20
28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) .............................................................15
28 U.S.C. § 1331............................................................14, 15
28 U.S.C. § 1343..................................................................15
28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)-(4) ..................................................14
28 U.S.C. § 1738..............................................................3, 21
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) .............................................................15
vii
42 U.S.C. § 1983..................................................................14
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-258,
39 Stat. 726 ..........................................................................16
Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 .....................................................................1
OTHER AUTHORITIES
18B Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed. 2025 update)
........................................................................................18
Bradford Higdon,
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: The Case for Putting
It to Work, Not to Rest
90 U. Cin. L. Rev. 352 (2021) .................................20–21
Class Action Compl.,
Sung Cho v. City of New York, No. 1:16-cv-07961
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2016), Dkt. No. 1 .............................7
Erwin Chemerinsky,
Federal Jurisdiction (8th ed. 2021).............................18
First Amended Civil Rights Compl.,
Hohenberg v. Shelby County, No. 2:20-cv-02432
(W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2020), Dkt. No. 16 ........................5
Jack Beerman,
Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be
Our Guide,
74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1209 (1999)............................18
viii
Raphael Graybill,
The Rook That Would Be King: Rooker-Feldman Abstention Analysis After Saudi Basic
32 Yale J. on Reg. 591 (2015) ............................. 9, 10, 11
Samuel Bray,
Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 Green Bag 2d 317
(2006) .............................................................................18
Stip. and Order of Settlement,
Sung Cho v. City of New York, No. 1:16-cv-07961
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2020), Dkt. No. 111 ...........................7
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It
Up?, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081 (1999) ..................18
1
“Rooker-Feldman continues to wreak havoc across the
country. * * * Notwithstanding Exxon Mobil’s efforts to
return Rooker-Feldman to its modest roots, lawyers continue to invoke the rule and judges continue to dismiss
federal actions under it. Here’s to urging the Court to
give one last requiem to Rooker-Feldman.”
-VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,
951 F.3d 397, 405 (6th Cir. 2020)
(Sutton, J., concurring)
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The Institute for Justice (IJ) is a nonprofit public interest law firm that litigates to uphold individuals’ constitutional rights. We routinely file federal lawsuits focused
on our four pillars of economic liberty, private property
rights, free speech, and educational freedom. Our clients
stand up to unconstitutional laws and policies, but they
typically only learn they are subject to those unjust policies after facing enforcement. This is common not just for
IJ’s clients but for all civil-rights litigants, as any plaintiff
with a sufficiently certain injury to have standing will typically have faced enforcement. And that will often involve
a state court proceeding.
IJ carefully follows federal procedural rules to vindicate our clients’ rights. And we can do so because federal
procedural case law and state preclusion rules typically
yield comprehensible guidelines for their application. But
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an unpredictable animal
that is applied inconsistently, and often improperly, by
the lower courts. This Court has recognized that and has
1
In accordance with Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored this
brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amicus or its counsel have made any monetary contributions intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
repeatedly admonished that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is extremely narrow. Yet it continues to bedevil civilrights litigants. A chorus of judges, scholars, and members of this Court have condemned broad applications of
the doctrine, but lower federal courts have not gotten the
message.
It is meritorious civil-rights plaintiffs like IJ’s clients—and the federal rights they seek to vindicate—who
bear the costs. To protect their rights, we submit this
brief urging the Court to complete its decades-long project of curtailing Rooker-Feldman’s profligate use to improperly frustrate federal claims.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner persuasively explains why the RookerFeldman doctrine,2 on its own terms, ought not apply to
state court judgments subject to further review. But we
urge the Court to resolve this case by answering an antecedent question: Should the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
continue to exist at all?
The answer is no. Claim and issue preclusion resolve
all the legitimate concerns Rooker-Feldman might address, and they are tethered to an actual statutory command. Rooker-Feldman, by contrast, is an atextual implication at odds with modern modes of statutory interpretation, and it continues to wreak havoc despite this
Court’s best efforts at restraint. Petitioner cogently argues for abrogating Rooker-Feldman as an in-the-alternative basis for prevailing. Pet’r Br. 44-47. We encourage
the Court to resolve this case on that ground, rather than
leaving Rooker-Feldman to haunt the lower courts.
Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
2
3
Part I explains that this Court’s efforts to cabin
Rooker-Feldman have failed. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the
Court instructed lower courts to apply the doctrine only
narrowly. IJ’s experience shows that courts have not honored those limits, and that both courts and defendants
continue raising the doctrine even when it plainly does not
apply. Litigating Rooker-Feldman delays cases, harming
civil-rights litigants who face ongoing abridgments of
their constitutional rights. We also present empirical evidence to confirm that IJ’s clients are hardly unique and
that Rooker-Feldman’s appearance in the lower courts
has consistently grown since Exxon Mobil.
Part II provides the solution: abrogate the RookerFeldman doctrine. This Court’s stare decisis factors sup-
port abrogation. First, the doctrine is poorly reasoned. It
goes beyond the statutory text to imply a jurisdictional
limitation that Congress never wrote into law. That offends this Court’s modern approaches to statutory interpretation and jurisdiction. Second, the doctrine has
proven unworkable—and lower courts have proven incorrigible. And last, there are no significant reliance interests in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the extent state
courts (or other actors) rely on federal courts respecting
state judgments, the full-faith-and-credit statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1738, fully protects those interests.
Part III offers a middle ground if the Court wishes to
more forcefully repudiate a broad Rooker-Feldman doctrine without wholly abrogating it. That would involve
overturning Feldman only, with its erroneous extension
of the doctrine to cases “inextricably intertwined” with
state court judgments. Feldman was an aberration, at
odds with how the Court has articulated the doctrine before and since. Overturning it would decisively narrow the
doctrine to apply only in cases that exactly replicate relief
4
obtainable in a cert petition available under Section 1257.
We also offer implications of this narrowing rule to provide guidance to the lower courts.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT TRIED TO INTER THE
ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE, BUT IT
HASN’T WORKED.
From its humble origins and limited scope, lower federal courts expanded Rooker-Feldman to bar federal jurisdiction over an ever-growing array of cases related,
even tangentially, to prior state litigation. Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 283. In response, this Court in Exxon Mobil
emphasized that Rooker-Feldman applies only in “limited
circumstances,” when a state-court loser asks a federal
court to reject a final state judgment. Id. at 291. But lower
courts didn’t get the message.
In this Part, we provide evidence from IJ’s own experience, alongside broader empirical data. Both show that
Rooker-Feldman continues to be raised and applied well
beyond the narrow scope this Court prescribed, imposing
real costs on litigants. Despite this Court’s efforts to “finally inter[] the so-called ‘Rooker-Feldman doctrine,’”
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 468 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting), it still stalks the lower courts’ jurisprudence
“[l]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie,” Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
A.
IJ’s Experience Shows Rooker-Feldman
Continues To Impose Costly Delays.
IJ often litigates federal civil-rights cases with some
relation to state court proceedings. Even when those
cases fall far beyond the limited circumstances of Rooker
and Feldman, we still waste time and money refuting
5
spurious arguments relying on the doctrine. And sometimes the district court gives in to the doctrine’s siren
song, spawning needless appeals and delaying cases for
years.
1. That’s what happened to IJ client Sarah Hohenberg. She lost her Memphis home after the Shelby
County Environmental Court ordered her to leave and issued a warrant for her arrest. Hohenberg v. Shelby
County, 68 F.4th 336, 338 (6th Cir. 2023). She filed for
bankruptcy and was forced to flee to a motel in Mississippi. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint (Hohenberg
Complaint) 15, No. 2:20-cv-02432 (W.D. Tenn. July 6,
2020), Dkt. No. 16. That Environmental Court gives kangaroo courts a bad name: It doesn’t follow rules of evidence, didn’t allow Ms. Hohenberg to raise constitutional
issues, and didn’t even create a record from which she
could appeal. 68 F.4th at 338. So, with another homeowner, she sued, alleging that the government violated
their due-process rights by subjecting them to proceedings that lacked adequate procedural safeguards. Hohenberg Complaint at 21-23. Rather than challenging any final state court decision, our clients sought damages and a
declaration that the Environmental Court’s policies and
procedures were unconstitutional. Id. at 23-24.
The district court dismissed the suit under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, reasoning simply that state
court judgments were “at issue.” 2022 WL 3088100, at *5
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2022). The district court even
acknowledged that the plaintiffs didn’t ask it to overturn
any judgments, but it still characterized the request for
declaratory relief and damages as “a request for appellate
review.” Id. at *6.
It took an appeal to the Sixth Circuit to fix. That court
decried “lower courts’ extravagant use of Rooker and
6
Feldman” to clear dockets. Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 340.
As it explained, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)’s negative jurisdictional implication can apply only when a federal suit challenges a state judgment and asks to “undo or overturn”
it. Id. (cleaned up). Ms. Hohenberg’s case did neither. The
allegations challenged how the Environmental Court operated, not the specific judgments it reached. Id. And
awarding damages or declaratory relief wouldn’t affect
any judgments. Id. at 340-41. Quite simply, the plaintiffs
“ha[d] not appealed anything,” and even if their claims
impugned the Environmental Court’s orders, that’s not
enough for Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar. Id. at
341-42.
Ms. Hohenberg’s case illustrates the harms imposed
by district courts’ continued over-application of RookerFeldman. Appeals are costly and time-consuming. In her
case, it took a year to clear up the Rooker-Feldman error.
The whole time, our client—who is elderly, with meager
resources—was denied a federal remedy. The case remains pending before the district court; Ms. Hohenberg
remains without stable housing.
2. IJ clients were forced to endure similar delay in
Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639 (2d Cir.
2018). There, a New York City abatement ordinance allowed the City to close properties where certain crimes
occurred, even if the owner had nothing to do with them.
Id. at 642. As a result, our clients faced eviction notices
even though they had committed no crimes. Id. at 643.
Under pressure from the City and its attorneys, they entered into settlement agreements that required them to
waive various constitutional rights. Id. State trial judges
then signed off on those agreements with a rote “so ordered” docket entry. Id.
7
Our clients filed a federal suit asserting the City’s
scheme unconstitutionally coerced them into waiving
their rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 643-44; Class Action Complaint (Sung Cho Complaint) 40-49, No. 1:16-cv-07961, Dkt. No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
12, 2016). As in Hohenberg, they didn’t appeal any state
court decision. Rather, they asked the district court to declare the City’s abatement ordinance unconstitutional, to
enjoin City officials from enforcing agreements obtained
via the ordinance, and to award nominal damages. 910
F.3d at 643-44; Sung Cho Complaint at 51-53.
At a motion-to-dismiss hearing, the district court sua
sponte raised Rooker-Feldman and requested supplemental briefing. Id. at 644. The court’s ultimate decision
quoted the standard from Exxon Mobil. 2018 WL 401512,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018) (citing Exxon Mobil, 544
U.S. at 284). But it nevertheless dismissed the case under
Rooker-Feldman. Id. at *4-5.
The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal. As it explained, the claim challenged the City’s conduct in enforcing the abatement ordinance through coercive settlement
agreements, not the state court decisions “so ordering”
those agreements. 910 F.3d at 645-46. And the harm was
divorced from any state court judgment. Unconstitutional
coercion was illegal regardless of any later judicial order,
and the settlement agreements themselves became effective before any court judgment. Id. at 647-49.
After the Second Circuit’s ruling, the City agreed not
to enforce agreements it had reached under the no-fault
abatement ordinance. Dkt. No. 111 at 4 (Oct. 2, 2020). But
that vindication of our clients’ rights was delayed by the
district court’s Rooker-Feldman error—first by four
months for supplemental briefing and consideration at
the district court, then for almost a year on appeal.
8
3. These two cases exemplify how this Court’s efforts
since 2005 to limit the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine have failed. Both erroneous district-court decisions
identified Exxon Mobil as articulating the correct standard. Hohenberg, 2022 WL 3088100, at *4; Sung Cho, 2018
WL 401512, at *3. Both cited circuit court cases limiting
the doctrine after Exxon Mobil. Hohenberg, 2022 WL
3088100, at *5; Sung Cho, 2018 WL 401512, at *3. Yet both
wrongly applied the doctrine anyway.
These are two egregious examples where district
courts erroneously dismissed our clients’ cases. But they
are far from the only times IJ has had to fend off spurious
invocations of Rooker-Feldman across widely varying circumstances. See, e.g., Richwine v. Matuszak, 707 F. Supp.
3d 782, 794-95 (N.D. Ind. 2023) (rejecting Rooker-Feldman in free-speech challenge to state statute after ordering supplemental briefing), aff’d, 148 F.4th 942 (7th Cir.
2025); Fambrough v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:22-cv992, ECF No. 35 at 6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2023) (court sua
sponte ordering Rooker-Feldman briefing in First
Amendment retaliation case); Brucker v. City of Doraville, No. 1:18-cv-02375, 2019 WL 3557893, at *4-5 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 1, 2019) (rejecting Rooker-Feldman in procedural-due-process challenge to structure of a municipal
court), aff’d, 38 F.4th 876, 882 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022);
Birchansky v. Clabaugh, 421 F. Supp. 3d 658, 665-68 (S.D.
Iowa 2018) (Rooker-Feldman did not bar constitutional
challenge to certificate-of-need requirement for outpatient surgery centers); Collins v. Battle, No. 1:14-cv03824, 2015 WL 10550927, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ga. July 28,
2015) (rejecting Rooker-Feldman when government
acknowledged it didn’t apply after having moved to dismiss on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Eck v. Battle, No.
1:14-cv-962, 2014 WL 11199420, at *3 (N.D. Ga. July 28,
2014) (rejecting government’s argument Rooker-
9
Feldman applied to state administrative decisions);
Brody v. Village of Port Chester, No. 00-cv-7481, 2007
WL 704002, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (rejecting government Rooker-Feldman argument in due-process challenge to inadequate notice in condemnation proceedings).
B.
Empirical Evidence Indicates Lower
Courts Are (Ab)using Rooker-Feldman
More Than Ever.
Broader empirical evidence indicates IJ’s experience
is not unique. In preparing this brief, we conducted a
Westlaw search across just the year 2025, which showed
that district and circuit courts used the term “RookerFeldman” in 1,956 cases.3 And Rooker-Feldman issues
continue to inundate this Court. In October Term 2024
alone, this Court received 33 filings at the certiorari stage
citing “Rooker-Feldman.” Since the start of 2020, that figure is 223 filings. That doesn’t suggest that courts are limiting the doctrine’s application.
A 2015 study showed the doctrine’s use had grown
dramatically since Exxon Mobil sought to restrain
Rooker-Feldman in 2005. See Raphael Graybill, The
Rook That Would Be King: Rooker-Feldman Abstention
Analysis After Saudi Basic, 32 Yale J. on Reg. 591 (2015);
see also VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 407 (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting paper’s findings matched personal judicial experience). The paper looked at Rooker-Feldman’s
usage in three ways across four different four-year periods. First, it evaluated the total number of cases using the
phrase “Rooker-Feldman.” Graybill, supra, at 597-98.
Then, it identified cases where the courts likely applied
the doctrine by searching for “Rooker-Feldman” within
25 words of terms suggesting that a court used the
3
A similar Lexis search identified “Rooker-Feldman” in 2,051 cases.
10
doctrine to bar jurisdiction (“applies,” “lacks jurisdiction,” or “bars”). Id. at 598. Finally, the paper tallied cases
where courts likely rejected the doctrine by searching for
“Rooker-Feldman” within 25 words of terms suggesting
the doctrine didn’t apply (“does not bar,” “does not apply,” or “inapplicable”). Id. And to test whether the
change in frequency differed from other types of cases,
the paper also tracked the frequency of two control terms:
“Fourth Amendment” and “auto! accident.” Id. at 597.
Graybill’s results are striking: Lower courts followed
Exxon Mobil “with a significant increase in the number of
cases citing and applying Rooker-Feldman.” Id. at 599.
The growth substantially outpaced the control terms, id.,
and the study’s methodology suggested most of those
cases were applying the doctrine to bar suits, id. at 599600. Graybill concluded that “the Supreme Court and the
district courts live in different worlds.” Id. at 598-99.
More recent evidence shows those worlds aren’t getting any closer. We replicated that paper’s methodology
for the most recent four-year period (January 1, 2022, to
January 1, 2026) and found that the total number of district court cases citing Rooker-Feldman has increased yet
again by over 80%—from Graybill’s 3,066 cases identified
in the 2010-2014 period, to 5,539 cases we identified in the
most recent four-year period.4 And the district court
cases likely to have applied a Rooker-Feldman bar based
on the paper’s search terms increased by 70%. In short,
replicating the analysis on more recent data suggests that
district courts are citing Rooker-Feldman ever more often, and they’re applying it to bar ever more cases.
4
Because some 2025 cases may be added to Westlaw after we file this
brief in late January 2026, the numbers may grow.
11
A graph of those numbers is startling. Here we replicate and combine Tables 1 and 3 from Graybill’s original
paper, see id. at 598-600, and add our analysis of the most
recent four-year period. It shows that the number of
cases citing Rooker-Feldman and those seemingly applying the doctrine only continue to grow exponentially:
District Court Citations to
Rooker-Feldman
6000
Number of Cases
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
19972001
20012005
20062010
20102014
20222026
Total R-F Cites
347
656
2239
3066
5539
Cases Applying R-F
161
317
1046
1677
2855
12
C.
This Evidence Reflects Real Costs From
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.
IJ is just one civil-rights law firm, and our clients’ experiences show that Rooker-Feldman comes up again and
again, delaying justice for our clients by years. The national numbers confirm that our experience is not unusual. These examples and data tell a story of unnecessary
litigation costs and of delayed (or denied) justice.
And the IJ experiences may be comparatively rosy. At
least our clients eventually prevailed over the RookerFeldman doctrine. But IJ is an experienced civil-rights
law firm that’s well equipped to anticipate and litigate difficult procedural issues. Most victims of constitutional violations come to court with fewer resources and less experience—and maybe even without a lawyer. In 2025, for
example, two-thirds of published circuit court opinions
vacated or reversed district courts’ Rooker-Feldman dismissals. The picture was different for pro se plaintiffs.
Among unpublished circuit court opinions, a far higher
proportion affirmed dismissals under Rooker-Feldman,
and our review of those cases showed that most involved
pro se plaintiffs. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine sets a
trap even for experienced litigators and federal judges;
no wonder it ensnares less experienced litigants.
IJ’s experience and the statistics of Rooker-Feldman’s usage in the lower courts show that the doctrine
continues to thwart federal consideration of suits within
the district courts’ jurisdiction. Half-measures and admonishments to curtail the doctrine have failed.
13
II.
THE
COURT
SHOULD
ROOKER-FELDMAN.
ABROGATE
As Part I reinforces, “Rooker-Feldman continues to
wreak havoc across the country.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d
at 405 (Sutton, J., concurring). It has “bec[o]me a prolific
source of controversy, spawning a brood of lower-court
heirs,” “an untethered way for federal courts to defer to
state court litigation of related cases and controversies
and a new way to avoid deciding federal questions.” Id. at
406. That is even though this Court has never treated the
doctrine so extravagantly, and since 1983 has “never applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction,” instead only mentioning the doctrine “in passing or to explain why” the doctrine “did not dictate dismissal.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 287.
In Exxon Mobil, this Court tried to narrow the doctrine. The gist of the opinion was that “unless your name
was Rooker or Feldman,” the doctrine’s “supposed limit
on the jurisdiction of the federal courts applied to” practically “no one.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 405 (Sutton,
J., concurring). A year later, Lance reaffirmed that
“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another
name” and “applies only in ‘limited circumstances.’” 546
U.S. at 466; accord id. at 467-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
One justice took away the lesson that the Court had definitively buried the doctrine. See Marshall v. Marshall,
547 U.S. 293, 318 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)
(“I would provide the creature with a decent burial in a
grave adjacent to the resting place of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”).
But the evidence reveals the doctrine’s vitality has not
been sapped. It’s now time for this Court to complete the
project begun in Exxon Mobil and to “finally inter[] the
so-called ‘Rooker-Feldman doctrine.’” Lance, 546 U.S. at
14
468 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “[T]he stare decisis considerations most relevant here—the quality of the [doctrine’s] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, and reliance on the [doctrine]—all weigh in favor
of letting [Rooker-Feldman] go.” Loper Bright Enters. v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 407 (2024) (cleaned up). We address each element in turn.
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Is Wrong.
1. Congress has expressly given the district courts
broad jurisdiction over a wide range of suits, including
federal-question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Likewise, district courts have
broad civil-rights jurisdiction over claims “[t]o redress
the deprivation * * * of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States” or “[t]o
recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of
civil rights.” Id. § 1343(a)(3)-(4); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Many (if not most) litigants with a concrete-enough injury for standing to challenge an unconstitutional law or
policy will have faced application of that law to them, often
in a court proceeding. And federal litigation over the constitutionality of that law will often overlap with, or even
undermine, how the law was applied in state court. Yet
such suits for damages or equitable remedies fall
squarely within the express terms of Congress’s jurisdictional grants to the district courts. IJ’s cases discussed
above are examples.
2. Against Congress’s broad, express grants of district-court jurisdiction stands Rooker and Feldman’s curious interpretation of Section 1257 and its predecessor.
All that statute says is that this Court has jurisdiction to
review “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the
15
highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,”
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), and that the D.C. Court of Appeals
shall be treated as a state high court for those purposes,
id. § 1257(b). It says nothing about the district courts’ jurisdiction; much less does it strip them of any.
Nevertheless, Rooker said that Section 1257’s predecessor implied that “no court of the United States other
than this [C]ourt” could hear proceedings that fall within
its ambit. 263 U.S. at 416. Subsequent cases assumed that
was correct. E.g., Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 (observing
Section 1257 has been “long interpreted” to “vest[] authority to review a state court’s judgment solely in this
Court”). But in each of those cases, the Court has simply
restated Rooker’s conclusory interpretation without
squarely justifying the negative implication from Section
1257’s affirmative grant of jurisdiction.
In the same breath, the Court has recognized that
nothing stops Congress from giving the district courts
concurrent jurisdiction with this Court. See id. at 292 n.8.
Indeed, the habeas statutes give this Court, the circuit
courts, and district courts the same concurrent power to
“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Why statutes like 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343 should not be treated the same way has never been
explained. 5
5
Perhaps recognizing that Section 1257’s text provides little support
for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Respondents also note that jurisdiction-granting statutes like Section 1331 are limited to conferring
“original” jurisdiction on the district courts. See BIO 27-28. But
treating that single word “original” as a font for an expansive
Rooker-Feldman-style doctrine has all the same problems as
Rooker-Feldman itself by extracting a sweeping and unpredictable
jurisdictional bar from the thinnest of textual bases. The general rule
of the district courts’ federal-question jurisdiction is broad: They
16
Pragmatic considerations may explain the Rooker decision better than principled statutory interpretation.
When it was decided in 1923, this Court still had mandatory jurisdiction over most appeals asserting federal constitutional errors. See Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64258, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726-27. Indeed, it was even required
by statute to hear a direct appeal of the Rooker case from
the district court. 263 U.S. at 415 (citing Judicial Code,
§ 238, codified at Comp. St. § 1215). So the Court had a
strong motive to interpret Section 1257’s predecessor to
bar district-court jurisdiction, to prevent meritless appeals from making their way onto an overcrowded docket.
That would be especially tempting in a case like Rooker,
where the plaintiff had already brought the case to this
Court and failed to achieve review, only to file anew in district court. Id. at 414-15. But Rooker could have reached
the same result, on the merits, by applying normal principles of res judicata to give preclusive effect to the final
judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court. It’s understandable why the Court might have wanted a jurisdictional
docket-clearing rule in an era of so much mandatory jurisdiction, but that does not make Rooker’s atextual statutory interpretation more persuasive.
3. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also lacks “consistency with other related decisions” about the jurisdiction of the federal district courts in the century since
have jurisdiction if the claim turns on the proper “construction” of
“the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Verizon Md. Inc. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). That some of these
cases over which Congress has granted original jurisdiction may
cover similar subject matters to cases within Section 1257’s ambit, or
may function as a collateral attack on some prior judgment, is no reason to infer that Congress didn’t mean what it said in granting the
district courts broad jurisdiction over federal questions.
17
Rooker. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 203 (2019)
(citation omitted).
First, implying an atextual jurisdictional exception
conflicts with “the virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). That’s why, as Exxon Mobil held,
the mere fact that similar questions have come up in state
and federal cases does not strip jurisdiction from the district courts. 544 U.S. at 292. To the contrary, RookerFeldman’s broad application in the lower courts has had
the improper effect of “overriding Congress’ conferral of
federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts.” Id. at 283.
The doctrine is also at odds with this Court’s modern
textualist approach to statutory interpretation. Section
1257 simply provides that a certain set of cases “may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.” 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a). As this Court reads statutes today, what
matters first and foremost is what the text says. E.g.,
Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.,
603 U.S. 799, 815 (2024). And nothing in Section 1257’s
grant of jurisdiction takes anything away from the district courts’ jurisdiction.
To make matters worse, Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional rule. Not only does that invite lower courts to
raise the doctrine sua sponte as a docket-clearing tool; it
also conflicts with this “Court’s recent efforts to tighten
the screws on the meaning of subject matter jurisdiction.”
VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 407-08 (Sutton, J., concurring)
(collecting cases). As this Court “has reminded us nearly
once a year for almost two decades, we should not lightly
use jurisdictional rules to pinch-hit for non-jurisdictional
ones.” Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 340-41 (collecting cases);
18
see, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006)
(“Jurisdiction, this Court has observed, is a word of many,
too many, meanings. This Court, no less than other
courts, has sometimes been profligate in its use of the
term.” (cleaned up)).
4. Unsurprisingly, then, “[s]cholars” have “criticized
[Rooker-Feldman] and urged the Supreme Court to reassess.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 406 (Sutton, J., concurring) (collecting sources); accord Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at
340 (similar); see, e.g., 18B Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4469.1 (3d ed. 2025 update) (describing Rooker-Feldman as “nearly redundant” of preclusion principles and observing that “room remains to
limit it still further”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 897 (8th ed. 2021) (“[I]t is unclear what the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine adds to other doctrines[.]”);
Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 Green Bag
2d 317, 317-18 (2006) (“Rooker Feldman, the legal personality, died yesterday * * * . It is hoped that he leaves no
survivors.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman:
Worth Only the Powder To Blow It Up?, 74 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1081, 1084 (1999) (“The academy has done its job,
and now it is the Court’s turn.”); Jack Beerman, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be Our
Guide, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1209, 1209 (1999) (“I have
been unable to think of another legal doctrine that lacks
both a clear role and a clear justification.”).
B.
Rooker-Feldman Is Unworkable.
“Experience has also shown that [Rooker-Feldman] is
unworkable.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 407. As Part I reveals, this Court’s efforts to rein in the doctrine have not
worked. Instead, this Court has had “to clarify the doctrine again and again.” Id. at 409. Like other doctrines
this Court has abandoned after disuse, Rooker-Feldman
19
has not been applied by this Court since Feldman in 1983,
even as it continues to be misused in the lower courts. Cf.
id. at 410 (“[W]e have avoided deferring under Chevron
since 2016.”); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S.
507, 535 n.4 (2022) (“In the last two decades, this Court
has often criticized or ignored Lemon and its endorsement test variation.”).
At the same time, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine remains a source of turmoil in the lower courts, and its
(mis)use is only growing. Experience since Exxon Mobil
has shown that the doctrine “cannot be constrained by admonishing courts to be extra careful, or by tacking on a
new batch of conditions.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 411.
Even as this Court moved away from Feldman’s mischiefinviting “inextricably intertwined” test, lower courts continue to dismiss cases by applying that standard. See, e.g.,
Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th
754, 761, 767 n.5 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (rejecting district court’s reliance on the “inextricably intertwined”
standard); Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65
F.4th 500, 516 & n.18 (10th Cir. 2023) (reversing district
court order dismissing federal claims as “inextricably intertwined” with state-court judgments). Experience has
proved that only a definitive end to the doctrine can fix
the problem.
Even where circuit courts have tried to follow this
Court’s lead and restrain the doctrine, it has not stopped
district courts from overly broad applications of RookerFeldman. IJ’s Hohenberg case is a perfect example. It
arose in the Sixth Circuit, where now-Chief Judge Sutton
had given district judges flashing warnings not to apply
the doctrine. See VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 409 (Sutton,
J., concurring) (“[A] federal court tempted to dismiss a
case under Rooker-Feldman should do one thing: Stop.”).
But that did not stop the surely well-intentioned district
20
judge in Hohenberg from reaching for the doctrine to
clear the docket. Only yet another opinion from Chief
Judge Sutton—after a long delay for appeal—set things
right. 68 F.4th at 340.
Not only have the district courts been unable to follow
this Court’s guidance over the past two decades, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has also spawned Ptolemaic
elaborations and conflicts among the circuit courts. For
instance, the Second Circuit has discerned a four-prong
test for the doctrine, rather than reading Exxon Mobil to
be a narrow one-prong test about the bounds of Section
1257. See Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 645; accord Pet. App. 9a;
contra Miroth v. County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1151
(9th Cir. 2025) (referring to two elements); Hohenberg,
68 F.4th at 340 (“§ 1257(a)’s negative implication requires
two unusual things” (emphasis added)). And the multi-circuit split presented in this case is just one of several questions that have flummoxed the lower courts. See, e.g., In
re Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., LLC, 690 F.
App’x 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing circuit split on
whether Rooker-Feldman applies to judgments that are
void ab initio); Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 769 (five judges concluding Rooker-Feldman bars certain damages claims);
id. at 789 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Rooker-Feldman does not deprive federal district
courts of jurisdiction to award damages for injury caused
by a state court’s judgment.”); id. at 797-98 (Kirsch, J.,
concurring in part) (six judges concluding Rooker-Feldman generally does not apply to damages claims); HadziTanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 406 (7th Cir. 2023) (identifying only one other circuit that applied a similar “corruption exception”); but see id. at 413 (Kirsch, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (identifying that
“nearly every other circuit” applied a similar “corruption
exception”); see also Bradford Higdon, The Rooker-
21
Feldman Doctrine: The Case for Putting It to Work, Not
to Rest, 90 U. Cin. L. Rev. 352, 362-64 (2021) (identifying
multiple post-Exxon Mobil circuit splits).
C.
No Reliance Interests Support RookerFeldman.
“Nor has [Rooker-Feldman] been the sort of stable
background rule that fosters meaningful reliance.” Loper
Bright, 603 U.S. at 410 (cleaned up). Indeed, what this
Court said about the Chevron doctrine when discarding it
applies remarkably well to Rooker-Feldman: Given the
Court’s “turn away from [Rooker-Feldman], and its inconsistent application by the lower courts, it * * * is hard
to see how anyone * * * could reasonably expect a court
to rely on [Rooker-Feldman] in any particular case.”
Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 410 (cleaned up).
If it’s foolish for litigants to rely on Rooker-Feldman,
who would? Certainly not Congress or state courts. To
the extent Congress wants to give force to state judgments, it has codified that in the Full Faith and Credit
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293.
State courts can rely on that to ensure respect for their
judgments. And to the extent state courts would not give
preclusive effect to a judgment in a subsequent action,
they can hardly be said to rely on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine to bar suits they would not preclude themselves.
Instead, the state courts’ experience reveals that
there is no need for a Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
The state courts have not had problems dealing
with overlapping state and federal court decisions
from the other direction. Claim and issue preclusion principles have worked just fine in deciding
how to deal with a pending or final federal court
action with overlapping issues. To my knowledge,
there is no Rooker-Feldman equivalent in the fifty
22
state high courts. We might learn a thing or two
from them.
VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 408 (Sutton, J., concurring).
III.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AND AT MINIMUM, THE COURT SHOULD GO FURTHER
THAN EXXON-MOBIL TO ABROGATE
FELDMAN.
This case presents the Court’s first occasion to seriously revisit the Rooker-Feldman doctrine since it last
did so two decades ago in Exxon Mobil and Lance. Experience has shown that those cases have not worked in the
lower courts, and so this Court should take the opportunity to wholly abrogate the atextual and unnecessary
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. But if this Court is reluctant
to go so far, we present a half-way alternative: abrogating
Feldman without revisiting Rooker. In Subpart A we explain why this would be warranted, and in Subpart B articulate some of the specific rules that would emerge from
this more limited abrogation.
A.
If The Court Will Not Jettison RookerFeldman Altogether, It Should Scrap
Feldman.
Put simply: although Rooker was wrong, Feldman
was worse. In the sixty years between the two, Rooker
appeared only in passing in one of this Court’s opinions
and in one dissent from denial of cert. See Exxon Mobil,
544 U.S. at 288 n.3. But Feldman, with its loose “inextricably intertwined” dicta, unleashed a genie that even
Exxon Mobil could not put back in the bottle. At minimum, then, the Court should take Chief Judge Sutton’s
invitation to “go[] back to the first link in this chain”—
Rooker itself—and ditch the overweening “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” in favor of a more modest “1257 Rule” or
“Supreme Court review rule” closely tethered to the
23
narrow terms of Section 1257. VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at
409 (Sutton, J., concurring).
1. Even if this Court is disinclined to overturn Rooker,
it should reaffirm that Justice Van Devanter’s short opinion was no sweeping exception to Congress’s grants of jurisdiction, but instead a narrow implication from the predecessor statute to Section 1257. See 263 U.S. at 416 (interpreting Judicial Code, § 237, then codified at Comp. St.
§ 1214). Rooker’s facts exemplified its narrow reach: The
plaintiff lost in state trial court; that was affirmed by the
state supreme court; the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought
U.S. Supreme Court review; and finally, after all that, the
plaintiff tried again and sought the exact same relief in
federal district court with the same parties as the state
proceedings. Id. at 414-15. Worse still, the time for seeking such review had expired. Id. at 416. And the relief she
sought was directly “declar[ing]” a state-court judgment
“null and void.” Id. at 414. All Rooker established was that
for a case so clearly in the heartland of Section 1257’s predecessor, the Court would not allow an alternate route to
federal court.
2. But the unusual circumstances of Rooker—and the
tersely reasoned opinion that resulted—provided no basis
for Feldman’s more expansive ruling. In Feldman, the
plaintiffs were not seeking a do-over from a failed cert petition (they appear not to have filed any). Indeed, the relief they sought did not directly attack any state court final judgment, much less seek to declare it “null and void”
as in Rooker. Instead, the Feldman plaintiffs were challenging D.C.’s bar-admission rules under both the federal
Constitution and antitrust laws. Rather than asking to reverse a final state judgment, the relief they sought was to
invalidate the underlying bar-admission rules and an order allowing them to sit for the bar exam. 460 U.S. at 46869 & n.3, 472-73. This Court correctly recognized the
24
thrust of the plaintiffs’ lawsuits was well within the district court’s jurisdiction, insofar as they were “a general
attack on the constitutionality” of the bar rules. Id. at 487.
But in rejecting a narrow part of the plaintiffs’ claims,
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court unleashed the
sprawling Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The opinion held
that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims “to the extent” they “sought review” of the
D.C. high court’s “denial of their petitions for waiver” of
the bar requirements. Id. at 482. But the Court provided
little guidance on how to separate that aspect of the
claims from the permissible aspects attacking the bar
rules. Worse still, the phrase the Court chose—things “inextricably intertwined” with the state court adjudication,
id. at 486—was both vague and untethered from Section
1257’s text. Lower courts took that phrase and ran with
it. See VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 406 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The Court’s suggestion that federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state
court ‘decisions’ became a prolific source of controversy,
spawning a brood of lower-court heirs.” (cleaned up)).
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Feldman was more persuasive. As he noted, a “collateral attack upon the unconstitutional application of [the bar-admission] rules” was
plainly within Section 1331’s grant of federal-question jurisdiction. 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “There
may be other reasons for denying relief to the plaintiff,”
including “claim or issue preclusion,” “[b]ut it does violence to jurisdictional concepts for this Court to hold * * *
that the federal district court has no jurisdiction to conduct independent review of a specific claim that a licensing body’s action did not comply with federal constitutional standards.” Id. The majority would have done better to stick to its core jurisdictional holding—that the
crux of the plaintiffs’ claims were within the district
25
court’s jurisdiction—and leave for remand whether the
D.C. courts’ prior rulings would have any effect on the
merits through doctrines like claim and issue preclusion.
3. This Court’s opinions since Feldman strongly suggest it was a misstep. As Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a
unanimous Court acknowledged in Exxon Mobil, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the lower courts had come to
be “construed to extend far beyond the contours of the
Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts.” 544 U.S. at 283. In Exxon
Mobil, the only references to the “inextricably intertwined” standard were in describing Feldman and noting
that the court of appeals had applied the “inextricably intertwined” test. Id. at 286 & n.1, 291.
But this Court pointedly did not apply the “inextricably intertwined” standard or anything like it. To the contrary, it made clear that “parallel state and federal litigation” is not sufficient to “trigger[]” the Section 1257 jurisdictional bar. Id. at 292. Rather, “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning
the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.”
Id. (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282
(1910)). Even more decisive in repudiating any inextricably-intertwined standard, the Court was clear: “Nor does
§ 1257 stop a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state
court.” Id. at 293. Instead, district courts can have jurisdiction over such a claim, even if it is “one that denies a
legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to
which [the plaintiff] was a party.” Id. (citation omitted).
Since Exxon Mobil, the Court has consistently retreated from Feldman’s loose articulation. The next year
26
in Lance, the Court rejected applying Rooker-Feldman
where parties to the state court litigation differed from
those in the federal litigation. The Court again chided
lower courts for reading Rooker and Feldman as “a widereaching bar” and observed that the Court’s “cases since
Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the
Rooker-Feldman rule.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464.
The Court’s cases since have continued to reject arguments that the doctrine should apply, effectively disavowing anything as freewheeling as Feldman’s inextricablyintertwined standard. See Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230,
234-35 (2023); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531-33
(2011); accord Verizon, 535 U.S. at 644 n.3; Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). 6
All told, this Court’s Rooker-Feldman cases reflect
that Feldman is an aberration. From Rooker on, the
Court has hewed to treating the doctrine as barring jurisdiction only when a case would directly implicate Section
1257’s grant of jurisdiction. Feldman is the only case expanding the doctrine further.
4. Thus, even if the Court wishes to retain Rooker’s
central holding about Section 1257’s jurisdictional exclusivity, that can be honored with a far simpler “1257 Rule”
or “Supreme Court review rule” in place of the RookerFeldman doctrine. VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 409 (Sutton,
6
Some judges have taken the hint that “the phrase ‘inextricably intertwined’ has no independent content” given post-Feldman precedents from this Court. Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422
F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005); accord, e.g., In re Adams, 151 F.4th 144,
155 (3d Cir. 2025); Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1147. That lower-court judges
have (correctly) taken to ignoring Feldman’s central innovation is
more reason to formally abandon that decision. All the more so because other judges, even in the same circuits, still apply the “inextricably intertwined” test, e.g., Chris H. v. New York, 764 F. App’x 53,
56 (2d Cir. 2019)—reflecting the unpredictability of the doctrine.
27
J., concurring). Under that narrower rule, if a lawsuit in
district court is exactly replicating what Section 1257 allows through a cert petition, then Section 1257 would bar
the suit. If there is any difference, it would not.
This case illustrates one way the rule would work. For
Section 1257 to bar a suit, it must apply in the first place.
In Petitioner’s case, there are no “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had.” 28 U.S.C. § 1257. So she does not
fall within the bounds of Section 1257, and accordingly it
does not bar district-court jurisdiction. This Court already strongly suggested that result in Lance, where it
indicated that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the
plaintiff was “not in a position to ask this Court to review
the state court’s judgment.” 546 U.S. at 465 (cleaned up).
Short of ditching Rooker-Feldman altogether, the Court
should make Lance’s suggestion explicit by abrogating
Feldman in favor of a narrow rule that Rooker will apply
only to cases that exactly replicate what Section 1257
makes available via cert petition.
B.
The Court Should Also Articulate Important Effects Of Abrogating Feldman.
In addition to formally overturning Feldman and reversing the court of appeals’ judgment in this case, the
Court can helpfully rein in the lower courts by elaborating
some results that would entail for other cases. We suggest
three such principles here that would go a long way to
clearing up misuse of the doctrine in the lower courts.
1. Although the Court in Exxon Mobil and Lance implied the end of the inextricably-intertwined standard,
abrogating Feldman should mean formally rejecting it.
That language continues to be a basis for district courts
to apply Rooker-Feldman in an overbroad manner and
for defendants to argue for such application. It’s
28
especially easy for that to happen with an unsophisticated
or pro se plaintiff. He may not realize the subsequent retreat from Feldman, and so may not present the district
judge or magistrate judge with more recent precedents
that cast doubt on the inextricably-intertwined test.
On this point, we would urge the Court to adopt Chief
Judge Sutton’s formulation explicitly: The Rooker-Feldman “doctrine does not apply to federal lawsuits presenting similar issues to those decided in a state court case or
even to cases that present exactly the same, and thus the
most inextricably intertwined, issues.” VanderKodde, 951
F.3d at 406 (Sutton, J., concurring).
2. The Court should make clear that when a federal
case has different parties from the prior state court case,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not apply. A statement
like that could have warned off the district courts from
making the errors they did in both Hohenberg and Sung
Cho. This Court already strongly suggested such a rule in
Lance, when it rejected a parties-in-privity expansion of
Rooker-Feldman. 546 U.S. at 466; see also De Grandy,
512 U.S. at 1005-06 (“invocation of Rooker/Feldman” is
“inapt” where plaintiff “was not a party in the state
court”). It should make the general rule explicit.
3. Likewise, the Court should be clear that if a suit is
seeking any sort of relief that could not be obtained
through a cert petition, it does not fall within RookerFeldman. That is, unless the suit is simply seeking to vacate a final state-court judgment—or, in Rooker’s language, to “declare[]” it “null and void,” 263 U.S. at 414—
then the doctrine does not apply.
Thus, if the suit is seeking money damages, RookerFeldman would not apply. The same if, as in Sung Cho, it
is attacking some antecedent act to the final state court
judgment, such as the government’s enforcement
29
practices or a settlement agreement only later reflected
in a court order. Or if the suit challenges a separate and
subsequent act, such as an executive enforcement action
premised on the final state court judgment.
This simple rule, too, would have warded off the district courts in Hohenberg and Sung Cho.
***
It is time for the Court to fully abrogate the RookerFeldman doctrine. But short of that, the Court could do
worse than to adapt Chief Judge Sutton’s admonition to
the district courts: “Absent a claim seeking review of a
final state court judgment, a federal court tempted to dismiss a case under Rooker-Feldman should do one thing:
Stop. If the temptation lingers, the court should try something else: Reconsider.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 409.
And because there is no “final state court judgment” here
to review, Petitioner should prevail.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals’ judgment should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
BENJAMIN A. FIELD
Counsel of Record
TATE H. COOPER
INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE
901 North Glebe Rd.,
Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22203
(703) 682-9320
bfield@ ij.org
JANUARY 21, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.