Amicus Curiae Brief — T. M., Petitioner v. University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 21, 2026

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No. 25-197

In the Supreme Court of the United States

T.M.,

Petitioner,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF M ARYLAND

MEDICAL SYSTEM CORPORATION, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

BRIEF FOR THE INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

BENJAMIN A. FIELD

Counsel of Record

TATE H. COOPER

INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE

901 North Glebe Rd.,

Suite 900

Arlington, VA 22203

(703) 682-9320

bfield@ ij.org

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........................................2

ARGUMENT .......................................................................4

I. This Court Tried To Inter The Rooker-Feldman

Doctrine, But It Hasn’t Worked ............................4

A. IJ’s Experience Shows Rooker-Feldman

Continues To Impose Costly Delays................4

B. Empirical Evidence Indicates Lower Courts

Are (Ab)using Rooker-Feldman More Than

Ever .....................................................................9

C. This Evidence Reflects Real Costs From

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine ......................12

II. The Court Should Abrogate Rooker-Feldman ...13

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Is Wrong.....14

B. Rooker-Feldman Is Unworkable ...................18

C. No Reliance Interests Support

Rooker-Feldman ..............................................21

III. In The Alternative, And At Minimum, The Court

Should Go Further Than Exxon-Mobil To

Abrogate Feldman .................................................22

A. If The Court Will Not Jettison RookerFeldman Altogether, It Should Scrap

Feldman .................................................... 22

ii

B. The Court Should Also Articulate Important

Effects Of Abrogating Feldman.....................27

CONCLUSION..................................................................29

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,

546 U.S. 500 (2006) .......................................................18

Birchansky v. Clabaugh,

421 F. Supp. 3d 658 (S.D. Iowa 2018)...........................8

Brody v. Village of Port Chester,

No. 00-cv-7481, 2007 WL 704002

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) ..................................................9

Brucker v. City of Doraville,

No. 1:18-cv-02375, 2019 WL 3557893

(N.D. Ga. Apr. 1, 2019) ...................................................8

aff ’d, 38 F.4th 876 (11th Cir. 2022) ................................8

Chris H. v. New York,

764 F. App’x 53 (2d Cir. 2019) .....................................26

Collins v. Battle,

No. 1:14-cv-03824, 2015 WL 10550927

(N.D. Ga. July 28, 2015) .................................................8

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) .......................................................17

Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.,

603 U.S. 799 (2024) .......................................................17

D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983) ............................................. 2, 23, 24

iv

Eck v. Battle,

No. 1:14-cv-962, 2014 WL 11199420

(N.D. Ga. July 28, 2014) .................................................8

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005) ............. 3, 4, 7, 13, 15, 17, 21, 22, 25

Fambrough v. City of East Cleveland,

No. 1:22-cv-992, ECF No. 35

(N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2023)...............................................8

Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,

111 F.4th 754 (7th Cir. 2024) ..................................19, 20

Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc.,

65 F.4th 500 (10th Cir. 2023) ........................................19

Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson,

62 F.4th 394 (7th Cir. 2023) ..........................................20

Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections,

422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) .............................................26

Hohenberg v. Shelby County,

68 F.4th 336 (6th Cir. 2023) ...................... 5, 6, 17, 18, 20

Hohenberg v. Shelby County,

No. 2:20-cv-02432, 2022 WL 3088100

(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2022) ..........................................5, 8

In re Adams,

151 F.4th 144 (3d Cir. 2025) ........................................26

In re Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., LLC,

690 F. App’x 283 (5th Cir. 2017) ..................................20

v

Johnson v. De Grandy,

512 U.S. 997 (1994) .................................................26, 28

Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,

597 U.S. 507 (2022) .......................................................19

Knick v. Twp. of Scott,

588 U.S. 180 (2019) .......................................................17

Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,

508 U.S. 384 (1993) .........................................................4

Lance v. Dennis,

546 U.S. 459 (2006) ........................... 4, 13, 14, 26, 27, 28

Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024) ..................................... 14, 18, 19, 21

Marshall v. Marshall,

547 U.S. 293 (2006) .......................................................13

McClellan v. Carland,

217 U.S. 268 (1910) .......................................................25

Miroth v. County of Trinity,

136 F.4th 1141 (9th Cir. 2025) ................................20, 26

Reed v. Goertz,

598 U.S. 230 (2023) .......................................................26

Richwine v. Matuszak,

707 F. Supp. 3d 782 (N.D. Ind. 2023) ............................8

aff ’d, 148 F.4th 942 (7th Cir. 2025) ................................8

Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co.,

263 U.S. 413 (1923) ................................. 2, 15, 16, 23, 28

vi

Skinner v. Switzer,

562 U.S. 521 (2011) .......................................................26

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t,

523 U.S. 83 (1998) .........................................................16

Sung Cho v. City of New York,

910 F.3d 639 (2d Cir. 2018) ................................... 6, 7, 20

Sung Cho v. City of New York,

No. 1:16-cv-07961, 2018 WL 401512

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018).............................................7, 8

VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,

951 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2020)

...................................... 1, 9, 13, 17–19, 22–24, 26, 28, 29

Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,

535 U.S. 635 (2002) .................................................16, 26

STATUTES AND RULES

28 U.S.C. § 1257............................................................25, 27

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ............................................. 6, 15, 17, 20

28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) .............................................................15

28 U.S.C. § 1331............................................................14, 15

28 U.S.C. § 1343..................................................................15

28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3)-(4) ..................................................14

28 U.S.C. § 1738..............................................................3, 21

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) .............................................................15

vii

42 U.S.C. § 1983..................................................................14

Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-258,

39 Stat. 726 ..........................................................................16

Sup. Ct. R. 37.6 .....................................................................1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

18B Wright & Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed. 2025 update)

........................................................................................18

Bradford Higdon,

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: The Case for Putting

It to Work, Not to Rest

90 U. Cin. L. Rev. 352 (2021) .................................20–21

Class Action Compl.,

Sung Cho v. City of New York, No. 1:16-cv-07961

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2016), Dkt. No. 1 .............................7

Erwin Chemerinsky,

Federal Jurisdiction (8th ed. 2021).............................18

First Amended Civil Rights Compl.,

Hohenberg v. Shelby County, No. 2:20-cv-02432

(W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2020), Dkt. No. 16 ........................5

Jack Beerman,

Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be

Our Guide,

74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1209 (1999)............................18

viii

Raphael Graybill,

The Rook That Would Be King: Rooker-Feldman Abstention Analysis After Saudi Basic

32 Yale J. on Reg. 591 (2015) ............................. 9, 10, 11

Samuel Bray,

Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 Green Bag 2d 317

(2006) .............................................................................18

Stip. and Order of Settlement,

Sung Cho v. City of New York, No. 1:16-cv-07961

(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2020), Dkt. No. 111 ...........................7

Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,

Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It

Up?, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081 (1999) ..................18

1

“Rooker-Feldman continues to wreak havoc across the

country. * * * Notwithstanding Exxon Mobil’s efforts to

return Rooker-Feldman to its modest roots, lawyers continue to invoke the rule and judges continue to dismiss

federal actions under it. Here’s to urging the Court to

give one last requiem to Rooker-Feldman.”

-VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,

951 F.3d 397, 405 (6th Cir. 2020)

(Sutton, J., concurring)

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

The Institute for Justice (IJ) is a nonprofit public interest law firm that litigates to uphold individuals’ constitutional rights. We routinely file federal lawsuits focused

on our four pillars of economic liberty, private property

rights, free speech, and educational freedom. Our clients

stand up to unconstitutional laws and policies, but they

typically only learn they are subject to those unjust policies after facing enforcement. This is common not just for

IJ’s clients but for all civil-rights litigants, as any plaintiff

with a sufficiently certain injury to have standing will typically have faced enforcement. And that will often involve

a state court proceeding.

IJ carefully follows federal procedural rules to vindicate our clients’ rights. And we can do so because federal

procedural case law and state preclusion rules typically

yield comprehensible guidelines for their application. But

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an unpredictable animal

that is applied inconsistently, and often improperly, by

the lower courts. This Court has recognized that and has

1

In accordance with Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored this

brief in whole or in part, and no person other than amicus or its counsel have made any monetary contributions intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

2

repeatedly admonished that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is extremely narrow. Yet it continues to bedevil civilrights litigants. A chorus of judges, scholars, and members of this Court have condemned broad applications of

the doctrine, but lower federal courts have not gotten the

message.

It is meritorious civil-rights plaintiffs like IJ’s clients—and the federal rights they seek to vindicate—who

bear the costs. To protect their rights, we submit this

brief urging the Court to complete its decades-long project of curtailing Rooker-Feldman’s profligate use to improperly frustrate federal claims.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioner persuasively explains why the RookerFeldman doctrine,2 on its own terms, ought not apply to

state court judgments subject to further review. But we

urge the Court to resolve this case by answering an antecedent question: Should the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

continue to exist at all?

The answer is no. Claim and issue preclusion resolve

all the legitimate concerns Rooker-Feldman might address, and they are tethered to an actual statutory command. Rooker-Feldman, by contrast, is an atextual implication at odds with modern modes of statutory interpretation, and it continues to wreak havoc despite this

Court’s best efforts at restraint. Petitioner cogently argues for abrogating Rooker-Feldman as an in-the-alternative basis for prevailing. Pet’r Br. 44-47. We encourage

the Court to resolve this case on that ground, rather than

leaving Rooker-Feldman to haunt the lower courts.

Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

2

3

Part I explains that this Court’s efforts to cabin

Rooker-Feldman have failed. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the

Court instructed lower courts to apply the doctrine only

narrowly. IJ’s experience shows that courts have not honored those limits, and that both courts and defendants

continue raising the doctrine even when it plainly does not

apply. Litigating Rooker-Feldman delays cases, harming

civil-rights litigants who face ongoing abridgments of

their constitutional rights. We also present empirical evidence to confirm that IJ’s clients are hardly unique and

that Rooker-Feldman’s appearance in the lower courts

has consistently grown since Exxon Mobil.

Part II provides the solution: abrogate the RookerFeldman doctrine. This Court’s stare decisis factors sup-

port abrogation. First, the doctrine is poorly reasoned. It

goes beyond the statutory text to imply a jurisdictional

limitation that Congress never wrote into law. That offends this Court’s modern approaches to statutory interpretation and jurisdiction. Second, the doctrine has

proven unworkable—and lower courts have proven incorrigible. And last, there are no significant reliance interests in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. To the extent state

courts (or other actors) rely on federal courts respecting

state judgments, the full-faith-and-credit statute,

28 U.S.C. § 1738, fully protects those interests.

Part III offers a middle ground if the Court wishes to

more forcefully repudiate a broad Rooker-Feldman doctrine without wholly abrogating it. That would involve

overturning Feldman only, with its erroneous extension

of the doctrine to cases “inextricably intertwined” with

state court judgments. Feldman was an aberration, at

odds with how the Court has articulated the doctrine before and since. Overturning it would decisively narrow the

doctrine to apply only in cases that exactly replicate relief

4

obtainable in a cert petition available under Section 1257.

We also offer implications of this narrowing rule to provide guidance to the lower courts.

ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT TRIED TO INTER THE

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE, BUT IT

HASN’T WORKED.

From its humble origins and limited scope, lower federal courts expanded Rooker-Feldman to bar federal jurisdiction over an ever-growing array of cases related,

even tangentially, to prior state litigation. Exxon Mobil,

544 U.S. at 283. In response, this Court in Exxon Mobil

emphasized that Rooker-Feldman applies only in “limited

circumstances,” when a state-court loser asks a federal

court to reject a final state judgment. Id. at 291. But lower

courts didn’t get the message.

In this Part, we provide evidence from IJ’s own experience, alongside broader empirical data. Both show that

Rooker-Feldman continues to be raised and applied well

beyond the narrow scope this Court prescribed, imposing

real costs on litigants. Despite this Court’s efforts to “finally inter[] the so-called ‘Rooker-Feldman doctrine,’”

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 468 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting), it still stalks the lower courts’ jurisprudence

“[l]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie,” Lamb’s

Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.

384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

A.

IJ’s Experience Shows Rooker-Feldman

Continues To Impose Costly Delays.

IJ often litigates federal civil-rights cases with some

relation to state court proceedings. Even when those

cases fall far beyond the limited circumstances of Rooker

and Feldman, we still waste time and money refuting

5

spurious arguments relying on the doctrine. And sometimes the district court gives in to the doctrine’s siren

song, spawning needless appeals and delaying cases for

years.

1. That’s what happened to IJ client Sarah Hohenberg. She lost her Memphis home after the Shelby

County Environmental Court ordered her to leave and issued a warrant for her arrest. Hohenberg v. Shelby

County, 68 F.4th 336, 338 (6th Cir. 2023). She filed for

bankruptcy and was forced to flee to a motel in Mississippi. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint (Hohenberg

Complaint) 15, No. 2:20-cv-02432 (W.D. Tenn. July 6,

2020), Dkt. No. 16. That Environmental Court gives kangaroo courts a bad name: It doesn’t follow rules of evidence, didn’t allow Ms. Hohenberg to raise constitutional

issues, and didn’t even create a record from which she

could appeal. 68 F.4th at 338. So, with another homeowner, she sued, alleging that the government violated

their due-process rights by subjecting them to proceedings that lacked adequate procedural safeguards. Hohenberg Complaint at 21-23. Rather than challenging any final state court decision, our clients sought damages and a

declaration that the Environmental Court’s policies and

procedures were unconstitutional. Id. at 23-24.

The district court dismissed the suit under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, reasoning simply that state

court judgments were “at issue.” 2022 WL 3088100, at *5

(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 3, 2022). The district court even

acknowledged that the plaintiffs didn’t ask it to overturn

any judgments, but it still characterized the request for

declaratory relief and damages as “a request for appellate

review.” Id. at *6.

It took an appeal to the Sixth Circuit to fix. That court

decried “lower courts’ extravagant use of Rooker and

6

Feldman” to clear dockets. Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 340.

As it explained, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)’s negative jurisdictional implication can apply only when a federal suit challenges a state judgment and asks to “undo or overturn”

it. Id. (cleaned up). Ms. Hohenberg’s case did neither. The

allegations challenged how the Environmental Court operated, not the specific judgments it reached. Id. And

awarding damages or declaratory relief wouldn’t affect

any judgments. Id. at 340-41. Quite simply, the plaintiffs

“ha[d] not appealed anything,” and even if their claims

impugned the Environmental Court’s orders, that’s not

enough for Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional bar. Id. at

341-42.

Ms. Hohenberg’s case illustrates the harms imposed

by district courts’ continued over-application of RookerFeldman. Appeals are costly and time-consuming. In her

case, it took a year to clear up the Rooker-Feldman error.

The whole time, our client—who is elderly, with meager

resources—was denied a federal remedy. The case remains pending before the district court; Ms. Hohenberg

remains without stable housing.

2. IJ clients were forced to endure similar delay in

Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639 (2d Cir.

2018). There, a New York City abatement ordinance allowed the City to close properties where certain crimes

occurred, even if the owner had nothing to do with them.

Id. at 642. As a result, our clients faced eviction notices

even though they had committed no crimes. Id. at 643.

Under pressure from the City and its attorneys, they entered into settlement agreements that required them to

waive various constitutional rights. Id. State trial judges

then signed off on those agreements with a rote “so ordered” docket entry. Id.

7

Our clients filed a federal suit asserting the City’s

scheme unconstitutionally coerced them into waiving

their rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id. at 643-44; Class Action Complaint (Sung Cho Complaint) 40-49, No. 1:16-cv-07961, Dkt. No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.

12, 2016). As in Hohenberg, they didn’t appeal any state

court decision. Rather, they asked the district court to declare the City’s abatement ordinance unconstitutional, to

enjoin City officials from enforcing agreements obtained

via the ordinance, and to award nominal damages. 910

F.3d at 643-44; Sung Cho Complaint at 51-53.

At a motion-to-dismiss hearing, the district court sua

sponte raised Rooker-Feldman and requested supplemental briefing. Id. at 644. The court’s ultimate decision

quoted the standard from Exxon Mobil. 2018 WL 401512,

at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018) (citing Exxon Mobil, 544

U.S. at 284). But it nevertheless dismissed the case under

Rooker-Feldman. Id. at *4-5.

The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal. As it explained, the claim challenged the City’s conduct in enforcing the abatement ordinance through coercive settlement

agreements, not the state court decisions “so ordering”

those agreements. 910 F.3d at 645-46. And the harm was

divorced from any state court judgment. Unconstitutional

coercion was illegal regardless of any later judicial order,

and the settlement agreements themselves became effective before any court judgment. Id. at 647-49.

After the Second Circuit’s ruling, the City agreed not

to enforce agreements it had reached under the no-fault

abatement ordinance. Dkt. No. 111 at 4 (Oct. 2, 2020). But

that vindication of our clients’ rights was delayed by the

district court’s Rooker-Feldman error—first by four

months for supplemental briefing and consideration at

the district court, then for almost a year on appeal.

8

3. These two cases exemplify how this Court’s efforts

since 2005 to limit the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine have failed. Both erroneous district-court decisions

identified Exxon Mobil as articulating the correct standard. Hohenberg, 2022 WL 3088100, at *4; Sung Cho, 2018

WL 401512, at *3. Both cited circuit court cases limiting

the doctrine after Exxon Mobil. Hohenberg, 2022 WL

3088100, at *5; Sung Cho, 2018 WL 401512, at *3. Yet both

wrongly applied the doctrine anyway.

These are two egregious examples where district

courts erroneously dismissed our clients’ cases. But they

are far from the only times IJ has had to fend off spurious

invocations of Rooker-Feldman across widely varying circumstances. See, e.g., Richwine v. Matuszak, 707 F. Supp.

3d 782, 794-95 (N.D. Ind. 2023) (rejecting Rooker-Feldman in free-speech challenge to state statute after ordering supplemental briefing), aff’d, 148 F.4th 942 (7th Cir.

2025); Fambrough v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:22-cv992, ECF No. 35 at 6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2023) (court sua

sponte ordering Rooker-Feldman briefing in First

Amendment retaliation case); Brucker v. City of Doraville, No. 1:18-cv-02375, 2019 WL 3557893, at *4-5 (N.D.

Ga. Apr. 1, 2019) (rejecting Rooker-Feldman in procedural-due-process challenge to structure of a municipal

court), aff’d, 38 F.4th 876, 882 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022);

Birchansky v. Clabaugh, 421 F. Supp. 3d 658, 665-68 (S.D.

Iowa 2018) (Rooker-Feldman did not bar constitutional

challenge to certificate-of-need requirement for outpatient surgery centers); Collins v. Battle, No. 1:14-cv03824, 2015 WL 10550927, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ga. July 28,

2015) (rejecting Rooker-Feldman when government

acknowledged it didn’t apply after having moved to dismiss on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Eck v. Battle, No.

1:14-cv-962, 2014 WL 11199420, at *3 (N.D. Ga. July 28,

2014) (rejecting government’s argument Rooker-

9

Feldman applied to state administrative decisions);

Brody v. Village of Port Chester, No. 00-cv-7481, 2007

WL 704002, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007) (rejecting government Rooker-Feldman argument in due-process challenge to inadequate notice in condemnation proceedings).

B.

Empirical Evidence Indicates Lower

Courts Are (Ab)using Rooker-Feldman

More Than Ever.

Broader empirical evidence indicates IJ’s experience

is not unique. In preparing this brief, we conducted a

Westlaw search across just the year 2025, which showed

that district and circuit courts used the term “RookerFeldman” in 1,956 cases.3 And Rooker-Feldman issues

continue to inundate this Court. In October Term 2024

alone, this Court received 33 filings at the certiorari stage

citing “Rooker-Feldman.” Since the start of 2020, that figure is 223 filings. That doesn’t suggest that courts are limiting the doctrine’s application.

A 2015 study showed the doctrine’s use had grown

dramatically since Exxon Mobil sought to restrain

Rooker-Feldman in 2005. See Raphael Graybill, The

Rook That Would Be King: Rooker-Feldman Abstention

Analysis After Saudi Basic, 32 Yale J. on Reg. 591 (2015);

see also VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 407 (Sutton, J., concurring) (noting paper’s findings matched personal judicial experience). The paper looked at Rooker-Feldman’s

usage in three ways across four different four-year periods. First, it evaluated the total number of cases using the

phrase “Rooker-Feldman.” Graybill, supra, at 597-98.

Then, it identified cases where the courts likely applied

the doctrine by searching for “Rooker-Feldman” within

25 words of terms suggesting that a court used the

3

A similar Lexis search identified “Rooker-Feldman” in 2,051 cases.

10

doctrine to bar jurisdiction (“applies,” “lacks jurisdiction,” or “bars”). Id. at 598. Finally, the paper tallied cases

where courts likely rejected the doctrine by searching for

“Rooker-Feldman” within 25 words of terms suggesting

the doctrine didn’t apply (“does not bar,” “does not apply,” or “inapplicable”). Id. And to test whether the

change in frequency differed from other types of cases,

the paper also tracked the frequency of two control terms:

“Fourth Amendment” and “auto! accident.” Id. at 597.

Graybill’s results are striking: Lower courts followed

Exxon Mobil “with a significant increase in the number of

cases citing and applying Rooker-Feldman.” Id. at 599.

The growth substantially outpaced the control terms, id.,

and the study’s methodology suggested most of those

cases were applying the doctrine to bar suits, id. at 599600. Graybill concluded that “the Supreme Court and the

district courts live in different worlds.” Id. at 598-99.

More recent evidence shows those worlds aren’t getting any closer. We replicated that paper’s methodology

for the most recent four-year period (January 1, 2022, to

January 1, 2026) and found that the total number of district court cases citing Rooker-Feldman has increased yet

again by over 80%—from Graybill’s 3,066 cases identified

in the 2010-2014 period, to 5,539 cases we identified in the

most recent four-year period.4 And the district court

cases likely to have applied a Rooker-Feldman bar based

on the paper’s search terms increased by 70%. In short,

replicating the analysis on more recent data suggests that

district courts are citing Rooker-Feldman ever more often, and they’re applying it to bar ever more cases.

4

Because some 2025 cases may be added to Westlaw after we file this

brief in late January 2026, the numbers may grow.

11

A graph of those numbers is startling. Here we replicate and combine Tables 1 and 3 from Graybill’s original

paper, see id. at 598-600, and add our analysis of the most

recent four-year period. It shows that the number of

cases citing Rooker-Feldman and those seemingly applying the doctrine only continue to grow exponentially:

District Court Citations to

Rooker-Feldman

6000

Number of Cases

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0

19972001

20012005

20062010

20102014

20222026

Total R-F Cites

347

656

2239

3066

5539

Cases Applying R-F

161

317

1046

1677

2855

12

C.

This Evidence Reflects Real Costs From

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine.

IJ is just one civil-rights law firm, and our clients’ experiences show that Rooker-Feldman comes up again and

again, delaying justice for our clients by years. The national numbers confirm that our experience is not unusual. These examples and data tell a story of unnecessary

litigation costs and of delayed (or denied) justice.

And the IJ experiences may be comparatively rosy. At

least our clients eventually prevailed over the RookerFeldman doctrine. But IJ is an experienced civil-rights

law firm that’s well equipped to anticipate and litigate difficult procedural issues. Most victims of constitutional violations come to court with fewer resources and less experience—and maybe even without a lawyer. In 2025, for

example, two-thirds of published circuit court opinions

vacated or reversed district courts’ Rooker-Feldman dismissals. The picture was different for pro se plaintiffs.

Among unpublished circuit court opinions, a far higher

proportion affirmed dismissals under Rooker-Feldman,

and our review of those cases showed that most involved

pro se plaintiffs. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine sets a

trap even for experienced litigators and federal judges;

no wonder it ensnares less experienced litigants.

IJ’s experience and the statistics of Rooker-Feldman’s usage in the lower courts show that the doctrine

continues to thwart federal consideration of suits within

the district courts’ jurisdiction. Half-measures and admonishments to curtail the doctrine have failed.

13

II.

THE

COURT

SHOULD

ROOKER-FELDMAN.

ABROGATE

As Part I reinforces, “Rooker-Feldman continues to

wreak havoc across the country.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d

at 405 (Sutton, J., concurring). It has “bec[o]me a prolific

source of controversy, spawning a brood of lower-court

heirs,” “an untethered way for federal courts to defer to

state court litigation of related cases and controversies

and a new way to avoid deciding federal questions.” Id. at

406. That is even though this Court has never treated the

doctrine so extravagantly, and since 1983 has “never applied Rooker-Feldman to dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction,” instead only mentioning the doctrine “in passing or to explain why” the doctrine “did not dictate dismissal.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 287.

In Exxon Mobil, this Court tried to narrow the doctrine. The gist of the opinion was that “unless your name

was Rooker or Feldman,” the doctrine’s “supposed limit

on the jurisdiction of the federal courts applied to” practically “no one.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 405 (Sutton,

J., concurring). A year later, Lance reaffirmed that

“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another

name” and “applies only in ‘limited circumstances.’” 546

U.S. at 466; accord id. at 467-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

One justice took away the lesson that the Court had definitively buried the doctrine. See Marshall v. Marshall,

547 U.S. 293, 318 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)

(“I would provide the creature with a decent burial in a

grave adjacent to the resting place of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”).

But the evidence reveals the doctrine’s vitality has not

been sapped. It’s now time for this Court to complete the

project begun in Exxon Mobil and to “finally inter[] the

so-called ‘Rooker-Feldman doctrine.’” Lance, 546 U.S. at

14

468 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “[T]he stare decisis considerations most relevant here—the quality of the [doctrine’s] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, and reliance on the [doctrine]—all weigh in favor

of letting [Rooker-Feldman] go.” Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 407 (2024) (cleaned up). We address each element in turn.

A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Is Wrong.

1. Congress has expressly given the district courts

broad jurisdiction over a wide range of suits, including

federal-question jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Likewise, district courts have

broad civil-rights jurisdiction over claims “[t]o redress

the deprivation * * * of any right, privilege or immunity

secured by the Constitution of the United States” or “[t]o

recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of

civil rights.” Id. § 1343(a)(3)-(4); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Many (if not most) litigants with a concrete-enough injury for standing to challenge an unconstitutional law or

policy will have faced application of that law to them, often

in a court proceeding. And federal litigation over the constitutionality of that law will often overlap with, or even

undermine, how the law was applied in state court. Yet

such suits for damages or equitable remedies fall

squarely within the express terms of Congress’s jurisdictional grants to the district courts. IJ’s cases discussed

above are examples.

2. Against Congress’s broad, express grants of district-court jurisdiction stands Rooker and Feldman’s curious interpretation of Section 1257 and its predecessor.

All that statute says is that this Court has jurisdiction to

review “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the

15

highest court of a State in which a decision could be had,”

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), and that the D.C. Court of Appeals

shall be treated as a state high court for those purposes,

id. § 1257(b). It says nothing about the district courts’ jurisdiction; much less does it strip them of any.

Nevertheless, Rooker said that Section 1257’s predecessor implied that “no court of the United States other

than this [C]ourt” could hear proceedings that fall within

its ambit. 263 U.S. at 416. Subsequent cases assumed that

was correct. E.g., Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292 (observing

Section 1257 has been “long interpreted” to “vest[] authority to review a state court’s judgment solely in this

Court”). But in each of those cases, the Court has simply

restated Rooker’s conclusory interpretation without

squarely justifying the negative implication from Section

1257’s affirmative grant of jurisdiction.

In the same breath, the Court has recognized that

nothing stops Congress from giving the district courts

concurrent jurisdiction with this Court. See id. at 292 n.8.

Indeed, the habeas statutes give this Court, the circuit

courts, and district courts the same concurrent power to

“entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Why statutes like 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343 should not be treated the same way has never been

explained. 5

5

Perhaps recognizing that Section 1257’s text provides little support

for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Respondents also note that jurisdiction-granting statutes like Section 1331 are limited to conferring

“original” jurisdiction on the district courts. See BIO 27-28. But

treating that single word “original” as a font for an expansive

Rooker-Feldman-style doctrine has all the same problems as

Rooker-Feldman itself by extracting a sweeping and unpredictable

jurisdictional bar from the thinnest of textual bases. The general rule

of the district courts’ federal-question jurisdiction is broad: They

16

Pragmatic considerations may explain the Rooker decision better than principled statutory interpretation.

When it was decided in 1923, this Court still had mandatory jurisdiction over most appeals asserting federal constitutional errors. See Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64258, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726-27. Indeed, it was even required

by statute to hear a direct appeal of the Rooker case from

the district court. 263 U.S. at 415 (citing Judicial Code,

§ 238, codified at Comp. St. § 1215). So the Court had a

strong motive to interpret Section 1257’s predecessor to

bar district-court jurisdiction, to prevent meritless appeals from making their way onto an overcrowded docket.

That would be especially tempting in a case like Rooker,

where the plaintiff had already brought the case to this

Court and failed to achieve review, only to file anew in district court. Id. at 414-15. But Rooker could have reached

the same result, on the merits, by applying normal principles of res judicata to give preclusive effect to the final

judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court. It’s understandable why the Court might have wanted a jurisdictional

docket-clearing rule in an era of so much mandatory jurisdiction, but that does not make Rooker’s atextual statutory interpretation more persuasive.

3. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also lacks “consistency with other related decisions” about the jurisdiction of the federal district courts in the century since

have jurisdiction if the claim turns on the proper “construction” of

“the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Verizon Md. Inc. v.

Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). That some of these

cases over which Congress has granted original jurisdiction may

cover similar subject matters to cases within Section 1257’s ambit, or

may function as a collateral attack on some prior judgment, is no reason to infer that Congress didn’t mean what it said in granting the

district courts broad jurisdiction over federal questions.

17

Rooker. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 203 (2019)

(citation omitted).

First, implying an atextual jurisdictional exception

conflicts with “the virtually unflagging obligation of the

federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). That’s why, as Exxon Mobil held,

the mere fact that similar questions have come up in state

and federal cases does not strip jurisdiction from the district courts. 544 U.S. at 292. To the contrary, RookerFeldman’s broad application in the lower courts has had

the improper effect of “overriding Congress’ conferral of

federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts.” Id. at 283.

The doctrine is also at odds with this Court’s modern

textualist approach to statutory interpretation. Section

1257 simply provides that a certain set of cases “may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.” 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a). As this Court reads statutes today, what

matters first and foremost is what the text says. E.g.,

Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys.,

603 U.S. 799, 815 (2024). And nothing in Section 1257’s

grant of jurisdiction takes anything away from the district courts’ jurisdiction.

To make matters worse, Rooker-Feldman is a jurisdictional rule. Not only does that invite lower courts to

raise the doctrine sua sponte as a docket-clearing tool; it

also conflicts with this “Court’s recent efforts to tighten

the screws on the meaning of subject matter jurisdiction.”

VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 407-08 (Sutton, J., concurring)

(collecting cases). As this Court “has reminded us nearly

once a year for almost two decades, we should not lightly

use jurisdictional rules to pinch-hit for non-jurisdictional

ones.” Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at 340-41 (collecting cases);

18

see, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006)

(“Jurisdiction, this Court has observed, is a word of many,

too many, meanings. This Court, no less than other

courts, has sometimes been profligate in its use of the

term.” (cleaned up)).

4. Unsurprisingly, then, “[s]cholars” have “criticized

[Rooker-Feldman] and urged the Supreme Court to reassess.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 406 (Sutton, J., concurring) (collecting sources); accord Hohenberg, 68 F.4th at

340 (similar); see, e.g., 18B Wright & Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 4469.1 (3d ed. 2025 update) (describing Rooker-Feldman as “nearly redundant” of preclusion principles and observing that “room remains to

limit it still further”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 897 (8th ed. 2021) (“[I]t is unclear what the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine adds to other doctrines[.]”);

Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 Green Bag

2d 317, 317-18 (2006) (“Rooker Feldman, the legal personality, died yesterday * * * . It is hoped that he leaves no

survivors.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman:

Worth Only the Powder To Blow It Up?, 74 Notre Dame

L. Rev. 1081, 1084 (1999) (“The academy has done its job,

and now it is the Court’s turn.”); Jack Beerman, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be Our

Guide, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1209, 1209 (1999) (“I have

been unable to think of another legal doctrine that lacks

both a clear role and a clear justification.”).

B.

Rooker-Feldman Is Unworkable.

“Experience has also shown that [Rooker-Feldman] is

unworkable.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 407. As Part I reveals, this Court’s efforts to rein in the doctrine have not

worked. Instead, this Court has had “to clarify the doctrine again and again.” Id. at 409. Like other doctrines

this Court has abandoned after disuse, Rooker-Feldman

19

has not been applied by this Court since Feldman in 1983,

even as it continues to be misused in the lower courts. Cf.

id. at 410 (“[W]e have avoided deferring under Chevron

since 2016.”); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S.

507, 535 n.4 (2022) (“In the last two decades, this Court

has often criticized or ignored Lemon and its endorsement test variation.”).

At the same time, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine remains a source of turmoil in the lower courts, and its

(mis)use is only growing. Experience since Exxon Mobil

has shown that the doctrine “cannot be constrained by admonishing courts to be extra careful, or by tacking on a

new batch of conditions.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 411.

Even as this Court moved away from Feldman’s mischiefinviting “inextricably intertwined” test, lower courts continue to dismiss cases by applying that standard. See, e.g.,

Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th

754, 761, 767 n.5 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (rejecting district court’s reliance on the “inextricably intertwined”

standard); Graff v. Aberdeen Enterprizes, II, Inc., 65

F.4th 500, 516 & n.18 (10th Cir. 2023) (reversing district

court order dismissing federal claims as “inextricably intertwined” with state-court judgments). Experience has

proved that only a definitive end to the doctrine can fix

the problem.

Even where circuit courts have tried to follow this

Court’s lead and restrain the doctrine, it has not stopped

district courts from overly broad applications of RookerFeldman. IJ’s Hohenberg case is a perfect example. It

arose in the Sixth Circuit, where now-Chief Judge Sutton

had given district judges flashing warnings not to apply

the doctrine. See VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 409 (Sutton,

J., concurring) (“[A] federal court tempted to dismiss a

case under Rooker-Feldman should do one thing: Stop.”).

But that did not stop the surely well-intentioned district

20

judge in Hohenberg from reaching for the doctrine to

clear the docket. Only yet another opinion from Chief

Judge Sutton—after a long delay for appeal—set things

right. 68 F.4th at 340.

Not only have the district courts been unable to follow

this Court’s guidance over the past two decades, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine has also spawned Ptolemaic

elaborations and conflicts among the circuit courts. For

instance, the Second Circuit has discerned a four-prong

test for the doctrine, rather than reading Exxon Mobil to

be a narrow one-prong test about the bounds of Section

1257. See Sung Cho, 910 F.3d at 645; accord Pet. App. 9a;

contra Miroth v. County of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1151

(9th Cir. 2025) (referring to two elements); Hohenberg,

68 F.4th at 340 (“§ 1257(a)’s negative implication requires

two unusual things” (emphasis added)). And the multi-circuit split presented in this case is just one of several questions that have flummoxed the lower courts. See, e.g., In

re Cleveland Imaging & Surgical Hosp., LLC, 690 F.

App’x 283, 286 (5th Cir. 2017) (recognizing circuit split on

whether Rooker-Feldman applies to judgments that are

void ab initio); Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 769 (five judges concluding Rooker-Feldman bars certain damages claims);

id. at 789 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment)

(“Rooker-Feldman does not deprive federal district

courts of jurisdiction to award damages for injury caused

by a state court’s judgment.”); id. at 797-98 (Kirsch, J.,

concurring in part) (six judges concluding Rooker-Feldman generally does not apply to damages claims); HadziTanovic v. Johnson, 62 F.4th 394, 406 (7th Cir. 2023) (identifying only one other circuit that applied a similar “corruption exception”); but see id. at 413 (Kirsch, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (identifying that

“nearly every other circuit” applied a similar “corruption

exception”); see also Bradford Higdon, The Rooker-

21

Feldman Doctrine: The Case for Putting It to Work, Not

to Rest, 90 U. Cin. L. Rev. 352, 362-64 (2021) (identifying

multiple post-Exxon Mobil circuit splits).

C.

No Reliance Interests Support RookerFeldman.

“Nor has [Rooker-Feldman] been the sort of stable

background rule that fosters meaningful reliance.” Loper

Bright, 603 U.S. at 410 (cleaned up). Indeed, what this

Court said about the Chevron doctrine when discarding it

applies remarkably well to Rooker-Feldman: Given the

Court’s “turn away from [Rooker-Feldman], and its inconsistent application by the lower courts, it * * * is hard

to see how anyone * * * could reasonably expect a court

to rely on [Rooker-Feldman] in any particular case.”

Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 410 (cleaned up).

If it’s foolish for litigants to rely on Rooker-Feldman,

who would? Certainly not Congress or state courts. To

the extent Congress wants to give force to state judgments, it has codified that in the Full Faith and Credit

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293.

State courts can rely on that to ensure respect for their

judgments. And to the extent state courts would not give

preclusive effect to a judgment in a subsequent action,

they can hardly be said to rely on the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine to bar suits they would not preclude themselves.

Instead, the state courts’ experience reveals that

there is no need for a Rooker-Feldman doctrine:

The state courts have not had problems dealing

with overlapping state and federal court decisions

from the other direction. Claim and issue preclusion principles have worked just fine in deciding

how to deal with a pending or final federal court

action with overlapping issues. To my knowledge,

there is no Rooker-Feldman equivalent in the fifty

22

state high courts. We might learn a thing or two

from them.

VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 408 (Sutton, J., concurring).

III.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, AND AT MINIMUM, THE COURT SHOULD GO FURTHER

THAN EXXON-MOBIL TO ABROGATE

FELDMAN.

This case presents the Court’s first occasion to seriously revisit the Rooker-Feldman doctrine since it last

did so two decades ago in Exxon Mobil and Lance. Experience has shown that those cases have not worked in the

lower courts, and so this Court should take the opportunity to wholly abrogate the atextual and unnecessary

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. But if this Court is reluctant

to go so far, we present a half-way alternative: abrogating

Feldman without revisiting Rooker. In Subpart A we explain why this would be warranted, and in Subpart B articulate some of the specific rules that would emerge from

this more limited abrogation.

A.

If The Court Will Not Jettison RookerFeldman Altogether, It Should Scrap

Feldman.

Put simply: although Rooker was wrong, Feldman

was worse. In the sixty years between the two, Rooker

appeared only in passing in one of this Court’s opinions

and in one dissent from denial of cert. See Exxon Mobil,

544 U.S. at 288 n.3. But Feldman, with its loose “inextricably intertwined” dicta, unleashed a genie that even

Exxon Mobil could not put back in the bottle. At minimum, then, the Court should take Chief Judge Sutton’s

invitation to “go[] back to the first link in this chain”—

Rooker itself—and ditch the overweening “Rooker-Feldman doctrine” in favor of a more modest “1257 Rule” or

“Supreme Court review rule” closely tethered to the

23

narrow terms of Section 1257. VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at

409 (Sutton, J., concurring).

1. Even if this Court is disinclined to overturn Rooker,

it should reaffirm that Justice Van Devanter’s short opinion was no sweeping exception to Congress’s grants of jurisdiction, but instead a narrow implication from the predecessor statute to Section 1257. See 263 U.S. at 416 (interpreting Judicial Code, § 237, then codified at Comp. St.

§ 1214). Rooker’s facts exemplified its narrow reach: The

plaintiff lost in state trial court; that was affirmed by the

state supreme court; the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought

U.S. Supreme Court review; and finally, after all that, the

plaintiff tried again and sought the exact same relief in

federal district court with the same parties as the state

proceedings. Id. at 414-15. Worse still, the time for seeking such review had expired. Id. at 416. And the relief she

sought was directly “declar[ing]” a state-court judgment

“null and void.” Id. at 414. All Rooker established was that

for a case so clearly in the heartland of Section 1257’s predecessor, the Court would not allow an alternate route to

federal court.

2. But the unusual circumstances of Rooker—and the

tersely reasoned opinion that resulted—provided no basis

for Feldman’s more expansive ruling. In Feldman, the

plaintiffs were not seeking a do-over from a failed cert petition (they appear not to have filed any). Indeed, the relief they sought did not directly attack any state court final judgment, much less seek to declare it “null and void”

as in Rooker. Instead, the Feldman plaintiffs were challenging D.C.’s bar-admission rules under both the federal

Constitution and antitrust laws. Rather than asking to reverse a final state judgment, the relief they sought was to

invalidate the underlying bar-admission rules and an order allowing them to sit for the bar exam. 460 U.S. at 46869 & n.3, 472-73. This Court correctly recognized the

24

thrust of the plaintiffs’ lawsuits was well within the district court’s jurisdiction, insofar as they were “a general

attack on the constitutionality” of the bar rules. Id. at 487.

But in rejecting a narrow part of the plaintiffs’ claims,

Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court unleashed the

sprawling Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The opinion held

that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims “to the extent” they “sought review” of the

D.C. high court’s “denial of their petitions for waiver” of

the bar requirements. Id. at 482. But the Court provided

little guidance on how to separate that aspect of the

claims from the permissible aspects attacking the bar

rules. Worse still, the phrase the Court chose—things “inextricably intertwined” with the state court adjudication,

id. at 486—was both vague and untethered from Section

1257’s text. Lower courts took that phrase and ran with

it. See VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 406 (Sutton, J., concurring) (“The Court’s suggestion that federal courts lack jurisdiction over claims ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state

court ‘decisions’ became a prolific source of controversy,

spawning a brood of lower-court heirs.” (cleaned up)).

Justice Stevens’s dissent in Feldman was more persuasive. As he noted, a “collateral attack upon the unconstitutional application of [the bar-admission] rules” was

plainly within Section 1331’s grant of federal-question jurisdiction. 460 U.S. at 490 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “There

may be other reasons for denying relief to the plaintiff,”

including “claim or issue preclusion,” “[b]ut it does violence to jurisdictional concepts for this Court to hold * * *

that the federal district court has no jurisdiction to conduct independent review of a specific claim that a licensing body’s action did not comply with federal constitutional standards.” Id. The majority would have done better to stick to its core jurisdictional holding—that the

crux of the plaintiffs’ claims were within the district

25

court’s jurisdiction—and leave for remand whether the

D.C. courts’ prior rulings would have any effect on the

merits through doctrines like claim and issue preclusion.

3. This Court’s opinions since Feldman strongly suggest it was a misstep. As Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for a

unanimous Court acknowledged in Exxon Mobil, the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the lower courts had come to

be “construed to extend far beyond the contours of the

Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts.” 544 U.S. at 283. In Exxon

Mobil, the only references to the “inextricably intertwined” standard were in describing Feldman and noting

that the court of appeals had applied the “inextricably intertwined” test. Id. at 286 & n.1, 291.

But this Court pointedly did not apply the “inextricably intertwined” standard or anything like it. To the contrary, it made clear that “parallel state and federal litigation” is not sufficient to “trigger[]” the Section 1257 jurisdictional bar. Id. at 292. Rather, “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning

the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.”

Id. (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282

(1910)). Even more decisive in repudiating any inextricably-intertwined standard, the Court was clear: “Nor does

§ 1257 stop a district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state

court.” Id. at 293. Instead, district courts can have jurisdiction over such a claim, even if it is “one that denies a

legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to

which [the plaintiff] was a party.” Id. (citation omitted).

Since Exxon Mobil, the Court has consistently retreated from Feldman’s loose articulation. The next year

26

in Lance, the Court rejected applying Rooker-Feldman

where parties to the state court litigation differed from

those in the federal litigation. The Court again chided

lower courts for reading Rooker and Feldman as “a widereaching bar” and observed that the Court’s “cases since

Feldman have tended to emphasize the narrowness of the

Rooker-Feldman rule.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464.

The Court’s cases since have continued to reject arguments that the doctrine should apply, effectively disavowing anything as freewheeling as Feldman’s inextricablyintertwined standard. See Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230,

234-35 (2023); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 531-33

(2011); accord Verizon, 535 U.S. at 644 n.3; Johnson v. De

Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). 6

All told, this Court’s Rooker-Feldman cases reflect

that Feldman is an aberration. From Rooker on, the

Court has hewed to treating the doctrine as barring jurisdiction only when a case would directly implicate Section

1257’s grant of jurisdiction. Feldman is the only case expanding the doctrine further.

4. Thus, even if the Court wishes to retain Rooker’s

central holding about Section 1257’s jurisdictional exclusivity, that can be honored with a far simpler “1257 Rule”

or “Supreme Court review rule” in place of the RookerFeldman doctrine. VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 409 (Sutton,

6

Some judges have taken the hint that “the phrase ‘inextricably intertwined’ has no independent content” given post-Feldman precedents from this Court. Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422

F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2005); accord, e.g., In re Adams, 151 F.4th 144,

155 (3d Cir. 2025); Miroth, 136 F.4th at 1147. That lower-court judges

have (correctly) taken to ignoring Feldman’s central innovation is

more reason to formally abandon that decision. All the more so because other judges, even in the same circuits, still apply the “inextricably intertwined” test, e.g., Chris H. v. New York, 764 F. App’x 53,

56 (2d Cir. 2019)—reflecting the unpredictability of the doctrine.

27

J., concurring). Under that narrower rule, if a lawsuit in

district court is exactly replicating what Section 1257 allows through a cert petition, then Section 1257 would bar

the suit. If there is any difference, it would not.

This case illustrates one way the rule would work. For

Section 1257 to bar a suit, it must apply in the first place.

In Petitioner’s case, there are no “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a

decision could be had.” 28 U.S.C. § 1257. So she does not

fall within the bounds of Section 1257, and accordingly it

does not bar district-court jurisdiction. This Court already strongly suggested that result in Lance, where it

indicated that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because the

plaintiff was “not in a position to ask this Court to review

the state court’s judgment.” 546 U.S. at 465 (cleaned up).

Short of ditching Rooker-Feldman altogether, the Court

should make Lance’s suggestion explicit by abrogating

Feldman in favor of a narrow rule that Rooker will apply

only to cases that exactly replicate what Section 1257

makes available via cert petition.

B.

The Court Should Also Articulate Important Effects Of Abrogating Feldman.

In addition to formally overturning Feldman and reversing the court of appeals’ judgment in this case, the

Court can helpfully rein in the lower courts by elaborating

some results that would entail for other cases. We suggest

three such principles here that would go a long way to

clearing up misuse of the doctrine in the lower courts.

1. Although the Court in Exxon Mobil and Lance implied the end of the inextricably-intertwined standard,

abrogating Feldman should mean formally rejecting it.

That language continues to be a basis for district courts

to apply Rooker-Feldman in an overbroad manner and

for defendants to argue for such application. It’s

28

especially easy for that to happen with an unsophisticated

or pro se plaintiff. He may not realize the subsequent retreat from Feldman, and so may not present the district

judge or magistrate judge with more recent precedents

that cast doubt on the inextricably-intertwined test.

On this point, we would urge the Court to adopt Chief

Judge Sutton’s formulation explicitly: The Rooker-Feldman “doctrine does not apply to federal lawsuits presenting similar issues to those decided in a state court case or

even to cases that present exactly the same, and thus the

most inextricably intertwined, issues.” VanderKodde, 951

F.3d at 406 (Sutton, J., concurring).

2. The Court should make clear that when a federal

case has different parties from the prior state court case,

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not apply. A statement

like that could have warned off the district courts from

making the errors they did in both Hohenberg and Sung

Cho. This Court already strongly suggested such a rule in

Lance, when it rejected a parties-in-privity expansion of

Rooker-Feldman. 546 U.S. at 466; see also De Grandy,

512 U.S. at 1005-06 (“invocation of Rooker/Feldman” is

“inapt” where plaintiff “was not a party in the state

court”). It should make the general rule explicit.

3. Likewise, the Court should be clear that if a suit is

seeking any sort of relief that could not be obtained

through a cert petition, it does not fall within RookerFeldman. That is, unless the suit is simply seeking to vacate a final state-court judgment—or, in Rooker’s language, to “declare[]” it “null and void,” 263 U.S. at 414—

then the doctrine does not apply.

Thus, if the suit is seeking money damages, RookerFeldman would not apply. The same if, as in Sung Cho, it

is attacking some antecedent act to the final state court

judgment, such as the government’s enforcement

29

practices or a settlement agreement only later reflected

in a court order. Or if the suit challenges a separate and

subsequent act, such as an executive enforcement action

premised on the final state court judgment.

This simple rule, too, would have warded off the district courts in Hohenberg and Sung Cho.

***

It is time for the Court to fully abrogate the RookerFeldman doctrine. But short of that, the Court could do

worse than to adapt Chief Judge Sutton’s admonition to

the district courts: “Absent a claim seeking review of a

final state court judgment, a federal court tempted to dismiss a case under Rooker-Feldman should do one thing:

Stop. If the temptation lingers, the court should try something else: Reconsider.” VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 409.

And because there is no “final state court judgment” here

to review, Petitioner should prevail.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals’ judgment should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted.

BENJAMIN A. FIELD

Counsel of Record

TATE H. COOPER

INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE

901 North Glebe Rd.,

Suite 900

Arlington, VA 22203

(703) 682-9320

bfield@ ij.org

JANUARY 21, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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