Opposition Brief — Serafim Georgios Katergaris, Petitioner v. City of New York, New York
Supreme Court briefDec 5, 2025
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No. 25-187
In the Supreme Court of the United States
SERAFIM GEORGIOS KATERGARIS,
v.
Petitioner,
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
MURIEL GOODE-TRUFANT
Corporation Counsel of
the City of New York
RICHARD DEARING
Counsel of Record
CLAUDE S. PLATTON
HANNAH J. SAROKIN
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 356-2500
rdearing@law.nyc.gov
QUESTION PRESENTED
In 2022, petitioner Serafim Katergaris sued the
City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
the denial of due process in connection with a violation issued by the City in 2015 for a missed boilerinspection report for his property. Petitioner alleged
that he had not learned of the violation until 2021.
The district court granted summary judgment to
the City, holding that the claim was untimely under
the three-year statute of limitations. It concluded
that the City’s evidence of proper mailing of a notice
of violation to petitioner’s address in March 2015
triggered a presumption of receipt under the federalcommon-law “mailbox rule.” Although petitioner denied receiving the notice, he failed to rebut the presumption because the undisputed evidence established that he did not live at the property during the
period when the notice was sent; he failed to proffer
any evidence from his then-wife, who did live there;
the property had no mailbox, and mail was either
left on the ground outside or in a plastic bag tied to
the fence; and petitioner conceded that it was “quite
possible” that his mail would be delivered and then
lost before he became aware of it. The court of appeals affirmed in a nonprecedential decision.
The question presented is: Did the court of appeals correctly hold that petitioner failed to rebut
the presumption of receipt?
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED ....................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................... ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .................................................... 1
STATEMENT ........................................................... 3
A.
The mailed notice of violation and
petitioner’s unreliable system of mail
retrieval ......................................................... 3
B.
Petitioner’s lawsuit against the City and
the decisions below ........................................ 6
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION ........ 9
A.
This case is a poor vehicle for addressing
the question presented. ................................. 9
B.
There is no split in authority requiring the
Court’s intervention. ................................... 15
C.
The case does not present an important
issue warranting this Court’s review. ........ 24
CONCLUSION ....................................................... 27
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Akey v. Clinton Cty.,
375 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2004) ................................ 16
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986) ............................................ 17
Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp.,
283 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2002) .................... 13, 20
Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc.,
75 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1996) ................................ 15
California v. Rooney,
483 U.S. 307 (1987) ............................................ 10
Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
503 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2007) .............................. 20
Del. Valley Floral Group, Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets,
LLC,
597 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010)........................... 15
Ebner v. Bank of N.S.,
795 F. App’x 107 (3d Cir. 2020).............. 14, 23, 25
Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l Hepa Certificate Corp.,
817 F.3d 380 (1st Cir. 2016) ............................... 14
iii
Faciane v. Sun Life Assur. Co.,
931 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2019) .............................. 20
Free v. Wal-Mart La., LLC,
815 F. App’x 765 (5th Cir. 2020) ........................ 15
Gabaldon v. N.M. State Police,
139 F.4th 1207 (10th Cir. 2025) ......................... 15
Galvin v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
488 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2007)........................... 15
Garang v. City of Ames,
2 F.4th 1115 (8th Cir. 2021) ............................... 15
Gaspar-Francisco v. Bondi,
No. 22-126, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3320 (9th Cir.
Feb. 11, 2025)...................................................... 13
Hanna v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
812 F. App’x 104 (3d Cir. 2020).............. 14, 23, 25
In re Yoder,
758 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir. 1985) .......... 21, 22, 24, 25
ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc.,
482 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2007) .......................... 16, 17
Jones v. General Motors Corp.,
939 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1991) .............................. 15
iv
Laborers’ Int’l Union, of N. Am., Local 578 v.
NLRB,
594 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2010) ............................ 22
Leon v. Murphy,
988 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................ 25
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990) ............................................ 24
Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc.,
761 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2014) .............. 14, 22, 23, 24
Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604 (1953) ............................................ 26
Makhnevich v. Bougopoulos,
18-cv-285, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57706
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022) .................................... 18
Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,
851 F.2d 703 (3d Cir. 1998) ................................ 14
Meckel v. Cont’l Res. Co.,
758 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1985) .......................... 17, 25
Michelson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of the Army Agency,
860 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2021) ...................... 20
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982) ............................................ 11
v
Moscoso-Alvarado v. Wilkinson,
836 F. App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2021) ........................ 13
Nunley v. City of Los Angeles,
52 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 1995) .......................... 21, 24
Perma Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co.,
410 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1969) ................................ 14
Raeburn v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of N.Y.,
No. 10-cv-4818, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82751
(E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2015).................................... 18
Riggins v. SSC Yanceyville Operating Co., LLC,
800 F. App’x 151 (4th Cir. 2020) ........................ 14
Rodriguez v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc.,
435 F. App’x 885 (11th Cir. 2011) ...................... 15
Rosenthal v. Walker,
111 U.S. 185 (1884) ........................................ 1, 24
Russell v. Pac. Motor Trucking Co.,
672 F. App’x 629 (9th Cir. 2016) ........................ 15
Spagnuoli v. Louie’s Seafood Rest., LLC,
13-CV-4907, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38735
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2022) ...................................... 18
Stein v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
34 F. Supp. 3d 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) ................... 19
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715 (1979) ............................................ 24
vi
Vargas v. Capital One Fin. Advisors,
12-civ-5728, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116234
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013) .................................... 19
Weiss v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc.,
741 F. App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2018) ........................... 17
Witt v. Roadway Express,
136 F.3d 1424 (10th Cir. 1998) .......................... 22
Other Authorities
1 Weinstein’s Fed. Evid. § 301.02 (2025) .............. 24
Rules
1 R. City of N.Y. § 103-01 ........................................ 3
Fed. R. Evid. 301 .................................................... 24
vii
INTRODUCTION
Under the mailbox rule, evidence establishing
that a document was placed in the mail raises a rebuttable presumption of receipt. Rosenthal v.
Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1884). In this case, the
court of appeals held that evidence of proper mailing
of a notice of violation to petitioner’s address entitled
the City to a presumption of receipt and that petitioner failed to rebut the presumption. The court’s
fact-bound and well-founded application of the mailbox rule does not warrant the Court’s review. The
petition for certiorari should be denied.
First, this case is a particularly poor vehicle for
addressing the question presented. Petitioner asks
the Court to review whether a sworn denial of receipt, standing alone, is sufficient to rebut the presumption. But he did not merely deny receipt: he
also acknowledged in sworn testimony that he was
not living at the premises during the pertinent time
and that his haphazard mail-handling practices
made it “quite possible” that mail could have been
properly delivered but lost before he became aware
of or retrieved it. While the decision below reiterated
the Second Circuit’s prior holding that a denial alone
is insufficient, the judgment did not turn on it because petitioner’s denial did not stand alone.
Moreover, this highly unrepresentative case does
not present a useful lens through which to consider
whether a bare denial could be sufficient in more
typical circumstances. Again, petitioner admitted to
unreliable mail-retrieval practices and conceded
1
that he was an absentee owner at the time of the
mailing. While his then-wife did live at the premises
when not traveling for work, petitioner failed to proffer any evidence from her and conceded that he did
not know her mail-handling practices because he
was not there. He makes no attempt to show that
any court of appeals would find the presumption rebutted on this record, which contains overwhelming
evidence undercutting the force of his denial. The
case thus offers no opening to probe the differences
in the courts’ articulations of the standards for rebutting the mailbox-rule presumption.
Second, there is no circuit split requiring the
Court’s resolution. Petitioner points to several
courts of appeals that have stated that a denial of
receipt alone can rebut the presumption. But he fails
to show that this difference is dispositive in a significant number of cases, given the wide variety of evidence that courts, including the Second Circuit, have
recognized may corroborate a denial. Indeed, while
the circuits may differ in their phrasing of the rebuttal standard, in practice rebuttal will rarely turn on
a bare denial of receipt, unaccompanied by corroborating evidence.
Third, the question presented does not warrant
review. The mailbox rule has existed for well over a
century, and the cases petitioner highlights span
decades. Yet six circuits still have not addressed
whether a bare denial is sufficient to rebut the presumption. Moreover, the issue has not been fully
ventilated in the courts that have addressed it.
2
Thus, the question remains unripe for a grant of certiorari. Further, this common-law rule is inherently
flexible and case specific, lessening the need to ensure uniformity in how it is articulated because its
application will turn on the facts. In all, there is no
need for the Court to address this issue now.
STATEMENT
A. The mailed notice of violation and
petitioner’s unreliable system of mail
retrieval
Petitioner, who owns several properties, purchased a four-story residential building in Manhattan in November 2014 with his then-wife (2d Cir.
Appendix (“A”), 2d Cir. ECF Nos. 29-31, at 9, 110,
271-73, 718). He did not move into the building, however, until May 2015 (A719). Before he bought it, the
property had contained a low-pressure boiler,
though it was removed sometime after 2013 but before the sale (id.).
The City requires owners of properties with lowpressure boilers to obtain and submit proof of yearly
inspections. 1 R. City of N.Y. § 103-01(d). Failure to
submit the inspection report will result in a $1,000
fine. Id. 103-01(f). The City’s Department of Buildings (DOB) processes boiler-inspection reports after
each annual cycle (A137, 178, 393).
The prior owner of petitioner’s building failed to
submit a boiler-inspection report for 2013 (A395). After that annual cycle, DOB compiled a list of all delinquent owners and properties, which included
3
petitioner and the subject address, and contracted
with a vendor to generate notices of violation (A221,
393-98). For that 2013 annual cycle, the DOB list of
delinquent properties totaled 17,919 violations
(A395-96, 403).
On March 23, 2015, DOB’s vendor confirmed contemporaneously with DOB that its subcontractor
had printed and mailed the notices of violation,
which included a notice for petitioner’s property,
consistent with regular office procedures (A320-22,
344, 358-59, 366, 391, 396, 398, 400). A small fraction of those notices—roughly 500, or less than 3%—
were returned undeliverable (A18, 184). However, it
is undisputed that petitioner’s name and address
were correct on the notice of violation for his property (A278-79) and that postage for the bulk mailing
was paid (A353).
Though petitioner was able to receive mail at his
property, he conceded in his deposition that he had
no reliable system to ensure that he retrieved it
(A276-77, 719). Petitioner was not living at the property at the time of the notice’s mailing (A719).
Throughout March 2015, petitioner stated that he
was only at the subject premises for a total of about
three days (id.).
While petitioner’s then-wife lived at the property
at the relevant time, she did not submit a declaration or any other evidence (A719). For his part, petitioner acknowledged that his then-wife traveled frequently and did not check mail every day (A275). Petitioner further admitted in his deposition that he
4
did not know his then-wife’s mail-retrieval practices
(A275, 277). When asked who would retrieve the
mail when she was traveling, petitioner stated: “She
would pick it up when she got back, I guess. I’m – I
wasn’t there” (A277).
On the frequent occasions when no one was home
to retrieve mail, the postal service had no reliable
place to put it. Indeed, petitioner conceded at his
deposition that there was no mailbox on the premises in March 2015 (A276). Instead, he relied on a
haphazard mail-retrieval system. He testified that
he tied “a little plastic bag” to a fence, which “[s]ome
mail would be left in” (A276-78). Alternatively, mail
“would be thrown down in the lower entrance,” or
“left on the stoop” (A276). When asked if mail was
ever lost under this slapdash system, petitioner testified that “anytime you leave something outside …
it can be taken” or “wind could blow it” (A277). He
further explained that “unless [he] was expecting
something and didn’t receive it, [he] wouldn’t know
if [he] received it or not” (A278). And when asked if
mail could have been delivered by the postal service
and lost before he retrieved it, petitioner conceded
that it was “quite possible” (A277).
Well after his deposition, petitioner submitted a
declaration in opposition to the City’s motion for
summary judgment that attempted to rehabilitate
his deposition testimony. He stated that he “never
received” the notice of violation in 2015, though did
not explain how he knew that to be true given his
concessions in his deposition testimony (A718). He
further stated that his then-wife “would collect any
5
mail that came from where the Postal Service left it
outside the Property” and “would tell me whenever
any mail came addressed to me,” but again did not
detail his then-wife’s practices for retrieving mail or
specify when she was traveling during the relevant
time (A719). And he continued to proffer no evidence
at all from his ex-wife.
B. Petitioner’s lawsuit against the City
and the decisions below
1. In August 2022, more than seven years after
the City mailed the notice of violation, Petitioner
sued the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of
due process (A8, 29-32). After limited discovery focusing on timeliness (Pet. App. 43a), the City moved
for summary judgment on the ground that the threeyear statute of limitations applicable to § 1983
claims in New York had run (Pet. App. 10a).
2. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case (id.). The court held that the City’s
evidence of mailing raised a presumption under the
mailbox rule that petitioner received the notice of violation in 2015, and petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption with competent proof of nonreceipt.
Specifically, the court determined that petitioner’s
“unsubstantiated” denial and “scant” supporting evidence—which the court noted “likely could be given
by the large majority of persons denying receipt of
mail”—were insufficient (id. at 36a). Moreover, his
testimony as to the mail-retrieval system at the
property made it even “less plausible that the 2015
notice of violation went undelivered—as opposed to
6
having been overlooked or not responded to” (id.).
The court noted that petitioner was not yet living at
the property and his then-wife traveled frequently,
and that he failed to “adduce any testimony from his
ex-wife” or explain when she was traveling during
the relevant time (id.). His testimony as to his exwife’s mail handling practices was thus “largely
hearsay, and to the extent not, entitled to limited
weight” (id.).
The court concluded that the evidence painted a
“portrait of sloppy, if not collegiate, practices with
respect to incoming mail” that was “at odds with the
inference Katergaris seeks to raise of a system of receiving, collecting, and responding to mail so rigorous and orderly that it would have been improbable
for a delivered mailing to have gone unacted-upon”
(id. at 36a-37a). The court thus held that petitioner
“knew or had reason to know” of his due-process
claim when the notice of violation was delivered in
March 2015, rendering his suit against the City untimely (id. at 24a, 38a).
3. The Second Circuit affirmed in a nonprecedential decision (Pet. App. 2a-3a). The court determined that the City had triggered the presumption
of receipt under the mailbox rule by showing that
the notice of violation was correctly addressed and
mailed following standard office procedures (id. at
5a-6a). Petitioner does not seek this Court’s review
of this portion of the Second Circuit’s decision.
Next, the court of appeals agreed with the district
court that petitioner had not rebutted the presumption of receipt (Pet. App. 6a-8a). The court cited its
7
prior holding that “denial of receipt, without more,
is insufficient to rebut the presumption” (id. at 7a
(cleaned up) 1). The court clarified, however, that “rebutting the presumption does not require ‘direct
proof that the routine office procedure was either not
followed or carelessly carried out’” (id. (cleaned up)).
Instead, the court looked for something more than
“mere denial” in the record and held that petitioner’s
circumstantial evidence—including his purported
prompt response to other unspecified fines and his
quick payment of this fine once he alleged he learned
of it while trying to sell the property—was “undercut” by his testimony concerning his lack of a mailbox and “unreliable” mail-retrieval system (id.). Indeed, the court noted that petitioner’s system consisted of, as he described it, “‘a little plastic baggie’
hanging from the fence into which mail might be
‘rolled-up’ and ‘stuffed’ if it were not ‘thrown down
into the lower entrance’ or left outside ‘on the stoop’”
(id.).
Lastly, the court of appeals rejected petitioner’s
argument that its interpretation of the mailbox rule
made the presumption of receipt “effectively irrebuttable” and in conflict with Rule 301 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (id.). As the court noted, petitioner
provided “no support” for his contention that Rule
301 requires a presumption to be rebuttable by bare
denial (id. at 7a-8a). The court also emphasized that
1
This brief uses “cleaned up” to indicate that internal
quotation marks, alterations, or citations have been omitted
from quotations.
8
petitioner had “mischaracterize[d] the stringency of
[the court’s] rule” (id. at 8a).
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
A. This case is a poor vehicle for
addressing the question presented.
Petitioner asks the Court to consider whether a
“sworn denial” is sufficient to rebut the presumption
of receipt under the mailbox rule (Pet. i). But the
facts of this case make it a poor vehicle for addressing that question, for three main reasons. First, the
case does not properly present the question because
the judgment below did not turn on whether a bare
denial is sufficient. Second, the unusual facts of this
case do not offer a useful lens through which to consider what weight to accord to a bare denial in more
typical circumstances. And third, even if a circuit
split exists, as petitioner contends, this case would
not help resolve it because no circuit would be likely
to reach a different judgment on these facts.
1. This Court “reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.” California v. Rooney, 483 U.S.
307, 311 (1987) (cleaned up). But petitioner asks the
Court to review remarks in the Second Circuit’s decision. Though the court of appeals recited the principle that a denial of receipt, “without more,” is insufficient to rebut the presumption (Pet. App. 7a
(cleaned up)), that principle is not necessary to the
judgment, since petitioner’s denial did not stand
alone but rather was accompanied by extensive evidence from his own mouth undercutting any force it
may have. Petitioner conceded that when DOB
9
mailed the notice of violation, he had not yet moved
into the subject premises, and he further offered that
he was at the premises only for a handful of days in
the entire month of March 2015 (A276, 719). His
then-wife, who did not testify, was also frequently
traveling, and they did not have anyone checking
their mail in their absence (A275).
Petitioner also admitted that he had no mailbox
at the property (A276). Instead, as the district court
noted, he chose to employ a “sloppy, if not collegiate”
mail-retrieval system (Pet. App. 36a). Indeed, to the
extent he had a system at all, it consisted of “a little
plastic baggie hanging from the fence into which
mail might be rolled-up and stuffed if it were not
thrown down in the lower entrance or left outside on
the stoop” (id. at 7a (cleaned up)).
The petition studiously avoids these conceded
facts, just noting in passing that petitioner “did not
have a mailbox at the time” (Pet. 7). But below, even
petitioner had to admit that it was “quite possible”
that his mail could be delivered and lost before he
retrieved it (A277). As he surmised, his mail—left
outside and unsecured, potentially for extended periods—could readily be “taken” or blown away by the
wind (id.). He thus admitted that he would not know
whether he had received a piece of mail “unless [he]
was expecting something and didn’t receive it”
(A278). In all, petitioner’s multiple admissions render his denial here effectively meaningless in establishing whether the mail was properly delivered.
10
In essence, petitioner would have the Court artificially segment off his denial of receipt from the rest
of the record he created and consider whether it
would have been enough on its own to rebut the presumption (Pet. i). But the Court would review the
court of appeal’s judgment, not its words. And on
this record, the court of appeals correctly held that
the presumption was not rebutted, regardless of
whether a bare denial of receipt would have been
enough to overcome it. This Court has long declined
to use its review power merely to rewrite lower
courts’ decisions or review dicta. See Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.7 (1982). Petitioner has provided no basis for it to deviate from
this well-established practice here.
2. This case further presents a poor vehicle to address the question presented because it is unrepresentative of denial-of-receipt cases. Indeed, the peculiarities of this case highlight that not all denials
are created equal. The circumstances of petitioner’s
denial make it an outlier that can provide little insight about how to resolve the question presented
under more typical facts.
To start, petitioner concedes that he was an absentee owner when DOB mailed the notice of violation for his property on March 26, 2015 (A274, 719).
At the time, he was living in England, and he did not
move into the property until the end of May 2015;
nor did he say when in March he visited (id.). Only
his then-wife was living at the property at the time,
though she traveled frequently (id.).
11
Although the petition extols the importance of
ensuring that witnesses testify only about their personal knowledge (Pet. 11-12), petitioner fails to establish that he had personal knowledge of what was
delivered to the property in late March or early April
2015. Moreover, petitioner failed to proffer any
statement at all from his then-wife—the only person
living at the property at the pertinent time—and he
did not establish that he had any personal
knowledge of her mail-retrieval practices. To the
contrary, he did not claim to know when she was
traveling during the relevant period and conceded
that he did not know how often she checked for mail
(A275-77, 719). That he denied seeing the notice of
violation himself thus cannot establish whether it
was delivered to the property. Compounding the
problem is the unusually “sloppy, if not collegiate”
mail-retrieval system employed at the property (Pet.
App. 36a) that, as petitioner conceded, made it
“quite possible” that his mail could be lost without
his ever knowing (A276-78).
The petition suggests that any sworn denial of receipt should be enough to rebut the presumption and
force the question of receipt to a jury, but a denial
might have vastly different significance depending
on its context. For instance, a denial might mean one
thing if offered by all members of a household as opposed to just one. See, e.g., Gaspar-Francisco v.
Bondi, No. 22-126, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 3320, at
*2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 2025) (in immigration context,
holding that denial was insufficient to rebut presumption of receipt where unsupported by
12
declarations from “the homeowner or other residents” of the property). Or if the party offering the
denial lived at the address at the time as opposed to
infrequently visiting. See, e.g., Moscoso-Alvarado v.
Wilkinson, 836 F. App’x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2021) (in
immigration context, holding that mail recipient
failed to rebut presumption where evidence showed
he was only home for “a few days”). Or if the denying
party is an individual as opposed to a corporation.
See, e.g., Barnett v. Okeechobee Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232,
1241-42 (11th Cir. 2002). Crucially, whatever the
“typical” denial might look like, it is miles away from
the denial that petitioner offered here. The factual
oddities of this case gave the Second Circuit no reason to consider other possible forms of a denial or to
decide whether a denial alone could ever be sufficient to rebut the presumption. Nor would the case
offer this Court a useful opening to explore such
questions.
3. The petition’s deficiencies are further illustrated by what it fails to say. While petitioner asserts that this case implicates a circuit split, he does
not assert that any circuit would treat his testimony
here as sufficient to rebut the presumption. To the
contrary, it is unlikely that any circuit would.
For instance, petitioner relies heavily on Lupyan
v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 319 (3d
Cir. 2014) (Pet. 3, 14-15, 18-19), which endorsed a
bare-denial standard. But the Third Circuit has
more recently declined to find the presumption rebutted where the mail recipient’s denial was unsupported and the evidence otherwise undercut the
13
denial. See Ebner v. Bank of N.S., 795 F. App’x 107,
109 n.5 (3d Cir. 2020) (unsupported denial insufficient where recipient received other mailings from
same sender at same address); see also Hanna v.
Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 812 F. App’x 104, 10405 (3d Cir. 2020) (same). Here, petitioner’s own testimony powerfully undermines his denial, and there
is no basis to presume—nor does petitioner contend—that any other circuit would find the presumption rebutted on these facts. 2 Indeed, it is exceedingly unlikely that any court of appeals,
2 Moreover, the courts of appeals might plausibly view much of
petitioner’s post-deposition declaration through the lens of the
widely recognized “sham affidavit” rule, under which courts
generally decline to credit a sworn statement in opposition to
summary judgment that is contradicted by or inconsistent with
prior testimony, particularly where the discrepancy remains
unexplained. See e.g., Escribano-Reyes v. Prof’l Hepa
Certificate Corp., 817 F.3d 380, 386-87 (1st Cir. 2016); Perma
Research & Dev. Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 578 (2d Cir.
1969); Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 70506 (3d Cir. 1998); Riggins v. SSC Yanceyville Operating Co.,
LLC, 800 F. App’x 151, 160-61 (4th Cir. 2020); Free v. Wal-Mart
La., LLC, 815 F. App’x 765, 767 (5th Cir. 2020); Jones v.
General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 384-85 (6th Cir. 1991);
Buckner v. Sam’s Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1996);
Garang v. City of Ames, 2 F.4th 1115, 1122 (8th Cir. 2021);
Russell v. Pac. Motor Trucking Co., 672 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th
Cir. 2016); Gabaldon v. N.M. State Police, 139 F.4th 1207,
1211-12 (10th Cir. 2025); Rodriguez v. Jones Boat Yard, Inc.,
435 F. App’x 885, 887 (11th Cir. 2011); Galvin v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 488 F.3d 1026, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Del. Valley Floral
Group, Inc. v. Shaw Rose Nets, LLC, 597 F.3d 1374, 1381-82
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
14
regardless of how it articulates the rule, would have
found that petitioner made such a showing on this
record.
B. There is no split in authority
requiring the Court’s intervention.
Petitioner also fails to establish a circuit split requiring the Court’s resolution. To start, he mischaracterizes the stringency of the Second Circuit’s approach to rebutting the presumption. And, to the extent courts differ in their formulation of the rebuttal
standard, in practice they largely look to the totality
of the evidence to decide whether the presumption
has been overcome. Lastly, petitioner fails to show
that the Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
1. Petitioner frames his bid for certiorari around
a mischaracterization of the Second Circuit’s approach. He asserts that the court has adopted “a
uniquely harsh” standard for rebutting the presumption (Pet. 10) and that “the presumption [is] so
overwhelming that it essentially bars contradiction”
(id. at 19). These assertions bear little resemblance
to the Second Circuit’s precedents.
To be sure, the court has held that “[d]enial of receipt, without more, is insufficient to rebut the presumption.” Akey v. Clinton Cty., 375 F.3d 231, 235
(2d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). The court has not
discussed this limitation in depth. But it likely reflects that a bare denial of receipt, unaccompanied
by any contextualizing facts, is easily given but of
limited force. Most importantly, as the court
15
suggested in the decision at issue here, such a denial, if credited, speaks to the party’s knowledge of
receipt, but does not establish whether the party
would have reason to know if delivery had occurred
(see Pet. App. 8a (“The summary judgment rule
would be rendered sterile if the mere incantation of
intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman
to defeat an otherwise valid motion.” (quoting ITC
Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 150 (2d Cir.
2007))).
This case starkly illustrates the distinction: petitioner did not live at the property at the time of mailing and failed to proffer evidence from the only person who did (A275-78, 719). And he conceded that
his mail might have been delivered and then lost before he ever became aware of it (see A277-78). Such
a denial is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact
as to nonreceipt and defeat summary judgment under established principles that the Second Circuit
has expressly recognized. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see ITC Ltd., 482 F.3d
at 149 (“Courts and commentators are in general
agreement that proffered evidence is sufficient to rebut a presumption as long as the evidence could support a reasonable jury finding of the nonexistence of
the presumed fact.” (cleaned up)).
Contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 10, 19),
the Second Circuit has not placed any firm limits on
the types of corroborating evidence that could enable
a party to meet its burden. Indeed, in its first decision addressing the issue, the court rejected the
16
notion that “direct proof of divergence from routine
procedure is the sole or exclusive means” to rebut the
presumption, instead suggesting that “circumstantial evidence” of nonreceipt could suffice. Meckel v.
Cont’l Res. Co., 758 F.2d 811, 817 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying New York law). The court thus entertained
(though found lacking) the plaintiffs’ showing that
few recipients of a mass mailing had acted in response to it and that some other intended recipients
did not recall whether they received it. Id. at 818. By
contrast, the court determined that the presumption
of receipt was rebutted where the mail recipient offered “more than mere denial of receipt” by detailing
“his family’s regular procedure for reviewing” received mail. Weiss v. Macy’s Retail Holdings, Inc.,
741 F. App’x 24, 28 (2d Cir. 2018) (applying New
York law).
The decision below confirmed Meckel’s rejection
of a more stringent rule and similarly did not hesitate to consider the “additional circumstantial evidence” that petitioner highlighted to support his denial of receipt, including “that he generally pays or
contests citations immediately upon receipt, and
that he responded immediately when he did learn of
the violation in 2021” (Pet. App. 7a). But what carried the day was the overwhelming evidence of petitioner’s poor mail-handling practices that “undercut” his denial and circumstantial evidence (id.).
Consistent with this flexible approach, district
courts within the circuit have credited a range of circumstantial evidence as potentially sufficient to support a denial of receipt and rebut the presumption.
17
See, e.g., Raeburn v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev. of
N.Y., No. 10-cv-4818, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82751,
at *20-21 (E.D.N.Y. June 22, 2015) (presumption rebutted by recipient’s denial of receipt of one letter
paired with receipt and prompt response to followup letter sent a few months later); Spagnuoli v.
Louie’s Seafood Rest., LLC, 13-CV-4907, 2022 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38735, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2022)
(stating that “testimony denying receipt in combination with evidence of standardized procedures for
processing mail” at home “can be sufficient”). 3
Thus, petitioner is wrong to suggest that the Second Circuit “requires extensive evidence” for rebuttal (Pet. 19). And he offers no basis to conclude that
the forms of evidence that he concedes a party might
be able to offer to corroborate a denial—such as evidence of “their practice of opening mail” or “mention
[of] other mail they received at the critical time” (id.
3 Petitioner cites district court cases purporting to show that
the Second Circuit’s rule is effectively irrebuttable (Pet. 20).
Several involve bare denials or denials without credible
supporting evidence. See, e.g. Makhnevich v. Bougopoulos, 18cv-285, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57706, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2022); Vargas v. Capital One Fin. Advisors, 12-civ-5728, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116234, at *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013).
Others required a mail recipient to show proof of irregularity
in the mailing, see, e.g.. Stein v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 34 F.
Supp. 3d 224, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), which the court of appeals
confirmed in the decision below is not its rule (see Pet. App. 7a
(“[R]ebutting the presumption does not require direct proof
that the routine office procedure was either not followed or
carelessly carried out.” (cleaned up))).
18
at 18-19)—would be insufficient under the court’s
approach.
2. In practice, the Second Circuit’s approach to
rebutting the presumption is largely consistent with
that of the six other courts of appeals that have addressed the question. 4 While there are some variations in how the circuits articulate their rebuttal
standard, they consistently look to the totality of the
circumstances, as the Second Circuit did here, so rebuttal will rarely depend on a bare denial of receipt,
without corroborating evidence.
a. At the outset, two other circuits, which petitioner fails to discuss, draw the same line as the
court below. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that an
“assertion of non-receipt ... supported by circumstantial evidence” may be enough to rebut the presumption and avoid summary judgment, but a “bare assertion of non-receipt” would not. Custer v. Murphy
Oil USA, Inc., 503 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2007); see
also Faciane v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 931 F.3d 412,
421 (5th Cir. 2019) (“bare assertion of non-receipt”
insufficient).
4 By referencing district-court decisions from the First, Fourth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits (Pet. 20-21), petitioner
acknowledges that those circuits have not yet addressed this
question. Petitioner cites no trial-level decision from either the
D.C. Circuit or the Federal Circuit. And, although he also cites
decisions of district courts in the Fifth Circuit, that court, as
discussed next, has adopted the same approach as the Second
Circuit.
19
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the same principle
in a decision holding that a corporate employee’s
declaration of nonreceipt, “without citing any basis
for such knowledge”—for example, an explanation of
“office procedures for processing received mail”—
was insufficient to rebut the presumption. Barnett,
283 F.3d at 1241-42. The court noted that declarations denying receipt from a few corporate divisions
were not probative of nonreceipt because other divisions could have received the mailing, or it could
have been lost. Id. at 1242. More recently, the court
affirmed its rule, stating that “[a] party must do
more than simply allege that she never received a
mailed item in order to rebut the presumption” of receipt. Michelson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of the Army Agency,
860 F. App’x 677, 678 (11th Cir. 2021).
b. Petitioner cites decisions from four other
courts of appeals that, he contends, hold that a bare
denial of receipt is sufficient. But while their formulations of the standard differ from the Second Circuit’s, the courts appear to apply the rebuttal standard largely in line with the court below, considering
the totality of the evidence regarding receipt.
To start, petitioner cites the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nunley v. City of Los Angeles, 52 F.3d 792
(9th Cir. 1995), but that case did not involve a bare
denial of receipt or squarely hold that one would be
sufficient. An attorney asserted nonreceipt of a
mailed order, and the evidence showed that the attorney and a paralegal had each gone to the clerk’s
office well after the date of mailing to inquire
20
whether an order had been issued. Id. at 794. On
this record, the Ninth Circuit held that the attorney
had provided a “specific factual denial” sufficient to
rebut the presumption. Id. at 796-97. While the
court cautioned that “extensive evidence” is unnecessary, sufficient proof of nonreceipt might entail
“affidavits regarding the usual practice of opening
mail and actions consistent with non-receipt” or any
“indication of failed delivery.” Id. at 796.
So too in In re Yoder, 758 F.2d 1114 (6th Cir.
1985), which involved mailed notice of the deadline
to file proofs of products-liability claims. The evidence of proper mailing of the notice was highly
equivocal, and, in addition to the attorney’s denial of
receipt of the notice, two other attorneys testified
that they also had not received it. Id. at 1120-21.
Thus, although the Sixth Circuit stated that “[t]estimony of non-receipt, standing alone” could rebut the
presumption, id. at 1118, the record before the court
contained corroborating evidence, which the court
considered.
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit case that petitioner
relies on, Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424
(10th Cir. 1998), did not turn on a bare denial of receipt. There, the EEOC mailed two right-to-sue letters one day apart to the same address, but the recipient submitted an affidavit averring that he received one letter promptly and the other a month
later. Id. at 1429-30. The court held that a presumption of prompt receipt was rebutted by the recipient’s
affidavit. Id. And in a subsequent decision, the court
cited Witt for the proposition that “an opposing
21
party’s sworn denial of receipt can create a credibility issue that must be resolved by the trier of fact,”
but also noted specific facts in the record supporting
the denial, including that the mail recipient received
a second letter sent shortly after the disputed one
and acted on it immediately. Laborers’ Int’l Union,
of N. Am., Local 578 v. NLRB, 594 F.3d 732, 740
(10th Cir. 2010) (Gorsuch, J.) (emphasis added;
cleaned up).
Even the case most strongly embracing a baredenial rule presented additional evidence of nonreceipt. In Lupyan, the Third Circuit concluded that a
party should be able to rebut the presumption with
“a sworn statement to dispute receipt.” 761 F.3d at
322. But the court also emphasized that the mailing
party there was entitled to only a “very weak presumption” because the mailer could have but failed
to use certified mail and the evidence of mailing consisted of “self-serving affidavits signed nearly four
years after the alleged mailing date.” Id. at 320. And,
as noted above, the Third Circuit subsequently
held—without citing Lupyan—that a bare denial of
receipt, without support and undercut by circumstantial evidence, was insufficient to rebut the presumption. Ebner, 795 F. App’x at 109 n.5; see Hanna,
812 F. App’x at 105.
Thus, despite differences in their phrasing of the
relevant principles, the circuits’ application of the
rebuttal standard is not so different in practice.
Moreover, several of the circuits have not had an opportunity to fully address this question or have not
22
fully settled their approach, as shown by the recent
decisions of the Third Circuit moving away from an
expansive view of Lupyan.
3. To try to elevate the profile of the purported
circuit split, petitioner contends that the Second Circuit’s approach conflicts with Federal Rule of Evidence 301 (Pet. 18-19). But his argument again rests
on a mischaracterization of the stringency of the Second Circuit’s approach (id.). In any event, Rule 301
speaks to a different issue—the burdens of production and persuasion as to presumptions in civil
cases. 5 It “says nothing about how much evidence is
needed to rebut a presumption.” 1 Weinstein’s Fed.
Evid. § 301.02 (2025). Nor does it require a court deciding a summary-judgment motion to credit a conclusory denial. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497
U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990) (on summary judgment, it is
insufficient “to replace conclusory allegations of the
complaint or answer with conclusory allegations of
an affidavit”). 6
5 Rule 301 provides, in full: “In a civil case, unless a federal
statute or these rules provide otherwise, the party against
whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing
evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift
the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had
it originally.”
6 Several courts have looked to Rule 301 to answer a different
question that is not implicated here—whether a rebutted
presumption of receipt has any continuing relevance to
determining whether receipt occurred. Lupyan, 761 F.3d at
320-21; Nunley, 52 F.3d at 796; Yoder, 758 F.2d at 1119-20.
23
Finally, petitioner argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is somehow improper because it derives from New York law (Pet. 12-14). But state law
is an obvious source to draw from in setting federalcommon-law rules, as this Court has recognized. See
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,
718 (1979) (adopting state law as the “appropriate
federal rule”). Indeed, this Court’s original decision
applying the mailbox rule cited several state-court
decisions as the rule’s source. Rosenthal, 111 U.S. at
193.
C. This case does
important issue
Court’s review.
not present an
warranting the
In addition to the above points, the question presented is not an important one for the Court to decide. To start, there is no compelling reason for the
Court to take up the question now. As petitioner concedes, the mailbox rule is more than a century old
(Pet. 21). It has been four decades since the Second
Circuit first articulated the approach that petitioner
challenges, and three decades since the court
adopted it as federal common law. Meckel, 758 F.2d
at 817; Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir.
1993). The line of cases that petitioner highlights as
in conflict with the Second Circuit’s approach
reaches back forty years as well. Yoder, 758 F.2d at
1116. And, despite the mailbox rule’s long history,
six federal circuits still have not even reached the
rebuttal question, and recent decisions of the Third
Circuit indicate that its approach is not yet settled.
See Ebner, 795 F. App’x at 109 n.5; Hanna, 812 F.
24
App’x at 105. The issue should at minimum be allowed to percolate further.
The issue also has not been fully examined in the
courts that have reached it. None of those courts has
had occasion to explore in depth the reasons for their
principle that a bare denial will not suffice or to explore in any systematic way what evidence beyond a
bare denial might be sufficient. Plus, to our
knowledge based on available electronic dockets, no
party, including petitioner here, asked the Second,
Fifth, or Eleventh Circuits to review en banc any of
the decisions cited above or in petitioner’s brief that
consider a bare denial insufficient to rebut the presumption. Against this backdrop, petitioner identifies no pressing reason for the Court to grant review
here.
Petitioner also shows no need to impose uniformity on the lower courts’ approaches. For one
thing, the common-law mailbox rule is inherently
flexible and context specific. See Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953) (“It has been said so
often as to have become axiomatic that the common
law is not immutable but flexible, and by its own
principles adapts itself to varying conditions.”). Regardless of how courts articulate baseline principles,
the outcomes will often turn on the facts. As the foregoing discussion illustrates (supra at 14-15, 20-24),
even in courts receptive to a bare denial, the records
in individual cases often contain corroborating evidence. And courts that have adopted the principle
that a bare denial does not suffice, such as the court
25
below, will consider a range of corroborating evidence offered in support.
Moreover, petitioner fails to explain why the
lower courts could not come to different conclusions
about the quantum of evidence required to rebut the
presumption. Allowing a denial alone to rebut—
without any specific factual allegations or other evidence even tending to support the denial—risks rendering the presumption all but toothless, forcing the
question of receipt to a jury in virtually every case,
no matter how strong the evidence of proper mailing.
The differences that petitioner highlights reflect reasonable disagreements about how best to allocate
the risk of error. And litigants are well positioned to
develop their record in light of what their circuit requires. After all, petitioner’s real problem here is not
the standards that the courts below applied to his
claim, but rather that the facts are strikingly poor
for him. He shows no reason for the Court to weigh
in on the question presented, particularly in this
case where the Second Circuit’s judgment was resoundingly correct.
26
CONCLUSION
The petition should be denied.
MURIEL GOODE-TRUFANT
Corporation Counsel of
the City of New York
Counsel for Respondent
RICHARD DEARING
Counsel of Record
CLAUDE S. PLATTON
HANNAH J. SAROKIN
New York City Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
(212) 356-2500
rdearing@law.nyc.gov
December 2025
27
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.