Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mark Mazza, et ux., Petitioners v. Bank of New York Mellon, fka The Bank of New York, as Trustee for the Certificateholders of the CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2006-0A10 Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates Series 2006-0A10

No. 24A837

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MARK MAZZA,

LISA MAZZA,

Petitioners,

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,

Respondent.

APPENDIX

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

MARK MAZZA

LISA MAZZA

1271 Farm Road

Berwyn, PA 19312

(484) 318-6570

Pro Se

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Appendix A

Letter from the Court,

March 3, 2025.................. .......... la

Appendix B

Order of

Judge Eduardo

C. Robreno,

May 24, 2023.................... ......... 3a

Appendix C

Memorandum of

Judge Eduardo

C. Robreno,

May 24, 2023.................... ..........5a

Appendix D

Judgement of

Judge Eduardo

C. Robreno,

May 24th, 2023................ .......26a

Appendix E

Denial of

Petition for

Rehearing,

December 3, 2024............ .......27a

Appendix F

Opinion of the

Third Circuit

September 12, 2024.......... .......30a

Appendix G

Chester County

Dockets for

Foreclosure Case.............. ...... 40a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

Page

Appendix H

Foreclosure Judgment/

Decision of Chester County

Judge Jeffrey

R. Sommer,

January 23, 2015...................... 77a

Appendix I

Bank Of New York

Mellon Praecipe to

Enter Judgment

Pursuant to

Pa. R.C.P.227.4(2),

August 12, 2015......................... 78a

Appendix J

Appellants Reply

in Support of

Motion for

Summary Disposition

Pursuant to

3D CIR. L.A.R. 27.4,

April 19th, 2024.......................... 80a

Appendix K

Appellants Opposition/

Response To Appellee's

Motion For

Sur Reply Brief.........................98a

Appendix L

Appellants' Motion

For Summary Disposition

Pursuant To

3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.,

March 31, 2024........................ 114a

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

]3age

Appendix M

Motion Of Plaintiff To

Reinstate Ejectment Action,

October 31, 2023.................... .139a

Appendix N

Order From

Chester County

Denying Motion To

Reinstate Ejectment Action,

November 28, 2023.............. .147a

1

Appendix 0

Handwritten Note To

District Court Clerk,

Attaching Timestamp Copy

Of Defendant’s Amended

Answer, Affirmative

Defenses, And Counterclaim

On Docket Number

17-5453

May 20, 2021.......................... 149a

Appendix P

Complaint In Ejectment,

August 25, 2017......................,163a

Appendix Q

Certificate Of Service &

Certificate Of Compliance,

July 14, 2025......................... 166a

3a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,

Plaintiff

v.

MARK MAZZA, et al.,

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-5453

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2023, after

considering Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss the

Defendants' Counterclaims with Prejudice and for

Summary Judgment in Ejectment (ECF No. 49), and

any responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that

the motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED

as follows:

1. All counterclaims filed by Defendants are

DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Defendants' request for an extension of time

(EMF No. 52) is DENIED as moot.

3. Defendants' Motion for Discovery (ECF No.

54) is DENIED .

4. Defendants' Motion to Vacate (ECF No, 55)

is DENIED .

5. The Clerk of Court shall mark this case

CLOSED. AND IT IS SO ORDERED

4a

s/ Eduardo C. Robreno

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

5a

APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-5453

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,

Plaintiff

v.

MARK MAZZA, et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

I.

May 24, 2023

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Bank of New York Mellon ("BNYM")

brings this ejectment action under Pennsylvania law

against Defendants, Mark and Lisa Mazza ("the

Mazzas") . There are several motions pending before

the Court. First, Plaintiff has filed a motion to

summary judgment/motion to dismiss the

Defendants' counter claims with prejudice.1

1 After these issues were ripe for decision and the day before a

hearing scheduled before the Court, Mark Mazza filed for

bankruptcy, resulting in a stay of this action against him. See

In re Mark D. Mazza, 22-lok~13245 (E.D. Pa. Bankr.).

Following additional delays resulting from Mr. Mazza's

motion practice and f allure to meet bankruptcy court

deadlines, the bankruptcy court granted BNYM's motion for

relief from the bankruptcy stay. See Order Granting Relief

from Stay, 22-bk-13245 ECF No. 55 (E.D. Pa. Bankr. May 17,

2023) . The Order provides: Debtor shall be bound by this

Order in any conversion of the instant bankruptcy ease or in

6a

See Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mot."), ECE" No.

49.2 The Mazzas timely filed a response. See Defs. f

Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs. Resp."), ECF

No. 57. BNYM filed a reply brief on December 4,

2022. See Pl.'s Reply in Support of Pl.'s Mot. (\\pl_rs

Rep."), ECF No. 60.

The Mazzas have filed a Motion for Extension

of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary

Judgment (EGF No. 52)3, a Motion for Discovery

any subsequently filed bankruptcy case. Any future Automatic

Stays issued relating to the interest in the subject property of

Movant shall be null and void and will not prevent the

foreclosure of the Mortgaged Premises from proceeding and

from being valid in all respects, and Movant shall not be

required to obtain relief from any automatic stay that would

otherwise be imposed by the filing of any subsequent case.

Id. Mr. Mazza has filed a notice of appeal of the bankruptcy

order lifting the stay, but the stay is no longer in place. See

Notice of Appeal, 22-bk-13245 (E.D. pa. Bankr. May 18, 2023),

ECF No. 58.

2 In their response, the Mazzas argue that BNYIWS motion was

filed out of time. This Court conducted an in-person hearing in

this case and a related case on September 21, 2022, and at that

time, the Court inquired of BNYM's counsel when he would

have a motion for summary judgment ready for filing. BNYM's

counsel replied that he would be ready to file a motion for

summary judgment in fifteen days. However, this was not

incorporated into a scheduling order. When BNYM's counsel did

not file a motion within that time, the Court then issued a

scheduling order, See Order, ECF No. 48. BNYM filed its

motion the day the scheduling order was issued. The Mazzas

accuse the Court and BNYM's counsel of partaking in "ex parte

communications" because the timing of the filing was

"suspicious." This accusation is unsupported, and it cannot be

supported because it is f also. BNYM's motion was timely filed

and will be considered on the merits. The Mazzas have filed a

response to the motion.

3 BNYM has responded in opposition to the Mazzas' Motion for

an Extension of Time. See pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Ext.,

ECF No. 58. However, because the Mazzas filed a timely

7a

(ECF No. 54), and a Motion to Vacate the Cour t's

October 28, 2022 Order (ECE No. 55). Additionally,

the Mazzas have filed a Third Amended Answer with

no briefing or explanation. See Amended Answer

("Third Answer"), ECF No. 53.

I.

BACKGROUND

On June 12, 2012, BNYM filed an action

against the Mazzas in the Court of Common Pleas of

Chester County, Pennsylvania to foreclose on a

mortgage running in its f aver and encumbering the

property then-owned by the Mazzas 1271 Farm

Road, Berwyn, PA 19312 (the "Property") . After two

and a half years of litigation and a one-day bench

trial, BNYM secured a judgment in its f aver on

January 23, 2015. Following several post-trial

motions filed by the Mazzas, the court entered

judgment in foreclosure in the amount of

$1,085,000.00. The Mazzas then filed an

unsuccessful appeal, and BNYM's judgment was

reassessed at $1,501,572.00 after the case was

returned to the trial court. The Mazzas then filed

additional post-trial motions and initiated another

appeal, including an unsuccessful petition to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. A writ of execution in

favor of BNYM was issued in November 2016.

The Mazzas opposed BNYM'S attempts to

schedule a Sheriffs sale. However, on June 15, 2017,

a sheriffs sale was conducted, and BNYM acquired

title to the Property via its own writ at the sale. The

sheriffs deed was delivered to BNYM on August 8,

2017 and recorded on August 11, 2017. The Mazzas

filed more motions challenging the sale along with an

appeal. Ultimately, the Mazzas' challenges were

response to the motion for summary judgment, this motion is

moot.

8a

unsuccessful and the case was returned to the Court

of Common Pleas two years later in 2019.4

While the Mazzas continued to challenge the

Sheriffs sale, BNYM filed its complaint in ejectment

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County on

August 25, 2017, Before BNYM had served the

Mazzas with the complaint (Bn:/M avers this was

due to the Mazzas intentionally avoiding service) ,

the Mazzas removed the ejectment action to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania. The ease was originally assigned to

Judge Petrese B. Tucker.5 After Judge 5 Tucker

granted BNYM's motion for additional time to serve

Defendants by special service, the ejectment

complaint was served on the Mazzas on June 29,

2020. The Mazzas filed a motion to dismiss, and

Judge Tucker denied that motion in an Order dated

April 8, 2021. See Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECU no. 21;

see Order Denying Defs..* Mot. to Dismiss, ECP No.

22. On April 29, 2021, the Mazzas filed an answer

with counterclaims to the e ejectment complaint. See

Def s. Answer ("First Answer"), ECP No. 23.

BNYM filed a motion to dismiss the Mazzas'

counterclaims, which was granted by Judge Tucker,

who noted that the counterclaims were a collateral

attack on a state foreclosure judgment over which

the Court had no jurisdiction. See Pls . Mot. to

4 The Court of Common Pleas entered an order in September

2017 denying the Mazzas substantive relief and forbidding

them from filing fur they pleadings without prior leave of court.

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected the Mazzas'

appeal of the sheriffs sale in August 2018, and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Mazzas' petition for

further review.

5 Judge Tucker went on inactive status, and all of her cases

were reassigned to other judges of the Court, including this one

on July 22, 2022. See Reassignment Order, ECF No. 34 .

9a

Dismiss, ECF No. 25; Order Granting Pls. Mot. to

Dismiss, ECF No. 30 ("Defendants' six counterclaims

must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

because the crux of the counterclaims are [sic] an

attack on the prior state court judgment entered in

the foreclosure action.") . The Mazzas unsuccessfully

appealed Judge Tucker's order dismissing their

counterclaims.6

After the denial of their appeal, the Mazzas

filed two additional amended answers with

counterclaims--one on September 19, 2022 ("Second

Answer") (ECF No. 40), and one on November 18,

2022 (ECF No. 53)-~in addition to a Motion for

Extension of Time to Respond to Plaintiffs Motion

for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52), a Motion for

Discovery (ECF No. 54), and a Motion to Vacate the

Court's October 28, 2022 Order (ECF No. 55) . BNYM

has responded in opposition to the Mazzas' Motion

for an Extension of Time. See Pls.' Resp. to Def s Mot.

for Ext., ECF No. 57.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court has diversity jurisdiction over the

case as Plaintiff is a citizen of Delaware and New

York and Defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania,

and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See

28 U.S.C. § 1332. The parties agree Pennsylvania

substantive law applies.

6 The appeal was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

See Order, No. 22-1056 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2022), ECF No. 15.

The Mazzas filed a request for en banc reconsideration which

was also denied. See Order, No. 22-1856 (3d Cir. Nov. 3, 2022),

ECU No. 19

10a

1. Amended Pleadings

A party may amend its pleading once as a

matter of course within the time provided under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a) (1) . All further amendments require the other

party's consent or leave of the court, which the Court

"should freely give . . . when justice so requires.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (2). Of course, Rule 15’s liberal

standard for amendment is not boundless. "[A]

district court has discretion to deny a request to

amend if it is apparent from the record that (1) the

moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad

faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would

be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the

other party.” Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118,

134 (3d Cir. 2005). Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that "[a]n

amendment to a pleading related back to the date of

the original pleading when . . . the amendment."

asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out - or

attempted to be set out - in the original pleading. . .”

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 {c) (1) (B).

2. Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (1)

provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1).

A Rule 12(b) (1) motion may challenge jurisdiction

based on the face of the complaint or its existence in

fact. See Gould Elecs. Inc, v. United States, 220 F.3d

169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) . A

challenge based on the face of the complaint - a

facial attack - contests the sufficiency of the

pleadings and the court must view factual

allegations in the complaint in the light most

Ila

favorable to plaintiff. Constitution Party of Pa. v.

Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) ("[A] facial

attack calls for a district court to apply the same

standard of review it would use in considering a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b) (6), i.e.,

construing the alleged facts in favor of the

nonmoving party."). A challenge based on the

complaint's existence in fact -- a factual attack -concerns "the actual failure of [a plaintiffs] claims to

comport [factually] with the jurisdictional

prerequisites." U.S, ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa.

Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2007)

(quoting U.S, ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding

Co., 255 F. Supp. 2d 351, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). A

district court may "consider evidence outside the

pleadings" in a factual attack. Gould Elecs. Inc.. 220

F.3d at 176.

The purpose of a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to

dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings.

Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."

Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations

and quotations omitted). The standard requires

more than "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements." Id.

12a

3. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate if no

genuine dispute as to any material fact exists and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A motion for summary

judgment will not be defeated by 'the mere existence'

of some disputed facts, but will be denied when there

is a genuine issue of material fact." Am. Eagle

Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d

Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc..

477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). A fact is "material" if proof

of its existence or nonexistence might affect the

outcome of the litigation, and a dispute is "genuine"

if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248.

While the moving party bears the initial

burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, meeting this obligation shifts the

burden to the nonmoving party who must "set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial." Id. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)

(1963)). Although the Court views the facts in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Am.

Eagle Outfitters, 584 F.3d at 581, the responsive

burden cannot be satisfied by merely repeating

unsupported pleading allegations. Santini v.

Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) ("If the

moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to

the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and

come forward with specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.") (citations and

quotations omitted) .

13a

III.

DISCUSSION

1. Amended Pleadings

BNYM requests that the Mazzas' amended

pleadings be stricken pursuant to Rule 15. See Pl.'s

Mot. 6 n.6, ECF No. 49. After Judge Tucker denied

the Mazzas' motion to dismiss, the Mazzas filed their

first answer on April 29, 2021. See First Answer,

ECF No. 23. After further litigation, the Mazzas filed

two additional amended answers with counterclaims

-- one on September 19, 2022, and one on November

18, 2022. See Second Answer, ECF No. 40; Third

Answer, ECF No. 53. The Mazzas did not obtain

BNYM's consent nor the Court's leave to file their

Second or Third Answers.

The Mazzas aver that their Second Answer was

filed in the Court's after-hour filing box on May 20,

2021. However, the Mazzas have not provided any

proof, such as a file-stamped party copy, nor have

they explained why they waited until September

2022 to address "the original being misplaced or

lost." See Second Answer 1, ECF No. 40. The Mazzas

filed their Third Answer with no explanation or

briefing attached, and it includes additional revisions

to the Second Answer. Because the Mazzas have not

shown good cause for why they failed to obtain

BNYM's consent, leave of the Court, or make

amendments within the time allotted under Rule

15(a) (1), their amended answers will be stricken

pursuant to Rule 15.

The Mazzas aver that their Second Answer

was filed in the Court's after-hour filing box on May

20, 2021. However, the Mazzas have not provided

any proof, such as a file-stamped party copy, nor

have they explained why they waited until

September 2022 to address "the original being

14a

misplaced or lost." See Second Answer 1, ECF No. 40.

The Mazzas filed their Third Answer with no

explanation or briefing attached, and it includes

additional revisions to the Second Answer. Because

the Mazzas have not shown good cause for why they

failed to obtain BNYM's consent, leave of the Court,

or make amendments within the time allotted under

Rule 15(a) (1), their amended answers will be

stricken pursuant to Rule 15.

2. Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims

In the alternative, BNYM moves to dismiss the

counterclaims contained therein. Because Judge

Tucker previously dismissed the first six of eight

counterclaims contained in the amended pleadings

with prejudice, the Court need not readdress them.

See Order Granting Pl.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No.

30. Moreover, the Mazzas did not address the motion

to dismiss in their response in opposition.

Accordingly, the motion'to dismiss will be granted as

unopposed. See Local Rule 7.1(c). Even assuming the

Mazzas had opposed the motion, dismissal of the

counterclaims is nonetheless warranted. The

additional counterclaims, like counterclaims one

through six, will be dismissed with prejudice for lack

of jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

prohibits federal courts "from adjudicating actions in

which the relief requested requires determining

whether the state court's decision is wrong or voiding

the state court's ruling." In re Knapper, 407 F.3d

573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) {quoting Walker v. Horn, 385

F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2004)). A valid judgment in

mortgage foreclosure can bar a subsequent claim

based on the validity of the foreclosed mortgage

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Manu v. Nat'l

City Bank of Ind., 471 F. App'x 101, 105 (3d Cir.

2012) ("[Borrower's] allegations that various statutes

15a

and rights were violated because the defendants

threatened, and followed through with, foreclosure

when they had no right to do so is nothing more than

an attack on the state court judgment."). As Judge

Tucker stated in the original dismissal order, the

"counterclaims must be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine because the crux of the counterclaims are

[sic] an attack on the prior state court judgment

entered in the foreclosure action." See Dismissal

Order 6 n.i, ECF No. 30. As with the six

counterclaims that were already dismissed with

prejudice, the Mazzas "are clearly asking this Court

to void state court decisions regarding their property

interests. This Court has no jurisdiction to do so." Id.

(citations omitted) .

3. Summary Judgment

In response to BNYM's motion for summary

judgment, the Mazzas fail to raise any issues of fact

supported by competent evidence and simply

advance arguments based solely on their pleadings,

See Defs.' Resp. 6, ECF No. 57 ("Defendants [sic]

responsive pleading to this ejectment action sets

forth a number of jurisdiction defects or defenses. . .

."); id. at 16-17 ("Defendants . .. avers [sic] they have

timely raised affirmative defenses including

jurisdictional one's [sic] supporting that the ...

foreclosure judgment and sheriff sale are void."). The

responses are insufficient to defeat summary

judgment. See Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 812 F.3d

319, 330 (3d Cir. 2016) ("While at the motion-todismiss stage of proceedings a district court is

obligated to accept the allegations in plaintiffs

complaint as true, it does not accept mere allegations

as true at the summary judgment stage. To the

contrary, 'summary judgment is essentially "put up

16a

or shut up" time for the non-moving party' who 'must

rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot

rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal

memoranda, or oral argument.'" {citing Berckeley

Inv. Grp., Ltd, v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir.

2016))).

In a Pennsylvania ejectment action, the burden is

on the Plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of

the evidence that it is entitled to immediate

possession of real property and that defendant is

wrongly in possession of said property. Doman v.

Brogan, 592 A.2d 104, 108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);

Hallman v. Turns, 482 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1984) ("The plaintiffs burden in an action of

ejectment is clear: he must establish a right to

immediate exclusive possession. In order to recover

in an ejectment action, the plaintiff must show title

at the commencement of the action and can recover,

if at all, only on the strength of his own title, not

because of weakness or deficiency of title in the

defendant." (citation omitted) ].

Beyond demonstrating that a defendant has

superior title to that of plaintiff, Hallman, 482 A.2d

at 1287, the only other defense recognized in

Pennsylvania is proof that the foreclosure is void (not

voidable) as a result of a jurisdictional defect

preventing the foreclosure court from entering a

legal judgment. Dime Sav, Bank, FSB v. Greene, 813

A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) ("Where a

judgment is void, the sheriffs sale which follows is a

nullity. A judgment is void when the court had no

jurisdiction over the parties, or the subject matter, or

the court had no power or authority to render the

particular judgment."). "It is well-established that

the underlying [foreclosure] judgment and sheriffs

sale cannot be attacked in a collateral proceeding."

17a

Fannie Mae v. Ferraro, 10 Pa. D. & C. 5th 260, 26465 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 2009) (citing Roberts v. Gibson,

251 A.2d 799, 800 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969)).

A majority of the Mazzas' answers and defenses

concern the foreclosure action and the sheriffs sale.

However, raising issues concerning the foreclosure

action and the sheriffs sale in defense of BNYM's

ejectment complaint does not aid the Mazzas because

this ejectment action is a collateral proceeding, not

one where a party can relitigate adverse decisions in

the foreclosure action. See 1 Source Prop. Serv. LLC

v. Snook, 284 A.3d 890 (table), 890 (Pa. Super. Ct.

Aug. 3, 2022) (affirming trial court ruling that

defendant's ejectment defense failed because

"[Appellant] again sought to collaterally attack the

judgment and sale in the mortgage foreclosure

action"); Taylor v. Robinson, No. 1970 EDA 2012,

2012 WL 4108760, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 20,

2012), appeal dismissed. No. 1970 EDA 2012, 2013

WL 11283785 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2013) ("This

court's decision to grant Judgment on the Pleadings

should be affirmed because there were no actual

disputes of fact bearing on [Defendant's]

demonstrated right to immediate possession of the

property.") ; Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Citiano, 834

A.2d 645, 647 {Pa. Super, Ct. 2003), appeal denied,

847 A.2d 1286 (Table) {Pa. 2004) ("Appellant's

argument against summary judgment hinges on

whether the sheriffs sale complied with the notice

requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 3129.3 when the sale was

postponed .... This argument invokes a collateral

matter to the underlying ejectment action.").

The Mazzas, without support or detail, allege

in the First, Second, and Third Answer that the

foreclosure judgment was void and that BNYM does

hold superior title to the property. However, the

18a

Mazzas will not be able to challenge the state court's

decisions in the foreclosure action nor can they claim

that the recorded sheriffs deed does not result in

BNYM possessing superior title.

As the Pennsylvania Superior Court recently

explained while examining the defense of void

foreclosure judgment in a case with similar facts:

Instantly, the trial court denied Appellant's

request for a stay of execution, stating: "...

[Appellant] is again focused on the merits of

the foreclosure action in which she had been

represented by counsel, in which jurisdiction

over [Appellant] had never been contested,

and wherein [Appellant] did not pursue the

complaints which (Appellant] has sought to

raise collaterally in this ejectment action."

(Trial Court Opinion at 4). The record

supports the trial court's analysis.

Unlike in Meritor Mortg. Corp .- E, Appellant

does not advance a defective service argument

or otherwise explain why the mortgagee's

alleged failure to comply with certain federal

regulations renders the sheriffs sale void,

such that Appellant can collaterally attack the

mortgage foreclosure at this juncture.

Consequently, the trial court properly declined

to grant Appellant's request for a stay of

execution.

1 Source Prop. Serv. LLC, 284 A.3d at 890 (footnote

and citation omitted); see also Tolerico v. Munley,

242 A, 3d 402 (table), 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).

19a

On point is the decision of the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, in a case

such as this, where one party holds the sheriffs sale

deed while the other party is in actual possession. As

the court explained:

Here, the Sherriff s [sic] Deed establishes

[plaintiff] purchased and now owns the

property . . . Although [Defendant] claims that

the Property was not properly posted, she

failed to plead this allegation with specificity

and further failed to timely challenge the Sale.

[Defendant] does not dispute that she is in

possession of the property. Thus, there is no

doubt whatsoever that [plaintiff],

being out of possession yet having an

immediate right to possession, is entitled to

judgment in Ejectment, and a trial would be a

futile exercise.

Taylor, 2012 WL 4108760, see also FMMB Big

Lakes, LLC v. Croce, No. 1047 WDA 2019, 2020 WL

974413, at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2020), rearg,

denied, 227 A.3d 451 (Pa. Super. Ct. May 7, 2020)

("An ejectment action is collateral to the mortgage

foreclosure proceedings and the ensuing sheriffs

sale. The only relevant issue in this ejectment action

is whether [plaintiff] is the record owner of the

property with the right to possession. It is beyond

argument that [defendant] does not have title to the

real estate in question, and . . . [n]one of her

grievances is [sic] relevant to this ejectment action,

which merely involves whether [plaintiff) owns the

property and is out of possession."); Fed. Nat'l Mortg.

Ass'n, 834 A.2d at 646 (adopting the trial court's

finding that "[plaintiff] has title by virtue of the

20a

Sheriffs Deed Poll, and has therefore established its

superior title to the property currently occupied by

[defendant]"); Fannie Mae v. Scarborough, No.

02669, 2012 WL 6051098, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.

May 23, 2012) ("A party may obtain the right to

possess a property via sheriffs sale. When a party

asserts a possessory interest in real property based

on a successful bid and purchase at a sheriffs sale,

the right to immediate possession accrues when the

sheriffs deed is acknowledged and recorded.").

Here, the Mazzas have not and cannot

establish any of the few defenses to ejectment under

Pennsylvania law. The foreclosure judgment

rendered in favor of BNYM is not void. The Property

is located in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania's state

courts have primary jurisdiction over foreclosures of

Pennsylvania property, Pa. R. Civ. P. 1141-1150, the

Mazzas were served with and participated in the

foreclosure, and the Mazzas' appeal of the foreclosure

was unsuccessful.

Nonetheless, the Mazzas argue that BNYM's

foreclosure judgment is void because the mortgage

assignment to BNYM was an assignment into a trust

after the trust was closed, and therefore, not valid.

See Defs.' Resp. 7, ECF No. 57. Even if the Mazzas

had offered any factual support for this allegation,

which they have not, courts have concluded that a

breach of a pooling and servicing agreement (PSA)

does not affect negotiation or transfer of loan notes

and mortgages into trust, and that a borrow of a loan

included in a trust has no standing to raise an

21a

alleged violation of the PSA because they are not

parties to the trust contract.7 Courts in this district

have found the same:

In the past two (2) years, numerous courts

have held that a borrower lacks standing to

challenge a securitized trust’s authority to

enforce a loan note and mortgage based on

purported violations of the underlying PSA.

Most of the reported decisions arise in cases in

which the borrower initiated a lawsuit against

the mortgagee seeking a determination that it

lacked authority to enforce the subject note

and mortgage or wrongfully foreclosed on the

7 See, e.g„ Correia v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 452 B.R.

319, 324 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) (borrower lacked standing to

challenge the mortgage's assignment claim under the PSA);

Nachar v. PNC Bank, N.A.. 901 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019 (N.D.

Ohio 2012) ("[C]ourts that have considered the argument that a

borrower can claim third-party beneficiary status to [a PSA],

and premise a breach of contract or promissory estoppel claim

on [a PSA], have rejected that argument. "); Kelly v. Deutsche

Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 789 F. Supp. 2d 262, 267-68 {D. Mass.

2011) (borrower failed to show that he was either a party or a

third party beneficiary to the PSA and therefore could not raise

an alleged breach of the PSA as a defense to foreclosure);

Citibank, N.A. v. Wilbern, No. 12 C 755, 2013 WL 1283802, at

*4-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2013) ("[Defendants' concern regarding)

the propriety of the assignment of [their] loan under the terms

of the [PSA] . . if valid, does not affect Citibank's right to

proceed with the foreclosure; a trust's own violations of the

Internal Revenue Code might be a matter of concern for the

trust's investors, but they do not serve as a basis for opposing

another party's foreclosure attempts. ") ; Serra v. Quantum

Serv, Corp., No. 11-11843, 2012 WL 3548037, at *12-13 (D.

Mass. Aug. 5, 2012) , affd, 747 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2014)

("(Borrower] has presented no argument in support of the

contention that if the assignment did violate the governing

trust's documents, this would render the assignment invalid.").

22a

mortgage. Other decisions emanate from

bankruptcy proceedings in which the debtor

either initiated affirmative adversary

proceedings against the mortgagee raising

similar claims, objected to the mortgagee's

proof of claim, or challenged the mortgagee's

right to seek relief from the automatic stay.

Whatever the context, it appears that a

judicial consensus has developed holding that

a borrower lacks standing to (1) challenge the

validity of a mortgage securitization or (2)

request a judicial determination that a loan

assignment is invalid due to noncompliance

with a pooling and servicing agreement, when

the borrower is neither a party nor a third

party beneficiary of the securitization

agreement, i.e., the PSA.

In this case, based on the facts before me, I

come to the same conclusion. Because the Note

is a negotiable instrument and that BNYM is

the holder of the instrument, the Debtor lacks

standing to assert that BNYM cannot enforce

the Note due to an alleged failure to comply

with the PSA.

In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 284-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.

2012) (citations omitted) . Similarly,

Courts have consistently rejected attempts by

third parties to enforce the terms of

securitization agreements to which they are

not a party. Wittenberg v. First Independent

Mortgage Company, Civ. No. 10-58, 2011 WL

1357483 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 11, 2011) (finding

that mortgagor may not invoke pooling and

23a

servicing agreement because she was not an

intended beneficiary of the agreement);

Anderson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Civ.

No. 10-2685, 2011 WL 1627945, at *4-5 (D.

Minn. Apr. 8, 2011) (recognizing that

compliance with a pooling and servicing

agreement is not relevant to whether the

chain of assignment was effective); Densmore

v. Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. (In re

Densmore), 445 B.R. 307, 310 (Bankr. D. Vt.

2011) ("the question of whether the loan in

this case is listed in the PSA is immaterial to

the question of whether Litton may enforce the

note.").

In re D'Angelo, No. 11-14926, 2012 WL 27541, at *2

n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2012), affd, 479 B.R. 649

(E.D. Pa. 2012). Accordingly, the foreclosure

judgment is not void? 8

Nor do the Mazzas have superior title to the

Property. The Mazzas argue that "[i]n the instant

action there was a sheriff sale that was rescheduled

and defendants contend not receiving proper notice if

[sic] the new sheriff sale date." See Defs.' Resp. 13.

Rule 3129.3(b) (1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil

Procedure provides:

8 Belatedly, the Mazzas argue that the mortgage assignment to

BNYM "was ineffective or invalid since the assignment was not

executed by a [sic) individual as a nominee for MERS. MERS

per the mortgage/note was solely in a nominee role regarding

transfer or assignment and since assignment was not

effectuated there was no transfer of the mortgage/note upon

which the foreclosure complaint was based." See Defs.' Resp. 7,

ECF No. 57. The Mazzas attached only a copy of the

assignment, not the mortgage, which is not of the ordinary and

dated before the filing of foreclosure.

24a

If the sale is stayed, continued, postponed or

adjourned to a date certain within one

hundred thirty days of the scheduled sale,

notice of which sale was given as provided by

Rule 3129.2, and public announcement

thereof, including the new date, is made to the

bidders assembled at the time and place fixed

for the sale, no new notice as provided by Rule

3129.2 shall be required, but there may be

only two such stays, continuances,

postponements or adjournments within the

one hundred thirty day period without new

notice.

The Mazzas do not assert that a public

announcement was not made the day of the

originally scheduled sheriffs sale. Nor do they assert

that more than two sale postponements occurred

within 130 days from the original sale date. Given

that the Mazzas cannot point to a genuine issue of

material fact and that BNYM has shown it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment

will be granted in favor of BNYM and against the

Mazzas.9

9 The two remaining motions are the Mazzas' motion to vacate

and motion for discovery. The Mazzas request that the Court

vacate its October 28, 2022 Order requiring BNYM to file a

motion for summary judgment and strike BNYM's motion for

summary judgment pursuant to "Rule 60a (b)" (sic). See Mot. to

Vacate, ECF No. 55; Order for Summ. J., ECF No. 48. The

motion lacks support and merit. At the September 21, 2022

hearing, the Court asked BNYM if it was ready to move for

summary judgment and orally requested that BNYM file the

motion within fifteen days. However, the court did not provide

for such a deadline in the written order that it entered following

the hearing. Thereafter, on October 28, the Court entered an

order fixing the deadline for the filing of summary judgment.

25a

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined herein, BNYM’s motion to

dismiss counterclaims and motion for summary

judgment. Further, the Mazzas’ additional motions to

vacate, for discovery, and for an extension of time

will be denied.

An appropriate order follows.

Fixing a new deadline for the filing of summary judgment was

not a "mistake" and does not warrant that the order be vacated

pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1). In any event, the Mazzas responded

in opposition to the summary judgment motion and therefore

suffer no prejudice.

The Mazzas also request additional discovery. After ten years of

litigation, the Mazzas now seek the original mortgage and note,

production of the underwriting files and transfers by and

between banks, servicers, and MERS, depositions and written

proof the alleged assignments were executed by individuals

without capacity to sign assignments as assistant secretaries of

MERS. However, none of the information the Mazzas request is

relevant to this ejectment action - instead, the Mazzas appear

to be seeking this information to make collateral attacks or for

purposes of delay. As noted above, the defenses to an ejectment

action are limited, and the Mazzas have not and cannot

establish those defenses. Because the discovery sought is

irrelevant to the ejectment action, and the Mazzas have had

years in different courts to discover said information yet waited

until around a week until their response to summary judgment

was due to request this discovery, the motion will be denied.

26a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON,

Plaintiff

v.

MARK MAZZA, et al.,

Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-5453

JUDGMENT

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2023, in

accordance with the Court's Order of this same date,

it is hereby ORDERED that JUDGMENT in

ejectment is ENTERED in favor of Plaintiff Bank of

New York Mellon and against the Defendants.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Eduardo C. Robreno

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J.

27a

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

NO. 23-2168

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK

OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE

CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF THE CWALT, INC.,

ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-0A10

MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH

CERTIFICATES SERIES 2006-0A10

v.

MARK MAZZA; LISSA MAZZA,

Apellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-17-cv-05453)

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Present: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, BIBAS,

PORTER, MATEY, PHIPPS,

FREEMAN, MONTGOMERY-REEVES,

and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

The petition for rehearing filed by Appellants

in the above-captioned case having been submitted to

the judges who participated in the decision of this

Court and to all the other available circuit judges of

the circuit in regular active service, and no judge

28a

who concurred in the decision having asked for

rehearing, and a majority of the judges of the circuit

in regular service not having voted for rehearing, the

petition for rehearing by the panel and the Court en

banc is denied.

By the court,

s/ Arianna J. Freeman

Circuit Judge

Dated: December 3, 2024

29a

PDB/cc: Lisa Mazza

Mark Mazza

All Counsel of Record

30a

APPENDIX F

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 23-2168

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, FKA THE BANK

OF NEW YORK, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE

CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF THE CWALT, INC.,

ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006-0A10

MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES

SERIES 2006-0A10

v.

MARK MAZZA; LISA MAZZA,

Appellants

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-17-cv-05453)

District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno (Ret.)

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 3, 2024

Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN,

Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: September 12, 2024)

31a

OPINION*

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not a opinion of the full Court

and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute

binding precedent.

32a

Mark and Lisa Mazza appeal pro se from the District

Court's orders entering judgment in ejectment

against them and in favor of Appellee Bank of New

York Mellon (BNYM), and denying their

counterclaims. For the following reasons, we will

affirm the District Court's judgment.

In August 2015, BNYM obtained a foreclosure

judgment against the Mazzas in the Chester County

Court of Common Pleas for over $1.5 million, after

they failed to make the mortgage payments on their

Berwyn, Pennsylvania property. BNYM

subsequently obtained a writ of execution. In June

2017, it bought the property at a sheriffs sale, and

the deed was recorded.

The Mazzas unsuccessfully sought to set aside

the sheriffs sale in state court. See Bank of N.Y.

Mellon v. Mazza, Nos. 3265 EDA 2017, 99 EDA 2018,

2018 WL 3827268 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2018).

The Mazzas have refused to vacate the

property. Thus, in 2017, BNYM initiated an

ejectment action in the Court of Common Pleas. Prior

to service, the Mazzas removed the action to the

District Court. The matter was assigned to

Honorable Petrese B. Tucker. The Mazzas filed an

answer to the complaint which included six

counterclaims. Judge Tucker granted BNYM's

motion to dismiss the counterclaims, finding that

they were in essence an attack on the foreclosure

judgment, and therefore barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine.1 After the matter was reassigned

to the Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, the Mazzas

1 See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983);

Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

33a

filed two amended answers which also included

counterclaims. BNYM filed a motion for summary

judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, and a motion to dismiss the

counterclaims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6). On May 24, 2023, the

District Court entered an order granting summary

judgment to BNYM, and dismissing all

counterclaims with prejudice; a separate judgment in

ejectment was entered in favor of BNYM. The

Mazzas appealed.

We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over

the district court's application of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, see Parkview Assocs. P'ship v. City of

Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 323-24 (3d Cir. 2000), and its

grant of summary judgment, see Groman v. Twp. of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). A grant

of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review

reveals that "there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

We can quickly dispense with several of the

Mazzas' challenges on appeal.2 First, it was well

2 Appellants' motion to summarily reverse the District

Court's judgment is denied, See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir.

I.O.P. 10.6. The motion, which was filed after their brief, does

not rely on changed circumstances or a change in law. See 3d

Cir. L.A.R. 27.4(b). Moreover, the motion lacks merit. Contrary

to Appellants' arguments, the foreclosure judgment here was in

rem only; it was not an in personam money judgment subject to

revival under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5526(1). See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 4303;

42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5526(1); cf. Insilvco Corp, v. Rayburn. 543 A.2d

120, 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (recognizing the limited

34a

within the District Court's discretion to strike their

amended answers, which also included

counterclaims. See Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.,

266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001). The Mazzas did not

properly file an amended answer within the time

allotted, nor did they obtain BNYM's consent or the

Court's permission to file an amended answer. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) & (2). Second, the District

Court did not abuse its discretion in determining

that BNYM's summary judgment motion was timely

filed. See ECF No. 74 at 2 n.2.

Third, there is no basis in the record to

support the Mazza's claims of judicial bias. See

Securacomm Consulting, Inc, v. Securacom Inc., 224

F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that mere

disagreement with adverse rulings is insufficient

evidence of judicial bias). There was good cause to

reassign the matter from Judge Tucker, who had

assumed inactive status, to Judge Robreno, who was

presiding over a case which, we agree, was "related

to" the ejectment action.3 See E.D. Pa. Loc. R.

40.1(IV) & (V) (governing the assignment and

reassignment of related cases). None of the Mazzas'

allegations demonstrate that Judge Robreno was

unable to render fair judgment or that his

impartiality might be reasonably be questioned, and,

therefore, recusal was not required. See Litekv v.

United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ("opinions

formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced

or events occurring in the course of the current

circumstances (not present here) where a judgment in mortgage

foreclosure can be both in rem and in personam).

3 The "related" matter is a June 2020 complaint filed by the

Mazzas against BNYM and others, alleging, inter alia, that

BNYM acquired title to the Berwyn property through

fraudulent means. See E.D. Pa. Civ No. 2:20-ev-03253.

35a

proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute

a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they

display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that

would make fair judgment impossible").

Turning to the merits of the ejectment

complaint, we agree that BNYM was entitled to

summary judgment. Under Pennsylvania law, which

governs here, BNYM had the burden to establish the

right to immediate exclusive possession of the

property. See Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104, 108

(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). To do so, it had to demonstrate

paramount title to the property. Id. The recorded

sheriffs deed, attached to the motion for summary

judgment, established its claim to title. See Wells

Fargo Bank N.A v. Long, 934 A.2d 76, 80 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 2007). As noted by the District Court, the Mazzas

wholly failed to raise any genuine issues of material

fact as to BNYM's title. They did not contest BNYM's

Statement of Undisputed Facts, nor did they marshal

any evidence to support their affirmative defenses,

relying instead on a mere memorandum of law.

Accordingly, BNYM was entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See Williams v Borough of West

Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting

that the nonmoving party cannot simply assert

factually unsupported allegations to meet burden at

summary judgment).

The Mazzas argue that they were prejudiced

by the District Court's order denying their motion for

discovery. We find no abuse of discretion. See Mass.

Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc, v. A.B.A., 107 F.3d

1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting the standard of

review). To succeed on appeal, the Mazzas must

"show that the district court's denial of discovery

'made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and

36a

implicit in such a showing is proof that more diligent

discovery was impossible.""

Mass. Sch. of Law, 107 F.3d at 1032 (citation

omitted). The Mazzas cannot make this requisite

showing.

First, we agree with the District Court that

the Mazzas did not diligently pursue discovery. They

claimed to have uncovered the basis for their

discovery motion in 2018,4 but they waited to file the

motion Until November 2022, a year and a half after

they were served with the complaint, and a week

before their summary judgment response was due.

Second, the Mazzas have not shown that they

were denied the opportunity to discover evidence

which would support a viable defense. They sought

discovery of documents - including the original

mortgage note - to demonstrate that the underlying

foreclosure judgment is void, See Dime Say. Bank,

FSB v. Greene, 813 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2002) (recognizing that "a judgment which is void

can not support an ejectment action and may be

asserted as a defense in the ejectment proceeding").

They contend the mortgage assignment to FNYM

was invalid or ineffective for a number of reasons,

including that it was an assignment into a trust after

the trust was closed. They argue, therefore, that

BNYM lacked standing to enforce the note and bring

the foreclosure action. But under Pennsylvania's

Uniform Commercial Code (PUCC), a note secured by

a mortgage is a negotiable instrument; thus,

"challenges to the chain of possession by which [a

foreclosing party] came to hold the [n]ote [are]

immaterial to its enforceability." J.P. Morgan Chase

4 In their response to summary judgment, the Mazzas did not

identify or present the evidence which they claim to have

discovered in 2018.

37a

Bank y, Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1266 (Pa. Super. Ct.

2013). Moreover, under Pennsylvania law, standing

is a non-jurisdictional and waivable issue.

See In re Condemnation by Urban Redev, Auth, of

Pittsburgh, 913 A.2d 178, 181 n.6 (Pa. 2006). Thus,

even assuming that the District Court had the

authority to determine that the state foreclosure

judgment was void as a defense to ejectment, the

Mazzas' challenges to the assignment and BNYM's

standing could not have established it. Accordingly,

they were not prejudiced by the denial of the

discovery motion. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC,

652 F.3d 340, 348 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that we

will not disturb the District Court's discovery order

"absent a showing of actual or substantial

prejudice").

The District Court was clearly barred,

however, from granting relief on the Mazzas'

counterclaims. The District Court determined that

they were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

which precludes federal consideration of "cases

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those

judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp, v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). On appeal, the

Mazzas contend that the doctrine does not bar their

claims because they seek relief for injuries caused by

BNYM in fraudulently obtaining foreclosure, not for

injuries caused by the state court's judgment. See

Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild

LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (indicating

that the doctrine does not apply "when the source of

the injury is the defendant's actions (and not the

state court judgments)"). But for relief, the Mazzas

38a

sought, inter alia, quiet title to the property; to that

extent, they are precisely the type of claims which

Rooker-Feldman precludes.

See Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc.,

773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that

Rooker-Feldman barred plaintiffs suit "askfing] the

federal court to grant him title to his property

because the foreclosure judgment was obtained

fraudulently"); accord Taylor v. Fed, Nat'l Mortg.

Ass’n, 374 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2004), as amended

on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Aug. 3, 2004).

To the extent that the Mazzas sought damages

for injuries caused by BNYM stemming from the

assignment of the underlying mortgage note, their

claims are barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

See Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313

(Pa. 1995) (recognizing that a valid, final judgment

on the merits precludes future litigation between the

parties or their privies on the same cause of action,

including claims that could have been litigated

during the first proceeding); see also Rycoline Prods.,

Inc, v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 887 (3d Cir,

1997) (noting that federal courts are required to give

state court judgments the same preclusive effect that

the issuing state courts would give them).

Accordingly, the counterclaims were properly

dismissed with prejudice.

39a

Based on the foregoing, we deny the motion for

summary dismissal, and will affirm the District

Court's judgment.5

5 Appellee's motion for leave to file a sur reply in opposition to

summary disposition is granted. Appellants' motion for an

extension of time to file a supplemental appendix, and for leave

to file a supplemental appendix and expand the record is

granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted to the

extent it seeks to file, in a supplemental appendix, the

documents listed in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 and

3d Cir. LA.R. 30.3, that were not included in their appendix or

Appellee's appendix. The motion is otherwise denied. See

Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199,

226 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting the "exceptional circumstances"

necessary to justify supplementing the record on appeal).

Appellants' motion to stay, defer, continue and/or remove this

appeal from the September 3, 2024 calendar is denied.