Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.

No. 25-170

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY, et al.,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Colorado

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE ADVANCING AMERICAN

FREEDOM; INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF

EVANGELICAL CHAPLAIN ENDORSERS; JCCWATCH.ORG;

LANDMARK LEGAL FOUNDATION; YANKEE INSTITUTE;

TIM JONES, FORMER SPEAKER, MISSOURI HOUSE,

FOUNDER, LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA INSTITUTE;

JENNY BETH MARTIN, HONORARY CHAIRMAN, TEA

PARTY PATRIOTS ACTION; TAXPAYERS PROTECTION

ALLIANCE; AND HON. WILLIAM WAGNER (RET),

DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR OF LAW EMERITUS IN

SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

J. Marc Wheat

Counsel of Record

Timothy Harper (Admitted in DC)

Advancing American Freedom, Inc.

801 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Suite 930

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 780-4848

MWheat@advancingamericanfreedom.com

May 21, 2026

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether federal law precludes state-law claims

seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the

effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas

emissions on the global climate.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

OF AMICI CURIAE ...............................................1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

OF THE ARGUMENT ...........................................2

ARGUMENT ................................................................5

I. Those Who Framed and Ratified the

Constitution Knew Both the

Importance of National Regulation in

Some Areas and the Danger of States

Pursuing Their Perceived Self-Interest

at the Expense of Other States ....................... 5

II. If the Sort of State Court Litigation at

Issue Here is Allowed to Proceed,

Localities Like Boulder Could

Effectively Impose their Preferred

Regulatory Agendas on Other States

and the Nation as a Whole, to the

Great Detriment of Americans with no

Recourse ......................................................... 10

CONCLUSION ..........................................................17

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Coyle v. Smith,

221 U.S. 559 (1911) ................................................. 9

Dept. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis,

553 U.S. 328 (2008) ................................................. 9

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,

285 U.S. 262 (1932) ................................................. 3

Shelby County v. Holder,

570 U.S. 529 (2013) ................................................. 9

Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Ass’n v.

Thomas,

588 U.S. 504 (2019) ................................................. 9

Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,

451 U.S. 630 (1981) ................................................. 2

Constitution and Statutes

U.S. Const. Amend. X ..................................................3

Other Authorities

American Petroleum Institute, Contribution

of the Oil and Natural Gas Industry to the

US Economy in 2023 4 (2025),

https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/EnergyEconomics/API-Studies/2025/The-Oil-andGas-Industrys-Contribution-to-the-USEconomy.pdf .................................................. 14, 15

Brutus, No. 1 in 1 The Founders’

Constitution (Liberty Fund 1987) (1787) ............. 6

iv

Bureau of Labor Statistics “Occupational

employment and wages in oil and gas

industries, May 2024” at

https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2026/article

/occupational-employment-and-wages-inoil-and-gas-industries-may-2024.htm ................ 15

Kevin Dayaratna, Kat Miller, Energy

Abundance and Human Flourishing: A

Data-Driven Global Analysis, Advancing

American Freedom (forthcoming 2026) .............. 16

Federalist No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton)

(George Carey & James McClellan eds.,

2001) ...................................................................... 6

Federalist No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton)

(George Carey & James McClellan eds.,

2001) ...................................................................... 8

Federalist No. 45 (James Madison) (George

Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) .................. 8

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., Conservatives Stalk

the House: The Story of the Republican

Study Committee 212 (Green Hill

Publishers, Inc. 1983) ........................................... 1

Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A

Course Unbroken: The Constitutional

Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce

Clause, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1877 (2011) ....................... 7

Independence Index: Measuring Life, Liberty

and the Pursuit of Happiness, Advancing

American Freedom,

https://advancingamericanfreedom.com/aa

ff-independence-index/ ............................................ 1

v

James Madison, Vices of the Political System

of the United States, in 1 The Founders’

Constitution (Liberty Fund 1987) (1787) ............. 7

Multnomah County’s $51 Billion Lawsuit

against Big Oil & Gas, Reynolds &

Steindorf, LLP (Oct. 14, 2024) ............................ 13

Misato Sato, et al., Impacts of Climate

Litigation on Firm Value, 7 Nature

Sustainability 146 (2024) .................................... 13

New York Passes Climate Superfund

Legislation, Vinson & Elkins

(Mar. 25, 2026) .................................................... 13

RystadEnergy, Economic Impact of US

Independent Operators 9 (2025),

https://axpc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2025/09/Rystad-EnergyEconomic-Impact-of-IndependentOperators-August-2025.pdf ................................ 14

St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s

Commentaries, in 5 The Founders’

Constitution (Liberty Fund 1987) (1803) ............. 8

The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison)

(George W. Carey and James McClellan,

eds., The Liberty Fund 2001)................................ 3

The Federalist Society, Can State Courts Set

Global Climate Policy (YouTube Oct. 10,

2025) .................................................................... 15

U.S. Department of Energy & Employment,

State Reports (2025)

https://www.energy.gov/documents/2025useer-state-reports .............................................. 11

vi

Vices of the Political System of the United

States ..................................................................... 7

1

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Advancing American Freedom (AAF) is a nonprofit

organization that promotes and defends policies that

elevate traditional American values, including

freedom from arbitrary power.1 AAF “will continue to

serve as a beacon for conservative ideas, a reminder

to all branches of government of their responsibilities

to the nation,”2 and believes American prosperity

depends on ordered liberty and self-government.3 AAF

files this brief on behalf of its 155,355 members

nationwide.

Amici International Conference of Evangelical

Chaplain Endorsers; JCCWatch.org; Landmark Legal

Foundation; Yankee Institute; Tim Jones, Former

Speaker, Missouri House, Founder, Leadership for

America Institute; Jenny Beth Martin, Honorary

Chairman, Tea Party Patriots Action; Taxpayers

Protection Alliance; and Hon. William Wagner (Ret),

Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus believe that

the Constitution and the ideas that underly it are

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part.

No person other than Amicus Curiae and its counsel made any

monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2 Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., Conservatives Stalk the House: The Story

of the Republican Study Committee 212 (Green Hill Publishers,

Inc. 1983).

3 Independence Index: Measuring Life, Liberty and the Pursuit

of Happiness, Advancing American Freedom available at

https://advancingamericanfreedom.com/aaff-independenceindex/.

2

essential to the preservation of the freedom of the

people.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE

ARGUMENT

Since 2017, as many as sixty local governments

have sued energy companies that produce and sell

fossil fuels seeking billions of dollars in damages

allegedly caused by their contributions to “global

climate change.” Pet. at 2. Allowing municipalities to

engage in regulation-by-litigation to create energy

policy for the entire nation would be a perversion of

the federalist system adopted by the People in the

Constitution.

In April 2018, the County Commissioners of

Boulder County and the city of Boulder sued

international energy companies Exxon and Suncor in

state court. Boulder sought damages from the

companies “purportedly arising under state law” for

their production, promotion, refining, marketing, and

sale of fossil fuels which Boulder alleged exacerbated

climate change, which, in turn, harmed Boulder’s

property and residents. Pet. at 3.

Under this Court’s precedent, “the interstate or

international nature of” certain issues make them

“inappropriate for state law to control.” Texas

Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.

630, 641 (1981). The “interstate pollution” produced

by energy companies, which is overwhelmingly an

interstate industry, is just such an issue. Pet. at 3.

Boulder, however, contends that because The

Clean Air Act (CAA) displaced federal common law

and because the CAA does not explicitly preempt

3

Boulder’s suit, the suit is not preempted. As the

dissenting justices below recognized, such a precedent

would give cities “‘the green light to act as [their] own

republic’ by regulating on an interstate and

international level.” Pet. at 4.

The Constitution was designed to leave most

powers to the states, as demonstrated both by the

limited enumeration of federal powers and the express

statement of reserved powers in the Tenth

Amendment. The Framers knew that local control was

preferable wherever it was possible,4 and that

allowing each state to regulate most issues for itself

would create what Justice Brandeis would later

describe as laboratories of governance in which each

state has the power to address the issues it faces in

unique ways. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.

262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

National regulation, on the other hand, can be

desirable or even necessary where fifty different

approaches to a particular issue would be untenable.

State regulation of such national and international

issues would undermine the equality of the states

essential to constitutional federalism.

Faced with the costs, uncertainty, and

reputational risks of protracted litigation in dozens of

jurisdictions, energy companies like Petitioners here

4 See The Federalist No. 10, at 47 (James Madison) (George W.

Carey and James McClellan, eds., The Liberty Fund 2001)

(explaining that under the Constitution, “the great and

aggregate interests” of the nation should be “referred to the

national [legislature], the local and particular to the state

legislatures.”).

4

would face enormous pressure to settle. These

settlements would inevitably include production

commitments, operational restrictions of conduct fully

legal under federal law, and financial concessions that

effectively impose regulatory obligations on national

producers. No individual locality has constitutional

authority to impose such obligations.

The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement between

state attorneys general and the major tobacco

companies stands as a cautionary tale. Coordinated

state tort litigation yielded an agreement imposing

national restrictions on advertising, marketing, and

sales practices. These were restrictions that no

individual state legislature had enacted and that

Congress had never authorized. The result was

national regulatory policy made outside the

legislative process, without democratic accountability,

and insulated from the ordinary checks that govern

agency rulemaking. The energy litigation campaign

now underway threatens a similar result: national

constraints on fossil fuel production achieved not

through the legislative process but through litigation

in state courts.

The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution

knew from experience that states would pursue their

own interests at the expense of one another and of the

Union as a whole if given the opportunity. Among the

“[v]ices of the [p]olitical [s]ystem of the United

States,” according to James Madison, was the states’

propensity to impose laws that “trespass” on the

authority of one another.

Boulder’s litigation, if allowed to proceed, would do

just that, imposing the significant costs of its

5

idiosyncratic regulatory agenda on the entire nation

and on virtually every American. America’s energy

sector is both national in scope and crucial to

American prosperity. One state, much less one

locality, cannot usurp the authority of all the others

represented in the federal government.

Boulder’s litigation must not be allowed to proceed.

ARGUMENT

I. Those Who Framed and Ratified the

Constitution Knew Both the Importance of

National Regulation in Some Areas and the

Danger of States Pursuing Their Perceived SelfInterest at the Expense of Other States.

The purpose of the Constitution was to empower a

federal government that would be sufficient to

advance the critical interests of the United States

while restraining the powers of the new government

so that it would neither threaten the liberty of the

people nor unduly limit the powers of the state

governments.

A major concern among antifederalists was that

the government to be created by the proposed

Constitution would swallow up the powers of the

states. Thus, Brutus argued:

It is true this government is limited to

certain objects, or to speak more

properly, some small degree of power is

still left to the states, but a little

attention to the powers vested in the

general government, will convince every

candid man, that if it is capable of being

6

executed, all that is reserved for the

individual states must very soon be

annihilated, except so far as they are

barely necessary to the organization of

the general government.5

The antifederalists did not want the power of the

states to disappear under an ever-expanding federal

government.

The Constitution’s defenders, on the other hand,

insisted that those powers vested in the federal

government were only those necessary to protect the

interests of the nation as a whole, while the power to

regulate issues of local concern would remain with the

states. Hamilton said as much in Federalist No. 17.

Responding to the contention that the Constitution

“would tend to render the government of the Union too

powerful, and to enable it to absorb those residuary

authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave

to the States for local purposes,” Hamilton argued

that “the supervision of agriculture and of other

concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short,

which are proper to be provided for by local

legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general

jurisdiction.”6

The Framers thought that the federal government

would not be concerned with those things left to the

states’ governments. They knew from experience, on

the other hand, that state governments would seek to

5 Brutus, No. 1 in 1 The Founders’ Constitution at 260 (Liberty

Fund 1987) (1787).

6 Federalist No. 17, at 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Carey &

James McClellan eds., 2001).

7

extend their power into areas of national and

international concern.7 Vesting certain powers in the

federal government was thus not a threat to state

authority, but actually a protection of it.

In his Vices of the Political System of the United

States, published in 1787, Madison complained of the

“Trespasses of the States on the rights of each other.”8

Among theses were laws such as that of “Virginia

restricting foreign vessels to certain ports—of

Maryland in favor of vessels belonging to her own

citizens—of N. York in favor of the same.”9 These

“alarming symptoms” were representative of the

“practice of many States in restricting the commercial

intercourse with other States, and putting their

productions and manufactures on the same footing

with those of foreign nations.”10 While “not contrary to

the federal articles,” these laws were “adverse to the

spirit of the union” and led to “retaliating regulations,

no less expensive & vexatious in themselves, than

they [were] destructive of the general harmony.”11

As Hamilton later wrote, the:

7 Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The

Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97

Va. L. Rev. 1877, 1884-86 (2011).

James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United

States, in 1 The Founders’ Constitution at 167 (Liberty Fund

1987) (1787).

8

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

8

[U]nneighborly regulations of some

States, contrary to the true spirit of the

union, have, in different instances, given

just cause of umbrage and complaint to

others, and it is to be feared that

examples of this nature, if not restrained

by a national control, would be

multiplied and extended till they became

not less serious sources of animosity and

discord than injurious impediments to

the intercourse between the different

parts of the Confederacy.12

It could thus be expected that, “from the gradual

conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each

would at length come to be considered and treated by

the others in no better light than that of foreigners

and aliens.”13

Empowering the federal government in its proper

sphere was thus “essential to the security of the

people of America . . . against competitions and wars

among the different states.”14 It is through “the

federal government, then” that “the united republics

communicate with foreign nations, and with each

other.”15

12 Federalist No. 22, at 105 (Alexander Hamilton) (George Carey

& James McClellan eds., 2001).

13 Id.

14 Federalist No. 45, at 238 (James Madison) (George Carey &

James McClellan eds., 2001).

St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries, in 5 The

Founders’ Constitution at 404 (Liberty Fund 1987) (1803).

15

9

This Court has long recognized “that our Nation

‘was and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity

and authority,’” and that “the constitutional equality

of the States is essential to the harmonious operation

of the scheme upon which the Republic was

organized.” Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529,

544 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567, 580

(1911)).

This state equality principle applies to economic

regulation. As the Court has recognized, “if a state law

discriminates

against

out-of-state

goods

or

nonresident economic actors, the law can be sustained

only on a showing that it is narrowly tailored to

‘[a]dvance a legitimate local purpose.’” Tennessee Wine

and Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504,

518 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Dept. of

Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 128 (2008)).

If Boulder’s litigation at issue here and other

similar litigation that has been brought around the

country is allowed to proceed, the localities that bring

that litigation would benefit at the significant expense

of other states’ residents and businesses.

If any one state retains the power to engage in such

national and international regulation and exercises it,

then all the others will be forced to either see their

interests disadvantaged or to retaliate. That is bad

enough. What is worse is that it would be hard to

know how other states could protect their interests if

lawsuits like this one were allowed to proceed and

were ultimately successful.

10

How could states like Texas and Louisiana protect

the interests not only of the oil companies that operate

in those states and employ many of their residents,

but also the interests of its residents generally in

purchasing fuel at a market rate and not a price

manipulated by the regulation of other states? Such

states would have little if any recourse while the

localities that brought successful litigation would be

enriched by large payouts, the cost of which having

been passed on to those in other states.

Allowing this type of litigation to proceed would

not be a win for state authority. Instead, it would be a

significant loss for state authority and would lead

inexorably to harm to and thus retaliation from other

states. In this case, national power protects the

interests of the states. This litigation, which seeks to

implement national and even international policy

through state courts, cannot be allowed to proceed if

the fundamental equality, and thus authority, of

every state is to be respected.

II. If the Sort of State Court Litigation at Issue

Here is Allowed to Proceed, Localities Like

Boulder Could Effectively Impose their

Preferred Regulatory Agendas on Other States

and the Nation as a Whole, to the Great

Detriment of Americans with no Recourse.

The energy sector does not operate within state

lines. Crude oil extracted in Texas is refined in

Louisiana, transported through pipelines crossing a

dozen states, and ultimately sold as gasoline around

the country. Natural gas produced in Texas and New

Mexico in the Permian Basin heats homes in the

Northeast. The national electricity grid interconnects

11

generation, transmission, and distribution assets

across virtually every state in the Union. If all states

are to be equal, no one state can adopt regulations or

legislation designed to benefit itself at the significant

expense of the energy policy and interests of the other

states. State courts are in even less of a position to

adopt such policies.

Boulder seeks to nationalize its energy policy

though it is not the nation’s leader in energy

employment, nor is it even among the top three states,

which combine for 27.5 percent of all U.S. energy jobs.

The top three consist of Texas, California, and

Michigan, which in 2024 were home to 11.7 percent,

11.1 percent, and 4.7 percent respectively of all U.S.

energy jobs.16 By contrast, Colorado represented less

than 2 percent of all U.S. energy jobs.17

Similarly, the state’s economy is less dependent on

energy jobs than other states that contribute a similar

percentage to total national energy employment.

Energy jobs in Louisiana, contributing to 1.9 percent

of the national total, represent 8.4 percent of state

employment compared to 5.5 percent in Colorado.18

Similarly, energy jobs in Oklahoma constitute 1.7

percent of all U.S. energy jobs and 8.2 percent of total

state employment.19

16 U.S. Department of Energy & Employment, State Reports at

25,

133,

259

(2025)

available

at

https://www.energy.gov/documents/2025-useer-state-reports.

17 Id. at 31.

18 Id. at 31, 109.

19 Id. at 31, 217.

12

In 2024, the energy sector represented 16.2

percent of statewide employment in Wyoming.20 In

North Dakota during the same period, the energy

industry employed 13.7 percent of the state’s

workers.21 And in West Virginia, energy accounted for

12.3 percent of the state’s employment.22

If Boulder may sue energy producers for damages

arising from global greenhouse-gas emissions, then so

may thousands of other counties, municipalities, and

cities across the country, regardless of how miniscule

their share of the energy sector may be, each imposing

its own idiosyncratic liability regime on industries

whose operations span the continent. And this

litigation wave poses an immediate risk beyond the

employees of the states’ energy industries.

Eleven U.S. states and dozens of city, county, and

tribal governments across California, Colorado,

Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,

Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Puerto Rico

currently have active lawsuits seeking to hold major

oil and gas companies liable for alleged climate

damages.

The financial exposure these suits create is

enormous. Multnomah County, Oregon, has

demanded a $50 billion abatement fund plus $1.5

billion in future damages to 'weatherproof' the county

20 Id. at 301.

21 Id. at 205.

22 Id. at 289.

13

against future heat events like the 2021 heat dome.23

New York's Climate Change Superfund Act, signed

into law on December 26, 2024, imposes $75 billion in

assessments on major fossil fuel producers over 25

years, regardless of whether those companies

currently operate within the state.24 Dozens of

additional suits seek compensatory damages,

disgorgement of profits, and abatement funds from

the same producers.

A peer-reviewed study tracking 108 climate

lawsuits against publicly listed energy companies

over fifteen years found that capital markets treat

this litigation as a genuine financial threat. The

shares in the largest fossil fuel producers dropped

measurably each time a new suit was filed and fell

even more when courts ruled against them.25 Lenders

have responded in kind by pricing climate lawsuit

exposure directly into loan terms by raising interest

rates, shrinking credit lines, and shortening

repayment periods.

Companies forced to set aside massive litigation

reserves and contend with tighter credit conditions

would curtail capital investment in exploration and

production. This would tighten domestic energy

23 Multnomah County’s $51 Billion Lawsuit against Big Oil &

Gas, Reynolds & Steindorf, LLP (Oct. 14, 2024).

New York Passes Climate Superfund Legislation, Vinson &

Elkins (Mar. 25, 2026).

24

Misato Sato, et al., Impacts of Climate Litigation on Firm

Value, 7 Nature Sustainability 146, 1461 (2024).

25

14

supply and drive prices higher for every American

household and business.

The scale of the fuel industry's national footprint

is difficult to overstate. The oil and natural gas

industry's total contribution to gross domestic product

(GDP) exceeds $2.1 trillion annually, including direct,

indirect, and induced economic activity across all

sectors of the economy,26 accounting for 7.4 percent of

national output.27 The industry directly employs 2.5

million workers earning $372.4 billion in wages,

salaries, benefits, and proprietors' income.28 When

the full supply chain is counted (from wellhead

through pipelines, refineries, and distribution

networks), employment tied to the oil and natural gas

industry totals 10.6 million jobs.29 Independent

producers alone generated $488 billion in GDP in

2024 and paid $129 billion in federal, state, and local

taxes, royalties, and related payments.30 These jobs

consistently pay wages well above the all-industry

average. For example, oil and gas extraction workers

American Petroleum Institute, Contribution of the Oil and

Natural Gas Industry to the US Economy in 2023 4 (2025)

available

at

https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/EnergyEconomics/API-Studies/2025/The-Oil-and-Gas-IndustrysContribution-to-the-US-Economy.pdf.

26

27 Id. at 4.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 RystadEnergy, Economic Impact of US Independent Operators

9

(2025)

available

at

https://axpc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2025/09/Rystad-Energy-Economic-Impact-ofIndependent-Operators-August-2025.pdf.

15

earn an annual mean wage of $114,750,31 roughly

double the national median. The industry's total tax

contribution to federal, state, and local governments

reached $570.1 billion in 2023, accounting for 7.4

percent of all government tax receipts nationwide.32 A

litigation environment that systematically impairs

this industry's viability would hollow out the tax base

of energy-producing states and localities while raising

costs for consumers and businesses throughout the

country.

Permitting individual localities to use state tort

law as a de facto regulatory instrument over conduct

that is national and international in scope would

unravel the national energy system. And this

litigation is an effort at national and international

regulation. David Bookbinder, a former counsel of

record in the Boulder County lawsuit itself,

acknowledged in October 2025 that the litigation

strategy functions as “an indirect carbon tax.”33

As well as benefitting American workers through

higher wages and contributing to the government’s

tax income, a positive relationship exists between

energy access and prosperity. Surveying public health

Bureau of Labor Statistics “Occupational employment and

wages in oil and gas industries, May 2024” at

https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2026/article/occupationalemployment-and-wages-in-oil-and-gas-industries-may2024.htm.

31

32 American Petroleum Institute, supra note 23, at 4.

33 The Federalist Society, Can State Courts Set Global Climate

Policy,

at

32:58

(YouTube

Oct.

10,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1wyxaE4TC-A.

2025)

16

outcomes, life expectancy, child mortality, and

broader measures of environmental health, a

forthcoming paper from Advancing American

Freedom’s Institute for Statistical Policy Analysis

found that “a consistent pattern emerges: greater

access to affordable and reliable energy is closely

associated with improved living standards.”34

Specifically, “as economies gain access to more

abundant and reliable energy, they are able to

produce more goods and services per person,

supporting

higher

incomes

and

broader

improvements in material well-being.”35 A healthy

energy sector increases access to affordable energy,

which improves the lives of American families.

Energy costs are also embedded in virtually every

sector of the national economy: manufacturing,

agriculture, transportation, healthcare, and housing.

Litigation-imposed liability would therefore function

as a regressive tax on the cost of every good and

service that depends on affordable energy to produce

and deliver.

Any litigation-driven increase in energy prices

disproportionately

harms

the

lowest-income

Americans. For the poorest American households,

home utility bills and transportation fuel costs

consume roughly one dollar in every six they earn.

That is a share of income more than three times what

a typical American household pays.

34 Kevin Dayaratna, Kat Miller, Energy Abundance and Human

Flourishing: A Data-Driven Global

American Freedom (forthcoming 2026).

35 Id.

Analysis,

Advancing

17

Virtually every American would thus bear the

burden of this litigation were it allowed to proceed,

while only the residents of the localities that engage

in such regulation-by-litigation could hope, though

not necessarily expect, to benefit from the litigation.

States and localities have no authority to set

national and international policy. The Constitution

exists to ensure the liberty of the people. As the

Framers and ratifiers understood, leaving most power

to the states and granting only limited power to the

federal government was the best way to ensure that

liberty. But as they also understood from experience,

some powers needed to be vested in the federal

government alone lest those powers be used by some

states as a bludgeon against their sister states,

leading to retaliation and the ultimate breakdown of

the union.

Boulder’s litigation must not be allowed to proceed.

CONCLUSION

The Court should rule for Petitioners.

Respectfully submitted,

J. Marc Wheat

Counsel of Record

Timothy Harper (Admitted in DC)

Advancing American Freedom, Inc.

801 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 930

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 780-4848

mwheat@advancingamericanfreedom.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae