Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.

Supreme Court briefMay 21, 2026

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Text

No. 25-170

In the Supreme Court of the United States

______________________

SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC., ET AL.,

Petitioners,

v.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY, ET AL.

Respondents.

______________________

On Writ of Certiorari

to the Supreme Court of Colorado

______________________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

AND REVERSAL

______________________

Erica Klenicki

Caroline McAuliffe

THE NAM LEGAL CENTER

733 10th Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20001

May 21, 2026

Philip S. Goldberg

Counsel of Record

Christopher E. Appel

SHOOK, HARDY

& BACON L.L.P.

1800 K Street, N.W.

Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 783-8400

pgoldberg@shb.com

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................. ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ....................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................... 2

ARGUMENT .......................................................... 5

I.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW

BOULDER TO CIRCUMVENT ITS

RULING IN AEP THAT CLIMATE

CHANGE CLAIMS INVOKE A

“SPECIAL FEDERAL INTEREST” .......... 5

II. REPACKAGING CLAIMS FROM AEP

DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT

TODAY’S CLIMATE LITIGATION

SEEKS TO REGULATE INTERSTATE

AND INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS ..... 9

III. MERELY PASTING STATE LAW

LABELS ON FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS

CANNOT BE A MEANS FOR

USURPING FEDERAL AUTHORITY ...... 14

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THAT

CLAIMS ALLEGING HARM FROM

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ARE

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL LAW ............ 20

CONCLUSION ....................................................... 27

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011).............................. 2, 3, 5, 7, 22

Bucks County v. BP P.L.C., 2025 WL 1484203

(Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas May 16, 2025) .................. 18

California v. General Motors Corp.,

No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) ...................................... 5

City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., Inc.,

2025 WL 2269770 (S.C. Ct. Comm.

Pleas Aug. 6, 2025) .............................................. 19

City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,

993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ................... 4, 15, 21, 22

City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025

WL 209843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2025) ........... 18

City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C.,

325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ............... 14

Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,

718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013) ............................. 4, 5

Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,

839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012) .................. 8

Delaware ex rel. Jennings v. BP America Inc.,

2024 WL 98888 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2024) ... 17

iii

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,

406 U.S. 91 (1972).................................................. 7

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987).............................................. 17

Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. B.P.

P.L.C., -- A.3d --, 2026 WL 809501

(Md. Mar. 24, 2025) ....................................... 16, 21

Minnesota v. American Petroleum Inst.,

63 F.4th 703 (8th Cir. 2022) ................................ 12

Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil

Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012)............... 4, 5, 8

Platkin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025 WL 604846

(N.J. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2025) .............................. 18

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236 (1959).............................................. 23

Town of Carrboro v. Duke Energy Corp., 2026

WL 411466 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2026) ....... 19

United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,

332 U.S. 301 (1947)................................................ 7

Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,

551 U.S. 142 (2007).............................................. 13

West Virginia v. Environmental Prot. Agency,

597 U.S. 697 (2022)................................................ 3

Statutes

15 U.S.C. § 2901 ........................................................ 21

iv

15 U.S.C. §§ 2931 to 2939 ......................................... 21

Other Authorities

Kate Abnett & Alexander Chituc, EU Plans

Emergency Measures to Curb Energy Costs

as Iran War Hits Markets, Reuters,

Mar. 16, 2026 ....................................................... 25

Amici Brief of Alabama and 25 Other States, Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commr’s of

Boulder County, No. 25-170 (U.S., filed Sept.

26, 2025) ............................................................... 25

Beyond the Courtroom, Manufacturers’

Accountability Project, at https://

mfgaccountability project.org/beyond

-the-courtroom ..................................................... 13

Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority,

American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, No. 10-174 (U.S., filed Jan. 31, 2011) ............ 6

Brief for the United States as Amicus

Curiae, Sunoco LP v. City and County of

Honolulu, Nos. 23-947, 23-952, 2024 WL

5095299 (U.S., filed Dec. 10, 2024) ..................... 19

Julia Caulfield, Local Lawsuits Asks Oil and

Gas to Help Pay for Climate Change,

KOTO, Dec. 14, 2020, at https://coloradosun.com/2021/02/01/boulder-climatelawsuit-opinion/ .............................................. 10-11

v

City of Hoboken Press Release, Hoboken Becomes

First NJ City to Sue Big Oil Companies,

American Petroleum Institute for Climate

Change Damages, Sept. 2, 2020, at

https://www.hobokennj.gov/news/hobokensues-exxon-mobil-american-petroleum-institute-big-oil-companies ......................................... 12

Lesley Clark, Why Oil Companies Are Worried

About Climate Lawsuits From Gas States,

E&E News, Nov. 7, 2023 ..................................... 13

Editorial, Climate Lawsuits Take a Hit,

Wall St. J., May 17, 2021 .................................... 14

Ross Eisenberg, Forget the Green New Deal.

Let’s Get to Work on a Real Climate Bill,

Politico, Mar. 27, 2019 ......................................... 27

Establishing Accountability for Climate Damages:

Lessons from Tobacco Control, Summary of the

Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public

Opinion, and Legal Strategies, Union of

Concerned Scientists & Climate Accountability

Inst. (Oct. 2012), at https://www.ucs.org/sites/

default/files/attach/2016/04/establishing-accountability-climate-change-damages-lessonstobacco-control.pdf ................................................. 9

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

In re ExxonMobil Corp., No. 096-297222-18

(Tex. Dist. Ct.–Tarrant Cty. Apr. 24, 2018).......... 9

Kirk Herbertson, Oil Companies vs. Citizens:

The Battle Begins Over Who Will Pay Climate

Costs, EarthRights Int’l, Mar. 21, 2018 .............. 10

vi

Donald Kochan, Supreme Court Should Prevent

Flood of State Climate Change Torts, Bloomberg Law, May 20, 2024 ...................................... 24

Clifford Krauss, As Western Oil Giants Cut

Production, State-Owned Companies Step

Up, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2021 ............................. 25

William F. Lamb et al., A Review of Trends and

Drivers of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by

Sector from 1990 to 2018, 16 Env’t Res. Lett.

073005 (2021) ....................................................... 26

Charlie Melancon, Bipartisan Action,

Not Litigation, Is Key to Solving Climate

Change, Power, Apr. 19, 2021 ............................. 21

Kamden Mulder, Lawyer Behind Colorado

Climate Suit Says the Quiet Part Out Loud:

Litigation Is a Tax on Oil Companies and

Consumers, Nat’l Review, Oct. 20, 2025 ............. 11

Pl.’s Mot. For Entry of Partial Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Delaware v. BP Am.,

Inc., C.A. No. N20-C-09-097 (Del. Super. Ct.

Oct. 21, 2024) ....................................................... 17

Dawn Reeves, As Climate Suits Keeps Issue

Alive, Nuisance Cases Reach Key Venue

Rulings, Inside EPA, Jan. 6, 2020, at

https://insideepa.com/outlook/climate-suitskeeps-issue-alive-nuisance-cases-reach-keyvenue-rulings ....................................................... 11

vii

Susanne Rust, California Communities Suing Big

Oil Over Climate Change Face a Key Hearing

Wednesday, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 2020 ................. 13

Bill Schuette, Energy, Climate Policy Should

be Guided by Federal Laws, Congress,

Not a Chaotic Patchwork of State Laws,

Law.com, Apr. 25, 2024 .................................. 23-24

Victor E. Schwartz et al., Does the Judiciary Have

the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas

Emissions?, 46 Val. U. L. Rev. 369 (2012) ...... 8, 26

Alexa St. John, Justice Department Sues Hawaii,

Michigan, Vermont and New York Over State

Climate Actions, Assoc. Press, May 1, 2025, at

https://apnews.com/article/trump-doj-climatestates-policy-lawsuitsa5228e1dd6348f09d2a70f460142531a ................ 20

Jerry Taylor & David Bookbinder, Oil Companies

Should be Held Accountable for Climate

Change, Niskanen Center, Apr. 17, 2018 ........... 11

Michael Thulen, Why Hoboken’s Climate

Change Lawsuit Is Bad for New Jersey,

NJBiz, Oct. 11, 2021 ............................................ 25

Danielle Zanzalari, Government Lawsuits Threaten

Consumers’ Pockets and Do Little to Help the

Environment, USA Today, Nov. 1, 2023 ............. 24

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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Amicus curiae, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), is the largest manufacturing association in the United States, representing small and

large manufacturers in every industrial sector and in

all 50 states. Manufacturing employs 13 million men

and women, contributes $2.9 trillion to the U.S. economy annually, has the largest economic impact of any

major sector, and accounts for more than half of all

private-sector research and development in the nation. The NAM is the voice of the manufacturing community and leading advocate for a policy agenda that

helps manufacturers compete in the global economy

and create jobs across the United States.

The NAM is dedicated to manufacturing safe, innovative, and sustainable products that provide essential benefits to consumers while protecting human

health and the environment. Climate change is one of

the most important public policy issues of our time,

and the NAM supports national efforts to address climate change and improve public health through appropriate laws and regulations. Developing new technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, make

energy more efficient, and modify infrastructures to

deal with the impacts of climate change has become

an international imperative.

The NAM has grave concerns about Boulder’s and

similar state and local governments’ attempts to

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus curiae certifies that

this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any

party and that no person or entity, other than amicus curiae, its

members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the

preparation or submission of the brief.

2

impose state-law liability over the worldwide production, sale, and promotion of energy products. As the

Court found in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), climate litigation implicates federal law and complex policymaking. Statelaw claims, no matter how pleaded, are not the appropriate mechanism for deciding these critical national

issues. For these reasons, the NAM has a substantial

interest in attempts by Respondents and local governments to subject its members to unprincipled state liability for harms associated with climate change and

impose these costs on American manufacturers generally, particularly when doing so will not meaningfully

address climate change and will harm their ability to

compete in the international marketplace.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This lawsuit is part of a coordinated, national litigation campaign over global climate change that is invoking state liability law to regulate and impose a

penalty on the worldwide use of fossil fuels sold by

only certain companies. These claims, including the

one at bar, are legally unprincipled. As the organizers

of the litigation have acknowledged, the plaintiffs and

jurisdictions for these lawsuits have been chosen for

political reasons. The complaints have been carefully

packaged to appeal to parochial interests of state

courts by invoking state law and seeking money for

local constituencies. And the lawsuits target the companies they are choosing to blame for climate change.

As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Maryland Supreme Court, and others have

held, this litigation cannot be allowed to proceed under any state’s laws, regardless of the state liability

3

theory invoked or which companies were chosen for

the suits. The North Star for these rulings has been

this Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. v.

Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (hereafter “AEP”),

where this Court stated that determining the rights

and responsibilities for global climate change “require

federal law governance” and that “borrowing the law

of a particular State would be inappropriate.” 564 U.S.

at 422. The conduct and emissions alleged in climate

lawsuits largely occurred outside of any state’s borders and, as with any interstate or international emissions case, they are not subject to state law. Further,

as the Court recognized in AEP, climate change has

resulted from emissions of innumerable sources, products, and actions around the world for more than 200

years and involves air in its “ambient” state. Id. at

421. Thus, the Court explained, the Constitution “demands” federal decisional law for these matters. Id.

Indeed, the history of AEP is fundamental to this

litigation. There, the Court made clear that federal

law governs climate change emissions, federal common law claims over these emissions were displaced

when Congress enacted the Clean Air Act and delegated this governance to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the judiciary does not have the

institutional tools for deciding rights and responsibilities for climate change. Id. at 424. It concluded that

there was no room for a “parallel track” of tort litigation. Id. at 425.2 Given the clarity and breadth of the

ruling, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits dismissed climate

suits in their courts even though the cases were

2 The Court reaffirmed AEP in West Virginia v. Environmental

Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 730-31 (2022); see also id. at 771 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

4

brought under both state and federal laws, named

other types of energy companies, and sought other

remedies including damages and abatement. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d

849 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,

718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).

This case, as well as the broader climate litigation,

is an unapologetic attempt to circumvent the Court’s

ruling in AEP. Since 2017, the City and County of

Boulder have been among three-dozen local and state

governments that have filed comparable climate-related claims. The lawsuits have been purposefully reframed to look different from AEP but have the same

national effect. Like throwing legal spaghetti on the

wall, they invoke various state laws, target an assortment of activities they allege led to climate change in

violation of those state laws, name different combinations of companies, and seek money for local governments to deal with climate impacts—all to find a state

court that will not apply AEP to dismiss the claims.

The inescapable fact, though, is that regardless of how

the claims are repackaged, the people, products and

activities contributing to global climate change cannot

be subjected to any one state’s liability law. Such a

“sprawling case is simply beyond the limits” of state

liability law. City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993

F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2021). “Artful pleading cannot

transform [plaintiff’s] complaint into anything other

than a suit over global greenhouse gas emissions.” Id.

Amicus respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Colorado Supreme Court ruling below. Determining how to address climate change—its causes

and impacts—is one of the most important public policy issues that Congress, state and federal agencies,

5

and international bodies have been working on for

decades. These matters lie beyond the reach of Colorado law, and the ruling below should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW

BOULDER TO CIRCUMVENT ITS

RULING IN AEP THAT CLIMATE

CHANGE CLAIMS INVOKE A “SPECIAL

FEDERAL INTEREST”

The history of Boulder’s climate suit starts with

AEP, which was the first major case seeking to impose

liability over greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and

climate change. The targets for the litigation in AEP

were utilities that generated electricity for much of

America. Three lawsuits followed, each testing other

ways climate litigation could be framed. In California

v. General Motors Corp., California sued auto manufacturers for making products that emit GHGs. See

No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 17, 2007). In Kivalina, a village sued oil and gas

producers for damages related to rising sea levels. See

696 F.3d at 849. As here, the village alleged the defendants were “substantial contributors to global

warming” in part caused by “conspir[ing] to mislead

the public about the science of global warming.” Id. at

854. In Comer, Mississippi residents filed a class action against energy producers for Hurricane Katrina

losses, arguing defendants caused emissions that

made the hurricane more intense. See 718 F.3d at 460.

The underpinnings of all four cases are the same

as those here: climate change is caused by GHG emissions, including global use of oil, gas, and other fossil

fuels. See AEP, 564 U.S. at 416. The emissions have

6

accumulated in the atmosphere for more than 200

years and have caused impacts on the Earth. The defendants are in violation of some federal or state law

based on the way they are contributing to GHG emissions through their products, operations, or other activities. See id. at 418 (pleading state tort law in the

alternative). As a result, the defendants are responsible for climate change and its impacts, and the plaintiffs are entitled to various remedies. See id.

In AEP, the Obama administration filed a brief in

opposition to this liability. The Solicitor General underscored the legal deficiencies with allowing any entity to be liable for climate change, explaining that

claims over GHG emissions are inherently subjective

and unprincipled. It stated that there are “almost unimaginably broad categories of both potential plaintiffs and potential defendants.” Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority, American Electric Power Co. v.

Connecticut, No. 10-174 (U.S., filed Jan. 31, 2011).

The “[p]laintiffs have elected to sue a handful of defendants from among an almost limitless array of entities that emit greenhouse gases. Moreover, the types

of injuries that [the] plaintiffs seek to redress, even if

concrete, could potentially be suffered by virtually any

landowner, and to an extent, by virtually every person.” Id. at 15. “The medium that transmits injury to

potential plaintiffs is literally the Earth’s atmosphere—making it impossible to consider the sort of focused and more geographically proximate effects”

characteristic of U.S. liability law. Id. at 17.

This Court then unanimously held that Congress,

in enacting the Clean Air Act, displaced any federal

common law cause of action, thereby extinguishing

the viability of these GHG claims. The Court’s

7

reasoning demonstrates why claims over global climate change cannot be adjudicated under any state’s

law either. First, the Court explained that in United

States v. Standard Oil Co. of California it held that

certain claims invoke the “interests, powers and relations of the Federal Government as to require uniform

national disposition rather than diversified state rulings.” 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). And, in Illinois v. City

of Milwaukee, it stated that “air and water in their

ambient or interstate aspects” are among those areas

of law where “the basic scheme of the Constitution”

demands that they are governed by federal law. 406

U.S. 91, 103 (1972). The Court held these rulings apply to climate litigation because determining rights

and responsibilities for interstate and international

GHG emissions are inherently matters of “special federal interest,” which makes this subject “meet for federal law governance.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 422, 424.

Second, the Court expressed concern about allowing judges to make determinations and impose remedies over these national public policy matters given

the institutional limitations on the tools judges have

available to them. See id. at 428. To adjudicate these

claims, courts would have to regulate GHG emissions

from defendants’ products and conduct “by judicial decree.” Id. at 427. “The appropriate amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum: as with other

questions of national or international policy, informed

assessment of competing interests is required.” Id.

“[O]ur Nation’s energy needs and the possible economic disruption must weigh in the balance.” Id.

Courts do not have the ability to weigh these extrajudicial factors; they can decide only legal disputes on

the evidence presented. See id. at 428 (“Judges lack

8

the scientific, economic, and technological resources

an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order.”). Thus, regardless of legal doctrine, these policy

matters should not be decided by judges on an “ad hoc,

case-by-case” basis. Id.3

Given the Court’s clear direction against this type

of litigation on constitutional, federal common law,

and public policy grounds, courts dismissed the remaining climate cases. In Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit

stated that even though the parties, theories of liability, and remedies differed from AEP, given the Court’s

broad message against climate liability, “it would be

incongruous to allow [such litigation] to be revived in

another form.” 696 F.3d at 857. It appreciated that climate suits are the type of “transboundary pollution”

claims the Constitution commits exclusively to federal

law. Id. at 855. This is true regardless of how the suits

are framed—over energy use or products, by public or

private plaintiffs, under federal or state law, or for injunctive relief, abatement, or damages. In Comer, a

judge held that under AEP the state law claims were

preempted. See 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012).

Thus, the law was and is clear: claims over emissions contributing to global climate change are governed exclusively by federal law and the Clean Air

Act. The Court should not allow Boulder to skirt this

jurisprudence merely by painting these federal public

policy matters with a state liability law brush.

3 See also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Does the Judiciary Have the

Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 46 Val. U. L.

Rev. 369, 388-92 (2012) (discussing practical causation and redressability issues with climate litigation).

9

II. REPACKAGING CLAIMS FROM AEP

DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT

TODAY’S CLIMATE LITIGATION SEEKS

TO REGULATE INTERSTATE AND

INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS

Undeterred by AEP, the individuals behind the climate litigation campaign purposefully set out to retool this litigation so that it would appear different

from AEP but have the same effect of regulating interstate and international emissions. In 2012, many

of the advocacy groups and lawyers behind this litigation convened in La Jolla, California to brainstorm on

how to repackage the litigation in hopes of achieving

their national goals. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In re ExxonMobil Corp., No. 096-29722218 (Tex. Dist. Ct.–Tarrant Cty. Apr. 24, 2018), at 3

(discussing the “Workshop on Climate Accountability,

Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies”). The strategies

discussed included the one they ultimately employed:

filing lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions under various

state laws and asking for local damages, hoping at

least one court would allow claims to progress. See id.

Organizers of the conference captured their discussion and strategies for this litigation in a published

report. See Establishing Accountability for Climate

Damages: Lessons from Tobacco Control, Summary of

the Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies, Union of Concerned Scientists & Climate Accountability Institute (Oct. 2012).4

Despite AEP, they said “the courts offer the best

4 https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/04/

establishing-accountability-climate-change-damages-lessons-tobacco-control.pdf.

10

current hope” for imposing their national public policy

agenda over fossil fuel emissions, including imposing

a carbon penalty. Id. at 28. They discussed “the merits

of legal strategies that target major carbon emitters,

such as utilities [as in AEP], versus those that target

carbon producers,” as here. Id. at 12. And, they talked

through various causes of action, “with suggestions

ranging from lawsuits under public nuisance laws,” as

here, “to libel claims.” Id. at 11.

Given AEP, they emphasized making the lawsuits

look like traditional state damages claims rather than

directly asking a court to regulate emissions or put a

price on carbon use. See id. at 13. As one participant

said, “Even if your ultimate goal might be to shut

down a company, you still might be wise to start out

by asking for compensation for injured parties.” Id. Finally, they discussed “the importance of framing a

compelling public narrative,” including “naming [the]

issue or campaign” to generate “outrage.” Id. at 21, 28.

Lawsuits following this playbook were filed starting

in 2017, with Boulder’s action filed soon thereafter.

Outside of court, the advocates have openly

acknowledged the desired effect of this litigation is to

impose costs on consumers for the worldwide production, promotion, sale and use of fuel—what they call

its “true cost.” Kirk Herbertson, Oil Companies vs.

Citizens: The Battle Begins Over Who Will Pay Climate Costs, EarthRights Int’l, Mar. 21, 2018. One attorney associated with Boulder’s case told a Colorado

radio station that they want to force energy companies

to raise the price of fuel so “if they are continuing to

sell fossil fuels, that the cost of [climate change] would

ultimately get priced into them.” Julia Caulfield, Local Lawsuits Asks Oil and Gas to Help Pay for Climate

11

Change, KOTO, Dec. 14, 2020.5 This tactic is based on

their recognition that “companies are agents of consumers” such that “holding oil companies responsible is to hold oil consumers responsible.” Jerry Taylor

& David Bookbinder, Oil Companies Should be Held

Accountable for Climate Change, Niskanen Ctr., Apr.

17, 2018.6 Another lawyer associated with Boulder’s

litigation put it this way: “Essentially, the tort liability is an indirect carbon tax. You sue an oil company,

an oil company is liable, the oil company then passes

that liability on to the people who are buying its products.” Kamden Mulder, Lawyer Behind Colorado Climate Suit Says the Quiet Part Out Loud: Litigation Is

a Tax on Oil Companies and Consumers, Nat’l Review, Oct. 20, 2025 (quoting David Bookbinder).

In an effort to mask these goals and make this litigation more politically palatable, the advocates partnered with state and local governments—including

Boulder here—which would use the asserted monetary penalty to deal with local impacts of climate

change. The governments often disclaim any attempt

to regulate or put costs on emissions; they say they

just want money to deal with impacts of climate

change in their jurisdictions. However, artful pleading

5 https://coloradosun.com/2021/02/01/boulder-climate-lawsuit-

opinion/.

6 A reporter who follows the litigation has observed the incongru-

ity between the ways the cases are presented in and out of court:

“State and local governments pursuing the litigation argue that

the cases are not about controlling GHG emissions . . . But they

also privately acknowledge that the suits are a tactic to pressure

the industry.” Dawn Reeves, As Climate Suits Keeps Issue Alive,

Nuisance Cases Reach Key Venue Rulings, Inside EPA, Jan. 6,

2020, at https://insideepa.com/outlook/climate-suits-keeps-issuealive-nuisance-cases-reach-key-venue-rulings.

12

and disclaimers cannot hide the true federal, public

policy nature of this litigation. The lawsuits are being

funded by national and international non-profits because the litigation would impact federal energy policy. See, e.g., City of Hoboken Press Release, Hoboken

Becomes First NJ City to Sue Big Oil Companies,

American Petroleum Institute for Climate Change

Damages, Sept. 2, 2020 (noting legal fees would be

paid by the Institute for Governance and Sustainable

Development).7 As one jurist stated, the governments

and backers are waging this federal energy dispute

“through the surrogate of a private party as the defendant.” Minnesota v. American Petroleum Inst., 63

F.4th 703, 719 (8th Cir. 2023) (Stras, J., concurring).

Thus, the purposeful effect of this national litigation campaign is to use state law to penalize national

energy use and direct money from energy consumers

across the country to local governments, unbridled by

the checks and balances of Congress’s legislative process. But, as discussed below, the narrative promoted

by the campaign’s advocates to try to justify these

cases—that there is some widespread “campaign of

deception”—is undermined by the way the lawsuits

are packaged and pleaded. Governments are naming

anywhere from one or two, as here, to several dozen

defendants in different aspects of the energy industry,

including local entities to keep the cases in state court.

The ever-changing combination of defendants undermines the existence of any such conspiracy. It also

highlights why imposing liability on any one or group

7_https://www.hobokennj.gov/news/hoboken-sues-exxon-mobil-

american-petroleum-institute-big-oil-companies.

13

of defendants a plaintiff chooses to name for its lawsuit lacks any principled legal basis.

In addition, groups generating these lawsuits have

also acknowledged they are engaging in political-style

tactics to recruit local governments to bring these

cases and to leverage the litigation to hinder the energy companies politically. See Lesley Clark, Why Oil

Companies Are Worried About Climate Lawsuits From

Gas States, E&E News, Nov. 7, 2023. As one leader of

this effort said, “It’s no secret that we go around and

talk to elected officials” about bringing these lawsuits

and “look at the politics” in deciding whom to approach. Id.; see also Beyond the Courtroom, Manufacturers’ Accountability Project (detailing this litigation

campaign).8 They also believe state courts “tend to be

more favorable” than federal courts. Susanne Rust,

California Communities Suing Big Oil Over Climate

Change Face a Key Hearing Wednesday, L.A. Times,

Feb. 5, 2020 (quoting Prof. Hecht, co-Executive Director of the Emmett Institute on Climate Change and

the Environment at UCLA School of Law). It is because of these dynamics—where state courts are being

asked to rule against “unpopular” federal laws or outof-state defendants in favor of local recoveries—that

this Court has expressed concern that some state

courts “may reflect local prejudice.” Watson v. Philip

Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007) (cleaned up).

Overall, three dozen of these suits have been filed

in carefully chosen jurisdictions in an effort to “sidestep federal courts and [U.S.] Supreme Court precedent” and convince local courts to help them advance

their preferred public policy agenda by awarding

8 https://mfgaccountabilityproject.org/beyond-the-courtroom.

14

money to state and local jurisdictions. Editorial, Climate Lawsuits Take a Hit, Wall St. J., May 17, 2021.

If this gambit is successful, it will not just lead to a

state take-over of federal climate emissions law, as

sought here. It will provide a road map for people to

use state liability law to drive a wide variety of federal

legal and public policy matters irrespective of decisions made in Congress and federal agencies.

III. MERELY PASTING STATE LAW

LABELS ON FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS

CANNOT BE A MEANS FOR

USURPING FEDERAL AUTHORITY

The constitutional, legal, and public policy concerns this Court identified in AEP with respect to climate-related claims are not cured by reframing them

under state law. The causes of climate change are no

more local than in AEP; they still result from interstate and international emissions. And, the institutional deficiencies with judges making federal public

policy decisions on an ad hoc basis are magnified when

individual state judges could reach different determinations without legislative oversight or federal uniformity. When theories of harm are not moored to any

plaintiff, defendant, or jurisdiction and can be asserted by any state or local government in the nation,

liability against whom for whom and how much becomes unprincipled and could vary from court to court.

Federal courts readily saw through this state-law

reframing. The first jurist to address the substantive

issues was Judge Alsup in claims brought by San

Francisco and Oakland. See City of Oakland v. BP

P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (vacated

on other grounds). He found these cases even more

global than AEP, stating “[i]n light of AEP, plaintiffs

15

shift[ed] their focus” from local utility operations in

certain states “to sales of fossil fuels worldwide,”

which broadly expanded the national and international scope of the challenged activities. Id. at 1025.

“Their theory rests on the sweeping proposition that

otherwise lawful and everyday sales of fossil fuels,

combined with an awareness that greenhouse gas

emissions lead to increased global temperatures, constitute a public nuisance.” Id. at 1022. It attempts to

“reach the sale of fossil fuels anywhere in the world.”

Id. “The scope of plaintiffs’ theory is breathtaking.” Id.

The Second Circuit, in a ruling affirming dismissal

of New York City’s climate suit, directly called out this

reframing as a false veneer. The court wrote: “we are

told that this is merely a local spat about the City’s

eroding shoreline, which will have no appreciable effect on national energy or environmental policy. We

disagree.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 91. “Stripped

to its essence” the state law claims seek to impose liability and set national public policy law over global

emissions. Id. The Second Circuit then invoked Kivalina, holding that, regardless of the theories and

remedies asserted, AEP controls claims over climate

change. Id. at 96. Any “daylight” the plaintiffs assert

between these types of cases and AEP and Kivalina

“does not change the substance of [the] claims.” Id. at

97. There are no legal distinctions from AEP.

The Second Circuit went on to explain the legal

and constitutional deficiencies with allowing climate

claims packaged under state law: “a mostly unbroken

string of cases has applied federal law to disputes involving interstate air or water pollution.” Id. That is

because “a substantial damages award like the one requested by the City would effectively regulate the

16

Producers’ behavior far beyond New York’s borders.”

Id. at 92. “Any actions the Producers take to mitigate

their liability, then, must undoubtedly take effect

across every state (and country). And all without asking what the laws of those other states (or countries)

require.” Id. Such “sprawling” claims seeking “damages for the cumulative impact of conduct occurring

simultaneously across just about every jurisdiction on

the planet,” are “beyond the limits of state law.” Id.

During the pendency of the case at bar, the Maryland Supreme Court created a direct state high court

split with Colorado when it adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning and affirmed dismissal of three local

climate lawsuits all based on the same general premise as here. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

v. B.P. P.L.C., -- A.3d --, 2026 WL 809501, at *20 (Md.

Mar. 24, 2026). Echoing the Second Circuit, the Maryland Supreme Court stated that “[n]o amount of creative pleading can masquerade the fact that the local

governments are attempting to utilize state law to

regulate global conduct that is purportedly causing

global harm.” Id. Even if the reframing were permissible, the Maryland court continued, “we reject the assertion that their sweeping claims may be pursued

under state law.” Id. “The local governments are seeking to apply Maryland law to regulate conduct that occurs outside their jurisdictional borders.” Id. at 20.

Their “police powers” do not have this reach. Id.

The Maryland Supreme Court also agreed these

cases are governed by AEP, stating with respect to

their viability that it could “make short work of this

analysis given the Supreme Court’s ruling in AEP.”

Id. at *23. In light of this Court’s precedent on interstate emission cases, the Maryland court concluded

17

that federal law displaced or preempted the state-law

claims: “Interstate water and air pollution are areas

that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have

determined are governed by federal common law and,

therefore, leave no place for the application of state

law.” Id. at *10. “Allowing each of the 50 states (and

the countless individual local governments located

within them) to impose their own preferred policy solutions for climate change—with each state naturally

focused on local rather than national or international

impacts, would create a plainly ‘irrational system of

regulation’ that would lead to ‘chaotic confrontation

between sovereign states.’” Id. at *22 (quoting Int’l

Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987)).

The way this litigation has played out in Delaware

has underscored the fact that this global reach is the

intended nature of this litigation. There, the trial

court winnowed the state’s climate lawsuit based on a

determination that federal law “preempts state law to

the extent a state attempts to regulate air pollution

originating in other states.” Delaware ex rel. Jennings

v. BP America Inc., 2024 WL 98888, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2024). The State could sue only for

emissions in Delaware. In a telling response, the State

moved for partial final judgment, saying it had no interest in litigating a case based “solely [on] in-state

emissions.” Pl.’s Mot. For Entry of Partial Judgment

Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Delaware v. BP Am., Inc., C.A.

No. N20-C-09-097 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2024). The

plaintiff affirmed it was seeking relief for conduct that

“occurred in and outside of Delaware and that increased emissions in and outside of Delaware.” Id.

Several other state trial courts have issued similar

rulings, with some appeals of those rulings stayed

18

pending the Court’s decision in this case. A New Jersey court agreed with the “logic and reasoning” of the

Second Circuit that state tort law is not available for

climate change suits. Platkin v. ExxonMobil Corp.,

2025 WL 604846, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2025).

“Plaintiffs’ complaint, even under the most indulgent

reading, is entirely about addressing the injuries of

global climate change.” Id. at *9. A Pennsylvania trial

court also dismissed a local climate lawsuit, stating

“our federal structure does not allow Pennsylvania

law, or any State’s law, to address [state-law] claims”

that “are so intertwined with emissions.” Bucks

County v. BP P.L.C., 2025 WL 1484203, at *7, *8 (Pa.

Ct. Comm. Pleas May 16, 2025). Although the county

did “everything it can to avoid the issue of emissions,

it cannot avoid the fact that if there were no emissions

there would be no damages.” Id. at *7.

In New York, a trial court dismissed New York

City’s latest attempt at climate litigation, which focused on consumer protection claims. It stated that

any allegation over the impact of fossil fuel emissions

on the climate involves public information, meaning

“a reasonable consumer cannot have been misled.”

City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025 WL

209843, *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2025). “The City

cannot have it both ways by, on one hand, asserting

that consumers are aware of and commercially sensitive to the fact that fossil fuels cause climate change,

and, on the other hand, that the same consumers are

being duped by Defendants’ failure to disclose that

their fossil fuel products emit greenhouse gasses that

contribute to climate change.” Id. at *14.

In South Carolina, the court noted Charleston was

“seeking to hold two dozen energy companies,

19

retailers, and a pipeline liable under South Carolina

law for harms allegedly arising from the effects of

global greenhouse gas emissions and global climate

change.” City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., Inc.,

2025 WL 2269770, at *1 (S.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas Aug.

6, 2025). The court dismissed the claims, concluding

that “although Plaintiff’s claims purport to be about

deception, they are premised on, and seek redress for,

the effects of greenhouse gas emissions.” Id. at *2. In

North Carolina, a court dismissed climate claims

against Duke Energy Corporation as presenting “nonjusticiable questions.” Town of Carrboro v. Duke Energy Corp., 2026 WL 411466, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct.

Feb. 12, 2026).

Finally, both President Biden’s and Trump’s administrations have joined the Obama administration

in identifying legal deficiencies with state climate litigation. When a Petition in Honolulu’s climate case

was pending before this Court, President Biden’s Solicitor General asked this Court not to review it. See

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Sunoco

LP v. City and County of Honolulu, Nos. 23-947, 23952, 2024 WL 5095299 (U.S., filed Dec. 10, 2024). But

she also acknowledged state-law climate claims may

be foreclosed “to the extent they are based on emissions or other conduct outside of Hawaii.” Id. at *7.

She added: “To be sure, petitioners may ultimately

prevail on their contention that respondents’ claims

are barred by the Constitution—specifically, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and federal constitutional structure.” Id.

at *13. The Trump administration has amplified the

federal government’s view that this litigation is unsound, calling the suits “illegitimate impediments to

the production of affordable, reliable energy”

20

Americans need. Alexa St. John, Justice Department

Sues Hawaii, Michigan, Vermont and New York Over

State Climate Actions, Assoc. Press, May 1, 2025

(quoting then-U.S. Attorney General Bondi).

Thus, administrations of both political parties and

courts in a multitude of states are aligned on the inherent federal nature of this litigation. Determining

the rights and responsibilities for climate change is a

matter of federal public policy—not state liability

law—regardless of packaging.

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THAT

CLAIMS ALLEGING HARM FROM

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ARE

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL LAW

In allowing the climate claims below, the Colorado

Supreme Court made several legal errors that this

Court should correct in affirming that climate-related

claims are not appropriate for state law governance.

The constitutional principles this Court identified in

AEP with respect to interstate and international

emissions and the U.S. Constitution’s structure on the

limited scope of state authority are not so fragile as to

be swayed by Boulder’s reframing. The Court should

issue a ruling that underscores the basic truths about

climate litigation, reaffirming what it said in AEP.

Climate litigation, regardless of how it is

framed, is inherently about interstate and international emissions, not any underlying conduct

or product. The heart of Boulder’s claims, as in AEP,

is that Defendants exacerbated global climate change

by increasing carbon emissions through their conduct

and products. The Colorado Supreme Court distinguished these claims from AEP. It accepted Boulder’s

21

reframing that it “has not brought an action against a

pollution emitter to abate pollution. Rather, it seeks

damages from upstream producers for harms stemming from the production and sale of fossil fuels.”

2025 CO 21, ¶50. As the Second Circuit stated, picking

a differing part in the emissions process to target

“cannot transform [the lawsuit] into anything other

than a suit over global greenhouse gas emissions.”

City of New York, 993 F.3d at 91. Plaintiffs cannot

“have it both ways”: “disavowing any intent to address

emissions” while “identifying such emissions as the

singular source” of the harm they allege. Id.

To be clear, the state-law liability theories here are

fig leaves. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,

2026 WL 809501, at *28 (“each of the local governments’ claims fail to state legally cognizable claims

under Maryland common law”). Global climate change

is not the result of Defendant’s GHG emissions in Colorado, but of everyone, everywhere for more than 200

years. Also, the narrative that there is some widespread “campaign of deception” is undermined by the

litigation itself. Complaints recognize the global

knowledge of and public discourse over climate change

began in the 1960s and has increased over the past 60

years.9 These cases are not about who knew, said or

9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (establishing a “national climate pro-

gram” in 1978 to increase knowledge about the climate “through

research, data collection, assessments, information dissemination, and international cooperation”) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931 to

2939 (enacting Global Changes Research Act of 1990). Indeed,

since 1989, the United Nations has researched and published reports on the state of the knowledge about climate change, its

causes, and its impacts. Cf. Charlie Melancon, Bipartisan Action,

Not Litigation, Is Key to Solving Climate Change, Power, Apr. 19,

2021 (“[T]here has always been an understanding that climate

22

did what and when, whether the suits name utilities

or producers of energy, or which conduct or attributes

the governments assert are the bases for their liability

theories. These cases are about global emissions.

Federal law exclusively governs interstate

and international GHG emissions, and the Court

did not open the door in AEP for these claims to

be repackaged under state law. As the Court held

in AEP, climate litigation—as with all interstate and

international pollution cases—is necessarily governed

by federal law and, if a cause of action is allowed, the

dispute must be determined by federal common law.

The Court continued that Congress displaced this federal common law when it gave the EPA the authority

to make determinations with respect to these emissions in the Clean Air Act. The Colorado Supreme

Court, along with other courts, have twisted this displacement ruling, holding that if federal common law

has been displaced, then these claims can now suddenly be decided by any state court. The Second Circuit described this theory as “too strange to seriously

contemplate.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 99. It is.

Indeed, the entire argument that this Court in

AEP left open the potential for state litigation is premised on a false reading of AEP. In AEP, the Court

acknowledged the plaintiffs had also sought relief under state laws where the power plants were located

but those claims were not part of the appeal to this

Court. The Court then noted that the availability of

any such suit would depend, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the Clean Air Act. See AEP, 564 U.S. at

change is a problem and action is needed to address its risks. The

problem has been agreeing on the best path forward given the

philosophical and regional differences on energy policy.”).

23

429. However, the Colorado Supreme Court and others ignore the parenthetical following this statement,

which cabined the availability of any such state cases

to those applying the “law of the source State.’” Id.

(emphasis in original). Thus, the Court in AEP did

not, in any way, authorize applying Colorado law to

GHG emissions in other states and countries. That assertion is patently false and should be corrected.

Allowing Colorado to impose state liability

over interstate and international emissions

would be an unconstitutional form of state regulation by giving Colorado the authority to regulate conduct with no nexus to Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court is wrong that state liability is

not a form of state regulation subject to this Court’s

rulings. See 2025 CO 21, ¶10 (“Boulder does not, however, seek to enjoin any oil and gas operations or sales

in Colorado or elsewhere. Nor does it seek to enforce

emissions controls of any kind.”). A core tenet of liability is to define conduct that is unlawful, require defendants to compensate those harmed by that unlawful conduct, and instruct defendants and others not to

engage in any such unlawful conduct. The Court

should reaffirm its long-held view that liability is “a

potent method of governing conduct and controlling

policy.” San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). Liability regulates conduct.

Boulder admittedly seeks to impose liability on

and govern conduct almost exclusively outside of Colorado, thereby impermissibly regulating conduct in

other states and countries. Under this theory, each

state could impose its “own climate standards” on

other states and countries. Bill Schuette, Energy, Climate Policy Should be Guided by Federal Laws,

24

Congress, Not a Chaotic Patchwork of State Laws,

Law.com, Apr. 25, 2024 (Schuette was Michigan Attorney General from 2011-2019). The result would be

“a chaotic mix of state approaches [that] risks interfering with an effective, unified process to solve the

climate problems the plaintiffs seek to abate.” Donald

Kochan, Supreme Court Should Prevent Flood of State

Climate Change Torts, Bloomberg Law, May 20, 2024.

The Court should make clear that frustration with

Congress, EPA, and international bodies for not

adopting policies some people prefer, including imposing a carbon penalty or reducing fossil fuel use, does

not provide a state law basis for this litigation.

Any decision to impose a national carbon penalty must result from a public policy determination in Congress, not state liability law. As discussed above, this litigation is premised on the fact

that “forcing companies to raise the price of the energy

they don’t like, like fossil fuel energy, will make it too

expensive for people and businesses thus decreasing

the amount used.” Danielle Zanzalari, Government

Lawsuits Threaten Consumers’ Pockets and Do Little

to Help the Environment, USA Today, Nov. 1, 2023.

Legislative direction is needed here. Deciding whether

to impose this cost, on whom, how much, and where

the money should be spent involves factors beyond the

disputes of these parties—including energy affordability, economic impacts of raising energy costs, national security, and the impacts of shifting energy production to less environmentally conscience countries.

For example, state courts do not control the global

energy markets. As the New York Times has reported,

when manufacturers that sell energy in the United

States slow production, “that doesn’t mean the world

25

will have less oil.” Clifford Krauss, As Western Oil Giants Cut Production, State-Owned Companies Step

Up, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2021. “[T]he Middle East,

North Africa and Latin America are taking advantage

of the cutbacks . . . by cranking up” production and

making America “more dependent on . . . authoritarian leaders and politically unstable countries . . . that

are not under as much pressure to reduce emissions.”

Id. The result could actually make emissions worse

and hinder the U.S. in responding to international crises, as with the situations in Ukraine and Iran.10

Further, this litigation ignores state sovereignty

and the needs of other states to pay for and address

their own climate needs, which is one reason 26 U.S.

states filed a brief opposing this litigation campaign.

See Amici Brief of Alabama and 25 Other States, Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commr’s of Boulder

County, No. 25-170 (U.S., filed Sept. 26, 2025). As a

local leader said in response to Hoboken’s suit: “Hoboken is sticking the rest of us with [their] bill” as its

case “will make it much more expensive for us to put

gas in our cars and turn on our lights.” Michael Thulen, Why Hoboken’s Climate Change Lawsuit Is Bad

for New Jersey, NJBiz, Oct. 11, 2021 (Thulen served

as President of the Point Pleasant Borough Council).

This litigation is legally unprincipled, as it

seeks to create massive liability based on political decisions, not objective standards. Because

there are innumerable sources of GHG emissions in

every state and country—and have been for more than

10 See, e.g., Kate Abnett & Alexander Chituc, EU Plans Emer-

gency Measures to Curb Energy Costs as Iran War Hits Markets,

Reuters, Mar. 16, 2026 (noting plans to make more carbon emissions permits available to ease restrictions on fuels).

26

200 years—Respondents could have named innumerable combinations and permutations of entities, including entirely different companies in entirely different industries. Indeed, this litigation campaign has

targeted utilities and automakers in addition to an

ever-changing list of companies that produce fuel

products. The advocates behind this campaign could

just as readily have focused on agricultural operations

such as farming, building construction, forestry and

other land uses, or countless industrial activities that

involve significant GHG emissions. See generally William F. Lamb et al., A Review of Trends and Drivers

of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector from 1990 to

2018, 16 Env’t Res. Lett. 073005 (2021).

Instead, they made a political decision as to whom

to sue for climate change that aims to bypass Congress and put themselves “in the position of picking

winners and losers in the global climate change” policy debate. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas

Emissions?, 46 Val. U. L. Rev. 369, 385 (2012). This

litigation may advance some people’s preferred response to climate change, but it is not the role of state

courts to impose these changes on an ad hoc basis and

outside of the legislative process. The Court should

recognize that imposing liability for climate change on

any group of defendants is wholly unprincipled and

end this unsound litigation once and for all.

***

Ultimately, amicus believes the best way to address the impact of energy on the climate is for federal

and local governments to work with manufacturers

and others to develop public policies and technologies

that can reduce emissions and mitigate damages. See

27

Ross Eisenberg, Forget the Green New Deal. Let’s Get

to Work on a Real Climate Bill, Politico, Mar. 27, 2019.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, amicus curiae respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision below and

hold that federal law precludes state-law claims for

alleged injuries caused by global climate change.

Respectfully submitted,

Philip S. Goldberg

Counsel of Record

Christopher E. Appel

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.

1800 K Street, N.W., 1000

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 783-8400

pgoldberg@shb.com

Erica Klenicki

Caroline McAuliffe

THE NAM LEGAL CENTER

733 10th Street, N.W., Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20001

Dated: May 21, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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