Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 21, 2026
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No. 25-170
In the Supreme Court of the United States
______________________
SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY, ET AL.
Respondents.
______________________
On Writ of Certiorari
to the Supreme Court of Colorado
______________________
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
AND REVERSAL
______________________
Erica Klenicki
Caroline McAuliffe
THE NAM LEGAL CENTER
733 10th Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20001
May 21, 2026
Philip S. Goldberg
Counsel of Record
Christopher E. Appel
SHOOK, HARDY
& BACON L.L.P.
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 783-8400
pgoldberg@shb.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................. ii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ....................... 1
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .......................... 2
ARGUMENT .......................................................... 5
I.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW
BOULDER TO CIRCUMVENT ITS
RULING IN AEP THAT CLIMATE
CHANGE CLAIMS INVOKE A
“SPECIAL FEDERAL INTEREST” .......... 5
II. REPACKAGING CLAIMS FROM AEP
DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT
TODAY’S CLIMATE LITIGATION
SEEKS TO REGULATE INTERSTATE
AND INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS ..... 9
III. MERELY PASTING STATE LAW
LABELS ON FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS
CANNOT BE A MEANS FOR
USURPING FEDERAL AUTHORITY ...... 14
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THAT
CLAIMS ALLEGING HARM FROM
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ARE
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL LAW ............ 20
CONCLUSION ....................................................... 27
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011).............................. 2, 3, 5, 7, 22
Bucks County v. BP P.L.C., 2025 WL 1484203
(Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas May 16, 2025) .................. 18
California v. General Motors Corp.,
No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007) ...................................... 5
City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., Inc.,
2025 WL 2269770 (S.C. Ct. Comm.
Pleas Aug. 6, 2025) .............................................. 19
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ................... 4, 15, 21, 22
City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025
WL 209843 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2025) ........... 18
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C.,
325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ............... 14
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013) ............................. 4, 5
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012) .................. 8
Delaware ex rel. Jennings v. BP America Inc.,
2024 WL 98888 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2024) ... 17
iii
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91 (1972).................................................. 7
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987).............................................. 17
Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. B.P.
P.L.C., -- A.3d --, 2026 WL 809501
(Md. Mar. 24, 2025) ....................................... 16, 21
Minnesota v. American Petroleum Inst.,
63 F.4th 703 (8th Cir. 2022) ................................ 12
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012)............... 4, 5, 8
Platkin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025 WL 604846
(N.J. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2025) .............................. 18
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959).............................................. 23
Town of Carrboro v. Duke Energy Corp., 2026
WL 411466 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2026) ....... 19
United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
332 U.S. 301 (1947)................................................ 7
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.,
551 U.S. 142 (2007).............................................. 13
West Virginia v. Environmental Prot. Agency,
597 U.S. 697 (2022)................................................ 3
Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 2901 ........................................................ 21
iv
15 U.S.C. §§ 2931 to 2939 ......................................... 21
Other Authorities
Kate Abnett & Alexander Chituc, EU Plans
Emergency Measures to Curb Energy Costs
as Iran War Hits Markets, Reuters,
Mar. 16, 2026 ....................................................... 25
Amici Brief of Alabama and 25 Other States, Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commr’s of
Boulder County, No. 25-170 (U.S., filed Sept.
26, 2025) ............................................................... 25
Beyond the Courtroom, Manufacturers’
Accountability Project, at https://
mfgaccountability project.org/beyond
-the-courtroom ..................................................... 13
Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority,
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, No. 10-174 (U.S., filed Jan. 31, 2011) ............ 6
Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Sunoco LP v. City and County of
Honolulu, Nos. 23-947, 23-952, 2024 WL
5095299 (U.S., filed Dec. 10, 2024) ..................... 19
Julia Caulfield, Local Lawsuits Asks Oil and
Gas to Help Pay for Climate Change,
KOTO, Dec. 14, 2020, at https://coloradosun.com/2021/02/01/boulder-climatelawsuit-opinion/ .............................................. 10-11
v
City of Hoboken Press Release, Hoboken Becomes
First NJ City to Sue Big Oil Companies,
American Petroleum Institute for Climate
Change Damages, Sept. 2, 2020, at
https://www.hobokennj.gov/news/hobokensues-exxon-mobil-american-petroleum-institute-big-oil-companies ......................................... 12
Lesley Clark, Why Oil Companies Are Worried
About Climate Lawsuits From Gas States,
E&E News, Nov. 7, 2023 ..................................... 13
Editorial, Climate Lawsuits Take a Hit,
Wall St. J., May 17, 2021 .................................... 14
Ross Eisenberg, Forget the Green New Deal.
Let’s Get to Work on a Real Climate Bill,
Politico, Mar. 27, 2019 ......................................... 27
Establishing Accountability for Climate Damages:
Lessons from Tobacco Control, Summary of the
Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public
Opinion, and Legal Strategies, Union of
Concerned Scientists & Climate Accountability
Inst. (Oct. 2012), at https://www.ucs.org/sites/
default/files/attach/2016/04/establishing-accountability-climate-change-damages-lessonstobacco-control.pdf ................................................. 9
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
In re ExxonMobil Corp., No. 096-297222-18
(Tex. Dist. Ct.–Tarrant Cty. Apr. 24, 2018).......... 9
Kirk Herbertson, Oil Companies vs. Citizens:
The Battle Begins Over Who Will Pay Climate
Costs, EarthRights Int’l, Mar. 21, 2018 .............. 10
vi
Donald Kochan, Supreme Court Should Prevent
Flood of State Climate Change Torts, Bloomberg Law, May 20, 2024 ...................................... 24
Clifford Krauss, As Western Oil Giants Cut
Production, State-Owned Companies Step
Up, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2021 ............................. 25
William F. Lamb et al., A Review of Trends and
Drivers of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by
Sector from 1990 to 2018, 16 Env’t Res. Lett.
073005 (2021) ....................................................... 26
Charlie Melancon, Bipartisan Action,
Not Litigation, Is Key to Solving Climate
Change, Power, Apr. 19, 2021 ............................. 21
Kamden Mulder, Lawyer Behind Colorado
Climate Suit Says the Quiet Part Out Loud:
Litigation Is a Tax on Oil Companies and
Consumers, Nat’l Review, Oct. 20, 2025 ............. 11
Pl.’s Mot. For Entry of Partial Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Delaware v. BP Am.,
Inc., C.A. No. N20-C-09-097 (Del. Super. Ct.
Oct. 21, 2024) ....................................................... 17
Dawn Reeves, As Climate Suits Keeps Issue
Alive, Nuisance Cases Reach Key Venue
Rulings, Inside EPA, Jan. 6, 2020, at
https://insideepa.com/outlook/climate-suitskeeps-issue-alive-nuisance-cases-reach-keyvenue-rulings ....................................................... 11
vii
Susanne Rust, California Communities Suing Big
Oil Over Climate Change Face a Key Hearing
Wednesday, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 2020 ................. 13
Bill Schuette, Energy, Climate Policy Should
be Guided by Federal Laws, Congress,
Not a Chaotic Patchwork of State Laws,
Law.com, Apr. 25, 2024 .................................. 23-24
Victor E. Schwartz et al., Does the Judiciary Have
the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions?, 46 Val. U. L. Rev. 369 (2012) ...... 8, 26
Alexa St. John, Justice Department Sues Hawaii,
Michigan, Vermont and New York Over State
Climate Actions, Assoc. Press, May 1, 2025, at
https://apnews.com/article/trump-doj-climatestates-policy-lawsuitsa5228e1dd6348f09d2a70f460142531a ................ 20
Jerry Taylor & David Bookbinder, Oil Companies
Should be Held Accountable for Climate
Change, Niskanen Center, Apr. 17, 2018 ........... 11
Michael Thulen, Why Hoboken’s Climate
Change Lawsuit Is Bad for New Jersey,
NJBiz, Oct. 11, 2021 ............................................ 25
Danielle Zanzalari, Government Lawsuits Threaten
Consumers’ Pockets and Do Little to Help the
Environment, USA Today, Nov. 1, 2023 ............. 24
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
Amicus curiae, the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), is the largest manufacturing association in the United States, representing small and
large manufacturers in every industrial sector and in
all 50 states. Manufacturing employs 13 million men
and women, contributes $2.9 trillion to the U.S. economy annually, has the largest economic impact of any
major sector, and accounts for more than half of all
private-sector research and development in the nation. The NAM is the voice of the manufacturing community and leading advocate for a policy agenda that
helps manufacturers compete in the global economy
and create jobs across the United States.
The NAM is dedicated to manufacturing safe, innovative, and sustainable products that provide essential benefits to consumers while protecting human
health and the environment. Climate change is one of
the most important public policy issues of our time,
and the NAM supports national efforts to address climate change and improve public health through appropriate laws and regulations. Developing new technologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, make
energy more efficient, and modify infrastructures to
deal with the impacts of climate change has become
an international imperative.
The NAM has grave concerns about Boulder’s and
similar state and local governments’ attempts to
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus curiae certifies that
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any
party and that no person or entity, other than amicus curiae, its
members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the
preparation or submission of the brief.
2
impose state-law liability over the worldwide production, sale, and promotion of energy products. As the
Court found in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011), climate litigation implicates federal law and complex policymaking. Statelaw claims, no matter how pleaded, are not the appropriate mechanism for deciding these critical national
issues. For these reasons, the NAM has a substantial
interest in attempts by Respondents and local governments to subject its members to unprincipled state liability for harms associated with climate change and
impose these costs on American manufacturers generally, particularly when doing so will not meaningfully
address climate change and will harm their ability to
compete in the international marketplace.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This lawsuit is part of a coordinated, national litigation campaign over global climate change that is invoking state liability law to regulate and impose a
penalty on the worldwide use of fossil fuels sold by
only certain companies. These claims, including the
one at bar, are legally unprincipled. As the organizers
of the litigation have acknowledged, the plaintiffs and
jurisdictions for these lawsuits have been chosen for
political reasons. The complaints have been carefully
packaged to appeal to parochial interests of state
courts by invoking state law and seeking money for
local constituencies. And the lawsuits target the companies they are choosing to blame for climate change.
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Maryland Supreme Court, and others have
held, this litigation cannot be allowed to proceed under any state’s laws, regardless of the state liability
3
theory invoked or which companies were chosen for
the suits. The North Star for these rulings has been
this Court’s decision in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (hereafter “AEP”),
where this Court stated that determining the rights
and responsibilities for global climate change “require
federal law governance” and that “borrowing the law
of a particular State would be inappropriate.” 564 U.S.
at 422. The conduct and emissions alleged in climate
lawsuits largely occurred outside of any state’s borders and, as with any interstate or international emissions case, they are not subject to state law. Further,
as the Court recognized in AEP, climate change has
resulted from emissions of innumerable sources, products, and actions around the world for more than 200
years and involves air in its “ambient” state. Id. at
421. Thus, the Court explained, the Constitution “demands” federal decisional law for these matters. Id.
Indeed, the history of AEP is fundamental to this
litigation. There, the Court made clear that federal
law governs climate change emissions, federal common law claims over these emissions were displaced
when Congress enacted the Clean Air Act and delegated this governance to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the judiciary does not have the
institutional tools for deciding rights and responsibilities for climate change. Id. at 424. It concluded that
there was no room for a “parallel track” of tort litigation. Id. at 425.2 Given the clarity and breadth of the
ruling, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits dismissed climate
suits in their courts even though the cases were
2 The Court reaffirmed AEP in West Virginia v. Environmental
Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697, 730-31 (2022); see also id. at 771 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
4
brought under both state and federal laws, named
other types of energy companies, and sought other
remedies including damages and abatement. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2012); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).
This case, as well as the broader climate litigation,
is an unapologetic attempt to circumvent the Court’s
ruling in AEP. Since 2017, the City and County of
Boulder have been among three-dozen local and state
governments that have filed comparable climate-related claims. The lawsuits have been purposefully reframed to look different from AEP but have the same
national effect. Like throwing legal spaghetti on the
wall, they invoke various state laws, target an assortment of activities they allege led to climate change in
violation of those state laws, name different combinations of companies, and seek money for local governments to deal with climate impacts—all to find a state
court that will not apply AEP to dismiss the claims.
The inescapable fact, though, is that regardless of how
the claims are repackaged, the people, products and
activities contributing to global climate change cannot
be subjected to any one state’s liability law. Such a
“sprawling case is simply beyond the limits” of state
liability law. City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993
F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2021). “Artful pleading cannot
transform [plaintiff’s] complaint into anything other
than a suit over global greenhouse gas emissions.” Id.
Amicus respectfully requests that this Court reverse the Colorado Supreme Court ruling below. Determining how to address climate change—its causes
and impacts—is one of the most important public policy issues that Congress, state and federal agencies,
5
and international bodies have been working on for
decades. These matters lie beyond the reach of Colorado law, and the ruling below should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ALLOW
BOULDER TO CIRCUMVENT ITS
RULING IN AEP THAT CLIMATE
CHANGE CLAIMS INVOKE A “SPECIAL
FEDERAL INTEREST”
The history of Boulder’s climate suit starts with
AEP, which was the first major case seeking to impose
liability over greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and
climate change. The targets for the litigation in AEP
were utilities that generated electricity for much of
America. Three lawsuits followed, each testing other
ways climate litigation could be framed. In California
v. General Motors Corp., California sued auto manufacturers for making products that emit GHGs. See
No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007). In Kivalina, a village sued oil and gas
producers for damages related to rising sea levels. See
696 F.3d at 849. As here, the village alleged the defendants were “substantial contributors to global
warming” in part caused by “conspir[ing] to mislead
the public about the science of global warming.” Id. at
854. In Comer, Mississippi residents filed a class action against energy producers for Hurricane Katrina
losses, arguing defendants caused emissions that
made the hurricane more intense. See 718 F.3d at 460.
The underpinnings of all four cases are the same
as those here: climate change is caused by GHG emissions, including global use of oil, gas, and other fossil
fuels. See AEP, 564 U.S. at 416. The emissions have
6
accumulated in the atmosphere for more than 200
years and have caused impacts on the Earth. The defendants are in violation of some federal or state law
based on the way they are contributing to GHG emissions through their products, operations, or other activities. See id. at 418 (pleading state tort law in the
alternative). As a result, the defendants are responsible for climate change and its impacts, and the plaintiffs are entitled to various remedies. See id.
In AEP, the Obama administration filed a brief in
opposition to this liability. The Solicitor General underscored the legal deficiencies with allowing any entity to be liable for climate change, explaining that
claims over GHG emissions are inherently subjective
and unprincipled. It stated that there are “almost unimaginably broad categories of both potential plaintiffs and potential defendants.” Brief for the Tennessee Valley Authority, American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut, No. 10-174 (U.S., filed Jan. 31, 2011).
The “[p]laintiffs have elected to sue a handful of defendants from among an almost limitless array of entities that emit greenhouse gases. Moreover, the types
of injuries that [the] plaintiffs seek to redress, even if
concrete, could potentially be suffered by virtually any
landowner, and to an extent, by virtually every person.” Id. at 15. “The medium that transmits injury to
potential plaintiffs is literally the Earth’s atmosphere—making it impossible to consider the sort of focused and more geographically proximate effects”
characteristic of U.S. liability law. Id. at 17.
This Court then unanimously held that Congress,
in enacting the Clean Air Act, displaced any federal
common law cause of action, thereby extinguishing
the viability of these GHG claims. The Court’s
7
reasoning demonstrates why claims over global climate change cannot be adjudicated under any state’s
law either. First, the Court explained that in United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of California it held that
certain claims invoke the “interests, powers and relations of the Federal Government as to require uniform
national disposition rather than diversified state rulings.” 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). And, in Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee, it stated that “air and water in their
ambient or interstate aspects” are among those areas
of law where “the basic scheme of the Constitution”
demands that they are governed by federal law. 406
U.S. 91, 103 (1972). The Court held these rulings apply to climate litigation because determining rights
and responsibilities for interstate and international
GHG emissions are inherently matters of “special federal interest,” which makes this subject “meet for federal law governance.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 422, 424.
Second, the Court expressed concern about allowing judges to make determinations and impose remedies over these national public policy matters given
the institutional limitations on the tools judges have
available to them. See id. at 428. To adjudicate these
claims, courts would have to regulate GHG emissions
from defendants’ products and conduct “by judicial decree.” Id. at 427. “The appropriate amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-producing sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum: as with other
questions of national or international policy, informed
assessment of competing interests is required.” Id.
“[O]ur Nation’s energy needs and the possible economic disruption must weigh in the balance.” Id.
Courts do not have the ability to weigh these extrajudicial factors; they can decide only legal disputes on
the evidence presented. See id. at 428 (“Judges lack
8
the scientific, economic, and technological resources
an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order.”). Thus, regardless of legal doctrine, these policy
matters should not be decided by judges on an “ad hoc,
case-by-case” basis. Id.3
Given the Court’s clear direction against this type
of litigation on constitutional, federal common law,
and public policy grounds, courts dismissed the remaining climate cases. In Kivalina, the Ninth Circuit
stated that even though the parties, theories of liability, and remedies differed from AEP, given the Court’s
broad message against climate liability, “it would be
incongruous to allow [such litigation] to be revived in
another form.” 696 F.3d at 857. It appreciated that climate suits are the type of “transboundary pollution”
claims the Constitution commits exclusively to federal
law. Id. at 855. This is true regardless of how the suits
are framed—over energy use or products, by public or
private plaintiffs, under federal or state law, or for injunctive relief, abatement, or damages. In Comer, a
judge held that under AEP the state law claims were
preempted. See 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012).
Thus, the law was and is clear: claims over emissions contributing to global climate change are governed exclusively by federal law and the Clean Air
Act. The Court should not allow Boulder to skirt this
jurisprudence merely by painting these federal public
policy matters with a state liability law brush.
3 See also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Does the Judiciary Have the
Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions?, 46 Val. U. L.
Rev. 369, 388-92 (2012) (discussing practical causation and redressability issues with climate litigation).
9
II. REPACKAGING CLAIMS FROM AEP
DOES NOT CHANGE THE FACT THAT
TODAY’S CLIMATE LITIGATION SEEKS
TO REGULATE INTERSTATE AND
INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS
Undeterred by AEP, the individuals behind the climate litigation campaign purposefully set out to retool this litigation so that it would appear different
from AEP but have the same effect of regulating interstate and international emissions. In 2012, many
of the advocacy groups and lawyers behind this litigation convened in La Jolla, California to brainstorm on
how to repackage the litigation in hopes of achieving
their national goals. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In re ExxonMobil Corp., No. 096-29722218 (Tex. Dist. Ct.–Tarrant Cty. Apr. 24, 2018), at 3
(discussing the “Workshop on Climate Accountability,
Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies”). The strategies
discussed included the one they ultimately employed:
filing lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions under various
state laws and asking for local damages, hoping at
least one court would allow claims to progress. See id.
Organizers of the conference captured their discussion and strategies for this litigation in a published
report. See Establishing Accountability for Climate
Damages: Lessons from Tobacco Control, Summary of
the Workshop on Climate Accountability, Public Opinion, and Legal Strategies, Union of Concerned Scientists & Climate Accountability Institute (Oct. 2012).4
Despite AEP, they said “the courts offer the best
4 https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2016/04/
establishing-accountability-climate-change-damages-lessons-tobacco-control.pdf.
10
current hope” for imposing their national public policy
agenda over fossil fuel emissions, including imposing
a carbon penalty. Id. at 28. They discussed “the merits
of legal strategies that target major carbon emitters,
such as utilities [as in AEP], versus those that target
carbon producers,” as here. Id. at 12. And, they talked
through various causes of action, “with suggestions
ranging from lawsuits under public nuisance laws,” as
here, “to libel claims.” Id. at 11.
Given AEP, they emphasized making the lawsuits
look like traditional state damages claims rather than
directly asking a court to regulate emissions or put a
price on carbon use. See id. at 13. As one participant
said, “Even if your ultimate goal might be to shut
down a company, you still might be wise to start out
by asking for compensation for injured parties.” Id. Finally, they discussed “the importance of framing a
compelling public narrative,” including “naming [the]
issue or campaign” to generate “outrage.” Id. at 21, 28.
Lawsuits following this playbook were filed starting
in 2017, with Boulder’s action filed soon thereafter.
Outside of court, the advocates have openly
acknowledged the desired effect of this litigation is to
impose costs on consumers for the worldwide production, promotion, sale and use of fuel—what they call
its “true cost.” Kirk Herbertson, Oil Companies vs.
Citizens: The Battle Begins Over Who Will Pay Climate Costs, EarthRights Int’l, Mar. 21, 2018. One attorney associated with Boulder’s case told a Colorado
radio station that they want to force energy companies
to raise the price of fuel so “if they are continuing to
sell fossil fuels, that the cost of [climate change] would
ultimately get priced into them.” Julia Caulfield, Local Lawsuits Asks Oil and Gas to Help Pay for Climate
11
Change, KOTO, Dec. 14, 2020.5 This tactic is based on
their recognition that “companies are agents of consumers” such that “holding oil companies responsible is to hold oil consumers responsible.” Jerry Taylor
& David Bookbinder, Oil Companies Should be Held
Accountable for Climate Change, Niskanen Ctr., Apr.
17, 2018.6 Another lawyer associated with Boulder’s
litigation put it this way: “Essentially, the tort liability is an indirect carbon tax. You sue an oil company,
an oil company is liable, the oil company then passes
that liability on to the people who are buying its products.” Kamden Mulder, Lawyer Behind Colorado Climate Suit Says the Quiet Part Out Loud: Litigation Is
a Tax on Oil Companies and Consumers, Nat’l Review, Oct. 20, 2025 (quoting David Bookbinder).
In an effort to mask these goals and make this litigation more politically palatable, the advocates partnered with state and local governments—including
Boulder here—which would use the asserted monetary penalty to deal with local impacts of climate
change. The governments often disclaim any attempt
to regulate or put costs on emissions; they say they
just want money to deal with impacts of climate
change in their jurisdictions. However, artful pleading
5 https://coloradosun.com/2021/02/01/boulder-climate-lawsuit-
opinion/.
6 A reporter who follows the litigation has observed the incongru-
ity between the ways the cases are presented in and out of court:
“State and local governments pursuing the litigation argue that
the cases are not about controlling GHG emissions . . . But they
also privately acknowledge that the suits are a tactic to pressure
the industry.” Dawn Reeves, As Climate Suits Keeps Issue Alive,
Nuisance Cases Reach Key Venue Rulings, Inside EPA, Jan. 6,
2020, at https://insideepa.com/outlook/climate-suits-keeps-issuealive-nuisance-cases-reach-key-venue-rulings.
12
and disclaimers cannot hide the true federal, public
policy nature of this litigation. The lawsuits are being
funded by national and international non-profits because the litigation would impact federal energy policy. See, e.g., City of Hoboken Press Release, Hoboken
Becomes First NJ City to Sue Big Oil Companies,
American Petroleum Institute for Climate Change
Damages, Sept. 2, 2020 (noting legal fees would be
paid by the Institute for Governance and Sustainable
Development).7 As one jurist stated, the governments
and backers are waging this federal energy dispute
“through the surrogate of a private party as the defendant.” Minnesota v. American Petroleum Inst., 63
F.4th 703, 719 (8th Cir. 2023) (Stras, J., concurring).
Thus, the purposeful effect of this national litigation campaign is to use state law to penalize national
energy use and direct money from energy consumers
across the country to local governments, unbridled by
the checks and balances of Congress’s legislative process. But, as discussed below, the narrative promoted
by the campaign’s advocates to try to justify these
cases—that there is some widespread “campaign of
deception”—is undermined by the way the lawsuits
are packaged and pleaded. Governments are naming
anywhere from one or two, as here, to several dozen
defendants in different aspects of the energy industry,
including local entities to keep the cases in state court.
The ever-changing combination of defendants undermines the existence of any such conspiracy. It also
highlights why imposing liability on any one or group
7_https://www.hobokennj.gov/news/hoboken-sues-exxon-mobil-
american-petroleum-institute-big-oil-companies.
13
of defendants a plaintiff chooses to name for its lawsuit lacks any principled legal basis.
In addition, groups generating these lawsuits have
also acknowledged they are engaging in political-style
tactics to recruit local governments to bring these
cases and to leverage the litigation to hinder the energy companies politically. See Lesley Clark, Why Oil
Companies Are Worried About Climate Lawsuits From
Gas States, E&E News, Nov. 7, 2023. As one leader of
this effort said, “It’s no secret that we go around and
talk to elected officials” about bringing these lawsuits
and “look at the politics” in deciding whom to approach. Id.; see also Beyond the Courtroom, Manufacturers’ Accountability Project (detailing this litigation
campaign).8 They also believe state courts “tend to be
more favorable” than federal courts. Susanne Rust,
California Communities Suing Big Oil Over Climate
Change Face a Key Hearing Wednesday, L.A. Times,
Feb. 5, 2020 (quoting Prof. Hecht, co-Executive Director of the Emmett Institute on Climate Change and
the Environment at UCLA School of Law). It is because of these dynamics—where state courts are being
asked to rule against “unpopular” federal laws or outof-state defendants in favor of local recoveries—that
this Court has expressed concern that some state
courts “may reflect local prejudice.” Watson v. Philip
Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 150 (2007) (cleaned up).
Overall, three dozen of these suits have been filed
in carefully chosen jurisdictions in an effort to “sidestep federal courts and [U.S.] Supreme Court precedent” and convince local courts to help them advance
their preferred public policy agenda by awarding
8 https://mfgaccountabilityproject.org/beyond-the-courtroom.
14
money to state and local jurisdictions. Editorial, Climate Lawsuits Take a Hit, Wall St. J., May 17, 2021.
If this gambit is successful, it will not just lead to a
state take-over of federal climate emissions law, as
sought here. It will provide a road map for people to
use state liability law to drive a wide variety of federal
legal and public policy matters irrespective of decisions made in Congress and federal agencies.
III. MERELY PASTING STATE LAW
LABELS ON FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS
CANNOT BE A MEANS FOR
USURPING FEDERAL AUTHORITY
The constitutional, legal, and public policy concerns this Court identified in AEP with respect to climate-related claims are not cured by reframing them
under state law. The causes of climate change are no
more local than in AEP; they still result from interstate and international emissions. And, the institutional deficiencies with judges making federal public
policy decisions on an ad hoc basis are magnified when
individual state judges could reach different determinations without legislative oversight or federal uniformity. When theories of harm are not moored to any
plaintiff, defendant, or jurisdiction and can be asserted by any state or local government in the nation,
liability against whom for whom and how much becomes unprincipled and could vary from court to court.
Federal courts readily saw through this state-law
reframing. The first jurist to address the substantive
issues was Judge Alsup in claims brought by San
Francisco and Oakland. See City of Oakland v. BP
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (vacated
on other grounds). He found these cases even more
global than AEP, stating “[i]n light of AEP, plaintiffs
15
shift[ed] their focus” from local utility operations in
certain states “to sales of fossil fuels worldwide,”
which broadly expanded the national and international scope of the challenged activities. Id. at 1025.
“Their theory rests on the sweeping proposition that
otherwise lawful and everyday sales of fossil fuels,
combined with an awareness that greenhouse gas
emissions lead to increased global temperatures, constitute a public nuisance.” Id. at 1022. It attempts to
“reach the sale of fossil fuels anywhere in the world.”
Id. “The scope of plaintiffs’ theory is breathtaking.” Id.
The Second Circuit, in a ruling affirming dismissal
of New York City’s climate suit, directly called out this
reframing as a false veneer. The court wrote: “we are
told that this is merely a local spat about the City’s
eroding shoreline, which will have no appreciable effect on national energy or environmental policy. We
disagree.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 91. “Stripped
to its essence” the state law claims seek to impose liability and set national public policy law over global
emissions. Id. The Second Circuit then invoked Kivalina, holding that, regardless of the theories and
remedies asserted, AEP controls claims over climate
change. Id. at 96. Any “daylight” the plaintiffs assert
between these types of cases and AEP and Kivalina
“does not change the substance of [the] claims.” Id. at
97. There are no legal distinctions from AEP.
The Second Circuit went on to explain the legal
and constitutional deficiencies with allowing climate
claims packaged under state law: “a mostly unbroken
string of cases has applied federal law to disputes involving interstate air or water pollution.” Id. That is
because “a substantial damages award like the one requested by the City would effectively regulate the
16
Producers’ behavior far beyond New York’s borders.”
Id. at 92. “Any actions the Producers take to mitigate
their liability, then, must undoubtedly take effect
across every state (and country). And all without asking what the laws of those other states (or countries)
require.” Id. Such “sprawling” claims seeking “damages for the cumulative impact of conduct occurring
simultaneously across just about every jurisdiction on
the planet,” are “beyond the limits of state law.” Id.
During the pendency of the case at bar, the Maryland Supreme Court created a direct state high court
split with Colorado when it adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning and affirmed dismissal of three local
climate lawsuits all based on the same general premise as here. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
v. B.P. P.L.C., -- A.3d --, 2026 WL 809501, at *20 (Md.
Mar. 24, 2026). Echoing the Second Circuit, the Maryland Supreme Court stated that “[n]o amount of creative pleading can masquerade the fact that the local
governments are attempting to utilize state law to
regulate global conduct that is purportedly causing
global harm.” Id. Even if the reframing were permissible, the Maryland court continued, “we reject the assertion that their sweeping claims may be pursued
under state law.” Id. “The local governments are seeking to apply Maryland law to regulate conduct that occurs outside their jurisdictional borders.” Id. at 20.
Their “police powers” do not have this reach. Id.
The Maryland Supreme Court also agreed these
cases are governed by AEP, stating with respect to
their viability that it could “make short work of this
analysis given the Supreme Court’s ruling in AEP.”
Id. at *23. In light of this Court’s precedent on interstate emission cases, the Maryland court concluded
17
that federal law displaced or preempted the state-law
claims: “Interstate water and air pollution are areas
that the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
determined are governed by federal common law and,
therefore, leave no place for the application of state
law.” Id. at *10. “Allowing each of the 50 states (and
the countless individual local governments located
within them) to impose their own preferred policy solutions for climate change—with each state naturally
focused on local rather than national or international
impacts, would create a plainly ‘irrational system of
regulation’ that would lead to ‘chaotic confrontation
between sovereign states.’” Id. at *22 (quoting Int’l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987)).
The way this litigation has played out in Delaware
has underscored the fact that this global reach is the
intended nature of this litigation. There, the trial
court winnowed the state’s climate lawsuit based on a
determination that federal law “preempts state law to
the extent a state attempts to regulate air pollution
originating in other states.” Delaware ex rel. Jennings
v. BP America Inc., 2024 WL 98888, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2024). The State could sue only for
emissions in Delaware. In a telling response, the State
moved for partial final judgment, saying it had no interest in litigating a case based “solely [on] in-state
emissions.” Pl.’s Mot. For Entry of Partial Judgment
Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Delaware v. BP Am., Inc., C.A.
No. N20-C-09-097 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2024). The
plaintiff affirmed it was seeking relief for conduct that
“occurred in and outside of Delaware and that increased emissions in and outside of Delaware.” Id.
Several other state trial courts have issued similar
rulings, with some appeals of those rulings stayed
18
pending the Court’s decision in this case. A New Jersey court agreed with the “logic and reasoning” of the
Second Circuit that state tort law is not available for
climate change suits. Platkin v. ExxonMobil Corp.,
2025 WL 604846, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2025).
“Plaintiffs’ complaint, even under the most indulgent
reading, is entirely about addressing the injuries of
global climate change.” Id. at *9. A Pennsylvania trial
court also dismissed a local climate lawsuit, stating
“our federal structure does not allow Pennsylvania
law, or any State’s law, to address [state-law] claims”
that “are so intertwined with emissions.” Bucks
County v. BP P.L.C., 2025 WL 1484203, at *7, *8 (Pa.
Ct. Comm. Pleas May 16, 2025). Although the county
did “everything it can to avoid the issue of emissions,
it cannot avoid the fact that if there were no emissions
there would be no damages.” Id. at *7.
In New York, a trial court dismissed New York
City’s latest attempt at climate litigation, which focused on consumer protection claims. It stated that
any allegation over the impact of fossil fuel emissions
on the climate involves public information, meaning
“a reasonable consumer cannot have been misled.”
City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2025 WL
209843, *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2025). “The City
cannot have it both ways by, on one hand, asserting
that consumers are aware of and commercially sensitive to the fact that fossil fuels cause climate change,
and, on the other hand, that the same consumers are
being duped by Defendants’ failure to disclose that
their fossil fuel products emit greenhouse gasses that
contribute to climate change.” Id. at *14.
In South Carolina, the court noted Charleston was
“seeking to hold two dozen energy companies,
19
retailers, and a pipeline liable under South Carolina
law for harms allegedly arising from the effects of
global greenhouse gas emissions and global climate
change.” City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., Inc.,
2025 WL 2269770, at *1 (S.C. Ct. Comm. Pleas Aug.
6, 2025). The court dismissed the claims, concluding
that “although Plaintiff’s claims purport to be about
deception, they are premised on, and seek redress for,
the effects of greenhouse gas emissions.” Id. at *2. In
North Carolina, a court dismissed climate claims
against Duke Energy Corporation as presenting “nonjusticiable questions.” Town of Carrboro v. Duke Energy Corp., 2026 WL 411466, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Feb. 12, 2026).
Finally, both President Biden’s and Trump’s administrations have joined the Obama administration
in identifying legal deficiencies with state climate litigation. When a Petition in Honolulu’s climate case
was pending before this Court, President Biden’s Solicitor General asked this Court not to review it. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Sunoco
LP v. City and County of Honolulu, Nos. 23-947, 23952, 2024 WL 5095299 (U.S., filed Dec. 10, 2024). But
she also acknowledged state-law climate claims may
be foreclosed “to the extent they are based on emissions or other conduct outside of Hawaii.” Id. at *7.
She added: “To be sure, petitioners may ultimately
prevail on their contention that respondents’ claims
are barred by the Constitution—specifically, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and federal constitutional structure.” Id.
at *13. The Trump administration has amplified the
federal government’s view that this litigation is unsound, calling the suits “illegitimate impediments to
the production of affordable, reliable energy”
20
Americans need. Alexa St. John, Justice Department
Sues Hawaii, Michigan, Vermont and New York Over
State Climate Actions, Assoc. Press, May 1, 2025
(quoting then-U.S. Attorney General Bondi).
Thus, administrations of both political parties and
courts in a multitude of states are aligned on the inherent federal nature of this litigation. Determining
the rights and responsibilities for climate change is a
matter of federal public policy—not state liability
law—regardless of packaging.
IV. THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THAT
CLAIMS ALLEGING HARM FROM
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ARE
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL LAW
In allowing the climate claims below, the Colorado
Supreme Court made several legal errors that this
Court should correct in affirming that climate-related
claims are not appropriate for state law governance.
The constitutional principles this Court identified in
AEP with respect to interstate and international
emissions and the U.S. Constitution’s structure on the
limited scope of state authority are not so fragile as to
be swayed by Boulder’s reframing. The Court should
issue a ruling that underscores the basic truths about
climate litigation, reaffirming what it said in AEP.
Climate litigation, regardless of how it is
framed, is inherently about interstate and international emissions, not any underlying conduct
or product. The heart of Boulder’s claims, as in AEP,
is that Defendants exacerbated global climate change
by increasing carbon emissions through their conduct
and products. The Colorado Supreme Court distinguished these claims from AEP. It accepted Boulder’s
21
reframing that it “has not brought an action against a
pollution emitter to abate pollution. Rather, it seeks
damages from upstream producers for harms stemming from the production and sale of fossil fuels.”
2025 CO 21, ¶50. As the Second Circuit stated, picking
a differing part in the emissions process to target
“cannot transform [the lawsuit] into anything other
than a suit over global greenhouse gas emissions.”
City of New York, 993 F.3d at 91. Plaintiffs cannot
“have it both ways”: “disavowing any intent to address
emissions” while “identifying such emissions as the
singular source” of the harm they allege. Id.
To be clear, the state-law liability theories here are
fig leaves. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
2026 WL 809501, at *28 (“each of the local governments’ claims fail to state legally cognizable claims
under Maryland common law”). Global climate change
is not the result of Defendant’s GHG emissions in Colorado, but of everyone, everywhere for more than 200
years. Also, the narrative that there is some widespread “campaign of deception” is undermined by the
litigation itself. Complaints recognize the global
knowledge of and public discourse over climate change
began in the 1960s and has increased over the past 60
years.9 These cases are not about who knew, said or
9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (establishing a “national climate pro-
gram” in 1978 to increase knowledge about the climate “through
research, data collection, assessments, information dissemination, and international cooperation”) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931 to
2939 (enacting Global Changes Research Act of 1990). Indeed,
since 1989, the United Nations has researched and published reports on the state of the knowledge about climate change, its
causes, and its impacts. Cf. Charlie Melancon, Bipartisan Action,
Not Litigation, Is Key to Solving Climate Change, Power, Apr. 19,
2021 (“[T]here has always been an understanding that climate
22
did what and when, whether the suits name utilities
or producers of energy, or which conduct or attributes
the governments assert are the bases for their liability
theories. These cases are about global emissions.
Federal law exclusively governs interstate
and international GHG emissions, and the Court
did not open the door in AEP for these claims to
be repackaged under state law. As the Court held
in AEP, climate litigation—as with all interstate and
international pollution cases—is necessarily governed
by federal law and, if a cause of action is allowed, the
dispute must be determined by federal common law.
The Court continued that Congress displaced this federal common law when it gave the EPA the authority
to make determinations with respect to these emissions in the Clean Air Act. The Colorado Supreme
Court, along with other courts, have twisted this displacement ruling, holding that if federal common law
has been displaced, then these claims can now suddenly be decided by any state court. The Second Circuit described this theory as “too strange to seriously
contemplate.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 99. It is.
Indeed, the entire argument that this Court in
AEP left open the potential for state litigation is premised on a false reading of AEP. In AEP, the Court
acknowledged the plaintiffs had also sought relief under state laws where the power plants were located
but those claims were not part of the appeal to this
Court. The Court then noted that the availability of
any such suit would depend, inter alia, on the preemptive effect of the Clean Air Act. See AEP, 564 U.S. at
change is a problem and action is needed to address its risks. The
problem has been agreeing on the best path forward given the
philosophical and regional differences on energy policy.”).
23
429. However, the Colorado Supreme Court and others ignore the parenthetical following this statement,
which cabined the availability of any such state cases
to those applying the “law of the source State.’” Id.
(emphasis in original). Thus, the Court in AEP did
not, in any way, authorize applying Colorado law to
GHG emissions in other states and countries. That assertion is patently false and should be corrected.
Allowing Colorado to impose state liability
over interstate and international emissions
would be an unconstitutional form of state regulation by giving Colorado the authority to regulate conduct with no nexus to Colorado. The Colorado Supreme Court is wrong that state liability is
not a form of state regulation subject to this Court’s
rulings. See 2025 CO 21, ¶10 (“Boulder does not, however, seek to enjoin any oil and gas operations or sales
in Colorado or elsewhere. Nor does it seek to enforce
emissions controls of any kind.”). A core tenet of liability is to define conduct that is unlawful, require defendants to compensate those harmed by that unlawful conduct, and instruct defendants and others not to
engage in any such unlawful conduct. The Court
should reaffirm its long-held view that liability is “a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.” San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). Liability regulates conduct.
Boulder admittedly seeks to impose liability on
and govern conduct almost exclusively outside of Colorado, thereby impermissibly regulating conduct in
other states and countries. Under this theory, each
state could impose its “own climate standards” on
other states and countries. Bill Schuette, Energy, Climate Policy Should be Guided by Federal Laws,
24
Congress, Not a Chaotic Patchwork of State Laws,
Law.com, Apr. 25, 2024 (Schuette was Michigan Attorney General from 2011-2019). The result would be
“a chaotic mix of state approaches [that] risks interfering with an effective, unified process to solve the
climate problems the plaintiffs seek to abate.” Donald
Kochan, Supreme Court Should Prevent Flood of State
Climate Change Torts, Bloomberg Law, May 20, 2024.
The Court should make clear that frustration with
Congress, EPA, and international bodies for not
adopting policies some people prefer, including imposing a carbon penalty or reducing fossil fuel use, does
not provide a state law basis for this litigation.
Any decision to impose a national carbon penalty must result from a public policy determination in Congress, not state liability law. As discussed above, this litigation is premised on the fact
that “forcing companies to raise the price of the energy
they don’t like, like fossil fuel energy, will make it too
expensive for people and businesses thus decreasing
the amount used.” Danielle Zanzalari, Government
Lawsuits Threaten Consumers’ Pockets and Do Little
to Help the Environment, USA Today, Nov. 1, 2023.
Legislative direction is needed here. Deciding whether
to impose this cost, on whom, how much, and where
the money should be spent involves factors beyond the
disputes of these parties—including energy affordability, economic impacts of raising energy costs, national security, and the impacts of shifting energy production to less environmentally conscience countries.
For example, state courts do not control the global
energy markets. As the New York Times has reported,
when manufacturers that sell energy in the United
States slow production, “that doesn’t mean the world
25
will have less oil.” Clifford Krauss, As Western Oil Giants Cut Production, State-Owned Companies Step
Up, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 2021. “[T]he Middle East,
North Africa and Latin America are taking advantage
of the cutbacks . . . by cranking up” production and
making America “more dependent on . . . authoritarian leaders and politically unstable countries . . . that
are not under as much pressure to reduce emissions.”
Id. The result could actually make emissions worse
and hinder the U.S. in responding to international crises, as with the situations in Ukraine and Iran.10
Further, this litigation ignores state sovereignty
and the needs of other states to pay for and address
their own climate needs, which is one reason 26 U.S.
states filed a brief opposing this litigation campaign.
See Amici Brief of Alabama and 25 Other States, Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commr’s of Boulder
County, No. 25-170 (U.S., filed Sept. 26, 2025). As a
local leader said in response to Hoboken’s suit: “Hoboken is sticking the rest of us with [their] bill” as its
case “will make it much more expensive for us to put
gas in our cars and turn on our lights.” Michael Thulen, Why Hoboken’s Climate Change Lawsuit Is Bad
for New Jersey, NJBiz, Oct. 11, 2021 (Thulen served
as President of the Point Pleasant Borough Council).
This litigation is legally unprincipled, as it
seeks to create massive liability based on political decisions, not objective standards. Because
there are innumerable sources of GHG emissions in
every state and country—and have been for more than
10 See, e.g., Kate Abnett & Alexander Chituc, EU Plans Emer-
gency Measures to Curb Energy Costs as Iran War Hits Markets,
Reuters, Mar. 16, 2026 (noting plans to make more carbon emissions permits available to ease restrictions on fuels).
26
200 years—Respondents could have named innumerable combinations and permutations of entities, including entirely different companies in entirely different industries. Indeed, this litigation campaign has
targeted utilities and automakers in addition to an
ever-changing list of companies that produce fuel
products. The advocates behind this campaign could
just as readily have focused on agricultural operations
such as farming, building construction, forestry and
other land uses, or countless industrial activities that
involve significant GHG emissions. See generally William F. Lamb et al., A Review of Trends and Drivers
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector from 1990 to
2018, 16 Env’t Res. Lett. 073005 (2021).
Instead, they made a political decision as to whom
to sue for climate change that aims to bypass Congress and put themselves “in the position of picking
winners and losers in the global climate change” policy debate. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions?, 46 Val. U. L. Rev. 369, 385 (2012). This
litigation may advance some people’s preferred response to climate change, but it is not the role of state
courts to impose these changes on an ad hoc basis and
outside of the legislative process. The Court should
recognize that imposing liability for climate change on
any group of defendants is wholly unprincipled and
end this unsound litigation once and for all.
***
Ultimately, amicus believes the best way to address the impact of energy on the climate is for federal
and local governments to work with manufacturers
and others to develop public policies and technologies
that can reduce emissions and mitigate damages. See
27
Ross Eisenberg, Forget the Green New Deal. Let’s Get
to Work on a Real Climate Bill, Politico, Mar. 27, 2019.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, amicus curiae respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision below and
hold that federal law precludes state-law claims for
alleged injuries caused by global climate change.
Respectfully submitted,
Philip S. Goldberg
Counsel of Record
Christopher E. Appel
SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P.
1800 K Street, N.W., 1000
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 783-8400
pgoldberg@shb.com
Erica Klenicki
Caroline McAuliffe
THE NAM LEGAL CENTER
733 10th Street, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20001
Dated: May 21, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.