Reply Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.
Supreme Court briefNov 25, 2025
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No. 25-170
In the Supreme Court of the United States
SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.; SUNCOR ENERGY
SALES INC.; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS
v.
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;
CITY OF BOULDER
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
YAHONNES CLEARY
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
HUGH QUAN GOTTSCHALK
ERIC L. ROBERTSON
WHEELER TRIGG
O’DONNELL LLP
370 Seventeenth Street,
Suite 4500
Denver, CO 80202
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
Counsel of Record
WILLIAM T. MARKS
JAKE L. KRAMER
EMMA R. WHITE
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
A. The Court has jurisdiction ...................................................... 3
B. The decision below deepens a conflict
on the question presented ....................................................... 5
C. The decision below is incorrect .............................................. 7
D. The question presented is important and
warrants the Court’s review in this case ............................ 10
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
American Electric Power v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) .............................................................. 5
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) ...................... 5
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian,
590 U.S. 1 (2020) .................................................................. 3
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial
District Court, 408 P.3d 515 (Mont. 2017) ................... 3, 4
Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023) ................................ 5
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) .............. 8
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) .................................. 5-8, 10, 11
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975) .............................................................. 4
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000) .......................................................... 8, 9
Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA,
606 U.S. 100 (2025) ............................................................. 5
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) ............................. 9
Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268 (Colo. 2005) ..................... 3
Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
489 U.S. 46 (1989) ................................................................ 4
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) ................................. 7, 8
(I)
II
Page
Cases—continued:
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) .............................................................. 9
McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S. 139 (2020) .......................... 4
North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA,
615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................... 7
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors
of Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159 (1985) ............ 9
People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1983) ........... 3
People ex rel. T.T., 442 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2019) ....................... 3
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630 (1981) .............................................................. 8
United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) ........................... 8
Constitutions, statutes, and rules:
U.S. Const. Art. III .............................................................. 4, 5
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ...........................7, 9, 10
18 U.S.C. 13 ............................................................................... 9
28 U.S.C. 1257(a) .................................................................. 3, 4
28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1) ................................................................. 9
Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 2 .......................................................... 3
Colo. App. R. 21 ........................................................................ 3
Colo. App. R. 21(h) ................................................................... 3
Colo. App. R. 21(o) ................................................................... 3
Miscellaneous:
Can State Courts Set Global Climate Policy,
The Federalist Society (Oct. 8, 2025)
<tinyurl.com/fedsocpanel> .............................................. 2
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 25-170
SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.; SUNCOR ENERGY
SALES INC.; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS
v.
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;
CITY OF BOULDER
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
The case for certiorari here is extraordinarily compelling. The decision below authorized a local government to
seek damages from select energy companies for the alleged effects of global greenhouse-gas emissions on the
global climate. There is a clear and acknowledged conflict
on the question whether federal law precludes such
claims. Cases asserting similar claims have been filed in
numerous jurisdictions; the damages in even one case
could potentially reach into the billions of dollars; and
there are thousands of other local governments that could
bring their own actions.
(1)
2
The federal government has urged the Court to grant
review, explaining in a rare uninvited amicus brief that
the question presented is of “vast nationwide significance.” Br. 2. More than half of the States have also
urged review, arguing that the nationwide climate litigation represents a “grave threat” to their “equal sovereignty.” Br. 20. Joining the chorus are over 100 members
of Congress; leading business groups; academics; and former military leaders. The question presented cries out
for the Court’s resolution. And this case arises in a unique
posture that resolves any jurisdictional doubts and provides a clean opportunity for review before exorbitant liability can be imposed.
Respondents do not dispute that the decision below
deepens an existing conflict or that the question presented is of exceptional importance. Instead, respondents
focus on identifying potential obstacles to review. But
none is substantial. The Court has both statutory and
constitutional jurisdiction on multiple grounds. No legislative or regulatory development diminishes the need for
the Court’s guidance. And further percolation would not
aid the Court.
In a moment of candor, a member of respondents’ legal team recently said the quiet part out loud: the tort
liability being sought in the nationwide climate litigation
is designed to serve as a “carbon tax” and would cause the
entire energy industry to “declar[e] bankruptcy.” Can
State Courts Set Global Climate Policy, The Federalist
Society, at 32:55-34:43 (Oct. 8, 2025) <tinyurl.com/fedsocpanel> (comments of David Bookbinder). Before
these cases get anywhere near that point, the parties
should know whether federal law precludes the claims
from the outset. This is the right opportunity, and the optimal moment, to resolve that question. The petition for a
writ of certiorari should be granted.
3
A. The Court Has Jurisdiction
Contrary to respondents’ arguments (Br. in Opp. 617), the Court has both statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over this case.
1. The Court has statutory jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. 1257(a) for two independent reasons.
a. As the United States has explained (Br. 10-12), this
Court has jurisdiction under Section 1257(a) because the
case arises from a final determination of the Colorado Supreme Court in an original proceeding. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1 (2020), the Montana Supreme Court granted a supervisory writ to review a trial
court’s order denying summary judgment; it ultimately
affirmed the order and remanded for the case to continue.
See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial
District Court, 408 P.3d 515, 517, 523 (Mont. 2017). This
Court held that it had jurisdiction over that decision under
Section 1257(a) because, under Montana law, “a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-contained case, not an interlocutory appeal.” 590 U.S. at 12.
The same reasoning applies here. The Colorado Supreme Court stated that it was exercising “original jurisdiction” under Colorado Appellate Rule 21, pursuant to its
authority under the state constitution to exercise “general
superintending control over all inferior courts.” Pet. App.
7a-8a; Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 2. And that court has repeatedly characterized similar Rule 21 proceedings as
“original proceedings.” See, e.g., People ex rel. T.T., 442
P.3d 851, 853, 855-856 (2019); Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d
1268, 1271 (2005); People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247,
251 (1983). Because the decision below was a “final determination of [an] original proceeding” under Colorado law,
Colo. App. R. 21(h); see Colo. App. R. 21(o), it constituted
the final resolution of a “self-contained case” for purposes
of Section 1257(a). Atlantic Richfield, 590 U.S. at 12.
4
That distinguishes this case from Sunoco LP v. City &
County of Honolulu, No. 23-947, where the petition arose
from an interlocutory appeal in state court.
Respondents dismiss the Colorado Supreme Court’s
characterization of its own law as mere “shorthand.” Br.
in Opp. 11. But this Court does not “second-guess” a state
court’s “characterization of state law” on the nature of a
state-court proceeding. McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S.
139, 146 (2020). And to the extent respondents contend
that the proceeding “bears other markings of a discretionary, interlocutory appeal,” Br. in Opp. 12, exactly the
same could have been said about Atlantic Richfield. See
408 P.3d at 518, 523.
b. The Court also has jurisdiction under Section
1257(a) because this case falls within the fourth category
of cases identified in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975). See Pet. 32; U.S. Br. 21. Respondents’
contrary arguments (Br. in Opp. 8-9) lack merit. The existence of additional federal defenses is not a jurisdictional
bar under the fourth Cox factor. See Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 54-57 (1989); id. at 69 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, the Court requires that the petitioner “might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds,” such that future review of the federal issue would be “render[ed] unnecessary.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added). And
reversal on the federal issue raised here would end this
litigation, because respondents have never asserted a
claim based solely on in-state emissions.
2. Separately, respondents invite the Court to question whether they have alleged a valid injury-in-fact for
purposes of Article III jurisdiction. See Br. in Opp. 13-14.
Unsurprisingly, however, respondents cannot bring
themselves actually to argue that they suffered no such
5
injury. And while petitioners strongly dispute that respondents will be able to prove their claims, respondents
have sufficiently alleged a cognizable injury at the pleading stage. Respondents seek to recover for “their past
and future damages and costs to mitigate the impact of
climate change” allegedly attributable to petitioners’ conduct. Am. Compl. 121 (emphasis omitted). That is a paradigmatic Article III injury: respondents allege harm to
their own “legally protected interest[s], like property or
money,” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 489 (2023), and
seek damages as redress, see Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100, 111 (2025). That distinguishes this case from American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 418-419, 420 (2011), where the
plaintiffs attempted to redress only future injuries
through prospective limits on the defendants’ emissions.
The Court would also have Article III jurisdiction under ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). The decision below “poses a serious and immediate threat” to petitioners, id. at 618, by eliminating a threshold defense to
a lawsuit seeking billions of dollars in damages. Respondents’ Article III objection is creative but insubstantial.
B. The Decision Below Deepens A Conflict On The Question Presented
The Colorado Supreme Court expressly departed
from the Second Circuit’s decision in City of New York v.
Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2021). See Pet. App. 19a-20a.
The United States agrees there is a conflict and explains
that it “[w]arrants [t]his Court’s [r]eview.” Br. 19. Even
respondents admit (Br. in Opp. 20) that there is a conflict
as to their theory that petitioners knowingly produced,
marketed, and sold fossil fuels at levels that allegedly
caused climate change. That alone merits the Court’s intervention.
6
Respondents nevertheless argue (Br. in Opp. 20) that
review is not warranted because the Second Circuit did
not also address a deceptive-marketing theory of liability.
But it did: the complaint asserted liability based on the
defendants’ actions both in “producing, marketing, and
selling fossil fuels,” and “orchestrat[ing] a campaign of
deception and denial regarding climate change.” J.A. at
47-48, 51 (No. 18-2188). The Colorado Supreme Court was
thus correct to recognize that the state-law claims in City
of New York were “similar to those at issue here.” Pet.
App. 19a.
In any event, a difference in the challenged conduct
would not eliminate the conflict, because the theory of
harm is identical in both cases. In City of New York, the
plaintiff “identif [ied] [interstate and international] emissions as the singular source of [its] harm.” 993 F.3d at 91.
And here, respondents allege harm only from petitioners’
conduct that allegedly increased emissions and global climate change. See Pet. 29. The Colorado Supreme Court
concluded that federal law did not preclude claims seeking
relief for the alleged effects of greenhouse-gas emissions,
see Pet. App. 20a-21a, while the Second Circuit concluded
that federal law did preclude those claims, see 993 F.3d at
91. The resulting conflict warrants this Court’s review.
Respondents also contend (Br. in Opp. 21-23) that the
Second Circuit did not agree with petitioners’ theory of
constitutional preclusion. That contention misunderstands the Second Circuit’s reasoning. In holding that the
plaintiff ’s state-law claims could not proceed, the Second
Circuit explained that, where “federal common law exists,
it is because state law cannot be used,” as state law is not
“presumptively competent to address issues that demand
a unified federal standard simply because Congress saw
fit to displace a federal court-made standard with a legis-
7
lative one.” 993 F.3d at 98 (citation omitted). And the reason federal common law would have applied in the absence
of displacement was that the claims would have allowed
for regulation “far beyond New York’s borders” and
would have “implicat[ed] the conflicting rights of [S]tates”
and “our relations with foreign nations.” Id. at 92 (citation
omitted). The Second Circuit thus recognized that state
law did not apply because of background principles traceable to the structure of the Constitution. That is precisely
petitioners’ theory.
As petitioners have explained (Pet. 18-20), the decision
below is also inconsistent with North Carolina ex rel.
Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010), and Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee III), 731 F.2d 403 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985). Respondents briefly contend (Br. in Opp. 21 n.8) that those decisions are not “on-point,” but they do not dispute that those
decisions rejected attempts to use state law to redress injuries allegedly caused by pollution from other States.
There is plainly a conflict here, and only this Court can
resolve it.
C. The Decision Below Is Incorrect
Under well-established principles, the Constitution
and the Clean Air Act preclude respondents’ claims. In
its amicus brief, the federal government agrees, calling
the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision “manifestly
wrong.” Br. 2, 12-19. Although ultimately a matter for
another day, respondents’ contrary merits arguments
warrant a brief response here.
1. Respondents recognize (Br. in Opp. 30) that, in an
inherently federal area, state law can be preempted by
federal common law. According to respondents, however,
once Congress has displaced federal common law with a
federal statute, “the scope of any preemption turns on
8
congressional intent and the usual preemption analysis.”
Id. at 29.
Respondents ignore the reasons why federal common
law exists in the first place. Courts apply federal common
law in areas in which “the authority and duties of the
United States as sovereign are intimately involved” or
“the interstate or international nature of the controversy
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.” Texas
Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
641 (1981). For that reason, where “federal common law
exists, it is because state law cannot be used” as a constitutional matter. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 313 n.7 (1981).
Respondents recognize that the adoption of federal
common law is “informed by considerations of the constitutional structure,” Br. in Opp. 30, but they proceed to
cast aside those same constitutional considerations when
Congress has displaced federal common law by statute.
That makes little sense. The displacement of federal common law does “nothing to undermine” the constitutional
reasons why state law could not apply in the first instance.
Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 410. As the Second Circuit
aptly put it, it is “too strange to seriously contemplate”
that congressional action in an already inherently federal
area would silently invite state law to apply. City of New
York, 993 F.3d at 98-99.
So considered, respondents’ invocation of the presumption against preemption (Br. in Opp. 23-25) is puzzling. The presumption is “not triggered when [a] State
regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.” United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89, 108 (2000). The fact that Congress may not expressly preempt state law when legislating in such an area
“may reflect nothing more than the settled character of
implied preemption doctrine that courts will dependably
9
apply.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 387-388 (2000).
2. Under petitioners’ theory of constitutional preclusion, “the only state suits that remain available” to provide redress for injuries allegedly caused by interstate
emissions are “those specifically preserved by” the Clean
Air Act. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.
481, 492 (1987). Respondents seek to sow doubt about petitioners’ theory by arguing that, if the Constitution is
what displaces state law, there is necessarily “no room for
Congress to permit state law to apply.” Br. in Opp. 22.
Respondents are mistaken. In some contexts, Congress
can authorize deviations from the default rules derived
from the Constitution’s structure. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (dormant Commerce
Clause); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)
(state sovereign immunity). Congress may also adopt
state substantive law as the federal rule of decision in an
area governed by federal law. See 18 U.S.C. 13; 28 U.S.C.
1346(b)(1). Although Congress authorized the application
of source-state law in the Clean Air Act, see Ouellette, 479
U.S. at 497-499, it has not authorized the application of
state law to emissions emanating from another State.
3. Respondents further contend that their claims “do
not fall within the scope of the former federal common law
of interstate pollution.” Br. in Opp. 25. That is wrong.
Seeking injury in the form of physical harms allegedly
caused by global emissions, as petitioners do, is just an indirect method of regulating interstate and international
emissions. See Pet. 28-29; p. 2, supra.
4. Respondents also argue (Br. in Opp. 26-28) that the
Clean Air Act would not preempt their state-law claims
under a traditional preemption analysis. But as the
United States has explained, “there can be no dispute”
10
that the Clean Air Act would have preempted respondents’ claims if they had “brought the same common-law
claims against out-of-state emitters.” Br. 17. And
“[s]uing the suppliers instead of the emitters does not
avoid the conflict with the Clean Air Act’s decisionmaking
scheme,” because those claims still require a determination of the proper levels of greenhouse-gas emissions
across the country—a judgment that Congress left to the
Environmental Protection Agency. Ibid.
D. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants
The Court’s Review In This Case
Respondents do not dispute that the question presented is important. And if there were any doubt, the numerous amici supporting the petition—including the federal government, 26 States, and over 100 members of
Congress—dispel it.
Respondents nevertheless insist that this is not the
“right case” or the “right time.” Br. in Opp. 17. But if not
now, when? The unique posture of this case provides the
Court with the opportunity to address the question presented where there is no doubt about the Court’s jurisdiction. See pp. 3-5, supra. There is no reason to think that
plaintiffs whose claims are dismissed will seek this Court’s
review; the plaintiff in City of New York did not. And as
for the suits brought by the federal government, the
States being sued have sought dismissal on the ground
that the question presented should instead be resolved in
cases such as this one. See, e.g., Mot. to Dismiss, United
States v. Michigan, Civ. No. 25-496 (W.D. Mich.), Dkt. No.
11. While the defendants in these cases will theoretically
be able to seek review after liability is imposed, that is cold
comfort given the growing number of cases and the sheer
magnitude of the potential liability. See States Br. 18;
Members of Congress Br. 9-10, 17-20; API Br. 15-17.
11
The Court need not be detained long by respondents’
other arguments. It is entirely unrealistic to think that
respondents will be able to parse their claims at some
later point in the litigation and divide up their damages so
as to apply “the law of the jurisdictions where products
were marketed or caused emissions.” Br. in Opp. 17. The
mechanism of injury, after all, is the global accumulation
of greenhouse gases from worldwide fossil-fuel combustion. Potential “legislative and regulatory developments”
also present no concern. Id. at 19. No legislation has been
introduced to create a “liability shield.” Ibid. And any
proposed regulatory changes are irrelevant, because the
preclusion of respondents’ state-law claims does not depend on the content of any agency regulations.
Finally, further percolation would provide no benefit.
See Br. in Opp. 17-18. As evidenced by the dissent below,
petitioners unambiguously asserted the same theory of
preclusion before the Colorado Supreme Court that they
are asserting now. See Pet. App. 35a-39a, 43a-45a. And
as already explained, the Second Circuit’s decision in City
of New York rests on the same logic as petitioners’ theory.
Those decisions, together with Justice Samour’s dissent
below, comprehensively set out the arguments on both
sides of the conflict. There is no realistic chance that further percolation through state courts handpicked by
plaintiffs will benefit the Court, and the Court is unlikely
to see a better vehicle for review of the question presented
before liability is imposed. As the federal government
agrees, given the “vast nationwide significance” of the
question and the sheer magnitude of liability at issue for
one of the Nation’s most vital industries, this case is an
ideal vehicle for the Court’s review. U.S. Br. 2, 19-22.
12
*
*
*
*
*
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
HUGH QUAN GOTTSCHALK
ERIC L. ROBERTSON
WHEELER TRIGG
O’DONNELL LLP
370 Seventeenth Street,
Suite 4500
Denver, CO 80202
Counsel for Petitioners
Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.
and Suncor Energy Sales Inc.
KANNON K. SHANMUGAM
WILLIAM T. MARKS
JAKE L. KRAMER
EMMA R. WHITE
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
2001 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-7300
kshanmugam@paulweiss.com
THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.
DANIEL J. TOAL
YAHONNES CLEARY
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
1285 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10019
Counsel for Petitioner
Exxon Mobil Corporation
NOVEMBER 2025
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