Reply Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.

Supreme Court briefNov 25, 2025

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No. 25-170

In the Supreme Court of the United States

SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.; SUNCOR ENERGY

SALES INC.; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

PETITIONERS

v.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;

CITY OF BOULDER

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

YAHONNES CLEARY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

HUGH QUAN GOTTSCHALK

ERIC L. ROBERTSON

WHEELER TRIGG

O’DONNELL LLP

370 Seventeenth Street,

Suite 4500

Denver, CO 80202

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

Counsel of Record

WILLIAM T. MARKS

JAKE L. KRAMER

EMMA R. WHITE

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

A. The Court has jurisdiction ...................................................... 3

B. The decision below deepens a conflict

on the question presented ....................................................... 5

C. The decision below is incorrect .............................................. 7

D. The question presented is important and

warrants the Court’s review in this case ............................ 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Electric Power v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011) .............................................................. 5

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) ...................... 5

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian,

590 U.S. 1 (2020) .................................................................. 3

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial

District Court, 408 P.3d 515 (Mont. 2017) ................... 3, 4

Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477 (2023) ................................ 5

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) .............. 8

City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,

993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) .................................. 5-8, 10, 11

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,

420 U.S. 469 (1975) .............................................................. 4

Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,

530 U.S. 363 (2000) .......................................................... 8, 9

Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA,

606 U.S. 100 (2025) ............................................................. 5

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) ............................. 9

Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268 (Colo. 2005) ..................... 3

Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,

489 U.S. 46 (1989) ................................................................ 4

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,

731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) ................................. 7, 8

(I)

II

Page

Cases—continued:

International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) .............................................................. 9

McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S. 139 (2020) .......................... 4

North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. TVA,

615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) ............................................... 7

Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors

of Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159 (1985) ............ 9

People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1983) ........... 3

People ex rel. T.T., 442 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2019) ....................... 3

Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,

451 U.S. 630 (1981) .............................................................. 8

United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000) ........................... 8

Constitutions, statutes, and rules:

U.S. Const. Art. III .............................................................. 4, 5

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ...........................7, 9, 10

18 U.S.C. 13 ............................................................................... 9

28 U.S.C. 1257(a) .................................................................. 3, 4

28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1) ................................................................. 9

Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 2 .......................................................... 3

Colo. App. R. 21 ........................................................................ 3

Colo. App. R. 21(h) ................................................................... 3

Colo. App. R. 21(o) ................................................................... 3

Miscellaneous:

Can State Courts Set Global Climate Policy,

The Federalist Society (Oct. 8, 2025)

<tinyurl.com/fedsocpanel> .............................................. 2

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 25-170

SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.; SUNCOR ENERGY

SALES INC.; EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

PETITIONERS

v.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;

CITY OF BOULDER

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

The case for certiorari here is extraordinarily compelling. The decision below authorized a local government to

seek damages from select energy companies for the alleged effects of global greenhouse-gas emissions on the

global climate. There is a clear and acknowledged conflict

on the question whether federal law precludes such

claims. Cases asserting similar claims have been filed in

numerous jurisdictions; the damages in even one case

could potentially reach into the billions of dollars; and

there are thousands of other local governments that could

bring their own actions.

(1)

2

The federal government has urged the Court to grant

review, explaining in a rare uninvited amicus brief that

the question presented is of “vast nationwide significance.” Br. 2. More than half of the States have also

urged review, arguing that the nationwide climate litigation represents a “grave threat” to their “equal sovereignty.” Br. 20. Joining the chorus are over 100 members

of Congress; leading business groups; academics; and former military leaders. The question presented cries out

for the Court’s resolution. And this case arises in a unique

posture that resolves any jurisdictional doubts and provides a clean opportunity for review before exorbitant liability can be imposed.

Respondents do not dispute that the decision below

deepens an existing conflict or that the question presented is of exceptional importance. Instead, respondents

focus on identifying potential obstacles to review. But

none is substantial. The Court has both statutory and

constitutional jurisdiction on multiple grounds. No legislative or regulatory development diminishes the need for

the Court’s guidance. And further percolation would not

aid the Court.

In a moment of candor, a member of respondents’ legal team recently said the quiet part out loud: the tort

liability being sought in the nationwide climate litigation

is designed to serve as a “carbon tax” and would cause the

entire energy industry to “declar[e] bankruptcy.” Can

State Courts Set Global Climate Policy, The Federalist

Society, at 32:55-34:43 (Oct. 8, 2025) <tinyurl.com/fedsocpanel> (comments of David Bookbinder). Before

these cases get anywhere near that point, the parties

should know whether federal law precludes the claims

from the outset. This is the right opportunity, and the optimal moment, to resolve that question. The petition for a

writ of certiorari should be granted.

3

A. The Court Has Jurisdiction

Contrary to respondents’ arguments (Br. in Opp. 617), the Court has both statutory and constitutional jurisdiction over this case.

1. The Court has statutory jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. 1257(a) for two independent reasons.

a. As the United States has explained (Br. 10-12), this

Court has jurisdiction under Section 1257(a) because the

case arises from a final determination of the Colorado Supreme Court in an original proceeding. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 590 U.S. 1 (2020), the Montana Supreme Court granted a supervisory writ to review a trial

court’s order denying summary judgment; it ultimately

affirmed the order and remanded for the case to continue.

See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Montana Second Judicial

District Court, 408 P.3d 515, 517, 523 (Mont. 2017). This

Court held that it had jurisdiction over that decision under

Section 1257(a) because, under Montana law, “a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-contained case, not an interlocutory appeal.” 590 U.S. at 12.

The same reasoning applies here. The Colorado Supreme Court stated that it was exercising “original jurisdiction” under Colorado Appellate Rule 21, pursuant to its

authority under the state constitution to exercise “general

superintending control over all inferior courts.” Pet. App.

7a-8a; Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 2. And that court has repeatedly characterized similar Rule 21 proceedings as

“original proceedings.” See, e.g., People ex rel. T.T., 442

P.3d 851, 853, 855-856 (2019); Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d

1268, 1271 (2005); People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247,

251 (1983). Because the decision below was a “final determination of [an] original proceeding” under Colorado law,

Colo. App. R. 21(h); see Colo. App. R. 21(o), it constituted

the final resolution of a “self-contained case” for purposes

of Section 1257(a). Atlantic Richfield, 590 U.S. at 12.

4

That distinguishes this case from Sunoco LP v. City &

County of Honolulu, No. 23-947, where the petition arose

from an interlocutory appeal in state court.

Respondents dismiss the Colorado Supreme Court’s

characterization of its own law as mere “shorthand.” Br.

in Opp. 11. But this Court does not “second-guess” a state

court’s “characterization of state law” on the nature of a

state-court proceeding. McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S.

139, 146 (2020). And to the extent respondents contend

that the proceeding “bears other markings of a discretionary, interlocutory appeal,” Br. in Opp. 12, exactly the

same could have been said about Atlantic Richfield. See

408 P.3d at 518, 523.

b. The Court also has jurisdiction under Section

1257(a) because this case falls within the fourth category

of cases identified in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420

U.S. 469 (1975). See Pet. 32; U.S. Br. 21. Respondents’

contrary arguments (Br. in Opp. 8-9) lack merit. The existence of additional federal defenses is not a jurisdictional

bar under the fourth Cox factor. See Fort Wayne Books,

Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 54-57 (1989); id. at 69 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, the Court requires that the petitioner “might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds,” such that future review of the federal issue would be “render[ed] unnecessary.” Cox, 420 U.S. at 482 (emphasis added). And

reversal on the federal issue raised here would end this

litigation, because respondents have never asserted a

claim based solely on in-state emissions.

2. Separately, respondents invite the Court to question whether they have alleged a valid injury-in-fact for

purposes of Article III jurisdiction. See Br. in Opp. 13-14.

Unsurprisingly, however, respondents cannot bring

themselves actually to argue that they suffered no such

5

injury. And while petitioners strongly dispute that respondents will be able to prove their claims, respondents

have sufficiently alleged a cognizable injury at the pleading stage. Respondents seek to recover for “their past

and future damages and costs to mitigate the impact of

climate change” allegedly attributable to petitioners’ conduct. Am. Compl. 121 (emphasis omitted). That is a paradigmatic Article III injury: respondents allege harm to

their own “legally protected interest[s], like property or

money,” Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 489 (2023), and

seek damages as redress, see Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100, 111 (2025). That distinguishes this case from American Electric Power Co. v.

Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 418-419, 420 (2011), where the

plaintiffs attempted to redress only future injuries

through prospective limits on the defendants’ emissions.

The Court would also have Article III jurisdiction under ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989). The decision below “poses a serious and immediate threat” to petitioners, id. at 618, by eliminating a threshold defense to

a lawsuit seeking billions of dollars in damages. Respondents’ Article III objection is creative but insubstantial.

B. The Decision Below Deepens A Conflict On The Question Presented

The Colorado Supreme Court expressly departed

from the Second Circuit’s decision in City of New York v.

Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2021). See Pet. App. 19a-20a.

The United States agrees there is a conflict and explains

that it “[w]arrants [t]his Court’s [r]eview.” Br. 19. Even

respondents admit (Br. in Opp. 20) that there is a conflict

as to their theory that petitioners knowingly produced,

marketed, and sold fossil fuels at levels that allegedly

caused climate change. That alone merits the Court’s intervention.

6

Respondents nevertheless argue (Br. in Opp. 20) that

review is not warranted because the Second Circuit did

not also address a deceptive-marketing theory of liability.

But it did: the complaint asserted liability based on the

defendants’ actions both in “producing, marketing, and

selling fossil fuels,” and “orchestrat[ing] a campaign of

deception and denial regarding climate change.” J.A. at

47-48, 51 (No. 18-2188). The Colorado Supreme Court was

thus correct to recognize that the state-law claims in City

of New York were “similar to those at issue here.” Pet.

App. 19a.

In any event, a difference in the challenged conduct

would not eliminate the conflict, because the theory of

harm is identical in both cases. In City of New York, the

plaintiff “identif [ied] [interstate and international] emissions as the singular source of [its] harm.” 993 F.3d at 91.

And here, respondents allege harm only from petitioners’

conduct that allegedly increased emissions and global climate change. See Pet. 29. The Colorado Supreme Court

concluded that federal law did not preclude claims seeking

relief for the alleged effects of greenhouse-gas emissions,

see Pet. App. 20a-21a, while the Second Circuit concluded

that federal law did preclude those claims, see 993 F.3d at

91. The resulting conflict warrants this Court’s review.

Respondents also contend (Br. in Opp. 21-23) that the

Second Circuit did not agree with petitioners’ theory of

constitutional preclusion. That contention misunderstands the Second Circuit’s reasoning. In holding that the

plaintiff ’s state-law claims could not proceed, the Second

Circuit explained that, where “federal common law exists,

it is because state law cannot be used,” as state law is not

“presumptively competent to address issues that demand

a unified federal standard simply because Congress saw

fit to displace a federal court-made standard with a legis-

7

lative one.” 993 F.3d at 98 (citation omitted). And the reason federal common law would have applied in the absence

of displacement was that the claims would have allowed

for regulation “far beyond New York’s borders” and

would have “implicat[ed] the conflicting rights of [S]tates”

and “our relations with foreign nations.” Id. at 92 (citation

omitted). The Second Circuit thus recognized that state

law did not apply because of background principles traceable to the structure of the Constitution. That is precisely

petitioners’ theory.

As petitioners have explained (Pet. 18-20), the decision

below is also inconsistent with North Carolina ex rel.

Cooper v. TVA, 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010), and Illinois

v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee III), 731 F.2d 403 (7th

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985). Respondents briefly contend (Br. in Opp. 21 n.8) that those decisions are not “on-point,” but they do not dispute that those

decisions rejected attempts to use state law to redress injuries allegedly caused by pollution from other States.

There is plainly a conflict here, and only this Court can

resolve it.

C. The Decision Below Is Incorrect

Under well-established principles, the Constitution

and the Clean Air Act preclude respondents’ claims. In

its amicus brief, the federal government agrees, calling

the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision “manifestly

wrong.” Br. 2, 12-19. Although ultimately a matter for

another day, respondents’ contrary merits arguments

warrant a brief response here.

1. Respondents recognize (Br. in Opp. 30) that, in an

inherently federal area, state law can be preempted by

federal common law. According to respondents, however,

once Congress has displaced federal common law with a

federal statute, “the scope of any preemption turns on

8

congressional intent and the usual preemption analysis.”

Id. at 29.

Respondents ignore the reasons why federal common

law exists in the first place. Courts apply federal common

law in areas in which “the authority and duties of the

United States as sovereign are intimately involved” or

“the interstate or international nature of the controversy

makes it inappropriate for state law to control.” Texas

Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,

641 (1981). For that reason, where “federal common law

exists, it is because state law cannot be used” as a constitutional matter. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.

304, 313 n.7 (1981).

Respondents recognize that the adoption of federal

common law is “informed by considerations of the constitutional structure,” Br. in Opp. 30, but they proceed to

cast aside those same constitutional considerations when

Congress has displaced federal common law by statute.

That makes little sense. The displacement of federal common law does “nothing to undermine” the constitutional

reasons why state law could not apply in the first instance.

Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 410. As the Second Circuit

aptly put it, it is “too strange to seriously contemplate”

that congressional action in an already inherently federal

area would silently invite state law to apply. City of New

York, 993 F.3d at 98-99.

So considered, respondents’ invocation of the presumption against preemption (Br. in Opp. 23-25) is puzzling. The presumption is “not triggered when [a] State

regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.” United States v. Locke, 529

U.S. 89, 108 (2000). The fact that Congress may not expressly preempt state law when legislating in such an area

“may reflect nothing more than the settled character of

implied preemption doctrine that courts will dependably

9

apply.” Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530

U.S. 363, 387-388 (2000).

2. Under petitioners’ theory of constitutional preclusion, “the only state suits that remain available” to provide redress for injuries allegedly caused by interstate

emissions are “those specifically preserved by” the Clean

Air Act. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S.

481, 492 (1987). Respondents seek to sow doubt about petitioners’ theory by arguing that, if the Constitution is

what displaces state law, there is necessarily “no room for

Congress to permit state law to apply.” Br. in Opp. 22.

Respondents are mistaken. In some contexts, Congress

can authorize deviations from the default rules derived

from the Constitution’s structure. See Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (dormant Commerce

Clause); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)

(state sovereign immunity). Congress may also adopt

state substantive law as the federal rule of decision in an

area governed by federal law. See 18 U.S.C. 13; 28 U.S.C.

1346(b)(1). Although Congress authorized the application

of source-state law in the Clean Air Act, see Ouellette, 479

U.S. at 497-499, it has not authorized the application of

state law to emissions emanating from another State.

3. Respondents further contend that their claims “do

not fall within the scope of the former federal common law

of interstate pollution.” Br. in Opp. 25. That is wrong.

Seeking injury in the form of physical harms allegedly

caused by global emissions, as petitioners do, is just an indirect method of regulating interstate and international

emissions. See Pet. 28-29; p. 2, supra.

4. Respondents also argue (Br. in Opp. 26-28) that the

Clean Air Act would not preempt their state-law claims

under a traditional preemption analysis. But as the

United States has explained, “there can be no dispute”

10

that the Clean Air Act would have preempted respondents’ claims if they had “brought the same common-law

claims against out-of-state emitters.” Br. 17. And

“[s]uing the suppliers instead of the emitters does not

avoid the conflict with the Clean Air Act’s decisionmaking

scheme,” because those claims still require a determination of the proper levels of greenhouse-gas emissions

across the country—a judgment that Congress left to the

Environmental Protection Agency. Ibid.

D. The Question Presented Is Important And Warrants

The Court’s Review In This Case

Respondents do not dispute that the question presented is important. And if there were any doubt, the numerous amici supporting the petition—including the federal government, 26 States, and over 100 members of

Congress—dispel it.

Respondents nevertheless insist that this is not the

“right case” or the “right time.” Br. in Opp. 17. But if not

now, when? The unique posture of this case provides the

Court with the opportunity to address the question presented where there is no doubt about the Court’s jurisdiction. See pp. 3-5, supra. There is no reason to think that

plaintiffs whose claims are dismissed will seek this Court’s

review; the plaintiff in City of New York did not. And as

for the suits brought by the federal government, the

States being sued have sought dismissal on the ground

that the question presented should instead be resolved in

cases such as this one. See, e.g., Mot. to Dismiss, United

States v. Michigan, Civ. No. 25-496 (W.D. Mich.), Dkt. No.

11. While the defendants in these cases will theoretically

be able to seek review after liability is imposed, that is cold

comfort given the growing number of cases and the sheer

magnitude of the potential liability. See States Br. 18;

Members of Congress Br. 9-10, 17-20; API Br. 15-17.

11

The Court need not be detained long by respondents’

other arguments. It is entirely unrealistic to think that

respondents will be able to parse their claims at some

later point in the litigation and divide up their damages so

as to apply “the law of the jurisdictions where products

were marketed or caused emissions.” Br. in Opp. 17. The

mechanism of injury, after all, is the global accumulation

of greenhouse gases from worldwide fossil-fuel combustion. Potential “legislative and regulatory developments”

also present no concern. Id. at 19. No legislation has been

introduced to create a “liability shield.” Ibid. And any

proposed regulatory changes are irrelevant, because the

preclusion of respondents’ state-law claims does not depend on the content of any agency regulations.

Finally, further percolation would provide no benefit.

See Br. in Opp. 17-18. As evidenced by the dissent below,

petitioners unambiguously asserted the same theory of

preclusion before the Colorado Supreme Court that they

are asserting now. See Pet. App. 35a-39a, 43a-45a. And

as already explained, the Second Circuit’s decision in City

of New York rests on the same logic as petitioners’ theory.

Those decisions, together with Justice Samour’s dissent

below, comprehensively set out the arguments on both

sides of the conflict. There is no realistic chance that further percolation through state courts handpicked by

plaintiffs will benefit the Court, and the Court is unlikely

to see a better vehicle for review of the question presented

before liability is imposed. As the federal government

agrees, given the “vast nationwide significance” of the

question and the sheer magnitude of liability at issue for

one of the Nation’s most vital industries, this case is an

ideal vehicle for the Court’s review. U.S. Br. 2, 19-22.

12

*

*

*

*

*

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

HUGH QUAN GOTTSCHALK

ERIC L. ROBERTSON

WHEELER TRIGG

O’DONNELL LLP

370 Seventeenth Street,

Suite 4500

Denver, CO 80202

Counsel for Petitioners

Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc.

and Suncor Energy Sales Inc.

KANNON K. SHANMUGAM

WILLIAM T. MARKS

JAKE L. KRAMER

EMMA R. WHITE

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

2001 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006

(202) 223-7300

kshanmugam@paulweiss.com

THEODORE V. WELLS, JR.

DANIEL J. TOAL

YAHONNES CLEARY

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND,

WHARTON & GARRISON LLP

1285 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10019

Counsel for Petitioner

Exxon Mobil Corporation

NOVEMBER 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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