Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 9, 2025
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No. 25-170
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
______________
SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners,
v.
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;
CITY OF BOULDER,
Respondents.
______________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Colorado
______________
BRIEF OF HOUSE MAJORITY LEADER STEVE
SCALISE AND 102 OTHER MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONERS
______________
MICHAEL BUSCHBACHER
JARED M. KELSON
Counsel of Record
JENNIFER K. HARDY
LAURA B. RUPPALT
BOYDEN GRAY PLLC
800 Connecticut Ave NW,
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 955-0620
jkelson@boydengray.com
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether federal law precludes state-law claims
seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the
effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas
emissions on the global climate.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 4
ARGUMENT ............................................................... 6
I.
THIS CASE IS CRITICAL TO THE NATION.............. 6
A.
Energy Is Fundamentally Important ....... 6
B.
State and Local Governments Are
Trying to Usurp Federal Authority ........... 8
II. THIS CASE IS STRAIGHTFORWARD ..................... 11
A.
Interstate and International Emissions
Are the Domain of Federal Law .............. 11
B.
Congress Did Not Authorize States to
Regulate Interstate and International
Emissions in the Clean Air Act ............... 14
C.
Confirming Federal Authority Over
Interstate and International Emissions
Respects States......................................... 16
III. FURTHER PERCOLATION IS UNNECESSARY ....... 17
CONCLUSION ......................................................... 21
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) .................................... 5, 13, 15
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396 (2003) .............................................. 14
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964) .............................................. 13
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996) .............................................. 17
City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP,
537 P.3d 1173 (Haw. 2023) .................................. 17
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304 (1981) .............................................. 13
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021).......................... 5, 12, 17
North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,
615 F.3d 291 (2010) .............................................. 17
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,
587 U.S. 230 (2019) .............................................. 17
Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Org.,
606 U.S. 1 (2025) .................................................. 14
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907) .............................................. 12
iv
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991) .............................................. 14
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91 (1972) .......................................... 12, 13
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) ................................ 17
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) ........................................ 13, 16
Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S. 46 (1907) ................................................ 17
Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.,
565 U.S. 625 (2012) ................................................ 9
Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,
63 F.4th 703 (8th Cir. 2023) ................................ 11
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) ..................... 16
S.D. Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)................................. 9
Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) .............................. 12
U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River
Pres. Ass’n, 590 U.S. 604 (2020) ...................... 5, 14
United States v. Locke,
529 U.S. 89 (2000) ................................................ 16
v
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001) .......................................... 5, 15
STATUTES
42 U.S.C. § 15927(b)(1) ................................................ 7
Pub. L. No. 119-21, 139 Stat. 72 (2025) ...................... 7
EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Declaring a National Energy Emergency,
Exec. Order No. 14156,
90 Fed. Reg. 8433 (Jan. 29, 2025)...................... 7, 8
Establishing the National Energy Dominance
Council, Exec. Order No. 14213,
90 Fed. Reg. 9945 (Feb. 20, 2025).......................... 8
Protecting American Energy from State
Overreach, Exec. Order No. 14260,
90 Fed. Reg. 15513 (Apr. 14, 2025)........................ 8
Strengthening the Reliability and Security of
the United States Electric Grid,
Exec. Order No. 14262,
90 Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 14, 2025)........................ 8
Unleashing American Energy,
Exec. Order No. 14154,
90 Fed. Reg. 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025).......................... 8
vi
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Daniel Dassow, U.S. Energy Secretary, OpenAI
Co-founder Say AI Race Is ‘Manhattan
Project 2’ In Oak Ridge Visit, Knoxville
News Sentinel (Feb. 28, 2025) ............................... 7
David Arkush & Donald Braman, Climate
Homicide: Prosecuting Big Oil for Climate
Deaths, 48 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 45 (2024) ............ 19
IPCC, Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of
Climate Change, Working Group III
Contribution to the Sixth Assessment
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (2022) ......................................... 11
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Comprehensive Annual
Energy Data: Total Site-Delivered Energy
Use in All End-Use Sectors, by Federal
Agency (Billion Btu) (visited Oct. 9, 2025) ............ 6
U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs): How Much Oil Is
Consumed in the United States?
(updated Oct. 9, 2024) ............................................ 6
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici curiae are 103 duly elected Members of
Congress. Amici sit on various committees with
jurisdiction over matters of energy, natural resources,
and the environment. Amici have a profound and
direct interest in preserving the authority vested in
the federal government by the Constitution over
interstate
and
international
greenhouse-gas
emissions, including the fundamental power of
Congress to regulate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause.
The decision below supplants the legislative
prerogative of Congress, permitting a balkanized
patchwork of state and local regulation over matters
of uniquely federal concern. Amici file this brief to
defend their role in setting energy policy for the
United States—including the regulation of interstate
and international emissions—and to prevent state
and local governments from undermining the
comprehensive statutory schemes that Congress has
enacted.
The following is the full list of amici:
1 Counsel for amici curiae timely provided notice to all parties of
intent to file this brief. No party’s counsel authored this brief in
whole or in part, and no person or entity other than amici or their
counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund its
preparation or submission.
2
House of Representatives
Steve Scalise
Brett Guthrie
Bruce Westerman
Robert B. Aderholt
Mark Alford
Jodey C. Arrington
Brian Babin
Troy Balderson
Andy Barr
Aaron Bean
Cliff Bentz
Stephanie Bice
Sheri Biggs
Gus M. Bilirakis
Lauren Boebert
Mike Bost
Vern Buchanan
Ken Calvert
Kat Cammack
Mike Carey
Buddy Carter
Ben Cline
Michael Cloud
Andrew Clyde
Jeff Crank
Warren Davidson
Chuck Edwards
Ron Estes
Gabe Evans
Julie Fedorchak
Randy Fine
Brad Finstad
Scott Fitzgerald
Chuck Fleischmann
Vince Fong
Virginia Foxx
Scott Franklin
Craig Goldman
Tony Gonzales
Lance Gooden
Paul A. Gosar, D.D.S.
Sam Graves
Marjorie Taylor Greene
H. Morgan Griffith
Harriet M. Hageman
Abraham Hamadeh
Mike Haridopolos
Pat Harrigan
Diana Harshbarger
Kevin Hern
Clay Higgins
French Hill
Erin Houchin
Richard Hudson
Bill Huizenga
Jeff Hurd
Ronny L. Jackson
Mike Kennedy
Doug LaMalfa
Nick Langworthy
Julia Letlow
3
Nicole Malliotakis
Tracey Mann
Michael McCaul
Rich McCormick
Addison McDowell
John McGuire
Mark Messmer
Carol D. Miller
Cory Mills
Barry Moore
Riley Moore
Tim Moore
Gregory F. Murphy,
M.D.
Troy E. Nehls
Dan Newhouse
Bob Onder
Burgess Owens
Gary Palmer
Jimmy Patronis
Scott Perry
August Pfluger
Mike D. Rogers
John Rose
David Rouzer
Michael Rulli
John Rutherford
Derek Schmidt
Pete Sessions
Jefferson Shreve
Adrian Smith
Jason Smith
Pete Stauber
Dale Strong
Claudia Tenney
Glenn GT Thompson
Beth Van Duyne
Ann Wagner
Tim Walberg
Daniel Webster
Roger Williams
Rudy Yakym
Ryan Zinke
4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In recent years, multiple state and local
governments have launched a courtroom war against
the American energy industry. Unhappy with
national energy policy that—in their view—has not
moved quickly enough to replace fossil fuels, they
attempt to wield state law and state court judgments
to pursue crushing penalties against American oil and
gas companies for harms allegedly caused by global
greenhouse-gas emissions on the global climate. In so
doing, these States and localities would dictate
national energy policy themselves. This approach
upends the constitutional balance between federal
and state authority, discards a century of this Court’s
precedent, and undermines the federal legislative
process. It must stop now.
Abundant and reliable energy is fundamental to
our national stability, prosperity, and security. Both
Congress and the President are unified in prioritizing
that reality for all Americans. But Respondents, the
City and County of Boulder, Colorado, would
substitute their own preferred policies for those of the
federal government. They dress their complaint in the
language of state law, but they cannot escape that
every claim in some way turns on global greenhousegas emissions. And the sheer magnitude of the
damages at issue—likely tens of billions of dollars—
would restructure the American energy industry if not
bankrupt it altogether, especially when multiplied by
the dozens of similar cases around the country.
This has continued long enough. States have no
authority to regulate interstate and international
emissions that originate beyond their respective
5
borders. This Court has reiterated time and again
that “the basic scheme of the Constitution …
demands” the application of federal law to “‘air and
water in their ambient or interstate aspects.’” Am.
Elec. Power Co. (“AEP”) v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410,
421 (2011) (quoting Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
(“Milwaukee I”), 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972)). That is why
“[f]or over a century, a mostly unbroken string of cases
has applied federal law to disputes involving
interstate air or water pollution.” City of New York v.
Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2021)
(collecting cases).
Congress passed the Clean Air Act against this
backdrop. This Court has emphasized that Congress
must “enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to
significantly alter the balance between federal and
state power.” U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River
Pres. Ass’n, 590 U.S. 604, 621–22 (2020) (emphasis
added). The Clean Air Act contains no indication—
much less an “exceedingly clear” one—that Congress
intended to disturb the existing line between federal
and state authority to regulate interstate and
international emissions. Put another way, Congress
“does not … hide elephants in mouseholes” and subtly
empower state law and state courts to pursue
crippling damages against an essential industry for
worldwide conduct, especially for claims within the
exclusive domain of federal law. Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
The issues in this case have been developed at
length, and the disruption to the country grows daily.
This Court should not stand by while Respondents use
6
their state law and state courts to supplant federal
authority and set national energy policy.
The Court should grant the petition for certiorari
and reverse.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS CASE IS CRITICAL TO THE NATION
A. Energy Is Fundamentally Important
Congress has long recognized the importance of
abundant, reliable energy. The United States uses on
average over 20 million barrels of petroleum each day,
totaling 7.39 billion barrels each year.2 The energy it
provides enables virtually every aspect of American
life. It has also been key to the dynamism of the
American economy—the largest in the world—
enabling the rise of bedrock American industries such
as transportation, telecommunications, technology,
manufacturing, and finance.
Energy is likewise crucial to securing the future.
The U.S. Department of Defense relies extensively on
petroleum products.3 Nascent innovations, including
artificial intelligence and machine learning, have the
potential to transform society and similarly require
substantial energy resources. As Secretary of Energy
Chris Wright aptly observed regarding artificial
2 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs):
How Much Oil Is Consumed in the United States? (updated Oct.
9, 2024), https://perma.cc/HX8T-H4LH.
3 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Comprehensive Annual Energy Data:
Total Site-Delivered Energy Use in All End-Use Sectors, by
Federal Agency (Billion Btu), https://ctsedwweb.ee.doe.gov/
Annual/Report/TotalSiteDeliveredEnergyUseInAllEndUse
SectorsByFederalAgencyBillionBtu.aspx (visited Oct. 9, 2025).
7
intelligence, “We’re at the start of Manhattan Project
Two.… We could lose this race in many ways if we
don’t get energy right, we don’t unleash American
energy.”4
Just this year, Congress voted to increase oil and
gas production on federal land and the outer
continental shelf by raising the frequency of lease
sales and expanding areas available for resource
extraction. Pub. L. No. 119-21, §§ 50101–05, 139 Stat.
72, 137–44 (2025). Congress similarly expanded coal
mining on federal lands and expedited approval of
leases. Id. §§ 50201–04, 139 Stat. at 144–46; see also
42 U.S.C. § 15927(b)(1) (recognizing that “oil shale,
tar sands, and other unconventional fuels are
strategically important domestic resources that
should be developed to reduce the growing
dependence of the United States on politically and
economically unstable sources of foreign oil imports”).
These policies reflect the considered judgment of
Congress that such energy sources are vital to the
national interest and should be developed.
The Executive Branch similarly recognizes the
importance of abundant, reliable energy. The
President has placed energy at the forefront of his
priorities, even declaring a national energy
emergency to address strategic shortfalls. See
Declaring a National Energy Emergency, Exec. Order
No. 14156, § 1, 90 Fed. Reg. 8433, 8433–34 (Jan. 29,
2025). As the President explained, “We need a
reliable, diversified, and affordable supply of energy
4 Daniel Dassow, U.S. Energy Secretary, OpenAI Co-founder Say
AI Race Is ‘Manhattan Project 2’ In Oak Ridge Visit, Knoxville
News Sentinel (Feb. 28, 2025), https://perma.cc/P6MA-LUDT.
8
to drive our Nation’s manufacturing, transportation,
agriculture, and defense industries, and to sustain the
basics of modern life and military preparedness.” Id.
To that end, the President has issued Executive
Orders to streamline permitting processes, id. § 4, 90
Fed. Reg. at 8434–35; increase leases for oil and gas
production, including offshore leases, Unleashing
American Energy, Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed.
Reg. 8353 (Jan. 29, 2025); establish a National Energy
Dominance Council, Establishing the National Energy
Dominance Council, Exec. Order No. 14213, 90 Fed.
Reg. 9945 (Feb. 20, 2025); direct resources to
strengthen and secure the national electricity grid,
Strengthening the Reliability and Security of the
United States Electric Grid, Exec. Order No. 14262, 90
Fed. Reg. 15521 (Apr. 14, 2025); and protect American
energy from state and local overreach, Protecting
American Energy from State Overreach, Exec. Order
No. 14260, 90 Fed. Reg. 15513 (Apr. 14, 2025).
Congress and the Executive Branch agree on the
unique necessity of abundant, reliable energy. Its
importance to the entire country cannot be overstated.
B. State and Local Governments Are Trying
to Usurp Federal Authority
As the President has recognized, “American energy
suffers” when “State and local governments seek to
regulate energy beyond their constitutional or
statutory authorities.” Exec. Order No. 14260, 90 Fed.
Reg. at 15513. That is exactly what is happening here.
State and local governments, such as Respondents,
are supplanting the role assigned by the Constitution
to the federal government by using their state laws
and state courts to set national energy policy and
9
regulate interstate and international greenhouse-gas
emissions.
The Colorado Supreme Court insists that
Respondents are only “seek[ing] damages from
upstream producers for harms stemming from the
production and sale of fossil fuels,” and thus “do not
seek to regulate [greenhouse-gas] emissions.”
Pet.App.17a, 21a. That is wrong. Respondents openly
seek damages related to the effect of interstate and
international greenhouse-gas emissions on the global
climate.
This Court has been clear that “regulation can be
… effectively exerted through an award of damages.”
S.D. Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959). Moreover, “[t]he obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a
potent method of governing conduct and controlling
policy.” Id.; see Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.,
565 U.S. 625, 637 (2012). This case is no exception. As
dissenting Justices Samour and Boatright astutely
concluded, “While Boulder’s state-law claims
masquerade as tort claims for damages, a closer look
at the substance of those claims’ allegations reveals
that Boulder seeks to effectively abate or regulate
interstate emissions.” Pet.App.32a (Samour, J., joined
by Boatright, J., dissenting).
The enormous damages alleged in cases like this
leave no doubt they will compel compliance with the
preferred energy policy of Respondents. Although
Respondents here declined to put a number on the
damages they seek, a similar case filed in Oregon
against similar defendants, including Petitioner
Exxon, requests more than $50 billion to abate the
10
alleged harms that a single county argues are the
result of increased global greenhouse-gas emissions.
Second Am. Compl. ¶ 552, County of Multnomah v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23-CV-25164 (Or. Cir. Ct.).
Dozens of analogous lawsuits remain pending across
the country, seeking similar damage awards.
When multiplied across these numerous actions,
which only continue to proliferate, the American
energy industry could be decimated. Even the threat
of such liability serves as a potent warning to any
company against maintaining—let alone increasing—
production.
Nor can Respondents disclaim the reach of their
claims. Their own complaint alleges harms from
alleged contributions by Petitioners to “alteration of
the climate,” see, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1–2, 5–6, 62, 82,
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor
Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., No. 2018CV30349 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. June 11, 2018), which is a “global” effect, see id.
¶¶ 134, 137, 213. Respondents attribute these harms
to the worldwide oil and gas activities of Petitioners,
including operations in “the Canadian tar sands,” id.
¶¶ 384–88, 397; “Latin America,” id. ¶ 389; and
“Angola, Canada, Qatar, Russia and the United Arab
Emirates,” id. ¶ 94. Indeed, the Colorado Supreme
Court itself recognized that the case involves
“substantial issues of global import.” Pet.App.1a.
Other suits turn on similar claims that “[g]lobal
production and combustion of fossil fuels is the
central” cause of changes to the global climate, and
that the relevant defendants “have produced more
than 12% of the world’s fossil fuels since 1965, the
combustion of which has been the driving force
11
behind” the alleged harms. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 319,
City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HUD-L3179-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Apr. 21, 2023). As
Judge Stras has observed, despite attempts to
characterize such claims as traveling purely under
state law, referencing the pressing need to address
“climate change” more than 200 times in a complaint
reveals an actual intent to regulate an issue of
national and international consequence. See
Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 63 F.4th 703, 717
(8th Cir. 2023) (Stras, J., concurring).
Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”) has recognized that “[c]limate
litigation is an attempt to control, order or influence
the behaviour of others,” including at the “national
and international” level. 5 That is not the role of a
single State or locality. The Constitution places that
responsibility squarely with the federal government.
II. THIS CASE IS STRAIGHTFORWARD
States lack authority to regulate pollution,
including greenhouse-gas emissions, originating
beyond their respective borders. That is the exclusive
domain of federal law. Congress did not change that
by passing the Clean Air Act.
A. Interstate and International Emissions
Are the Domain of Federal Law
This Court has long held that disputes related to
interstate pollution are governed by federal law. In
5 IPCC,
Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change,
Working Group III Contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 1375 (2022),
https://perma.cc/JS43-77KW.
12
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., this Court
considered an original action by Georgia to enjoin
companies operating in Tennessee from “discharging
noxious gas” that drifted across the state border. 206
U.S. 230, 236 (1907). The Court explained that “by
their union,” States “made the forcible abatement of
outside nuisances impossible to each,” including
through operation of their state law and state courts.
Id. at 237. But they were not left without recourse.
The Constitution provided a new forum for such
disputes—a “suit in this Court,” governed by federal
common law. Id.
Since Georgia, “a mostly unbroken string of cases
has applied federal law to disputes involving
interstate air or water pollution.” City of New York,
993 F.3d at 91 (collecting cases). As the Tenth Circuit
explained:
Federal common law and not the varying
common law of the individual States is …
entitled and necessary to be recognized as a
basis for dealing in uniform standard with the
environmental rights of a State against
improper impairment by sources outside its
domain.
Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971).
This Court has repeatedly affirmed the inherently
federal nature of interstate pollution claims. In
Milwaukee I, this Court held that “federal common
law” governs claims related to “air and water in their
ambient or interstate aspects.” 406 U.S. at 103. This
Court noted the “overriding federal interest in the
need for a uniform rule of decision” and the “basic
interests of federalism” in a dispute over pollution in
13
Lake Michigan, which is “bounded … by four States.”
Id. at 105 n.6. The Court made clear in a follow-on
case that federal common law exists in such
circumstances because “state law cannot be used.”
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (“Milwaukee II”), 451
U.S. 304, 313 & n.7 (1981) (emphasis added).
This Court surveyed its precedent and made
similar observations in International Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, highlighting that “regulation of interstate
water pollution is a matter of federal, not state, law.”
479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987); see id. (explaining that
Milwaukee I “held that these cases should be resolved
by reference to federal common law; the implicit
corollary of this ruling was that state common law was
preempted”).
And most recently, in AEP, this Court reiterated
that regulation of interstate emissions is
“undoubtedly” one of the areas where “the basic
scheme of the Constitution … demands” the
application of federal law. 564 U.S. at 421. Applying
state law “would be inappropriate.” Id. at 422.
Furthermore, if States lack authority to regulate
emissions originating in other States, they
undoubtedly cannot apply their law to emissions
originating in other countries. This Court has never
suggested that state law applies in the context of
international emissions. To the contrary, in
Milwaukee I, this Court emphasized the “overriding
federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of
decision” by relying on a case about exclusive federal
authority over an international matter. 406 U.S. at
105 n.6 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964)). It would be passing strange if
14
state law somehow had greater purchase in an area
implicating the “exclusive authority” of the federal
government “in international relations and with
respect to foreign intercourse and trade.” Fuld v.
Palestine Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 15 (2025)
(cleaned up); see also, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419–20 (2003). Instead,
States have lacked authority to regulate interstate or
international emissions originating beyond their
borders.
B. Congress Did Not Authorize States to
Regulate Interstate and International
Emissions in the Clean Air Act
Congress did not subtly transfer the exclusive
federal authority over interstate and international
emissions to the States when it passed the Clean Air
Act. The federalism canon does not allow such implied
reordering.
This Court has held that Congress must “enact
exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly
alter the balance between federal and state power.”
Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, 590 U.S. at 621–22
(emphasis added); see also, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“If Congress intends to alter
the usual constitutional balance between the States
and the Federal Government, it must make its
intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language
of the statute.” (cleaned up) (emphasis added)).
Congress provided no indication in the Clean Air Act,
much less an “exceedingly clear” one, that it intended
to alter this long-standing division between federal
and state authority in the context of interstate and
international emissions. Nor did the Colorado
15
Supreme Court identify clear language allowing the
application of state law to such disputes. That is the
end of the matter.
Congress similarly “does not alter the fundamental
details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531
U.S. at 468. Thus, Congress did not subtly empower
state law and state courts to pursue crippling
damages against an essential industry for worldwide
conduct, especially for claims within the exclusive
domain of federal law. That again is dispositive.
The Colorado Supreme Court also failed a basic
analysis of the Clean Air Act itself. That statute is a
comprehensive statutory and regulatory regime that
“displace[d]” the federal common law of interstate air
pollution. AEP, 564 U.S. at 424. Substituting one form
of federal regulation (the Clean Air Act) for another
(federal common law) does not imply any intent to
breathe life into state law claims. The text of the
Clean Air Act certainly does not expressly or impliedly
signal a new and expansive role for States to regulate
in areas from which they have been excluded. And it
would defy logic to say that the Clean Air Act prohibits
“federal judges” from “set[ting] limits on greenhouse
gas emissions” across the country, id. at 429
(emphasis added), while silently authorizing state
judges to do the same around the world.
The Colorado Supreme Court did not address these
basic principles of statutory interpretation. Instead, it
made a wrong turn at the start by applying a
presumption against preemption of state law.
Pet.App.11–12a. But as dissenting Justices Samour
16
and Boatright explained, that presumption does not
apply “[i]n a case like this one … where state law has
not traditionally occupied the field.” Pet.App.27a
(Samour, J., joined by Boatright, J., dissenting).
These dissenting justices share company with this
Court, which has been explicit that “in an area where
there has been a history of significant federal
presence,” the “‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not
triggered.” United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108
(2000) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The field of interstate and
international pollution claims has always been
governed by federal law—first federal common law,
and now the Clean Air Act where applicable. Native
Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849,
857 (9th Cir. 2012) (“If the federal common law cause
of action has been displaced by legislation, that means
that ‘the field has been made the subject of
comprehensive legislation’ by Congress.” (quoting
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 314)). That leaves no room
for state law claims like those Respondents bring now.
C. Confirming Federal Authority Over
Interstate and International Emissions
Respects States
Confirming federal authority over interstate and
international emissions would respect the sovereignty
and proper role of States. If each could regulate
emissions originating from the others, it would
undoubtedly “lead to chaotic confrontation” between
them. Int’l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 496 (quoting Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee (“Milwaukee III”), 731 F.2d 403,
414 (7th Cir. 1984)).
17
Allowing States to reach beyond their respective
borders and set national energy policy is anathema to
the principles of horizontal federalism embodied in
the Constitution. “It follows from these principles,”
this Court has said, “that a State may not impose
economic sanctions” using its own laws “with the
intent of changing … lawful conduct in other States.”
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996);
see Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907). Doing
so would undermine the “equal dignity and
sovereignty” of other States. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal.
v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230, 245 (2019).
Federal
authority
over
interstate
and
international emissions is thus necessary to protect
the proper role and sovereignty of the States.
III. FURTHER PERCOLATION IS UNNECESSARY
The question presented here is fully developed for
review. This Court now has the benefit of both a
majority opinion and dissent below; another state
supreme court decision, City & County of Honolulu v.
Sunoco LP, 537 P.3d 1173 (Haw. 2023); a decision by
the Second Circuit, see City of New York, 993 F.3d 81;
and analogous decisions by the Fourth and Seventh
Circuits, see North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615
F.3d 291 (2010); Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d 403. Further
percolation is cumulative, at best.
Moreover, the country simply cannot wait for this
issue to be decided at some indeterminate point in the
future. Dozens of these cases are underway in state
courts, and more will surely follow, emboldened by the
18
decision below.6 A similar case was filed earlier this
year by an individual alleging wrongful death based
6 See, e.g., California v. BP p.l.c., No. RG17875889 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Cnty. of Alameda); California v. BP p.l.c., No. CGC-17561370 (Cal. Super. Ct., Cnty. of S.F.); California v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., No. CGC-23-609134 (Cal. Super. Ct.); City of Imperial
Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV01227 (Cal. Super. Ct.); County
of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV02586 (Cal. Super. Ct.);
County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03222 (Cal.
Super. Ct.); City of Richmond v. Chevron Corp., No. 18CV00055
(Cal. Super. Ct.); City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp.,
No. 17CV03243 (Cal. Super. Ct.); County of Santa Cruz v.
Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03242 (Cal. Super. Ct.); Connecticut v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HHDCV206132568S (Conn. Super. Ct.);
Delaware v. BP Am. Inc., No. N20C-09-97 (Del. Super. Ct.);
District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2020 CA 002892
B (D.C. Super. Ct.); Hawai‘i v. BP p.l.c., No. 1CCV-25-717 (Haw.
Cir. Ct.); City & County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20380 (Haw. Cir. Ct.); County of Maui v. Sunoco LP, No. 2CCV-20283 (Haw. Cir. Ct.); City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c.,
No. 2024CH01024 (Ill. Cir. Ct.); Maine v. BP p.l.c., No. PORSCCV24-442 (Me. Super. Ct.); Massachusetts v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. 1984CV03333 (Mass. Super. Ct.); Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. BP p.l.c., No. 24-C-18-4219 (Md. Cir. Ct.); Anne
Arundel County v. BP p.l.c., No. 02-CV-21-565 (Md. Cir. Ct.); City
of Annapolis v. BP p.l.c., No. 02-CV-21-250 (Md. Cir. Ct.);
Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst., No. 62-CV-20-3837 (Minn.
Dist. Ct.); Platkin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. MER-L-1797-22
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.); City of Hoboken, No. HUD-L-3179-20;
City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 451071/2021 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.); City of New York v. BP p.l.c., No. 18-cv-182 (S.D.N.Y.);
Town of Carrboro v. Duke Energy Corp., No. 24CV3385-670 (N.C.
Super. Ct.); County of Multnomah, No. 23-CV-25164; Bucks
County v. BP p.l.c., No. 2024-1836 (Pa. C.P.); Rhode Island v.
Chevron Corp., C.A. No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct.); Vermont
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 21-CV-02778 (Vt. Super. Ct.); King
County v. BP p.l.c., No. 18-2-11859-0 (Wash. Super. Ct.); Makah
Indian Tribe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23-2-25216-1 (Wash.
Super. Ct.); Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
19
on a heat wave. See Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 252-15986-8 (Wash. Super. Ct.). And certain legal
academics are now advocating for prosecutors to bring
“climate homicide” charges and exercise civil
forfeiture to seize company assets, restructuring them
into public benefit corporations. David Arkush &
Donald Braman, Climate Homicide: Prosecuting Big
Oil for Climate Deaths, 48 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 45
(2024).
These issues have also created significant friction
between the States. Cf. supra Part II.C. Nearly half
the country was recently before this Court asking for
review of the issue in this case, explaining their sister
States “threaten not only our system of federalism and
equal sovereignty among States, but our basic way of
life.” Mot. at 2, Alabama v. California, 145 S. Ct. 757
(2025) (No. 22O158). An even larger coalition of States
has now filed suit against New York and intervened
in a suit against Vermont to enjoin their “climate
superfund” laws that impose decades of retroactive
liability on American energy companies for their
alleged role in global greenhouse-gas emissions, as
well. West Virginia v. James, No. 1:25-cv-168
(N.D.N.Y.); Chamber of Com. of the U.S. of Am. v.
Moore, No. 2:24-cv-1513 (D. Vt.).
The situation has become so fraught that the U.S.
Department of Justice has sought to enjoin Hawaii
and Michigan from filing their own lawsuits, see
United States v. Michigan, No. 1:25-cv-496 (W.D.
Mich.); United States v. Hawaii, No. 1:25-cv-179 (D.
No. 23-2-25215-2 (Wash. Super. Ct.); Municipality of Bayamón v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:22-cv-1550 (D.P.R.); Municipality of
San Juan v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:23-cv-1608 (D.P.R.).
20
Haw.); and New York and Vermont from
implementing their “climate superfund” laws, United
States v. New York, No. 1:25-cv-3656 (S.D.N.Y.);
United States v. Vermont, No. 2:25-cv-463 (D. Vt.).
This case, and others like it, threaten the
abundant, reliable energy that underpins every aspect
of American life, including the standard of living for
ordinary Americans. Although national energy policy
is the subject of vigorous debate, it is a national issue
that must be decided at the national level—by officials
elected by the people of all States—not in a local jury
room. The federal government must be permitted to
fulfill its role in setting national energy policy and
regulating interstate and international emissions.
This Court should put an end to these
unconstitutional attempts to dictate national energy
policy from state courthouses before more, and
irreparable, damage is done.
21
CONCLUSION
The petition for certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
October 9, 2025
MICHAEL BUSCHBACHER
JARED M. KELSON
Counsel of Record
JENNIFER K. HARDY
LAURA B. RUPPALT
BOYDEN GRAY PLLC
800 Connecticut Avenue NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 955-0620
jkelson@boydengray.com
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.