Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.

No. 25-170

Supreme Court of the United States

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SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.;

SUNCOR ENERGY SALES INC.;

EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

v.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;

CITY OF BOULDER,

Respondents.

──────────────────────────

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO

──────────────────────────

BRIEF OF ALABAMA AND 25 OTHER STATES AS

AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

──────────────────────────

Steve Marshall

Attorney General

Edmund G. LaCour Jr.

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Robert M. Overing

Deputy Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE ALABAMA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

501 Washington Avenue

Montgomery, AL 36130

(334) 242-7300

Edmund.LaCour@

AlabamaAG.gov

Counsel for Amicus State of Alabama

(additional counsel listed on signature page)

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI STATES................................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..................................... 2

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 3

I. Federalism and Precedent Foreclose StateLaw Claims Based on Interstate Emissions. ..... 3

A. State law can regulate emissions within

state borders but not beyond them. .............. 5

B. The displacement of federal common law

does not permit state law to regulate

interstate emissions. .................................... 12

C. This case is about interstate emissions. ..... 16

II. This Case is an Ideal Vehicle to Address an

Issue of Great Constitutional and Economic

Consequence. ..................................................... 18

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 21

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL ........................................ 22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, (AEP)

564 U.S. 410 (2011) ............................. 1, 6, 9, 13-15

Anne Arundel County. v. BP p.l.c.,

No. C-02-CV-21-565 (M.D. Cir. Ct.) ...................... 9

Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n,

576 U.S. 787 (2015) .............................................. 11

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,

376 U.S. 398 (1964) .............................................. 12

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,

517 U.S. 559 (1996) .................................... 3, 16, 18

Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Ct. of Baltimore,

104 U.S. 592 (1881) .............................................. 10

Bucks County v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 2024-01836 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.) ......................... 9

Burton’s Lessee v. Williams,

16 U.S. 529 (1818) .................................................. 3

California v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

CGC-23-609134 (S.F. Super. Ct.) .......................... 8

Cipollone v. Liggett Grp.,

505 U.S. 504 (1992) .............................................. 17

City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP,

No. 1CCV-20-380 (Haw. Cir. Ct.) ...................... 8-9

City of Annapolis v. BP p.l.c.,

No. C-02-CV-21-250 (Md. Cir. Ct.) ........................ 9

City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co.,

2020-CP-10-03975 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl.) ................... 9

City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 2024CH01024 (Ill. Cir. Ct.) ............................. 8

iii

City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp.,

No. HUD-L-3179-20 (N.J. Super. Ct.) ................... 8

City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron,

No. MSC17-1227 (Contra Costa Super. Ct.) ......... 8

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, (Milwaukee II),

451 U.S. 304 (1981) .......................................... 2, 12

City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,

993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ...... 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17-20

City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c.,

No. CJC-24-5310 (S.F. Super. Ct.) ........................ 9

City of Richmond v. Chevron,

No. MSC18-55 (Contra Costa Super. Ct.) ............. 8

Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

83 F.4th 122 (2d Cir. 2023) .................................. 20

Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. HHDCV206132568S (Conn. Super. Ct.) ......... 8

Connecticut v. Massachusetts,

282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931) .............................. 4 , 7

County of Marin v. Chevron,

No. CIV-17-2586 (Marin Super. Ct.) ..................... 8

County of Maui v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,

No. 2CCV-20-283 (Haw. Cir. Ct.) .......................... 8

County of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct.)................................. 8

County of San Mateo v. Chevron,

No. 17-CIV-3222 (San Mateo Super. Ct.) .............. 8

County of Santa Cruz v. Chevron,

No. 17-CV-3242 (Santa Cruz Super. Ct.) .............. 8

Coyle v. Smith,

221 U.S. 559 (1911) ................................................ 3

iv

Delaware v. B.P. Am., Inc.,

No. N20C-09-97 (Del. Super. Ct.) .......................... 8

District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 2020 CA 2892 (D.C. Super. Ct.) ...................... 8

Envtl. Working Grp. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,

No. 2024-CAB-005935

(D.C. Super. Ct.) ................................................... 20

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,

587 U.S. 230 (2019) .......................................... 3, 16

Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,

206 U.S. 230 (1907) .............................. 1, 2, 4, 6, 10

Gibbons v. Ogden,

22 U.S. 1 (1824) ...................................................... 4

Hawaii v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 1CCV-25-717 (Haw. Cir. Ct.) .......................... 8

Healy v. Beer Inst.,

491 U.S. 324 (1989) .........................................16-17

Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,

304 U.S. 92 (1938) .............................................. 4, 6

Hoyt v. Sprague,

103 U.S. 613 (1880) .............................................. 18

Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,

362 U.S. 440 (1960) .............................................. 10

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, (Milwaukee I),

406 U.S. 91 (1972) .......................... 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 14

Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, (Milwaukee III),

731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) .......................... 14, 19

Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) .......................................... 8, 15

v

Iowa v. Illinois,

147 U.S. 1 (1893) .................................................... 7

Kansas v. Colorado,

206 U.S. 46 (1907) ...................................2-6, 12, 14

King County v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 18-2-11859 (Wash. Super. Ct.) ........................ 9

Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.,

565 U.S. 625 (2012) .............................................. 16

Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 25-2-15986-8 (Wash. Super. Ct.) ..................... 8

Lessee of Marlatt v. Silk,

36 U.S. 1 (1837) ...................................................... 4

Lochner v. New York,

198 U.S. 45 (1905) ................................................ 10

Louisiana v. Texas,

176 U.S. 1 (1900) .................................................. 16

Maine v. BP p.l.c.,

No. PORSC-CV-24-442 (Me. Super. Ct.) ............... 8

Mayor of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c.,

31 F.4th 178 (4th Cir. 2022) ................................ 12

Mayor of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 24-C-18-4219 (Md. Cir. Ct.)............................. 9

McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee,

8 U.S. 209 (1808) .................................................... 3

Metro v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 3:24-cv-19 (Or. Cir. Ct.) ................................... 8

Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst., (API)

63 F.4th 703 (8th Cir. 2023) .................................. 5

Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,

No. 62-CV-20-3837 (Minn. Dist. Ct.) ..................... 8

vi

Missouri v. Illinois,

180 U.S. 208 (1901) ................................................ 4

Missouri v. Illinois,

200 U.S. 496 (1906) .................................. 3, 4, 6, 10

Municipality of San Juan v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 3:23-cv-1608 (D.P.R.) ....................................... 8

Municipalities of Puerto Rico v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 3:22-cv-1550 (D.P.R. 2022) .............................. 8

Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,

584 U.S. 453 (2018) ................................................ 3

N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head,

234 U.S. 149 (1914) .............................................. 16

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Ct.,

658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) ...................................... 10

Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross,

598 U.S. 356 (2023) .............................................. 16

Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,

696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012) ...........................14-15

New Jersey v. New York,

283 U.S. 336 (1931) .......................................... 4, 10

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,

285 U.S. 262 (1932) .............................................. 11

North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth.,

615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) .............................. 8, 9

Nw. Laundry v. City of Des Moines,

239 U.S. 486 (1916) .............................................. 10

Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County,

414 U.S. 661 (1974) .............................................. 15

Oregon v. Ice,

555 U.S. 160 (2009) .............................................. 11

vii

Platkin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. MER-L-1797-22 (Super. Ct. N.J.) ................... 8

Puerto Rico v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. SJ2024CV06512 (T.P.I. San Juan) ................. 9

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,

37 U.S. 657 (1838) .................................................. 3

Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co.,

35 F.4th 44 (1st Cir. 2022) ................................... 12

Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co.,

No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct.) ....................... 9

Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,

492 U.S. 115 (1989) .............................................. 11

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,

359 U.S. 236 (1959) .............................................. 17

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,

538 U.S. 408 (2003) ................................................ 9

Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,

451 U.S. 630 (1981) .......................................... 6, 12

United States v. Standard Oil Co.,

332 U.S. 301 (1947) .............................................. 13

Vermont v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 21-CV-2778 (Vt. Super. Ct.) ............................ 8

Virginia v. Tennessee,

148 U.S. 503 (1893) ................................................ 7

Wisc. Dept. of Ind. v. Gould Inc.,

475 U.S. 282 (1986) ................................................ 7

Statutes

Ala. Code §6-5-127 ..................................................... 11

Ala. Code §9-1-6(a) .................................................... 11

viii

Ala. Code §9-2-2 ......................................................... 11

Ala. Code §9-17-1, et seq. ........................................... 11

Ala. Code §22-23-47 ................................................... 11

Ala. Code §22-28-3 ..................................................... 11

Cal. Gov’t Code §7513.75(a)(3) (West) ...................... 11

Cal. Pub. Res. Code §25000.5(a) (West) ................... 11

Clean Air Act ............................................. 2, 12, 14, 19

Clean Water Act .................................................. 12, 15

Tex. Water Code Ann. §7.257 (West) ........................ 11

Utah Code Ann. §78B-4-515 (West) .......................... 10

Other Authorities

Complaint, New York v. JBS USA Food Co.,

No. 450682/2024 (N.Y. Super. Ct. filed

Feb. 28, 2024) ....................................................... 20

Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James

Sues World’s Largest Beef Producer for Misrepresenting Environmental Impact of Their Products

(Feb. 28, 2024), tinyurl.com/28udz5pa ................ 20

Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law,

107 Cal. L. Rev. 527 (2019) .................................... 6

The Federalist No. 80 (Cooke ed. 1961)...................... 4

1

INTEREST OF AMICI STATES

Amici States are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas,

Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,

Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,

Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,

Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming.1

The City and County of Boulder, Colorado, assert

a power with no analogue in our Nation’s history and

no place in our federalism: “the forcible abatement of

outside nuisances.” Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206

U.S. 230, 237 (1907). Like disputes over borders,

disputes over cross-border emissions cannot be settled

by one State alone. Rather, as the Court has

recognized for over a century, “suits brought by one

State to abate pollution emanating from another

State” are “meet for federal law governance.” Am.

Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 421-22

(2011) (AEP). Whether Congress or federal courts

supply the controlling law, there is no world in which

Boulder, Colorado, gets to set global energy policy.

Suits like this one imperil the ability of Amici

States to achieve their policy prerogatives on energy

production and environmental protection. To be sure,

States can assign liability for conduct outside their

borders in some contexts. But the theory that every

State can regulate every molecule that enters the

atmosphere anywhere in the world is unlimited. When

one State’s power grows so far beyond its proper

sphere, the rights of every other State wither.

1 Per this Court’s Rule 37.2, Amici gave timely notice to counsel

of record more than ten days prior to this brief’s due date.

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. The reason a State cannot apply its home state

law to interstate emissions has to do with the “basic

interests of federalism.” Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,

406 U.S. 91, 105 & n.6 (1972) (Milwaukee I). The

“cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the

states to each other, is that of equality of right.”

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907). No State

can “enforce its own policy” on the others, so either

Congress or “interstate common law” must provide

“the rule which shall control.” Id. at 95, 98.

The court below erred in two ways. First, because

applying state law is constitutionally “impossible,”

Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237, any displacement

of earlier federal law is irrelevant to the question

presented. Contra App.9a-11a, 17a-20a. The Clean

Air Act did not and could not alter the fact that “state

law cannot be used.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451

U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981) (Milwaukee II). Second, the

Constitution does not distinguish between “an action

against a pollution emitter to abate pollution” and this

action for “damages from upstream producers” for the

alleged cost of pollution. App.17a. Boulder tries to

dodge centuries of precedent, but there is no hiding

the source of its alleged injury, the chain of causation

it pleaded, and the likely effect of the drastic remedies

it demands.

II. Cases like this one threaten the availability of

affordable energy and the sovereignty of States. The

time to intervene is now—before courts amenable to

these lawsuits can do serious damage to the Nation’s

energy system. There is already a clear division of

authority, and opportunities for review may be few

and far between. This case is a perfect vehicle.

3

ARGUMENT

I. Federalism and Precedent Foreclose StateLaw Claims Based on Interstate Emissions.

By declaring independence, the Colonies laid claim

“to all the rights and powers of sovereign states.”

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. 230, 23738 (2019) (citing McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 8 U.S. 209,

212 (1808)). “A sovereign decides by his own will,

which is the supreme law within his own boundary.”

Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 737

(1838). When sovereign wills conflict, they may settle

their differences by treaty or war. For example, if one

creates a “nuisance” “upon a navigable river like the

Danube, [it] would amount to a casus belli for a state

lower down, unless removed.” Missouri v. Illinois, 200

U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906).

But the Colonies joined the Union, and from the

origins of our federal system flow several basic tenets

of constitutional law. While the Constitution “did not

abolish the sovereign powers of the States,” it “limits

[their] sovereignty in several ways.” Murphy v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. 453, 470 (2018).

Unlike “absolutely independent nations,” which

may resort to force, no State “can impose its own

legislation” or “enforce its own policy upon the

other[s].” Kansas, 206 U.S. at 95, 98; see BMW of N.

Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996). “[H]appily

for our domestic harmony, the power of aggressive

operation against each other is taken away.” Burton’s

Lessee v. Williams, 16 U.S. 529, 538 (1818). Every

State agreed to “stand[] on the same level with all the

rest,” Kansas, 206 U.S. at 97, to form “a union of

states, equal in power, dignity and authority.” Coyle v.

Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911).

4

Relinquishing the powers of diplomacy and war did

not render the States defenseless. What would have

been political fights among sovereigns became judicial

questions with answers in federal law. Rhode Island,

37 U.S. at 737-38, 743. By ratifying the Supremacy

Clause, the States “surrendered to congress, and its

appointed Court, the right and power of settling their

mutual controversies.” Id. at 737; see Kansas, 206 U.S.

at 95; Missouri, 200 U.S. at 518-20; Missouri v.

Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); see also Gibbons v.

Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824). The Constitution thus

provided a structural solution for “bickerings and

animosities … that could not be foreseen.” The

Federalist No. 80 at 537 (Cooke ed. 1961). “Whatever

practices” that “tend[] to disturb the harmony

between the States are proper objects of federal

superintendence and control.” Id.

In areas ripe for interstate conflict, the Court has

maintained State equality and harmony by declining

to apply any one State’s law. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at

95; Missouri, 200 U.S. at 520; see also, e.g., New Jersey

v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931); Connecticut v.

Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670-71 (1931). Instead,

only federal law can govern matters that implicate

interstate relations. The doctrine extends even to

cases involving private parties like this one. See, e.g.,

Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch

Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938); Tenn. Copper Co., 206

U.S. at 237; Lessee of Marlatt v. Silk, 36 U.S. 1, 22-23

(1837).

The Court had these principles in mind when it

decided Milwaukee I, which was also an interstate

nuisance case. Illinois alleged that Milwaukee had

polluted Lake Michigan, an interstate body of water.

Invoking the logic of federalism, the Court held

5

unanimously that Illinois could not force Milwaukee

to abate its activity, but neither could Illinois be asked

“to submit to whatever might be done.” 406 U.S. at

104. Pitting two sovereign wills against each other,

the “nature of the problem” created an impasse that

required a neutral arbiter, i.e., federal law. Id. at 103

n.5. Congress can legislate, or federal courts can apply

common law. Either way, state law cannot govern a

controversy that “touches basic interests of

federalism” or that needs “a uniform rule.” Id. at 105

n.6. “Certainly,” the pollution of Lake Michigan was

such a controversy. Id.

Likewise, the claims here cannot proceed under

state law. Boulder seeks to enact a global climate

policy—one that would interfere with the sovereign

power of every other State to regulate energy and the

environment within its borders. “This is, in effect, an

interstate dispute.” Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,

63 F.4th 703, 718 (8th Cir. 2023) (Stras, J.,

concurring) (API); contra App.18a. Colorado law

cannot resolve an interstate dispute without breaking

basic tenets of federalism.

A. State law can regulate emissions within

state borders but not beyond them.

1. Cases involving interstate gas emissions

implicate the conflicting rights of States. Contra

App.18a (“No such issue of state sovereignty is

presented in this case.”). The federal judiciary has

understood for well “over a century” the need for

federal resolution of such disputes. City of New York

v. Chevron Corp., 993 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2021)

(collecting cases). Where no federal statute governs,

this Court has identified and applied principles of

general law—“what may not improperly be called

6

interstate common law.” Kansas, 206 U.S. at 98; see

API, 63 F.4th at 718 (Stras, J., concurring) (“The rule

of decision … has always been … what we now know

as the federal common law.”).2

For example, Missouri once sued to enjoin the

dumping of sewage into an Illinois river, which it

alleged would deposit downstream into Missouri

riverbeds and poison Missouri water. Missouri v.

Illinois, 200 U.S. at 517. Applying principles “known

to the older common law,” not state law, the Court

found that Missouri’s claim failed for want of injury

and causation. Id. at 522.

Air pollution is no different. When Georgia sought

to enjoin a Tennessee company from “discharging

noxious gas” over state lines, Georgia law did not

govern. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236. The Court

identified common-law principles to determine that a

State could be “entitled to specific relief” rather than

“give up quasi-sovereign rights for pay.” Id. at 237-38.

And the Court rejected a defense of laches. Id. at 239.

None of the analysis depended on state law but

instead a federal equity jurisprudence built for

interstate emissions cases.

In Milwaukee I, the Court recognized a general

rule that claims to protect “ecological rights” against

“impairment … from sources outside the State[]” have

their “basis and standard in federal common law.” 406

U.S. at 100. The dispositive fact was not that Lake

2 The Court has identified interstate common law as one of the

“special” kinds that survived Erie. See, e.g., AEP, 564 U.S. at 421;

Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 & n.13

(1981); Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 105-06; Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at

110. Often, the rules of specialized common law are “just the old

general-law doctrines in disguise.” Stephen E. Sachs, Finding

Law, 107 Cal. L. Rev. 527, 558 (2019).

7

Michigan is “bounded … by four States,” one of which

was polluting. Id. at 104 n.6. When “deal[ing] with air

and water in their … interstate aspects,” the “basic

interests of federalism” demand the application of

federal law. Id. at 103 n.5, 104 n.6; see also Iowa v.

Illinois, 147 U.S. 1, 7-8, 13 (1893) (rejecting the views

of dueling state courts in favor of “equality” in river

rights); Connecticut, 282 U.S. at 669-70 (rejecting

“municipal law”); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,

523-24 (1893) (applying public law, international law,

and moral law). Alleging liability for emissions from

sources outside Colorado, the interstate dispute at

hand cannot be resolved under state law and must be

dismissed.

The interstate emissions cases support dismissal

for another reason: the “need for a uniform rule of

decision.” Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. Only

federal law, “not the varying common law of

individual states,” can serve as a “basis for dealing in

uniform standard with the environmental rights of

[each] State.” Id. at 108 n.9. That rationale applies a

fortiori to claims based on global emissions, which

implicate every State, not just those with claims to a

specific river or lake.

The logic of the decision below justifies a world in

which the same production and sale of energy is

subject to every State’s regulatory and enforcement

regime simultaneously, creating unpredictable and

conflicting duties. See Wisc. Dept. of Ind. v. Gould Inc.,

475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986) (“Conflict is imminent

whenever two separate remedies … bear on the same

activity.” (cleaned up)). Such “balkanization of clean

air regulations and a confused patchwork of standards” would harm “industry and the environment

alike.” North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley

8

Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2010); see also City

of New York, 993 F.3d at 91; App.25a, 28a, 47a

(Samour, J., dissenting). If every State regulates the

same conduct, energy producers would face enormous

“uncertainty,” and States would risk “chaotic

confrontation” with one another. Int’l Paper Co. v.

Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 496 (1987).

Unfortunately, chaos is already unfolding. Dozens

of States, localities, and even private parties are

prosecuting actions like this one under the aegis of

state and local law.3 These suits threaten ruinous

3 See Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 25-2-15986-8 (Wash. Super.

Ct.); Hawaii v. BP p.l.c., No. 1CCV-25-717 (Haw. Cir. Ct.); Maine

v. BP p.l.c., No. PORSC-CV-24-442 (Me. Super. Ct.); City of

Chicago v. BP p.l.c., No. 2024CH01024 (Ill. Cir. Ct.); Metro v.

Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:24-cv-19 (Or. Cir. Ct.); Municipality of

San Juan v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:23-cv-1608 (D.P.R.);

California v. Exxon Mobil Corp., CGC-23-609134 (S.F. Super.

Ct.) (coordinated with County of San Mateo v. Chevron, No. 17CIV-3222 (San Mateo Super. Ct.); County of Marin v. Chevron,

No. CIV-17-2586 (Marin Super. Ct.); County of Santa Cruz v.

Chevron, No. 17-CV-3242 (Santa Cruz Super. Ct.); City of

Imperial Beach v. Chevron, No. MSC17-1227 (Contra Costa

Super. Ct.); City of Richmond v. Chevron, No. MSC18-55 (Contra

Costa Super. Ct.)); County of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,

No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct.); Municipalities of Puerto Rico v.

Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 3:22-cv-1550 (D.P.R. 2022); Platkin v.

Exxon Mobil Corp., No. MER-L-1797-22 (Super. Ct. N.J.);

Vermont v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 21-CV-2778 (Vt. Super. Ct.);

County of Maui v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., No. 2CCV-20-283 (Haw.

Cir. Ct.); Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HHDCV

206132568S (Conn. Super. Ct.); Delaware v. B.P. Am., Inc., No.

N20C-09-97 (Del. Super. Ct.); City of Hoboken v. Chevron Corp.,

No. HUD-L-3179-20 (N.J. Super. Ct.); District of Columbia v.

Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 2020 CA 2892 (D.C. Super. Ct.);

Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst., No. 62-CV-20-3837 (Minn.

Dist. Ct.); City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-380 (Haw.

9

liability for the energy industry. As cases progress

around the country, it becomes more and more likely

that one state court, interpreting one State’s law,

would “scuttle the nation’s carefully created system

for accommodating the need for energy production and

the need for clean air.” North Carolina, 615 F.3d at

296. As this Court has recognized, federal law

“prescribe[s] [an] order of decisionmaking” because

“our Nation’s energy needs and the possibility of

economic disruption must weigh in the balance.” Cf.

AEP, 564 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added). That balance

can be struck—and disaster avoided—only if this

Court puts a stop to the idea any one State can

regulate interstate emissions.

2. Even if there were not directly controlling

caselaw that mandates dismissal, it is not hard to see

how suits like this one undermine federalism. Simply

put, they interfere with the right of “each State [to]

make its own reasoned judgment about what conduct

is permitted or proscribed within its borders.” State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,

422 (2003). States have long pursued their interests

in reducing pollution through regulation, litigation,

Cir. Ct.); Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., No. PC-2018-4716

(R.I. Super. Ct.); City of Oakland v. BP p.l.c., No. CJC-24-5310

(S.F. Super. Ct.); but see City of New York, 993 F.3d 81

(dismissed); City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., 2020-CP-1003975 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl.) (dismissed); Bucks County v. BP p.l.c.,

No. 2024-01836 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.) (same); Anne Arundel County.

v. BP p.l.c., No. C-02-CV-21-565 (M.D. Cir. Ct.) (dismissed;

appeal pending); City of Annapolis v. BP p.l.c., No. C-02-CV-21250 (Md. Cir. Ct.) (same); Mayor of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c., No. 24C-18-4219 (Md. Cir. Ct.) (same); Puerto Rico v. Exxon Mobil

Corp., No. SJ2024CV06512 (T.P.I. San Juan) (voluntarily

dismissed) King County v. BP p.l.c., No. 18-2-11859 (Wash.

Super. Ct.) (same).

10

and other means. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement

Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (a law

“designed to free from pollution the very air that

people breathe clearly falls within … the police

power”); Nw. Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S.

486, 490-92 (1916) (“no doubt” that “emission of smoke

[was] within the regulatory power of the state”). For

every State has “real and substantial interests” in the

environment, New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 342, including

“all the earth and air within its domain,” Tenn. Copper

Co., 206 U.S. at 237.

But by “the law of nature these things are common

to mankind.” Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Ct., 658

P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983) (quoting the Code of

Justinian). So it is no surprise that a sovereign might

complain of “outside nuisances” and other “injuries

[like] torts” emanating from beyond its borders. Tenn.

Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237; see also Missouri, 200

U.S. at 520-21.

But the extraterritorial extension of state law (i.e.,

the use of force) is not a constitutional option for

dealing with outside nuisances. See id.; Milwaukee I,

406 U.S. at 103-05; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125,

140-41 (1902); cf. Bonaparte v. Appeal Tax Ct. of

Baltimore, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881). Seizing that

power diminishes the power of every other State “to

promote the general welfare, or to guard the public

health, the public morals, or the public safety” within

its borders. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 67

(1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Colorado cannot govern the global atmosphere

because our federal system allows States to pursue

their own divergent policies. And they do. Compare,

e.g., Utah Code Ann. §78B-4-515 (West) (limiting

11

liability for “greenhouse gas emissions”); Tex. Water

Code Ann. §7.257 (West) (providing affirmative

defenses to torts allegedly “arising from greenhouse

gas emissions”) with Cal. Gov’t Code §7513.75(a)(3)

(West) (noting “the state’s broad[] efforts to

decarbonize”); Cal. Pub. Res. Code §25000.5(a) (West)

(declaring “overdependence on … petroleum based

fuels” to be “a threat”). Such variety reflects the

genius of American federalism, which lets “different

communities” live by “different local standards.” Sable

Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126

(1989); Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting

Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 817 (2015); Oregon v. Ice, 555

U.S. 160, 171 (2009). Within its own domain, a State

may “serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and

economic experiments without risk to the rest of the

country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,

311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

But the laboratory model does not work if one State

can terminate another State’s experiment. Alabama,

for example, highly values the production and use of

traditional energy. It is Alabama’s policy “that the

extraction of coal provides a major present and future

source of energy and is an essential and necessary

activity which contributes to the economic and

material well-being of the state.” Ala. Code §9-1-6(a);

see also id. §9-17-1, et seq. (governing the development

of oil and gas).

Alabama has also enacted laws to protect air

quality, prevent water pollution, and conserve wildlife, see id. §§6-5-127, 9-2-2, 22-23-47, 22-28-3, but its

views on how to achieve those ends diverge sharply

from those of Boulder, Colorado. See, e.g., Am. Compl.

¶325 (complaining that petitioners plan to “sell[] more

fossil fuels”); id. ¶¶532-34 (seeking future damages

12

and “abatement of the hazards”). There can be no

question that Boulder’s billion-dollar carbon tax (e.g.,

id. ¶450) would damage the efforts of other States to

promote affordable and reliable energy.

Our constitutional structure can happily tolerate

such irreconcilable differences among States—but not

if every State is “bound to yield its own views” on

interstate gas emissions to those of Colorado. Kansas,

206 U.S. at 97.

B. The displacement of federal common law

does not permit state law to regulate

interstate emissions.

The court below and others around the country

have resisted Milwaukee’s application on the ground

that the federal common law governing interstate

emissions “no longer exists” after the Clean Air Act

and Clean Water Act. App.17a; see also, e.g., Rhode

Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 35 F.4th 44, 55 (1st Cir.

2022); Mayor of Baltimore v. BP p.l.c., 31 F.4th 178,

206 (4th Cir. 2022). On this view, displacement of

federal common law allows “state law … [to] snap back

into action unless specifically preempted by statute.”

City of New York, 993 F.3d at 98. The “snap back”

approach is misguided for several reasons.

First, federal common law “exists … because state

law cannot be used.” Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313

n.7. In the “enclaves” of federal common law, States

are not “free to develop their own doctrines.” Banco

Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426

(1964). After displacement, “the need” for federal

common law “disappears,” App.10a, but only because

a different federal rule took its place. And whatever

form the federal law takes, it remains equally

“inappropriate for state law to control.” Texas Indus.,

13

451 U.S. at 641; see also AEP, 564 U.S. at 422. As the

Second Circuit held, “state law does not suddenly

become competent to address issues that demand a

unified federal standard simply because Congress …

displace[d] a federal court-made standard with a

legislative one.” City of New York, 993 F.3d at 98;

accord App.26a (Samour, J., dissenting).

The Court addressed a similar issue in United

States v. Standard Oil, a damages action arising from

the collision of a truck with a U.S. Army soldier. 332

U.S. 301, 302 (1947). The truck owner’s liability could

not “be determined by state law” because the matter

“vitally affect[ed] [federal] interests, powers, and

relations … as to require uniform national disposition

rather than diversified state rulings.” Id. at 305, 307.

“The only question” was “which organ of the

Government is to make the determination [of]

liability.” Id. at 316. Finding that decision best left for

“Congress, not for the courts,” the Court effectively

barred a remedy—much like AEP in the emissions

context. But the Court did not revisit its choice-of-law

holding as if state law might “snap back” in the

absence of federal common law.

Each of these cases is an “authority supporting the

proposition that once federal common law exists, the

structure of the Constitution precludes the

application of state law even when that common law

no longer exists.” Contra App.17a. More precisely,

federal common law has supplied a rule of decision in

cases where state law cannot. Repeating that federal

common law “in this area” no longer exists (App.6a,

10a, 11a, 16a, 17a), the court below blinded itself to

decisive precedent. What does the work is not the

preemptive effect of federal common law today, but

the constitutional need for its creation.

14

The law of interstate emissions was developed

because “the basic scheme of the Constitution so

demands.” AEP, 564 U.S. at 421. “The very reasons

the Court gave for resorting to federal common law in

Milwaukee I are the same reasons why … federal law

must govern” even after any displacement. Illinois v.

City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 410-11 (7th Cir.

1984) (Milwaukee III). Resolving an interstate

controversy under a single State’s law is a violation of

state sovereignty, see supra §I.A; Kansas, 206 U.S. at

95, which no federal statute could permit.

Likewise, because “uniquely federal” interests

demand “uniform federal standards,” state law can

never be conclusive. Milwaukee III, 731 F.2d at 410.

“[T]he state claiming injury cannot apply its own state

law to out-of-state discharges.” Id. Illinois squarely

argued in Milwaukee III that if federal common law

were “dissipated” by statute, then “Illinois law must

again control.” Id. at 406. But the Seventh Circuit

understood that under “the logic of Milwaukee I,” state

law could never apply to interstate pollution. Id. at

411. Whether common law or statute, “federal law

must govern.” Id.

So it must govern here. The federal interests are

the same or even stronger. As explained in AEP, trial

courts “issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions” are

not well “suited to serve as primary regulator of

greenhouse gas emissions.” 564 U.S. at 428. If the

Clean Air Act was meant to be a better and more

uniform solution, it would make no sense for state law

to “snap back” and recreate the problem that better

federal law tried to solve.

Put differently, “displacement of a federal common

law right of action” is a “displacement of remedies.”

15

Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d

849, 857 (9th Cir. 2012). Whether a “federal common

law remedy [is] available” (App.10a) has no bearing on

the availability of another remedy under state law.

Nor can state law govern just because the claim “may

fail at a later stage” under federal law. Oneida Indian

Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida County, 414 U.S. 661, 675

(1974); cf. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 499-500.

To reach a contrary view, the court below misread

AEP v. Connecticut. There, the Court left open the

possibility of certain state-law claims, 564 U.S. at 429,

but not the claims here. The Court noted in dicta

(because it was not briefed) that after the Clean Water

Act, a plaintiff could still bring a “nuisance claim

pursuant to the law of the source State.” Id. (quoting

Ouelette, 479 U.S. at 489). That fact does not help

Boulder, which brings claims under Colorado law, not

that of any source State. See Ouelette, 479 U.S. at 495.

The type of claim AEP left open (intrastate) never had

to be governed by federal common law in the first

place. By contrast, the type of claim here (interstate)

has never been resolved by state law alone.

In fact, AEP reaffirmed that “suits brought by one

State to abate pollution emanating from another

State” are “meet for federal law governance.” 564 U.S.

at 421-22. In such suits, “borrowing the law of a

particular State would be inappropriate.” Id. The

court below ignored these lines in AEP, App.9a-11a,

as well as this Court’s doubt that “a State may sue to

abate any and all manner of [interstate] pollution,”

564 U.S. at 421-22. If federal law, despite its virtues

in this area, does not provide a judicial remedy, id. at

422-23, the AEP Court surely did not invite state law

to fill the void.

16

Finally, the lower court mistook petitioners to be

advancing a “brooding” and “vague federal interest.”

App.18a. But the horizontal separation of powers is

fundamental tenet of constitutional law. See Nat’l

Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 376

(2023). One does not need “text” (App.18a) to know

what is “so obviously the necessary result of the

Constitution.” N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149,

161 (1914). For example, States lack the “raw power

to apply their own law” to “disputes over borders,

water rights, or the interpretation of interstate

compacts.” Franchise Tax Bd., 587 U.S. at 246

(citations omitted). So too the fact that States may not

regulate the global atmosphere is “not spelled out in

the Constitution” but nonetheless “implicit in its

structure and supported by historical practice.” Id. at

247. Anything else is “ahistorical literalism.” Id.

C. This case is about interstate emissions.

If a state statute imposed massive fines for oil and

gas sold in a neighboring State, no one would doubt

the violation of the neighbor’s sovereignty. Cf.

Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1900) (Brown,

J., concurring). This attempt to impose tort liability to

the same end is no different, for “State power may be

exercised as much by a jury’s application of a state

rule of law in a civil lawsuit as by a statute.” BMW,

517 U.S. at 573 n.17.

Styling a State’s effort “to impose its own policy

choice” as a tort action does not shield it from the basic

“principles of state sovereignty and comity.” Id. at 572.

Those principles would be “meaningless” if a State

could do indirectly what it could not do directly. See

Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637

(2012); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-36 & n.13

17

(1989). Thus, whether Colorado law regulates

emissions through the “power to give damages rather

than to enjoin,” the result is still “a potent method of

governing conduct and controlling policy.” San Diego

Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247

(1959); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504,

548 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).

The court below asserted that Boulder does “not

seek to regulate [greenhouse gas] emissions.”

App.21a. But taxing emissions—i.e., regulating

them—is the heart of the suit. Boulder complains that

petitioners “continue to conduct their fossil fuel

activities” and “produce a substantial amount of

[greenhouse gas] emissions.” Am. Compl. ¶¶325, 451.

Boulder claims this is a nuisance precisely because of

the emissions. For the alleged harms caused by

emissions, Boulder seeks billions of dollars in

damages, id. ¶¶222, 450, and disgorgement, id. ¶¶69,

84, 488. Boulder also demands “future damages and

costs” to “mitigate, abate, and/or remediate the

impacts of climate change.” Id. ¶532. In what way

doesn’t this case “implicat[e] the regulation of

interstate pollution”? App.17a.

There is no way Boulder can succeed without

impacting “any oil and gas operations or sales in

Colorado or elsewhere.” App.4a. It is “common sense

and basic economics” that raising the “cost of conduct

will make that conduct less common.” City of New

York, 993 F.3d at 93 (cleaned up). Any relief would be

“a de facto regulation on greenhouse gas emissions.”

Id. at 96. Boulder cannot “hid[e] the obvious”; it seeks

“a global remedy for a global issue.” API, 63 F.4th at

719 (Stras, J., concurring). While not every lawsuit

against the energy industry is an attempt to regulate

18

emissions, that’s what “this case is about.” App.33a

(Samour, J., dissenting).

Because Boulder deems “altering the climate” to be

a public nuisance, Am. Compl. ¶447, the cloak of

consumer protection is not available. It is clear that

the only way for energy companies to avoid liability

altogether, according to the complaint, would be to

halt the production, sale, and use of their products

everywhere. And regardless of the label, forcing global

energy companies to cease doing business everywhere

is not among a State’s constitutional powers. Colorado

law can reach “persons and property within the limits

of its own territory.” Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613,

630 (1880). But virtually all the conduct Boulder

targets occurred outside of Colorado, well beyond the

proper regulatory sphere of state law. See City of New

York, 993 F.3d at 92; cf. BMW, 517 U.S. at 573 n.20.

There is no historical analogue for what Boulder is

trying to do. The court below was wrong to cast this

suit as a matter “of traditional state responsibility.”

App.23a-24a; see App.27a (Samour, J., dissenting).

II. This Case is an Ideal Vehicle to Address an

Issue of Great Constitutional and Economic

Consequence.

A. This case may be a rare opportunity for the

Court to intervene before Amici States, their citizens,

and our Nation’s energy sector suffer serious damage.

Boulder alone demands billions of dollars, and every

decision like the one below is a green light for future

plaintiffs. At least one county in Colorado already has

a copycat lawsuit. App.25a (Samour, J., dissenting).

The Court might consider the enormous costs and

uncertainty of litigation in dozens of state courts

around the country. See supra n.3. Some courts

19

appreciate the grave constitutional problems with

these suits; others do not. The Court may not have

another chance to consider the question presented

before a state court imposes devastating preliminary

relief or entertains enormously wasteful discovery.

B. The issue has percolated, and a clear split of

authority has emerged. In the Second Circuit, a

“nuisance suit seeking to recover damages for the

harms caused by global greenhouse gas emissions”

may not proceed under state law. City of New York,

993 F.3d at 91. That court did not credit the City’s

narrative that its suit concerned only “production,

promotion, and sale,” rather than the regulation of

emissions. Id. The court held that such claims “must

be brought under federal common law,” but the Clean

Air Act “barred” them by displacing the common-law

remedy. Id. at 95, 100. Likewise, the Seventh Circuit

decided decades ago that the plaintiff’s own state law

cannot govern “out-of-state discharges.” Milwaukee

III, 731 F.2d at 410. It did not matter whether federal

common law had been “dissipated” by statute. Id. at

406. Regardless, “federal law must govern.” Id. at 411.

The Colorado Supreme Court expressly departed

from both decisions. Relying heavily on a decision

from the Hawaii Supreme Court, the court gave no

weight to the reasons of constitutional structure that

motivated interstate common law. Id. at 17a-18a.

Second, the court held that federal common law never

governed this type of suit because Boulder sues

“upstream producers,” not a “pollution emitter.”

App.17a. The court found no preemption.

This is one of few cases on appeal to raise the

central issues outside of the context of removal to

federal court. Whether the federal law governing

20

interstate emissions precludes the application of state

law is a better question than whether it does so in a

way that supports removal. If this Court grants

review, it would be “free to consider the [] preemption

defense on its own terms, not under the heightened

standard unique to the removability inquiry.” New

York, 993 F.3d at 94 (collecting cases acknowledging

the distinction); accord Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil

Corp., 83 F.4th 122, 138 n.4 (2d Cir. 2023).

C. The grave threat these suits pose to equal

sovereignty and our Nation’s energy infrastructure

are reason enough for this Court to grant review. But

the theory used against energy producers here can be

expanded to target any extraterritorial activity that

purportedly “exacerbate[s] climate change.” App.2a.

Last year, New York sued “the world’s largest

producer of beef products, for misleading the public

about its environmental impact.”4 The beef producer’s

pledge to reach “Net Zero by 2040” was allegedly

misleading because the company “plans to grow global

demand for its product,” rather than “reduce

production of and demand for” it. Complaint, ¶¶14344, New York v. JBS USA Food Co., No. 450682/2024

(N.Y. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 28, 2024). That case was

tossed, but a similar (albeit less ambitious) suit

against the second largest meat company is ongoing.

See Envtl. Working Grp. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No.

2024-CAB-005935 (D.C. Super. Ct.). Given the ease of

pleading that deep-pocketed companies have

“exacerbate[d] climate change,” App.2a, one can only

expect to see more suits like these.

4 Office of N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Sues World’s

Largest Beef Producer for Misrepresenting Environmental Impact

of Their Products, Feb. 28, 2024, tinyurl.com/28udz5pa.

21

The States, upon entering the Union, gave up the

right to use their laws to wage this sort of interstate

conflict. They gave up the right to impose their policy

choices on other States and activities entirely outside

the home State’s jurisdiction. The Court should grant

review here before any further damage is done to our

national economy and to our federal scheme.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Steve Marshall

Attorney General

Edmund G. LaCour Jr.

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

Robert M. Overing

Deputy Solicitor General

OFFICE OF THE ALABAMA

ATTORNEY GENERAL

501 Washington Avenue

Montgomery, AL 36130

(334) 242-7300

Edmund.LaCour@

AlabamaAG.gov

22

ADDITIONAL COUNSEL

STEPHEN J. COX

Attorney General

State of Alaska

LIZ MURRILL

Attorney General

State of Louisiana

TIM GRIFFIN

Attorney General

State of Arkansas

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

JAMES UTHMEIER

Attorney General

State of Florida

CATHERINE L. HANAWAY

Attorney General

State of Missouri

CHRISTOPHER M. CARR

Attorney General

State of Georgia

AUSTIN KNUDSEN

Attorney General

State of Montana

RAÚL R. LABRADOR

Attorney General

State of Idaho

MICHAEL T. HILGERS

Attorney General

State of Nebraska

THEODORE E. ROKITA

Attorney General

State of Indiana

DREW WRIGLEY

Attorney General

State of North Dakota

BRENNA BIRD

Attorney General

State of Iowa

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

State of Ohio

KRIS W. KOBACH

Attorney General

State of Kansas

GENTNER DRUMMOND

Attorney General

State of Oklahoma

RUSSELL M. COLEMAN

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Kentucky

DAVID W. SUNDAY, JR.

Attorney General

Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania

24

ALAN WILSON

Attorney General

State of South Carolina

MARTY JACKLEY

Attorney General

State of South Dakota

JONATHAN SKRMETTI

Attorney General

State of Tennessee

KEN PAXTON

Attorney General

State of Texas

DEREK BROWN

Attorney General

State of Utah

JOHN B. MCCUSKEY

Attorney General

State of West Virginia

KEITH G. KAUTZ

Attorney General

State of Wyoming