Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 15, 2025
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No. 25-170
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
————
SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.; SUNCOR ENERGY
SALES INC.; EXXON MOBILE CORPORATION,
v.
Petitioners,
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;
CITY OF BOULDER,
Respondents.
————
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Colorado
————
BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
————
MARK A. PERRY
Counsel of Record
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
2001 M Street NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 682-7000
mark.perry@weil.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
American Petroleum Institute
September 15, 2025
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................
ii
INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS CURIAE .........
1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .............................
3
ARGUMENT ........................................................
7
I. The essence of Respondents’ action is to
seek redress for alleged injuries arising
from global climate change and to
regulate emissions ....................................
7
II. The regulation of interstate emissions is
an inherently federal domain ...................
9
III. Allowing Boulder’s claims to proceed
would have the effect of interfering with
federal regulation of emissions and
setting back the energy transition ...........
14
CONCLUSION ....................................................
22
(i)
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Page(s)
Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 396 (2003) ...................................
19
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) ........................... 4, 9, 10, 13
Anne Arundel Cty. v. BP p.l.c.,
No. C-02-CV-21-000565 (Md. Cir. Ct.) .....
15
Bucks County v. BP p.l.c.,
No. 2024-01836-0000 (Pa. Commw. Ct.).......
16
California v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. CGC23609134 (Cal. Super. Ct.) .........
15
Cal. ex rel. Herrera v. BP p.l.c.,
No. CGC-17-561370 (Cal. Super. Ct.) ......
16
Cal. ex rel. Oakland City Att’y v. BP p.l.c.,
No. RG17875889 (Cal. Super. Ct.) ...........
16
City and County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP,
No. CAAP-22-0000429 (Haw. Ct. App.) ........
16
City and County of Honolulu v.
Chevron Corp.
No. CAAP-22-0000135 (Haw. Ct. App.) ........
16
City of Annapolis v. BP p.l.c.,
No. C-02-CV-21-000250 (Md. Cir. Ct.) .....
15
City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co.,
No. 2020CP1003975 (S.C. Ct. Com.) ........
16
City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c.,
No. 2024CH01024 (Ill. Cir. Ct.) ................
15
City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. HUD-L-003179-20 (N.J. Super.) ........ 15-16
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp.,
No. C17-01227 (Cal. Super. Ct.) ...............
16
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan,
451 U.S. 304 (1981) ................................... 5, 10
City of New York v. Chevron Corp.,
993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2021) ................ 4, 8, 10, 19
City of Richmond v. Chevron Corp.,
No. C18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct.) ...............
16
City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp.,
No. 17CV03243 (Cal. Super. Ct.) .............
16
Cnty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp.,
No. CIV1702586 (Cal. Super. Ct.) ............
16
Cnty. of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct.) ...................
15
Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp.,
No. 17CIV03222 (Cal. Super. Ct.) ............
16
Cnty. of Santa Cruz v. Chevron Corp.,
No. 17CV03242 (Cal. Super. Ct.) .............
16
Connecticut v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. HHDCV206132568S (Conn. Super.
Ct.) .............................................................
15
Delaware ex rel. Jennings v.
BP America Inc.,
No. N20C-09-097, 2024 WL 98888
(Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 2024), appeal
refused, No. 54, 2024 (Del. May 8, 2024) . 1, 16
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico v.
Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. SJ2024CV06512 (P.R. TPI) .....................
16
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
406 U.S. 91 (1972) .................................. 4, 10-12
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985) ...........
11
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) ....................... 10, 11, 14, 16
Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. 25-2-15986-8 (Wash. Super. Ct.) .......
15
Makah Indian Tribe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. 23-2-25216-1 (Wash. Super. Ct.) .......
15
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. BP p.l.c.,
No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct.) ...........
16
Minnesota v. American Petroleum Institute,
No. 62-CV-20-3837, 2025 WL 562630
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 14, 2015), appeal
docketed on other grounds, No. A250407 (Minn. Ct. App.) ............................... 1, 16
Platkin v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
No. MER-L-001797-22 (N.J. Super. Ct.) ..
15
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
COURT FILINGS
Page(s)
Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp.,
No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct.) ..........
16
State of Texas v. Pankey,
441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) ............. 10, 11, 13
West Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency,
597 U.S. 697 (2022) ...................................
13
Compl., Cnty. of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil
Corp, No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct. June
22, 2023) ....................................................
17
NON-PERIODICAL PUBLICATIONS
Energy’s Vital Role in World War II Offers
Lessons For Today, Am. Oil & Gas Rptr.
(Oct. 2023), https://www.aogr.com/webexclusives/exclusive-story/energys-vitalrole-in-world-war-ii-offers-lessons-for-tod
ay ...............................................................
20
Europe and the U.S. Make Ambitious Plans
to Reduce Reliance on Russian Gas, The
New York Times, March 22, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/bus
iness/energy-environment/biden-eu-liqu
efied-natural-gas-deal-russia.html (last
visited September 2, 2025) .......................
21
Nat’l Petroleum Council, A National Oil
Policy for the United States (1949),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/file
s/2022-11/1949-National_Oil_Policy_for_
United_States.pdf (last visited September
3, 2025) ......................................................
20
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
PBS News Hour, California Sues Oil
Companies for Exacerbating Climate
Change (Sept. 20, 2023), https://www.
pbs.org/video/suing-big-oil-1695235855/
(last visited September 3, 2025) ...............
17
U.S. Dep’t Energy Info. Admin., Natural
gas explained, https://www.eia.gov/energ
yexplained/natural-gas/ (last visited
September 3, 2025) ...................................
17
U.S. Dep’t Energy Info. Admin., Use of
energy explained, https://www.eia.gov/en
ergyexplained/use-of-energy/ (last visited
September 10, 2025) ................................. 17, 18
U.S. Dep't of Agric., Impacts of Higher
Energy Prices on Agriculture and Rural
Economies (Aug. 18, 2011), https://ers.us
da.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/publ
ications/44894/6806_err123_reportsum
mary.pdf (last visited September 3, 2025)
...................................................................
18
U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Oil and Natural
Gas: Providing Energy Security and
Supporting Our Quality of Life (Sept.
2020), https://www.energy.gov/fecm/artic
les/us-oil-and-natural-gas-providingenergy-security-and-supporting-ourquality-life (last visited September 3,
2025) ..........................................................
18
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page(s)
U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Transp.
Stats., Inflation and Transportation,
https://data.bts.gov/stories/s/Transportat
ion-an d-Inflation/f9jm-cqwe/ (last visited
September 3, 2025) ...................................
18
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sourc
es-green
house-gas-emissions
(last
visited September 3, 2025) .......................
12
What are the trends in greenhouse gas
emissions and concentrations and their
impacts on human health and the
environment?,
U.S
Environmental
Protection Agency, https://www.epa.gov/r
eport-environment/greenhouse-gases#:~:
text=Greenhouse%20gases%2C%20such
%20as%20carbon%20dioxide%2C%20me
thane%2C,received%20from%20the%20s
un%20and%20emitted%20from
(last
visited September 3, 2025) .......................
11
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Exec. Order No. 14,260 (Apr. 8, 2025) .........
7
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) .........
12
INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS CURIAE1
The American Petroleum Institute (“API”) is a
nationwide, non-profit trade association that represents
approximately 600 companies involved in every aspect
of the petroleum and natural-gas industry. Its members
range from the largest integrated companies to the
smallest independent oil and gas producers. API’s
members include producers, refiners, suppliers, marketers, pipeline operators, and marine transporters, as
well as service and supply companies that support the
industry. API is also the worldwide leading body for
establishing standards that govern the oil and
natural-gas industry.
This case is one of many that have been brought
against petroleum and natural-gas companies at the
state and local level. Many of the plaintiffs are
represented by the same counsel. Although API is not
a party to this case, state and local plaintiffs are
pursuing API as a defendant in other cases,
contending that API’s exercise of its First Amendment
rights to advocate for its members and petition the
government is a basis for tort liability. See, e.g.,
Minnesota v. Am. Petroleum Inst., No. 62-CV-20-3837,
2025 WL 562630 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 14, 2025), appeal
docketed on other grounds, No. A25-0407 (Minn. Ct.
App.); Delaware ex rel. Jennings v. BP Am. Inc., No.
N20C-09-097, 2024 WL 98888 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9,
2024), appeal refused, No. 54, 2024 (Del. May 8, 2024).
1
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2, ten days before this
brief was due, amicus notified counsel of record for the parties of
its intention to file this brief. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
37.6, amicus state that no counsel for a party authored this brief
in whole or in part and that no person other than amicus, their
members, or their counsel made any monetary contributions
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
2
This case will have broad implications for the entire
petroleum and natural-gas industry, and thus API has
a concrete stake in ensuring that plaintiffs are not
permitted to misuse state tort law to target its members.
Broadly speaking, these suits are an attempt to
remedy the effects of global climate change at the state
and local level. Although Respondents’ complaint
purportedly focuses only on the marketing, sale, and
production of fossil fuels, there is no doubt that this
case necessarily revolves around the effects of interstate greenhouse gas emissions. Interstate emissions
have long been governed exclusively by federal law
because they occupy an inherently federal domain that
states do not have the authority to regulate. The
strained reasoning of the decision below that held
Respondents could advance state-law claims is contrary to a century of this Court’s precedent, and it
should be rejected.
Furthermore, if Respondents’ claims were to
succeed, the results would be disastrous, both for the
energy industry and for any serious effort to address
climate change. API has advocated for considered and
evidence-based policies at the national level that
support research and the ongoing transition to cleaner
energy sources. API knows well that to execute this
transition, policymakers must strike a delicate
balance between reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and maintaining the consistent energy supply on
which the world economy depends.
Respondents’ suit strikes no such balance; to the
contrary, it merely seeks to recover monetary damages
for a city and the surrounding county, while leaving
the work of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to
others. Indeed, Respondents’ suit will make it more
difficult to address climate change at the national level,
3
because it will invite a patchwork of conflicting
judgments in 50 states, rather than one uniform
standard for the nation.
This suit and similar litigation would also have
impacts beyond the law. Ad hoc sanctioning and
regulation of energy companies will destabilize the
whole sector. API is uniquely situated to explain the
likely effects on the energy sector and the world
economy if billion-dollar judgments pile up and the
threat of future liability under varying state-court
judgments undercuts American energy production. As
API explains below, even small changes to costs and
prices in the energy industry can have ripple effects
throughout the world economy. This Court should stop
these suits in their tracks and allow national
policymakers to address the nationwide issue of
greenhouse gas emissions.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Colorado Supreme Court erred in ruling that
Respondents could bring state tort claims to remedy
alleged injuries caused by global climate change. For
over a century, this Court has held that interstate air
and water pollution are inherently federal domains.
Claims alleging that out-of-state emissions caused
injury within a state have always been governed by
federal law. Yet the decision below found that the
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) somehow revived state law
claims that never existed. This was error, and the
overwhelming weight of this Court’s precedent precludes Respondents’ claims. Furthermore, if Respondents
were to succeed on their claims, they would impair
federal efforts to address climate change by creating a
patchwork of different standards and inconsistent
judgments regulating the same underlying conduct.
Respondents’ suit is not a workable means by which to
4
address climate change, and it would instead unleash
chaos in sectors vital to the American economy.
As an initial matter, Respondents’ framing of their
claims as related only to the marketing, sale, and
production of fossil fuels—rather than the emission of
the greenhouse gases itself—should be rejected.
Respondents’ framing is an attempt to plead around
the exclusivity of federal law. Respondents know that
matters related to air emissions are exclusively
governed by federal law, and that they cannot openly
base their claims on the emission of greenhouse gases.
But all of Respondents’ alleged injuries were
manifestly caused by global climate change, which is
itself caused largely by the emission of greenhouse
gases. To the extent Petitioners’ “upstream” marketing,
sale, and production of fossil fuels are causal at all, they
are twice-removed from Respondents’ alleged injury.
The complaint’s focus on a narrow set of remote
activities is not credible, and it is clear the
Respondents seek to recover for the effects of
interstate greenhouse gas emissions. As the Second
Circuit held in City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 993
F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2021), “[a]rtful pleading cannot
transform the . . . complaint into anything other than
a suit over global greenhouse gas emissions.”
The regulation of interstate emissions is an
inherently federal domain. American Electric Power
Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 421, 422 (2011) (“air
and water in their ambient or interstate aspects” are
“meet for federal law governance”). For decades, this
Court applied federal common law to disputes arising
from interstate emissions. See Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (hereinafter
“Milwaukee I”); see also City of New York, 993 F.3d at
91 (collecting cases). After the CAA was enacted, this
5
Court held that the statute had displaced federal
common law in the realm of interstate emissions.
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304,
313-14 (1981) (hereinafter “Milwaukee II”). Disputes
arising from interstate emissions were thereafter
governed by the CAA. Id.
The common thread through all of these cases and
changes to the law is that federal law has always
applied to disputes arising from interstate emissions.
Yet the Colorado Supreme Court found that Respondents’
state tort claims were viable because (1) the tortious
conduct was not the emission of greenhouse gases, and
(2) federal common law no longer precludes state-law
claims. Pet. App’x at 18a, 20a. As discussed above,
Respondents do in fact necessarily allege that the
tortious conduct at issue is the emission of greenhouse
gases, and the decision below incorrectly credited
Respondents’ pleading gimmick. As to (2), the decision
below erroneously assumed that when federal common
law is displaced, state-law claims become available.
State-law claims have never been available for
disputes arising from interstate emissions, because
interstate emissions are an inherently federal domain.
Federal common law was displaced, but this bedrock
principle remains.
If Respondents’ claims were to succeed, many other
judgments in many other states would surely follow.
Petitioners and other participants in the energy
industry would be subject to an impossible web of
disparate judgments and billion-dollar awards for the
same conduct. This would do nothing to advance a
solution to global climate change and would in fact
impair any federal effort toward a nationwide solution.
The resulting deluge of fines, damages awards, and
6
conflicting decisions would also unleash chaos in the
energy industry and the world economy more broadly.
Respondents fail to recognize that combatting
climate change requires a concerted effort among
businesses, governments, and nations. Currently,
fossil fuels provide the majority of the world’s energy,
and there is not yet a viable replacement at scale. A
solution to global climate change involves balancing
the world’s energy needs with the need to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Regulation must be carefully
targeted to avoid destabilizing the energy supply that
underlies the world economy. Congress and the agencies
to which it has delegated authority can perform this
balancing act, taking the interests of the whole nation
into account. In contrast, Respondents’ suit blindly
targets fossil fuel companies and attempts to recover
for injuries in their locality, without any regard to the
effects on the rest of the country or the world.
Combatting climate change requires serious federal
and international action. Respondents’ suit is not a
serious attempt to address climate change, and it
would impair federal action by inviting a complex and
inconsistent web of state-court rules.
In addition to powering the world economy, fossil
fuels are a strategically important resource and a longstanding pillar of U.S. national security. The United
States’ ability to produce and export fossil fuels has
long been used as both a negotiating tool in diplomatic
relations and an instrument of war. The Constitution
is clear that the federal government has exclusive
control over matters related to foreign affairs, and that
state law should not interfere with this exclusive
federal domain. Respondents’ suit threatens to interfere with the United States’ ability to conduct foreign
affairs, because it would shift regulatory power over a
7
strategically important industry from the federal
government to the states. Furthermore, Respondents’
suit and the likely follow-on suits, if successful, would
destabilize the energy sector and reduce its capacity to
respond to national security imperatives like the war
in Ukraine.
ARGUMENT
This case exemplifies the President’s recent pronouncement that “States have . . . sued energy
companies for supposed ‘climate change’ harm under
nuisance or other tort regimes that could result in
crippling damages. . . . These State laws and policies
try to dictate interstate and international disputes
over air, water, and natural resources; unduly discriminate against out-of-State businesses; contravene the
equality of States; and retroactively impose arbitrary
and excessive fines without legitimate justification. . . .
They should not stand.” Exec. Order No. 14,260 at 1
(Apr. 8, 2025) (emphasis added).
I. The essence of Respondents’ action is to
seek redress for alleged injuries arising
from global climate change and to regulate
emissions.
A threshold matter is whether Respondents’ claims
are premised only on the marketing, sale, and
production of fossil fuels—purportedly bringing their
claims within the ambit of state law—or if Respondents’
claims seek to remedy alleged injuries from interstate
greenhouse gas emissions—bringing them within an
inherently federal domain. The Colorado Supreme
Court accepted Respondents’ claims at face value.
Finding that the complaint’s allegations had everything to do with “tortious conduct that [federal law]
8
does not address,” and nothing to do with “[greenhouse
gas] emissions by defendants themselves,” the court held
that Respondents’ claims did not implicate the
regulation of interstate emissions.
Respondents’ assertion that their claims relate only
to the marketing, sale, and production of fossil fuels
does not withstand scrutiny, and the Court should not
indulge their sleight of hand pleading. As the Second
Circuit held in City of New York, 993 F.3d at 91,
“[a]rtful pleading cannot transform the . . . complaint
into anything other than a suit over global greenhouse
gas emissions.”
The majority below reasoned that “[Respondents’]
claims do not seek compensation for any GHG
emissions by defendants themselves but rather focus
on [Petitioners’] upstream production activities.” Pet.
App’x at 20a. But the distinction between greenhouse
gas emissions and “upstream activities” is illusory.
Whether Respondents style their complaint as targeting upstream activities or the emissions themselves,
the result is the same: Respondents are demanding
compensation from Petitioners for the effects of
worldwide greenhouse gas emissions. The “upstream
activities” Respondents identify are only relevant to
the extent they allegedly caused the emission of
greenhouse gases. See, e.g., Amended Compl. ¶¶ 12729 (production of fossil fuels resulted in higher levels
of CO2). There is no question that all of Respondents’
injuries are alleged to have been directly caused by the
accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g.,
id. ¶ 129. Despite Respondents’ superficial focus on
upstream activities, the emissions themselves are a
necessary causal link without which Respondents’
claims fall apart. Respondents would have difficulty
establishing, for example, that the Petitioners’
9
marketing, sale, and production of fossil fuels was an
actual or proximate cause of injuries in Colorado.
Greenhouse gases have been emitted from many
different sources since the beginning of the industrial
revolution. The “upstream activities” of Petitioners
are far too remote to support Respondents’ claims. To
say that this case does not involve the regulation of
interstate greenhouse gas emissions is to ignore that
these emissions are alleged to be the direct cause of
Respondents’ alleged injuries and are a necessary
element of Respondents’ claims.
The decision below, however, elided the central issue
in the complaint by concluding that Respondents’
claims do not “involve uniquely federal areas of
regulation” because “nuisance abatement issues and
the other torts that Boulder has alleged in this case
have been deemed traditional state law matters
implicating important state interests.” Pet. App’x at
15a (emphasis omitted).
The court failed to
acknowledge, however, that the “nuisance abatement
issues” are not the typical local disputes that these
terms imply, but in fact arise from atmospheric
changes of planetary proportions. Putting state-law
labels on plainly interstate activities does not suffice
to sustain state-law claims in the inherently federal
domain of interstate emissions.
II. The regulation of interstate emissions is
an inherently federal domain.
This Court has recognized that “air and water in
their ambient or interstate aspects” are “meet for
federal law governance.” American Electric Power, 564
U.S. at 421, 422. “[A] mostly unbroken string of cases”
going back more than a century “has applied federal
law to disputes involving” claims arising out of
10
interstate emissions. City of New York, 993 F.3d at 91
(collecting cases); see Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 103.
It is because of the inherently federal nature of
interstate emissions and discharges that this Court
long held that suits related to air and water pollution
were governed by federal common law. See American
Electric Power, 564 U.S. at 420-23; Milwaukee I, 406
U.S. at 103. After the enactment of the CAA and Clean
Water Act (“CWA”), this Court held that the federal
statutory schemes had displaced federal common law.
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313-14; Int’l Paper Co. v.
Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987). In holding that the
CWA preempted most state-law claims, this Court
relied not only on the statute itself, but also on “the
fact that the control of interstate pollution is primarily
a matter of federal law.” Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 492.
Although the federal common law of air and water
pollution has been displaced, the reasons that it
was first applied remain. In a 1972 case, this Court
explained that interstate pollution required the
application of federal common law because it “touches
basic interests of federalism” and implicates an
“overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform
rule of decision” in the field of interstate emissions.
Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. This Court agreed
with a Tenth Circuit decision elaborating on the
reasons that “[f]ederal common law and not the
varying common law of the individual States” must
apply when a controversy invokes “the environmental
rights of a State against improper impairment by
sources outside its domain.” Id. at 107 n.9 (citing State
of Tex. v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971)). The
Tenth Circuit had explained that if state law was
permitted to resolve such disputes, “more conflicting
disputes, increasing assertions and proliferating con-
11
tentions would seem to be inevitable.” Pankey, 441
F.2d at 241.
The justifications for precluding state-law claims in
emissions cases were not “undermine[d]” by the CAA
or the CWA, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403,
410 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985),
and they are certainly no less applicable to the
emissions that cause global climate change. In fact,
that global climate change inherently requires a
federal solution is perhaps more evident than with
respect to the other forms of pollution that this Court
has previously addressed. In particular, this Court’s
decisions emphasize that the location of the source of
an emission or discharge is a dispositive factor in
determining whether federal law provides the exclusive remedy. See e.g., Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 93
(federal common law applied to pollution in Wisconsin
caused by sewage discharge originating in Illinois);
Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 488-89 (state-law claims
permitted only where water pollution is caused by an
in-state source). Although Respondents carefully
avoid admitting it in their complaint, it cannot be
seriously disputed that climate change is caused by
emissions throughout the United States and the
world, and that CO2, methane, and other greenhouse
gases from countless sources intermix in the
atmosphere. See What are the trends in greenhouse gas
emissions and concentrations and their impacts on
human health and the environment?, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency.2 Importantly, not
all of these emissions originate in petroleum products,
2
https://www.epa.gov/report-environment/greenhouse-gases
#:~:text=Greenhouse%20gases%2C%20such%20as%20carbon%2
0dioxide%2C%20methane%2C,received%20from%20the%20sun
%20and%20emitted%20from (last visited September 3, 2025).
12
or indeed from energy consumption at all. Sources of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.3 Given the breadth and scale of the
causes of climate change, any solutions that are to be
effective must be uniform and comprehensive,
necessarily making them solutions that only federal
policymakers can provide.
State-law tort claims that aim to regulate emissions
not only violate the “overriding federal interest in the
need for a uniform rule of decision,” Milwaukee I, 406
U.S. at 105 n.6, they also impinge on the rights of other
states by making determinations that will have an
impact well beyond the borders of the state in which
the claims are brought. By asking a Colorado court to
determine whether fossil fuel production “unreasonably
interfere[s]” with a public right such that it amounts
to a public nuisance, Restatement (Second) of Torts §
821B (1979), Respondents are necessarily asking the
court to determine whether fuel producers’ conduct
was reasonable. Making that determination requires
considering not only the risks of fossil fuel use to the
planet, but also how well those risks have been
weighed against the world’s gargantuan need for
energy and the difficulty of developing an alternative
at scale. Furthermore, the Colorado court would need
to apportion blame for climate change as a whole, not
merely alleged harms felt in Colorado, which cannot
possibly be traced to a single source. The court would
thus take on the role of quantifying the contribution of
whole industries to global climate change, including
the many fuel producers and unrelated industries not
before the court. Other states, then, would also make
these same sweeping determinations for claims
3
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gasemissions (last visited September 3, 2025).
13
brought under their own laws. In this untenable
contest between state courts over global emissions,
“more conflicting disputes, increasing assertions and
proliferating contentions would seem to be inevitable,”
Pankey, 441 F.2d at 241.
This Court has affirmed on multiple occasions that
weighty determinations affecting the entire nation
must be made by Congress or its designated federal
agency. W. Virginia v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 597 U.S. 697
(2022) (“Capping carbon dioxide emissions at a level
that will force a nationwide transition . . . . [but] [a]
decision of such magnitude and consequence rests
with Congress itself, or an agency acting pursuant to
a clear delegation from that representative body.”);
American Electric Power, 564 U.S. at 428 (noting that
Congress “designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as
best suited to serve as primary regulator of
greenhouse gas emissions”).
In an attempt to distinguish the repeated declarations of this Court regarding the inherently federal
nature of claims premised on interstate emissions, the
decision below asserted that the enactment of the CAA
rendered the Court’s prior holdings inapplicable.
Specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court reasoned
that “the CAA displaced federal common law governing interstate pollution damages suits and, thereafter,
federal common law did not preempt state law.” Pet.
App’x at 16a. The court thus appeared to posit that if
federal common law no longer applies, state law must
apply.
As an initial matter, the decision below rests on the
dubious suggestion that the enactment of a broad
federal air pollution and emissions scheme reduced the
scope of federal authority in that very field. The
decision below noted that Petitioners had cited
14
“no applicable authority supporting the proposition
that once federal common law exists, the structure of
the Constitution precludes the application of state law
even when that common law no longer exists.” Id. at
17a. However, in the cases in which this Court has
considered the CWA’s or CAA’s displacement of federal
common law, it has held that the statutes leave no
room for the types of state-law claims at issue here.
See e.g., Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 488-89. Furthermore,
even assuming that the displacement of federal
common law by a federal statute could theoretically
resurrect state-law claims, the court’s reasoning would
nevertheless run up against the basic fact that
interstate emissions have never been governed by
state law. Thus, the CAA’s displacement of federal
common law could not have resurrected state-law
claims that never existed.
III. Allowing Respondents’ claims to proceed
would interfere with federal regulation of
emissions and set back the energy
transition.
The inherently federal nature of emissions
regulation is grounded not only in abstract Constitutional
principles of federalism, but also in the practical
impossibility of effectively regulating nationwide environmental matters at the state level. Allowing state
law to regulate interstate emissions would compromise any attempt at a uniform scheme or concerted
effort toward combatting climate change. It would also
risk serious disruption to the national economy and
undermine the United States’ ability to conduct
foreign affairs.
A. This practical reality is well known to API and
its members, who operate across the world and comply
with the laws of many different jurisdictions. Because
15
of the need to standardize fuel production methods,
changes in the law of one jurisdiction affect API’s
members’ behavior in other jurisdictions. Furthermore,
climate change is undisputedly a global phenomenon
that requires a coordinated response at the national
and international level. It is widely understood that
combatting climate change is one of the great
challenges of our age, and the solutions require
significant research, scientific innovation, and carefully
targeted regulation. Any solution also requires coordination with other sovereign nations.
Federal
authorities—the President, Congress, and the expert
agency to which it has delegated authority (the EPA)—
are the bodies capable of undertaking this task.
In contrast, state courts are not in a position to
effectively regulate global greenhouse gas emissions
and would in fact harm any effort to do so. Regulating
greenhouse gas emissions via a litany of state-law tort
actions would create a sprawling patchwork of regulations across all 50 states that would undermine any
attempt at uniform, federal regulation. If Respondents’ state-law claims are allowed to proceed, many
will follow in other states. Dozens of lawsuits bringing
state-law tort claims have already been filed in
different state jurisdictions.4 Inevitably, different
4
Leon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 25-2-15986-8 (Wash.
Super. Ct.); City of Chicago v. BP p.l.c., No. 2024CH01024 (Ill. Cir.
Ct.); Cnty. of Multnomah v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 23CV25164
(Or. Cir. Ct.); California v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. CGC23609134
(Cal. Super. Ct.); Makah Indian Tribe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
23-2-25216-1 (Wash. Super. Ct.); Platkin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No.
MER-L-001797-22 (N.J. Super. Ct.); City of Annapolis v. BP p.l.c.,
No. C-02-CV-21-000250 (Md. Cir. Ct.); Anne Arundel Cty. v. BP
p.l.c., No. C-02-CV-21-000565 (Md. Cir. Ct.); Connecticut v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., No. HHDCV206132568S (Conn. Super. Ct.); City of
Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HUD-L-003179-20 (N.J.
16
states’ courts will come to different decisions, and
API’s members could well be subject to inconsistent
laws and judgments. Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 496
(allowing “a number of different states to have
independent and plenary regulatory authority over a
single discharge would lead to chaotic confrontation
between sovereign states.” (citation omitted)).
In sum, the use of tort law to regulate emissions
takes a hammer to a problem that requires a scalpel.
Respondents seek to short-circuit the ongoing energy
transition to their exclusive benefit, at the expense of
every other state and locality in the nation—all of which
are affected by climate change.
Furthermore, the damages requested by Respondents
and other plaintiffs across the country are enough to
cripple the energy industry and cause ripple effects
throughout the American economy. Respondents seek
Super.); Delaware v. BP America Inc., No. N20C-09-097 (Del.
Super. Ct.); City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., No.
2020CP1003975 (S.C. Ct. Com.); Minnesota v. American
Petroleum Institute, No. 62-CV-20-3837 (Minn. Dist. Ct.); Rhode
Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct.); City
of Richmond v. Chevron Corp., No. C18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct.);
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. BP p.l.c., No. 24-C-18-004219
(Md. Cir. Ct.); City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C1701227 (Cal. Super. Ct.); Cnty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No.
CIV1702586 (Cal. Super. Ct.); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron
Corp., No. 17CIV03222 (Cal. Super. Ct.); City of Santa Cruz v.
Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03243 (Cal. Super. Ct.); Cnty. of Santa
Cruz v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CV03242 (Cal. Super. Ct.); Cal. ex
rel. Herrera v. BP p.l.c., No. CGC-17-561370 (Cal. Super. Ct.); Cal.
ex rel. Oakland City Att’y v. BP p.l.c., No. RG17875889 (Cal. Super. Ct.);
City and County of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, et al, No. CAAP-22-0000429
(Haw. Ct. App.); City and County of Honolulu v. Chevron Corp. et al, No.
CAAP-22-0000135 (Haw. Ct. App.); Bucks County v. BP p.l.c., No. 202401836-0000 (Pa. Commw. Ct.); Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico v.
Exxon Mobil Corp. et al, No. SJ2024CV06512 (P.R. TPI).
17
extensive monetary relief to compensate for alleged
property damage and to maintain basic municipal
functions, such as repairing bridges and containing
wildfires. Amended Compl. ¶ 532. Other states have
signaled that they will seek damages on an even larger
scale. For example, California is seeking “tens of
billions to hundreds of billions in ongoing damages going
forward.” PBS News Hour, California Sues Oil
Companies for Exacerbating Climate Change (Sept. 20,
2023).5 Multnomah, Oregon is seeking over $1.5
billion in damages and an abatement fund of over $50
billion paid for by the defendants. Compl. at 174-75,
Cnty. of Multnomah, No. 23CV25164 (Or. Cir. Ct. June 22,
2023).
In these self-interested suits, states and municipalities disregard the national interest in maintaining the
supply of low-cost energy that powers the American
economy. If these suits succeed in obtaining billiondollar judgments for particular states and localities,
the costs will inevitably impact the energy supply
chain. The inflationary effect of increased energy costs
could have sweeping effects on the U.S. economy and
international trade. About 60% of U.S. households rely
on natural gas as their primary source of
energy. U.S. Dep’t Energy Info. Admin., Natural gas
explained6; U.S. Dep’t Energy Info. Admin., Use of
energy explained.7 Nearly the entire transportation
sector depends on energy derived from fossil fuels.
This affects not only the cost of gas for individuals, but
5
https://www.pbs.org/video/suing-big-oil-1695235855/ (last visited September 3, 2025).
6
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/ (last visited September 3, 2025).
7
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/use-of-energy/ (last
visited September 10, 2025).
18
also the cost of logistics and shipping. U.S. Dep’t
Energy Info. Admin., Use of energy explained.8 Studies
have shown that, because these sectors are so vital,
even modest increases in core energy prices can have
ripple effects that disrupt the entire economy. Dep’t of
Transp., Bureau of Transp. Stats., Inflation and
Transportation.9
The value of petroleum to the economy also extends
well beyond fuel. Petroleum-based products such as
plastic are ubiquitous in basic consumer products and
essential to nearly every major industry. For example,
an increase in the cost of petroleum-based products
would be immediately felt in the agricultural industry,
U.S. Dep't of Agric., Impacts of Higher Energy Prices
on Agriculture and Rural Economies (Aug. 18, 2011),10
the manufacturing industry, U.S. Dep’t Energy Info.
Admin., Use of energy explained,11 and the healthcare
industry, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Oil and Natural
Gas: Providing Energy Security and Supporting Our
Quality of Life (Sept. 2020).12
The potential consequences of Respondents’ suit
have serious implications for the national economy. It
8
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/use-of-energy/ (last
visited September 10, 2025).
9
https://data.bts.gov/stories/s/Transportation-and-Inflatio
n/f9jm-cqwe/ (last visited September 3, 2025).
10
https://ers.usda.gov/sites/default/files/_laserfiche/publica
tions/44894/6806_err123_reportsummary.pdf (last visited September 3, 2025).
11
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/use-of-energy/ (last
visited September 10, 2025).
12
https://www.energy.gov/fecm/articles/us-oil-and-naturalgas-providing-energy-security-and-supporting-our-quality-life
(last visited September 3, 2025).
19
is for that reason that federal policymakers, and not
individual states, have the exclusive authority to
regulate nationwide emissions. Allowing states to
bypass federal supremacy would impose ad hoc,
localized solutions on a problem that requires a broad
and careful review in which all interested parties are
represented.
B. Allowing state tort law to govern emissions
would also intrude on the federal government’s
exclusive control over foreign affairs. Am. Ins. Ass’n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (“[t]he exercise of
the federal executive authority,” particularly in the
area of foreign affairs, “means that state law must give
way where, as here, there is evidence of clear conflict
between the policies adopted by the two”). As noted
above, no solution to the climate crisis is possible
without international cooperation. The federal government must be able to negotiate on behalf of the
nation as a whole and make agreements regarding
greenhouse gas emissions with other sovereign nations.
The federal government cannot effectively do so if the
states have already imposed their own standards that
may conflict with those under negotiation. In essence,
the federal government cannot negotiate the regulation
of nationwide emissions if it does not have the
exclusive authority to regulate such emissions. City of
New York, 993 F.3d at 103 (State-law tort suit “would
not only risk jeopardizing our nation’s foreign policy
goals but would also seem to circumvent Congress’s
own expectations and carefully balanced scheme of
international cooperation on a topic of global concern.”).
More generally, the strategic importance of fossil
fuels means that they have always played a crucial
role in foreign affairs. During World War II, the United
States’ reserves of oil became “[a] prime weapon of
20
victory in two world wars” and “a bulwark of our
national security.”
Nat’l Petroleum Council, A
National Oil Policy for the United States 1 (1949).13 At
the time the United States entered the war, it had
more petroleum reserves than any other country in the
world, and President Franklin Roosevelt wielded the
industry as an instrument of foreign affairs. Energy’s
Vital Role in World War II Offers Lessons For Today,
Am. Oil & Gas Rptr. (Oct. 2023).14 In 1941, the United
States embargoed oil shipments to Japan, dramatically altering the course of the war in the Pacific. Id.
On the other hand, President Roosevelt accelerated
shipments of high-octane fuel for aircraft, as well as oil
for ships, lubricants, and synthetic rubber to the Allies.
Id. During the span of the conflict, the oil industry
increased production by nearly 30% to meet the
enormous demand. Id. U.S. oil and petroleum-based
products were necessary for the Allies to continue
fighting, and the United States’ wealth of petroleum
resources emerged as one of its most powerful tools in
foreign affairs.
Id.; Nat’l Petroleum Council, A
National Oil Policy for the United States 1.15
The petroleum industry is no less a part of foreign
affairs today. In 2022, following Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, the European Union sought to reduce its
dependence on natural gas from Russia. President Joe
13
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/1949National_Oil_Policy_for_United_States.pdf (last visited September 3, 2025).
14
https://www.aogr.com/web-exclusives/exclusive-story/ene
rgys-vital-role-in-world-war-ii-offers-lessons-for-today (last visited September 3, 2025).
15
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/1949National_Oil_Policy_for_United_States.pdf (last visited September 3, 2025).
21
Biden agreed to increase shipments of natural gas and
dramatically increase the United States’ export
capacity. Europe and the U.S. Make Ambitious Plans
to Reduce Reliance on Russian Gas, The New York
Times, March 22, 2022.16 The agreement envisions the
United States increasing its exports to the EU from 15
billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas to 50
billion cubic meters by 2030. Id. The executive
agreement called on the energy industry to respond
with massive investments to increase production of
fossil fuels. Id.
Given the vital role that fossil fuels continue to play
in foreign affairs and national security, the need to
reduce emissions and combat climate change must be
carefully weighed against the need to increase
production when it is in the interest of national
security. State courts are clearly not the proper
authority to conduct this balancing of environmental
and national security interests, and their attempt to
do so would violate the federal government’s exclusive
control over foreign affairs. State-court suits like
Respondents’ and their attendant risk of future
liability for climate-related damages could well impact
fuel production. This would severely hinder the
federal government’s ability to use the United States’
natural resources as a tool to advance the nation’s
strategic interests. State interference with any of
these interests is untenable and only reinforces why
the conduct at issue in this case falls within an
inherently federal domain.
* * *
16
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/business/energy-en
vironment/biden-eu-liquefied-natural-gas-deal-russia.html (last visited September 2, 2025).
22
Global climate change is a serious issue that
deserves serious action. API firmly believes that the
only viable solutions to climate change exist at the
national level and as a uniform, nationwide standard.
Americans depend on a stable energy supply and the
economy that it powers, and these energy needs must
be carefully balanced against the need to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. However, policymakers
representing the interests of all 50 states must
address this issue. The basic principles of federalism
hold that it is improper for one state court addressing
one county’s claims to render decisions that affect the
citizens of every other state.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
MARK A. PERRY
Counsel of Record
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
2001 M Street NW
Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 682-7000
mark.perry@weil.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
American Petroleum Institute
September 15, 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.