Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.
Supreme Court briefSep 11, 2025
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No. 25-170
In the Supreme Court of the United States
__________
SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.;
SUNCOR ENERGY SALES INC.; EXXON MOBIL CORP.,
Petitioners,
v.
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;
CITY OF BOULDER,
Respondents.
__________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Colorado
__________
BRIEF OF THE FRONTIER INSTITUTE,
INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, PELICAN
INSTITUTE, AND MANHATTAN INSTITUTE
AS AMICI CURIAE
SUPPORTING PETITIONERS
__________
Marcella Burke
Paul B. Simon
BURKE LAW GROUP PLLC
1000 Main Street,
Suite 2300
Houston, TX 77002
(832) 987-2214
marcella@burkegroup.law
Ilya Shapiro
Counsel of Record
MANHATTAN INSTITUTE
52 Vanderbilt Ave.
New York, NY 10017
(212) 599-7000
ishapiro@manhattan.
institute
September 11, 2025
Additional counsel listed on signature page
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
The Colorado Supreme Court found that the Clean
Air Act’s framework did not preempt all state and local
regulation of emissions and allowed Boulder County to
bring tort claims under Colorado law against Suncor
Energy and Exxon Mobil Corporation for damages
from carbon emissions.
The question presented is:
Whether federal law precludes state-law claims
seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas
emissions on the global climate.
ii
Table of Contents
QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENT........................................................... 2
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 3
I. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM IS
DEEPLY ROOTED IN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ....................... 3
A. The History of Horizontal Federalism ........ 3
B. The Constitutional Structure of
Horizontal Federalism ................................. 8
II. FOUR ASPECTS OF HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM ARE RELEVANT TO
THIS CASE ..................................................... 11
A. Overreaching.............................................. 11
B. Exclusions .................................................. 13
C. Favoritism .................................................. 15
D. Externalities .............................................. 18
III.THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
IGNORED HORIZONTAL
FEDERALISM ................................................ 20
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 24
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut,
564 U.S. 410 (2011) ................................................ 21
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996) ................................................ 13
Canaday v. Anthem Companies, Inc.,
9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021) ...................................... 2
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955)......................... 9
Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy
USA, Inc., 2025 WL 1363355
(Colo. May 12, 2025)......................................... 21, 22
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) ......................... 16
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,
587 U.S. 230 (2019) ............................................ 2, 17
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925) .............. 13
Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880) ...................... 14
Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234 (1818) ............ 16
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ................... 12
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) .............. 12
Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,
479 U.S. 481 (1987) .................................... 21, 22, 23
Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ......... 12
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) ........ 18–19, 23
Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.,
565 U.S. 625 (2012) ................................................ 22
iv
Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross,
598 U.S. 356 (2023) ................................ 2, 13, 15, 23
Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909)..................... 13
Northwest Airlines Inc. v. County of Kent,
510 U.S. 355 (1994) ................................................ 13
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ......................... 11
People of State of Ill. v. City of Milwaukee,
731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) .................................. 21
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) ....... 14
Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (1779) ............. 5
Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n,
502 U.S. 591 (1992) ................................................ 18
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) .... 17–18
Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772) ............ 4
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966) ................................................ 18
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) ..................... 20
Underwriters Nat. Assur. Co. v. N.C. Life & Acc.
& Health Ins. Guaranty Ass’n,
455 U.S. 691 (1982) .................................... 16, 17, 23
W.Va. ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951) ......... 19
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286 (1980) ............................................ 2, 12
Constitutional Provisions & Statutes
An Act to Provide for the Government of the
Territory North-West of the River Ohio,
art. V § 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789) ................................ 8, 17
Art. of Confed. of 1781, art. IV, § 1 ............................. 6
v
Colo. Const. art. XIV .................................................. 20
U.S. Const. art. I, §10 .............................................. 8, 9
U.S. Const. art. IV, §1.................................................. 9
U.S. Const. art. IV, §2.................................................. 9
Other Authorities
2 The Records of the Constitutional Convention of
1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) ................................. 7
Allen Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism,
93 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (2008)........... 2, 3, 6, 11, 16, 19
Angus Thuermer, “Hageman Proposes a Boulder,
Colorado, Fossil-Fuel-Free Experiment,”
Cap City News, Aug. 8, 2024 ................................. 20
Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial
State Legislation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1865 (1987) ..... 3
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations at I, § 18
(Joseph Chitty ed., 1834) (1758) .......................... 5, 6
Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a
Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency,
49 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1997) ............................................ 9
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,
91 Yale L.J. 425 (1982) ............................................ 9
Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers
Reconsidered,
85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133 (2010) ...................... 10
Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous
History of a Constitutional Principle,
18 Publius 53 (1988) ................................................ 8
vi
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,
Backdoor Federalization,
53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353 (2006) ................................ 10
The Articles of Confederation of the United
Colonies of New England; May 19, 1643 § 3,
The Avalon Project ................................................... 5
The Federalist No. 7 (Hamilton) ............................... 10
The Federalist No. 44 (Madison) ................................. 9
The Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton) ............................. 10
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England § 4 (1765) ................................................... 4
Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,
78 Columbia L. Rev. 1587 (1978)........................... 10
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
The Frontier Institute is an independent research and educational institution with the mission to
keep the spirit of the western frontier alive with sound
public policy and education programs that empower
Montanans to be pioneers, innovators and risk takers.
To those ends, the Frontier Institute is dedicated to
upholding the separation-of-powers requirements of
the United States and Montana Constitutions that foster democratic accountability and sound public policy.
The Independence Institute is a 501(c)(3) public
policy research organization in Denver, founded on the
eternal truths of the Declaration of Independence. The
briefs and scholarship of research director David Kopel
have been cited in seven opinions of this Court and 89
opinions of lower courts. The Institute’s senior fellow
in constitutional studies, law professor Robert Natelson, has been cited in 11 opinions of this Court.
The Pelican Institute for Public Policy is a nonpartisan research and educational organization, the
leading voice for free markets in Louisiana. Pelican’s
mission is to conduct research and analysis that advances sound policies based on free enterprise, individual liberty, and constitutionally limited government.
The Manhattan Institute (MI) is a nonprofit public policy research foundation whose mission is to develop and disseminate new ideas that foster greater
economic choice and individual responsibility, to advance the flourishing of America’s great cities.
Rule 37 statement: Counsel for both parties were timely notified of amici’s intent to file this brief. No counsel for any party
authored this brief in any part; nobody other than amici made a
monetary contribution to fund its preparation or submission.
1
2
This case interests amici because a proper understanding of federalism means that sometimes federal
law precludes contrary state law. The transaction of
actually interstate commerce such as energy production, and its attendant pollution, is such a quintessentially federal area. Having one regulatory structure
here allows for legal stability and the efficient allocation of economic resources
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“Constitutional federalism has two distinct dimensions: the federal government must interact with the
states, and states must interact with each other.” Allen Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev.
493, 501 (2008). The former interactions are more familiar, but other significant friction occurs from engagements among states or their inhabitants.
The principles governing these interactions have
been called many things: “antidiscrimination,” Nat’l
Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 376
(2023); “comity,” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,
587 U.S. 230, 245 (2019); “interstate federalism,” see
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 293 (1980); and “horizontal federalism,” Canaday
v. Anthem Companies, Inc., 9 F.4th 392, 410 (6th Cir.
2021) (Donald, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
We will use the last term, “horizontal federalism.”
This case implicates four recurring “sources of interstate friction” that this Court regularly analyzes,
based on the following principles:
•
Overreaching: A state may not adjudicate,
tax, regulate, or punish conduct that occurs beyond its borders, or is lawful in other states.
3
•
Exclusions: States (especially commercially
powerful ones) may not leverage their regulations to restrict other states’ policymaking.
•
Favoritism: The federal government may intervene when states regulate in favor of local interests ways that burden constitutional rights.
•
Externalities: Federal law governs when a
state pursues a policy that affects another, and
both states have equal rights of action.
See Erbsen, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 514.
Horizontal federalism emerges from the rich scholarship and experience that informed the framers and
the federal structure they established. The Colorado
Supreme Court neglected that framework here.
ARGUMENT
I. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM IS DEEPLY
ROOTED IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Horizontal federalism is “one of those foundational
principles of our federalism which we infer from the
structure of the Constitution as a whole.” Donald H.
Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich.
L. Rev. 1865, 1885 (1987).
A. The History of Horizontal Federalism
In the introduction to his Commentaries, Blackstone explained the limitations on applying English
law to colonies like America:
For it is held, that if an uninhabited country be
discovered and planted by English subjects, all
4
the English laws are immediately there in force.
For as the law is the birth right of every subject,
so wherever they go they carry their laws with
them. But in conquered or ceded countries, that
have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws, but until he
does actually change them, the antient laws of
the country remain…. Our American plantations
are principally of this latter sort, being obtained
in the last century either by right of conquest and
driving out the natives (with what natural justice
I shall not at present enquire) or by treaties. And
therefore the common law of England, as such,
has no allowance or authority there, they being
no part of the mother country, but distinct
(though dependent) dominions.
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England § 4 at 105 (1765). Even that early, the application of law to a person thus depended on (1) whose
law they were born under, and (2) whether their land
had been conquered and the law changed. Foreign
laws, including the common law, are not self-executing; they must be deliberately imposed or adopted.
A few years before the Revolution, British courts
were articulating the doctrines of extraterritoriality
and comity in jurisdictions that American lawyers like
the framers followed closely. One jurist, Lord Mansfield, held that a slave brought from America could not
be detained in England because “[t]he state of slavery
… is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support
it, but positive law.” Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep.
499, 510 (1772). So British jurists held that a law of
one jurisdiction was not given effect in another if repugnant to that jurisdiction’s fundamental principles.
5
Likewise, in Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165
(1779), Mansfield ruled that “one nation does not take
notice of the revenue laws of another.” There, a contract to evade French customs law could not be enforced in an English court, because English courts
would not enforce French tax law.
The idea consistently advanced in these writings is
that the effect of the laws of a sovereign stop at its borders. Every court and country applies and fashions its
own law but respects the statutes “carried with” the
subjects of other sovereigns, and adopts the ones they
deem persuasive or appropriate. Any further entanglement would lead to confusion about which law applies.
These principles had already seeped into early intercolonial governance. In 1643, for example, four British colonies in America formed a league for mutual defense, provided that each colony “shall have peculiar
jurisdiction and government within their limits[.]” The
Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of
New England; May 19, 1643 § 3, The Avalon Project,
https://tinyurl.com/2p9ksh4d. The colonies also agreed
to return fugitives and settle disputes through a
shared council—an early recognition that while each
was autonomous, cooperation under law was necessary for true order among equals. This early federalstyle structure constituted the background by which
America’s government later formed.
European law-of-nations theorists also shaped
early American understandings of comity and equal
sovereignty. A treatise on the subject, widely read in
Revolutionary America, maintained that nations are
equal in rights and dignity, regardless of size or
power—just like individuals. Emer de Vattel, The Law
of Nations at I, § 18 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1834) (1758).
6
“A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic
is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful
kingdom.” Id. This idea of sovereign equality posited
that no state may subordinate another by force of law.
Mutual recognition and voluntary respect were ideal,
even necessary, when crafting a union of states.
The Constitution’s framers were acutely aware
that unrestrained state action leads to interstate friction and conflict. Our first charter, the Articles of Confederation, viewed each state as its own sovereign, and
provided “the free inhabitants” of each state with
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in
the several States, and the people of each State
shall have free ingress and regress to and from
any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the
privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the
same duties, impositions and restrictions as the
inhabitants thereof respectively….
Art. of Confed. of 1781, art. IV, § 1. Yet under the Articles, states often “pursued conflicting self-interests
at their collective expense,” enacting protectionist
measures and interfering with commerce. Erbsen, 93
Minn. L. Rev. at 511. They coined their own money,
raised their own armies, and erected trade barriers,
“creating systemic friction that left them collectively
worse off.” Id. at 533. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention emerged from a years-long battle
with that problematic interstate construction, producing a system of government with a different approach.
It bears noting from the outset that the Constitution contains no explicit provision requiring blanket
interstate equality. At the Constitutional Convention,
Gouverneur Morris proposed striking a portion of what
7
is now Article IV, Section 3, that required new states
to be admitted “on the same terms” as current states.
2 The Records of the Constitutional Convention of
1787 at 454 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). James Madison
opposed Morris’s motion, arguing that new states “neither would nor ought to submit to a Union which degraded them from an equal rank with the other
States.” Id. George Mason likewise argued that Morris’s suggestion appeared intended to deter western
emigration, but that this was impossible. Id. Mason
continued that “the best policy” regarding these new
states would be “to treat them with that equality
which will make them friends not enemies.” Id. Morris
agreed that stopping western emigration was impossible, but “did not wish to throw the power into the[]
hands” of newly admitted states. Id. Roger Sherman
then notably stated that he was in favor of “fixing an
equality of privileges by the Constitution,” and therefore opposed the motion. John Langdon chimed in to
support the motion because he wondered about circumstances “which would render it inconvenient” to
admit new states on equal footing with established
ones. Id. North Carolina’s Hugh Williamson also clarified that while existing states “enjoy an equality now,
and for that reason are admitted to [Congress] in the
Senate,” this reason did not apply to new states. Id.
The body accepted Morris’s edits by a 9–2 vote. Id.
This debate is highly instructive as to the framers’
perspective on interstate relations. Morris’s edit provoked vocal debate from Madison, Mason, and Sherman—leading architects of the Constitution’s framework—because it ran counter to their conviction that
existing states should have equality of privileges. But
Morris and his supporting delegates, who won the day,
8
thought it best to leave to Congress’s judgment the exact admission terms for new states.
The Convention’s view was not that states were unequal or lacked equal sovereignty. It was that the
elected representatives of existing states should decide
what privileges new states had when admitting them.
Although the Convention did not settle this question,
the Continental Congress in New York incorporated
the Northwest Ordinance under the new Constitution,
requiring that new states would enter the union “on
equal footing” with existing states. An Act to Provide
for the Government of the Territory North-West of the
River Ohio, art. V § 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 n.a (1789). Every
state since has been admitted “with an express declaration of equality” with existing states. Peter S. Onuf,
New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional Principle, 18 Publius 53, 54 (1988).
B. The Constitutional Structure of Horizontal
Federalism
Despite that disagreement at the drafting stage,
the Constitution established a federal structure that
treats states as equal sovereigns with limited authority to encroach on each other’s respective domains.
States may not, for example, coin money or lay duties
without Congress’s consent. U.S. Const. art. I, §10. In
addition to these pointed restraints on interstate activity, the Constitution includes provisions designed to
foster comity and equality between the several states.
The Interstate Compact Clause, U.S. Const. art. I,
§10, cl.3, allows states to resolve disagreements by
“Agreement or Compact” with congressional approval.
These agreements have been frequently employed to
govern relations between states since the founding.
9
See Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 Fla. L.
Rev. 1, 3–4 nn.14–18 (1997) (listing compacts). While
such arrangements are allowed, any “Treaty, Alliance,
or Confederation” between states is prohibited. U.S.
Const. art. I, §10, cl.1. This language likely refers to
unilateral contracts between states without Congress’s say-so, or military or external-facing agreements. It was part of the Articles of Confederation and
“for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into
the new Constitution.” The Federalist No. 44 (Madison), at 281 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
The Constitution also includes another clause similar to a provision in the Articles, which provides that
the “Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.” Art. IV, §2, cl.1. While pared down from its
earlier counterpart, the constitutional version has a
wider sweep—preserving the legal and natural rights
of American citizens in all contexts, not merely a commercial one. Based on its lineage and language, this
clause governs state legislative power “in commercial
matters where Congress has not yet acted.” Julian N.
Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,
91 Yale L.J. 425, 448 (1982). And all that does not obviate the dormant Commerce Clause, which speaks to
relations between states that specifically concern commerce—addressed infra at II.B.
Another clause requires states to give “Full Faith
and Credit” to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV,
§1; see also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955)
(clause prevents states from “adopting any policy of
hostility” to each other’s acts). This extraterritoriality
10
doctrine sets the boundaries for how states must treat
the decisions and laws of other states.
Other constitutional provisions help complete the
horizontal federalism framework. Five of the nine provisions in Article III addressing jurisdiction concern
the interaction between states, emphasizing the framers’ concern that courts should referee “bickering and
animosities” between these co-equal sovereigns. The
Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton) at 477. Hamilton specifically worried about this issue, warning that states exercising “distinctions, preferences, and exclusions . . .
would beget discontent,” causing “outrages,” and then
“reprisals and wars.” Federalist No. 7 (Hamilton). Rather than addressing the externalities that activity legal in one state might cause in another, the Constitution sets this problem aside for judicial resolution—
and the courts’ solution has often been explicit federal
control. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M.
Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev.
1353, 1368–98 (2006) (discussing federalization of areas traditionally under state control).
At bottom, equality among the states is a due process concern. “[D]ue process primarily protects individuals from being unfairly subject to another state’s
laws.” Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers
Reconsidered, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133, 1137–38
(2010). Scholarship regarding extraterritoriality, has
long noted that horizontal federalism “protect[s] persons against the unfair application of a law” outside
proper borders while also “furthering other interstate
… values[.]” Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 Columbia L. Rev. 1587, 1589 (1978).
Together, these provisions provide the framework
of horizontal federalism. The Constitution preserves
11
each state’s authority to make laws and regulations
that govern activity occurring within its bounds while
restraining that power beyond a state’s borders.
II. FOUR ASPECTS OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM ARE RELEVANT TO THIS CASE
Because horizontal federalism is a structural doctrine inferable from the Constitution, rather than delineated in an explicit clause, how may lower courts
“weave wisps of structure into judicially enforceable
standards”? Erbsen, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 582. A robust
body of the Court’s case law has given shape to aspects
of horizontal federalism, in a variety of contexts. All
has in common the presupposition that state power is
limited by the equal sovereignty of other states and by
a common interest in preventing interstate friction—
the “reprisals and wars” of Hamilton’s warning.
A. Overreaching
With narrow exceptions, states cannot tax or regulate beyond their borders, or punish conduct that was
lawful where it occurred. Courts have long recognized
this principle in the law of personal jurisdiction.
In the post-Civil War period, this Court found in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), that “no
State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority
over persons or property without its territory.” Because “the several States are of equal dignity and authority,” one state extending its reach to conduct beyond its borders is “an encroachment upon the independence” of the state where the affected persons or
property are actually located. Id. at 722–23.
The Court eventually softened Pennoyer’s requirement that state jurisdiction screeches to a stop at its
12
borders. It allowed jurisdiction where contacts existed
with the forum state, but affirmed that such jurisdiction must not transgress “traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). The federal
system does not permit states to hale every outsider
with whom they have contact into court:
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate before
the tribunals of another State; even if the forum
State has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy; even if the forum State is the
most convenient location for litigation, the Due
Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the
State of its power to render a valid judgment.
Woodson, 444 U.S. at 294.
The strictures of personal jurisdiction are “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States” that safeguard individual fairness and
interstate sovereignty. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 251 (1958). Every state’s judicial power ends
where another’s authority begins, and no state can
punish or regulate conduct lawful in another state if
that conduct lacks a meaningful connection to the forum. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407–408
(1930) (holding that Texas law “may not validly affect
contracts which are neither made nor are to be performed in Texas”).
This Court’s personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence,
therefore, highlights an important facet of the doctrine: a state may regulate activity beyond its physical
13
borders only if that activity has a meaningful, substantial nexus with it—in this case, minimum contacts.
But the principle is more than jurisdictional. Due
process constrains states from taxing or regulating in
a way that “infring[es] on the policy choices of other
States.” See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
572 (1996) (noting this in dicta); see also Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 477–79 (1925) (holding Due
Process Clause bars Pennsylvania from imposing
transfer tax on art in New York owned by Pennsylvania decedent); Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 321
(1909) (reversing criminal conviction in Oregon of
Washington resident who fished in Washington using
gear lawful in Washington). A robust body of law confirms that infringement on another state’s policy is the
line that another state may not cross when regulating.
B. Exclusions
Despite the general prohibition against overreach,
as a practical matter, a large state’s in-state bans on
certain activity may lead to de facto nationwide rules,
especially in the commercial realm. But even these
rules are limited: states may not leverage their restrictive regulations to prevent more permissive policymaking elsewhere.
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” Ross, 598 U.S. at 369
(cleaned up). Protectionist state action amounts to
“discrimination against interstate commerce” in this
telling. Northwest Airlines Inc. v. County of Kent, 510
U.S. 355, 373 n.18 (1994). But while states may not
“build up” commerce by burdening industry and
14
“business of other states,” so long as its goals are not
protectionism, “a State may exclude from its territory,
or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its
judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to” its own
citizenry. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880).
In Ross, petitioners argued that the dormant Commerce Clause operates as a near-blanket prohibition of
“state laws that have the practical effect of controlling
commerce outside the State,” even unintentionally. Id.
at 371 (quotation omitted). The Court disagreed, noting that its prior decisions prohibited only state statutes that “prevented out-of-state firms from undertaking competitive pricing or deprived businesses and
consumers in other States of whatever competitive advantages they may possess.” Id. at 374 (cleaned up).
Inferring more would “invite endless litigation and inconsistent results” when any state made a law that influenced commerce outside its borders. Id. at 375. The
Court noted that antidiscrimination under the
dormant Commerce Clause “may well represent one
more effort to mediate competing claims of sovereign
authority under our horizontal separation of powers,”
but it does not allow the Court to strike down all extraterritorial exercises of state power. Id. at 376.
The Ross petitioners advanced another argument
premised on Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970), which held that state statutes regulating
to “effectuate a local public interest” with incidental
interstate commerce effects will be upheld “unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.” The Court
fractured over how to handle this claim. The plurality
held that the petitioners’ claim that California’s pork
regulations flunk Pike fails because courts cannot
15
weigh a law’s economic and non-economic effects, and
that such policy choices “belong to the people and their
elected representatives.” Ross, 598 U.S. at 382. Congress may step in if a state law disrupts an industry
given “its power to adopt federal legislation that may
preempt conflicting state laws.” Id. at 382–83.
But Chief Justice Roberts—joined by three others—would have vacated and remanded. Id. at 395.
Roberts noted that most of the Court agreed that “it is
possible to balance benefits and burdens[,]” even of
various kinds, under Pike. Id. at 397. Accordingly,
Roberts found that this Court’s precedents distinguish
“the costs of complying with a given state regulation
from other economic harms to the interstate market.”
Id. Certain state regulations may not impose a cost immediately, or that cost may be “difficult to quantify,”
but it is not “noneconomic” cost. Id. at 399. The chief
justice distinguishes his approach from a per se prohibition on extraterritorial state action by finding that
regulations imposing “broad impact requiring . . . compliance even by producers who do not wish to sell in
the regulated market” may fail under Pike. Id. at 402.
It cannot be that the Constitution, without exceptions, prohibits a state from regulating activity wholly
within its bounds in a way that affects commerce beyond them. But when one state makes a law that burdens commercial activity that occurs in another state,
such laws are suspect under horizontal federalism.
C. Favoritism
States also “have an incentive to favor local interests,” but if they do so in a way that burdens the Privileges and Immunities or Full Faith and Credit
16
Clauses, federal courts must step in to referee the conflict. See Erbsen, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 521.
Where a state has jurisdiction to rule on a case’s
merits, the judgment of its courts is entitled to full
faith and credit. See Underwriters Nat. Assur. Co. v.
N.C. Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guaranty Ass’n, 455
U.S. 691, 705–06 (1982). Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun emphasized that “the concept of full faith
and credit is central to our system of jurisprudence[,]”
as we are “a union of states” each with its own courts
that sit in judgment over cases and controversies
properly before them. Id. at 703–04. If two states could
exercise jurisdiction over the same activity, “uncertainty, confusion, and delay” would ensue. Id. at 704.
So, the final merits judgments of state courts have effect “in every other court of the United States, which
it had in the State where it was pronounced.” Id. (quoting Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235 (1818)
(Marshall, C.J.)).
Yet as noted above, these judgments only have authority “if the court in the first State had power to pass
on the merits—had jurisdiction, that is, to render the
judgment.” Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 110 (1963).
Although the united nature of America’s several states
implies full faith and credit, “the structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers,” limits the faith and credit any state must
provide to another. Underwriters, 455 U.S. at 704.
In short, states are obliged to give full respect to
the valid judgments of another state respecting cases
properly before it.
This Court has also emphasized the importance of
the “equal sovereign powers” of states in other cases.
17
As evinced by its adoption of the Northwest Ordinance,
see supra at I.1, Congress established early in the Nation’s history that new states joined the Union on the
same footing as current ones. This power was central
to a state’s sovereign authority, and “[e]quality of constitutional right and power is the condition of all the
states of the Union, old and new.” Id. at 575.
The Court recognized the federal system’s mediating role again in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt.
There, a citizen of Nevada sued a California state
agency for alleged torts committed in the course of a
tax investigation. 587 U.S. at 234. The Court held that
Nevada lacked jurisdiction, as a state could not “be
sued by a private party without its consent in the
courts of a different State.” Id. at 233. The Constitution both “assumes that the States retain their sovereign immunity except as otherwise provided” and “fundamentally adjusts the States’ relationship with each
other and curtails their ability, as sovereigns, to decline to recognize each other’s immunity.” Id. at 237.
The Court has recognized an outer limit to the federal policing responsibility regarding favoritism, however. When addressing the Voting Rights Act’s reliance on out-of-date data for its preclearance coverage
formula, Chief Justice Roberts grounded his reasoning
that the law as applied was unconstitutional in the
“fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” of the
states. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544
(2013) (citation omitted). Because the VRA held some
states to be more equal than others, requiring nine
states to “beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise
have the right to enact and execute on their own,” its
preclearance regime violated the Constitution. Id.
18
Even though the VRA was adopted when these states
were “geographic areas where immediate action
seemed necessary” to correct race-based voting discrimination, it was meant to expire after five years. Id.
at 546 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 328 (1966)). Instead it was reauthorized and
extended even after voter turnout equalized, removing
any need for its “unprecedented authority” over an
area reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 546. As umpire over the situation, the
Court held that this VRA provision, as it then stood,
impermissibly favored some states over others.
The Court will not, therefore, sanction federal intervention that violates the equal power of states to
govern their own affairs if there is no constitutional
need to do so—no violation of privileges or immunities,
full faith and credit, or due process. Anything else
would represent an “extraordinary departure” from
federalism. Id. at 557 (quoting Presley v. Etowah
County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 591, 500–01 (1992)).
D. Externalities
Finally, when states both have an equal right of action regarding use of a common resource but different
regimes of law, the proper solution is a federal one.
In Kansas v. Colorado, Kansas filed an original action in this Court to enjoin the latter state’s diversion
of water from the Arkansas River, arguing that Colorado’s upstream irrigation was harming its citizens.
206 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1907). Although the Court noted
from the outset that the suit “involves no question of
boundary or of the limits of territorial jurisdiction[,]”
id. at 80, it held that the Supreme Court was still the
proper court for such a question, as the Court “must be
19
held to embrace all controversies of a justiciable nature arising within the territorial limits of the nation.”
Id. at 83. In settling the matter, the Court held:
One cardinal rule underlying all the relations of
the states to each other is that of equality of
right. Each state stands on the same level with
all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on
none of the others, and is bound to yield its own
views to none.
Id. at 97. In fact, no state may “legislate for, or impose
its own policy upon the other” in a matter of interstate
concern. Id. at 95. Kansas followed the common-law riparian doctrine while Colorado embraced the doctrine
of public ownership. Neither state could impose its
controlling regime on the other unilaterally. Id. It fell
to this Court to settle the dispute “in such a way as will
recognize the equal rights of both, and at the same
time establish justice between them.” Id. at 98.
Kansas v. Colorado confirmed that this Court’s
body of law governing interstate disputes—not the
laws or judgments of one state regime over another—
governs state-to-state relations in the realm of nuisances. The Court has also recognized the applicability
of interstate compacts to regulate such situations. See
W.Va. ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 24 (1951).
“[S]tatutory or dormant federal preemption … and diversity litigation” may also apply. Erbsen, 93 Minn. L.
Rev. at 524.
*
*
*
In sum, horizontal federalism is the doctrine that
State A generally may not directly regulate activity
that occurs in State B, unless that activity has a substantial connection with State A. Even in such an
20
instance, the Constitution requires State A to give full
faith and credit to State B’s decisions about the activity, and to regulate in a manner that does not prevent
State B from regulating the activity as it sees fit. A
federal solution may be required to settle secondary effects of differing state policies. To “fuse into one Nation” coequal states, see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 395 (1948), capacity-and constraint analysis
should guide the result when state priorities clash.
III. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT IGNORED HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM
The court below ignored horizontal federalism principles. Here, Boulder County, a political subdivision of
Colorado, see Colo. Const. art. XIV §1, sued out-of-state
oil companies—affiliates of Suncor Energy, headquartered in Canada, and ExxonMobil Corporation, headquartered in Texas—for alleged violations of state tort
law based on the companies’ production and promotion
of fossil fuels throughout the world. Boulder County
alleged that these companies’ activities led to the emission of greenhouse gases that contributed to climate
change that caused harms within Colorado—increased
wildfires, floods, heat, and the like—based on attribution modeling. 2
The Colorado Supreme Court found that these
state-law claims could proceed and were not
preempted by the Clean Air Act because of a savings
2 Ironically, when Rep. Harriet Hageman (R-Wyo.) challenged
Boulder to abandon its use of fossil fuel energy sources, given its
professed fear of their alleged effects, city leaders cursorily rejected the suggestion because of the city’s admitted, critical reliance on these energy sources. See Angus Thuermer, “Hageman
Proposes a Boulder, Colorado, Fossil-Fuel-Free Experiment,” Cap
City News, Aug. 8, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/nd95cu6b.
21
clause in the federal statute. It stated that federal
common-law claims for pollution abatement only applied to “suits brought by one State to abate pollution
emanating from another state,” Cnty. Comm’rs of
Boulder County v. Suncor Energy USA, Inc., 2025 WL
1363355 at *9 (Colo. May 12, 2025) (paraphrasing Am.
Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 419
(2011)) (emphasis in original). By the Colorado high
court’s telling, this case is different, because no form of
preemption supports the idea that the Clean Air Act
preempts state tort claims.
The Court addressed a similar fact pattern in the
Clean Water Act context in a case replete with horizontal federalism principles. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Recognizing an externality
problem, the Court held that “it is not necessary for a
federal statute to provide explicitly that particular
state laws are pre-empted.” Id. at 491. Put another
way, a savings clause does not mean that Federal law
fails to preempt state regulation. See id. at 493. States
may not impose their own regulations against out-ofstate water pollution sources. See id. at 495. Subjecting a company to potentially 50 different state nuisance standards for a single course of conduct would
make it “virtually impossible to predict the standard
for a lawful discharge into an interstate body of water.”
Id. at 497 (quoting People of State of Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)).
The majority below distinguished Ouellette on the
ground that Boulder County was not trying to regulate
emissions but seeking compensation for local harms.
In its telling, the Court in Ouellette was just performing “the very type of preemption analysis that we have
conducted above” to determine whether a suit under
22
state law could proceed. Boulder County at *25. But
there is no meaningful difference, in this instance, between direct regulation via state law and indirect regulation via state tort. Requiring damages is “a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling policy.”
Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637
(2012) (quotation omitted). In fact, in Ouellette this
Court recognized that it ought not “draw a line” between different types of relief when evaluating
preemption, because then a state might try to control
out-of-state activity via another form of punishment.
479 U.S. at 498 n.19. Again, per this Court’s horizontal
federalism jurisprudence, externalities suggest a potential opportunity for federal preemption.
But far broader concerns than preemption militate
against this unwise state court ruling. To allow the
long-arm application of state torts in a manner that
effectively prohibits not only legal activity occurring in
other American states, but legal activity throughout
the world, violates horizontal federalism’s chief tenet
regarding overreaching: One state may not, via its own
law, penalize conduct that is legal in another state and
occurs within that state’s boundaries.
If Colorado’s tort law were used to judge the activities of other states in allowing oil extraction and promotion, Colorado could override the policy judgments
of those other jurisdictions. That could lead to the interstate tyranny that horizontal federalism seeks to
prevent—the export of state standards for behavior in
a manner that governs activity throughout the nation.
Ignoring the damage that extraterritorial application
of tort law here performs to the nation as a whole, as
the majority below does, is willful blindness.
23
Every state may redress action that occurs within
or has sufficient contacts with its territory. See, e.g.
Underwriters, 455 U.S. at 705–06. But a state may not
apply its own law to settle an injury caused by action
in another state. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at 95. Such controversies fall to the federal courts—and federal law—
to settle. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 495. And a state (or
locality) certainly may not apply its law in a manner
that conflicts with another state’s sovereignty. Ross,
598 U.S. at 388. Boulder County residents have the opportunity to affect national policymaking, but nobody
outside the county has any role in electing the local officials pushing here to drive national energy policy
through tort suits brought at the local courthouse. In
cases like these, horizontal federalism’s delicate balance can only be preserved by a federal umpire.
24
CONCLUSION
This case presents an important issue regarding
whether horizontal federalism bars the application of
one state’s tort law to restrict activity in another. The
Court should grant certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
Marcella Burke
Paul B. Simon
BURKE LAW GROUP PLLC
1000 Main Street,
Suite 2300
Houston, TX 77002
(832) 987-2214
marcella@burkegroup.law
Ilya Shapiro
Counsel of Record
MANHATTAN INSTITUTE
52 Vanderbilt Ave.
New York, NY 10017
(212) 599-7000
ishapiro@manhattan.
institute
Sarah Harbison
Pelican Center for Justice
400 Poydras St., # 900
New Orleans, LA 70130
(504) 500-0506
sarah@pelicaninstitute.org
David B. Kopel
INDEPENDENCE
INSTITUTE
727 East 16th Ave.
Denver, CO 80203
(303) 279-6536
david@i2i.org
September 11, 2025
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.