Amicus Curiae Brief — Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., et al., Petitioners v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 11, 2025

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No. 25-170

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________

SUNCOR ENERGY (U.S.A.) INC.;

SUNCOR ENERGY SALES INC.; EXXON MOBIL CORP.,

Petitioners,

v.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF BOULDER COUNTY;

CITY OF BOULDER,

Respondents.

__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Court of Colorado

__________

BRIEF OF THE FRONTIER INSTITUTE,

INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE, PELICAN

INSTITUTE, AND MANHATTAN INSTITUTE

AS AMICI CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

__________

Marcella Burke

Paul B. Simon

BURKE LAW GROUP PLLC

1000 Main Street,

Suite 2300

Houston, TX 77002

(832) 987-2214

marcella@burkegroup.law

Ilya Shapiro

Counsel of Record

MANHATTAN INSTITUTE

52 Vanderbilt Ave.

New York, NY 10017

(212) 599-7000

ishapiro@manhattan.

institute

September 11, 2025

Additional counsel listed on signature page

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Colorado Supreme Court found that the Clean

Air Act’s framework did not preempt all state and local

regulation of emissions and allowed Boulder County to

bring tort claims under Colorado law against Suncor

Energy and Exxon Mobil Corporation for damages

from carbon emissions.

The question presented is:

Whether federal law precludes state-law claims

seeking relief for injuries allegedly caused by the effects of interstate and international greenhouse-gas

emissions on the global climate.

ii

Table of Contents

QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................. 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT........................................................... 2

ARGUMENT ................................................................ 3

I. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM IS

DEEPLY ROOTED IN

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ....................... 3

A. The History of Horizontal Federalism ........ 3

B. The Constitutional Structure of

Horizontal Federalism ................................. 8

II. FOUR ASPECTS OF HORIZONTAL

FEDERALISM ARE RELEVANT TO

THIS CASE ..................................................... 11

A. Overreaching.............................................. 11

B. Exclusions .................................................. 13

C. Favoritism .................................................. 15

D. Externalities .............................................. 18

III.THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT

IGNORED HORIZONTAL

FEDERALISM ................................................ 20

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 24

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut,

564 U.S. 410 (2011) ................................................ 21

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,

517 U.S. 559 (1996) ................................................ 13

Canaday v. Anthem Companies, Inc.,

9 F.4th 392 (6th Cir. 2021) ...................................... 2

Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955)......................... 9

Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy

USA, Inc., 2025 WL 1363355

(Colo. May 12, 2025)......................................... 21, 22

Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) ......................... 16

Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,

587 U.S. 230 (2019) ............................................ 2, 17

Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925) .............. 13

Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880) ...................... 14

Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234 (1818) ............ 16

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) ................... 12

Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) .............. 12

Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette,

479 U.S. 481 (1987) .................................... 21, 22, 23

Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ......... 12

Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) ........ 18–19, 23

Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp.,

565 U.S. 625 (2012) ................................................ 22

iv

Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross,

598 U.S. 356 (2023) ................................ 2, 13, 15, 23

Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909)..................... 13

Northwest Airlines Inc. v. County of Kent,

510 U.S. 355 (1994) ................................................ 13

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ......................... 11

People of State of Ill. v. City of Milwaukee,

731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984) .................................. 21

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) ....... 14

Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164 (1779) ............. 5

Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n,

502 U.S. 591 (1992) ................................................ 18

Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) .... 17–18

Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1772) ............ 4

South Carolina v. Katzenbach,

383 U.S. 301 (1966) ................................................ 18

Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) ..................... 20

Underwriters Nat. Assur. Co. v. N.C. Life & Acc.

& Health Ins. Guaranty Ass’n,

455 U.S. 691 (1982) .................................... 16, 17, 23

W.Va. ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951) ......... 19

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,

444 U.S. 286 (1980) ............................................ 2, 12

Constitutional Provisions & Statutes

An Act to Provide for the Government of the

Territory North-West of the River Ohio,

art. V § 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789) ................................ 8, 17

Art. of Confed. of 1781, art. IV, § 1 ............................. 6

v

Colo. Const. art. XIV .................................................. 20

U.S. Const. art. I, §10 .............................................. 8, 9

U.S. Const. art. IV, §1.................................................. 9

U.S. Const. art. IV, §2.................................................. 9

Other Authorities

2 The Records of the Constitutional Convention of

1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) ................................. 7

Allen Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism,

93 Minn. L. Rev. 493 (2008)........... 2, 3, 6, 11, 16, 19

Angus Thuermer, “Hageman Proposes a Boulder,

Colorado, Fossil-Fuel-Free Experiment,”

Cap City News, Aug. 8, 2024 ................................. 20

Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v.

Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant

Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial

State Legislation, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1865 (1987) ..... 3

Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations at I, § 18

(Joseph Chitty ed., 1834) (1758) .......................... 5, 6

Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a

Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency,

49 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1997) ............................................ 9

Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,

91 Yale L.J. 425 (1982) ............................................ 9

Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers

Reconsidered,

85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133 (2010) ...................... 10

Peter S. Onuf, New State Equality: The Ambiguous

History of a Constitutional Principle,

18 Publius 53 (1988) ................................................ 8

vi

Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey,

Backdoor Federalization,

53 UCLA L. Rev. 1353 (2006) ................................ 10

The Articles of Confederation of the United

Colonies of New England; May 19, 1643 § 3,

The Avalon Project ................................................... 5

The Federalist No. 7 (Hamilton) ............................... 10

The Federalist No. 44 (Madison) ................................. 9

The Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton) ............................. 10

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England § 4 (1765) ................................................... 4

Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,

78 Columbia L. Rev. 1587 (1978)........................... 10

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

The Frontier Institute is an independent research and educational institution with the mission to

keep the spirit of the western frontier alive with sound

public policy and education programs that empower

Montanans to be pioneers, innovators and risk takers.

To those ends, the Frontier Institute is dedicated to

upholding the separation-of-powers requirements of

the United States and Montana Constitutions that foster democratic accountability and sound public policy.

The Independence Institute is a 501(c)(3) public

policy research organization in Denver, founded on the

eternal truths of the Declaration of Independence. The

briefs and scholarship of research director David Kopel

have been cited in seven opinions of this Court and 89

opinions of lower courts. The Institute’s senior fellow

in constitutional studies, law professor Robert Natelson, has been cited in 11 opinions of this Court.

The Pelican Institute for Public Policy is a nonpartisan research and educational organization, the

leading voice for free markets in Louisiana. Pelican’s

mission is to conduct research and analysis that advances sound policies based on free enterprise, individual liberty, and constitutionally limited government.

The Manhattan Institute (MI) is a nonprofit public policy research foundation whose mission is to develop and disseminate new ideas that foster greater

economic choice and individual responsibility, to advance the flourishing of America’s great cities.

Rule 37 statement: Counsel for both parties were timely notified of amici’s intent to file this brief. No counsel for any party

authored this brief in any part; nobody other than amici made a

monetary contribution to fund its preparation or submission.

1

2

This case interests amici because a proper understanding of federalism means that sometimes federal

law precludes contrary state law. The transaction of

actually interstate commerce such as energy production, and its attendant pollution, is such a quintessentially federal area. Having one regulatory structure

here allows for legal stability and the efficient allocation of economic resources

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

“Constitutional federalism has two distinct dimensions: the federal government must interact with the

states, and states must interact with each other.” Allen Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 Minn. L. Rev.

493, 501 (2008). The former interactions are more familiar, but other significant friction occurs from engagements among states or their inhabitants.

The principles governing these interactions have

been called many things: “antidiscrimination,” Nat’l

Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356, 376

(2023); “comity,” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt,

587 U.S. 230, 245 (2019); “interstate federalism,” see

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

286, 293 (1980); and “horizontal federalism,” Canaday

v. Anthem Companies, Inc., 9 F.4th 392, 410 (6th Cir.

2021) (Donald, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

We will use the last term, “horizontal federalism.”

This case implicates four recurring “sources of interstate friction” that this Court regularly analyzes,

based on the following principles:

•

Overreaching: A state may not adjudicate,

tax, regulate, or punish conduct that occurs beyond its borders, or is lawful in other states.

3

•

Exclusions: States (especially commercially

powerful ones) may not leverage their regulations to restrict other states’ policymaking.

•

Favoritism: The federal government may intervene when states regulate in favor of local interests ways that burden constitutional rights.

•

Externalities: Federal law governs when a

state pursues a policy that affects another, and

both states have equal rights of action.

See Erbsen, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 514.

Horizontal federalism emerges from the rich scholarship and experience that informed the framers and

the federal structure they established. The Colorado

Supreme Court neglected that framework here.

ARGUMENT

I. HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM IS DEEPLY

ROOTED IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

Horizontal federalism is “one of those foundational

principles of our federalism which we infer from the

structure of the Constitution as a whole.” Donald H.

Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics

Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 Mich.

L. Rev. 1865, 1885 (1987).

A. The History of Horizontal Federalism

In the introduction to his Commentaries, Blackstone explained the limitations on applying English

law to colonies like America:

For it is held, that if an uninhabited country be

discovered and planted by English subjects, all

4

the English laws are immediately there in force.

For as the law is the birth right of every subject,

so wherever they go they carry their laws with

them. But in conquered or ceded countries, that

have already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws, but until he

does actually change them, the antient laws of

the country remain…. Our American plantations

are principally of this latter sort, being obtained

in the last century either by right of conquest and

driving out the natives (with what natural justice

I shall not at present enquire) or by treaties. And

therefore the common law of England, as such,

has no allowance or authority there, they being

no part of the mother country, but distinct

(though dependent) dominions.

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England § 4 at 105 (1765). Even that early, the application of law to a person thus depended on (1) whose

law they were born under, and (2) whether their land

had been conquered and the law changed. Foreign

laws, including the common law, are not self-executing; they must be deliberately imposed or adopted.

A few years before the Revolution, British courts

were articulating the doctrines of extraterritoriality

and comity in jurisdictions that American lawyers like

the framers followed closely. One jurist, Lord Mansfield, held that a slave brought from America could not

be detained in England because “[t]he state of slavery

… is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support

it, but positive law.” Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep.

499, 510 (1772). So British jurists held that a law of

one jurisdiction was not given effect in another if repugnant to that jurisdiction’s fundamental principles.

5

Likewise, in Planche v. Fletcher, 99 Eng. Rep. 164, 165

(1779), Mansfield ruled that “one nation does not take

notice of the revenue laws of another.” There, a contract to evade French customs law could not be enforced in an English court, because English courts

would not enforce French tax law.

The idea consistently advanced in these writings is

that the effect of the laws of a sovereign stop at its borders. Every court and country applies and fashions its

own law but respects the statutes “carried with” the

subjects of other sovereigns, and adopts the ones they

deem persuasive or appropriate. Any further entanglement would lead to confusion about which law applies.

These principles had already seeped into early intercolonial governance. In 1643, for example, four British colonies in America formed a league for mutual defense, provided that each colony “shall have peculiar

jurisdiction and government within their limits[.]” The

Articles of Confederation of the United Colonies of

New England; May 19, 1643 § 3, The Avalon Project,

https://tinyurl.com/2p9ksh4d. The colonies also agreed

to return fugitives and settle disputes through a

shared council—an early recognition that while each

was autonomous, cooperation under law was necessary for true order among equals. This early federalstyle structure constituted the background by which

America’s government later formed.

European law-of-nations theorists also shaped

early American understandings of comity and equal

sovereignty. A treatise on the subject, widely read in

Revolutionary America, maintained that nations are

equal in rights and dignity, regardless of size or

power—just like individuals. Emer de Vattel, The Law

of Nations at I, § 18 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1834) (1758).

6

“A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic

is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful

kingdom.” Id. This idea of sovereign equality posited

that no state may subordinate another by force of law.

Mutual recognition and voluntary respect were ideal,

even necessary, when crafting a union of states.

The Constitution’s framers were acutely aware

that unrestrained state action leads to interstate friction and conflict. Our first charter, the Articles of Confederation, viewed each state as its own sovereign, and

provided “the free inhabitants” of each state with

all privileges and immunities of free citizens in

the several States, and the people of each State

shall have free ingress and regress to and from

any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the

privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the

same duties, impositions and restrictions as the

inhabitants thereof respectively….

Art. of Confed. of 1781, art. IV, § 1. Yet under the Articles, states often “pursued conflicting self-interests

at their collective expense,” enacting protectionist

measures and interfering with commerce. Erbsen, 93

Minn. L. Rev. at 511. They coined their own money,

raised their own armies, and erected trade barriers,

“creating systemic friction that left them collectively

worse off.” Id. at 533. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention emerged from a years-long battle

with that problematic interstate construction, producing a system of government with a different approach.

It bears noting from the outset that the Constitution contains no explicit provision requiring blanket

interstate equality. At the Constitutional Convention,

Gouverneur Morris proposed striking a portion of what

7

is now Article IV, Section 3, that required new states

to be admitted “on the same terms” as current states.

2 The Records of the Constitutional Convention of

1787 at 454 (Max Farrand ed., 1937). James Madison

opposed Morris’s motion, arguing that new states “neither would nor ought to submit to a Union which degraded them from an equal rank with the other

States.” Id. George Mason likewise argued that Morris’s suggestion appeared intended to deter western

emigration, but that this was impossible. Id. Mason

continued that “the best policy” regarding these new

states would be “to treat them with that equality

which will make them friends not enemies.” Id. Morris

agreed that stopping western emigration was impossible, but “did not wish to throw the power into the[]

hands” of newly admitted states. Id. Roger Sherman

then notably stated that he was in favor of “fixing an

equality of privileges by the Constitution,” and therefore opposed the motion. John Langdon chimed in to

support the motion because he wondered about circumstances “which would render it inconvenient” to

admit new states on equal footing with established

ones. Id. North Carolina’s Hugh Williamson also clarified that while existing states “enjoy an equality now,

and for that reason are admitted to [Congress] in the

Senate,” this reason did not apply to new states. Id.

The body accepted Morris’s edits by a 9–2 vote. Id.

This debate is highly instructive as to the framers’

perspective on interstate relations. Morris’s edit provoked vocal debate from Madison, Mason, and Sherman—leading architects of the Constitution’s framework—because it ran counter to their conviction that

existing states should have equality of privileges. But

Morris and his supporting delegates, who won the day,

8

thought it best to leave to Congress’s judgment the exact admission terms for new states.

The Convention’s view was not that states were unequal or lacked equal sovereignty. It was that the

elected representatives of existing states should decide

what privileges new states had when admitting them.

Although the Convention did not settle this question,

the Continental Congress in New York incorporated

the Northwest Ordinance under the new Constitution,

requiring that new states would enter the union “on

equal footing” with existing states. An Act to Provide

for the Government of the Territory North-West of the

River Ohio, art. V § 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 n.a (1789). Every

state since has been admitted “with an express declaration of equality” with existing states. Peter S. Onuf,

New State Equality: The Ambiguous History of a Constitutional Principle, 18 Publius 53, 54 (1988).

B. The Constitutional Structure of Horizontal

Federalism

Despite that disagreement at the drafting stage,

the Constitution established a federal structure that

treats states as equal sovereigns with limited authority to encroach on each other’s respective domains.

States may not, for example, coin money or lay duties

without Congress’s consent. U.S. Const. art. I, §10. In

addition to these pointed restraints on interstate activity, the Constitution includes provisions designed to

foster comity and equality between the several states.

The Interstate Compact Clause, U.S. Const. art. I,

§10, cl.3, allows states to resolve disagreements by

“Agreement or Compact” with congressional approval.

These agreements have been frequently employed to

govern relations between states since the founding.

9

See Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 Fla. L.

Rev. 1, 3–4 nn.14–18 (1997) (listing compacts). While

such arrangements are allowed, any “Treaty, Alliance,

or Confederation” between states is prohibited. U.S.

Const. art. I, §10, cl.1. This language likely refers to

unilateral contracts between states without Congress’s say-so, or military or external-facing agreements. It was part of the Articles of Confederation and

“for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into

the new Constitution.” The Federalist No. 44 (Madison), at 281 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

The Constitution also includes another clause similar to a provision in the Articles, which provides that

the “Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several

States.” Art. IV, §2, cl.1. While pared down from its

earlier counterpart, the constitutional version has a

wider sweep—preserving the legal and natural rights

of American citizens in all contexts, not merely a commercial one. Based on its lineage and language, this

clause governs state legislative power “in commercial

matters where Congress has not yet acted.” Julian N.

Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest,

91 Yale L.J. 425, 448 (1982). And all that does not obviate the dormant Commerce Clause, which speaks to

relations between states that specifically concern commerce—addressed infra at II.B.

Another clause requires states to give “Full Faith

and Credit” to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial

Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV,

§1; see also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955)

(clause prevents states from “adopting any policy of

hostility” to each other’s acts). This extraterritoriality

10

doctrine sets the boundaries for how states must treat

the decisions and laws of other states.

Other constitutional provisions help complete the

horizontal federalism framework. Five of the nine provisions in Article III addressing jurisdiction concern

the interaction between states, emphasizing the framers’ concern that courts should referee “bickering and

animosities” between these co-equal sovereigns. The

Federalist No. 80 (Hamilton) at 477. Hamilton specifically worried about this issue, warning that states exercising “distinctions, preferences, and exclusions . . .

would beget discontent,” causing “outrages,” and then

“reprisals and wars.” Federalist No. 7 (Hamilton). Rather than addressing the externalities that activity legal in one state might cause in another, the Constitution sets this problem aside for judicial resolution—

and the courts’ solution has often been explicit federal

control. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M.

Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. Rev.

1353, 1368–98 (2006) (discussing federalization of areas traditionally under state control).

At bottom, equality among the states is a due process concern. “[D]ue process primarily protects individuals from being unfairly subject to another state’s

laws.” Mark D. Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers

Reconsidered, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133, 1137–38

(2010). Scholarship regarding extraterritoriality, has

long noted that horizontal federalism “protect[s] persons against the unfair application of a law” outside

proper borders while also “furthering other interstate

… values[.]” Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 Columbia L. Rev. 1587, 1589 (1978).

Together, these provisions provide the framework

of horizontal federalism. The Constitution preserves

11

each state’s authority to make laws and regulations

that govern activity occurring within its bounds while

restraining that power beyond a state’s borders.

II. FOUR ASPECTS OF HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM ARE RELEVANT TO THIS CASE

Because horizontal federalism is a structural doctrine inferable from the Constitution, rather than delineated in an explicit clause, how may lower courts

“weave wisps of structure into judicially enforceable

standards”? Erbsen, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 582. A robust

body of the Court’s case law has given shape to aspects

of horizontal federalism, in a variety of contexts. All

has in common the presupposition that state power is

limited by the equal sovereignty of other states and by

a common interest in preventing interstate friction—

the “reprisals and wars” of Hamilton’s warning.

A. Overreaching

With narrow exceptions, states cannot tax or regulate beyond their borders, or punish conduct that was

lawful where it occurred. Courts have long recognized

this principle in the law of personal jurisdiction.

In the post-Civil War period, this Court found in

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), that “no

State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority

over persons or property without its territory.” Because “the several States are of equal dignity and authority,” one state extending its reach to conduct beyond its borders is “an encroachment upon the independence” of the state where the affected persons or

property are actually located. Id. at 722–23.

The Court eventually softened Pennoyer’s requirement that state jurisdiction screeches to a stop at its

12

borders. It allowed jurisdiction where contacts existed

with the forum state, but affirmed that such jurisdiction must not transgress “traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe v. Washington,

326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). The federal

system does not permit states to hale every outsider

with whom they have contact into court:

Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no

inconvenience from being forced to litigate before

the tribunals of another State; even if the forum

State has a strong interest in applying its law to

the controversy; even if the forum State is the

most convenient location for litigation, the Due

Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the

State of its power to render a valid judgment.

Woodson, 444 U.S. at 294.

The strictures of personal jurisdiction are “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States” that safeguard individual fairness and

interstate sovereignty. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.

235, 251 (1958). Every state’s judicial power ends

where another’s authority begins, and no state can

punish or regulate conduct lawful in another state if

that conduct lacks a meaningful connection to the forum. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407–408

(1930) (holding that Texas law “may not validly affect

contracts which are neither made nor are to be performed in Texas”).

This Court’s personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence,

therefore, highlights an important facet of the doctrine: a state may regulate activity beyond its physical

13

borders only if that activity has a meaningful, substantial nexus with it—in this case, minimum contacts.

But the principle is more than jurisdictional. Due

process constrains states from taxing or regulating in

a way that “infring[es] on the policy choices of other

States.” See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,

572 (1996) (noting this in dicta); see also Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 477–79 (1925) (holding Due

Process Clause bars Pennsylvania from imposing

transfer tax on art in New York owned by Pennsylvania decedent); Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315, 321

(1909) (reversing criminal conviction in Oregon of

Washington resident who fished in Washington using

gear lawful in Washington). A robust body of law confirms that infringement on another state’s policy is the

line that another state may not cross when regulating.

B. Exclusions

Despite the general prohibition against overreach,

as a practical matter, a large state’s in-state bans on

certain activity may lead to de facto nationwide rules,

especially in the commercial realm. But even these

rules are limited: states may not leverage their restrictive regulations to prevent more permissive policymaking elsewhere.

The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” Ross, 598 U.S. at 369

(cleaned up). Protectionist state action amounts to

“discrimination against interstate commerce” in this

telling. Northwest Airlines Inc. v. County of Kent, 510

U.S. 355, 373 n.18 (1994). But while states may not

“build up” commerce by burdening industry and

14

“business of other states,” so long as its goals are not

protectionism, “a State may exclude from its territory,

or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its

judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to” its own

citizenry. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880).

In Ross, petitioners argued that the dormant Commerce Clause operates as a near-blanket prohibition of

“state laws that have the practical effect of controlling

commerce outside the State,” even unintentionally. Id.

at 371 (quotation omitted). The Court disagreed, noting that its prior decisions prohibited only state statutes that “prevented out-of-state firms from undertaking competitive pricing or deprived businesses and

consumers in other States of whatever competitive advantages they may possess.” Id. at 374 (cleaned up).

Inferring more would “invite endless litigation and inconsistent results” when any state made a law that influenced commerce outside its borders. Id. at 375. The

Court noted that antidiscrimination under the

dormant Commerce Clause “may well represent one

more effort to mediate competing claims of sovereign

authority under our horizontal separation of powers,”

but it does not allow the Court to strike down all extraterritorial exercises of state power. Id. at 376.

The Ross petitioners advanced another argument

premised on Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,

142 (1970), which held that state statutes regulating

to “effectuate a local public interest” with incidental

interstate commerce effects will be upheld “unless the

burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive

in relation to the putative local benefits.” The Court

fractured over how to handle this claim. The plurality

held that the petitioners’ claim that California’s pork

regulations flunk Pike fails because courts cannot

15

weigh a law’s economic and non-economic effects, and

that such policy choices “belong to the people and their

elected representatives.” Ross, 598 U.S. at 382. Congress may step in if a state law disrupts an industry

given “its power to adopt federal legislation that may

preempt conflicting state laws.” Id. at 382–83.

But Chief Justice Roberts—joined by three others—would have vacated and remanded. Id. at 395.

Roberts noted that most of the Court agreed that “it is

possible to balance benefits and burdens[,]” even of

various kinds, under Pike. Id. at 397. Accordingly,

Roberts found that this Court’s precedents distinguish

“the costs of complying with a given state regulation

from other economic harms to the interstate market.”

Id. Certain state regulations may not impose a cost immediately, or that cost may be “difficult to quantify,”

but it is not “noneconomic” cost. Id. at 399. The chief

justice distinguishes his approach from a per se prohibition on extraterritorial state action by finding that

regulations imposing “broad impact requiring . . . compliance even by producers who do not wish to sell in

the regulated market” may fail under Pike. Id. at 402.

It cannot be that the Constitution, without exceptions, prohibits a state from regulating activity wholly

within its bounds in a way that affects commerce beyond them. But when one state makes a law that burdens commercial activity that occurs in another state,

such laws are suspect under horizontal federalism.

C. Favoritism

States also “have an incentive to favor local interests,” but if they do so in a way that burdens the Privileges and Immunities or Full Faith and Credit

16

Clauses, federal courts must step in to referee the conflict. See Erbsen, 93 Minn. L. Rev. at 521.

Where a state has jurisdiction to rule on a case’s

merits, the judgment of its courts is entitled to full

faith and credit. See Underwriters Nat. Assur. Co. v.

N.C. Life & Acc. & Health Ins. Guaranty Ass’n, 455

U.S. 691, 705–06 (1982). Writing for the Court, Justice

Blackmun emphasized that “the concept of full faith

and credit is central to our system of jurisprudence[,]”

as we are “a union of states” each with its own courts

that sit in judgment over cases and controversies

properly before them. Id. at 703–04. If two states could

exercise jurisdiction over the same activity, “uncertainty, confusion, and delay” would ensue. Id. at 704.

So, the final merits judgments of state courts have effect “in every other court of the United States, which

it had in the State where it was pronounced.” Id. (quoting Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 235 (1818)

(Marshall, C.J.)).

Yet as noted above, these judgments only have authority “if the court in the first State had power to pass

on the merits—had jurisdiction, that is, to render the

judgment.” Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 110 (1963).

Although the united nature of America’s several states

implies full faith and credit, “the structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers,” limits the faith and credit any state must

provide to another. Underwriters, 455 U.S. at 704.

In short, states are obliged to give full respect to

the valid judgments of another state respecting cases

properly before it.

This Court has also emphasized the importance of

the “equal sovereign powers” of states in other cases.

17

As evinced by its adoption of the Northwest Ordinance,

see supra at I.1, Congress established early in the Nation’s history that new states joined the Union on the

same footing as current ones. This power was central

to a state’s sovereign authority, and “[e]quality of constitutional right and power is the condition of all the

states of the Union, old and new.” Id. at 575.

The Court recognized the federal system’s mediating role again in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt.

There, a citizen of Nevada sued a California state

agency for alleged torts committed in the course of a

tax investigation. 587 U.S. at 234. The Court held that

Nevada lacked jurisdiction, as a state could not “be

sued by a private party without its consent in the

courts of a different State.” Id. at 233. The Constitution both “assumes that the States retain their sovereign immunity except as otherwise provided” and “fundamentally adjusts the States’ relationship with each

other and curtails their ability, as sovereigns, to decline to recognize each other’s immunity.” Id. at 237.

The Court has recognized an outer limit to the federal policing responsibility regarding favoritism, however. When addressing the Voting Rights Act’s reliance on out-of-date data for its preclearance coverage

formula, Chief Justice Roberts grounded his reasoning

that the law as applied was unconstitutional in the

“fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” of the

states. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544

(2013) (citation omitted). Because the VRA held some

states to be more equal than others, requiring nine

states to “beseech the Federal Government for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise

have the right to enact and execute on their own,” its

preclearance regime violated the Constitution. Id.

18

Even though the VRA was adopted when these states

were “geographic areas where immediate action

seemed necessary” to correct race-based voting discrimination, it was meant to expire after five years. Id.

at 546 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383

U.S. 301, 328 (1966)). Instead it was reauthorized and

extended even after voter turnout equalized, removing

any need for its “unprecedented authority” over an

area reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 546. As umpire over the situation, the

Court held that this VRA provision, as it then stood,

impermissibly favored some states over others.

The Court will not, therefore, sanction federal intervention that violates the equal power of states to

govern their own affairs if there is no constitutional

need to do so—no violation of privileges or immunities,

full faith and credit, or due process. Anything else

would represent an “extraordinary departure” from

federalism. Id. at 557 (quoting Presley v. Etowah

County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 591, 500–01 (1992)).

D. Externalities

Finally, when states both have an equal right of action regarding use of a common resource but different

regimes of law, the proper solution is a federal one.

In Kansas v. Colorado, Kansas filed an original action in this Court to enjoin the latter state’s diversion

of water from the Arkansas River, arguing that Colorado’s upstream irrigation was harming its citizens.

206 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1907). Although the Court noted

from the outset that the suit “involves no question of

boundary or of the limits of territorial jurisdiction[,]”

id. at 80, it held that the Supreme Court was still the

proper court for such a question, as the Court “must be

19

held to embrace all controversies of a justiciable nature arising within the territorial limits of the nation.”

Id. at 83. In settling the matter, the Court held:

One cardinal rule underlying all the relations of

the states to each other is that of equality of

right. Each state stands on the same level with

all the rest. It can impose its own legislation on

none of the others, and is bound to yield its own

views to none.

Id. at 97. In fact, no state may “legislate for, or impose

its own policy upon the other” in a matter of interstate

concern. Id. at 95. Kansas followed the common-law riparian doctrine while Colorado embraced the doctrine

of public ownership. Neither state could impose its

controlling regime on the other unilaterally. Id. It fell

to this Court to settle the dispute “in such a way as will

recognize the equal rights of both, and at the same

time establish justice between them.” Id. at 98.

Kansas v. Colorado confirmed that this Court’s

body of law governing interstate disputes—not the

laws or judgments of one state regime over another—

governs state-to-state relations in the realm of nuisances. The Court has also recognized the applicability

of interstate compacts to regulate such situations. See

W.Va. ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 24 (1951).

“[S]tatutory or dormant federal preemption … and diversity litigation” may also apply. Erbsen, 93 Minn. L.

Rev. at 524.

*

*

*

In sum, horizontal federalism is the doctrine that

State A generally may not directly regulate activity

that occurs in State B, unless that activity has a substantial connection with State A. Even in such an

20

instance, the Constitution requires State A to give full

faith and credit to State B’s decisions about the activity, and to regulate in a manner that does not prevent

State B from regulating the activity as it sees fit. A

federal solution may be required to settle secondary effects of differing state policies. To “fuse into one Nation” coequal states, see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.

385, 395 (1948), capacity-and constraint analysis

should guide the result when state priorities clash.

III. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT IGNORED HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM

The court below ignored horizontal federalism principles. Here, Boulder County, a political subdivision of

Colorado, see Colo. Const. art. XIV §1, sued out-of-state

oil companies—affiliates of Suncor Energy, headquartered in Canada, and ExxonMobil Corporation, headquartered in Texas—for alleged violations of state tort

law based on the companies’ production and promotion

of fossil fuels throughout the world. Boulder County

alleged that these companies’ activities led to the emission of greenhouse gases that contributed to climate

change that caused harms within Colorado—increased

wildfires, floods, heat, and the like—based on attribution modeling. 2

The Colorado Supreme Court found that these

state-law claims could proceed and were not

preempted by the Clean Air Act because of a savings

2 Ironically, when Rep. Harriet Hageman (R-Wyo.) challenged

Boulder to abandon its use of fossil fuel energy sources, given its

professed fear of their alleged effects, city leaders cursorily rejected the suggestion because of the city’s admitted, critical reliance on these energy sources. See Angus Thuermer, “Hageman

Proposes a Boulder, Colorado, Fossil-Fuel-Free Experiment,” Cap

City News, Aug. 8, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/nd95cu6b.

21

clause in the federal statute. It stated that federal

common-law claims for pollution abatement only applied to “suits brought by one State to abate pollution

emanating from another state,” Cnty. Comm’rs of

Boulder County v. Suncor Energy USA, Inc., 2025 WL

1363355 at *9 (Colo. May 12, 2025) (paraphrasing Am.

Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 419

(2011)) (emphasis in original). By the Colorado high

court’s telling, this case is different, because no form of

preemption supports the idea that the Clean Air Act

preempts state tort claims.

The Court addressed a similar fact pattern in the

Clean Water Act context in a case replete with horizontal federalism principles. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). Recognizing an externality

problem, the Court held that “it is not necessary for a

federal statute to provide explicitly that particular

state laws are pre-empted.” Id. at 491. Put another

way, a savings clause does not mean that Federal law

fails to preempt state regulation. See id. at 493. States

may not impose their own regulations against out-ofstate water pollution sources. See id. at 495. Subjecting a company to potentially 50 different state nuisance standards for a single course of conduct would

make it “virtually impossible to predict the standard

for a lawful discharge into an interstate body of water.”

Id. at 497 (quoting People of State of Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984)).

The majority below distinguished Ouellette on the

ground that Boulder County was not trying to regulate

emissions but seeking compensation for local harms.

In its telling, the Court in Ouellette was just performing “the very type of preemption analysis that we have

conducted above” to determine whether a suit under

22

state law could proceed. Boulder County at *25. But

there is no meaningful difference, in this instance, between direct regulation via state law and indirect regulation via state tort. Requiring damages is “a potent

method of governing conduct and controlling policy.”

Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637

(2012) (quotation omitted). In fact, in Ouellette this

Court recognized that it ought not “draw a line” between different types of relief when evaluating

preemption, because then a state might try to control

out-of-state activity via another form of punishment.

479 U.S. at 498 n.19. Again, per this Court’s horizontal

federalism jurisprudence, externalities suggest a potential opportunity for federal preemption.

But far broader concerns than preemption militate

against this unwise state court ruling. To allow the

long-arm application of state torts in a manner that

effectively prohibits not only legal activity occurring in

other American states, but legal activity throughout

the world, violates horizontal federalism’s chief tenet

regarding overreaching: One state may not, via its own

law, penalize conduct that is legal in another state and

occurs within that state’s boundaries.

If Colorado’s tort law were used to judge the activities of other states in allowing oil extraction and promotion, Colorado could override the policy judgments

of those other jurisdictions. That could lead to the interstate tyranny that horizontal federalism seeks to

prevent—the export of state standards for behavior in

a manner that governs activity throughout the nation.

Ignoring the damage that extraterritorial application

of tort law here performs to the nation as a whole, as

the majority below does, is willful blindness.

23

Every state may redress action that occurs within

or has sufficient contacts with its territory. See, e.g.

Underwriters, 455 U.S. at 705–06. But a state may not

apply its own law to settle an injury caused by action

in another state. See Kansas, 206 U.S. at 95. Such controversies fall to the federal courts—and federal law—

to settle. See Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 495. And a state (or

locality) certainly may not apply its law in a manner

that conflicts with another state’s sovereignty. Ross,

598 U.S. at 388. Boulder County residents have the opportunity to affect national policymaking, but nobody

outside the county has any role in electing the local officials pushing here to drive national energy policy

through tort suits brought at the local courthouse. In

cases like these, horizontal federalism’s delicate balance can only be preserved by a federal umpire.

24

CONCLUSION

This case presents an important issue regarding

whether horizontal federalism bars the application of

one state’s tort law to restrict activity in another. The

Court should grant certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Marcella Burke

Paul B. Simon

BURKE LAW GROUP PLLC

1000 Main Street,

Suite 2300

Houston, TX 77002

(832) 987-2214

marcella@burkegroup.law

Ilya Shapiro

Counsel of Record

MANHATTAN INSTITUTE

52 Vanderbilt Ave.

New York, NY 10017

(212) 599-7000

ishapiro@manhattan.

institute

Sarah Harbison

Pelican Center for Justice

400 Poydras St., # 900

New Orleans, LA 70130

(504) 500-0506

sarah@pelicaninstitute.org

David B. Kopel

INDEPENDENCE

INSTITUTE

727 East 16th Ave.

Denver, CO 80203

(303) 279-6536

david@i2i.org

September 11, 2025

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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