Amicus Curiae Brief — Leonard W. Hoffmann, et al., Petitioners v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc.

Supreme Court briefSep 21, 2026

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No. 25-159

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

LEONARD W. HOFFMANN, ET AL.,

Petitioners,

WBI ENERGY TRANSMISSION, INC.,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

BRIEF OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT

Andrew R. Varcoe

Mariel A. Brookins

U.S. CHAMBER

LITIGATION CENTER

1615 H Street NW

Washington, D.C. 20062

Jonathan Y. Ellis

Counsel of Record

Grace Greene Simmons

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

888 16th Street N.W., Suite 500

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 828-2887

jellis@mcguirewoods.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae the Chamber of Commerce

of the United States of America

September 21, 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................... ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ................... 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT.............................................................. 2

ARGUMENT .................................................................... 4

U.S. businesses need durable and affordable

access to natural gas, and interstate pipelines

make that possible ................................................ 4

II.

The Natural Gas Act should not be interpreted

to create obstacles to the development of

interstate pipelines ............................................... 9

Interstate pipelines need a nationally

uniform rule ............................................. 12

Permitting state law to fill the gap

would frustrate the objectives of the

Natural Gas Act ...................................... 18

Commercial parties would reasonably

expect that federal, not state law,

determines just compensation in this

context ...................................................... 24

CONCLUSION............................................................... 26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

Burks v. Lasker,

441 U.S. 471 (1979) ......................................................... 7

Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v.

Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement,

962 F.2d 1192 (6th Cir. 1992) ................................ 11, 15

Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment Auth.,

375 Mass. 360 (1978) .................................................... 18

E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage,

361 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 2004) ........................................ 20

Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders,

617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) ................................ 15, 22

Illinois Nat. Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co.,

314 U.S. 498 (1942) ....................................................... 14

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc.,

500 U.S. 90 (1991) ................................................... 15, 17

Kohl v. United States,

91 U.S. 367 (1876) ......................................................... 26

Lebov, LLC v. New York,

185 A.D.3d 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) ........................ 19

iii

Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,

148 U.S. 312 (1893) ................................................. 16, 18

Myersville Citizens for a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC,

783 F.3d 1301 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................................... 14

NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n,

425 U.S. 662 (1976) ....................................................... 13

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of Land One

1691 Sq. Foot More or Less Parcel of Land In the

Town of New London,

822 F.2d 1261 (2d Cir. 1987) .................................. 13, 21

PennEast Pipeline Co., v. New Jersey,

594 U.S. 482 (2021) ................. 1, 10, 14-15, 22-23, 25-26

Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land

in Levy Cnty.,

59 F.4th 1158 (11th Cir. 2023) ............................... 10, 20

Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 3.921 Acres of Land

in Lake Cnty., Fla.,

74 F.4th 1346 (11th Cir. 2023) ............................... 11, 25

Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., Colo.,

605 U.S. 168 (2025) ....................................................... 24

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., v. Permanent Easement

for 7.053 Acres,

931 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2019) ............. 10-11, 15, 19-22, 25

United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson,

319 U.S. 266 (1943) ......................................................... 9

United States v. Bodcaw Co.,

440 U.S. 202 (1979) ....................................................... 18

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,

440 U.S. 715 (1979) ....................... 3, 11-13, 16-18, 24-25

United States v. Miller,

317 U.S. 369 (1943) ......................................................... 9

United States v. Yazell,

382 U.S. 341 (1966) ..................................................16-17

WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Easement &

Right-of-Way Across,

No. 1:18-cv-078, 2024 WL 1477719

(D.N.D. Mar. 5, 2024)..............................................20-21

WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Easement and

Right-of-Way Across,

No. 1:18-cv-078, 2022 WL 22649232

(D. N. D. Nov. 1, 2022) ................................ 11-12, 14, 18

WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 189.9 rods,

more or less, located in Township 149 North,

132 F.4th 1058 (8th Cir. 2025) .................... 10-11, 17-18

West Virginia v. United States,

479 U.S. 305 (1987) ............................................16-17, 26

Constitutional Provisions & Statutes

U.S. Const. amend. V..................................................... 3, 11

Mich. Const. Art. X. § 2 ................................................18-19

Nev. Const. Art. 1 § 22 ...................................................... 19

15 U.S.C. § 717(a) ............................................................... 13

15 U.S.C. § 717c .................................................................. 16

15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) .............................................................. 15

15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) ..................................................10, 16-17

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1135(b) ............................................. 19

Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1263.410(a) ............................................. 19

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-1-122 ................................................ 19

Fla. Stat. § 73.071(3)(b) ..................................................... 19

Ga. Code § 22-1-12.............................................................. 19

Ind. Code § 14-39-1-9 ......................................................... 23

Minn. Stat. § 117.031.......................................................... 19

55 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 557.1 .................................................. 19

Tex. Prop. Code § 21.019(b)-(c) ........................................ 19

Va. Code Ann. § 25-1-230.1(C) .......................................... 19

Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6r)(a) ..................................................... 23

Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-704(a)(iii) ............................................... 18

Other Authorities

Adam Kay, America’s Industrial Edge Is Fueled by

Natural Gas, Am. Gas Ass’n (Feb. 14, 2026),

https://perma.cc/C9NA-XY9T ...................................... 4

Adam Kay, Fueling Prosperity: How Small Businesses

Rely on Natural Gas, Am. Gas Ass’n (May 14, 2025),

https://perma.cc/7B4T-A6A2 ........................................ 6

Amendments to the Natural Gas Act: Hearings on

H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R. 2569, and

H.R. 2956 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and

Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong. 183 (1947) ............... 23

Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting

Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges,

100 Iowa L. Rev. 947 (2015) ....................... 13-15, 22-23

Am. Gas Ass’n, Advancing America’s

Agriculture: The Value of Natural Gas to U.S.

Agriculture and Agrochemicals (Mar. 2023),

https://perma.cc/4TPP-6CK9........................................ 5

Am. Gas Ass’n, Natural Gas Fuels Businesses,

https://perma.cc/23JT-J4M4 (last visited Sept.

15, 2026) ....................................................................... 4-5

Am. Gas Ass’n, Natural Gas Pipeline Systems:

Delivering Resiliency (Oct. 10, 2014),

https://perma.cc/Z5QD-VBYJ ...................................... 7

Am. Gas Ass’n, Natural Gas Reliability as a

Public Health Essential (Apr. 6, 2026),

https://perma.cc/X6BB-UQKM .................................... 6

vii

Am. Gas Ass’n, The Unspoken Story: America’s

Natural Gas Value Chain Is Keeping the

Affordability Crisis from Getting Worse

(May 12, 2026), https://perma.cc/YLP7-VZQH .......... 7

Am. Geosciences Inst., Non-Fuel Products of Oil

& Gas (June 1, 2018),

https://perma.cc/CA5N-J3EC ...................................... 5

Interstate Nat’l Gas Ass’n of Am., North America

Midstream Infrastructure through 2035, (June

18, 2018), https://perma.cc/EA4T-VBEB .................... 8

Chris Newman, PHMSA Targets Aging Natural

Gas Pipelines with $98M in Modernization

Grants, Nat’l Gas Intel. (Apr. 6, 2026),

https://perma.cc/T8GA-SYNZ ...................................... 8

Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas

Pipeline Facilities: Statement of Policy,

88 FERC ¶ 61,227, (Sept. 15, 1999) .......................14-15

The Federal Common Law,

82 Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1969) ....................................... 17

FERC, FERC Unleashes Natural Gas Permit

Reforms, Accelerating Infrastructure Upgrades

for Affordable, Reliable Energy Nationwide

(May 21, 2026), https://perma.cc/7G6A-GT54 ............. 8

Int’l Energy Agency, Energy Supply for AI,

https://perma.cc/K7T5-U65R (last visited

Sept. 15, 2026) ................................................................. 6

viii

Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45239,

Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Siting: FERC

Policy and Issues for Congress, (2022) ............8, 15-16

Paul W. Parfomak, et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R48967,

The Natural Gas Act: Background, Key

Provisions, and Policy Issues, (2026) ..................13-14

S. Rep. No. 429, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2

(1947) ............................................................................. 22

S&P Global Energy, Price & Economic Impacts

of an Accelerating Export Industry, (July 16,

2026), https://perma.cc/ZC9E-UWUW...............5-9, 20

Dep’t of Transp., Phases of Pipeline Construction:

An Overview (Apr. 18, 2022),

https://perma.cc/K6R8-BY9H .................................... 20

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Energy Products Are

Key Inputs to Global Chemicals Industry (June

21, 2019), https://perma.cc/GH38-L4KL ..................... 5

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Heating U.S. Commercial

Buildings Is Most Energy Intensive in Cold Climates

(Sept. 6, 2023), https://perma.cc/V8PT-Q54G ............. 5

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Explained:

Natural Gas Pipelines (Mar. 19, 2024),

https://perma.cc/7TYA-R5PX ................................... 6-7

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Pipeline Companies Deliver

Most of the U.S. Electric Power Sector’s Natural Gas

(Feb. 26, 2025), https://perma.cc/E6DF-2GL8 ........... 7

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Short-Term Energy Outlook

(Sept. 2026), https://perma.cc/F4DR-A7SW ............... 7

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Use of Energy

Explained: Energy Use for Transportation,

https://perma.cc/G87E-4Y2K (last visited

Sept. 15, 2026) ................................................................. 6

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Use of Energy Explained:

Energy Use in Industry (Jan. 15, 2025),

https://perma.cc/4VPR-33BP........................................ 5

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE*

The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America is the world’s largest business organization. As

the nation’s leading advocate for business, the Chamber

represents companies and professional organizations of

every size, in every industry sector, and from every region of the country. An important function of the Chamber is to represent the interests of its members in matters

before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts.

To that end, the Chamber regularly files amicus curiae

briefs in cases, like this one, that raise issues of concern

to the nation’s business community, including cases that

involve development of critically needed infrastructure.

See, e.g., PennEast Pipeline Co., v. New Jersey, 594 U.S.

482 (2021).

The Chamber has a significant interest in the question

presented here. The Chamber’s members include not

only pipeline constructors and operators directly affected

by the ruling below, but also the multitude of businesses

in every industry relying on interstate natural-gas pipelines to keep their lights on and shops and factories running. These members have a strong interest in ensuring

that the eminent-domain process established under the

Natural Gas Act (NGA) is uniform, clear, and administrable nationwide, preventing a patchwork of state regimes

burdening the efficient development of national energy

solutions.

* No party’s counsel authored any part of this brief. No person or

entity, other than amicus curiae, its members, and its counsel, made

any contribution towards the preparation or submission of this brief.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The decision below should be affirmed. The Eighth

Circuit correctly interpreted the Natural Gas Act based

on its text, structure, and context, as ably explained by

Respondent and the United States. The Chamber of

Commerce writes separately to underscore the importance of uniform rules for energy infrastructure to

American businesses.

Our Nation needs a robust infrastructure for natural

gas. Natural gas is a building block of American commercial and industrial activity. It powers our manufacturing

facilities, heats our office buildings, and fuels our agricultural operations. Over 300,000 miles of pipelines service

enterprises in every corner of the country. This vast network did not materialize by accident; it is the product of

sustained investment, enabled by a federal regulatory

framework that Congress carefully designed to ensure

that infrastructure can be developed orderly and efficiently on a national scale.

The rules governing the exercise of eminent domain

under the NGA—including the measure of just compensation—directly affect the feasibility and cost of pipeline

projects, and thus the ability of American businesses to

access the energy resources they require. Uncertainty or

hostility

compensation

rules

can

deter

investment, delay critical projects, and harm businesses

and consumers.

In the NGA, Congress delegated the federal eminent

domain power to private parties acting in the federal government’s stead. When a pipeline company exercises that

delegated authority, it stands in the shoes of the federal

government itself, wielding federal power to acquire

property for a federally permitted project serving the national interest. Federal law thus decides the complete

measure of just compensation, as the Eighth Circuit correctly recognized. Because the NGA does not define the

measure of just compensation, the default federal rule applies: the Fifth Amendment requires that the property

owner receive fair market value for the property as compensation for the taking.

The inquiry should end there. Several courts of appeals have read the NGA not to import the federal rule,

but to give courts the option to choose between federal or

state law. The district court took that approach, and

petitioners and their amici retreat to it as a last resort.

They rely on United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,

440 U.S. 715 (1979), which sets forth a framework for deciding whether federal common law should craft a single

federal rule or import state law. But federal law as a

whole leaves no gap on compensation that can be filled by

judicial policymaking.

Moreover, even if such a gap existed, it must be filled

with one uniform federal rule, not fifty separate state

rules. The NGA establishes a comprehensive federal

scheme, to serve federal interests, overseen by a federal

agency. That scheme requires a uniform federal rule on

just compensation, just as it imposes uniform rules on

other aspects of the pipeline process. Importing state law

to determine just compensation would undermine the

Act’s objectives. Interstate pipelines, given their complexity, need predictable and efficient rules. Having fifty

different state compensation regimes would make expensive projects even more costly. And it would provide an

opportunity for hostile States to craft compensation rules

in a way that could effectively nullify the federal eminent

domain power. Finally, a uniform federal rule would not

disrupt any commercial expectations. Interstate pipelines are national projects, not local ones, and parties to

such proceedings would reasonably expect federal law to

govern—including on the measure of compensation due.

Our Nation needs an ample and increasing supply of

natural gas. We cannot afford legal uncertainty that

chills investment in essential infrastructure or that subjects interstate pipelines to a patchwork of inconsistent

state-law rules. Making clear that federal law determines

just compensation under the Natural Gas Act will help

provide the certainty that American businesses require to

continue investing in the energy infrastructure on which

our economy depends.

ARGUMENT

I. U.S. businesses need durable and affordable access

to natural gas, and interstate pipelines make that

possible.

Natural gas fuels American enterprise, keeping lights

on and factories running. This is possible only with robust

and reliable pipeline infrastructure.

Natural gas is a leading commercial fuel source.

Nearly 6 million businesses rely on natural gas.

Adam Kay, America’s Industrial Edge Is Fueled by

Natural Gas, Am. Gas Ass’n (Feb. 14, 2026),

https://perma.cc/C9NA-XY9T; Am. Gas Ass’n, Natural

Gas Fuels Businesses, https://perma.cc/23JT-J4M4 (last

visited Sept. 15, 2026). And industrial demand is

increasing; it is up more than 30% over the last two

decades. S&P Global Energy, Price & Economic Impacts of an Accelerating Export Industry 5 (July 16,

2026), https://perma.cc/ZC9E-UWUW. For most businesses that rely on natural gas for their operations, natural gas is their primary fuel source; for others, it is a critical substitute.

Demand for natural gas runs the gamut of the country’s industries. Natural gas is critical to our nation’s

manufacturing facilities, accounting for 40% of all fuel

consumed by plants and factories. U.S. Energy Info.

Admin., Use of Energy Explained: Energy Use in Industry (Jan. 15, 2025), https://perma.cc/4VPR-33BP. It fuels

our agricultural operations. Am. Gas Ass’n, Advancing

America’s Agriculture: The Value of Natural Gas to

U.S. Agriculture and Agrochemicals 3, 9 (Mar. 2023),

https://perma.cc/4TPP-6CK9. Natural gas is a key ingredient in fertilizer. Id. It also powers farm equipment, and

provides energy to dry and process foods, safely store

them, and then transport them to grocery stores and dinner tables. Id. at 3.

And the list continues. Natural gas heats most of our

office buildings, schools, and stores. U.S. Energy Info.

Admin., Heating U.S. Commercial Buildings Is Most

Energy Intensive in Cold Climates (Sept. 6, 2023),

https://perma.cc/V8PT-Q54G. It serves as a feedstock for

numerous chemicals and plastics. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Energy Products Are Key Inputs to Global Chemicals Industry (June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/GH38L4KL; Am. Geosciences Inst., Non-Fuel Products of Oil

& Gas (June 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/CA5N-J3EC.

It helps hospitals sterilize equipment. Am. Gas Ass’n,

Natural Gas Reliability as a Public Health Essential

(Apr. 6, 2026), https://perma.cc/X6BB-UQKM. It powers

the appliances at 80% of restaurants. Adam Kay, Fueling

Prosperity: How Small Businesses Rely on Natural Gas,

Am. Gas Ass’n (May 14, 2025), https://perma.cc/

7B4T-A6A2. It’s used by buses, trucks, and boats as an

alternative fuel. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Use of Energy Explained: Energy Use for Transportation,

https://perma.cc/G87E-4Y2K (last visited Sept. 15, 2026).

And data centers rely on it to meet a quarter of their energy needs. Int’l Energy Agency, Energy Supply for AI,

https://perma.cc/K7T5-U65R (last visited Sept. 15, 2026).

These operations all depend on interstate pipelines to

transport natural gas. Over 300,000 miles of pipelines

crisscross the nation, servicing operations from Maine to

Wyoming. Price & Economic Impacts, supra, at 11.

U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Explained:

Natural Gas Pipelines (Mar. 19, 2024), https://perma.cc/

7TYA-R5PX. Many large operations—like factories and

industrial facilities—connect directly to pipelines. U.S.

Energy Info. Admin., Pipeline Companies Deliver Most

of the U.S. Electric Power Sector’s Natural Gas (Feb. 26,

2025), https://perma.cc/E6DF-2GL8. But most businesses access natural gas indirectly, through local distribution networks. Id.

Because of this robust national pipeline system, the

domestic natural-gas market has remained “resilient to

external shocks,” allowing businesses to weather global

wars and national disasters. Price & Economic Impacts,

supra, at 23; Am. Gas Ass’n, Natural Gas Pipeline

Systems: Delivering Resiliency 1 (Oct. 10, 2014),

https://perma.cc/Z5QD-VBYJ. The infrastructure has

also kept energy prices competitive. Am. Gas Ass’n, The

Unspoken Story: America’s Natural Gas Value Chain Is

Keeping the Affordability Crisis from Getting Worse

(May 12, 2026), https://perma.cc/YLP7-VZQH. The

United States enjoys some of the lowest industrial

natural-gas prices in the world—with a benchmark price

of $3.53 per MMBtu in 2025, and an even lower $3.43 in

2026, as compared to the United Kingdom’s average

$19 per MMBtu and France’s $28. U.S. Energy Info.

Admin., Short-Term Energy Outlook 2 (Sept. 2026),

https://perma.cc/F4DR-A7SW; Price & Economic Impacts, supra, at 13. Lower overhead means that businesses can keep prices down for consumers and focus

their funds on expanding and innovating. It also reduces

barriers to entry for small businesses. And it helps American companies better compete in global markets. The

Unspoken Story, supra.

This robust infrastructure is no accident, but the result of the focused efforts of industry and policymakers.

Developers, with the support of their commercial customers, have invested over $280 billion in pipeline infrastructure over the past fifteen years. Price & Economic Impacts, supra, at 11; see Interstate Nat’l Gas Ass’n of Am.,

North America Midstream Infrastructure through 2035

9 (June 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/EA4T-VBEB. And

policymakers have consistently pushed to streamline and

expedite the permitting and construction process. See

Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45239, Interstate

Natural Gas Pipeline Siting: FERC Policy and Issues

for Congress, 13, 17-22 (2022); see, e.g., FERC, FERC

Unleashes Natural Gas Permit Reforms, Accelerating

Infrastructure Upgrades for Affordable, Reliable Energy

Nationwide (May 21, 2026), https://perma.cc/7G6A-GT54.

Nevertheless, new infrastructure must continue to be

built to meet growing demand and replace aging systems.

Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Siting, supra, at 3; see,

e.g., Chris Newman, PHMSA Targets Aging Natural

Gas Pipelines with $98M in Modernization Grants, Nat’l

Gas Intel. (Apr. 6, 2026), https://perma.cc/T8GA-SYNZ.

Significant bottlenecks persist. Price & Economic Impacts, supra, at 11, 25. And pipeline development remains

“challenging,” “particularly across state borders.” Price

& Economic Impacts, supra, at 18.

It is critical for the continuing efforts to expand and

improve our pipeline infrastructure to succeed. The natural gas industry is a driving force of employment and

economic growth. Over 150 pipeline companies operate

in the United States. Price & Economic Impacts, supra,

at 11. Over the next 15 years, the domestic natural-gas

industry is projected to generate nearly $3 trillion in revenue for U.S. businesses and contribute $1.4 trillion to

gross domestic product. Id. at 20. This growth will support 550,000 jobs, yielding $630 billion in labor income.

Id. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is set to become the

country’s second largest net export; in 2025, it produced

over $44 billion in export revenue. Id. at 2, 6, 17. Today,

the U.S. is the world’s leading supplier of LNG, and will

soon account for one-third of the global supply. Id. at 15.

And at home, natural gas is essential to every corner of

American business. With stable energy supplies, businesses can plan, invest, and grow with confidence. Interstate pipeline projects help provide that stability, ensuring that natural gas remains available to more businesses

at affordable prices.

II. The Natural Gas Act should not be interpreted to

create obstacles to the development of interstate

pipelines.

Petitioners’ position would create additional obstacles

to realizing the benefits of natural gas. Subjecting interstate pipelines to a patchwork of inconsistent state-law

rules would chill investment in essential infrastructure,

impairing the ability of American businesses to access

this important resource.

The NGA does not define the standard for just compensation, so the default federal rule applies. Brief for

Respondent 12-22; see, e.g., United States ex rel. Tenn.

Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281-82 (1943);

United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943). Under

the Act, pipeline developers exercise the federal eminent

domain power, stepping into the federal government’s

shoes. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). The federal government,

when it exercises its eminent domain power, is bound by

the federal rule for just compensation: the property

owner is entitled to “market value,” or “the full monetary

equivalent of the property taken,” but “cannot recover for

indirect costs like attorney fees and expenses.” WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 189.9 rods, more or less, located in Township 149 North, 132 F.4th 1058, 1060-61

(8th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). It follows that when a

private party exercises that “categorical” power, PennEast Pipeline Co., LLC v. New Jersey, 594 U.S. 482, 498

(2021), the developer is bound by the same default federal

standard, WBI Energy, 132 F.4th at 1061. The Eighth

Circuit thus adopted the correct reading of the Act, for all

the reasons explained by Respondent and the United

States. Resp. Br. 12-43; Brief for the United States as

Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at the Certiorari

Stage 8-18.

Petitioners and their amici urge this Court to reach a

different conclusion based on a different test. The district

court read the NGA not to import the “default” federal

rule, WBI Energy, 132 F.4th at 1061, but as an opportunity to exercise judicial discretion and decide between

crafting a single uniform federal rule for interstate pipelines and borrowing the laws of each state through which

the pipeline passes. Other courts of appeals have likewise

read the Act to contain a “gap” on this issue that could be

filled with either state or federal law. See Sabal Trail

Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty.,

59 F.4th 1158, 1172 (11th Cir. 2023); Tenn. Gas Pipeline

Co., v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d

237, 245 (3d Cir. 2019); Columbia Gas Transmission

Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement, 962 F.2d

1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992).

Congress left “no gaps to fill” here, as the Eighth

Circuit explained. WBI Energy, 132 F.4th at 1062.

“[N]othing in the Natural Gas Act tells [pipeline developers] what they must pay when taking property.” Id. But

“any gaps are filled by the Fifth Amendment itself,

including the obligation to pay just compensation.” Id.

(citations omitted). It is thus not up to federal courts to

engage in “interstitial lawmaking” by “build[ing] out compensation standards.” Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v.

3.921 Acres of Land in Lake Cnty., Fla., 74 F.4th 1346,

1350 (11th Cir. 2023) (Grant, J., concurring). “[F]ederal

law already provide[s] a standard.” Id. at 1349.

Even if the NGA could be read as giving courts an option on the measure of compensation, the only logical

choice is a uniform federal rule, not disparate state laws.

Petitioners and lower courts rely on the framework this

Court set out in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440

U.S. 715 (1979). Under Kimbell Foods, in the rare situation when a federal statute contains a genuine gap—

something that cannot be resolved by proper interpretation of the statute—courts, as a matter of federal common

law and “judicial policy,” can choose to either “fashion a

nationwide federal rule,” or “to adopt state law.” Id. at

728. The test balances three considerations: First, does

the statute administer a federal program that “by [its] nature [is] and must be uniform in character throughout the

Nation”? Id. (citations omitted). Second, would state law

“frustrate specific objectives of the federal” statute? Id.

Third, would a consistent federal rule “disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law”? Id.

The district court below, joining several courts of

appeals, deemed these considerations to favor importing

state compensation laws into the NGA. Those decisions

are mistaken. The NGA establishes a comprehensive federal scheme for building and running interstate pipelines,

including obtaining rights-of-way through eminent

domain. The standard for compensation based on those

takings should be the same throughout the nation.

Permitting state law to define just compensation instead

would subject interstate pipelines to a patchwork of fifty

different regimes. That is precisely the kind of disuniformity and uncertainty that Congress sought to eliminate when it enacted the Act. And because interstate

pipelines are federally permitted and exercise the federal

eminent domain power, property owners reasonably expect just compensation to be set based on federal law, not

state law. Resp. Br. 45-49.

A. Interstate pipelines need a nationally uniform

rule.

“[F]ederal programs that by their nature are and

must be uniform in character throughout the Nation

necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules.”

Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (citations omitted). The

NGA establishes such a program for interstate naturalgas pipelines.

1. The “federal interests” here “are identifiable and

strong.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Two Parcels of

Land One 1691 Sq. Foot More or Less Parcel of Land In

the Town of New London, 822 F.2d 1261, 1267 (2d Cir.

1987); see Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 730. For over a century, natural gas has played an “essential role” in our

country, serving as a primary power source. Paul W. Parfomak, et al., Cong. Rsch. Serv., R48967, The Natural Gas

Act: Background, Key Provisions, and Policy Issues 1

(2026). Its distribution and sale is thus “affected with a

public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 717(a). To that end, the NGA

is intended “to encourage the orderly development of

plentiful supplies of ... natural gas at reasonable prices.”

NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669-70

(1976).

“Federal regulation” of interstate transport “is necessary” to promote these interests. 15 U.S.C. § 717(a).

Interstate pipelines are inherently national projects.

Production facilities are often thousands of miles from the

communities they serve. Unlike other forms of fuel,

which can be transported by truck, boat, or rail, “natural

gas is transported to markets almost exclusively by pipelines.” Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100

Iowa L. Rev. 947, 950 (2015). These underground pipelines generally need to cross numerous States to reach

their destination.

States along the route might object to serving as a

thoroughfare, based on their own energy policies or

because their own citizens will not directly benefit.

Absent federal intervention, those States could put up

“roadblocks” that singlehandedly cut off access for

another State, or even an entire region. Klass & Meinhardt, supra, at 951; see id. at 993. To avoid this, the Natural Gas Act brought interstate pipeline development

“under national control,” Illinois Nat. Gas Co. v. Central

Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 506 (1942), ensuring

that the United States retains “overarching influence”

so that necessary infrastructure is made available across

the entire country, Cong. Rsch. Serv., The Natural Gas

Act: Background, Key Provisions, and Policy Issues,

supra, at 6.

The district court and some courts of appeals reasoned that the federal interests here are reduced, or even

non-existent, because the pipeline “involves two private

parties, not the United States government.” WBI Energy

Transmission, Inc. v. Easement and Right-of-Way

Across, No. 1:18-cv-078, 2022 WL 22649232, at *6 (D. N.

D. Nov. 1, 2022). But the federal interests in national

pipeline infrastructure are no less salient because the

private parties are the ones building the pipelines.

PennEast, 594 U.S. at 495-97. The projects are closely

overseen by a federal agency and allowed to proceed only

if they are found to be in the public interest. Certification

of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities: Statement of Policy, 88 FERC ¶ 61,227, at 22-29 (Sept. 15,

1999) (“Statement of Policy”); see Myersville Citizens for

a Rural Cmty., Inc. v. FERC, 783 F.3d 1301, 1307-09

(D.C. Cir. 2015). When a developer exercises the federal

eminent domain power conferred by the NGA, it stands

in the shoes of the federal government itself. PennEast,

594 U.S. at 495-97. Nothing about that delegation diminishes the federal character of that power—much less the

federal interests it serves. Id.; cf. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.,

931 F.3d at 248, 251; Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617

F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980).

2. The Natural Gas Act sets out a comprehensive

scheme to promote these federal interests. That scheme

“evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards,” including on just compensation. Kamen v. Kemper

Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991).

The Act implements “a nationwide federal program.”

Columbia Gas, 962 F.2d at 1196. Interstate pipelines are

overseen by a single federal agency—originally the Federal Power Commission, now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission—which “exercises virtually exclusive

control … and approval of interstate natural gas pipelines.” Klass & Meinhardt, supra, at 950; see Interstate

Natural Gas Pipeline Siting, supra, at 4-8 (detailing this

federal process). Interstate pipelines may be constructed

or extended only upon a finding of “public convenience

and necessity.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c). This standard,

among other things, requires considering the interests of

“[l]andowners whose land would be condemned for the

new pipeline right-of-way, under eminent domain rights

conveyed by the” federal approval. Statement of Policy,

supra, at 24. The developer must prove that the benefits

from the pipeline are “proportional to the … proposed exercise of eminent domain procedures.” Id. at 27. For this

and other considerations, the same federal standard applies uniformly to all interstate pipelines. Id. at 22-29.

Federal oversight applies throughout the lifecycle of

an interstate pipeline. Once approved, the pipeline must

be built according to the “terms and conditions” in the

federal order, “including the authorized pipeline route

and any construction or environmental mitigation

measures required.” Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline

Siting, supra, at 7-8. And once the pipeline is up and

running, the price to transport gas is set through federal

ratemaking under a uniform federal standard. 15 U.S.C.

§ 717c. This “program is general and standardized,” and

“the terms are explicitly dictated by federal law.” United

States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966); cf. Kimbell

Foods, 440 U.S. at 730-32 (federal program had “expressly incorporate[d] state law,” both procedural and

“substantive,” and relied on “local lending offices and

employees … familiar with the law of their respective

localities”).

This uniformity extends to takings under the Act.

Rather than having to rely on 50 disparate state powers,

pipeline companies may acquire rights-of-way by exercising the federal eminent domain power—a feature Congress added to the federal statutory program after States

tried to impair pipeline development. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h).

The power to condemn property and the obligation to pay

for that property go hand in hand; “the one is so inseparably connected with the other that they may be said to

exist, not as separate and distinct principles, but as parts

of one and the same.” Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United

States, 148 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1893) (citations omitted). If

federal law governs the authority to take, federal law

equally governs what must be paid for that taking. See

West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 308-09

(1987) (applying uniform federal rule to determine liability for prejudgment interest on federal contract).

This is not a situation where state laws “furnish

convenient solutions,” Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729

(citations omitted), for peripheral, procedural, or “supplemental” matters, The Federal Common Law, 82

Harv. L. Rev. 1512, 1525-26 (1969). This Court has

imported state law to decide threshold procedural

requirements for corporate derivative suits, like requiring that shareholders make a demand upon the board,

Kamen, 500 U.S. at 97-109, and granting independent

directors the right to terminate the suit, Burks v. Lasker,

441 U.S. 471, 477-86 (1979). State law has also been

imported to determine capacity to contract with the federal government, Yazell, 382 U.S. at 357-58, and priority

of commercial liens between private and government

lenders, Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729-39. In each of

these matters, state law was incorporated to answer only

ancillary questions inherently of a state-law character.

Here, by contrast, the measure of just compensation

cannot be separated from the exercise of the federal

eminent domain power. Cf. Pet. Br. 39-40; compare also

15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (providing that federal condemnation

procedures should “conform as nearly as may be” with the

relevant state practice).

3. Interstate natural-gas pipelines are a matter of

national concern requiring uniform national standards.

Indeed, the standard for just compensation is already

“well-established” in federal law. WBI Energy, 132 F.4th

at 1060. It “equates to market value” of the property

taken, excluding “indirect costs like attorney fees and expenses.” Id. at 1060-61. This rule is both fair and administrable. It provides the property owner with “a full and

perfect equivalent for the property taken,” Monongahela

Nav. Co., 148 U.S. at 326, while recognizing that “[t]he

injury done” by a taking is the loss of the property itself,

not “all the costs” a property owner “incurs as a result of

a condemnation action.” United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440

U.S. 202, 204 (1979). The first Kimbell Foods factor

strongly supports applying that existing federal rule.

B. Permitting state law to fill the gap would frustrate the objectives of the Natural Gas Act.

It would “frustrate specific objectives” of the NGA to

import state law to override the default federal rule.

Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. Requiring courts and developers to apply disparate state compensation rules, rather than a single federal standard, would lead to added

costs and administrative waste. More concerningly, it

would give States an avenue to seek to limit or prevent

pipeline development.

1. State laws vary widely on what counts as just

compensation. Some States mirror the default federal

standard and require only fair market value for the property itself—although they may differ on the method for

calculating that value. See, e.g., Correia v. New Bedford

Redevelopment Auth., 375 Mass. 360, 361 (1978) (detailing accepted methods); Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-704(a)(iii)

(same). Other States might add a multiplier; Michigan,

for instance, demands “125% of [the] property’s fair market value” for primary residences. Mich. Const. Art.

X. § 2. Others conduct a more holistic inquiry to determine compensation. For example, Pennsylvania balances

“the original cost of construction,” “the gross annual revenue of the property,” “the probable earning capacity of

the property,” “[t]he reproduction cost of the property,”

and any “other elements of value.” 55 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 557.1.

Beyond the value of the taken property itself, States

might permit recovery for “consequential damages.”

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 931 F.3d at 244 (Pennsylvania);

see also Lebov, LLC v. New York, 185 A.D.3d 911, 912

(N.Y. App. Div. 2020). This can include lost profits,

Va. Code Ann. § 25-1-230.1(C), or the costs of any adjustments or alterations required to the remaining property,

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 931 F.3d at 244 (Pennsylvania);

see also Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1263.410(a); Fla. Stat.

§ 73.071(3)(b). Other States provide for “all reasonable

costs and expenses,” Nev. Const. Art. 1 § 22, like “appraisal … and engineering fees,” Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.,

931 F.3d at 245 (Pennsylvania); accord Minn.

Stat. § 117.031; Ga. Code § 22-1-12. And some allow for

attorneys’ fees.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-1135(b);

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-1-122; Minn. Stat. § 117.031; Tex.

Prop. Code § 21.019(b)-(c); see also Resp. Br. 28-29.

2. Imposing these disparate state compensation rules

on interstate pipeline projects would increase the cost and

burdens of interstate development, and may halt some

projects altogether.

Pipeline projects are already complex and expensive

undertakings. The developer must assess multiple “possible routes,” considering which communities need

service, the volume the pipeline must carry, and which

population centers and existing infrastructure must

be avoided. Dep’t of Transp., Phases of Pipeline

Construction: An Overview (Apr. 18, 2022), https://

perma.cc/K6R8-BY9H. It then has to “engineer the actual system designs” and “construct the pipelines.” Id.

But in order to do that, the developer must “acquire

the right-of-way ... to build, operate and maintain the

pipelines” through “purchase, license, or easement

agreement.” Id.

This right-of-way process can be particularly onerous.

Developers must engage in individual negotiations with

each landowner along the route. If the parties cannot

reach agreement, the developer must initiate separate

court proceedings for each tract. E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co.

v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir. 2004). For one 94-mile

pipeline, this process required “separate hearings on

compensation” for 85 tracts of land. Id. Pipelines generate no revenue until the entire line is completed and delivery can begin. So they need enormous up-front capital

investment;

currently

scheduled

projects

are

expected to require nearly $40 billion over the next 15

years. Price & Economic Impacts, supra, at 19.

By including sums (such as attorneys’ fees) in “just

compensation” that go beyond the amount available under federal law, state law can contribute to the sticker

price of a parcel of land, often significantly. See, e.g.,

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 931 F.3d at 242 (awarding almost

$1 million in consequential damages to a single landowner); Sabal Trail, 59 F.4th at 1162 (awarding over

$765,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs to two landowners);

see also Resp. Br. 30. For the single parcel involved in

this case, attorneys’ fees and costs amounted to $380,000.

WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Easement & Rightof-Way Across, No. 1:18-cv-078, 2024 WL 1477719, at *3

(D.N.D. Mar. 5, 2024). These added expenses not only

would create disparities among similarly situated parties

affected by the same pipeline project in different states,

but could encumber a project so much that it becomes infeasible.

Navigating disparate state regimes also imposes significant administrative burdens on a project. A developer

has to “enmesh itself in the” compensation regimes of

each State through which the pipeline passes, an “unenviable position” for a federal project operating across multiple jurisdictions. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 822 F.2d

at 1267. These variations can result in “uncertainties and

delays,” id. at 1266-67, compounding already formidable

development challenges.

The courts of appeals that go the other way have discounted these concerns on the ground that private entities expend private money, rather than “federal dollars,”

in paying just compensation. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 931

F.3d at 249. But like the federal government, a private

party exercising delegated federal eminent domain power

“has a strong interest in reducing the costs of its own

exercises of eminent domain.” Id. More importantly, so

does the public: Costs of pipeline development are reflected in the rates paid by consumers. Keeping development expenditures down thus translates to lower natural

gas prices for customers.

3. In addition to these direct and inevitable costs, imposing a state-law regime for just compensation introduces the opportunity for mischief that the NGA was designed to avoid. If States define the compensation due for

condemnations under the NGA, state law could define

“just compensation” in terms so expansive or “hostile” as

to effectively deprive a pipeline operator of its ability to

exercise the federal eminent domain power. Georgia

Power Co., 617 F.2d at 1120; see Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co.,

931 F.3d at 253 (recognizing that “a state could theoretically have a compensation law so far out of step with federal law as to create a significant conflict”).

History demonstrates that States have been willing to

erect barriers to interstate pipeline development when

given the opportunity. Before Congress amended the

NGA to delegate the federal eminent domain power,

States frequently imposed restrictions—denying eminent

domain authority to out-of-state corporations, or requiring that pipelines directly benefit in-state residents.

PennEast Pipeline Co., 594 U.S. at 489. These restrictions meant that companies “often had only an illusory right to build.” Id.; see S. Rep. No. 429, 80th Cong.,

1st Sess. 2, at 1-2 (1947).

For instance, after World War II, one company converted emergency crude-oil pipelines, no longer needed

after the war, into natural gas lines. Klass & Meinhardt,

supra, at 996. But to make the pipeline operational, the

company needed to expand it into Pennsylvania. Id.

“State governments, the coal industry, and railroad interests blocked [those] efforts.” Id. at 997. That winter saw

“[n]atural gas shortages,” id., much to the “discomfort

and peril” of consumers, Amendments to the Natural Gas

Act: Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, H.R.

2569, and H.R. 2956 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce, 80th Cong. 183 (1947) (statement of John Siggins, Jr., Chairman, Pa. Pub. Utility

Comm’n). And “nearly 50,000 workers” were “laid off

from jobs” that depended on natural gas. Klass & Meinhardt, supra, at 997. “Congress acted to remedy this defect” by granting pipeline companies “the federal eminent

domain power,” ensuring that operators would not be left

to the mercy of competing and potentially unfriendly

state regimes. PennEast, 594 U.S. at 489.

The same threat of “States impeding interstate pipeline development” applies to the measure of compensation. PennEast, 594 U.S. at 498. Consider a hypothetical

State that, to disincentivize natural-gas development, decides to allow property owners to recover enhanced damages in natural-gas pipeline takings. Cf. Ind. Code § 1439-1-9 (imposing special compensation requirements for

takings by CO2 pipelines); Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6r)(a) (same

for taking for any “fuel pipeline”); see also Resp. Br. 30.

A natural-gas pipeline needs an easement on a farm. The

fair market value for an easement is $10,000, and the pipeline is financed accordingly.

But under the hypothetical compensation scheme, the

property owner recovers far more in an award from a local (and sympathetic) finder of fact: for lost profits from

reduced crop yields on adjacent property, for the diminished resale value of the property and neighboring lots,

and even for the purported stigma of having a pipeline

nearby. The owner also gets to recover expert and attorneys’ fees, and so has little incentive to limit costs. All in,

an easement that would cost $10,000 under federal law

now costs $400,000 under state law. Now multiply that

across the 40-plus easements that the pipeline has to acquire in a State. The pipeline’s nominal authority to exercise federal eminent domain would become “illusory.”

Id. at 489. And “[a]n eminent domain power that is incapable of being exercised amounts to no eminent domain

power at all.” Id. at 504.

The consequences of such obstruction extend far beyond individual pipeline projects. When infrastructure

development is impeded, “[f]ewer projects make it to the

finish line”—or even “the starting line.” Seven Cnty.

Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., Colo., 605 U.S. 168,

184 (2025). “Those that survive often end up costing much

more than is anticipated or necessary.” Id. “And that in

turn means fewer and more expensive” pipelines to meet

national energy needs, and “fewer jobs, as new projects

become difficult to finance and build in a timely fashion.”

Id. These harms—reduced energy reliability, higher

prices, and diminished economic growth—are then borne

by American businesses and consumers.

C. Commercial parties would reasonably expect

that federal, not state law, determines just compensation in this context.

Finally, fashioning a uniform federal rule would not

“disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state

law.” Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 729. Interstate pipelines are national projects, not local ones. The parties to

condemnation proceedings under the Natural Gas Act

would reasonably expect federal law to govern—including on the measure of compensation due.

No doubt, state law defines the contours of property

rights. Brief of Petitioners 42; see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 931 F.3d at 251. But the question here is how to

determine just compensation for the taking of such rights

by federal eminent domain under a federal statute, the

NGA. That is a quintessentially federal question. Under

the NGA, property is being taken pursuant to “a private

delegation of the federal eminent domain power,” not the

exercise of any “state government[]’s ... state eminent domain power.” Sabal Trail, 74 F.4th at 1349 (Grant, J.,

concurring). Property owners thus would not “have their

expectations thwarted” by the application of federal law

to determine just compensation. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S.

at 739.

To the contrary, property owners would reasonably

expect that federal law would determine the measure of

compensation. The property is being taken for an interstate project authorized by a federal agency under federal law, typically in a proceeding in federal court. The

“parties that conduct business in this industry are already

on notice of the potential application of federal law.”

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 931 F.3d at 254; cf. Kimbell

Foods, 440 U.S. at 739-40 & n.42. After all, “[t]he federal

eminent domain power ... can neither be enlarged nor diminished by a State,” “[n]or can any State prescribe the

manner in which it must be exercised.” PennEast, 594

U.S. at 494-95 (quoting Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367,

374 (1876)); see West Virginia, 479 U.S. at 309.

The federal rule is well-settled and fair to both

condemnors and property owners. Applying it here

would not disrupt settled expectations; it would confirm

them.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm

the Eighth Circuit’s judgment.

Respectfully submitted,