Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Anton Joseph Lazzaro, Petitioner v. United States

No.

In the

Supreme Court

of the United States

______________

Anton Lazzaro,

v.

Petitioner,

United States of America,

Respondent.

______________

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

______________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

______________

Daniel L. Gerdts

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

331 Second Avenue South, Suite 705

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401

(612) 800-5086

daniel@danielgerdtslaw.com

Attorney for Petitioner

2025 - Bachman Legal Printing n (612) 339-9518

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Does a person who engages in otherwise lawful,

consensual sex with a 16 or 17-year-old dating partner

commit “sex-trafficking” if the person gives

unconditional gifts to the date?

May a person be convicted under 18 U.S.C. §

1591(a), for the sex trafficking of a minor without

knowledge that a minor would be caused to engage in

a commercial sex act?

ii

PROCEEDINGS DIRECTLY RELATED

TO THIS CASE

United States vs. Anton Lazzaro, 21-Cr-173PJS-DTS, District of Minnesota (judgment entered on

9 August 2023).

United States vs. Anton Lazzaro, Nos. 23-3098

and 23-3411, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

(judgment entered on 25 February 2025).

United States vs. Anton Lazzaro, Nos. 23-3098

and 23-3411, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Order

Denying Petition for En Banc Rehearing) (order

entered on 6 May 2025).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

PROCEEDINGS DIRECTLY RELATED ................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................ v

CITATIONS OF THE OPINIONS AND ORDERS

ENTERED BELOW..................................................... 1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ............................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED IN THE CASE ........................................ 1

STATEMENT .............................................................. 1

A.

Background ..................................................... 1

B.

The Decision Below ........................................ 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......... 7

I. The Unconstitutionally Vague Application of

Section 1591(a) to Defendant’s Conduct Requires

this Court’s Intervention. ........................................ 7

A.

Congressional Intent .................................. 10

B.

Lack of Fair Notice ..................................... 11

C.

Arbitrary Enforcement ............................... 15

II.

The Circuit Split of Authority Regarding Proof

of the Required Mens Rea Requires Resolution by

this Court. ............................................................... 16

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 20

iv

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: Opinion of the Court of

Appeals (25 February 2025)............................... A-1

APPENDIX B: Transcript of the District Court’s

Oral Ruling from the Bench Denying

Motion to Dismiss (9 August 2023) …............. A-33

APPENDIX C: Court of Appeals Order

Denying Petition for En Banc Rehearing

(6 May 2025) ………...………….………….……. A-38

APPENDIX D: Excerpt of Trial Testimony

(Vol. I, at 227) (22 March 2023)……................ A-40

APPENDIX E: Statutory Provisions

Involved ………………………………………….. A-41

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Ciminelli v. United States,

598 U.S. 306 (2023) ............................................. 7

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) ....... 16

Dubin v. United States,

599 U.S. 110 (2023) ................................. 8, 11, 14

Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,

581 U.S. 385 (2017) ............................................. 3

Grayned v. City of Rockford,

408 U.S. 104 (1972) ............................................ 11

McCormick v. United States,

500 U.S. 257 (1991) ............................................ 14

McDonnell v. United States,

579 U.S. 550 (2016) ............................................ 15

Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504

(S.D.N.Y. 2018) ................................................... 12

Percoco v. United States,

598 U.S. 319 (2023) ....................................... 7, 11

Skilling v. United States,

561 U.S. 358 (2010) ............................................ 14

Snyder v. United States, 603 U.S. 1 (2024) ....... 7, 12

vi

United States v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026

(9th Cir. 2017)..................................................... 12

United States v. Purcell, 967 F.3d 159

(2nd Cir. 2020).................................................... 17

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,

489 U.S. 235 (1989)............................................. 10

United States v. Roy, 630 F. App'x 169

(4th Cir. 2015)..................................................... 17

United States v. Todd,

627 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................... 17

United States v. Tutstone, 525 F. App'x 304

(6th Cir. 2013)..................................................... 17

Van Buren v. United States,

593 U.S. 374 (2021) ......................................... 7, 8

OTHER AUTHORITIES

18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) ........................... ii, 2, 5, 8, 15, 17

18 U.S.C. § 3231 ....................................................... 2

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 1291 ....................................................... 5

vii

Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the

Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law,

108 The American Journal Of International

Law 609 (2014) .......................................................... 9

Julie A. Dahlstrom, The Elastic Meaning(s) of

Human Trafficking, 108 California Law Review 379

(2020) ............................................................. 9, 12, 14

1

CITATIONS OF THE OPINIONS

AND ORDERS ENTERED BELOW

The order of the court of appeals denying the

petition for en banc rehearing is unofficially reported

at 2025 WL 1305358. The panel opinion of the court of

appeals is reported at 129 F.4th 514.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The judgment of the court of appeals was

entered in this case on 25 February 2025. Petitioner

was granted an extension of time to file a petition for

en banc rehearing, and thereafter timely filed said

petition. The petition for en banc rehearing was denied

by the court of appeals on 6 May 2025. This Petition

for Certiorari is timely filed within the meaning of

Rule 13 of the rules of this Court. This Court has

jurisdiction to review the decision of the court of

appeals pursuant to a writ of certiorari under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1).

PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THE CASE

The relevant statutory provisions (18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a) and (e)(3)) are set forth the appendix. Pet.

App. A-41.

STATEMENT

A.

Background.

1. The case arises from a federal grand jury

indictment on 11 August 2021, charging Petitioner

Lazzaro with conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, sex

trafficking of minors, attempted sex trafficking of a

minor, and obstruction of justice, in violation of 18

2

U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and (d), and 1594 (a) and (c). The

charges of attempted sex trafficking and obstruction

were later dropped or dismissed. The district court had

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

2. The case is unprecedented and unique – so

far. The Department of Justice has never before

exercised its discretion to bring a case under § 1591(a)

that relies on such an expansive interpretation of the

federal sex-trafficking statute. In this spacious new

construal of the reach of the statute, the federal

government may prosecute an array of common dating

behaviors as “sex-trafficking” crimes when the local

prosecutor disapproves of the relationship – or even

just one of the parties to the relationship. The opinion

below by the court of appeals leaves a surprising

judicial imprimatur on this overzealous expansion of

the law that requires this Court’s review.

The case garnered immense publicity and public

interest because Mr. Lazzaro had been a prominent

Republican donor in Minnesota political circles, who

was well known for his strident political rhetoric and

embarrassment of a Democratic member of the

Minnesota Congressional delegation. He was still very

young – only 29-years-old – at the time that the

Government alleges that he engaged in the conduct at

issue at trial – but not so young that he had not

already made a big splash in state politics.

3. The conduct alleged to be criminal consisted

of little more than dating 16 and 17-year-old females.

In Minnesota, as in the majority of the jurisdictions in

the Republic (federal enclaves included), it is entirely

lawful to date and have consensual sexual

relationships with persons who are as young as 16

years of age. See Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581

3

U.S. 385, 396 (2017) (“A significant majority of

jurisdictions thus set the age of consent at 16”).

Through an expansive reading of the federal sex

trafficking statute, however, the disapproving

prosecutors here have sought to impose an effective

national age of consent of 18, by making it a serious

federal felony to exchange gifts to foment or

strengthen a romantic relationship with a person who

is only 16 or 17.

4. Most of the facts of the case were not in

dispute, though there were a few significant

disagreements at trial. All of the relevant conduct

occurred during a seven-month period of time in 2020,

during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. During

the pandemic, taking dates to restaurants and clubs

was not possible in Minneapolis, so Petitioner Lazzaro

invited his dates to his residence or he took them

shopping. None of the invitations or any of the

communications preceding the dates ever mentioned

sexual activity – let alone sexual activity of a

commercial nature.

5. During that time, Mr. Lazzaro met his CoDefendant Gisela Castro Medina. She also was young

(18-years-old), and they met on-line through a dating

website. He invited her over to his residence. She

accepted the invitation and brought along a friend

(alleged victim G.L.). Despite never before having met

or even communicated with each other, Lazzaro and

G.L. hit it off well, and ended up having spontaneous

sex that evening. That conduct was one of the charged

acts of sex trafficking in the indictment.

Ms. Castro Medina testified that Mr. Lazzaro

asked her a couple of days later to become his

“recruiter” – to help him meet other potential romantic

partners – something he described as “matchmaking.”

4

Castro Medina assisted in the matchmaking effort by

providing a few on-line introductions between Mr.

Lazzaro and some of her friends from a social media

platform. Mr. Lazzaro preferred younger dates, but he

insisted that his they be old enough lawfully to engage

in consensual sexual relations. The cutoff was 16.

6. Mr. Lazzaro generously gave away gifts and

cash to all of his dates and their guests during or after

their visits. Sometimes Lazzaro and his dates had sex,

but his generosity was never contingent on it, and

none of the alleged victims testified that Mr. Lazzaro

ever asked for anything in exchange for his gifts. The

money and gifts were not overly extravagant either –

his most expensive handouts were a designer purse

and an iPhone.

Sometimes his dates did engage in sexual

activity, but not very often: all of the conduct

contended to be criminal in this case consisted of fewer

than a dozen sex acts with five different females over

the course of the seven-month period.

7. The Government nonetheless argued that the

handful of sex acts at issue were “commercial,” based

on the gifts and money, and also because several of the

alleged victims subjectively believed that they had

received money or other gifts at least in part on

account of sexual activity. None of them considered the

conduct to constitute prostitution, however, expressly

rejecting the suggestion:

Q. Okay. Now, you were questioned about

your interactions with Tony, and you

said, "It sounds bad, but it wasn't. It

wasn't bad. It wasn't like prostitution or

anything." You said that, right?

5

A. I can't for sure say I remember saying

that, but that sounds like something that

I agree with right now.

Q. So you agree with it now?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. It was not prostitution?

A. I -- no.

Pt. App. A-40.

8. A jury nonetheless found Petitioner Lazzaro

guilty on all counts after trial in federal district court

in the district of Minnesota. The district court imposed

a sentence of 252 months in prison on 9 August 2023,

orally denying Lazzaro’s motion to dismiss the charges

as unconstitutionally void for vagueness as applied to

his conduct.

9. Petitioner Lazzaro timely filed a notice of

appeal, and the court of appeals had jurisdiction from

the district court’s final judgment pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1291.

B.

The Decision Below.

In its opinion filed on 25 February 2025, a panel

of the court of appeals affirmed the convictions. Among

other arguments, Mr. Lazzaro had contended that §

1591(a) was unconstitutionally void for vagueness as

applied to his conduct, focusing on the application of

the second element of the statute – requiring

knowledge that a minor would be caused to engage in

a commercial sex act. He asserted that it failed to

provide adequate notice that his conduct violated the

law. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence

to prove the same element of the offense, urging the

adoption of the standard employed by four sister

circuit courts of appeal.

6

1. The opinion below dismissed Lazzaro’s

vagueness challenge to the application of the second

element in two paragraphs, finding that “[a] person of

ordinary intelligence would know that flaunting cash

and valuables to minors, plying those minors with

alcohol and drugs, and paying them in cash or

valuables after sex could ‘cause’ those minors to

engage in a commercial sex act.” Pet. App. A-15-A16.

2. The decision below also concluded that

§1591(a) is sufficiently circumscribed by a hidden

“intent” requirement: “Moreover, that a defendant

must intend certain consequences further undermines

Lazzaro’s arguments. Section 1591(a) requires proof

that a defendant “mean[t] to ‘cause’ the minor to

engage in commercial sex acts.” . . . That state of mind

narrows the statute’s application considerably yet still

sweeps in Lazzaro’s conduct here.” Pet. App. A-16.

3. Regarding the sufficiency challenge, the

decision below found “the evidence was more than

sufficient to prove that Lazzaro intended and knew

that each of the minor victims would be caused to

engage in commercial sex.” Pet. App. A-20. It

concluded that his conduct “demonstrated an ongoing,

implicit offer to pay for sex acts,” and that “the proof

of intent we have already described is enough to

support his convictions.” Pet. App. A-21 (emphasis

added). It declined even to consider the standard

adopted in four of the other courts of appeals.

4. The court of appeals denied Petitioner’s

timely petition for en banc rehearing on 6 May 2025.

7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant review of the decision

of the court of appeals because the court of appeals has

interpreted a federal criminal statute in a way that

directly conflicts with the relevant decisions of this

Court, expanding the statute’s reach far beyond what

both Congress intended and the statutory text

reasonably permits. This Court’s review also is needed

to resolve the split of circuit authority that the opinion

below has created with at least four other circuit

courts of appeal. This Court’s intervention and review

of the case is essential to assure a uniform and

reasonable interpretation of an important federal

criminal statute.

I.

The Unconstitutionally Vague Application

of Section 1591(a) to Defendant’s Conduct

Requires this Court’s Intervention.

This Court has repeatedly taken prosecutors to

task for the undue expansion of federal criminal

jurisdiction on the basis of creative interpretations of

the statutes’ prohibitions that threaten to criminalize

ordinary conduct. See, e.g., Snyder v. United States,

603 U.S. 1 (2024); Percoco v. United States, 598 U.S.

319 (2023); Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306

(2023); Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374

(2021). It has, moreover,

traditionally exercised restraint in

assessing the reach of a federal criminal

statute. This restraint arises both out of

deference to the prerogatives of Congress

and out of concern that a fair warning

should be given to the world in language

that the common world will understand

of what the law intends to do if a certain

8

line is passed. After all, crimes are

supposed to be defined by the legislature,

not by clever prosecutors riffing on

equivocal language.

Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 129–30 (2023)

(cleaned up).

The decision below is a direct affront to this

entire body of jurisprudence. It presents the Court

with yet another failure to heed its clear admonitions

against the overbroad construction of federal criminal

statutes. It circumvents the Court’s precedents by

conjuring an entirely made-up “state of mind”

requirement that purportedly “narrows the statute’s

application considerably.” Pet. App. A-16. Despite this

Court’s repeated directives to construe federal

criminal statutes narrowly, the decision below actually

gives its stamp of approval to a greatly expanded reach

of the sex trafficking statute that “would attach

criminal penalties to a breathtaking amount of

commonplace [dating] activity.” Van Buren 593 U.S. at

393 (modified). Even in cases without a split of circuit

court authority, this Court has granted certiorari to

reign in overly expansive interpretations of federal

criminal statutes. E.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S.

528 (2015). Considering that this case also presents a

split of circuit authority on how to interpret § 1591(a),

the Court should grant review here as well.

The vague rendering of the statute in this case

is not the first time its reach has been extended, and

Petitioner’s arguments regarding its vague application

were anticipated. Indeed, legal commentators have

observed for years how prosecutors have aggressively

pushed at the boundaries of what defines and

constitutes “sex trafficking,” often blurring the

9

definition in the process, and inviting challenges on the

grounds of overbreadth and vagueness as a result:

as the definition broadens, defendants

may continue to raise a host of

constitutional

concerns

about

the

overbreadth and vagueness of the

statutes. These challenges may become

more frequent as the definition expands,

and they highlight real concerns about due

process and freedom of association. . . .

Even if such broad statutes are upheld by

courts, definitional expansion will pose

problems for the legitimacy and the

conceptual viability of human trafficking.

Julie A. Dahlstrom, The Elastic Meaning(s) of Human

Trafficking, 108 California Law Review 379, 434 (2020).

See also Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the

Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 The

American Journal Of International Law 609, 610 (2014)

(“Notwithstanding the global consensus that trafficking

is something to be rid of, the anti-trafficking field is a

strikingly ‘rigor-free zone’ when it comes to defining the

concept’s legal parameters.”) “Defense attorneys will

raise new challenges on behalf of defendants who may

genuinely be shocked to be called perpetrators of human

trafficking.” Dahlstrom, at 435. Mr. Lazzaro is one such

defendant who was genuinely shocked at the allegations

in this case.1

1 The boundary-pushing cases criticized by Dahlstrom and others

at least usually involve something resembling criminal conduct

(such as sexual assault). This case pushes the boundaries much

further – into commonplace dating behavior.

10

A.

Congressional Intent.

The vagueness inherent in the application of the

sex trafficking statute to Petitioner’s conduct arises in

part because it is unmoored from the intent of Congress

when it promulgated the law. That intent had nothing

to do with criminalizing common dating behaviors and

otherwise lawful sexual relationships with 16 and 17year-old minors. Indeed, the vast expansion of the

statute accomplished in this case strays far from the

goal envisioned by Congress. This Court has found that

“in the rare cases in which the literal application of a

statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with

the intentions of its drafters, the intention of the

drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”

United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242

(1989) (cleaned up). The opinion below disagreed,

concluding that “generalized notions of Congressional

intent do not impact the standard of conduct outlined in

the text of the statute.” Pet. App. A-18.

Congress’ intention was decidedly not ambiguous

when the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015

was enacted, as Senator John Cornyn, the author and

principal sponsor of the Act, made clear during debate

on the Senate floor,

we don’t treat a young girl who has been

trafficked as the criminal. In other words,

in the past I think there’s been somewhat

of a tendency to say, we're going to arrest

a 15-year-old girl and charge her for being

a prostitute. When in fact, she has no

choice in the matter. She is being

compelled . . . it’s not a voluntary act on her

part.

https://www.c-span.org/video/?324785-1/senate-sessionpart-1, at 4:59:38-5:00:11 (11 March 2015) (emphasis

11

added). Senator Roy Blunt, a co-sponsor of the

legislation, emphasized the same problem intended to

be addressed by the legislation: “This bill helps victims

of trafficking who are often invisible, often underserved, often unknown by anybody in the community

where they have been taken except a person who

somehow has seized control over them and the people

with whom that person deals with.” Id. at 2:38:522:39:15 (emphasis added).

Congress simply did not pass the Act to pursue

individuals engaging in ordinary dating behaviors who

have voluntary sexual relations with their dates. And it

most certainly did not pass the law to preempt state ageof-consent provisions with a uniform federal standard.

B.

Lack of Fair Notice.

“It is a basic principle of due process that an

enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are

not clearly defined.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408

U.S. 104, 108 (1972). This Court’s precedents “insist

that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a

reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so

that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the

innocent by not providing fair warning.” Id. at 108. “The

Legislature must identify the conduct it wishes to

prohibit. And its prohibition must be knowable in

advance—not a lesson to be learned by individuals only

when the prosecutor comes calling or the judge debuts a

novel charging instruction.” Percoco v. United States,

598 U.S. 319, 337–38 (2023) (Gorsuch, J., Concurring).

Notwithstanding the clear intent of Congress, the

prosecution in this case has employed a “rapacious

interpretation,” Dubin, at 134, of § 1591(a) that turns

commonplace dating activity into the federal crime of

sex trafficking. The commentators had it right, but this

case far exceeds the observed “lack of consensus on the

12

exact contours of the legal definition . . . of human

trafficking.” Dahlstrom, at 389.

This is not a case in which the Petitioner should

have known that his conduct was in violation of the law.

In the run-of-the-mill case of genuine sex trafficking,

there is a negotiated transaction between a buyer and a

pimp for sexual services to be provided by the minor

victim. The nature of the transaction by itself provides

fair notice to the participants that the conduct is

unlawful.

No such explicitly unlawful conduct occurred in

this case. One might disapprove of the “ill-advised, but

perfectly legal, relationship [Lazzaro] had with a young

woman above the age of consent under [Minnesota] law”

(see United States v. Laursen, 847 F.3d 1026, 1036 (9th

Cir. 2017) (Hawkins, Circuit Judge, concurring)), but

here there was no pimp, no prostitution, no negotiated

exchange of money for sex, indeed there was no

discussion of sex at all.

The conduct in this case is far closer to the

hypothetical considered by the court in Noble v.

Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2018):

“whether an individual who treats a person to a free

dinner and a movie, promises future outings and/or

gifts, and then attempts and/or engages in what he or

she construes as consensual sexual activity, could be

prosecuted under Section 1591 as a ‘sex trafficker.’” Id.

at 523.

Unfortunately, the statute’s definition of

“commercial sex act” provides nothing to restrain the

overzealous prosecutor. And it fails also to provide

proper guidance to a person of normal intelligence on

how to “distinguish the innocuous from the criminal.”

Snyder, 603 U.S. at 17. It includes within its broad

definition “any sex act, on account of which anything of

13

value is given to or received by any person.” Pet. App.

A-41.

While this statute does not present the same

issue as the distinction between bribes and gratuities

considered by the Court in Snyder, the words “on

account of” must be interpreted in connection with the

“knowledge” requirement of § 1591(a) (knowledge that

the minor will be caused to engage in a commercial sex

act). Because when it is, the “thing of value” takes on

the same distinct role as the bribe did in Snyder; it

serves to influence conduct. See id. at 11. It either

influences the victim directly to engage in the future

sex act, or it influences her handlers to cause her to do

so.

Snyder teaches that mere gratuities after the

fact do not constitute bribes, and they likewise cannot

turn an otherwise innocent completed sex act into a

“commercial” sex act. This distinction was entirely lost

on the court of appeals in its decision below, which

absurdly concluded that “paying [minors] in cash or

valuables after sex could cause’ those minors to engage

in a commercial sex act.” Pet. App. A-15-16.

It is the knowledge that is required to accompany

the conduct in the second element of the offense that

provides the required notice in a typical case.

Knowledge that the minor will be caused to participate

in a commercial sex act. That knowledge, of course,

refers to the knowledge of the accused trafficker and

obviously to that person’s knowledge before the sex act

takes place – contemporaneously with the enticement or

transportation or other alleged conduct from the first

element. In the typical case, that knowledge is readily

apparent because the buyer will be negotiating the

terms of the commercial sex with the pimp or other

person who has control over the minor before it

14

happens. The facts of this case demonstrate no such

knowledge, and therefore fail to provide the requisite

notice.

As the law was applied to the facts of this case,

there simply was no discernable bright line that

distinguished “sex trafficking” from the giving of a gift

to a lawful intimate partner who was seventeen-yearsold. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 424

(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[the statute] provides no

‘ascertainable standard’ for the conduct it condemns”).

As applied to the facts of this case, there was no

“formulation that define[d] the forbidden zone of

conduct with sufficient clarity.” McCormick v. United

States, 500 U.S. 257, 273 (1991). As one commentator

has observed in recommending legislative changes,

merely “innocuous” dating behavior cannot reasonably

give rise to 21 years of incarceration in a federal prison:

In particular, future legislation should

ensure that defendants have clear notice

of the prohibited conduct. Legislation

should not be so overbroad as to create

civil or criminal penalties for innocuous

behavior. At a bare minimum, such laws

must include a mens rea requirement,

requiring evidence that the defendant

“knowingly” engaged in or benefited from

sex trafficking.

Dahlstrom, at 436.

The law as applied to Mr. Lazzaro in this case did

not provide that required clear notice. As construed here

by the Government, the statute outlaws all consensual

sex with a seventeen-year-old (even in the majority of

jurisdictions where it is otherwise lawful) if the

romantic relationship is nurtured with the giving of

gifts or if a partner expresses their post-coital

15

contentment with trinkets and cash gratuities. “The

text and context of the statute do not support such a

boundless interpretation.” Dubin, 599 U.S. at 114.

C.

Arbitrary Enforcement.

The broad interpretation of § 1591(a) as approved

in the decision below, and as applied to the facts of this

case, also fails to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement because there is no explicit standard for

how to apply it. There is no line that gives notice as to

what kinds of gifts may be exchanged in a sexual dating

relationship without violating the law. Does the gift of a

Prada purse or an iPhone turn an ordinary, voluntary

sex act into a “commercial” sex act? What about lunch

at a Chipotle restaurant?

This Court already has emphasized that we

cannot rely on the Government to exercise its discretion

responsibly when given such wide latitude in its vague

interpretation of a criminal statute: “But the

Government's legal interpretation is not confined to

cases involving extravagant gifts or large sums of

money, and we cannot construe a criminal statute on

the assumption that the Government will use it

responsibly.” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550,

576 (2016) (cleaned up). The loose and vague application

of § 1591(a), as approved by the decision below, would

apply equally to all college freshmen hoping to score

with high school seniors through gifts of admission to

the next fraternity party or free liquor and

transportation. Any time a teen date is gifted a concert

ticket, or entrance to a sporting event, or dinner and a

movie – and sex follows – the local constabulary is given

free rein to arrest and bring charges.

Like the commercial sex requirement, there is

nothing about the first element of the offense that

provides any further guidance either to the prospective

16

offender or to the investigator making charging

recommendations. According to the opinion below, “[a]

person of ordinary intelligence would know that Lazzaro

‘enticed’ his victims by displaying photographs of

himself with expensive items and celebrities.” Pet. App.

A-15. Persons of ordinary intelligence apparently should

know that hanging a photograph of yourself posing with

President Trump (as Lazzaro did here) will get you 21

years in prison if let your date walk by the photograph

and later end up in bed with her. That is no guardrail at

all to curb the discretion of the police and prosecutors.

In short, the overly vague and expansive reading

of the statute’s sweep – as expressly condoned by the

opinion below – does “not provide sufficiently specific

limits on the enforcement discretion of the police to meet

constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity.”

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999). And

there is no doubt in this case that the exercise of

discretion to prosecute Petitioner Lazzaro had more to

do with his politics than anything having to do with his

dating conduct.

II.

The Circuit Split of Authority Regarding

Proof of the Required Mens Rea Requires

Resolution by this Court.

As explained above, the knowledge requirement

of the statute is essential to limit its reach, but the

opinion below flippantly discards the knowledge

element altogether, and in the process creates a conflict

with the holding of at least four other circuits. The

statutory language provides that the knowledge

element is met when the accused knows, or recklessly

17

disregards, that a minor will be caused to engage in a

commercial sex act in the future.2

Petitioner had urged the court of appeals to adopt

the same standard that had previously been adopted by

four sister circuits for ascertaining that knowledge:

When an act of Congress requires

knowledge of a future action, it does not

require knowledge in the sense of

certainty as to a future act. What the

statute requires is that the defendant

know in the sense of being aware of an

established modus operandi that will in

the future cause a person to engage in

prostitution.

United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 2010);

accord United States v. Purcell, 967 F.3d 159, 192 (2nd

Cir. 2020); United States v. Roy, 630 F. App'x 169, 170–

71 (4th Cir. 2015) (“This interpretation comports with

the obvious, commonsense interpretation of what people

mean when they speak of ‘knowing’ of a future event”);

United States v. Tutstone, 525 F. App'x 298, 304 (6th Cir.

2013).

The typical scheme, and the one Congress

obviously enacted § 1591(a) to combat, employs a pimp,

advertising, and customers who negotiate a price for sex

acts with minors. That modus operandi is the subject of

hundreds of judicial decisions interpreting the statute.

Deviations from that scheme are few. They have

included direct negotiations for sex with minors who

advertise their own services on-line, but these are rare.

All of those cases, however, including the rare

2 The alternative under the statute is that the accused knows that

an adult will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act through

means of force, fraud, or coercion.

18

exceptions, have an established modus operandi that

informs the pimp, his assistants, the sex-working

minors, and their customers, and provides the required

“knowledge” that the minor will be caused to engage in

a commercial sex act in the future – whether that future

is within the hour or weeks down the road.

The opinion below eschews the knowledge

requirement altogether. In its stead, it requires nothing

more than proof of an intent to cause a minor to engage

in a commercial sex act. According to the opinion below,

the Government “only had to prove that Lazzaro

‘mean[t] to cause’ the minors to engage in commercial

sex acts.” Pet. App. A-21. “[P]roof of intent . . . is enough

to support his convictions.” Id.

No other circuit has relaxed the knowledge

requirement so far as to forego it altogether in favor of

merely having an intent. The opinion below may just as

well have characterized the required mens rea as a

simple desire, hope, or wish for commercial sex with a

minor. Regardless how it is framed, “intent” and

“knowledge” are not the same, and the opinion below

creates a definitive split of circuit authority regarding

what state of mind must be proved to be found guilty of

sex trafficking and what standard should be used for

assessing it.

The inscrutable opinion below does not attempt

to justify how it can dispense with the statutory

requirement of knowledge in favor of a substitute state

of mind. It also fails explain the conclusion that Mr.

Lazzaro did indeed “intend” to cause anyone to engage

in “commercial” sex acts. The jury, of course, was never

instructed to consider “intent” in its deliberations. It

was instructed rather to find that Lazzaro had the

requisite knowledge that a minor would be caused to

engage in a commercial sex act. It is undeniable, and

19

quotidian, that Petitioner Lazzaro had hoped for sex

with his dates, but “commercial sex”? Seriously?

Even in the standard scheme, a person who

aspires to become a pimp and who fully “intends” to

recruit someone who will be caused to engage in

commercial sex acts does not by that mere intent violate

§ 1591(a). It requires significantly more, and the opinion

below permitting far less – and thereby definitively

splitting circuit authority on what state of mind is

required – is untenable. This case, and the opinion of the

court of appeals below, provides the Court with the

perfect vehicle to resolve that split of authority and to

provide guidance on how to interpret this important

federal criminal statute.

20

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition.

Dated: 4 August 2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Daniel L. Gerdts

________________________

Daniel L. Gerdts

Counsel of Record

331 Second Avenue South

Suite 705

Minneapolis, MN 55401

(612) 800-5086

daniel@danielgerdtslaw.com