Amicus Curiae Brief — Total Quality Logistics, LLC, Petitioner v. Robert Cox, as Personal Representative and Special Administrator of the Estate of Greta Cox

No. 25-145

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

————

TOTAL QUALITY LOGISTICS, LLC,

v.

Petitioner,

ROBERT COX,

Respondent.

————

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

————

BRIEF OF TRANSPORTATION

INTERMEDIARIES ASSOCIATION, INC.

AS AMICUS CURIAE

SUPPORTING PETITIONERS

————

MARC S. BLUBAUGH

Counsel of Record

JOHN KERKHOFF

BENESCH FRIEDLANDER COPLAN

& ARONOFF LLP

41 South High Street

Suite 2600

Columbus, Ohio 43215-6164

(614) 223-9300

mblubaugh@beneschlaw.com

jkerkhoff@beneschlaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Transportation Intermediaries

Association, Inc.

September 5, 2025

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. – (202) 789-0096 – WASHINGTON, D.C. 20002

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................

ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF

AMICUS CURIAE ...........................................

1

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .........................

3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION..

6

I.

This case presents an issue of enormous

importance

to

the

transportation

industry and American economy..............

6

A. Brokers Are Essential Links in U.S.

Supply Chains .....................................

6

B. Congress Enacted the FAAAA in order

to Unleash the U.S. Economy ..............

10

C. The Court’s Intervention is Now

Necessary

to

Preserve

FAAAA

Preemption ...........................................

12

This Court should grant the petition to

address the deepening split among the

Circuit Courts of Appeal ...........................

18

CONCLUSION ....................................................

21

II.

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,

513 U.S. 219 (1995) ...................................

17

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v.

City of Los Angeles,

569 U.S. 641 (2013) ...................................

17

Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.,

65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) ................. 8, 19

California Trucking Ass’n v. Su,

903 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2018) ..................... 11, 16

City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &

Wrecker Serv., Inc.,

536 U.S. 424 (2002) ................................... 3, 10

Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc.,

142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir. 2025) ....... 12, 17, 19, 20

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ................................... 10, 17

Doggett v. United States,

505 U.S. 647 (1992) ...................................

20

McGruder v. Bank of Wash.,

22 U.S. 598 (1824) .....................................

20

Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

976 F.3d 1016 (2020) ................................ 14, 19

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992) ...................................

17

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg,

572 U.S. 273 (2014) ...................................

17

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv.;

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg,

572 U.S. 273 (2014) ...................................

17

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor

Transport Ass’n,

552 U.S. 364 (2008) ................................... 11, 17

Shawn Montgomery v.

Caribe Transport II, LLC,

No. 24-1238 (docketed June 4, 2025) .......

21

Thompson v. Dallas City Attorney’s Office,

913 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2019) .....................

6

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters. Inc.,

74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) ............... 10, 19, 20

Ye v. Global Sunrise, Inc.,

No. 1:18-CV-01961, 2020 WL 1042047

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2020) .............................

14

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

Property Broker Security for the Protection

of the Public, 4 I.C.C. 2d 358, 1988 WL

225581 (Mar. 14, 1988) .............................

16

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 ....................................

4

49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) .....................................

1, 8

49 U.S.C. § 13102(14) ...................................

9

49 U.S.C. § 13906 .........................................

16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page(s)

49 U.S.C. § 14501 .........................................

10

§ 14501(c)(1) ............................................. 3, 19

§ 14501(c)(2) ..............................................

3

§ 14501(c)(2)(A) .........................................

3

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, Pub. L. 103-305, 108 Stat.

1569 (Aug. 23, 1994) ..... 2, 3, 5, 10-12, 14, 16-21

§ 601, 108 Stat. 1605 ................................

10

§ 601(a)(1)(A)-(C), 108 Stat. 1605 .............

11

49 C.F.R. § 371.2 ..........................................

8

49 C.F.R. § 385.13 ........................................

14

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Trucking Associations, ATA

American Trucking Trends 2024 (Sept.

11, 2024), https://www.trucking.org/new

s-insights/ata-american-trucking-trend

s-2024 ........................................................

9

Economics and Industry Data, AMERICAN

TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, www.trucking.

org/economics-and-industry-data

(last

visited Sept. 3, 2025) ................................

7

U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for

Legal Reform, Roadblock: The Trucking

Litigation Problem and How to Fix It

(July 2023), https://instituteforlegalrefor

m.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Road

block-The-Trucking-Litigation-Problemand-How-to-Fix-It-FINAL-WEB.pdf ........ 12, 13

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Amicus Curiae Transportation Intermediaries

Association, Inc. (“TIA”) is a not-for-profit trade

association that has, for over 40 years, provided

leadership, education and training resources, and

public policy advocacy to the $343 billion per year

third-party transportation and logistics industry,

which includes those who broker the transportation

of freight.1 TIA has over 1,700 member companies,

ranging from start-ups to international shipping

companies, including large and small freight brokers.

TIA members’ core service is to provide “freight

brokerage” by arranging for the interstate transportation of goods at the request of their shipper customers.

Freight brokers perform this service by retaining

interstate motor carriers to transport the goods from

origin to destination.

The Interstate Commerce Act defines a “broker” as

“a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee

or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent

sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out

by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling,

providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor

carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2).2 At

1

Pursuant to Rule 37.2 of this Court’s Rules of Practice, TIA

states that all counsel of record received notice of TIA’s intent to

file this brief more than ten days before its due date, and that

all counsel of record have consented to its filing. Pursuant to

Rule 37.6, amicus curiae affirms that no counsel for any party

authored this brief in whole or in part and that no party, party’s

counsel, or third-party (other than TIA and its members) made

any monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or

submission of this brief.

2

Brokers are also more colloquially referred to in the industry

as freight brokers, truck brokers, property brokers, load brokers,

2

the request of shippers or others seeking the transportation of goods (collectively, “shippers”), brokers

arrange transportation of goods from one point to

another, either within or across multiple states or

internationally, according to the specific needs of the

shipper. These services may involve the use of more

than one transportation mode, such as air, rail, truck,

and ship, and typically involve movements across

multiple states, and frequently, multiple nations. In

short, brokers might be described as “travel agents for

freight” and, thus, TIA members are intermediaries

between and deal directly with shippers and motor

carriers on a daily basis.

TIA and its members have an interest in the issues

before this Court, as these issues will have a profound

effect on the manner in which brokers perform their

core service of selecting and arranging motor carriers

to transport freight and the rates associated therewith. Indeed, the issues present a particularly acute,

existential threat to smaller freight brokers that

comprise much of TIA’s membership. Of note, over

70% of TIA’s members generate under $15 million in

annual revenue.

TIA thus submits this brief to provide the Court

with information regarding the operations and activities of brokers, the legislative background of the

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act

(“FAAAA”), and the practical, adverse effects that tort

lawsuits like the one that is the subject of this case

have on brokers, especially smaller brokers and new

entrants to the broker and intermediary markets.

third-party logistics providers, etc. For the balance of this brief,

TIA simply refers to these businesses as “brokers.”

3

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

When Congress passed the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, it preempted a broad

swath of state laws and regulations governing the

surface transportation industry. No dispute exists on

this point. The deregulatory goal of the FAAAA

was to facilitate interstate commerce by eliminating

the patchwork quilt of conflicting state laws and

regulations that was hampering the operations of

motor carriers and brokers. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

And in fact, every Circuit Court of Appeals to address

that issue has agreed: The FAAAA largely preempts

state laws and regulations.

That is where the agreement ends. As is often

the case in law, the “General rule,” id., came with

exceptions—or “matters not covered,” as the statute

puts it, id. § 14501(c)(2). And, at issue here is the

meaning of the so-called “safety exception,” a savings

clause that provides that the FAAAA does not “restrict

the safety regulatory authority of a State with

respect to motor vehicles.” Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A)

(emphasis added). That straightforward text seems

clear enough: Under the FAAAA, states retain

regulatory authority over motor vehicles, despite the

otherwise broad preemption language in the statute.

Stated another way, the savings clause allows states

to continue to regulate the safety of motor carriers,

trucks, and cars operating in the state. 3

3

As a savings clause, the so-called safety exception simply

preserves the states’ pre-existing authority (and the limits of that

authority) to regulate motor carriers. City of Columbus v. Ours

Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 439 (2002) (noting

that statute’s language preserves the “preexisting and traditional

state police power over safety.”). As the Motor Carrier Act of 1935

4

Yet, the Circuit Courts of Appeal are deeply divided

over one part of the statute’s meaning. Stretching the

law’s text to its breaking point, creative plaintiff

lawyers have argued that the phrase “with respect to

motor vehicles” permits states not only to exercise

safety regulatory authority over motor carriers (who

obviously operate motor vehicles) but to exercise

similar authority over brokers (who do not operate

motor vehicles). In other words, plaintiffs have used

their novel and expansive reading of the statute to

bring state tort claims against brokers alleging

negligent hiring of motor carriers.

Two Circuits have accepted plaintiffs’ interpretation

and allowed state tort law claims to proceed against

brokers. Two other Circuits have rejected that

approach, holding that the so-called safety exception

covers only motor carriers, not brokers, meaning that

claims against brokers remain preempted. District

courts and state courts, too, have issued differing

opinions. The resulting landscape leaves brokers and

shippers subject to a dizzying array of conflicting

standards across the country—and no chance of

consensus is on the horizon. The lower courts are

irreconcilably at odds.

This fracture among the Circuit courts comes with

serious consequences for the nation. After all, the

transportation and supply chain industry plays a

critical role in the nation’s economy. From furniture

to food, computers to cars, America’s products move

via the country’s roadways—in trucks. And each haul

eliminated the states’ power to determine which motor carriers

were permitted to operate in interstate commerce, 49 U.S.C.

§§ 301–327, the states likewise remain without that power to

determine (through jury verdicts or otherwise) which motor

carriers a broker is permitted to use in interstate commerce.

5

brings crucial goods and products to consumers from

coast to coast. Totaled up, the transportation industry

represents hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue,

arranges billions of tons of freight transported

via trucks, and employs millions of hardworking

Americans.

But all of that is increasingly threatened without

this Court’s intervention. Indeed, the split among the

lower courts is currently undermining a critical

industry on which so many Americans rely. Brokers

are left guessing as to their responsibility and

potential liability, which has a tremendous negative

effect on their prices and services. Congress intended

the FAAAA to do just the opposite. The statute

reflected Congress’s longstanding commitment to

deregulating the trucking industry. Specifically,

Congress well understood that without clear rules,

companies in the brokerage and trucking industry

would face haphazard regulatory schemes that would

impede competition, raise prices, affect routes, alter

services, and harm the country’s economy. That is the

inevitable result of denying review on this issue.

In short, it is hard to overstate the exceptional

importance of the Question Presented to the brokerage

industry (and, by extension, to the overall supply

chain and the economy). America’s economy moves on

interstate highways and roads where all manner of

goods are shipped from California to Connecticut,

Alabama to Alaska. Almost every physical good is

ultimately moved by truck. That industry cannot be

sustained and thrive without clarity in the law. And

only this Court can provide the answers that brokers,

shippers, and plaintiffs need.

Lest there be any doubt: Without this Court’s

intervention, the transportation industry in general

6

and the brokerage industry in particular will continue

to be mired in confusion, leading to inefficient service,

unknown responsibilities and obligations for brokers,

and a weaker American economy. As explained further below, these effects are simply devastating for

all brokers and particularly for small brokers as well

as others who desire to enter the market. This is all

the more important in light of the unprecedented

freight recession that has been ongoing since 2022.

The trucking industry and brokerage industry will

suffer. Competition will erode. And ultimately,

American consumers and the rule of law will pay the

price. See, e.g., Thompson v. Dallas City Attorney’s

Office, 913 F.3d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting “the

Rule of Law’s foremost virtues: clarity, certainty, and

consistency.”).

The petition should be granted.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. This case presents an issue of enormous

importance to the transportation industry

and American economy.

A. Brokers Are Essential Links in U.S.

Supply Chains.

To understand the urgent importance of the

Question Presented here, one must first appreciate the

fundamentals of the transportation industry and, in

particular, the trucking industry.

Drive on any of America’s interstates today—from

Interstate-90 in Washington to Interstate-75 in

Florida—and truckers hauling America’s goods line

the road. These loads do not move by accident.

Moving freight requires hard work. Three key players

ensure that goods arrive at their destination: (1)

7

shippers, (2) motor carriers, and (3) brokers. Shippers

sell and seek to move goods. Motor carriers perform

the transportation (i.e., they operate the physical

trucks). And brokers act as matchmakers—arranging

motor carriers to transport goods at the request of

shippers in both short- and long-range transit

Although transportation is a complex business, the

fundamental principles that drive the industry are

rather straightforward. Sellers want to ship products

to buyers in other areas of the country or the world.

And, in almost every instance, moving those products

involves, whether in whole or in part, transportation

by truck. Trucks can navigate various terrains and

areas of the country inaccessible to other modes of

transportation. Plus, trucks transport all types of

goods—small, large, oversized, fragile, perishable, and

all things in between. And, to top it off, trucks often

offer the most cost-effective way to get a product from

Point A to Point B. In short, trucking just makes sense

for many shippers of goods.

Brokers make theory become reality. Shippers often

lack the institutional knowledge or experience to

contract with motor carriers directly. But brokers

have it. Indeed, they have been doing so for decades.

Brokers’ relationships with shippers and carriers

are the best and sometimes only means through

which small and medium sized motor carriers can

access freight from medium and larger shippers. In

fact, approximately 95.5% of motor carriers registered

with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

(“FMCSA”) operate ten trucks or less. Economics and

Industry Data, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS,

www.trucking.org/economics-and-industry-data (last

visited Sept. 3, 2025).

8

So, when sellers want to find a motor carrier, they

turn to brokers. Brokers act as intermediaries to

arrange transportation by placing those shipments

with motor carriers for actual transportation from

origin to destination. Said more simply, shippers hire

brokers to find motor carriers. This process is vital to

make sure America’s goods get to retailers, distributors, and other businesses and consumers across

the country. See Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar

Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2023)

(explaining that the “domestic trucking industry

consists of several players, including the shipper, the

broker, and the motor carrier.”).

Laws recognize the role of brokers in the logistics

business. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, a

broker is “a person, other than a motor carrier or an

employee or agent of a motor carrier, that as a

principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for,

or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or

otherwise as selling, providing, or arranging for,

transportation by motor carrier for compensation.”

49 U.S.C. § 13102(2). Brokers’ services often include

arranging transportation of goods within a single state

or across multiple states, depending on the needs of

the shipper. See 49 C.F.R. § 371.2 (“Broker means a

person who, for compensation, arranges, or offers

to arrange, the transportation of property by an

authorized motor carrier.”); id. (defining “brokerage

service” as “the arranging of transportation . . . of a

motor vehicle or of property . . . on behalf of a motor

carrier, consignor, or consignee.”). Sometimes, transportation occurs by multiple modes—air, rail, ship,

and on a truck. Other times, shipment moves across

multiple countries. But at all times, brokers deal

directly with motor carriers.

9

Like brokers, motor carriers are vital to the transportation industry. A “motor carrier” is “a person

providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). Brokers—and other

industry players—rely on the predictability and

stability provided by motor carriers. When motor

carriers raise prices, brokers must do so, too, for their

shipper customers—such as manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. Those higher costs are ultimately

borne by consumers. The symbiotic relationship among

shippers, carriers, and brokers creates an effective

industry, provides stability in the supply chain, and

contributes to an overall healthy economy.

In summary, shippers, brokers, and carriers, each

hold vital and specific roles in ensuring products get

where they need to go. They all help contribute to an

efficient transportation industry. And that industry

plays a leading role in today’s economy. After all, in

2023 in North America, more than 14 million trucks

moved more than 11 billion tons of freight and

collected more than $987 billion in revenue. See

American Trucking Associations, ATA American

Trucking Trends 2024 (Sept. 11, 2024), https://www.

trucking.org/news-insights/ata-american-truckingtrends-2024. Trucking employs some 8.5 million

people, and the industry moves more than two-thirds

of cross-border trade between the U.S. and Canada,

and nearly 85 percent of goods across the Mexican

border. Id. Brokers themselves have a large role

in the overall sector, as they are pivotal players in the

$343 billion per year third-party transportation and

logistics industry. In short, the country depends on

shippers using brokers to find truckers in order keep

the American economy moving.

10

B. Congress Enacted the FAAAA in order to

Unleash the U.S. Economy.

Before the FAAAA’s preemption provision, brokers

faced a potpourri of laws and regulations from states

that imposed significant burdens. Seeking to bring

stability to a sector of the economy long saddled

with that crazy-quilt patchwork of state regulations,

Congress passed and amended the FAAAA. Pub. L.

103-305, § 601, 108 Stat. 1569, 1605 (Aug. 23, 1994),

49 U.S.C. § 14501; see Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters. Inc.,

74 F.4th 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2023) (Congress passed

the FAAAA “as part of a greater push to deregulate

interstate transportation industries.”). Through the

FAAAA, Congress sought to provide brokers predictability and clarity. This was a well-known fact.

“Congress turned its attention to the trucking

industry ‘upon finding that state governance of

intrastate transportation of property had become

‘unreasonably burden[some]’ to ‘free trade, interstate

commerce, and American consumers.’” Ye, 74 F.4th

453 at 457 (quoting Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v.

Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)). Put plainly,

Congress’s intent in passing the FAAAA—and deregulating the transportation sector generally—was to

permit the free flow of freight. Concerned with varying

and disparate state laws imposing burdens on

interstate transport, Congress sought to unshackle the

industry from such restraints.

Stability, then, stood at the core of the FAAAA.

State laws had long presented problems for trucking

companies “attempting to conduct a standard way of

doing business.” City of Columbus v. Ours Garage

& Wrecker Servs., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002).

Congress helped achieve its deregulatory goals in

the FAAAA by preempting state laws—and thus

11

providing clarity and predictability to brokers. Congress did so because it “believed deregulation would

address the inefficiencies, lack of innovation, and lack

of competition caused by non-uniform state regulations of motor carriers.” California Trucking Ass’n v.

Su, 903 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2018).

Indeed, Congress expressly found that varying state

regulations and laws addressing the transportation

of goods had “imposed an unreasonable burden on

interstate commerce,” “impeded the free flow of trade,

traffic, and transportation of interstate commerce,”

and “placed an unreasonable cost on the American

consumers.” Pub. L. 103-305, § 601(a)(1)(A)-(C), 108

Stat. 1569, 1605. “Congress’ overarching goal” was

to “help[ ] assure transportation rates, routes, and

services . . . reflect ‘maximum reliance on competitive

market forces,’ thereby stimulating ‘efficiency, innovation, and low prices,’ as well as ‘variety’ and ‘quality,’”

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 552

U.S. 364, 371 (2008) (citation omitted), and to avoid “a

patchwork of state service-determining laws, rules

and regulations” that would be “inconsistent with

Congress’ major legislative effort to leave such decisions, where federally unregulated, to the competitive

marketplace.” Id. at 373 (citations omitted).

Given this reality, this Court has held that the

FAAAA’s preemption provision must be read broadly

to serve the underlying purposes. Rowe, 552 U.S. at

373. Preemption, this Court held, ensured that the

“rates, routes, and services” in the transportation

industry were governed by the “maximum reliance on

competitive forces.” Id. at 370–71.

The FAAAA worked. It helped eliminate vague and

unnecessary burdens on transportation of goods. It led

to the free flow of trade. And it provided clarity and

12

predictability by eliminating risk posed by state laws.

The preemption provision plays a paramount role in

the law’s success.

C. The Court’s Intervention is Now Necessary

to Preserve FAAAA Preemption.

The proven effectiveness of the FAAAA is now

at risk. Common-law negligence lawsuits against

brokers have created the very instability that Congress sought to eliminate. And if this Court does not

step in to resolve the issue, the FAAAA’s text and

purpose will be all for naught. Allowing a decision like

Cox to stand effectively amounts to disguised, de facto

state regulation of interstate brokers.

After all, lawsuits against motor carriers can end

with multi-million-dollar verdicts. See U.S. Chamber

of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, Roadblock:

The Trucking Litigation Problem and How to Fix It 2

(July 2023), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wpcontent/uploads/2023/07/Roadblock-The-Trucking-Lit

igation-Problem-and-How-to-Fix-It-FINAL-WEB.pdf

(noting mean award of more than $27 million in

trucking cases). And such lawsuits are on the rise. A

study from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce included

“an analysis of verdicts in the trucking industry from

2005 to 2019” that “found that the number of cases

with verdicts over $1 million increased by 235 percent

when comparing the latter half of that period (20122019) to the first half (2005-2011).” Id. at 6–7. The

same study of verdicts over $1 million calculated an

867 percent increase in the average size of verdicts

between 2010-2018. Id. at 7.

Brokers are just the latest target in plaintiffs’

lawsuits. The reason is obvious: Brokers present

additional “deep pockets” for personal injury cases

13

arising out of highway accidents caused by motor

carriers. See U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for

Legal Reform, Roadblock: The Trucking Litigation

Problem and How to Fix It (July 2023), https://

instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/

07/Roadblock-The-Trucking-Litigation-Problem-andHow-to-Fix-It-FINAL-WEB.pdf. And in recent years

the number of lawsuits against brokers has only

increased.

But subjecting brokers to such liability revives the

very problems Congress sought to end. For one thing,

states have various tort regimes with different duties,

responsibilities, and potential liabilities. So, brokers

would be forced to traverse a complex maze of dozens

of regulatory and general tort-liability schemes,

effectively nullifying any deregulatory goal Congress

sought to achieve. The applicable standard of care for

a broker that is selecting a motor carrier would vary

state-by-state, case-by-case, judge-by-judge, and juryby-jury. No “standard” way of performing business

would exist. Indeed, it would be impossible for brokers

even to begin to untie the Gordian knot presented by

the disparate requirements imposed by all of the

states, particularly when so many loads cross the

boundaries of numerous states.

For another thing, brokers simply cannot screen

motor carriers in the way plaintiffs imagine. Brokers,

recall, are akin in many respects to travel agents.

And just as a travel agent arranging a flight cannot

evaluate whether a federally licensed airline has safe

equipment or safe hiring practices, so, too, a broker

arranging a load is not equipped to evaluate whether

a particular federally-licensed motor carrier is “safe

enough” to avoid tort liability. The federal government itself already licenses and rates carriers for

14

safety, and those that fail are not permitted to operate.

49 C.F.R. § 385.13. Imposing a common law duty on

brokers to second-guess the federal government’s

determination that a given motor carrier is fit to

operate on the public roads “would have a significant

economic impact on . . . broker services.” Ye v. Global

Sunrise, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-01961, 2020 WL 1042047,

at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2020). Most importantly,

allowing courts to create such a duty flatly hinders the

objectives of the FAAAA.

The practical challenge for small brokers is all

the more catastrophic. A small brokerage business

employing a handful of employees lacks the resources

to “outsmart” the federal government’s decision to

authorize a motor carrier to operate on the public road.

A small broker cannot collect, examine, and reach

empirically sound, evaluative conclusions regarding

whether a federally licensed motor carrier is safe to

use. For example, a small broker cannot interview the

motor carrier’s drivers to determine whether they are

competent, cannot assess whether the state should or

should not have granted a given driver a commercial

driver’s license, cannot inspect the motor carrier’s

equipment to determine if it is adequately maintained

and marked, and cannot otherwise evaluate the motor

carrier’s safety management culture. Indeed, since a

broker is not in the business of operating a motor

carrier, a broker lacks the technical skills and

knowledge necessary even to determine what data to

collect and what questions to ask. These tasks are

difficult enough for the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration, a large federal agency in the United

States Department of Transportation that employs

well over 1,000 people across the country; these tasks

represent an impossible undertaking for a small

broker.

15

Similarly, consider the absurdity of a small broker

instructing a large motor carrier that it cannot do

business with the large motor carrier because the

broker has somehow determined that the motor

carrier is not “safe enough.” In essence, the broker

would be telling the motor carrier how to operate—

what driver to hire, what safety rules to follow,

what equipment to use, and more—when such motor

carriers are already required by law to operate safely.

A small broker in Ohio employing five (5) persons

cannot realistically instruct a motor carrier—let alone

UPS, FedEx, or any of the nation’s largest motor

carriers—how to operate their businesses. The largest

motor carriers in the United States are publiclytraded, multibillion dollar enterprises with many

thousands of employees managing highly sophisticated operations. Such carriers will not be tutored by

a small broker regarding how to maintain equipment,

how to hire and manage their workforces, or how

to administer other best safety practices at their

companies. Indeed, it strains credulity to think that

such carriers would modify their enterprise-wide

practices to accommodate a small broker that shares a

perceived concern about that motor carrier’s national

approach to safety management.

Moreover, if brokers are held liable for their selection of particular motor carriers, new motor carriers

will not enter the market, thereby imperiling competition. This is because brokers would be forced to

do business with only the most established motor

carriers, which would “effectively eliminate some

motor carriers from the transportation market

altogether.” Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.,

976 F.3d 1016, 1032 (9th Cir. 2020) (Fernandez, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part). The

“inefficiencies, lack of innovation, and lack of com-

16

petition caused by non-uniform state regulations,”

though, was precisely what Congress wanted to

prevent through the FAAAA. California Trucking

Ass’n, 903 F.3d at 960. Similarly, the combination of

these inconsistencies (which the FAAAA intended to

eliminate) and the potential for catastrophic liability,

discourages new brokers from entering the market.

Eliminating new market entrants naturally stunts

potential growth in a critical economic sector that

serves as the backbone of the United States’ economy.

A growing domestic trucking marketplace is indispensable to the nation in light of the ongoing reshoring

of supply chains and the increased production of goods

within the United States.

Furthermore, Congress intended brokers to flourish

in the marketplace as evidenced by the low barrier to

market entry that Congress created. In order to obtain

a license, a putative broker need merely to submit an

application, pay a filing fee, and post a seventy-five

thousand dollar ($75,000) surety bond that serves as

security for payment of motor carrier freight charges.4

4

In contrast to its treatment of motor carriers, federal law does

not require brokers to maintain any form of liability insurance.

See 49 U.S.C. § 13906. Indeed, in a 1988 order, the Interstate

Commerce Commission (the “ICC”) explained that brokers were

not subject to liability for trucking accidents. Property Broker

Security for the Protection of the Public, 4 I.C.C. 2d 358, 366, 1988

WL 225581, at *7 (Mar. 14, 1988).

The ICC expressly

acknowledged that brokers do “not require operation of vehicles

nor the transportation or otherwise handling of cargo,” so

“brokers are not exposed to bodily injury, property damage or

cargo loss and damage liability as are motor carriers.” Id. For

that reason, the ICC stated, there was “no need” for a “selfinsurance program for brokers similar to that in place for motor

carriers.” Id. The cost—and even the availability—of liability

insurance to protect against a liability that Congress never

intended brokers to bear presents another massive obstacle to

17

Indeed, as a result of the relative ease with which one

may enter the brokerage market, small brokers have

become a key lubricant for modern supply chains in

the United States. By driving small brokers out of

the marketplace and by discouraging new market

entrants, decisions like Cox gum up those very supply

chains that are so essential to a thriving American

economy. While the regulatory steps for a broker to

enter the market are simple, the potential for catastrophic liability creates a complex and colossal

barrier to entering the brokerage market.

This is not an arcane question or issue outside the

scope of this Court’s typical review. To the contrary,

this Court has routinely understood the importance of

preemption in the FAAAA and similar statutes. See

TQL, Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 22 (citing American

Trucking Associations, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 569

U.S. 641 (2013); Dan’s City Used Cars v. Pelkey, 569

U.S. 251 (2013); Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor

Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); Ours Garage &

Wrecker Serv.; Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S.

273 (2014); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S.

219 (1995); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504

U.S. 374 (1992)).

No reason exists to deny this preemption question.

Brokers and motor carriers need this Court to explain

what liability might attach to private tort claims, and

whether brokers can be held liable for selection of

motor carriers. After all, brokers must be able to factor

this type of potential “nuclear” liability exposure into

their businesses (specifically, their rates and services)

and their plans for the future. They cannot do so

small brokers in particular who wish to enter or remain in the

market.

18

without clarity—which is precisely what the FAAAA

was designed to provide. This Court should grant the

petition to address the exceptionally important issue.

II. This Court should grant the petition to

address the deepening split among the

Circuit Courts of Appeal.

Aside from the obvious national importance of this

case, this Court should grant the petition based on the

deep divide among the circuits. This court has denied

review no fewer than three times in recent years

to clarify the scope of FAAAA preemption—instead

allowing the issue to continue to percolate among the

lower courts.

Percolation has run its course. The impossible

dilemma facing a freight broker when performing its

core function (selecting and arranging motor carriers)

becomes even more stark and more excruciating with

each divergent opinion issued. The deep circuit split

has made the fate of the freight brokerage industry

progressively more precarious. Four Circuit Courts

have directly addressed whether the FAAAA allows

state common-law negligence selection claims against

brokers. The split is over the meaning of the five

words: “with respect to motor vehicles.”5 The score5

TIA recognizes that Petitioner also disputes the meaning of

“the safety regulatory authority of a State.” However, no circuit

split exists as to the meaning of that particular phrase, whereas

the circuits are clearly split on the meaning of “with respect to

motor vehicles.” For its part, TIA maintains that motor carriers

remain fully subject to common law negligence claims arising

from their operations since such claims are an expression of “the

safety regulatory authority of a State.” TIA does not take the

position that Congress intended the so-called safety exception,

which is a savings statute, to immunize motor carriers from their

own negligent acts and omissions.

19

board is tied at 2-2. The split is clear. The split is

direct. No further consideration in the lower courts

would be useful for this Court. The split presents an

existential threat to freight brokers across the country

for all of the reasons set forth above.

The Seventh Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit have

held that the so-called safety exception does not “save”

negligent selection claims against brokers. Those

courts have instead ruled that the FAAAA’s broad

preemption in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) bars private

tort lawsuits against brokers for negligent hiring.

Both Circuits explained that the key language of the

statute—“with respect to motor vehicles”—requires

some direct connection with motor vehicles. Aspen

Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261,

1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that brokers have an

indirect connection to motor vehicles, so the safety

exception didn’t apply to negligent tort claim); Ye v.

GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 462 (7th

Cir. 2023) (claim against broker was “too attenuated”

from motor vehicles).

The Sixth and Ninth Circuit hold the opposite view.

In Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., the Ninth

Circuit held that the safety exception applies to claims

against brokers because a state law’s connection to

motor vehicles need not be direct; instead, it must only

“promote safety on the road.” 976 F.3d 1016, 1030

(2020). And since that case arose out of a motor

vehicle accident, it possessed the “requisite ‘connection

with’ motor vehicles” to fall within the safety

exception’s scope. Id. at 1031.

The Sixth Circuit largely agreed with the Ninth

Circuit. In the case below here— Cox v. Total Quality

Logistics, Inc., 142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir. 2025)—the

Court explained that preemption does not apply when

20

the law “substantively concerns motor vehicles and

motor vehicle safety.” Id. at 858. And to make that

determination, no “direct connection to motor vehicles”

is required. Id. at 857. Thus, brokers can, under the

Sixth Circuit’s ruling, be subject to tort liability in

negligent hiring lawsuits.

As noted above, this split has urgent, real-world

implications for the freight brokerage community.

Brokers operating today face different potential liabilities depending on the Circuit in which a motor vehicle

accident occurs or a transaction occurs. A negligent

selection claim in Evansville, Indiana is preempted,

Ye, 74 F.4th at 462, but just across the Ohio River in

Louisville, Kentucky, the same broker will be subject

to liability on the same claim, Cox, 142 F.4th at 858.

Thus, under today’s Circuit split, a broker cannot

predict what liability it might face. It largely all

depends on how far the motor carrier made it down the

road—and in which Circuit that road lies—when an

accident occurs.

Without a single, uniform ruling about the meaning

of the so-called safety exception in the FAAAA,

brokers are simply left to guess about what law

governs. This guesswork undercuts the FAAAA’s core

purpose and runs headlong into basic rule-of-law

principles. Cf. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,

669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“the law draws

force from the clarity of its command and the certainty

of its application.”); McGruder v. Bank of Wash.,

22 U.S. 598, 602 (1824) (“Precision and certainty are

often of more importance to the rules of law, than their

abstract justice.”).

The lower courts, in other words, have presented a

clean split on a pure question of law that affects

billions of dollars in the national economy. The case,

21

coupled with another petition pending before the

Court, gives the Court an ideal vehicle to resolve the

divide among the circuits and to protect the freight

brokerage industry from further, debilitating uncertainty that undermines the nation’s economy.6

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set

forth in Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,

Amicus Curiae Transportation Intermediaries Association, Inc., respectfully urges this Court to grant

the Petition while consolidating it, grouping it, or

otherwise linking it with the petition in Shawn

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, Case

No. 24-1238 (docketed June 4, 2025).

Respectfully submitted,

MARC S. BLUBAUGH

Counsel of Record

JOHN KERKHOFF

BENESCH FRIEDLANDER COPLAN

& ARONOFF LLP

41 South High Street

Suite 2600

Columbus, Ohio 43215-6164

(614) 223-9300

mblubaugh@beneschlaw.com

jkerkhoff@beneschlaw.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Transportation Intermediaries

Association, Inc.

September 5, 2025

6

The case of Shawn Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC,

et al., Case No. 24-1238, similarly addresses the scope of the socalled safety exception under the FAAAA.