Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Carlos A. Alonso Cano, as Next Friend of His Minor Daughters Katy Alonso Morejon and Jany Leidy Alonso Morejon, et al., Petitioners v. 245 C&C, LLC, et al.

Supreme Court briefJun 22, 2026

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APPENDIX

Appendix A

USCA11 Case: 23-12413 Doc. 172-1, 12/23/25

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

Nos. 23-12413, 23-13392

Non-Ar gument Calendar

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

as next friend of his minor daughters

Katy Alonso Morejon and Jany Leidy Alonso

Morejon,

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JANY L. ALONSO,

Interested Party-Appellant,

versus

245 C&C, LLC, CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. l:19-cv-21826-JAL

Appendix A

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In this consolidated appeal, Plaintiffs-Appellants Carlos Alonso Cano (Cano);

his wife, Fe Morejon Fernandez; and their daughter, Jany Alonso Morejon

(collectively, Appellants),1 appeal:

(1) various discovery, pretrial, and posttrial orders; (2) the district court’s partial

grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees 245 C&C, LLC and

CFH Group, LLC (collectively, Appellees) on Appellants’ Fair Housing Act (FHA)

discrimination and retaliation claims, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and state law claim

for the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment; and (3) the district court’s verdict

in favor of Appellees on Appellants’ remaining FHA discrimination claims following

a bench trial. After careful review, we affirm in part and dismiss in part this appeal.

Appellants first argue that the magistrate judge and the district judge

abused their discretion in imposing a $3,000 sanction against Cano for a discovery

violation.

We review a district court’s discovery order imposing sanctions for an abuse

of discretion. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir.

1997). A district court abuses its discretion when it “applies an incorrect legal

standard, fails to follow the appropriate procedures

1 Angie Morejon and Katy Morejon, while plaintiffs below, are not parties in the present appeal.

Appendix A

when making the relevant determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly

erroneous.” Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Brown, 69 F.4th 1321, 1329 (11th Cir.

2023). We will not reverse the imposition of sanctions unless we are left with a

“definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a “clear error of

judgment.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1313

(11th Cir. 2011). We afford “wide discretion” to district courts when they impose

sanctions because the imposition of sanctions is “heavily dependent on the court’s

firsthand knowledge, experience, and observation.” Brown, 69 F.4th at 1329.

Pro se briefs are liberally construed. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874

(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Importantly, “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on

appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to

the evidence, the appellant must include in the record a transcript of all evidence

relevant to that finding or conclusion.” Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2). The burden is on the

appellant to ensure the appellate record is complete, and we “must affirm the

district court when an appellant fails to provide all the evidence that the trial court

had before it when making various contested . . . rulings.” Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d

1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, any attorney or

other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any

territory thereof who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings may be

required to pay the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by his conduct.

Appendix A

Under Rule 37(a), a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or

discovery, and if the motion is granted, “the court must, after giving an opportunity

to be heard, require the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party

or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses

incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1),

(5)(A) (emphasis added). However, the court must not order payment of sanctions if

the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the discovery

sought, the opposing party’s nondisclosure was substantially justified, or other

circumstances would make the payment of sanctions unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii).

Here, neither the magistrate judge nor the district judge abused their

discussion in imposing the sanction against Cano. Although Cano argued that the

sanction should have been imposed against his attorney Michael Lutfy under §

1927, the magistrate judge appropriately relied on Federal Rule 37, which allows for

the sanction to be imposed upon a party. The record reveals that the district court

allowed Cano an opportunity to respond and appropriately determined that it was

not left with a definite and firm conviction that the magistrate judge made a clear

error of judgment. Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1313. Further, Appellants failed to ensure

the record was complete. As the party with the burden of proof, Appellants failed to

provide the relevant discovery hearing transcripts to both the district court and this

court. Their failure to

Appendix A

provide these transcripts supports the conclusion that this court should affirm the

imposition of sanctions.

Because Cano failed to demonstrate that his delay in disclosing discovery was

substantially justified, we affirm the impositions of sanctions against Cano.

II.

Appellants next challenge the magistrate judge’s orders granting Appellees’

motion to strike their jury demand and denying Appellants’ motion to amend their

second amended complaint. Appellees contend that this court lacks jurisdiction to

consider the issue because Appellants failed to timely object to the magistrate

judge’s orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). We review our subject

matter jurisdiction de novo. Sloan v. Drummond Co., Inc., 102 F.4th 1169, 1173

(11th Cir. 2024). Generally, our jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions of the

district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.A federal magistrate judge may be assigned to

hear and determine non-dispositive pretrial matters and are subject to

reconsideration by the district court if there are timely objections or an order is

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)—(b). A magistrate judge’s

order denying a plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint is a non-dispositive

pretrial motion. Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc., 106 F.4th 1091, 1099 (11th Cir.

2024). Pro se parties are required to follow procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc.,

490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).

Appendix A

When a non-dispositive pretrial matter is referred to a magistrate judge, “[a]

party may serve and file objections to the order within 14 days after being served

with a copy. A party may not assign as error a defect in the order not timely

objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). As such, Rule 72(a) applies to instances where a

party fails to object to the magistrate judge’s order. See Smith, 106 F.4th at 1099-

1100.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), when a magistrate judge rules on a

pretrial matter, the “[a]ppeals from the magistrate’s ruling must be to the district

court,” so we lack jurisdiction to hear appeals “directly from federal magistrates.”

United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980).2 We have applied Renfro

in cases where a magistrate judge issues a non-dispositive order, a party failed to

object to the order, and the same party subsequently appealed from a final

judgment. United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1359-62 (11th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam).

Here, we lack jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ challenge to the magistrate

judge’s order granting Appellees’ motion to strike their jury demand and the order

denying their motion to amend their second amended complaint because they failed

to timely

2 We are bound by decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued before

October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

Appendix A

object to the magistrate judge’s order under Rule 72.3 Thus, we dismiss this issue.

III.

Next, Appellants challenge the district court’s partial grant of summary

judgment in favor of Appellees on their second amended complaint’s Counts 4, 5, 9,

10, 11, 12, and 14. Count 4 addressed Appellants’ requested accommodation for

Appellees to paint their guest bathtub. Count 5 focused on Appellants’ noise

complaints coming from tree trimming and pressure washing equipment. Count 9

alleged retaliatory actions by Appellees because of Appellants’ failure to remove

tape from their windows. Those retaliatory actions include Appellees threatening to

fine Appellants $150, providing a seven-day notice to cure, and later giving a lease

termination notice. Count 10 claimed that Appellants suffered harassment from On

Call Patrol. Count 11 asserted that there was a causal connection between

Appellants filing their second Housing and Urban Development Department (HUD)

complaint and Appellees initiating eviction proceedings. Count 12 asserted that

Appellees appealing the state court’s decision regarding the state eviction

proceedings was frivolous. Count 14 alleged that Appellees breached the covenant of

quiet enjoyment.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Jones u.

UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012).

3 Appellants also challenge the magistrate judge’s authority to rule on the motion to strike. But we

need not consider the merits of Appellants’ contentions as a result. Weber u. Finker, 554 F.3d 1379,

1385 (11th Cir. 2009).

Appendix A

Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). We construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of

the nonmoving party. Jones, 683 F.3d at 1291-92.

A party abandons claims on appeal when they fail to plainly and prominently

raise the issue in their brief. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,

681 (11th Cir. 2014). Parties must do more than make passing references or raise

the issue in a perfunctory manner to adequately preserve an issue for appellate

review. Id. Thus, to properly preserve an argument for appellate review, a party

must advance arguments or cite authority to establish the district court’s error. Id.

This rule applies to pro se parties because although we liberally construe pro se

briefings, issues not briefed on appeal by pro se litigants are deemed abandoned.

Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.

The FHA prohibits landlords from discriminating against individuals on the

basis of their disability by refusing to make necessary reasonable accommodations

or modifications to afford that person an equal opportunity to use and enjoy their

dwelling or the premises. Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765

F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). An FHA failure to accommodate claim has four

elements: (1) the plaintiff is disabled; (2) the plaintiff requested

Appendix A

a reasonable accommodation; (3) the requested accommodation was necessary to

give the plaintiff an opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling; and (4) the

defendants refused to make the accommodation. Id.

As to the first element, defendants must know of the complained of handicap

and the necessity of the accommodation, as they cannot be held liable for refusing to

grant an accommodation that they did not know was necessary. Schwarz v. City of

Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1219 (11th Cir. 2008). If a landlord is skeptical

about a tenant’s alleged disability, the landlord must request documentation or

open a dialogue with the tenant regarding the disability. Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at

1287. As to the third element, the requested accommodation “must (1) actually

alleviate the effects of the plaintiffs disability and (2) address the needs created by

the plaintiffs disability.” Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1280 (11th Cir. 2022). We take a more expansive view of

the term necessary, asking if the effect of the handicap, not the handicap per se,

would be alleviated by the requested accommodation. Schaw v. Habitat for Human,

of Citrus Cnty., Inc., 938 F.3d 1259, 1270 (11th Cir. 2019). Additionally, the FHA

makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in

the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on

account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or

enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by” the FHA. 42 U.S.C. § 3617.

Unlawful conduct under this

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Appendix A

statute includes “[threatening, intimidating or interfering with persons in their

enjoyment of a dwelling because of [their] handicap,” “[Retaliating against any

person because that person has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in a proceeding under the Fair Housing Act,” and

“[Retaliating against any person because that person reported a discriminatory

housing practice to a housing provider or other authority.” 24 C.F.R.§ 100.400(c)(2),

(5), (6).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that he engaged in a protected activity, he suffered an adverse action, and there

was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.

Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016). The protected activity

element may be met by the plaintiff making a reasonable accommodation request.

Id. A plaintiff must also demonstrate that they had a reasonable, good faith belief

that the defendant was engaging in unlawful activity. Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp.,

291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Good faith belief requires the belief itself to be

objectively reasonable in light of the facts. Id. A lack of statutory support or case

law demonstrating defendants’ activities were unlawful supports the finding that a

plaintiffs belief is not objectively reasonable. See Dixon v. The Hallmark Co., Inc.,

627 F.3d 849, 857 (11th Cir. 2010).

The third element also requires a showing of but-for causation. Frazier- White,

818 F.3d at 1258. To establish causation, the plaintiff

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Appendix A

must demonstrate that the decisionmaker was aware of the plaintiff engaging in

protected conduct and that the protected conduct and the adverse action were not

wholly unrelated. Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1211 (11th Cir. 2013).

Where express covenants in a lease provision are inconsistent with the

implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, a court is free to give effect to both the express

and implied covenants. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Brickell Bldg.

1 Holding Co., Inc., 923 F.2d 810, 815 (11th Cir. 1991).

As an initial matter, Appellants abandoned any challenges as to Counts 4

and 10 because they failed to plainly and prominently argue those issues in their

brief. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681.

To Count 5, in which Appellants complained of the noisy equipment from the

tree trimmers and pressure washing, the district court properly determined that

there was no dispute of material fact showing that Appellees knew the reasonable

accommodations requested were necessary nor did they have prior knowledge of

Angie’s disability.

First, the record does not support that the effects of Angie’s disability would

have been alleviated by accommodations. A review of medical evidence in the record

reveals that Angie was diagnosed with hearing loss, with one doctor noting that he

had no startle response to sounds as loud as 100 decibels. Appellants’ submitted

videos reflect almost inaudible sound when their sliding glass door is closed, the

12a

Appendix A

volume only increasing when the door was open or when there was a short burst of

sound from a chainsaw or woodchipper. Second, Cano’s complaints never expressed

how Angie’s disabilities made him sensitive to loud noises nor why the requested

accommodation was necessary. Cano referred to Angie as his disabled son, but did

not explicitly share that Angie had a sensitivity to noise nor provided

documentation that would support his accommodation requests. Rather, Cano

merely stated that his disabled son was inconvenienced or that Angie’s sleep was

disrupted by noise.

Also, Appellants were unable to establish that the district judge failed to

consider all relevant evidence in making this determination, including evidence

from Appellants’ self-titled PSUSB. We find the district court properly considered

all relevant evidence, including citing to evidence submitted on the PSUSB.4

As such, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor

of Appellees on Count 5 because there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to

whether the requested accommodation was necessary or if Appellees even knew the

requested accommodation could have been necessary.

We affirm the district court’s ruling on Count 9 because Appellants were

unable to establish that Appellees engaged in retaliation after Appellants did not

4 The PSUSB is a USB that contained both evidence included in the previous USB as well as

evidence not submitted within the first USB.

13a

Appendix A

remove tape from their windows. Appellees threatened to fine Appellants $150 for

failing to remove tape from their windows, provided Appellants a seven-day notice

to cure, and then gave Appellants a notice of termination of their lease. Appellants

did not demonstrate that they had a reasonable good faith belief that Appellee’s

actions were unlawful. Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1311. There is neither statutory support

nor case law that would support an objective belief that Appellees violated the law

by telling their tenants they needed to remove tape from their windows or face a

fine. There is similarly no statute nor case that prohibits landlords from giving

noncompliant tenants a notice to cure or a non-renewal letter. Thus, Appellant’s

belief was not objectively reasonable. As such, there is no genuine dispute of

material fact and the district court properly granted summary judgment as to

Count 9.

We affirm the district court’s determination that there was no genuine issue

of material fact in Count 11 regarding the causal connection between Appellees

initiating eviction proceedings and Appellants filing their second HUD complaint.

Appellants filed their second HUD complaint one day after being served with the

notice of nonrenewal. Appellants then refused to vacate the apartment in

accordance with the nonrenewal, at which time Appellees initiated eviction

proceedings. Further, once Appellees had notice of the HUD complaint, they came to

a mutual agreement to extend Appellants’ move out date by five months to

accommodate the investigation. The record provides no evidence that Appellees had

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Appendix A

knowledge of the HUD complaint when they initiated eviction processes, therefore

Appellants’ HUD complaint could not have been the but-for cause of their eviction.

Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the district court

appropriately granted summary judgment as to Count 11.

We affirm the district court’s determination on Count 12 because Appellants

failed to demonstrate that Appellees acted in retaliation through their appeal in the

state eviction proceedings. Record evidence supports that Appellees appealed the

decision from the state court eviction proceedings in Florida state court because

they had a reasonable belief they were entitled to judgment in their favor, not, as

Appellants claim, as an abuse of process to threaten, coerce, intimidate, or retaliate

against Appellants. Thus, we find that Appellants failed to show a genuine issue of

material fact and the district court properly granted summary judgment to

Appellees as to Count 12.

We affirm the district court’s determination on Count 14. Appellants failed to

establish a genuine dispute of material fact by demonstrating that Appellees

violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment because their claims are either waived by

the lease agreement and good conduct addendum or not supported by record

evidence. Appellants’ allegations as to maintenance workers and fumigators

entering their apartment without prior notice is waived by the express covenant in

the lease that allows maintenance and pest control to enter Appellants’ apartment

“at any reasonable time, without notice for inspection.” Appellants’ complaints

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Appendix A

about their noisy neighbors are waived by the good conduct addendum, in which

Appellants agreed to tell management of any noise problems and allow staff to

handle it in an appropriate manner. Appellants’ allegations regarding the water

shut off are waived by the lease agreement and good conduct addendum because

Appellants acknowledged in the good conduct addendum that it was possible water

could be turned off temporarily without notification during an emergency. And

when the water shut off happened outside of an emergency, Appellees gave

Appellants advanced notice. Finally, as to Appellants’ complaint about the laundry

equipment making noise, the record demonstrates that the laundry equipment’s

noise was not audible in Appellants’ apartment. Thus, the district court

appropriately determined that Appellants did not establish a genuine dispute of

material fact showing that Appellees violated the covenant of quiet enjoyment. In

sum, we dismiss Appellants’ challenges regarding Counts 4 and 10 because they

abandoned any potential argument. We affirm the district court’s granting of

summary judgment to Appellees on Appellants’ Counts 5, 9, 11, 12, and 14 because

no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding each issue.

IV.

Appellants next challenge the district court’s bifurcation of the trial as well as its

verdict following a bench trial, where the court determined that Count 1 was barred

by the FHA’s two-year statute of limitations and that Count 3 was meritless. In

16a

Appendix A

Count 1, Appellants asserted that Appellees violated the FHA by failing to provide a

reasonable accommodation when they refused to give Angie a specific handicap

parking spot. In Count 3, Appellants alleged Appellees violated the FHA by refusing

to permit reasonable modifications of the premises by declining to permit the

modification of Angie’s bathroom.

We review the district court’s order bifurcating trial for an abuse of

discretion. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Vizcay, 826 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016). District

courts are allowed to bifurcate issues for separate trials for “convenience ... or to

expedite and economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Moreover, “each party is deemed

bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent,” and a party cannot “avoid the consequences

of the acts or omissions of [their] freely selected agent.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,

370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962).

A district court’s interpretation and application of a statute of limitations is

reviewed de novo. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334

(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). After a bench trial, we review a district court’s

conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. U.S. Commodity

Futures Trading Comm’n v. S. Tr. Metals, Inc., 894 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir.

2018). Regarding findings of fact, we will not find clear error unless we are left with

a “definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made. Sidman u. Travelers Cas.

& Sur., 841 F.3d 1197, 1201 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, a

district court’s factual findings will stand so long as they are supported by

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Appendix A

substantial evidence. Id. To bring an FHA failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff

must show that they actually made a request and that the request was refused.

Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1219. The FHA has a two-year statute of limitations. 42

U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).

We ordinarily will not review the district court’s credibility findings because

witness credibility is within the court’s province. Sidman, 841 F.3d at 1201. We give

“great deference” to the district court’s credibility determinations because the

district court is the only one who could assess variations in demeanor and the

witness’s tone of voice. OH1 Asset (VA) Martinsville SNF, LLC v. Wagner, 115 F.4th

1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2024). We cannot set aside a finding of fact based on the

district court’s decision to credit one witness’s testimony over another where that

witness’s testimony was coherent and facially plausible and was not contradicted by

extrinsic evidence. Id.

Here, Appellants did not provide arguments or citations to authority

demonstrating how the district court abused its discretion in bifurcating the trial.

Thus, Appellants abandoned their challenge against the district court’s bifurcation

because they failed to

plainly and prominently raise that issue in their brief. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874.

As to Count 1, the district court correctly determined that Appellants’ claim

was barred by FHA’s two-year statute of limitations. Both parties agreed that

Appellants requested a reserved handicapped parking space in late 2012 or early

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Appendix A

2013. Appellants point to Cano’s testimony to show Appellants requested a reserved

handicapped parking space at various times in 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017. The

2017 alleged requests are the only ones which may have fallen within the statute of

limitations because this suit was filed on May 6, 2019. But there is no evidence

beyond Cano’s testimony that supports a handicapped parking space request in

2017 (or any other time besides the late 2012 or early 2013 request). The district

court did not find Cano’s testimony credible due to its observations of Cano

throughout the trial and that his testimony was not supported by any extraneous

evidence. Appellants did not provide evidence such as eyewitnesses or

documentation responding to the alleged requests, and other testimonies

contradicted Cano’s claim. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the district

court’s finding that Appellants only requested a reserved handicapped parking

space once in either 2012 or 2013. And even if the request happened in 2013, the

denial is clearly outside the two-year statute of limitations for an FHA failure to

accommodate claim. Thus, we affirm the district court’s determination that

Appellants are barred by the statute of limitations as to Count 1.

As to Count 3, the district court properly determined that Appellees did not

refuse to accommodate Appellants’ request for a bathroom modification. The court

appropriately found that Appellants failed to demonstrate their request was denied,

an essential element of a failure to accommodate claim. The court’s determination is

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Appendix A

supported by substantial record evidence, which shows that Appellants made one

official request for a bathroom modification on August 26, 2018, which was

approved the next day and confirmed a few days later. Thus, we affirm the district

court’s conclusion that Appellants failed to establish a prima facie failure to

accommodate claim for Count 3.

Finally, Appellants ask this court to vacate a Florida appellate court decision

that was rendered against them. Appellees contend we lack jurisdiction to consider

this issue under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291—1296 and the Rooker-Feldman^ doctrine.

Our jurisdiction is limited to “appeals from all final decisions of the district

courts of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We also have jurisdiction to review

certain interlocutory orders and specific issues of controlling questions of law on

orders not otherwise appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1291(a), (b).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from reviewing or

rejecting state court judgments rendered before the district court litigation began.

Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 2021). It “eliminates federal court

jurisdiction over those cases that are essentially an appeal by a state court loser

seeking to relitigate a claim that has already been decided in a state court.” Target

Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018). The

5 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. Of Col. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

(1983).

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Appendix A

doctrine is of a “limited scope” and “ensure [s] that the inferior federal courts do not

impermissibly review decisions of the state courts—a role reserved to the United

States Supreme Court.” Id. at 1281, 1285.

Here, we lack jurisdiction to consider this argument. This issue involves

consideration of an order we are not permitted to review because it is not a final

order of a United States District Court nor an interlocutory order or issue that

solely involves a question of law. Appellants seek the reversal of a state court

decision against them, which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine explicitly prohibits.

Thus, we dismiss this claim.

AFFIRMED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.6

6 In their reply brief, Appellants contended that the district court erred in granting Appellees’ motion

for taxable costs. We will not address arguments raised for the first time in the appellant’s reply

brief. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Here, while Appellants indicated them intent to appeal the order

imposing costs in their notice of appeal, they failed to raise this issue in their initial brief, meaning

they have abandoned this issue on appeal. As such, we affirm.

21a

Appendix B

USCA11 Case: 23-12413 Doc. 178, 02/05/26

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

Nos. 23-12413, 23-13392

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

as next friend of his minor daughters

Katy Alonso Morejon and Jany Leidy Alonso

Morejon,

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JANY L. ALONSO,

Interested Party-Appellant,

versus

245 C&C, LLC, CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. l:19-cv-21826-JAL

22a

Appendix B

Order of the Court

23-12413

ORDER:

Appellants’ motion for additional time to file and to use excess pages in their

petition for rehearing is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Appellants

have 14 days from the date of this order to file their petition. The petition may not

exceed 15 pages. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(d)(3)(B); 11th Cir. R. 40-4.

DAVID J. SMITH

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

ENTERED FOR THE COURT - BY DIRECTION

23a

Appendix C

USCA11 Case: 23-12413 Doc. 190-2, 03/25/26

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 23-12413

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

as next friend of his minor daughters

Katy Alonso Morejon and Jany Leidy Alonso

Morejon,

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JANY L. ALONSO,

Interested Party-Appellant,

versus

245 C&C, LLC,

CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. l:19-cv-21826-JAL

No. 23-13392

24a

Appendix C

Order of the Court

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

as next friend of his minor daughters

Katy Alonso Morejon and Jany Leidy Alonso

Morejon,

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JANY L. ALONSO,

Interested Party-Appellant,

versus

245 C&C, LLC,

CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. l:19-cv-21826-JA

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before LUCK, LAGOA and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED, no judge in regular active service

on the Court having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc. FRAP

40. The Petition for Panel Rehearing also is DENIED. FRAP 40.

25a

Appendix D

FLSD, Case l:19-cv-21826-JAL, DE 88, 11/19/19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 19-21826-CIV-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually

and as guardian for his son, ANGIE ALONSO

MOREJON, and as next of friend of his minor

daughters, KATY ALONSO MOREJON and JANY LEIDY ALONSO MOREJON

and FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ, individually,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

245 C & C, LLC and CFH GROUP, LLC.,

Defendants.

_______________________________________________________ /

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court following an informal discovery

conference held before the undersigned on November 19, 2019. Having heard from

both parties and for the reasons stated on the record, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that on or before 5:00 PM on November 21,

2019, the plaintiffs shall provide the defendants with deposition dates in January

2020 for the deposition of CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that on or before December 16, 2019, unless

otherwise noted in this Order, all discovery responses ordered herein shall be

provided. It is

26a

Appendix D

further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiffs shall respond to

Interrogatory 1 and indicate why the requested accommodations were reasonable

and necessary and would afford Angie an equal opportunity to access the facilities

or its services. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Interrogatory 5, the

plaintiffs shall provide a summary of each person’s knowledge regarding the

lawsuit. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Interrogatory 7(b), the

plaintiffs shall provide the responsive emails. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiffs shall respond again to

Interrogatory 8. If there are differences from year to year, the plaintiffs shall

provide the specific information for those years. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Interrogatory 11, the

plaintiffs shall indicate which plaintiff each of the doctors are for, provide the

names of the doctors for all plaintiffs, and provide HIPAA forms for all doctors or

specific information regarding doctor visits for all doctors. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJDUGED that in response to Interrogatory 12, the

plaintiffs shall indicate if CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO was employed in 2016. The

27a

Appendix D

plaintiffs shall also provide the income and rate of pay for FE MORE JON

FERNANDEZ and the years she worked. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants shall give the plaintiffs

the information the defendants have with respect to the lawsuits the defendants

allege are not listed by the plaintiffs in response to Interrogatory 13. If necessary,

the plaintiffs shall amend their response to Interrogatory 13 appropriately. It is

further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that with respect to Request for Production 10,

the plaintiffs’ attorney shall inquire from the plaintiff if any additional schedules

for the tax returns exist, and if they do, the plaintiffs shall provide those additional

schedules. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Request for Production 1,

the plaintiffs shall provide the first HUD complaint to the defendants. If the

plaintiffs do not have the first HUD complaint, the plaintiffs shall indicate so in

writing. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Request for Production 4,

the plaintiff shall provide a response to each subsection and indicate if the

documents were provided. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Request for Production 11,

the plaintiffs shall provide the responsive documents in their possession, custody,

28a

Appendix D

and control. If the plaintiffs do not have the responsive documents, the plaintiffs

shall indicate so in writing. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Request for Production 17,

if the plaintiffs do not have the responsive documents, the plaintiffs shall indicate

so in writing. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Request for Production 18,

if the plaintiffs have the responsive documents, the plaintiffs shall provide them. If

the plaintiffs do not have the responsive documents, the plaintiffs shall indicate so

in writing. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Request for Productions 22,

25, and 30, the plaintiffs shall indicate in writing that they do not have any direct

evidence responsive to the requests. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that in response to Request for Productions 33,

34, 36, 39, and 44, the plaintiffs shall identify what documents were provided and if

there are no furthers documents, the plaintiffs shall indicate so. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the failure to properly provide discovery

was not substantially justified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 provides

(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.

29a

Appendix D

(A) If the Motion is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery is Provided After

Filing). If the motion is granted-or the disclosure or requested discovery is provided

after the motion was filed-the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard,

require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or

attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movants reasonable expenses

incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37

Accordingly, the defendants are awarded attorney’s fees for 7.5 hours at a

rate of $ 400.00 per hour for a total of $ 3000.00 to be paid by the plaintiffs, to the

defendants’ attorney within 30 days of the day of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED, in Cambers, at Miami, Florida, this 19th day of

November 2019

SULLIVAN

30a

Appendix E

FLSD, Case l:19-cv-21826-JAL DE 98. 12/12/19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 19-21826-CIV-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually

and as guardian for his son, ANGIE ALONSO

MOREJON, and as next of friend of his minor

daughters, KATY ALONSO MOREJON and

JANY LEIDY ALONSO MOREJON and

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ, individually,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

245 C & C, LLC and CFH GROUP, LLC.,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________ /

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court following an informal discovery

conference held before the undersigned on December 12, 2019. Having heard from

the parties and for the reasons stated on the record, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the last paragraph of the Order entered

by the undersigned at DE # 88 on November 19, 2019, is hereby amended to read:

Accordingly, the defendants are awarded attorney’s fees for 7.50 hours at a

rate of $400.00 per hour for a total of $3,000.00 to be paid by the plaintiff, CARLOS

31a

Appendix E

A. ALONSO CANO, individually, to the defendants’ attorney within 30 days of the

date of this Order.

It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

individually, is not required to pay the aforementioned $3,000.00 attorney’s fees

until Judge Lenard rules on the objection to the fees. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

individually shall pay the attorney’s fees within seven (7) days of Judge Lenard’s

Order on the objection, or provide a filing to the Court within seven (7) days of

Judge Lenard’s Order on the objection explaining why CARLOS A. ALONSO

CANO, individually is unable to pay the entire fees amount at one time. Thereafter,

the undersigned may consider a payment plan for CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

individually to pay the required attorney’s fees.

DONE AND ORDERED, in Chambers, at Miami, Florida, this 12th day of

December 2019.

JOHN J. ©’SULLIVAN

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

32a

Appendix F

FLSD, Case l:19-cv-21826-JAL DE 160. 02/19/20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 19-21826-CIV-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually

and as guardian for his son, ANGIE ALONSO

MORE JON, and as next friend of his minor

daughters, KATY ALONSO MOREJON and

JANY LEIDY ALONSO MOREJON, and

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ individually,

Plaintiffs,

245 C & C, LLC and CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants.

_______________________________________________________ /

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY ORDER IMPOSING

FEE AWARD AGAINST PLAINTIFF CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO

(D.E, 150, 153)

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Carlos A. Alonso Cano’s

( Cailos ) Objection to Magistrate Judge John J. Sullivan’s Order awarding

Defendants 245 C & C, LLC and CFH Group, LLC $3,000.00 in attorneys’ fees for

certain discovery violations, (“Objections,” D.E. 150), and Supplement thereto,

(“Supplement,” D.E. 153), filed January 24, 2020.

33a

Appendix F

I. Relevant background

On May 6, 2019, Plaintiffs, through attorney Michael Lufty, instituted this

lawsuit asserting various violations of the Fair Housing Act and Florida state law.

(D.E. 1.)

On June 25, 2019, the Court entered an omnibus Order which, inter alia,

referred all pretrial discovery disputes to Judge O’Sullivan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636. (“Beginning Order,” D.E. 21.) Attached to the Court’s Beginning Order were

Judge O’Sullivan’s Discovery Procedures. (Id. at 7.) Pursuant to Judge O’Sullivan’s

Discovery Procedures, all discovery disputes that require Court intervention are set

for a hearing. (Id.) Written discovery motions are not permitted unless the Court is

unable to resolve the disputes during the hearing. (Id.) Judge O’Sullivan’s Discovery

Procedures explicitly state: “The Court may impose sanctions, monetary or

otherwise, if the Court determines discovery is being improperly sought or is not

being provided in good faith.” (Id.)

On October 30, 2019, the Parties appeared before Judge O’Sullivan for a

hearing on a discovery dispute. (See D.E. 76, 80.) Carlos has not provided the Court

with a transcript of this hearing, but on November 5, 2019, Judge O’Sullivan issued

a post-hearing Order providing Plaintiffs until November 12, 2019 to “further

respond to (a) the Requests for Production that were discussed on the record and (b)

the Interrogatories that were discussed on the record.” (D.E. 83 H 1.) Judge

O’Sullivan further

34a

Appendix F

ordered the Parties to “engage in further conferral efforts regarding all remaining

discovery requestsf,]” and scheduled another hearing for November 19, 2019 to

address all outstanding discovery disputes. (Id.

2-3.)

On November 18, 2019, Mr. Lufty filed an “Unopposed Motion to Withdraw

as Counsel of Record.” (D.E. 85.) The Motion states that “Attorney Michael C. Lutfy

wishes to withdraw as counsel after communicating with Carlos Alonso on

November 18, 2019, and being told that his client wishes to proceed pro se.” (Id.

1.) The Motion said nothing about withdrawing as attorney for the other Plaintiffs,

Fe, Angie, Katy and Jany. (See id.)

On November 19, 2019, Judge O’Sullivan held an informal discovery

conference. (See D.E. 86.) Carlos has not provided the Court with a transcript of this

hearing, but on November 19, 2019, Judge O’Sullivan issued a post-hearing Order

instructing Plaintiffs to supplement some of their Interrogatory responses and

responses to Requests for Production. (D.E. 88 at 1-4.) The Order concludes:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiffs’ failure to properly provide

discovery was not substantially justified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37[(a)] provides

(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective

Orders.

(A) If the Motion is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery is Provided After

Filing). If the motion is granted-or if the disclosure or requested discovery is

provided after the motion was filed-the court must, after giving an

35a

Appendix F

opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated

the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s

reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.

Accordingly, the defendants are awarded attorney’s fees for 7.50 hours at a

rate of $400.00 per hour for a total of $3,000.00 to be paid by the plaintiffs, to the

defendants’ attorney within 30 days of the date of this Order.

(Id. at 4.)

On November 22, 2019, the Court entered an Order granting in part Mr.

Lufty’s Motion to Withdraw. (D.E. 89.) Specifically, the Court granted the Motion as

it pertained to withdrawing as Carlos’s attorney, but denied it as to the remaining

Plaintiffs (because the Motion did not specifically move to withdraw from

representing the remaining Plaintiffs). (Id.)

On December 3, 2019, Mr. Lufty filed Objections on behalf of Fe, Angie, Katy,

and Jany, seeking to vacate the portion of Judge O’Sullivan’s Order that awarded

Defendants’ attorney $3,000.00. (See D.E. 93.) Relevant here, Mr. Lufty argued that

“the Court should vacate the award against all Plaintiffs on the grounds that the

discovery sought was only addressed to 'Carlos A. Alonso Cano.’” (Id.

11.) “An

36a

Appendix F

award against all Plaintiffs is clearly erroneous and contrary to law, because it was

not the responsibility of the other Plaintiffs to respond to the discovery.” (Id.

12.)

On December 4, 2019, Carlos filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s

Order permitting Mr. Lufty to withdraw as his attorney. (D.E. 94.)

On December 12, 2019, Judge O’Sullivan entered an Order amending the

November 19, 2019 Order to clarify that only Carlos is responsible for paying the

attorneys’ fees:

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the last paragraph of the Order entered

by the undersigned at DE # 88 on November 19, 2019, is hereby amended to

read:

Accordingly, the defendants are awarded attorney’s fees for 7.50 hours at a

rate of $400.00 per hour for a total of $3,000.00 to be paid by the plaintiff,

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually, to the defendants’ attorney within

30 days of the date of this Order.

It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

individually, is not required to pay the aforementioned $3,000.00 attorney’s

fees until Judge Lenard rules on the objection to the fees. It is further

37a

Appendix F

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO,

individually shall pay the attorney’s fees within seven (7) days of Judge

Lenard’s Order on the objection, or provide a filing to the Court within seven

(7) days of Judge Lenard’s Order on the objection explaining why CARLOS A.

ALONSO CANO, individually is unable to pay the entire fees amount at one

time. Thereafter, the undersigned may consider a payment plan for CARLOS

A. ALONSO CANO, individually to pay the required attorney’s fees.

(D.E. 98 at 1-2, and together with D.E. 88, “Fee Award Order.”)

On December 23, 2019, the Court issued an Order granting Carlos’s Motion

for Reconsideration of the Court’s Order permitting Mr. Lufty to withdraw as his

attorney, and vacated the Court’s prior Order permitting Mr. Lufty to withdraw.

(D.E. 119.) However, on December 27, 2019, the Court entered an Order permitting

Mr. Lufty to withdraw as counsel of record for all Plaintiffs. (D.E. 126.)

Carlos never filed Objections to Judge O’Sullivan’s order imposing the fee

award against him under Rule 37(a)(5)(A). On December 27, 2019, after permitting

Mr. Lufty to withdraw as counsel, the Court issued an Order Providing Carlos an

Opportunity to Object to the Fee Award. (D.E. 128.)

On January 24, 2020, Carlos filed the instant Objections. (D.E. 150.) The

same day, he filed a

38a

Appendix F

separate document “to Support the ‘Objection’” to Judge O’Sullivan’s Order.

(“Supplement,” D.E. 153.)

Upon review of the Objections, Supplement, and the record, the Court finds

as follows.

II. Legal Standard

Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, the Court may designate a

magistrate judge to hear and determine any nondispositive pretrial matter pending

before the court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).

Additionally, pursuant to Local Magistrate Judge Rule 1(c): “A Magistrate Judge

may hear and determine any procedural or discovery motion or other pretrial

matter in a civil or criminal case, other than the motions which are specified in

subsection 1(d), infra, of these rules.” (Emphasis added.) The Court may reconsider

a magistrate judge’s order “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s

order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“The district judge in the case must consider timely objections and

modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to

law.”); S.D. Fla. L. Mag. R. 4(a)(1) (providing that the Court shall set aside any part

of a magistrate judge’s order on a nondispositive pretrial matter “found to be clearly

erroneous or contrary to law”); Merritt v. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 649 F.2d 1013,

1017 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a magistrate judge possesses the authority under

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) to issue an order awarding attorneys’

39a

Appendix F

fees pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) where a party’s conduct necessitates a motion to

compel discovery, “reviewable under the clearly erroneous and contrary to law’

standard”).1

The “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard is “extremely

deferential.” Melech v. Life Ins. Co. of N.A., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1283 (S.D. Ala.

2012) (citation omitted). A “factual finding is clearly erroneous when, ‘although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Univ, of Ga.

Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1543 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States

v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “An order is contrary to law when it

fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Matter

of Application of O’Keefe, 184 F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (citation

omitted).

III. Discussion

Although Carlos’s pro se filings are difficult to decipher, the Court has fully

and carefully considered all of the arguments and evidence contained in Carlos’s

Objections, (D.E. 149), and Supplement thereto, (D.E. 153), and finds that Carlos

has not established that Judge O’Sullivan’s

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted

as binding precedent all decisions handed down by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981.

Merritt was decided June 2, 1981.

40a

Appendix F

Orders of November 19, 2019, (D.E. 88), and December 12, 2019, (D.E. 98), imposing

a fee award against Carlos under Rule 37 is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

To begin with, as the objecting party, Carlos bears the burden of proving that

Judge O’Sullivan’s Fee Award Order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. See

Howard v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1372 (M.D. Fla.

2011) (observing that the objecting party “must establish that the order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law”). Carlos failed to file a Transcript of the discovery

hearings before Judge O’Sullivan, so the Court can only review the findings and

conclusions as stated in his Orders of November 19, 2019, (D.E. 88), and December

12, 2019, (D.E. 98).

Rule 37 provides that if the Court grants a motion for an order compelling

disclosure or discovery, it “must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the

party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney

advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in

making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). However,

the Court “must not order this payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before

attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;

(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially

justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id.

41a

Appendix F

On November 19, 2019, Judge O’Sullivan’s issued an Order following an

informal discovery conference instructing Plaintiffs to respond to certain

Interrogatories and Requests for Production. (D.E. 88 at 1-4.) Judge O’Sullivan

further found that “plaintiffs’ failure to properly provide discovery was not

substantially justified[,]” and “awarded attorney’s fees for 7.50 hours at a rate of

$400.00 per hour for a total of $3,000.00 to be paid by the plaintiffs, to the

defendants’ attorney . . . .” (Id. at 4.) On December 12, 2019, Judge O’Sullivan

issued a post-hearing Order clarifying that the $3,000.00 fee award is “to be paid by

plaintiff, Carlos A. Alonso Cano, individually[.]” (D.E. 98.)

The Court begins by noting that the document containing Carlos’s Objections

also serves as (1) a Notice Striking his Motion in Opposition to Ms. Langbein’s

Declaration (D.E. 120), (2) a Reply to Ms. Langbein’s Declaration, and (3) and a

Reply to Defendants’ Verified Response to Carlos’s Motion in Opposition to Ms.

Langbein’s Declaration. (See D.E. 149 at 1.) Thus, many of the arguments contained

in the document are, or appear to be, irrelevant to the issue before the Court. (See,

e.g., Obj. at 1-4 (arguing that Ms. Langbein has been uncooperative during these

proceedings, for example, by refusing to waive service of process); id. at 6 (arguing

that Mr. Lufty instructed him not to provide addresses and telephone numbers in

response to one interrogatory, which is irrelevant because Judge O’Sullivan did not

find that to be a discovery violation); id. at 10-13 (replying to Defendants’ Response

to Carlos’s Motion

42a

Appendix F

in Opposition to Ms. Langbein’s Declaration).) It further appears that all of the

statements contained in the Supplement to the Objections are irrelevant, or they

are so confusing that their relevance is indeterminable. (See D.E. 153 at 1-8

(documenting telephone and email exchanges between Carlos and Ms. Langbein

regarding discovery production in December 2019, even though the Fee Award was

imposed for discovery violations prior to December 2019).)

Some of the statements asserted in the Objections appear to be relevant but

are unpersuasive. (See, e.g., id. at 5 (arguing that Carlos was only responsible for

thirty-three days of the three-month delay in responding to interrogatories, where

Rule 33 requires responses to be made within thirty days); id. at 7 (“At, the end, the

delay caused by Defendants’ lawyer asking for some ‘Better Initial Disclosures and

Documents’, will be demonstrated that it was no so important for this case.”).)

Other statements may be relevant to whether Plaintiff s non-compliance with

interrogatories and requests for production was substantially justified (or otherwise

excusable), but are insufficient for the Court to conclude that Judge O’Sullivan

erred, much less clearly so, or that his fee award was contrary to law. For example,

he argues that he did not intend to delay discovery, but that it “was almost

impossible for” him to timely comply with the discovery requests in this case and a

companion case before Judge Scola. (Id.) He also appears to argue that Mr. Lufty is

responsible for at least some of the delay in

43a

Appendix F

the discovery responses and, as such, Carlos should not be required to pay the

entire fee award. (See id. at 9.) However, the evidence to which Carlos cites—on

these issues or any other issue—does not leave the Court “with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Laite, 756 F.2d at 1543 (quoting

U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395). And because Rule 37(a)(5)(A) permits the Court

to order either the party or the attorney or both to pay the fee award, the Court

cannot conclude that Judge O’Sullivan “fail[ed] to apply or misappliefd] relevant

statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Matter of Application of O’Keefe, 184 F.

Supp. 3d 1362, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (citation omitted).

Finally, to the extent that Defendants request additional attorneys’ fees

incurred in briefing these issues and responding to Carlos’s various filings, (see D.E.

107 at 5-6, D.E. 134 at 4), the request is denied.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND AD JDUGED that Plaintiff Carlos A.

Alonso Cano’s Objections to Judge O’Sullivan’s Orders of November 19, 2019, (D.E.

88), and December 12, 2019, (D.E. 98), are OVERRULED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 19th day of

February, 2020.

Joan A. Lenard. United States District Judge

44a

Appendix G

FLSD, Case l:19-cv-21826-JAL DE 180, 03/19/2020

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 19-21826-CIV-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually

and as guardian for his son, ANGIE ALONSO

MOREJON, and as next of friend of his minor

daughters, KATY ALONSO MOREJON and JANY LEIDY

ALONSO MOREJON and FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ,

individually,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

245 C & C, LLC and CFH GROUP, LLC.,

Defendants.

_________________________________________________________________ !

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the defendants’ Motion to Strike Jury

Trial Demand Only (DE # 106, 12/17/19). Having reviewed the applicable filings and

law, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants’ Motion to Strike Jury

Trial Demand Only (DE # 106, 12/17/19) is GRANTED in accordance with the

following Order.

45a

Appendix G

FACTS

The plaintiffs sued their landlord, under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) on the

grounds that the defendants failed to accommodate a disabled plaintiff. (DE # 145,

at p. 2). The plaintiffs initially entered into a lease agreement with the defendants

on October 29, 2011. The plaintiffs subsequently entered into another lease on

November 1, 2013. The plaintiffs entered into renewals of the lease thereafter. (DE

# 106, 12/17/2019). Paragraph 29 of the lease provided that “[t]he [r]esident hereby

waives Resident’s right to demand a jury trial in any cause of action arising

between [l]andlord and Resident concerning this contract.” (DE # 106-1, at p. 9,

12/17/2019). On December 17, 2019, the defendants filed a Motion to Strike Jury

Trial Demand (DE # 106) (the “Motion”). The defendants address various issues

alleged in the Second Amended Complaint that are not determinative of their

Motion. (Id. at pp. 2-4). The defendants argue that the plaintiff is not entitled to a

jury trial due to the waiver clause in the lease agreement, and that their complaint

arising under the FHA does not defeat the waiver of jury trial provision in the lease

agreement. (Id. at p. 5). Further, the defendants argue the lease agreement meets

the test for a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, and that a jury waiver

provision can validly require the substitution of one neutral decision-maker for

another trier of fact. (Id.).

The plaintiffs filed their response to the defendants’ Motion (the “Response”)

on January 24, 2020. (DE 145). Throughout the

46a

Appendix G

plaintiffs’ response they reincorporate the allegations stated in their Corrected

Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint that the defendants

committed violations under the FHA. (Id.). The plaintiffs argue they are entitled to

a trial by jury pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 38 and the 7th Amendment of the

United States Constitution. (Id. at pp. 1, 6). The plaintiffs also argue that their

waiver of a jury trial pursuant to paragraph 29 of the lease agreement was not

voluntary or informed. (Id. at p. 13). Additionally, the plaintiffs refer to various

cases that are not cited. (Id. at p. 10-11). Nevertheless the plaintiffs argument with

respect to the cases that are not cited are not of consequence to the legal issues of a

waiver of jury trial. The plaintiff further incorporates a lengthy nutshell of the

history of the FHA and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that are immaterial to

the Motion. (DE # 145,1/24/2020).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. Jury Trial Waiver Clause

The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution “provides that ‘in

[s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,

the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.’” Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Heiners,

Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990) (quoting U.S. Const, amend. VII).

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 38 states the parties rights in an action preserve the right to a

jury trial as prescribed in the 7th Amendment or a federal statute. The Rule

47a

Appendix G

further states a party must demand a jury trial and state the issues to be heard and

decided by a jury. Id. Here, the plaintiffs timely and properly demand a jury trial in

their Second Amended Complaint. (DE # 92, p. 53, 12/2/2019). However, the

plaintiffs waived their right to a jury trial against the defendants when they

executed the lease agreement and continued to renew the lease because the lease

contained a jury trial waiver clause.

“Contractual waivers of a person's right to a jury trial are routinely deemed

enforceable, provided that they are knowing and voluntary.” Ackner v. PNC Bank,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222813 at *10 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2017). The court weighs the

following factors when determining if a right to jury trial has been waived via a

contractual provision: “(1) the conspicuousness of the provision in the contract; (2)

the level of sophistication and experience of the parties entering into the contract;

(3) the opportunity to negotiate terms of the contract; (4) the relative bargaining

power of each party; and (5) whether the waiving party was represented by

counsel.” Head v. Cornerstone Residential Msmt., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102218 at

*6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2006). The factors are not determinative, and the court

weighs the circumstances, considering whether the waiver was unconscionable,

contrary to public policy, or unfair. Ackner, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222813 at *11.

Here, the jury waiver language in the lease agreement was conspicuous. The

clause title was bold and capitalized. Moreover, the language in the

48a

Appendix G

clause was the only clause which contained an italicized font on the subject page.

The plaintiffs initialed the page containing the jury waiver clause, the initial was

located about an inch away from the jury waiver clause, and the language of the

clause was clear and easy to read. See Pearson v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14541 at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2015) (finding a jury waiver

clause enforceable when the clause was in bold type faced, the plaintiff signed the

page where the jury waiver clause was located, and the signature was one inch

away from the clause); see also Oglesbee v. IndyMac Fin. Servs., 675 F. Supp. 2d

1155, 1158 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (finding a jury waiver clause is valid even when the title

of the clause was “Jury Trial Waiver,” the clause was the same font as the

remainder of the document, and the language in the clause was clear and easy to

read).

Second, the plaintiffs level of sophistication and experience must be weighed.

Special education is not required to understand the terms of a jury waiver clause

when it is written in plain language. See Correa v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP,

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159089 at *49-50 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2012). Here, the language

in the jury trial waiver clause stated: ““[t]he [r]esident hereby waives [r]esident’s

right to demand a jury trial in any cause of action arising between [l]andlord and

[r]esident concerning this contract.” (DE # 106-1, at p. 9, 12/17/2019). Moreover, the

resume of plaintiff Carlos A. Alonso Cano, who signed the lease agreement,

indicates he was formerly a licensed insurance agent

49a

Appendix G

who read and explained insurance policies to customers. (DE # 156-1, at p. 3,

1/31/2020). Thus, Mr. Alonso Cano was sophisticated enough to understand the

meaning of a waiver of jury trial clause if he had the ability understand and explain

insurance policies. See Ackner, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222813 at *11 (finding a

waiver of jury trial clause valid where the plaintiffs were credit card applicants).1

Furthermore, Mr. Alonso Cano does not provide any evidence that he was unable to

understand the meaning of the jury trial waiver clause. See Oglesbee, 675 F. Supp.

2d at 1158 (finding a party was sophisticated enough to understand the meaning of

a jury trial when said party did not offer any evidence to the contrary).

Mr. Alonso Cano argues that his wife Fe Morejon Fernandez, who is also a

plaintiff that signed the lease, could not understand the jury trial waiver clause in

the lease agreement because she does not speak English. This argument fails

because “[i]t is axiomatic that a person who signs a contract is presumed to knowQ

its contents.” Larach v. Std. Chid. Bank Int'l (Americas) Ltd., 2011 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 163670 at *30 (S.D. Fla. Jun. 7, 2011). Additionally, “‘it is generally the duty

of a party to a contract to learn and understand its contents before he signs it.’” Id.

(quoting Addison v. Carballosa, 48 So. 3d 951, 954 (3d DCA 2010)). A party cannot

1 In Ackner, the plaintiffs conceded they had the sophistication to understand what the jury

waiver meant. See Ackner, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222813 at *11.

50a

Appendix G

defend against a provision of a contract simply because they did not or could not

read it. Id. Moreover, Mrs. Morejon Fernandez signed all the renewals and the

Response to defendants Motion which is written in English. (DE # 106-1,

12/17/2019, at pp. 13-15); (DE # 145, 1/24/2020).

With respect to the plaintiffs ability to negotiate the contract, the plaintiffs

do not offer any evidence that they could not negotiate the lease agreement or walk

away from signing the lease agreement. The plaintiffs had the ability to negotiate or

not sign the lease agreement. See Correa, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159089 at *50

(finding a plaintiff failed to establish the third factor when the plaintiff did not offer

any evidence that the plaintiff could not negotiate the contract or have the ability to

not sign). With respect to the plaintiffs’ bargaining power, the plaintiffs do not offer

any evidence that the defendants had superior bargaining power. The plaintiffs had

sufficient bargaining power in negotiating the lease. See Pearson, 2015 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 14541 at *7 (dismissing plaintiffs argument that they had little bargaining

power because they did not provide sufficient evidence). Lastly, the plaintiffs were

not represented by counsel when negotiating the lease, however, if Mr. Alonso Cano

was sophisticated enough to understand the jury trial waiver clause, he was

sophisticated enough to know he could retain counsel to negotiate the lease. See

Ackner, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222813 at *13 (stating that “as [p]laintiffs are

‘sufficiently sophisticated to understand what the waiver

51a

Appendix G

means’, [p]laintiffs would appear to be sufficiently sophisticated to know that they

could obtain advice of counsel. . . .”) (citations omitted)).

Because the totality of the circumstances weigh heavily in favor of the

defendants, the jury trial waiver clause in the lease agreement is enforceable and

was consented to voluntarily. As such the jury trial waiver clause is not

unconscionable, contrary to public policy, or unfair.

FHA Does Not Invalidate A Jury Trial Waiver Clause

The FHA does not invalidate a jury trial waiver clause in a contract. See

Milsan u. Cornerstone Residential Mgmt.. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22252 at *16-17

(S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2007) (stating that an FHA claim for the occupancy limits

prescribed by the landlord allegedly discriminating the tenant arises out of the

contract and allows a jury trial waiver clause to be enforceable). Here, the jury trial

waiver clause states “[t]he [r]esident hereby waives [r]esident’s right to demand a

jury trial in any cause of action arising between [l]andlord and [r]esident concerning

this contract.” (DE # 106-1,12/17/2019 p. 9). Here, the jury trial waiver clause states

“[t]he [r]esident herebj' waives [r]esident’s right to demand a jury trial in any cause

of action arising between [l]andlord and [r]esident concerning this contract.” (DE #

106-1, 12/17/2019 p. 9). Here, the plaintiffs’ claim arising from the FHA is

considered an action arising between the parties in connection with the lease

agreement because the plaintiffs allegations of defendants’ violations of the FHA

relate to provisions that the lease agreement governs. Thus, the jury trial waiver

52a

Appendix G

clause applies. See Milsap, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22252 at *16-17 (citing Head,

2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102218 at *11 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2006)) (finding that the jury

trial waiver clause arose out of or related to the agreement because FHA claim

derived from the occupancy limits that the parties agreed to in the agreement).

Accordingly, the defendants’ Motion to Strike Jury Demand Only (DE # 106,

12/17/20) is GRANTED.

DONE AND ORDERED, in Chambers, at Miami, Florida, this 19th day of

March 2020.

SULLIVAN

Copies mailed by Chambers to:

Carlos A. Alonso Cano

2500 West 56th Street

Apt. 1301

Hialeah, FL 33016-4769

53a

Appendix H

FLSD, Case l:19-cv-21826-JAL DE 678. 07/20/2023

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 19-21826-CIV-LENARD/DAMIAN

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually

and as guardian for his son, ANGIE ALONSO

MORE JON, KATY ALONSO MOREJON,

JANYLEIDY ALONSO MOREJON, and

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ individually,

Plaintiffs,

245 C & C, LLC and CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________ /

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

THIS CAUSE came before the Court for a bench trial held from June 5

through June 27, 2023. The Court has carefully considered the credibility of the

witnesses presented and the evidence admitted during the trial. Pursuant to Rule

52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court makes the following

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

54a

Appendix H

For context, the Court will first provide a brief background and recitation of

the relevant procedural history.

BRIEF BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Angie Alonso Morejon (“Angie”) is a permanently disabled individual

who suffers from, among other things, mental retardation, severe cerebral palsy,

and spasticity. (Second Am. Compl. (D.E. 92)

4.) Plaintiff Carlos A. Alonso Cano

(“Carlos”) is Angie’s father and Plenary Guardian; Plaintiff Fe Morejon Fernandez

(“Fe”) is Angie’s mother; and Plaintiffs Katy Alonso Morejon (“Katy”) and Jany

Leidy Alonso Morejon (“Jany”) are Angie’s sisters. (Id.

14-17.)

From October 2011 to January 2021, Plaintiffs resided in a rental apartment

in the Villas of Hialeah apartment complex (“VOH”) located in Hialeah, Florida.1

(Id.

2, 36.)

On February 1, 2018, Defendants instituted eviction proceedings against Plaintiffs.

The eviction case was tried in the Miami-Dade County Court on November 15, 16, and 19, 2018. The

trial judge retired before issuing a ruling. A successor judge was appointed and issued a final

judgment on June 20, 2019, finding in favor of Carlos and Fe. 245 C & C, LLC appealed the adverse

final judgment, and on September 3, 2020, the Appellate Division of the Miami-Dade Circuit Court

reversed the final judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for 245 C &

C, LLC and to calculate an award of attorney’s fees for 245 C & C, LLC. It appears that Plaintiffs

finally vacated the apartment on January 12, 2021. (See D."E. 427 1.)

55a

Appendix H

Defendant 245 C & C, LLC and/or Defendant CFH Group, LLC owns VOH, (id.

22), while Defendant CFH Group, LLC operates VOH, (id.

25).

BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 6, 2019, Carlos, through counsel, initiated this federal lawsuit

alleging that Defendants violated (1) various provisions of the Fair Housing Act

(“FHA”), (2) the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment under Florida state law, and

(3) Section 83.67(1), Florida Statutes, by unlawfully turning off the water to

Plaintiffs’ home without warning. (D.E. I.)2 On July 19, 2019, the Court

entered an Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Corrected Combined Motion to

Dismiss Complaint and/or for More Definite Statement. (D.E. 43.) The Court found

This is Plaintiffs’ third attempt at suing Defendants in federal court. On February

12, 2018, Carlos, proceeding pro se, sued Defendants in this District alleging violations of his civil

rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the FHA. See Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC, et al.,

Case No. 18-20537-Civ-Ungaro (“Cano I”), D.E. 1. Judge Ungaro dismissed the pro se Complaint

without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and provided Plaintiff leave to amend. Cano I, D.E. 6.

Carlos filed an Amended Complaint, id., D.E. 9 & 10, which Judge Ungaro dismissed as

“unintelligible,” id., D.E. 38. Thereafter, Carlos, through newly-acquired counsel, filed a Second

Amended Complaint. Id., D.E. 42. Carlos’s counsel subsequently withdrew, id., D.E. 50, and Carlos

moved pro se to amend his complaint a third time, id., D.E. 62. Judge Ungaro granted the motion to

amend but stated that she would not grant any further opportunities to amend. Id., D.E. 67. Carlos

filed a Third Amended Complaint, id., D.E. 73, which Defendants moved to dismiss, id., D.E. 81. On

January 28, 2019, Judge Ungaro granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the Third Amended

Complaint was a “shotgun pleading” and, nevertheless, failed to state a claim. Id., D.E. 84. Because

Carlos had been given numerous opportunities to file a complaint that stated a claim upon which

refief could be granted and otherwise complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but had

failed to do so, Judge Ungaro dismissed the case without prejudice. Id.

On March 19, 2019, Carlos, proceeding pro se, filed a second federal lawsuit against

Defendants. See Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC, et al., 19-21045-Civ-Altonaga (“Cano II”). Judge Altonaga

sua sponte dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted and because it was an improper “shotgun pleading.” Id., D.E. 5. Judge Altonaga

denied leave to amend because: “(1) this is Plaintiffs fourth pleading directed to these two

Defendants; (2) Plaintiff has already been instructed on federal pleading standards and is aware

shotgun pleadings are subject to dismissal; and (3) Plaintiff was previously warned additional

pleadings would not be allowedf.]” Id. at 5. Carlos moved to reopen the case and amend the

complaint, id., D.E. 11, but Judge Altonaga denied the motion, id., D.E. 12.

56a

Appendix H

that the Complaint constituted a “shotgun pleading” that violated federal pleading

standards because four of the five Counts alleged multiple claims;3 as such, the

Court required Carlos to file an Amended Complaint. (Id. at 9-12.) Although the

Court provided Carlos leave to file an Amended Complaint, it warned “that it may

be the final amendment the Court permits him to make[,]” (id. (citing Brown v.

Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 342 F. App’x 552, 554 (11th Cir. 2009))), and

instructed that “Plaintiff should endeavor to remedy all deficiencies, whether

discussed in this Order or not[,]” (id. at 15).

On August 9, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint which contained

nineteen causes of action. (D.E. 52.) Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Amended Complaint, (D.E. 61), which the Court granted in part, dismissing Counts

Two, Six, Seven, Eight, Seventeen, Eighteen, and Nineteen with prejudice for

failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted, (D.E. 90). Although the

Court had previously warned Plaintiffs that it may not permit any further

The Court found that Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of quiet

enjoyment did not constitute a “shotgun pleading” because, although it alleged various ways in

which Defendants breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, “it appears that under Florida

law a landowner can breach the covenant of quiet enjoyment through a course of conduct.” (D.E. 43

at 10-11 (citing Misha Enters, v. GAR Enters., LLC, 117 So. 3d 850, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

(finding genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in favor of landownei’ on claim

for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment where complaint alleged, inter aha, that

defendant harassed plaintiff and its customers for several months, towed vehicles belonging to

plaintiffs customers, and “needlessly caus[ed] numerous agencies to inspect [plaintiffs] operation

and property”); Carner v. Shapiro, 106 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (affirming damages

award for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment where building-owner remodeled building over fourmonth period).)

57a

Appendix H

amendments, the Court provided Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add

language to one paragraph. (Id. at 64.)

On December 2, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended

Complaint asserting claims under the Fair Housing Act and Florida state law (D.E.

92.) The Second Amended Complaint contained a jury trial demand. (Id. at 1.)

On December 17, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Jury Trial

Demand Only.4 (D.E. 106.)

On March 19, 2020, Magistrate Judge John J. O’Sullivan issued an Order

granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike Jury Demand Only, finding that Plaintiffs

had contractually waived their right to a jury trial.5 (D.E. 180.)

Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts

Thirteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen. (D.E. 368.) The Court entered an Order granting the

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts Thirteen and Fifteen, and

dismissing Count Sixteen with prejudice as an impermissible shotgun pleading.

(D.E. 438.)

On December 16, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer and Affirmative Defenses

to the remaining claims. (D.E. 101.) Relevant here, Defendants’ Ninth Affirmative

On December 27, 2019, Plaintiffs’ original attorney was permitted to withdraw. (D.E.

126.) Plaintiffs then proceeded pro se until February 10, 2023, when attorney Michael D. Dunlavy

filed a Supplemental Notice of Permanent Appearance of Counsel on behalf of all Plaintiffs. (D.E.

581.)

Plaintiffs did not object to, seek reconsideration of, or otherwise challenge Judge

O’Sullivan’s Order for almost three years. Then, beginning on March 14, 2023, on the eve of trial,

Plaintiffs filed a series of motions seeking to undo Judge O’Sullivan’s Order. (See D.E. 588, 599, 601.)

The Court denied each of those motions. (See D.E. 598, 603, 604.)

58a

Appendix H

Defense asserts that any claim under the FHA which arose more than two years

before the filing of this lawsuit is barred by the FHA’s statute of limitations. (Id.

282.)

On November 16, 2020, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,

(D.E. 364), and a Statement of Material Undisputed Facts in support thereof, (D.E.

366). They also filed a Request for Judicial Notice. (D.E. 372.)

On January 11, 2021—after providing Plaintiffs two extensions of time to

respond, (D.E. 390, 411)—Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, (D.E. 413), to which they attached 245 pages of

exhibits, (D.E. 413-1). Plaintiffs did not file a Response to Defendants’ Statement of

Material Undisputed Facts, nor did it file a Response to Defendants’ Request for

Judicial Notice.

10.

On February 5, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’

Response in its Entirety and to Deem Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts

Admitted, or to Strike Particular Statements from the Response. (D.E. 435.)

11.

On March 15, 2021—after providing Plaintiffs two extensions of time to

respond to the Motion to Strike, (D.E. 437, 446)—Plaintiffs filed a document titled

“Response” which did not respond to Defendants’ Motion to Strike but was instead

an entirely new response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 447.)

However, like its predecessor, it did not contain a Response to Defendants’

59a

Appendix H

Statement of Material Undisputed Facts. Thereafter, Defendants filed a Reply in

support of their Motion to Strike. (D.E. 456.)

12.

On May 18, 2021, the Court entered an Omnibus Order Granting Defendants’

Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Response in its Entirety and to Deem Defendants’

Statement of Material Undisputed Facts Admitted, Granting Defendants’ Request

for Judicial Notice, Granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and

Closing Case. (“First Order on Summary Judgment,” D.E. 468.)

First, the Court granted the Motion to Strike by default because “Plaintiffs

failed to respond to any of the arguments raised in Defendants’ Motion to Strike [.]”

(Id. at 9.) Alternatively, the Court granted the Motion to Strike on the merits

because Plaintiffs failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1. (Id. at 10-13.) The Court

explained that because Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendants’ Statement of

Material Facts, by operation of Local Rule 56.1,

Defendants’ facts were deemed

admitted to the extent that they were supported by record evidence. (Id. at 12-13.)

Second, the Court granted the Request for Judicial Notice by default because

Plaintiffs failed to respond to the Request. (Id. at 15.) Alternatively, the Court

granted the Request for Judicial Notice on the merits, finding “that the materials

listed in Defendants’ requests are subject to judicial notice.” (Id. at 15-16 (citations

omitted).)

60a

Appendix H

Third, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id. at

17-87.) Initially, the Court found that all of the facts recited in the Omnibus Order’s

“Facts” section were supported by record evidence and therefore deemed admitted

by operation of Rule 56.1. (Id. at 17 n.12.) The Court then found that the admitted

facts and record evidence established that Defendants were entitled to summary

judgment as to each remaining Count. (Id. at 39-86.) The Court subsequently

entered Final Judgment by separate entry and closed the case. (D.E. 469.)

13.

On June 1, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reopen pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3)

and (6). (D.E. 470.) They argued that the Court relied upon false statements by

Defendants’ witnesses when concluding that Defendants’ were entitled to summary

judgment, and that there is record evidence supporting their claims. (See id. at 220.) On the last page of the Motion to Reopen, under the “Legal Standard” heading,

Plaintiffs appeared to argue that the Court erred by granting Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment without first providing Plaintiffs notice of the rules and

requirements governing motions for summary judgment. (Id. at 20.) Defendants

filed a Response, (D.E. 474), to which Plaintiffs filed a Reply, (D.E. 477).

14.

On June 25, 2021, the Court entered an Order granting the Motion to

Reopen. (D.E. 483.) Briefly, the Court found that the Motion was properly construed

as one under Rule 59(e), (id. at 9), and found that the Court committed reversible

error by granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment without first

providing notice to Plaintiffs of (1) the rules governing summary judgment, (2) their

61a

Appendix H

right to file affidavits or other material in opposition to the motion, and (3) the

consequences of default, (id. at 9-15 (citing Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822,

825 (11th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, the Court vacated in part the Court’s First Order

on Summary Judgment,6 and reinstated the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id. at

17.) The Court furthei' provided the Parties notice of (1) the rules governing

summary judgment, (2) their right to file affidavits or other material in opposition

to the motion, and (3) the consequences of default, pursuant to Rule 56(c) and (f),

Griffith, Couch v. Clark, 725 F. App’x 808, 811-12 (11th Cir. 2018), “and/or

otherwise.” (Id. at 18-22.)

15.

On August 2, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Request for Judicial Notice. (D.E. 493.)

Defendants filed a Response, (D.E. 517), to which Plaintiffs filed a Reply, (D.E. 534).

16.

Also on August 2, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Responses to the Motion for

Summary Judgment (D.E. 491) and Statement of Material Facts in Dispute (D.E.

492), which contained a section that included five “New Facts.” (Id.

138-42). The

same day, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Conventional Filing of Plaintiffs’ USB as

Appendixes to Summary Judgment. (“Notice of Conventional Filing,” D.E. 495.)

Plaintiffs attached to the Notice of Conventional Filing “Appendix A” which

contained 115 pages of documents supporting their Statement of Material Facts in

Specifically, the Court vacated the First Order on Summary Judgment to the extent

that it granted Defendants’ Motion foi' Summary Judgment, but not to the extent that it granted

Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. (D.E. 483 at 17 n.10.) The Court did not find that failure to

provide notice under Griffith required the Court to vacate the part of the First Order on Summary

Judgment granting Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. (Id. at 15 n.9.)

62a

Appendix H

Dispute. (D.E. 495-1.) However, on August 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of

Striking the Notice of Conventional Filing. (D.E. 501.) By operation of the Notice of

Striking, both the Notice of Conventional Filing (D.E. 495) and Appendix A

attached thereto (D.E. 495-1) have been stricken from the record. Plaintiffs did not

refile Appendix A with the Court.

17.

On August 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Motion (1) requesting leave to file a new

USB drive with evidence that was specifically prepared to support Plaintiffs’

responses to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of Material

Undisputed Facts, and (2) striking the USB drive Plaintiffs had previously filed in

support of their opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

Statement of Material Undisputed Facts. (D.E. 499.) On August 9, 2021, the Court

granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for leave to file a new USB drive and stated that “[t]his

will be the final USB the Court permits Plaintiffs to file in support of their

opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Statement of

Material Facts.” (D.E. 505.) The Court also granted the Motion to strike the

previously-filed USB drive. (Id.) The new USB did not contain “Appendix A,” nor

does it appear anywhere else in the record.

18.

On September 3, 2021, Defendants filed their Reply in support of their

Motion for Summary Judgment (D.E. 514), their Reply and Objections to Plaintiffs’

Statement of New Undisputed Facts (D.E. 520), and a separate Reply

“Memorandum” to Plaintiffs’ Statement of New Undisputed Facts (D.E. 521).

63a

Appendix H

19.

Also on September 3, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike Previously

Unasserted Claims and New Facts to Support these Claims in Plaintiffs’ Response

to Motion for Summary Judgment, its Accompanying Statement of Opposing

Material Facts and Supporting Affidavits. (D.E. 516.) Plaintiffs filed a Response on

September 30, 2021, (D.E. 535), to which Defendants filed a Reply on November 29,

2021, (D.E. 548).

20.

Also on September 3, 2021, Defendants filed Objections to Plaintiffs’

Opposing Materials and Declarations Supporting Response to Summary Judgment

and Motion to Strike Declarations as Shams. (D.E. 518.) Plaintiffs filed a Response

on September 30, 2021, (D.E. 536), to which Defendants filed a Reply on November

29, 2021, (D.E. 549).

21.

Also on September 3, 2021, Defendants filed Objections to and Motion to

Strike Plaintiffs’ Disputes of Defendants’ Statement of Material Undisputed Facts,

(D.E. 519). Plaintiffs filed a Response on September 30, 2021, (D.E. 537), to which

Defendants filed a Reply on November 29, 2021, (D.E. 550).

22.

On August 17, 2022, the Court entered an Omnibus Order: (1) denying

Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice, (D.E. 493); (2) granting in part and denying

in part Defendants’ Motion to Strike Previously Unasserted Claims and New Facts

to Support these Claims in Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion for Summary Judgment,

its Accompanying Statement of Opposing Material Facts and Supporting Affidavits,

(D.E. 516); denying Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Declarations as Shams

64a

Appendix H

and deferring consideration of Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiffs’ Opposing

Materials and Declarations Supporting Response to Summary Judgment (D.E. 518);

and denying Defendants’ Objections to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Dispute of

Defendants Statement of Material Facts, (D.E. 519). (D.E. 553.)

23.

Also on August 17, 2022, the Court entered an Amended Order Granting in

Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (D.E. 555.)

Relevant here, the Court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts

Four, Five, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and Fourteen, and denied the Motion as to

Counts One and Three.

In Count One, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the FHA by

failing to provide a reasonable accommodation—specifically, an assigned

handicapped parking spot with an access aisle on the driver’s side reserved

exclusively for Angie. (Second Am. Compl.

39, 128-43.) In this regard, the Second

Amended Complaint alleges that “[f]rom March 2017 to June 2017, Carlos made

various requests to Vilma for a disabled parking spot reserved exclusively for

Angie [,]” (id.

39), but “Vilma repeatedly refused to provide the reserved parking

spot for Angie...,” (id.

43).

In Count Three, Carlos, Fe, and Angie allege that Defendants violated

the FHA by refusing to permit a reasonable modification to the existing premises—

specifically, a modification to Angie’s bathroom. (Id.

150-56.) The Second

Amended Complaint alleges that “from March 2017 to August 2018, Carlos

65a

Appendix H

requested that they be allowed to modify the bathroom of Angie, but Vilma in more

than one occasion refused the modification, saying they never allowed it in ‘Villas.’”

(Id. | 59.)

24.

On May 31, 2023, the Court held a Pretrial Conference during which counsel

for both Parties agreed to bifurcate trial into two phases:

Phase 1 would be limited to whether Plaintiffs made requests for the

accommodation and modification alleged in Counts One and Three,

respectively, within the FHA’s limitations period, and whether those

requests were denied;

Phase 2, if necessary, would address the reasonableness and necessity

of the accommodation and/or modification

25. Between June 5 and June 27, 2023, the Court heard Phase 1 of the

trial. (See D.E. 647, 668.)

26.

On June 30, 2023, the Court entered a Paperless Interim Order of

Completion of Trial finding, “based upon the evidence presented at trial, that: (1) a

request for a modification to the bathroom did not occur until August 26, 2018, and

that request was granted the next day; and (2) a request for an assigned, dedicated

handicapped parking space was made only once, and that request occurred around

October 2012.” (D.E. 672.) Because no request for an accommodation or modification

was made and denied within the limitations period, the Court stated that Phase 2 of

66a

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trial would not be necessary and ordered the Parties to file Proposed Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Id.)

27.

On July 12, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their Proposed Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, (D.E. 676), and Defendants filed their Proposed Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, (D.E. 677).

III.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff Angie Alonso Morejon (“Angie”) suffers from severe physical and

intellectual disabilities. It is undisputed that Angie is disabled for purposes of the

Fair Housing Act.7 (Pretrial Stip. (D.E. 595) at 3.)

Beginning in October 2011, and throughout the period alleged in the Second

Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs rented Apartment #1301 at the Villas of Hialeah

(“VOH”) in Hialeah, Florida.8 (See Def. Ex. A; Trial Tr. 6/9/2023 (Lowenhaupt) at

16:20-21.)9

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

The FHA refers to discrimination based on “handicap” rather than disability. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f).

Disability scholars, however, generally prefer the term "disability” to handicap, and the Americans

with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§

12101—12213) (“ADA”), reflects that preference. For this reason, we treat the terms interchangeably

and elect to use “disability” and the preferred possessive construction. Bhogaita u. Altamonte Heights

Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014).

Although the trial record does not reflect exactly when Plaintiffs vacated Apartment

#1301 following the conclusion of the state court eviction proceedings, on January 21, 2021, Plaintiffs

filed an “Emergency Motion” stating that “they were evicted from their apartment by the Miami

Dade Police Department” on January 12, 2021. (D.E. 427 1.)

It appears that the Parties only ordered official trial transcripts for some of the

testimony. Where the official trial transcripts are divided by witness, the Court will include the

witness’s name in parentheses. For testimony with no official transcript, the Court will cite to a

rough draft of the transcript provided by the Court Reporter.

67a

Appendix H

Defendant CFH Group, LLC is the property management company that

controls VOH. (Trial Tr. 6/9/2023 (Cabrerizo) at 5:12-24.)

Tom Cabrerizo is CFH Group’s CEO. (Id. at 4:12.)

Vilma Hernandez (“Hernandez”) is the Property Manager at VOH. (Trial Tr.

6/23/2023 at 88:7-14.)

Marleyn Garcia was CFH Group’s Regional Property Manager (and

Hernandez’s direct supervisor) during the relevant period. (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023

(rough) at 33:2-5, 33:22 - 34:1.) Ms. Garcia now lives in Knoxville, Tennessee and

no longer works for CFH Group. (Id. at 32:21-24.)

Paul Gallner was CFH Group’s Manager of Safety and Compliance during

the relevant period. (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (Gallner) at 3:7.) He is currently CFH

Group’s Director of Safety and Compliance. (Id. at 3:3.)

Amanda Ortiz (“Ortiz”) is a social worker who has been working with Angie

since 2012 as a Consultant and Waiver Support Coordinator. (Trial Tr. 6/5/2023 at

6:15-17.) As Angie’s Waiver Support Coordinator, Ortiz’s “main function is to

coordinate all services” for Angie, which includes submitting requests to Florida’s

Agency for Persons with Disabilities (“APD”) to secure funds for Angie’s care. (Trial

Tr. 6/9/2023 (Ferguson) at 14:22 - 15:5; 26:23 - 27:9; 44:12 - 50:25.)

68a

Appendix H

a. Count One: Request for accommodation - assigned handicapped

parking space

The only time Plaintiffs requested an assigned handicapped parking space

was in late 2012 or early 2013. (Trial Tr. 6/23/2023 at 98:9-16; 106:8-9.)

10.

Carlos testified that he orally requested an assigned handicapped parking

space on seven occasions during his tenancy at VOH: first, on February 3, 2013,

from Hernandez, (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (rough) at 130:3-14); second, in October 2015

from Hernandez, (id. at 131:10-16); third, on August 4, 2016, from CFH Group CEO

Tom Cabrerizo, (id. at 133:23 - 134:21); fourth, on September 9, 2016, from

Hernandez and Marleyn Garcia, (Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos) at 7:8-11; Trial Tr.

6/20/2023 at 4:17 - 5:8; Trial Tr. 6/22/2023 at 3:12-23); fifth, in October 2016 from

Hernandez, (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (rough) at 137:15 - 138:3); sixth, on March 29, 2017,

from Hernandez, (Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos) at 10:16-19); and seventh, on April 7,

2017, from Hernandez, (id. at 10:20-25). (See also Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos) at 6:1619.)

11.

Only March 29, 2017, and April 7, 2017, fall within the period alleged in the

Second Amended Complaint—i.e., March 2017 to June 2017. (D.E. 92

12.

39.)

The Court finds that Carlos’s testimony on this issue was not credible or

reliable, based on observations of him as he testified at trial, his embellishment of

the underlying facts, and his inconsistent testimony.

69a

Appendix H

Furthermore, there were no other eyewitnesses to his alleged

requests on March 29 and April 7, 2017, (see Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos)

at 8:20-22; Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Fe) at 16:3-9), and there were no

contemporaneous notes, emails, letters, or doctor’s notes corroborating

Carlos’s testimony.

Additionally, his testimony conflicted with other credible witnesses,

including Marleyn Garcia who had no interest in the outcome of the

case. For example, Carlos testified that he also requested an assigned

handicapped parking space during a meeting with Ms. Garcia and

Vilma Hernandez on September 9, 2016. (Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos) at

7:8-11; Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 at 4:17 - 5:8; Trial Tr. 6/22/2023 at 3:12-23.)

Ms. Garcia testified that she never met with Carlos in September of

2016. (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (Garcia) at 6:3-14.) Ms. Garcia testified that

she met with Carlos and Fe in August of 2016, but neither Carlos nor

Fe made a request for an assigned handicapped parking space at that

meeting. (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (rough) at 38:2-4; 39:8-23.) Rather, they

only discussed the “good conduct” addendum to their lease because

neither Carlos nor Fe wanted to sign it. (Id. at 37:11 — 38:17.) Based on

the consistency of Ms. Garcia’s testimony with other credible and

reliable evidence, the fact that she no longer works for CFH Group and

therefore has no interest in the outcome of this case, and the Court’s

70a

Appendix H

observation of the witness during her testimony at trial, the Court

finds Ms. Garcia to be credible and reliable.

Similarly, Carlos testified that on August 4, 2016, the entire family

met with CFH Group CEO Tom Cabrerizo, and during the meeting

Carlos requested an assigned handicapped parking space and

permission to modify Angie’s bathroom. (Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 (Carlos) at

3:25 - 4:11.) Mr. Cabrerizo testified that he met with the Plaintiffs

after they appeared at his office unannounced wanting to discuss the

nonrenewal of their lease. (Trial Tr. 6/9/2023 (Cabrerizo) at 7:1 - 8:18.)

Mr. Cabrerizo testified that he had no recollection of Carlos discussing

a handicapped parking space or a bathroom modification,

[a]nd ... if he would have, at the time, it certainly would have

been something that I would have discussed with my VP at the

time, when I went over this meeting with her regarding the

nonrenewal, as at the time, I was on the board of the Woody

Foundation, which dealt with disability, and I was on that board

for four years, and I spent a lot of time on that board.

(Id. at 9:7-13.) Mr. Cabrerizo explained that the Woody

Foundation “dealt with disability, primarily spinal cord

injuries,” and that he “was instrumental in bringing in the

Woody Pack, which essentially was assistive devices to help

71a

Appendix H

these kids with these spinal cord injuries to be able to take care

of themselves; feed themselves, you know, be able to wash, to

wash their teeth, comb their hair in some cases, just all, all

devices.” (Id. at 10:1-6.) When asked: “[I]f [Carlos] had made a

comment about needing an accommodation, would that have

drawn your attention?” Mr. Cabrerizo responded: “100 percent.

This is something that I would have brought up in my

conversation with Gliset Perez, as this is something that was

dear to me at the time - and still is.” (Id. at 10:9-11.) Based on

the consistency of Mr. Cabrerizo’s testimony with other credible

and reliable evidence, and the Court’s observation of the witness

during his testimony at trial, the Court finds Mr. Cabrerizo to be

credible and reliable.

13.

Vilma Hernandez testified that Carlos requested an assigned handicapped

parking space only once, either in 2012 or early 2013, (Trial Tr. 6/23/2023 at 98:11,

106:8-10), “and that was the only time that he requested it[,]” (id. at 98:11-12; see

also id. at 99:6-7; 106:8).

When asked whether Plaintiffs requested an assigned handicapped

parking space between March 2017 and June 2017, as alleged Second

Amended Complaint, Hernandez replied: “No. They did not request

anything from me in that period of time.” (Id. at 102:17-18.)

72a

Appendix H

When asked whether Carlos made a request for an assigned

handicapped parking space specifically on March 29, 2017, as Carlos

claimed during his testimony, Hernandez replied: “No. He did not

make any request that day.” (Id. at 103:10.)

Hernandez testified that Carlos never emailed her any photographs or

videos purporting to show Plaintiffs having difficulty loading Angie

into their vehicle, and never emailed her regarding problems finding a

parking space for Angie. (Id. at 104:11-15.)

14.

The Court finds Hernandez to be credible and reliable. She testified that she

remembered the 2012 or 2013 encounter with Carlos as follows:

He came to the door. He stood at the door. He said, “Vilma, I need you

to give me parking spot number 2, which is in front of Building 2500

because that one has the ramp on the side of the driver.”

And I answered, “Carlos, unfortunately, according to the laws in

Florida, but according to statutes, parking cannot be assigned to

disabled, not designated. It has to be available for all people, any

person who has the disable park tag.” And that was the only time he

asked, and that was my answer. (Id. at 98:24-7.). She further testified

that during the March 29, 2017 encounter,

73a

Appendix H

Carlos only complained about receiving a parking violation warning

from third-party On-Call Parking (“On-Call”):

I remember he came into the office. He asked to speak with me. He

told me, “Vilma, I got a warning.”

I told him, “Don Carlos, I want you to do me a favor, call On-Call

because they are the company in charge of the parking

administration.” I continued working. It was the end of the month, and

there’s a lot of reports to be made. And he left.

(Id. at 103:1-6.) Based on Hernandez’s memory of the relevant encounters with

Carlos, the consistency of her testimony with other credible and reliable evidence,

and the Court’s observation of the witness during her testimony at trial, the Court

finds Hernandez credible and reliable.

15.

Amanda Ortiz speaks with Carlos on the phone at least twice a month and

visits Angie at his home twice a year. (Trial Tr. 6/5/2023 at 6:6-9, 33:25 — 34:1.)

As a Consultant and Waiver Support Coordinator, Ortiz is required to

keep accurate notes of all contacts she has with Angie and Carlos. (Id.

at 5:21-24.)

Ortiz has taken contemporaneous notes of all contacts with Angie and

Carlos since her initial visit with Angie on August 6, 2012. (See id. at

11:25-12:2.)

74a

Appendix H

Ortiz initials all of her notes. (See id. at 11:22 - 12:2; id. at 25:19-21.)

If Ortiz has a health or safety concern, she is required to record it in

her notes. (Id. at 10:20-25.)

None of Ortiz’s notes from March and April 2017 reflect any

discussions with Carlos regarding a handicapped parking space.

Ortiz’s notes from March 2, 2017 state, in their entirety:

As a consultant, I contacted Angie at home and spoke to him in

regards to his health and services. As a consultant, I also spoke

to his father and manager and told me all services and support

is all in place with the approved cost plan. As a consultant, I

informed them about a pen house and Summer Camp hosted by

Great Heights Academy, if they needed any more information I

will fax it over. As a consultant, I asked Angie what he likes to

do for community involvement and he says he likes to watch

movies, eat, and spend time with family and friends. As a

consultant, I asked them to call whenever they had any

questions or concerns.

(Def. Ex. 2F (emphasis added).) Ortiz’s handwritten initials appear next to

this note.

75a

Appendix H

Ortiz’s notes from March 20, 2017 state, in their entirety:

As a consultant I contacted Angie at his home and spoke to Angie’s

father in regard to Angie to see how he was doing and if there was

anything that he needed. He tells me Angie is doing great and he is

happy and stable. As a consultant, I asked about his health and goals.

He continues to tell me how much Angie improves with his goals and

will like to continue working on those same goals. As a consultant, I

discussed the Support Plan and monthly budget/ statements to ensure

proper management.

There have been no changes in medication. Angie’s father informs me

about his concerns of the letter he received from APD about the EZ

budget and AIM, as a consultant, I informed him that this was nothing

to worry about for the moment, it was just standard procedure and

that if anything changed WSC will inform him of the changes.

Angie’s father tells me that Angie continues to be active by going to the

beach, library, and family reunions. I will continue to monitor and

review Angie’s health and services for the month of April.

(Id. (emphasis added).) Ortiz’s handwritten initials appear next to this note.

Ortiz’s notes from April 4, 2017 state, in their entirety:

As a consultant, I contacted Angie at home and spoke to him in regards

to his health and services. As a consultant, I also spoke to his father,

76a

Appendix H

he stated that all services and support are in place with the approved

cost plan. As a consultant, I informed them about the Family Health

Forum on April 22, 2017 in Miami Gardens, if they needed any more

information I will fax it over. As a consultant, I asked Angie what he

likes to do for community involvement and he says he likes to watch

movies, eat, and spend time with family and friends. As a consultant, I

asked them to call whenever they had any questions or concerns.

(Id. (emphasis added).) Ortiz’s handwritten initials appear next to this note.

Ortiz’s notes from April 18, 2017 state, in their entirety:

As a consultant, I contacted Angie at his home and spoke to Angie’s

father in regard to Angie, to see how he was doing and if there was

anything he needed. He tells me Angie is doing great and he is happy

and stable. As a consultant, I asked about his health and goals. He

continues to tell me how much Angie improves with his goals and will

like to continue working on those same goals. As a consultant, I

discussed the Support Plan and monthly budget/ statements to ensure

proper management. Angie’s father tells me that Angie continues to be

active by going to the beach, library, and family reunions. I will

continue to monitor and review Angie’s health and services for the

month of May.

(Id. (emphasis added).) Ortiz’s handwritten initials appear next to this note.

77a

Appendix H

At trial, Ortiz testified that her notes do not reflect any discussions

with Plaintiffs about handicapped parking. (Trial Tr. 6/5/2023 at 30:14-

17.)

The Court accords great weight to Ortiz’s notes because they were

made at the time of the conversations and initialed by Ortiz. The fact

that the notes do not reflect any issues with parking at VOH is highly

significant. It establishes that there were no issues with the disabled

parking that hampered Angie’s ability to participate in activities in the

community and travel to and from VOH.

Thus, Ortiz’s notes support an inference that Carlos did not request an assigned

handicapped parking space during the relevant period, because there was no need

to do so.

b. Count Three: Request for modification Angie’s bathroom

16.

The first and only time Plaintiffs requested permission to modify Angie’s

bathroom was August 26, 2018, and that request was granted the next day.

17.

In 2012, Carlos asked Amanda Ortiz whether Angie’s bathroom should be

remodeled due to his disabilities. (Trial Tr. 6/5/2023 at 28:8 - 29:13.) Ortiz told

Carlos that APD would not approve a request for funds to remodel Angie’s bathroom

because Plaintiffs did not own the apartment. (Id. at 28:4 - 29:13.)

78a

Appendix H

18.

Carlos testified that he orally requested permission to modify Angie’s

bathroom on six occasions during his tenancy at VOH: first, on February 3, 2013,

from Hernandez, (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (rough) at 130:3-14); second, on August 4, 2016,

from CFH Group CEO Tom Cabrerizo, (id. at 133:23 - 134:21; Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 at

3:25 - 4:11); third, on September 9, 2016, from Hernandez and Marleyn Garcia,

(Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 at 4:17 - 5:8; Trial Tr. 6/22/2023 at 3:12-23); fourth, in October

2016 from Hernandez, (Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 at 6:8-9); fifth, in early March 2017 from

Hernandez, (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (rough) at 138:4-6); and sixth, on March 29, 2017,

from Hernandez, (Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos) at 10:16-19).

Although Carlos also testified that he told a HUD investigator that he

asked for permission to modify Angie’s bathroom “from August 4, 2016

up until April 7, 2017[,]” (Trial Tr. 6/22/2023 at 40:12), there is no

other testimony that he requested a bathroom modification on April 7,

2017, and he appeared to testify on cross-examination that he only

requested an assigned handicapped parking space on April 7, 2017.10

(Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 at 7:24 - 8:8.)

19.

Only early March 2017 and March 29, 2017 fall within the period alleged in

the Second Amended Complaint—i.e., March 2017 to August 2018. (D.E. 92

39.)

Furthermore, in Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, they list April

7, 2017 as a date on which they requested an assigned handicapped parking space, but do not list it

as a date on which they requested permission to modify Angie’s bathroom. (D.E. 676 at 10-11.)

79a

Appendix H

20.

The Court finds that Carlos’s testimony on this issue was not credible or

reliable, based on observations of him as he testified at trial, his embellishment of

the underlying facts, and his inconsistent testimony.

Furthermore, there were no other eyewitnesses to his alleged requests

in March 2017, (see Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos) at 8:20-22; Trial Tr.

6/6/2023 (Fe) at 16:3-9), and there were no contemporaneous notes,

emails, letters, or doctor’s notes corroborating Carlos’s testimony.

Additionally, his testimony conflicted with other credible witnesses,

including Marleyn Garcia who had no interest in the outcome of the

case. Carlos testified that he requested a bathroom modification during

a meeting with Marleyn Garcia and Vilma Hernandez on September 9,

2016. (Trial Tr. 6/6/2023 (Carlos) at 7:8-11; Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 at 4:17

— 5:8; Trial Tr. 6/22/2023 at 3:12-23.) Ms. Garcia testified that she

never met with Carlos in September of 2016. (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023

(Garcia) at 6:3-14.) Ms. Garcia testified that she met with Carlos and

Fe in August of 2016, but neither Carlos nor Fe requested a bathroom

modification at that meeting. (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (rough) at 38:2-4;

39:24 — 40:2.) Rather, they only discussed the “good conduct”

addendum to their lease because neither Carlos nor Fe wanted to sign

it. (Id. at 37:11 - 38:17.) Based on the consistency of Ms. Garcia’s

testimony with other credible and reliable evidence, the fact that she

80a

Appendix H

no longer works for CFH Group and therefore has no interest in the

outcome of this case, and the Court’s observation of the witness during

her testimony at trial, the Court finds Ms. Garcia to be credible and

reliable.

Similarly, Carlos testified that on August 4, 2016, the entire family

met with CFH Group CEO Tom Cabrerizo, and during the meeting

Carlos requested an assigned handicapped parking space and

permission to modify Angie’s bathroom. (Trial Tr. 6/20/2023 (Carlos) at

3:25 - 4:11.) Mr. Cabrerizo testified that he met with the Plaintiffs

after they appeared at his office unannounced wanting to discuss the

nonrenewal of their lease. (Trial Tr. 6/9/2023 (Cabrerizo) at 7:1 - 8:18.)

Mr. Cabrerizo testified that he had no recollection of Carlos discussing

a handicapped parking space or a bathroom modification,

[a]nd ... if he would have, at the time, it certainly would have

been something that I would have discussed with my VP at the

time, when I went over this meeting with her regarding the

nonrenewal, as at the time, I was on the board of the Woody

Foundation, which dealt with disability, and I was on that board

for four years, and I spent a lot of time on that board.

(Id. at 9:7-13.) Mr. Cabrerizo explained that the Woody Foundation

“dealt with disability, primarily spinal cord injuries,” and that he “was

instrumental in bringing in the Woody Pack, which essentially was

assistive devices to help these kids with these spinal cord injuries to be

81a

Appendix H

able to take care of themselves; feed themselves, you know, be able to

wash, to wash their teeth, comb their hair in some cases, just all, all

devices.” (Id. at 10:1-6.) When asked: “[I]f [Carlos] had made a

comment about needing an accommodation, would that have drawn

your attention?” Mr. Cabrerizo responded: “100 percent. This is

something that I would have brought up in my conversation with

Gliset Perez, as this is something that was dear to me at the time -

and still is.” (Id. at 10:9-11.)

Based on the consistency of Mr. Cabrerizo’s testimony with other

credible and reliable evidence, and the Court’s observation of the

witness during his testimony at trial, the Court finds Mr. Cabrerizo to

be credible and reliable.

21.

On February 27, 2017, Dr. Reynold Duarte Martinez wrote Angie a

prescription for a shower chair, (Pl. Ex. 9), and on February 28, 2017, Dr. Martinez

wrote a Medical Necessity Letter in support of a customized shower chair, (Pl. Ex.

10).

Carlos presented the documentation supporting a shower chair to his

insurance carrier, but the insurance carrier did not cover the type of

shower chair Angie needed. (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023 (rough) at 119:11-17.)

82a

Appendix H

Carlos did not request from APD funds to purchase a shower chair, but

instead requested from APD funds to modify Angie’s bathroom in 2018.

(Id. at 119:21-120:2.)

22.

As a Consultant and Waiver Support Coordinator, Amanda Ortiz is required

to keep accurate notes of all contacts she has with Angie and Carlos. (Trial Tr.

6/5/2023 at 5:21-24.)

Ortiz has been keeping contemporaneous notes of all contacts she has

with Angie and Carlos since her initial visit with Angie on August 6,

2012. (See id. at 11:25-12:2.)

Ortiz initials all of her notes. (See id. at 11:22 - 12:2; id. at 25:19-21.)

Ortiz testified that if she has a health or safety concern, she is required

to record it in her notes. (Id. at 10:20-25.)

None of Ortiz’s notes from March 2017 reflect that Carlos discussed a

bathroom modification with Ortiz.

Ortiz’s notes from March 2, 2017 state, in their entirety:

As a consultant, I contacted Angie at home and spoke to him in regards

to his health and services. As a consultant, I also spoke to his father

and manager and told me all services and support is all in place with

the approved cost plan. As a consultant, I informed them about a pen

house and Summer Camp hosted by Great Heights Academy, if they

needed any more information I will fax it over. As a consultant, I asked

Angie what he likes to do for community involvement and he says he

likes to watch movies, eat, and spend time with family and friends. As

a consultant, I asked them to call whenever they had any questions or

concerns.

83a

Appendix H

(Def. Ex. 2F (emphasis added).) Ortiz’s handwritten initials appear next to

this note.

Ortiz’s notes from March 20, 2017 state, in their entirety:

As a consultant I contacted Angie at his home and spoke to Angie’s

father in regard to Angie to see how he was doing and if there was

anything that he needed. He tells me Angie is doing great and he is

happy and stable. As a consultant, I asked about his health and goals.

He continues to tell me how much Angie improves with his goals and

will like to continue working on those same goals. As a consultant, I

discussed the Support Plan and monthly budget/ statements to ensure

proper management. There have been no changes in medication.

Angie’s father informs me about his concerns of the letter he received

from APD about the EZ budget and AIM, as a consultant, I informed

him that this was nothing to worry about for the moment, it was just

standard procedure and that if anything changed WSC will inform him

of the changes. Angie’s father tells me that Angie continues to be active

by going to the beach, library, and family reunions. I will continue to

monitor and review Angie’s health and services for the month of April.

(Id. (emphasis added).) Ortiz’s handwritten initials appear next to this note.

At trial, Ortiz reviewed her notes from 2016 and 2017 and testified

that they contain no references to a “bathtub modification.” (Trial Tr.

6/5/2023 at 24:2-8.)

The Court accords great weight to Ortiz’s notes because they were

made at the time of the conversations and initialed by Ortiz. The fact

that the notes do not reflect any discussions regarding a bathroom

modification in March 2017 is highly significant and supports the

conclusion that Carlos did not request a bathroom modification in early

March 2017 or on March 29, 2017.

84a

Appendix H

23.

Ortiz testified that she told Carlos in 2012 that APD would not approve a

request for funds to modify Angie’s bathroom because Plaintiffs did not own the

apartment. (Trial Tr. 6/5/2023 at 28:8 - 29:15.) She later learned that she was

incorrect. (Id. at 28:18 - 29:15.)

“[A]t the end” of 2017, she and Carlos began planning to request funds

from APD for an environmental assessment evaluation,11 (Trial Tr.

6/5/2023 at 58:2 - 59:14), which is the first step in receiving approval

for funds to make a bathroom modification, (Trial Tr. 6/9/2023

(Ferguson) at 9:21 - 10:2).

On August 4, 2018, Ortiz prepared the paperwork requesting funds

from APD for an environmental assessment evaluation. (Trial Tr.

6/5/2023 at 66:5; Def. Ex. 2C)

24.

On August 26, 2018, Carlos submitted a written request to VOH for

permission to modify Angie’s bathroom. (See Trial Tr. 6/23/2023 at 73:1-13; Pl. Ex.

117.)12 Carlos testified that this was the only written request that he made, and

that the request was approved the next day. (Id. at 62:6-8; see also id. at 72:17-19.)

An environmental assessment involves hiring a contractor to visit the site of the

proposed modification, to “draw up a plan, show pictures, and basically tell [APD] the cost of that

modification.” (Trial Tr. 6/9/2023 (Ferguson) at 11:9-11.)

The August 26, 2018, written request was admitted into evidence as Plaintiffs’

Exhibit 117 on June 23, 2023. (Trial Tr. 6/23/2023 at 73:10-13.) However, on June 26, 2023,

Plaintiffs counsel represented at trial that it had been introduced as Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 118, (Trial

Tr. 6/26/2023 at 24:7-10), and when the Parties submitted their evidence to the Court at the close of

Phase 1 of the trial, the August 26, 2018 written request was marked “P-118.”

85a

Appendix H

On August 27, 2018, Defendants’ corporate attorney, Kenneth J.

Lowenhaupt, Esq., sent Carlos a letter approving the written request

for permission to modify Angie’s bathroom. (Pl. Ex. 3E; see also Trial

Tr. 6/23/2023 at 62:6-8, see also id. at 72:17-19.)

On August 31, 2018, Vilma Hernandez emailed Carlos to confirm that

his written request was granted. (Pl. Ex. 3G.)

25.

Hernandez testified that the first and only time Carlos requested a bathroom

modification was August 26, 2018, “and he received the authorization immediately.”

(Trial Tr. at 6/23/2023 at 105:15-17; see also Trial Tr. 6/26/2023 at 12:8-11; see also

id. at 17:23.)

26.

The Court finds Vilma to be credible and reliable based on her memory of the

relevant encounters with Carlos, the consistency of her testimony with other

credible and reliable evidence, and the Court’s observation of the witness during her

testimony at trial.

27.

On August 23, 2018, Doctor Annette Fornos wrote a letter in support of “a

home bathtub that is suited for someone with [Angie’s] medical condition.”

(Def. Ex. K.) Dr. Fornos testified that this “was the first time that anyone has asked

[her] to write a letter in support of a bathroom modificationf.]” (Trial Tr. 6/7/2023

(Fornos-cross) at 15:3-7.) Based on the Court’s observation of the witness during her

testimony at trial, the Court finds Dr. Fornos to be credible and reliable.

86a

Appendix H

28.

Marleyn Garcia testified that the first time Carlos requested a bathtub

modification was in August 2018, and the request was granted. (Trial Tr. (rough)

6/7/2023 at 40:13-22.) As previously stated, the Court finds Ms. Garcia to be credible

and reliable.

29.

Paul Gallner testified that in the fall of 2018 he learned that Carlos

requested permission to modify the bathroom. (Trial Tr. (Gallner) 6/7/2023 at 5:6-9.)

To his knowledge, this was Carlos’s first such request. (Id. at 5:18-25.) Gallner

discussed the request with Hernandez and told her that any modification would

require a licensed contractor and that the bathroom would have to be returned to its

original condition when Plaintiffs moved. (Id. at 6:6-13.) Based on the consistency of

Mr.Gallner’s testimony with other credible and reliable evidence, and the Court’s

observation of the witness during his testimony at trial, the Court finds Mr. Gallner

to be credible and reliable.

87a

Appendix H

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any

person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a

dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with

such dwelling, because of a handicap of (A) that person; or (B) a person

residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold,

rented, or made available; or (C) any person associated with that

person.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2).

2. “Discrimination” includes both:

“a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person,

reasonable modifications of existing premises occupied or to be

occupied by such person if such modifications may be necessary to

afford such person full enjoyment of the premises . . . [,]” 42 U.S.C. §

3604(f)(3)(A); and

“a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies,

practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to

afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwellingf,]” 42

U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).

88a

Appendix H

“A successful failure-to-accommodate claim has four elements. To

prevail, one must prove that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of

the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) the

requested accommodation was necessary to afford him an opportunity

to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make

the accommodation.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n Inc.,

765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Schwarz v. City of

Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201, 1218-19 (11th Cir. 2008)).

“A reasonable-modification plaintiff must prove ‘[1] that she suffers

from a disability, [2] that she requested an accommodation or

modification, [3] that the defendant housing provider refused to make

the accommodation or to permit the modification [the denial element],

and [4] that the defendant knew or should have known of the disability

at the time of the refusal.’” Johnson v. Jennings, 772 F. App’x 822, 825

(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass’n,

760 F.3d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 2014)). “The claim also requires proof of

‘both [5] the reasonableness and [6] necessity of

the requested

modification.’” Id. (quoting Hollis, 760 F.3d at 541). “The failure to

make a timely determination after meaningful review amounts to

89a

Appendix H

constructive denial of a requested accommodation [or modification], ‘as

an indeterminate delay has the same effect as an outright denial.’”

Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1286.

The FHA has a two-year statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. §

3613(a)(1)(A). Specifically, an “aggrieved person” who has been

“injured by a discriminatory housing practice” is entitled to file a civil

action “not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the termination of

an alleged discriminatory housing practice, . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§

3602(i)(l), 3613(a)(1)(A). The FHA’s “statute of limitations begins to

run when ‘facts supportive of the cause of action are or should be

apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated.’” Wood v.

Briarwinds Condo. Ass’n Bd. of Dirs., 369 F. App’x 1, 4 (11th Cir. 2010)

(quoting Hipp u. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir.

2001)). For example, the FHA’s statute of limitations begins to run

when a request for a reasonable accommodation, or for permission to

make a reasonable modification, is denied. See Oliver v. Fox Wood at

Trinity Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., Case No: 8:17-cv-585-T-30AAS, 2018 WL

4608325, at *7-8 & n.5 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2018) (finding that the

FHA’s statute of limitations began to run when a reasonably prudent

90a

Appendix H

person would have become aware that a requested accommodation or

permission to modify was denied, and that an injury is not a

“continuing injury” simply because a request was denied) (citing

Telesca v. Vill. of Kings Creek Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 390 F. App’x 877, 882

(11th Cir. 2010)).

However, “[t]he computation of such 2-year period shall not include

any time during which an administrative proceeding under this

subchapter was pending with respect to a complaint or charge under

this subchapter based upon such discriminatory housing practice.”13 42

U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(B). The FHA’s statute of limitations is not tolled by

a request for administrative review of a no-cause determination. See

Allen v. Hous. Auth. of City of Auburn, Ala., 638 F. App’x 825, 831

(11th Cir. 2015) (observing that “nothing in the statutory scheme of the

FHA expressly contemplates such review” and that “the FHA’s

implementing regulations do not provide for administrative review of

determinations of no reasonable cause”).

On September 27, 2017, Plaintiffs’ filed a Housing Discrimination Complaint with

the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (See Def. Ex. 3W.) HUD conducted an

investigation and issued a final decision ninety days later on December 26, 2017. (See Second Am.

Compl. H 94.) Although HUD’s “no cause” letter was not introduced into evidence at trial, counsel for

both Parties agreed that the HUD investigation lasted 90 days, and therefore that the limitations

period would be statutorily tolled for 90 days. (Trial Tr. 6/22/2023 at 47:14-24.)

91a

Appendix H

In a civil trial, the plaintiff must prove every element of his case by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334,

1347 (11th Cir. 2003); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300,

1320 (11th Cir. 1999). “The burden of showing something by a

‘preponderance of the evidence,’. . . ‘simply requires the trier of fact ‘to

believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its

nonexistence before [he] may find in favor of the party who has the

burden to persuade the [judge] of the fact’s existence.”” Concrete Pipe

and Prods, of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508

U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72

(1970)).

As to Count One, the Court finds that Carlos requested an assigned

handicapped parking space only once, and that request was made and

denied in late 2012 or early 2013. Plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on

May 6, 2019, more than six years after Carlos’s request for an assigned

handicapped parking space was denied.14

The Court need not decide whether the initial Complaint filed in this action relates

back to the complaints filed in Cano I or Cano II, (see supra Note 3), because even assuming

arguendo that the relation back doctrine of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) does apply, Carlos

filed his complaint in Cano I approximately five years after his request for an assigned handicapped

parking space was denied in 2012 or early 2013.

92a

Appendix H

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as to Count One because:

Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

they requested an assigned handicapped parking space between

March 2017 to June 2017, as alleged in the Second Amended

Complaint;

Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

they otherwise requested an assigned handicapped parking

space within the limitations period;

Plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

Defendants denied any such request; and

Any claim predicated on Plaintiffs’ late 2012 or early 2013

request for an assigned handicapped parking space is barred by

the FHA’s statute of limitations.

As to Count Three, the Court finds that the first and only time Carlos

requested permission to modify Angie’s bathroom was August 26, 2018,

and that request was granted the next day. Accordingly, Defendants

are entitled to judgment as to Count Three because Plaintiffs failed to

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendants denied a

request for permission to make a reasonable modification to the

premises.

93a

Appendix H

CONCLUSION

The Court has carefully considered all of the evidence, the Parties’

arguments, the testimony of all of the witnesses, applicable law, and the pertinent

portions of the record. Accordingly, based on the foregoing findings of fact and

conclusions of law, and consistent with the Court’s prior rulings:

Defendants 245 C & C, LLC and CFH Group, LLC are entitled to

judgment in their favor as to Counts One and Three of Plaintiffs’

Second Amended Complaint; and

Judgment shall be set out in a separate document, pursuant to Rule

52(a)(1) and 58(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 20th day of July,

2023.

Joan A. Lenard. United States District Judge

94a

Appendix I

FLSD, Case l:19-cv-21826-JAL, DE 679, 07/20/23

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 19-21826-CIV-LENARD/DAMIAN

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually

and as guardian for his son, ANGIE ALONSO

MOREJON, KATY ALONSO MOREJON,

JANY LEIDY ALONSO MOREJON, and

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ individually,

Plaintiffs,

245 C & C, LLC and CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants.

________________________________________________________ /

FINAL JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE is before the Court following a bench trial on Counts One and

Three of the Second Amended Complaint, and entry of the Court’s Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law as to those Counts.1 Pursuant to Rules 52(a)(1) and 58(a) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

FINAL JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Defendants 245 C

& C, LLC and CFH Group, LLC and against Plaintiffs Carlos A. Alonso Cano,

The Second Amended Complaint contained nineteen Counts. (D.E. 92.) The Court

previously dismissed Counts Two, Six, Seven, Eight, Seventeen, Eighteen, and Nineteen with

prejudice for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted, (D.E. 90); dismissed Count

Sixteen with prejudice as an impermissible shotgun pleading, (D.E. 438); granted Defendants’

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts Thirteen and Fifteen, (id.); and granted

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts Four, Five, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and

Fourteen, (D.E. 555).

95a

Appendix I

Angie Alonso Morejon, Katy Alonso Morejon, Jany Leidy Alonso Morejon,

and Fe Morejon Fernandez on all Counts contained in the Second Amended

Complaint; and

This case is now CLOSED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 20th day of July,

2023.

JOAN A. LENARD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, et al.

Petitioners

245 C&C, LLC, &

CFH GROUP, LLC,

Respondents

On petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the 11th Circuit, Atlanta, Georgia

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

Carlos A. Alonso Cano,

Fe Morejon Fernandez,

Jany L. Alonso Morejon,

Pro Se Petitioners

6700 NW 186th Street. Apt. 121

Hialeah, FL. 33015

Phone: (214)-962-7965

Email: carloscaco3@yahoo.com

TABLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES

Pages

APPENDIX J:

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED.................................... la

APPENDIX K

District Court’s Amended Order (DE 555,

08/17/22), Granting in Part and Denying in Part

Defendants’ “Motion for Summary Judgment”..... 12a

Appendix J

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by the following methods:

(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or

criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree.

2. The 7th Amendment. The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

guarantees the right to a jury trial in federal civil cases and protects juries' factual

findings from being overturned by judges. Ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of

Rights, it ensures citizens can resolve disputes between private parties before a jury

of their peers. The amendment reads:

"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty

dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall

be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the

rules of the common law."

3. Rule 38. Right to a Jury Trial; Demand

(a) Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh

Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved

to the parties inviolate.

(b) Demand. On any issue triable of right by a jury, a party may demand a jury trial

by:

Appendix J

(1) serving the other parties with a written demand—which may be included in a

pleading—no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the issue is

served; and

(2) filing the demand in accordance with Rule 5(d).

have tried by a jury; otherwise, it is considered to have demanded a jury trial on all

the issues so triable. If the party has demanded a jury trial on only some issues, any

other party may—within 14 days after being served with the demand or within a

shorter time ordered by the court—serve a demand for a jury trial on any other or

all factual issues triable by jury.

(d) Waiver; Withdrawal. A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly

served and filed. A proper demand may be withdrawn only if the parties consent.

4. Rule 39. Trial by Jury or by the Court

(a) When a Demand Is Made. When a jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38,

the action must be designated on the docket as a jury action. The trial on all issues

so demanded must be by jury unless:

(1) the parties or their attorneys file a stipulation to a noniury trial or so

stipulate on the record.

5. 42 U.S. C. § 3604(f)(1)- Discrimination in the sale or rental of housing and other

prohibited practices. It shall be unlawful—(1) To discriminate in the sale or rental,

or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because

Appendix J

of a handicap of—

(A) that buyer or renter, [1]

(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so sold,

rented, or made available; or

6. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)- For purposes of this subsection, discrimination includes—

(A) a refusal to permit, at the expense of the handicapped person, reasonable

modifications of existing premises occupied or to be occupied by such person if such

modifications may be necessary to afford such person full enjoyment of the premises

except that, in the case of a rental, the landlord may where it is reasonable to do so

condition permission for a modification on the renter agreeing to restore the interior

of the premises to the condition that existed before the modification, reasonable

wear and tear excepted. [2]

(B) a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or

services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal

opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling

7. 42 U.S.C. § 3613. Enforcement by private persons

(a) Civil action

(1) (A) An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate

United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the

occurrence or the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice,

Appendix J

or the breach of a conciliation agreement entered into under this subchapter,

whichever occurs last, to obtain appropriate relief with respect to such

discriminatory housing practice or breach.

(1) (B) The computation of such 2-year period shall not include any time

during which an administrative proceeding under this subchapter was

pending with respect to a complaint or charge under this subchapter based

upon such discriminatory housing practice. This subparagraph does not apply

to actions arising from a breach of a conciliation agreement.

8. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (a)(2). An aggrieved person may commence a civil action under

this subsection whether or not a complaint has been filed under section 3610(a) of

this title and without regard to the status of any such complaint.

9. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (b)(1). Upon application by a person alleging a discriminatory

housing practice or a person against whom such a practice is alleged, the court may

appoint an attorney for such person (EA).

10. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (c)(1). In a civil action under subsection (a), if the court finds

that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur, the court

may award to the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, and subject to subsection

(d), may grant as relief, as the court deems appropriate, any permanent or

temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other

order (including an order enjoining the defendant from engaging in such practice or

ordering such affirmative action as may be appropriate).

Appendix J

11. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or

interfere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his

having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any

other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by

section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.

12. 24 C.F.R, § 100,400.

(a) This subpart provides the Department's interpretation of the conduct that is

unlawful under section 818 of the Fair Housing Act.

(b) It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person

in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of that person having exercised or

enjoyed, or on account of that person having aided or encouraged any other person

in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this part.

following:

(5) Retaliating against any person because that person has made a complaint,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a proceeding under the

Fair Housing Act.

(6) Retaliating against any person because that person reported a

discriminatory housing practice to a housing provider or other authority.

Appendix J

13. Fla. Stat. 83.56(2)(b). If the tenant materially fails to comply with s. 83.52 or

material provisions of the rental agreement, other than a failure to pay rent, or

reasonable rules or regulations, if such noncompliance is of a nature that the

tenant should be given an opportunity to cure it, deliver a written notice to

the tenant specifying the noncompliance, including a notice that, if the

noncompliance is not corrected within 7 days from the date that the written

notice is delivered, the landlord shall terminate the rental agreement by reason

thereof.

14. Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosures or to Cooperate in Discovery;

Sanctions

(a) Motion for an Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery.

(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.

(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is Provided After Filing). If

the motion is granted—or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after

the motion was filed—the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard,

require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or

attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses

incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not

order this payment if:

(ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially

justified: or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

Appendix J

15. Rule 72. Magistrate Judges: Pretrial Order

(a) Nondispositive Matters. When a pretrial matter not dispositive of a party's claim

or defense is referred to a magistrate judge to hear and decide, the magistrate judge

must promptly conduct the required proceedings and, when appropriate, issue a

written order stating the decision. A party may serve and file objections to the order

within 14 days after being served with a copy. A party may not assign as error a

defect in the order not timely objected to. The district judge in the case must

consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is

clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.

(b) Dispositive Motions and Prisoner Petitions.

(1) Findings and Recommendations. A magistrate judge must promptly conduct the

required proceedings when assigned, without the parties’ consent, to hear a pretrial

matter dispositive of a claim oi' defense or a prisoner petition challenging the

conditions of confinement. A record must be made of all evidentiary proceedings and

may, at the magistrate judge's discretion, be made of any other proceedings. The

magistrate judge must enter a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate,

proposed findings of fact. The clerk must immediately serve a copy on each party as

provided in Rule 5(b).

(2) Objections. Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended

disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. A party may respond to another party's objections

Appendix J

within 14 days after being served with a copy. Unless the district judge orders

otherwise, the objecting party must promptly arrange for transcribing the record, or

whatever portions of it the parties agree to or the magistrate judge considers

sufficient.

(3) Resolving Objections. The district judge must determine de novo any part of the

magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge

may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence;

or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

16. 24 CFR $ 103.310, Conciliation agreement.

(a) The terms of a settlement of a complaint will be reduced to a written conciliation

agreement. The conciliation agreement shall seek to protect the interests of the

aggrieved person, other persons similarly situated, and the public interest.

The types of relief that may be sought for the aggrieved person are described in §

103.315. The provisions that may be sought for the vindication of the public interest

are described in § 103.320.

(b)

(1) The agreement must be executed by the respondent and the complainant. The

agreement is subject to the approval of the Assistant Secretary, who will indicate

approval by signing the agreement. The Assistant Secretary will approve an

agreement and, if the Assistant Secretary is the complainant, will execute the

agreement, only if:

Appendix J

(i) The complainant and the respondent agree to the relief accorded the aggrieved

person;

(ii) The provisions of the agreement will adequately vindicate the public interest;

and

(iii) If the Assistant Secretary is the complainant, all aggrieved persons named in

the complaint are satisfied with the relief provided to protect their interests.

17. 24 CFR § 103.315- Relief sought for aggrieved persons.

(a) The following types of relief may be sought for aggrieved persons in conciliation:

(1) Monetary relief in the form of damages, including damages caused by

humiliation or embarrassment, and attorney fees;

(2) Other equitable relief including, but not limited to, access to the dwelling at

issue, or to a comparable dwelling, the provision of services or facilities in

connection with a dwelling, or other specific relief; or

(3) Injunctive relief appropriate to the elimination of discriminatory housing

practices affecting the aggrieved person or other persons.

18. 24 CFR § 103.320- Provisions sought for the public interest.

The following are types of provisions may be sought for the vindication of the public

interest:

(a) Elimination of discriminatory housing practices.

10a

Appendix J

(b) Prevention of future discriminatory housing practices.

(d) Reporting requirements.

(e) Monitoring and enforcement activities.

19. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United

States magistrate judge or a part-time United States magistrate judge who serves

as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or

nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially

designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves.

20. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2). If a magistrate judge is designated to exercise civil

jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the clerk of court shall, at the

time the action is filed, notify the parties of the availability of a magistrate judge

to exercise such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be

communicated to the clerk of court. Thereafter, either the district court judge

or the magistrate judge may again advise the parties of the availability of the

magistrate judge, but in so doing, shall also advise the parties that they are

free to withhold consent without adverse substantive consequences. Rules

of court for the reference of civil matters to magistrate judges shall include

procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent.

11a

Appendix J

21. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4). The court may, for good cause shown on its own motion,

or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party, vacate a reference of

a civil matter to a magistrate judge under this subsection.

TABLE OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDICES

APPENDIX K

Pages (12a-136a)

12a

FLSD, Case l:19-cv-21826-JAL, DE 555, 8/17/22

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CARLOS A. ALONSO CANO, individually

and as guardian for his son, ANGIE ALONSO

MORE JON, and as next friend of his minor

daughters, KATY ALONSO MOREJON and

JANY LEIDY ALONSO MOREJON, and

FE MOREJON FERNANDEZ individually,

Plaintiffs,

245 C & C, LLC and CFH GROUP, LLC,

Defendants.

___________________________________________ I

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (D.E. 364)

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants 245 C & C, LLC and CFH

Group, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (“Motion,” D.E. 364), filed November

16, 2020. Plaintiffs filed a Response on August 3, 2021, (“Response,” D.E. 491), to

which Defendants filed a Reply on September 3, 2021, (“Reply,” D.E. 514). Upon

review of the Motion, Response, Reply, and the record, the Court finds as follows.

Background

Plaintiff Angie Alonso Morejon (“Angie”) is a permanently disabled individual

who suffers from, among other things, mental retardation, severe cerebral palsy,

and spasticity. (Second Am. Compl. (D.E. 92)

4.) Plaintiff Carlos A. Alonso Cano

13a

(“Alonso”) is Angie’s father and Plenary Guardian; Plaintiff Fe Morejon Fernandez

(“Morejon”) is Angie’s mother; and Plaintiffs Katy Alonso Morejon and Jany Leidy

Alonso Morejon are Angie’s sisters. (Id.

14-17.)

During the relevant period, Plaintiffs resided in a rental apartment in the

Villas of Hialeah apartment complex (“VOH”) located in Hialeah, Florida. (Id.

2.)

Defendant 245 C & C, LLC and/or Defendant CFH Group, LLC owns VOH, (id.

22), while Defendant CFH Group, LLC operates VOH, (id.

(“Vilma”) is the Property Manager at VOH.1 (Id.

II.

25). Vilma Hernandez

27.)

Brief procedural history

On May 6, 2019, Alonso, through counsel,2 initiated this federal lawsuit

alleging that Defendants violated (1) various provisions of the Fair Housing Act

(“FHA”), (2) the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment under Florida state law, and

(3) Section 83.67(1), Florida Statutes, by unlawfully turning off the water to

Plaintiffs’ home without warning. (D.E. I.)3 On July 19, 2019, the Court entered an

On February 1, 2018, Defendants instituted eviction proceedings against Plaintiffs.

The eviction case was tried in the Miami-Dade County Court on November 15, 16, and 19, 2018. The

trial judge retired before issuing a ruling. A successor judge was appointed and issued a final

judgment on June 20, 2019, finding in favor of Alonso and Morejon. 245 C & C, LLC appealed the

adverse final judgment, and on September 3, 2020, the Appellate Division of the Miami-Dade Circuit

Court reversed the final judgment and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment for

245 C & C, LLC and to calculate an award of attorney’s fees for 245 C & C, LLC.

Plaintiffs’ counsel was permitted to withdraw on December 27, 2019. (D.E. 126.)

This is Plaintiffs’ third attempt at suing Defendants in federal court. On February

12, 2018, Alonso, proceeding pro se. sued Defendants in this District alleging violations of his civil

rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”). See Cano v.

245 C&C, LLC, et al.. Case No. 18-20537-Civ-Ungaro (“Cano I”). D.E. 1. Judge Ungaro dismissed the

pro se Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and provided Plaintiff leave to

amend. Cano I. D.E. 6. Alonso filed an Amended Complaint, id., D.E. 9 & 10, which Judge Ungaro

dismissed as “unintelligible,” id., D.E. 38. Thereafter, Alonso, through newly-acquired counsel, filed a

Second Amended Complaint. Id., D.E. 42. Alonso’s counsel subsequently withdrew, id., D.E. 50, and

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Order Granting in Part Defendants’ Corrected Combined Motion to Dismiss

Complaint and/or for More Definite Statement. (D.E. 43.) The Court found that the

Complaint constituted a “shotgun pleading” that violated federal pleading

standards because four of the five Counts alleged multiple claims;4 as such, the

Court required Alonso to file an Amended Complaint. (Id. at 9-12.) Although the

Court provided Alonso leave to file an Amended Complaint, it warned “that it may

be the final amendment the Court permits him to make[,]” (id. (citing Brown v.

Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 342 F. App’x 552, 554 (11th Cir. 2009))), and

Alonso moved pro se to amend his complaint a third time, id., D.E. 62. Judge Ungaro granted the

motion to amend but stated that she would not grant any further opportunities to amend. Id., D.E.

67. Alonso filed a Third Amended Complaint, id., D.E. 73, which Defendants moved to dismiss, id.,

D.E. 81. On January 28, 2019, Judge Ungaro granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the Third

Amended Complaint was a “shotgun pleading” and, nevertheless, failed to state a claim. Id., D.E. 84.

Because Alonso had been given numerous opportunities to file a complaint that stated a claim upon

which relief could be granted and otherwise complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but

had failed to do so, Judge Ungaro dismissed the case without prejudice. Id.

On March 19, 2019, Alonso, proceeding pro se, filed a second federal lawsuit against Defendants. See

Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC, et al., 19-21045-Civ-Altonaga (“Cano II”). Judge Altonaga sua sponte

dismissed the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted and because it was an improper “shotgun pleading.” Id., D.E. 5. Judge Altonaga denied leave

to amend because: “(1) this is Plaintiffs fourth pleading directed to these two Defendants; (2)

Plaintiff has already been instructed on federal pleading standards and is aware shotgun pleadings

are subject to dismissal; and (3) Plaintiff was previously warned additional pleadings would not be

allowedf.]” Id. at 5. Alonso moved to reopen the case and amend the complaint, id., D.E. 11, but

Judge Altonaga denied the motion, id., D.E. 12.

The Court found that Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied covenant of quiet

enjoyment did not constitute a “shotgun pleading” because, although it alleged various ways in

which Defendants breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, “it appears that under Florida

law a landowner can breach the covenant of quiet enjoyment through a course of conduct.” (D.E. 43

at 10-11 (citing Misha Enters, v. GAR Enters, LLC, 117 So. 3d 850, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

(finding genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment in favor of landowner on claim

for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment where complaint alleged, inter alia, that defendant

harassed plaintiff and its customers for several months, towed vehicles belonging to plaintiffs

customers, and “needlessly caus[ed] numerous agencies to inspect [plaintiffs] operation and

property”); Carner v. Shapiro, 106 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (affirming damages award

for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment where building-owner remodeled building over four-month

period).)

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instructed that “Plaintiff should endeavor to remedy all deficiencies, whether

discussed in this Order or not[,]” (id. at 15).

On August 9, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint which contained

nineteen causes of action. (D.E. 52.) Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the

Amended Complaint, (D.E. 61), which the Court granted in part, dismissing Counts

Two, Six, Seven, Eight, Seventeen, Eighteen, and Nineteen with prejudice for

failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted, (D.E. 90). Although the

Court had previously warned Plaintiffs that it may not permit any further

amendments, the Court provided Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to add

language to one paragraph. (Id. at 64.)

On December 2, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended

Complaint asserting claims under the Fair Housing Act and Florida state law. (D.E.

92.)

Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts

Thirteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen. (D.E. 368.)

The Court entered an Order granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as

to Counts Thirteen and Fifteen, and dismissing Count Sixteen with prejudice as an

impermissible shotgun pleading. (D.E. 438.) The following claims remain:

•

In Count One, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the FHA by failing

to provide a reasonable accommodation—specifically, a handicapped parking

spot with an access aisle on the driver’s side reserved exclusively for Angie,

(Second Am. Compl.

39, 128-43);

•

In Count Three. Alonso, Morejon, and Angie allege that Defendants violated

the FHA by refusing to permit a reasonable modification to the existing

premises—specifically, a modification to Angie’s bathroom, (id.

150-56);

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•

In Count Four. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the FHA by failing

to provide a reasonable accommodation—specifically, painting the bathtub in

the guest bathroom without using toxic substances, (id.

157-62);

• In Count Five. Alonso, Morejon, and Angie allege that Defendants violated

the FHA by

• failing to provide a reasonable accommodation—specifically, removing the

operation of noisy equipment near Plaintiffs’ apartment, (id.

163-68);

• In Count Nine, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in coercion,

intimidation, and retaliation in violation of the FHA where, “[a]fter many

events that [are] detailed in other portions of the [Second] Amended

Complaint,” Defendants threatened a $150.00 fine if tape was not removed

from Plaintiffs’ windows, issued a “SEVEN DAY NOTICE TO CURE,” issued

a Notice of Termination of Plaintiffs’ month-to-month tenancy, and finally

issued an eviction notice (id.

187-207);

•

In Count Ten, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in coercion,

intimidation, and retaliation in violation of the FHA where, in retaliation for

requesting reasonable accommodations and modifications, the company that

controlled VOH’s parking areas “used intimidation tactics against Plaintiffs,

causing fear, loss of sleep and affecting Angie and his family [,]” (id.

20816);

•

In Count Eleven, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in coercion,

intimidation, and retaliation in violation of the FHA by instituting eviction

proceedings in retaliation for filing a complaint with HUD, (id.

217-27);

•

In Count Twelve, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in coercion,

intimidation, and retaliation in violation of the FHA by appealing the state

court’s judgment of retaliatory eviction, (id.

228-38);

•

In Count Fourteen, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached the implied

covenant of quiet enjoyment and various provisions of Chapter 83, Florida

Statutes, (id. ^[^ 249-57).

(See Second Am. Compl., D.E. 92.)

On December 16, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer and Affirmative

Defenses. (D.E. 101.) Defendants’ Sixth Affirmative Defense asserts that “Plaintiffs

17a

have waived their rights to legal and equitable relief as a consequence of signing

the Month-to-Month Lease which contained a Good Conduct Addendum.” (Id.

279.) Defendants’ Ninth Affirmative Defense asserts that any claim under the FHA

which arose more than two years before the filing of this lawsuit is barred by the

FHA’s statute of limitations. (Id.

282.).

On November 16, 2020, Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary

Judgment, (D.E. 364), and a Statement of Material Undisputed Facts in support

thereof, (D.E. 366). They also filed a Request for Judicial Notice.5 (D.E. 372.)

On January 11, 2021—after providing Plaintiffs two extensions of time to

respond, (D.E. 390, 411)—Plaintiffs filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, (D.E. 413), to which it attached 245 pages of

exhibits, (D.E. 413-1). Plaintiffs did not file a Response to Defendants’ Statement of

10.

11.

(D.E. 372.)

Defendants requested that the Court take judicial notice of the following:

Records of the Miami-Dade Property Appraiser’s Office related to Folio # 04-2034160-0010, Villa Hialeah Subdivision, 2500 W. 56th Street, Hialeah, FL.

Excerpt from the Florida Fire Prevention Code, Section 11.7.2.

Excerpts from Florida Agency for Persons with Disabilities, “CDC+ Program

Handbook.”

Excerpts from Florida Agency for Healthcare Administration, “Disabilities Individual

Budgeting Waiver Services and Limitations Handbook.”

Florida Statutes §§ 83.51(l)(a), 83.53(2)(a), 83.53(3), 83.55, 83.64, 83.67, 95.11(2)(b),

95.11(3)(f), 316.1955(1), 320.0848 and 553.504.

Miami-Dade County Ordinances 30-442, 30-443 and 30-447.

Excerpt from Chapter 5, OSHA Field Handbook.

Docket in Miami Dade County Court Case No. 18-000236 CC 21.

Final Judgment in Miami-Dade County Court Case No. 18-00236 CC 21.

Opinion and Mandate from Appellate Division, Miami-Dade Circuit Court Case No.

19-00208 AP 01.

Hurricane Irma striking South Florida on 9/10/17. National Weather Service,

Hurricane Irma Local Report/Summary (available at

https://www.weather.gov/mfl/hurricaneirma).

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Mat

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