Respondents Brief — Christina Casarez, Petitioner v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.
Supreme Court briefAug 26, 2026
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NO. 25-1421
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
CHRISTINA CASAREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC., ET AL.,
Respondents.
__________________________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeal of California, Fifth Appellate District
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC.
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER’S QUESTION NO. 2 AND
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S QUESTIONS NOS. 1 AND 3
Edward R. Hugo
Counsel of Record
Alex G. Taheri
Jullian Sekona
HUGO PARKER, LLP
90 New Montgomery Street #1010
San Francisco, CA 94105
August 26, 2026
SUPREME COURT PRESS
Counsel for Respondents
♦
(888) 958-5705
♦
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc. supports certiorari solely and narrowly as to Petitioner’s Question
No. 2:
Petitioner’s Question No. 2
Whether 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) may be invoked
by nonenumerated defendants such as shippers
and receivers to preempt state wrongful-death
and negligence claims arising from a fatal truck
crash, even though the statute expressly names
only motor carriers, motor private carriers,
brokers, and freight forwarders.
_______________________
However, Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc. opposes
certiorari, summary reversal, or GVR relief as to
Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3; and instead presents
these Counter-Questions.
Counter-Question to Petitioner’s Question No. 1
Whether the California Court of Appeal correctly
held that petitioner’s common-law negligence and
wrongful-death claims, which allege that an agricultural seller-shipper loaded produce onto a motor
carrier’s vehicle and permitted departure, are
expressly preempted under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)
as state laws “related to a price, route, or service”
with respect to the transportation of property.
Counter-Question to Petitioner’s Question No. 3
Whether Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC,
608 U.S. ___ (2026), which was strictly limited to
whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits
negligent-selection tort claims against upstream
ii
freight brokers, compels summary reversal or a
grant, vacate, and remand (GVR) order in a case
involving an agricultural grower-shipper who
played no role in selecting the motor carrier, tractor
trailer, or driver.
iii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Respondent IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC. is not publicly
traded, has no parent corporation and no public
company owns 10% or more of its stock.
Irigoyen Farms, Inc. is not a public company and
no public company owns 10% or more of its stock.
Respondent Walmart, Inc. who is not a party to
this brief, is publicly traded. (NYSE: WMT)
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vii
OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1
JURISDICTION.......................................................... 1
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................. 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 2
A. Undisputed Factual Background and
Supply Chain Structure ................................... 2
B. Procedural Posture and Lower Court
Rulings .............................................................. 5
1. Summary Judgment and Preserved
Evidentiary Objections ............................... 5
2. Court of Appeal Decision and
Subsequent Proceedings ............................. 6
REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI
LIMITED STRICTLY TO PETITONER’S
QUESTION NO. 2 AND DENYING
CERTIORARI OR SUMMARY DISPOSITION
AS TO QUESTIONS NOS. 1 AND 3 .......................... 8
I.
The Court Should Grant Certiorari
Limited Strictly to Petitioner’s Question
No. 2 to Resolve Whether Non-Enumerated
Shippers May Invoke FAAAA Preemption. .... 8
A. Petitioner’s Question No. 2 Presents an
Important, Pure Question of Statutory
Interpretation on a Clean Record. ............. 8
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
B. The FAAAA Expressly Preempts
Petitioner’s Common Law Negligence
Claims Against Agricultural Shippers....... 9
C. The FAAAA’s Preemption Clause Is Not
Textually Restricted to Enumerated
Entity Defendants. ................................... 11
II. Certiorari, Summary Reversal, or GVR
Relief Should Be Denied As To Petitioner’s
Questions Nos. 1 and 2 Because
Montgomery Does Not Control Express
Preemption or Shippers and Receivers. ........ 15
A. Montgomery Solved a Narrow Question
Limited to Upstream Freight Brokers. .... 15
B. The Court of Appeals Safety-Exception
Ruling Accords With This Court’s
Interpretive Framework ........................... 17
C. Petitioner’s Request for Summary
Reversal or GVR Relief Is
Unwarranted Because Montgomery
Addressed Different Parties, Different
Claims, and Different Statutory
Provisions. ................................................. 19
III. Alternatively, If The Court Declines Review
of Petitioner’s Question No. 2, Certiorari
Should Be Denied Entirely Because
Unresolved State Law Elements Make This
Case A Poor Vehicle For Review Regarding
Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3. ............... 20
CONCLUSION.......................................................... 23
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued
Page
RESPONDENT
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
Defendant Irigoyen Farms, Inc.’s Separate
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Relevant Excerpts (May 24, 2023) ..................... 1a
Defendant Irigoyen Farms, Inc.’s Objections to
Evidence in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Adjudication (August 4, 2023) .......... 6a
Brief of Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc.,
Relevant Excerpts (January 2, 2025) .............. 21a
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,
446 U.S. 608 (1980) ........................................... 14
Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.,
65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) ....................... 20
Bedoya v. Am. Eagle Express Inc.,
914 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2019) ......................... 12, 13
Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc.,
114 Cal. App. 5th 873, 337 Cal. Rptr. 3d
262 (2025) ........................................................ 1, 6
Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
569 U.S. 251 (2013) ................... 10, 13, 18, 20, 22
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air
Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) ...... 13
Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC,
146 S. Ct. 1199 (2026) ......... 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
504 U.S. 374 (1992) ..................................... 10, 11
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg,
572 U.S. 273 (2014) ....................................... 9, 12
Pavan v. Smith,
582 U.S. 563 (2017) ............................................ 20
Reid v. Google, Inc.,
50 Cal. 4th 512 (2010) ......................................... 6
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n,
552 U.S. 364 (2008) ..................................... 10, 12
Schweiker v. Hansen,
450 U.S. 785 (1981) ............................................ 20
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued
Page
TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19 (2001) ............................................. 14
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Superior Ct.,
105 Cal. App. 5th 838 (2024) .............................. 6
Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc.,
74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) ............................... 20
STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ..................................................... 1
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) ................. i, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11,
.................................................... 14, 15, 17, 19, 20
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) ........ 2, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19
49 U.S.C. § 15401(c)(1) ............................................... 9
49 U.S.C. §§ 13906(a)(1) ............................................ 16
49 U.S.C. §§ 13906(b)(2)(A)......................................... 16
JUDICIAL RULES
Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3) ............. 6
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(c) ..................................... 6
REGULATIONS
49 C.F.R. § 390.6 ........................................................ 21
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District
of California affirmed summary judgment on FAAAA
preemption, holding that nonenumerated shippers and
receivers could invoke 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) and that
the safety exception did not apply because petitioner’s
claims did not allege the tractor-trailer was defective
or unsafe. The appellate court’s disposition rested solely
on FAAAA preemption, expressly declining to reach
other issues, stating, “[i]n light of our disposition, we
need not address other arguments raised by the parties.”
Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 5th 873,
888, 337 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 273 (2025), reh’g denied
(Oct. 17, 2025), review denied (Jan. 14, 2026).
Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme
Court on November 10, 2025. The Supreme Court of
California denied review on January 14, 2026. Petitioner’s Appendix [“App.”] 21.
JURISDICTION
The case arises from a published California Fifth
Appellate District decision, with preserved federal
questions and summary-judgment posture. Both trial
and appellate courts relied on preemption. The Supreme
Court of California denied review on January 14,
2026. The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)
Express preemption of state provisions related to
a price, route, or service of motor carriers, brokers,
or freight forwarders, with respect to the transportation of property. The FAAAA expressly preempts state laws “related to” the price, route, or
service of motor carriers, brokers, and freight
forwarders. The statute requires that the state
law be “with respect to the transportation of
property.”
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)
Safety exception preserving state “safety regulatory
authority” “with respect to motor vehicles.” The
phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” must
impose a direct, meaningful limit to avoid surplusage and to prevent the exception from swallowing preemption.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Undisputed Factual Background and Supply
Chain Structure
This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision
that occurred on September 27, 2019, in Fresno County,
California, involving a tractor-trailer operated by
independent contractor Andre Hill. At the time of the
collision, Hill was transporting a commercial load of
3
fresh produce from Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc.
(“Irigoyen Farms”), an agricultural grower located in
Selma, California, to a Walmart Inc.’s distribution
facility in McCarran, Nevada.
The legal and operational logistics chain governing
the transportation of this produce was distinct and
multi-tiered:
1.
Seller / Shipper: Irigoyen Farms contracted
with Royal Violet Logistics, LLC (“Royal
Violet”), an independent shipping agent, to
arrange for transportation.
2.
Transportation Brokers: Royal Violet subcontracted with SIO Logistics LLC (“SIO”) to
secure a licensed motor carrier.
3.
SIO contracted with Gold Coast Logistics
Group (“Gold Coast”) to serve as the motor
carrier.
4.
Driver: Gold Coast hired Andre Hill as an
independent contractor driver and provided
the tractor-trailer. App.2-3.
4
Respondent Irigoyen Farms was strictly a
commercial grower and seller of agricultural goods.
App.3. Irigoyen Farms did not own or maintain the
tractor-trailer involved in the accident. Nor did Irigoyen
Farms select, vet, or hire Gold Coast as the motor
carrier, or Andre Hill as the driver. Supp.App.1a-5a.
Petitioner brought suit asserting state common-law
causes of action against Irigoyen Farms. Specifically,
Petitioner alleged that Irigoyen Farms acted negligently
in loading produce and allowing the driver to depart
despite alleged actual knowledge of driver exhaustion.
App.3-4. Petitioner did not allege any mechanical failure, structural defect, or physical impairment inherent
to the tractor-trailer unit itself.
5
B.
Procedural Posture and Lower Court Rulings
1. Summary Judgment and
Evidentiary Objections
Preserved
In May 2023, Respondent Irigoyen Farms moved
for summary judgment on the ground that Petitioner’s
state common-law claims were expressly preempted
by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization
Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
In opposition to the motion, Petitioner submitted
the declarations of Jesus Nuno Aguayo, a former employee of Irigoyen Farms, and Jane Ann Lyttle, who
claimed to reside near the Irigoyen Farms facility, as well
as the letter report of V. Paul Herbert. Supp.App.6a-20a.
In his declaration, Mr. Aguayo claimed that independent
contractor driver Andre Hill acted “odd” and “noticeably
lethargic” during loading operations on September 27,
2019, a statement offered to support Petitioner’s claim
of actual knowledge of driver exhaustion. Irigoyen
Farms filed timely, written evidentiary objections to
both declarations and to the letter report of V. Paul
Herbert pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule
3.1354. Supp.App.6a-20a.
Following oral argument on August 9, 2023, the
Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, adopted
its tentative ruling without modification, granting
summary judgment in favor of Irigoyen Farms.
App.23-32. Although the trial court’s order included a
blanket statement that “all objections are overruled,”
the court made no specific, individualized rulings on
Irigoyen Farms’ written objections to the Aguayo
declaration, the Lyttle declaration, or the letter report
of V. Paul Herbert. App.23-26.
6
Under established California law, where a trial
court fails to expressly rule on specific evidentiary
objections in a summary judgment proceeding, the
objections are deemed impliedly overruled and are
preserved for appellate review, provided the objector
renewed them in the appellate court. Union Pac. R.R.
Co. v. Superior Ct., 105 Cal. App. 5th 838, 849 (2024),
review denied (Dec. 31, 2024), citing Reid v. Google,
Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 512, 534 (2010). In reviewing the
summary judgment record, the Court of Appeal noted
that its review was bounded by the facts set forth in
the parties’ separate statements (Cal Civ. Proc. Code
§ 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3)) and that it would consider
evidence to which objections were made but overruled.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(c); Casarez v. Irigoyen
Farms, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 5th 873, 877 (2025), reh’g
denied (Oct. 17, 2025), review denied (Jan. 14, 2026).
Irigoyen Farms expressly incorporated its objections to Petitioner’s evidence in its appellate briefing, and
incorporates those same objections herein. Supp.App.
23a. Because this objectionable evidence is incompetent
and inadmissible, Respondent respectfully requests that
this Court sustain the evidentiary objections and exclude
such improper evidence from the factual record.
2. Court of Appeal Decision and Subsequent
Proceedings
On September 10, 2025, the California Court of
Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District affirmed the
grant of summary judgment, holding:
Nothing in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) restricts
the preemption defense solely to named
motor carriers or brokers; rather, preemption
applies based on whether the state law claim
7
directly impacts carrier prices, routes, or
services.
The FAAAA’s safety exception in 49 U.S.C.
§ 14501(c)(2)(A), which preserves state regulatory authority “with respect to motor vehicles,”
requires a direct connection to vehicle equipment and safety. Because Petitioner’s claims
targeted dockside loading oversight rather
than defects in the tractor-trailer itself, the
claims were preempted.
The Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review on January 14, 2026.
8
REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI
LIMITED STRICTLY TO PETITONER’S
QUESTION NO. 2 AND DENYING CERTIORARI
OR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AS TO
QUESTIONS NOS. 1 AND 3
I.
The Court Should Grant Certiorari Limited
Strictly to Petitioner’s Question No. 2 to
Resolve Whether Non-Enumerated Shippers
May Invoke FAAAA Preemption.
A. Petitioner’s Question No. 2 Presents an
Important, Pure Question of Statutory
Interpretation on a Clean Record.
Petitioner’s Question No. 2 presents an important,
pure question of statutory interpretation: whether
nonenumerated commercial entities, such as agricultural growers, shippers, and receivers, may invoke
express preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The
decision below cleanly presents this issue. The California Court of Appeal correctly held that § 14501(c)(1)
governs the operational subject matter and market
effect of the state legal mandate being enforced, rather
than the formal statutory category of the named
defendant.
Critically, the threshold question of whether
FAAAA preemption applies to commercial buyers and
sellers remains completely undecided in the wake of
Montgomery. Whether this case is decided on the
merits by this Court or remanded to the lower courts,
this foundational preemption issue must be decided
by the receiving court even if remanded. Leaving this
9
statutory question unresolved guarantees that state
and federal courts will continue to issue conflicting,
piecemeal rulings regarding shipper and receiver
liability across nationwide supply chains.
We agree with Petitioners in this single regard:
the applicability of FAAAA preemption to commercial
shippers and receivers is an open and important
question of national importance that requires clear
resolution. Rather than forcing the receiving court to
resolve this pure question of federal law on remand
without guidance, this Court should grant certiorari
on Petitioner’s Question No. 2 now to resolve the issue
correctly, establish uniform national guidance, and
settle the threshold statutory framework before any
remaining issues are remanded
Because this statutory question directly impacts
nationwide agricultural supply chains, creates pressing
uncertainty for commercial shippers, and is fully
preserved on a clean record, this Court should grant
certiorari limited strictly to Petitioner’s Question No. 2.
B. The FAAAA Expressly Preempts Petitioner’s Common Law Negligence Claims
Against Agricultural Shippers.
Under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), state authorities,
including state courts enforcing common law tort duties,
may not “enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other
provision having the force and effect of law related to
a price, route, or service of any motor carrier[,] broker,
or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation
of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 15401(c)(1).
State common law rules comfortably qualify as
provisions having the force and effect of law. See
Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 280-81 (2014).
10
Moreover, this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that
the statutory phrase “related to” expresses a broad
preemptive purpose, encompassing any state law that
has a connection with or references to carrier prices,
routes, or services, whether directly or indirectly. See
Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251,
251–52 (2013) (Dan’s City); Rowe v. New Hampshire
Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 375–76 (2008)
(Rowe); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (Morales).
Ad hoc common law negligence claims operate
as state regulation by imposing legal duties and financial
exposure on commercial shippers, effectively forcing
them to alter their routine logistics and dockside
operations under threat of tort liability. Imposing a
common law duty that requires agricultural growers
and shippers to screen drivers, inspect vehicles, or
delay shipments at the loading dock creates an
enforceable legal standard that directly interferes
with the service, timing, and dispatch operations
inherent in motor carrier transportation.
As an agricultural grower shipping perishable
fresh produce into interstate commerce, Irigoyen
Farms relies on streamlined, predictable, and uniform
logistics chains. Subjecting agricultural shippers to
localized, variable, common law tort duties would force
farm operators to act as de facto safety inspectors for
independent motor carriers, creating severe bottlenecks
at the dock and threatening the timely movement of
essential agricultural goods.
Furthermore, allowing individual state tort
systems to impose liability on commercial growers for
routine loading and release decisions would reestablish
a patchwork of conflicting state-level regulations. Such
11
state-by-state interference erects the exact obstacle
preemption barriers that Congress sought to eliminate in mandating a uniform, deregulated interstate
market under the FAAAA.
C. The FAAAA’s Preemption Clause Is Not
Textually Restricted to Enumerated Entity
Defendants.
i. Judicial Precedent Dictates That Preemption Depends on the Operational
Effect of State Law, Not the Defendant’s Formal Identity.
Petitioner contends that because 49 U.S.C. § 14501
(c)(1) explicitly references “motor carrier, broker, or
freight forwarder,” nonenumerated entity defendants
such as agricultural shippers cannot assert preemption.
We agree with Petitioner’s framing of Question Presented No. 2 as a pure issue of statutory interpretation,
but the plain text of the statute compels the opposite
conclusion on the merits.
As the California Court of Appeal correctly
observed, Section 14501(c)(1) governs the subject matter
and impact of the state rule being enforced, not the
formal identity of the defendant in court. The statute
prohibits any state law that is “related to a price, route,
or service of any motor carrier, broker, or freight
forwarder.” Nothing in the FAAAA requires the
beneficiary of preemption to be an enumerated entity.
In Morales, 504 U.S. at 386, this Court emphasized
that federal preemption applies to any state requirement having the force and effect of law that directly or
indirectly impacts prices, routes, or services. Rather
than restricting preemption only to state statutes
targeting specifically enumerated industry entities, the
12
Court established that the statutory phrase “relating to”
must be interpreted broadly to encompass general state
common law, especially when it produces a “significant
impact” on market operations, rates, or service delivery.
The scope of federal preemption broadly encompasses state common law claims and duties, which
carry the full force and effect of law under the statute.
As this Court held in Northwest, 572 U.S. at 280-81,
state law causes of action, including implied contractual
covenants or broad common law duties, constitute stateimposed standards that trigger preemption whenever
they seek to enlarge or alter underlying commercial
bargains. Consequently, state law claims cannot be
weaponized against non-enumerated third parties or
intermediaries where doing so imposes non-negotiated,
state-mandated obligations that directly affect pricing,
routing, or service mechanics.
Similarly, in Rowe, this Court reaffirmed that state
rules of broad applicability, even those designed for
general public health, are preempted when their
practical enforcement produces a direct, significant
economic impact on rates, routes, or services. Rowe,
552 U.S. at 371–72.
Ultimately, federal courts evaluating FAAAA preemption analyze the functional economic impact of a
state law action to determine whether its effect on
price, route, or service is direct and significant rather
than “tenuous, remote, or peripheral.” See, e.g., Bedoya
v. Am. Eagle Express Inc., 914 F.3d 812, 823 (3d Cir.
2019) (explaining that preemption turns on whether a
state mandate binds a carrier to a particular price, route,
or service, or creates a regulatory patchwork that
erects barriers to entry or restricts operations). Where
a state legal requirement goes beyond background state
13
police powers and directly alters operational standards,
cost structures, or service delivery within the transportation pipeline, preemption applies to prevent local
regulation from overriding federal deregulatory intent.
Id.; see also Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 264.
Applying these principles, courts evaluate whether
a state law claim impermissibly imposes state regulation
on transportation prices, routes, or services, regardless
of whether the named defendant is a carrier or a shipper.
A state rule that dictates how shippers select, mandate,
or structure carrier services directly impacts carrier
prices, routes, and services. To hold otherwise would
allow plaintiffs to defeat federal preemption through
creative pleading i.e., shifting the target of the lawsuit
to an unlisted entity while achieving the exact local
regulatory mandate Congress sought to prohibit. See
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt.
Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 253–54 (2004) (explaining that
standard-enforcement efforts directed at non-enumerated entities still constitute impermissible state regulation because a standard remains a standard regardless
of who is targeted for enforcement).
If a plaintiff could evade FAAAA preemption simply
by redirecting a service-based tort claim upstream
against a shipper, the federal statutory protection
guaranteed to carriers and brokers would be completely
undermined. Shippers would be compelled by state
tort threats to impose rigid routing, operational, and
scheduling constraints upon carriers, effectively reregulating carrier services through commercial contract.
14
ii. The Plain Text and Structure of 49
U.S.C. § 14501(c) Confirm Preemption
Is Unrestricted by Defendant Type.
The plain language and statutory structure of the
FAAAA confirm that preemption is defined by the
nature and effect of the state legal mandate, not by
restrictive classifications of the entities invoking or
subject to its protections.
First, the primary operative provision, 49 U.S.C.
§ 14501(c)(1), broadly preempts any state “law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to a price, route, or service.” (emphasis
added) Absent from this core preemption standard is
any limitation restricting its application solely to actions
brought directly against designated statutory entities.
Instead, Congress focused the preemptive purpose
entirely on the impact of the state rule – specifically,
whether the state provision has the “force and effect
of law” and relates to pricing, routing, or service.
Second, the statutory scheme reinforces the Act’s
expansive scope through the explicit and narrow savings
provisions set forth in § 14501(c)(2). In crafting the
FAAAA, Congress expressly carved out defined exceptions to preemption, specifically preserving state regulatory authority over motor vehicle safety, highway
route controls, and mandatory cargo insurance levels.
Under established principles of statutory construction,
where Congress explicitly enumerates specific exceptions to a broad general rule, it is presumed that no
other unstated exceptions exist. TRW Inc. v. Andrews,
534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001), citing Andrus v. Glover Constr.
Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–617 (1980).
15
Had Congress intended to exempt claims involving
non-enumerated entities or non-traditional market
actors from preemption, even where those claims
directly impact prices, routes, or services, it would
have included them alongside the explicit statutory
savings clauses in § 14501(c)(2). Because Congress
provided no such exception, the broad statutory mandate
of § 14501(c)(1) controls. The text of the Act does not
limit who may assert preemption, and the lower
court’s holding is entirely faithful to the statutory
text.
II. Certiorari, Summary Reversal, or GVR
Relief Should Be Denied As To Petitioner’s
Questions Nos. 1 and 3 Because Montgomery
Does Not Control Express Preemption or
Shippers and Receivers.
Petitioner asserts that this Court’s decision in
Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 146 S. Ct. 1199
(2026) (Montgomery), invalidates the lower court’s
analysis and warrants either summary reversal or a
GVR order. Petitioner’s reliance on Montgomery is
misplaced.
A. Montgomery Solved a Narrow Question
Limited to Upstream Freight Brokers.
In Montgomery, this Court resolved a narrow
circuit split regarding whether the FAAAA’s safety
exception, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), preserves state
common law negligent-hiring claims brought directly
against freight brokers who select unsafe motor carriers.
In answering the close “question of whether state tort
suits against upstream brokers who select the trucking
companies are [ . . . ] permitted” under the FAAAA,
the Court highlights (and Justice Kavanaugh agrees
16
in his concurring opinion) that certain statutory provisions of the FAAAA, namely, the mandatory insurance
provision (49 U.S.C. §§ 13906(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)) and the
intrastate preemption provision (§ 14501(b)(1)) weigh
“[i]n favor of the brokers.” Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at
1207. This Court did not attempt to answer the
question of whether a seller of goods, here, a farm, that
contracted with a shipping agent, who subcontracted
with a freight broker, who contracted with a motor
carrier, who hired an independent contractor driver,
could be sued in state court under FAAAA preemption.
Neither Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence nor the
Court’s opinion evaluated provisions of the Act as they
apply directly to commercial sellers or buyers of goods.
Rather, this Court held that a claim that a company
negligently hired another to transport goods is not
preempted by the FAAAA’s express preemption clause
because it falls within the Act’s safety exception for a
State’s safety regulatory authority “with respect to
motor vehicles.” Id. at 1205. The Court reasoned that
negligent-hiring duties are part of a State’s safety
authority and that requiring a broker to exercise
reasonable care in selecting a motor carrier “concerns”
motor vehicles, thus fitting § 14501(c)(2)(A). Id.
Here, Respondent Irigoyen Farms did not select
the motor carrier, did not select the driver, did not own
the tractor-trailer, and had no contractual privity with
the motor carrier or driver. Supp.App.2a-4a. Because
Respondent performed no carrier-selection function
whatsoever, expanding Montgomery’s narrow brokercentric holding to cover an agricultural seller would
stretch the safety exception far beyond its statutory
text.
17
B. The Court of Appeals Safety-Exception
Ruling Accords With This Court’s Interpretive Framework
The FAAAA’s safety exception cannot save
Petitioner’s claims against Respondent because an
agricultural shipper’s dockside commercial operations
lack the direct nexus to motor vehicle safety required
by § 14501(c)(2)(A). When applied to the case here,
Petitioner’s claims fall squarely outside the Act’s
safety exception.
The decision below faithfully applied this Court’s
established principles of statutory interpretation to give
independent, operative effect to the deliberate textual
contrast between the FAAAA’s express preemption
clause and its safety exception. Under 49 U.S.C. § 14501
(c)(1), Congress mandated broad preemption over
state rules related to price, route, or service “with
respect to the transportation of property.” In stark
contrast, when crafting the safety exception in § 14501
(c)(2)(A), Congress deliberately chose not to preserve
general state authority over “the transportation of
property.” Instead, Congress strictly limited the safety
exception to state regulatory authority “with respect
to motor vehicles.” The distinction is decisive. By
shifting from the expansive term “transportation of
property” which statutory definitions encompass all
movement, loading, unloading, and handling of goods,
to the narrow, specific phrase “with respect to motor
vehicles,” Congress signaled a clear intent to restrict
saved state authority to state laws directly targeting
vehicle equipment, operation, and physical safety
standards.
18
Drawing on this Court’s decision in Dan’s City,
the California Court of Appeal recognized that while
the preemption clause’s “related to” language is deliberately broad, the safety exception’s limiting phrase
“with respect to motor vehicles” requires that a claim
“concerns” or “regards” vehicles used in the transportation of property. Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1205.
Reading the safety exception to encompass indirect,
generalized supply-chain pressures would strip “with
respect to motor vehicles” of meaningful effect, render
the statute’s specific carve-outs for highway route
controls and hazardous cargo redundant, and allow
the safety exception to swallow the express preemption
rule entirely.
Unlike a broker’s negligent selection of a motor
carrier, which determines the specific commercial
vehicle placed on the public highway, Petitioner’s
allegations against Irigoyen Farms regarding dockside
interaction do not carry a direct motor-vehicle safety
nexus. Extending Montgomery to all shippers and
receivers would turn routine loading and unloading
coordination into a new legal duty, bringing back the
exact patchwork of state rules Congress passed the
FAAAA to prevent.
Because the Court of Appeal correctly recognized
that only safety-related claims concerning motor
vehicles are saved – while non-safety common law
intrusions into carrier pricing, routes, and services
remain preempted – its ruling reflects a routine, textbound application of federal preemption principles.
19
C. Petitioner’s Request for Summary
Reversal or GVR Relief Is Unwarranted
Because Montgomery Addressed Different
Parties, Different Claims, and Different
Statutory Provisions.
Petitioner’s contention that Montgomery compels
summary reversal or a GVR order overstates the
overlap between that decision and the decision below.
In Montgomery, this Court addressed a single, limited
question: whether state tort claims alleging negligent
hiring against upstream freight brokers who select
motor carriers are saved by the FAAAA’s safety exception. In concluding that requiring a broker to exercise
reasonable care in selecting a carrier “concerns” motor
vehicles under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), the Court
focused squarely on the broker’s selection function and
statutory provisions peculiar to brokers.
Montgomery did not decide whether nonenumerated
upstream sellers, growers, or receivers (who play no
role in carrier selection) can assert preemption or be
subjected to common-law tort duties. This Court never
evaluated provisions of the Act, if any, that apply to
buyers or sellers of goods acting in their capacity as
agricultural shippers.
Here, the California Court of Appeal resolved two
fundamental issues not answered by Montgomery: (1)
whether nonenumerated entity defendants like agricultural shippers may assert FAAAA preemption under
§ 14501(c)(1), and (2) whether common-law claims
premised on dockside scheduling pressure and driver
release, which do not allege that the tractor-trailer
itself was defective or unsafe, possess the requisite
vehicle-safety nexus under § 14501(c)(2)(A).
20
Petitioner’s assertion of an outcome-determinative
conflict mischaracterizes the decision below. While
Petitioner argues that the California Court of Appeal
previously relied on the line of authority rejected in
Montgomery, such as Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc.,
74 F.4th 453, 455–56 (7th Cir. 2023) and Aspen Am. Ins.
Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1272
(11th Cir. 2023), the court below independently
grounded its holding on the plain text of § 14501(c)(1)
and applied this Court’s teachings in Dan’s City to
limit the safety exception to claims with a direct
motor-vehicle connection.
At most, if this Court perceives any tension following Montgomery, the appropriate disposition is a
straightforward denial of certiorari or, in the alternative,
a standard remand without predeterminate instructions.
Summary reversal is reserved for clear-cut errors
controlled by existing precedent. See, e.g., Pavan v.
Smith, 582 U.S. 563, 567–68 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), (citing Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791,
(1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Because Montgomery
left open the exact legal questions presented by an
agricultural shipper in Respondent’s position, extraordinary summary relief is wholly unwarranted.
III. Alternatively, If The Court Declines Review of
Petitioner’s Question No. 2, Certiorari Should
Be Denied Entirely Because Unresolved State
Law Elements Make This Case A Poor Vehicle
For Review Regarding Petitioner’s Questions
Nos. 1 and 3.
Setting aside the merits of the statutory preemption
analysis, this case presents significant impediments
that render it an ill-suited candidate for this Court’s
21
review regarding Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3.
The lower courts decided this case solely on FAAAA
preemption grounds; threshold common-law elements,
including duty, breach, and proximate causation, were
never reached below. Because the Court of Appeal
explicitly noted that it need not address the parties’
alternative arguments in light of its preemption disposition, those unresolved state law issues remain fully
preserved and could independently resolve this action
on remand. Granting certiorari on this procedural record
would force the Court to issue broad pronouncements
on federal preemption in a case that may ultimately
dispose of itself under basic state tort principles.1
Petitioner’s reliance on inadmissible hearsay as
allegedly aggravating factual circumstances further
underscores the inherently fact-bound nature of this
dispute. Petitioner asserts that its claims are “analytically stronger” than those in Montgomery because
Respondent allegedly possessed contemporaneous, firsthand knowledge of driver exhaustion and released the
truck under stringent delivery pressure. Far from
demonstrating a matter of national importance, these
1 Petitioner’s theory that agricultural shippers face state common
law liability directly touches upon an area governed by comprehensive federal regulation under 49 C.F.R. § 390.6, which explicitly
prohibits motor carriers, shippers, receivers, or transportation
intermediaries from coercing drivers to operate commercial motor
vehicles in violation of federal safety standards. Because the
Court of Appeal resolved this case strictly on FAAAA preemption,
these broader federal administrative regulatory standards and
alternative defenses were never reached below. Because these
unexamined threshold issues remain preserved, addressing
Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3 on this incomplete procedural
record is premature and renders this case an unsuitable vehicle
for review.
22
highly specific allegations confirm that any eventual
resolution would turn on a local, record-specific factual
inquiry, and evidentiary rulings, rather than a clean
statutory vehicle suitable for establishing uniform
national rules.
Finally, Petitioner fails to show any genuine circuit
conflict warranting this Court’s intervention. The decision below rightfully applied this Court’s established
framework specifically drawing from Dan’s City to
distinguish between “related to” and “with respect to”
to resolve the nonenumerated entity issue under the
plain statutory text and apply a reasoned limiting
construction to the safety exception as pleaded.
Because the Court of Appeal’s ruling represents
a straightforward, record-specific application of settled
federal statutory interpretation principles to an
upstream agricultural shipper, certiorari should be
denied.
23
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully
requests that the petition for a writ of certiorari be
GRANTED limited solely to Petitioner’s Question
No. 2; however, certiorari, summary reversal, and GVR
relief should be DENIED as to Petitioner’s Questions
Nos. 1 and 3.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Edward R. Hugo
Edward R. Hugo
Counsel of Record
Alex G. Taheri
Jullian Sekona
HUGO PARKER, LLP
90 New Montgomery Street #1010
San Francisco, CA 94105
Counsel for Respondent
Irigoyen Farms, Inc.
August 26, 2026
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.