Respondents Brief — Christina Casarez, Petitioner v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 26, 2026

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NO. 25-1421

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

CHRISTINA CASAREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC., ET AL.,

Respondents.

__________________________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Court of Appeal of California, Fifth Appellate District

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC.

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER’S QUESTION NO. 2 AND

IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER’S QUESTIONS NOS. 1 AND 3

Edward R. Hugo

Counsel of Record

Alex G. Taheri

Jullian Sekona

HUGO PARKER, LLP

90 New Montgomery Street #1010

San Francisco, CA 94105

August 26, 2026

SUPREME COURT PRESS

Counsel for Respondents

♦

(888) 958-5705

♦

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc. supports certiorari solely and narrowly as to Petitioner’s Question

No. 2:

Petitioner’s Question No. 2

Whether 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) may be invoked

by nonenumerated defendants such as shippers

and receivers to preempt state wrongful-death

and negligence claims arising from a fatal truck

crash, even though the statute expressly names

only motor carriers, motor private carriers,

brokers, and freight forwarders.

_______________________

However, Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc. opposes

certiorari, summary reversal, or GVR relief as to

Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3; and instead presents

these Counter-Questions.

Counter-Question to Petitioner’s Question No. 1

Whether the California Court of Appeal correctly

held that petitioner’s common-law negligence and

wrongful-death claims, which allege that an agricultural seller-shipper loaded produce onto a motor

carrier’s vehicle and permitted departure, are

expressly preempted under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)

as state laws “related to a price, route, or service”

with respect to the transportation of property.

Counter-Question to Petitioner’s Question No. 3

Whether Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC,

608 U.S. ___ (2026), which was strictly limited to

whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits

negligent-selection tort claims against upstream

ii

freight brokers, compels summary reversal or a

grant, vacate, and remand (GVR) order in a case

involving an agricultural grower-shipper who

played no role in selecting the motor carrier, tractor

trailer, or driver.

iii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Respondent IRIGOYEN FARMS, INC. is not publicly

traded, has no parent corporation and no public

company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Irigoyen Farms, Inc. is not a public company and

no public company owns 10% or more of its stock.

Respondent Walmart, Inc. who is not a party to

this brief, is publicly traded. (NYSE: WMT)

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ........................................ i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ........... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vii

OPINIONS BELOW ................................................... 1

JURISDICTION.......................................................... 1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................. 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 2

A. Undisputed Factual Background and

Supply Chain Structure ................................... 2

B. Procedural Posture and Lower Court

Rulings .............................................................. 5

1. Summary Judgment and Preserved

Evidentiary Objections ............................... 5

2. Court of Appeal Decision and

Subsequent Proceedings ............................. 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

LIMITED STRICTLY TO PETITONER’S

QUESTION NO. 2 AND DENYING

CERTIORARI OR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

AS TO QUESTIONS NOS. 1 AND 3 .......................... 8

I.

The Court Should Grant Certiorari

Limited Strictly to Petitioner’s Question

No. 2 to Resolve Whether Non-Enumerated

Shippers May Invoke FAAAA Preemption. .... 8

A. Petitioner’s Question No. 2 Presents an

Important, Pure Question of Statutory

Interpretation on a Clean Record. ............. 8

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

B. The FAAAA Expressly Preempts

Petitioner’s Common Law Negligence

Claims Against Agricultural Shippers....... 9

C. The FAAAA’s Preemption Clause Is Not

Textually Restricted to Enumerated

Entity Defendants. ................................... 11

II. Certiorari, Summary Reversal, or GVR

Relief Should Be Denied As To Petitioner’s

Questions Nos. 1 and 2 Because

Montgomery Does Not Control Express

Preemption or Shippers and Receivers. ........ 15

A. Montgomery Solved a Narrow Question

Limited to Upstream Freight Brokers. .... 15

B. The Court of Appeals Safety-Exception

Ruling Accords With This Court’s

Interpretive Framework ........................... 17

C. Petitioner’s Request for Summary

Reversal or GVR Relief Is

Unwarranted Because Montgomery

Addressed Different Parties, Different

Claims, and Different Statutory

Provisions. ................................................. 19

III. Alternatively, If The Court Declines Review

of Petitioner’s Question No. 2, Certiorari

Should Be Denied Entirely Because

Unresolved State Law Elements Make This

Case A Poor Vehicle For Review Regarding

Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3. ............... 20

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 23

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS – Continued

Page

RESPONDENT

APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Defendant Irigoyen Farms, Inc.’s Separate

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,

Relevant Excerpts (May 24, 2023) ..................... 1a

Defendant Irigoyen Farms, Inc.’s Objections to

Evidence in Opposition to Motion for

Summary Adjudication (August 4, 2023) .......... 6a

Brief of Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc.,

Relevant Excerpts (January 2, 2025) .............. 21a

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co.,

446 U.S. 608 (1980) ........................................... 14

Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.,

65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023) ....................... 20

Bedoya v. Am. Eagle Express Inc.,

914 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2019) ......................... 12, 13

Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc.,

114 Cal. App. 5th 873, 337 Cal. Rptr. 3d

262 (2025) ........................................................ 1, 6

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,

569 U.S. 251 (2013) ................... 10, 13, 18, 20, 22

Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air

Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) ...... 13

Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC,

146 S. Ct. 1199 (2026) ......... 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

504 U.S. 374 (1992) ..................................... 10, 11

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg,

572 U.S. 273 (2014) ....................................... 9, 12

Pavan v. Smith,

582 U.S. 563 (2017) ............................................ 20

Reid v. Google, Inc.,

50 Cal. 4th 512 (2010) ......................................... 6

Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n,

552 U.S. 364 (2008) ..................................... 10, 12

Schweiker v. Hansen,

450 U.S. 785 (1981) ............................................ 20

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES – Continued

Page

TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

534 U.S. 19 (2001) ............................................. 14

Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Superior Ct.,

105 Cal. App. 5th 838 (2024) .............................. 6

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc.,

74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) ............................... 20

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ..................................................... 1

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) ................. i, 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11,

.................................................... 14, 15, 17, 19, 20

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) ........ 2, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19

49 U.S.C. § 15401(c)(1) ............................................... 9

49 U.S.C. §§ 13906(a)(1) ............................................ 16

49 U.S.C. §§ 13906(b)(2)(A)......................................... 16

JUDICIAL RULES

Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3) ............. 6

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(c) ..................................... 6

REGULATIONS

49 C.F.R. § 390.6 ........................................................ 21

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District

of California affirmed summary judgment on FAAAA

preemption, holding that nonenumerated shippers and

receivers could invoke 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) and that

the safety exception did not apply because petitioner’s

claims did not allege the tractor-trailer was defective

or unsafe. The appellate court’s disposition rested solely

on FAAAA preemption, expressly declining to reach

other issues, stating, “[i]n light of our disposition, we

need not address other arguments raised by the parties.”

Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 5th 873,

888, 337 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 273 (2025), reh’g denied

(Oct. 17, 2025), review denied (Jan. 14, 2026).

Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme

Court on November 10, 2025. The Supreme Court of

California denied review on January 14, 2026. Petitioner’s Appendix [“App.”] 21.

JURISDICTION

The case arises from a published California Fifth

Appellate District decision, with preserved federal

questions and summary-judgment posture. Both trial

and appellate courts relied on preemption. The Supreme

Court of California denied review on January 14,

2026. The Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)

Express preemption of state provisions related to

a price, route, or service of motor carriers, brokers,

or freight forwarders, with respect to the transportation of property. The FAAAA expressly preempts state laws “related to” the price, route, or

service of motor carriers, brokers, and freight

forwarders. The statute requires that the state

law be “with respect to the transportation of

property.”

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A)

Safety exception preserving state “safety regulatory

authority” “with respect to motor vehicles.” The

phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” must

impose a direct, meaningful limit to avoid surplusage and to prevent the exception from swallowing preemption.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Undisputed Factual Background and Supply

Chain Structure

This action arises out of a motor vehicle collision

that occurred on September 27, 2019, in Fresno County,

California, involving a tractor-trailer operated by

independent contractor Andre Hill. At the time of the

collision, Hill was transporting a commercial load of

3

fresh produce from Respondent Irigoyen Farms, Inc.

(“Irigoyen Farms”), an agricultural grower located in

Selma, California, to a Walmart Inc.’s distribution

facility in McCarran, Nevada.

The legal and operational logistics chain governing

the transportation of this produce was distinct and

multi-tiered:

1.

Seller / Shipper: Irigoyen Farms contracted

with Royal Violet Logistics, LLC (“Royal

Violet”), an independent shipping agent, to

arrange for transportation.

2.

Transportation Brokers: Royal Violet subcontracted with SIO Logistics LLC (“SIO”) to

secure a licensed motor carrier.

3.

SIO contracted with Gold Coast Logistics

Group (“Gold Coast”) to serve as the motor

carrier.

4.

Driver: Gold Coast hired Andre Hill as an

independent contractor driver and provided

the tractor-trailer. App.2-3.

4

Respondent Irigoyen Farms was strictly a

commercial grower and seller of agricultural goods.

App.3. Irigoyen Farms did not own or maintain the

tractor-trailer involved in the accident. Nor did Irigoyen

Farms select, vet, or hire Gold Coast as the motor

carrier, or Andre Hill as the driver. Supp.App.1a-5a.

Petitioner brought suit asserting state common-law

causes of action against Irigoyen Farms. Specifically,

Petitioner alleged that Irigoyen Farms acted negligently

in loading produce and allowing the driver to depart

despite alleged actual knowledge of driver exhaustion.

App.3-4. Petitioner did not allege any mechanical failure, structural defect, or physical impairment inherent

to the tractor-trailer unit itself.

5

B.

Procedural Posture and Lower Court Rulings

1. Summary Judgment and

Evidentiary Objections

Preserved

In May 2023, Respondent Irigoyen Farms moved

for summary judgment on the ground that Petitioner’s

state common-law claims were expressly preempted

by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization

Act of 1994 (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

In opposition to the motion, Petitioner submitted

the declarations of Jesus Nuno Aguayo, a former employee of Irigoyen Farms, and Jane Ann Lyttle, who

claimed to reside near the Irigoyen Farms facility, as well

as the letter report of V. Paul Herbert. Supp.App.6a-20a.

In his declaration, Mr. Aguayo claimed that independent

contractor driver Andre Hill acted “odd” and “noticeably

lethargic” during loading operations on September 27,

2019, a statement offered to support Petitioner’s claim

of actual knowledge of driver exhaustion. Irigoyen

Farms filed timely, written evidentiary objections to

both declarations and to the letter report of V. Paul

Herbert pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule

3.1354. Supp.App.6a-20a.

Following oral argument on August 9, 2023, the

Superior Court of California, County of Fresno, adopted

its tentative ruling without modification, granting

summary judgment in favor of Irigoyen Farms.

App.23-32. Although the trial court’s order included a

blanket statement that “all objections are overruled,”

the court made no specific, individualized rulings on

Irigoyen Farms’ written objections to the Aguayo

declaration, the Lyttle declaration, or the letter report

of V. Paul Herbert. App.23-26.

6

Under established California law, where a trial

court fails to expressly rule on specific evidentiary

objections in a summary judgment proceeding, the

objections are deemed impliedly overruled and are

preserved for appellate review, provided the objector

renewed them in the appellate court. Union Pac. R.R.

Co. v. Superior Ct., 105 Cal. App. 5th 838, 849 (2024),

review denied (Dec. 31, 2024), citing Reid v. Google,

Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 512, 534 (2010). In reviewing the

summary judgment record, the Court of Appeal noted

that its review was bounded by the facts set forth in

the parties’ separate statements (Cal Civ. Proc. Code

§ 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3)) and that it would consider

evidence to which objections were made but overruled.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(c); Casarez v. Irigoyen

Farms, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 5th 873, 877 (2025), reh’g

denied (Oct. 17, 2025), review denied (Jan. 14, 2026).

Irigoyen Farms expressly incorporated its objections to Petitioner’s evidence in its appellate briefing, and

incorporates those same objections herein. Supp.App.

23a. Because this objectionable evidence is incompetent

and inadmissible, Respondent respectfully requests that

this Court sustain the evidentiary objections and exclude

such improper evidence from the factual record.

2. Court of Appeal Decision and Subsequent

Proceedings

On September 10, 2025, the California Court of

Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District affirmed the

grant of summary judgment, holding:



Nothing in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) restricts

the preemption defense solely to named

motor carriers or brokers; rather, preemption

applies based on whether the state law claim

7

directly impacts carrier prices, routes, or

services.



The FAAAA’s safety exception in 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(2)(A), which preserves state regulatory authority “with respect to motor vehicles,”

requires a direct connection to vehicle equipment and safety. Because Petitioner’s claims

targeted dockside loading oversight rather

than defects in the tractor-trailer itself, the

claims were preempted.

The Supreme Court of California denied discretionary review on January 14, 2026.

8

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

LIMITED STRICTLY TO PETITONER’S

QUESTION NO. 2 AND DENYING CERTIORARI

OR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AS TO

QUESTIONS NOS. 1 AND 3

I.

The Court Should Grant Certiorari Limited

Strictly to Petitioner’s Question No. 2 to

Resolve Whether Non-Enumerated Shippers

May Invoke FAAAA Preemption.

A. Petitioner’s Question No. 2 Presents an

Important, Pure Question of Statutory

Interpretation on a Clean Record.

Petitioner’s Question No. 2 presents an important,

pure question of statutory interpretation: whether

nonenumerated commercial entities, such as agricultural growers, shippers, and receivers, may invoke

express preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The

decision below cleanly presents this issue. The California Court of Appeal correctly held that § 14501(c)(1)

governs the operational subject matter and market

effect of the state legal mandate being enforced, rather

than the formal statutory category of the named

defendant.

Critically, the threshold question of whether

FAAAA preemption applies to commercial buyers and

sellers remains completely undecided in the wake of

Montgomery. Whether this case is decided on the

merits by this Court or remanded to the lower courts,

this foundational preemption issue must be decided

by the receiving court even if remanded. Leaving this

9

statutory question unresolved guarantees that state

and federal courts will continue to issue conflicting,

piecemeal rulings regarding shipper and receiver

liability across nationwide supply chains.

We agree with Petitioners in this single regard:

the applicability of FAAAA preemption to commercial

shippers and receivers is an open and important

question of national importance that requires clear

resolution. Rather than forcing the receiving court to

resolve this pure question of federal law on remand

without guidance, this Court should grant certiorari

on Petitioner’s Question No. 2 now to resolve the issue

correctly, establish uniform national guidance, and

settle the threshold statutory framework before any

remaining issues are remanded

Because this statutory question directly impacts

nationwide agricultural supply chains, creates pressing

uncertainty for commercial shippers, and is fully

preserved on a clean record, this Court should grant

certiorari limited strictly to Petitioner’s Question No. 2.

B. The FAAAA Expressly Preempts Petitioner’s Common Law Negligence Claims

Against Agricultural Shippers.

Under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), state authorities,

including state courts enforcing common law tort duties,

may not “enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other

provision having the force and effect of law related to

a price, route, or service of any motor carrier[,] broker,

or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation

of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 15401(c)(1).

State common law rules comfortably qualify as

provisions having the force and effect of law. See

Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 280-81 (2014).

10

Moreover, this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that

the statutory phrase “related to” expresses a broad

preemptive purpose, encompassing any state law that

has a connection with or references to carrier prices,

routes, or services, whether directly or indirectly. See

Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251,

251–52 (2013) (Dan’s City); Rowe v. New Hampshire

Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 375–76 (2008)

(Rowe); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504

U.S. 374, 384 (1992) (Morales).

Ad hoc common law negligence claims operate

as state regulation by imposing legal duties and financial

exposure on commercial shippers, effectively forcing

them to alter their routine logistics and dockside

operations under threat of tort liability. Imposing a

common law duty that requires agricultural growers

and shippers to screen drivers, inspect vehicles, or

delay shipments at the loading dock creates an

enforceable legal standard that directly interferes

with the service, timing, and dispatch operations

inherent in motor carrier transportation.

As an agricultural grower shipping perishable

fresh produce into interstate commerce, Irigoyen

Farms relies on streamlined, predictable, and uniform

logistics chains. Subjecting agricultural shippers to

localized, variable, common law tort duties would force

farm operators to act as de facto safety inspectors for

independent motor carriers, creating severe bottlenecks

at the dock and threatening the timely movement of

essential agricultural goods.

Furthermore, allowing individual state tort

systems to impose liability on commercial growers for

routine loading and release decisions would reestablish

a patchwork of conflicting state-level regulations. Such

11

state-by-state interference erects the exact obstacle

preemption barriers that Congress sought to eliminate in mandating a uniform, deregulated interstate

market under the FAAAA.

C. The FAAAA’s Preemption Clause Is Not

Textually Restricted to Enumerated Entity

Defendants.

i. Judicial Precedent Dictates That Preemption Depends on the Operational

Effect of State Law, Not the Defendant’s Formal Identity.

Petitioner contends that because 49 U.S.C. § 14501

(c)(1) explicitly references “motor carrier, broker, or

freight forwarder,” nonenumerated entity defendants

such as agricultural shippers cannot assert preemption.

We agree with Petitioner’s framing of Question Presented No. 2 as a pure issue of statutory interpretation,

but the plain text of the statute compels the opposite

conclusion on the merits.

As the California Court of Appeal correctly

observed, Section 14501(c)(1) governs the subject matter

and impact of the state rule being enforced, not the

formal identity of the defendant in court. The statute

prohibits any state law that is “related to a price, route,

or service of any motor carrier, broker, or freight

forwarder.” Nothing in the FAAAA requires the

beneficiary of preemption to be an enumerated entity.

In Morales, 504 U.S. at 386, this Court emphasized

that federal preemption applies to any state requirement having the force and effect of law that directly or

indirectly impacts prices, routes, or services. Rather

than restricting preemption only to state statutes

targeting specifically enumerated industry entities, the

12

Court established that the statutory phrase “relating to”

must be interpreted broadly to encompass general state

common law, especially when it produces a “significant

impact” on market operations, rates, or service delivery.

The scope of federal preemption broadly encompasses state common law claims and duties, which

carry the full force and effect of law under the statute.

As this Court held in Northwest, 572 U.S. at 280-81,

state law causes of action, including implied contractual

covenants or broad common law duties, constitute stateimposed standards that trigger preemption whenever

they seek to enlarge or alter underlying commercial

bargains. Consequently, state law claims cannot be

weaponized against non-enumerated third parties or

intermediaries where doing so imposes non-negotiated,

state-mandated obligations that directly affect pricing,

routing, or service mechanics.

Similarly, in Rowe, this Court reaffirmed that state

rules of broad applicability, even those designed for

general public health, are preempted when their

practical enforcement produces a direct, significant

economic impact on rates, routes, or services. Rowe,

552 U.S. at 371–72.

Ultimately, federal courts evaluating FAAAA preemption analyze the functional economic impact of a

state law action to determine whether its effect on

price, route, or service is direct and significant rather

than “tenuous, remote, or peripheral.” See, e.g., Bedoya

v. Am. Eagle Express Inc., 914 F.3d 812, 823 (3d Cir.

2019) (explaining that preemption turns on whether a

state mandate binds a carrier to a particular price, route,

or service, or creates a regulatory patchwork that

erects barriers to entry or restricts operations). Where

a state legal requirement goes beyond background state

13

police powers and directly alters operational standards,

cost structures, or service delivery within the transportation pipeline, preemption applies to prevent local

regulation from overriding federal deregulatory intent.

Id.; see also Dan’s City, 569 U.S. at 264.

Applying these principles, courts evaluate whether

a state law claim impermissibly imposes state regulation

on transportation prices, routes, or services, regardless

of whether the named defendant is a carrier or a shipper.

A state rule that dictates how shippers select, mandate,

or structure carrier services directly impacts carrier

prices, routes, and services. To hold otherwise would

allow plaintiffs to defeat federal preemption through

creative pleading i.e., shifting the target of the lawsuit

to an unlisted entity while achieving the exact local

regulatory mandate Congress sought to prohibit. See

Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt.

Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 253–54 (2004) (explaining that

standard-enforcement efforts directed at non-enumerated entities still constitute impermissible state regulation because a standard remains a standard regardless

of who is targeted for enforcement).

If a plaintiff could evade FAAAA preemption simply

by redirecting a service-based tort claim upstream

against a shipper, the federal statutory protection

guaranteed to carriers and brokers would be completely

undermined. Shippers would be compelled by state

tort threats to impose rigid routing, operational, and

scheduling constraints upon carriers, effectively reregulating carrier services through commercial contract.

14

ii. The Plain Text and Structure of 49

U.S.C. § 14501(c) Confirm Preemption

Is Unrestricted by Defendant Type.

The plain language and statutory structure of the

FAAAA confirm that preemption is defined by the

nature and effect of the state legal mandate, not by

restrictive classifications of the entities invoking or

subject to its protections.

First, the primary operative provision, 49 U.S.C.

§ 14501(c)(1), broadly preempts any state “law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of

law related to a price, route, or service.” (emphasis

added) Absent from this core preemption standard is

any limitation restricting its application solely to actions

brought directly against designated statutory entities.

Instead, Congress focused the preemptive purpose

entirely on the impact of the state rule – specifically,

whether the state provision has the “force and effect

of law” and relates to pricing, routing, or service.

Second, the statutory scheme reinforces the Act’s

expansive scope through the explicit and narrow savings

provisions set forth in § 14501(c)(2). In crafting the

FAAAA, Congress expressly carved out defined exceptions to preemption, specifically preserving state regulatory authority over motor vehicle safety, highway

route controls, and mandatory cargo insurance levels.

Under established principles of statutory construction,

where Congress explicitly enumerates specific exceptions to a broad general rule, it is presumed that no

other unstated exceptions exist. TRW Inc. v. Andrews,

534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001), citing Andrus v. Glover Constr.

Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–617 (1980).

15

Had Congress intended to exempt claims involving

non-enumerated entities or non-traditional market

actors from preemption, even where those claims

directly impact prices, routes, or services, it would

have included them alongside the explicit statutory

savings clauses in § 14501(c)(2). Because Congress

provided no such exception, the broad statutory mandate

of § 14501(c)(1) controls. The text of the Act does not

limit who may assert preemption, and the lower

court’s holding is entirely faithful to the statutory

text.

II. Certiorari, Summary Reversal, or GVR

Relief Should Be Denied As To Petitioner’s

Questions Nos. 1 and 3 Because Montgomery

Does Not Control Express Preemption or

Shippers and Receivers.

Petitioner asserts that this Court’s decision in

Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 146 S. Ct. 1199

(2026) (Montgomery), invalidates the lower court’s

analysis and warrants either summary reversal or a

GVR order. Petitioner’s reliance on Montgomery is

misplaced.

A. Montgomery Solved a Narrow Question

Limited to Upstream Freight Brokers.

In Montgomery, this Court resolved a narrow

circuit split regarding whether the FAAAA’s safety

exception, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), preserves state

common law negligent-hiring claims brought directly

against freight brokers who select unsafe motor carriers.

In answering the close “question of whether state tort

suits against upstream brokers who select the trucking

companies are [ . . . ] permitted” under the FAAAA,

the Court highlights (and Justice Kavanaugh agrees

16

in his concurring opinion) that certain statutory provisions of the FAAAA, namely, the mandatory insurance

provision (49 U.S.C. §§ 13906(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)) and the

intrastate preemption provision (§ 14501(b)(1)) weigh

“[i]n favor of the brokers.” Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at

1207. This Court did not attempt to answer the

question of whether a seller of goods, here, a farm, that

contracted with a shipping agent, who subcontracted

with a freight broker, who contracted with a motor

carrier, who hired an independent contractor driver,

could be sued in state court under FAAAA preemption.

Neither Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence nor the

Court’s opinion evaluated provisions of the Act as they

apply directly to commercial sellers or buyers of goods.

Rather, this Court held that a claim that a company

negligently hired another to transport goods is not

preempted by the FAAAA’s express preemption clause

because it falls within the Act’s safety exception for a

State’s safety regulatory authority “with respect to

motor vehicles.” Id. at 1205. The Court reasoned that

negligent-hiring duties are part of a State’s safety

authority and that requiring a broker to exercise

reasonable care in selecting a motor carrier “concerns”

motor vehicles, thus fitting § 14501(c)(2)(A). Id.

Here, Respondent Irigoyen Farms did not select

the motor carrier, did not select the driver, did not own

the tractor-trailer, and had no contractual privity with

the motor carrier or driver. Supp.App.2a-4a. Because

Respondent performed no carrier-selection function

whatsoever, expanding Montgomery’s narrow brokercentric holding to cover an agricultural seller would

stretch the safety exception far beyond its statutory

text.

17

B. The Court of Appeals Safety-Exception

Ruling Accords With This Court’s Interpretive Framework

The FAAAA’s safety exception cannot save

Petitioner’s claims against Respondent because an

agricultural shipper’s dockside commercial operations

lack the direct nexus to motor vehicle safety required

by § 14501(c)(2)(A). When applied to the case here,

Petitioner’s claims fall squarely outside the Act’s

safety exception.

The decision below faithfully applied this Court’s

established principles of statutory interpretation to give

independent, operative effect to the deliberate textual

contrast between the FAAAA’s express preemption

clause and its safety exception. Under 49 U.S.C. § 14501

(c)(1), Congress mandated broad preemption over

state rules related to price, route, or service “with

respect to the transportation of property.” In stark

contrast, when crafting the safety exception in § 14501

(c)(2)(A), Congress deliberately chose not to preserve

general state authority over “the transportation of

property.” Instead, Congress strictly limited the safety

exception to state regulatory authority “with respect

to motor vehicles.” The distinction is decisive. By

shifting from the expansive term “transportation of

property” which statutory definitions encompass all

movement, loading, unloading, and handling of goods,

to the narrow, specific phrase “with respect to motor

vehicles,” Congress signaled a clear intent to restrict

saved state authority to state laws directly targeting

vehicle equipment, operation, and physical safety

standards.

18

Drawing on this Court’s decision in Dan’s City,

the California Court of Appeal recognized that while

the preemption clause’s “related to” language is deliberately broad, the safety exception’s limiting phrase

“with respect to motor vehicles” requires that a claim

“concerns” or “regards” vehicles used in the transportation of property. Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1205.

Reading the safety exception to encompass indirect,

generalized supply-chain pressures would strip “with

respect to motor vehicles” of meaningful effect, render

the statute’s specific carve-outs for highway route

controls and hazardous cargo redundant, and allow

the safety exception to swallow the express preemption

rule entirely.

Unlike a broker’s negligent selection of a motor

carrier, which determines the specific commercial

vehicle placed on the public highway, Petitioner’s

allegations against Irigoyen Farms regarding dockside

interaction do not carry a direct motor-vehicle safety

nexus. Extending Montgomery to all shippers and

receivers would turn routine loading and unloading

coordination into a new legal duty, bringing back the

exact patchwork of state rules Congress passed the

FAAAA to prevent.

Because the Court of Appeal correctly recognized

that only safety-related claims concerning motor

vehicles are saved – while non-safety common law

intrusions into carrier pricing, routes, and services

remain preempted – its ruling reflects a routine, textbound application of federal preemption principles.

19

C. Petitioner’s Request for Summary

Reversal or GVR Relief Is Unwarranted

Because Montgomery Addressed Different

Parties, Different Claims, and Different

Statutory Provisions.

Petitioner’s contention that Montgomery compels

summary reversal or a GVR order overstates the

overlap between that decision and the decision below.

In Montgomery, this Court addressed a single, limited

question: whether state tort claims alleging negligent

hiring against upstream freight brokers who select

motor carriers are saved by the FAAAA’s safety exception. In concluding that requiring a broker to exercise

reasonable care in selecting a carrier “concerns” motor

vehicles under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), the Court

focused squarely on the broker’s selection function and

statutory provisions peculiar to brokers.

Montgomery did not decide whether nonenumerated

upstream sellers, growers, or receivers (who play no

role in carrier selection) can assert preemption or be

subjected to common-law tort duties. This Court never

evaluated provisions of the Act, if any, that apply to

buyers or sellers of goods acting in their capacity as

agricultural shippers.

Here, the California Court of Appeal resolved two

fundamental issues not answered by Montgomery: (1)

whether nonenumerated entity defendants like agricultural shippers may assert FAAAA preemption under

§ 14501(c)(1), and (2) whether common-law claims

premised on dockside scheduling pressure and driver

release, which do not allege that the tractor-trailer

itself was defective or unsafe, possess the requisite

vehicle-safety nexus under § 14501(c)(2)(A).

20

Petitioner’s assertion of an outcome-determinative

conflict mischaracterizes the decision below. While

Petitioner argues that the California Court of Appeal

previously relied on the line of authority rejected in

Montgomery, such as Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc.,

74 F.4th 453, 455–56 (7th Cir. 2023) and Aspen Am. Ins.

Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1272

(11th Cir. 2023), the court below independently

grounded its holding on the plain text of § 14501(c)(1)

and applied this Court’s teachings in Dan’s City to

limit the safety exception to claims with a direct

motor-vehicle connection.

At most, if this Court perceives any tension following Montgomery, the appropriate disposition is a

straightforward denial of certiorari or, in the alternative,

a standard remand without predeterminate instructions.

Summary reversal is reserved for clear-cut errors

controlled by existing precedent. See, e.g., Pavan v.

Smith, 582 U.S. 563, 567–68 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting), (citing Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 791,

(1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Because Montgomery

left open the exact legal questions presented by an

agricultural shipper in Respondent’s position, extraordinary summary relief is wholly unwarranted.

III. Alternatively, If The Court Declines Review of

Petitioner’s Question No. 2, Certiorari Should

Be Denied Entirely Because Unresolved State

Law Elements Make This Case A Poor Vehicle

For Review Regarding Petitioner’s Questions

Nos. 1 and 3.

Setting aside the merits of the statutory preemption

analysis, this case presents significant impediments

that render it an ill-suited candidate for this Court’s

21

review regarding Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3.

The lower courts decided this case solely on FAAAA

preemption grounds; threshold common-law elements,

including duty, breach, and proximate causation, were

never reached below. Because the Court of Appeal

explicitly noted that it need not address the parties’

alternative arguments in light of its preemption disposition, those unresolved state law issues remain fully

preserved and could independently resolve this action

on remand. Granting certiorari on this procedural record

would force the Court to issue broad pronouncements

on federal preemption in a case that may ultimately

dispose of itself under basic state tort principles.1

Petitioner’s reliance on inadmissible hearsay as

allegedly aggravating factual circumstances further

underscores the inherently fact-bound nature of this

dispute. Petitioner asserts that its claims are “analytically stronger” than those in Montgomery because

Respondent allegedly possessed contemporaneous, firsthand knowledge of driver exhaustion and released the

truck under stringent delivery pressure. Far from

demonstrating a matter of national importance, these

1 Petitioner’s theory that agricultural shippers face state common

law liability directly touches upon an area governed by comprehensive federal regulation under 49 C.F.R. § 390.6, which explicitly

prohibits motor carriers, shippers, receivers, or transportation

intermediaries from coercing drivers to operate commercial motor

vehicles in violation of federal safety standards. Because the

Court of Appeal resolved this case strictly on FAAAA preemption,

these broader federal administrative regulatory standards and

alternative defenses were never reached below. Because these

unexamined threshold issues remain preserved, addressing

Petitioner’s Questions Nos. 1 and 3 on this incomplete procedural

record is premature and renders this case an unsuitable vehicle

for review.

22

highly specific allegations confirm that any eventual

resolution would turn on a local, record-specific factual

inquiry, and evidentiary rulings, rather than a clean

statutory vehicle suitable for establishing uniform

national rules.

Finally, Petitioner fails to show any genuine circuit

conflict warranting this Court’s intervention. The decision below rightfully applied this Court’s established

framework specifically drawing from Dan’s City to

distinguish between “related to” and “with respect to”

to resolve the nonenumerated entity issue under the

plain statutory text and apply a reasoned limiting

construction to the safety exception as pleaded.

Because the Court of Appeal’s ruling represents

a straightforward, record-specific application of settled

federal statutory interpretation principles to an

upstream agricultural shipper, certiorari should be

denied.

23

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully

requests that the petition for a writ of certiorari be

GRANTED limited solely to Petitioner’s Question

No. 2; however, certiorari, summary reversal, and GVR

relief should be DENIED as to Petitioner’s Questions

Nos. 1 and 3.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Edward R. Hugo

Edward R. Hugo

Counsel of Record

Alex G. Taheri

Jullian Sekona

HUGO PARKER, LLP

90 New Montgomery Street #1010

San Francisco, CA 94105

Counsel for Respondent

Irigoyen Farms, Inc.

August 26, 2026

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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